TrustCB B.V.
Registered address:
Van den Berghlaan 48, 2132 AT
Hoofddorp, The Netherlands
nscib@trustcb.com
https://trustcb.com/common-criteria/nscib/
https://nscib.nl
TrustCB B.V. is a registered company at the
Netherlands Chamber of Commerce (KVK),
under number 858360275.
Version
2023-06
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Certification Report
ePass Applet on Sm@rtCafé® Expert 8.0 C2 v1.0
Sponsor: Veridos GmbH, Identity Solutions by
Giesecke+Devrient and Bundesdruckerei
Prinzregentenstr. 161
81677 München
Germany
Developer: Giesecke+Devrient Mobile Security GmbH
Prinzregentenstraße 161
81677 München
Germany
Evaluation facility: SGS Brightsight B.V.
Brassersplein 2
2612 CT Delft
The Netherlands
Report number: NSCIB-CC-2300051-01-CR
Report version: 1
Project number: NSCIB-2300051-01
Author(s): Kjartan Jæger Kvassnes
Date: 12 December 2023
Number of pages: 12
Number of appendices: 0
Reproduction of this report is authorised only if the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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CONTENTS
Foreword 3
Recognition of the Certificate 4
International recognition 4
European recognition 4
1 Executive Summary 5
2 Certification Results 6
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation 6
2.2 Security Policy 6
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 7
2.3.1 Assumptions 7
2.3.2 Clarification of scope 7
2.4 Architectural Information 7
2.5 Documentation 7
2.6 IT Product Testing 8
2.6.1 Testing approach and depth 8
2.6.2 Independent penetration testing 8
2.6.3 Test configuration 8
2.6.4 Test results 8
2.7 Reused Evaluation Results 9
2.8 Evaluated Configuration 9
2.9 Evaluation Results 9
2.10 Comments/Recommendations 9
3 Security Target 10
4 Definitions 10
5 Bibliography 11
Page: 3/12 of report number: NSCIB-CC-2300051-01-CR, dated 12 December 2023
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Foreword
The Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security (NSCIB) provides a third-party
evaluation and certification service for determining the trustworthiness of Information Technology (IT)
security products. Under this NSCIB, TrustCB B.V. has the task of issuing certificates for IT security
products, as well as for protection profiles and sites.
Part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product, protection profile or site
according to the Common Criteria assessment guidelines published by the NSCIB. Evaluations are
performed by an IT Security Evaluation Facility (ITSEF) under the oversight of the NSCIB Certification
Body, which is operated by TrustCB B.V. in cooperation with the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom
Relations.
An ITSEF in the Netherlands is a commercial facility that has been licensed by TrustCB B.V. to
perform Common Criteria evaluations; a significant requirement for such a licence is accreditation to
the requirements of ISO Standard 17025 “General requirements for the accreditation of calibration and
testing laboratories”.
By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, TrustCB B.V. asserts that the product or site complies with
the security requirements specified in the associated (site) security target, or that the protection profile
(PP) complies with the requirements for PP evaluation specified in the Common Criteria for
Information Security Evaluation. A (site) security target is a requirements specification document that
defines the scope of the evaluation activities.
The consumer should review the (site) security target or protection profile, in addition to this
certification report, to gain an understanding of any assumptions made during the evaluation, the IT
product's intended environment, its security requirements, and the level of confidence (i.e., the
evaluation assurance level) that the product or site satisfies the security requirements stated in the
(site) security target.
Reproduction of this report is authorised only if the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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Recognition of the Certificate
Presence of the Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement (CCRA) and the SOG-IS logos on the
certificate indicates that this certificate is issued in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA and
the SOG-IS Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOG-IS MRA) and will be recognised by the participating
nations.
International recognition
The CCRA was signed by the Netherlands in May 2000 and provides mutual recognition of certificates
based on the Common Criteria (CC). Since September 2014 the CCRA has been updated to provide
mutual recognition of certificates based on cPPs (exact use) or STs with evaluation assurance
components up to and including EAL2+ALC_FLR.
For details of the current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, see
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
European recognition
The SOG-IS MRA Version 3, effective since April 2010, provides mutual recognition in Europe of
Common Criteria and ITSEC certificates at a basic evaluation level for all products. A higher
recognition level for evaluation levels beyond EAL4 (respectively E3-basic) is provided for products
related to specific technical domains. This agreement was signed initially by Finland, France,
Germany, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Italy joined the SOG-IS
MRA in December 2010.
For details of the current list of signatory nations, approved certification schemes and the list of
technical domains for which the higher recognition applies, see https://www.sogis.eu.
Page: 5/12 of report number: NSCIB-CC-2300051-01-CR, dated 12 December 2023
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1 Executive Summary
This Certification Report states the outcome of the Common Criteria security evaluation of the ePass
Applet on Sm@rtCafé® Expert 8.0 C2 v1.0. The developer of the ePass Applet on Sm@rtCafé®
Expert 8.0 C2 v1.0 is Giesecke+Devrient ePayments GmbH located in München, Germany and
Veridos GmbH located in München, Germany was the sponsor of the evaluation and certification. A
Certification Report is intended to assist prospective consumers when judging the suitability of the IT
security properties of the product for their particular requirements.
The TOE is an applet named ePass applet based on Sm@rtCafé® Expert 8.0 C2 platform, which is
used as an ICAO eMRTD, which can be configured to support the different authentication
mechanisms.
The TOE has been evaluated by SGS Brightsight B.V. located in Delft, The Netherlands. The
evaluation was completed on 12 December 2023 with the approval of the ETR. The certification
procedure has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Netherlands Scheme for
Certification in the Area of IT Security [NSCIB].
The scope of the evaluation is defined by the security target [ST], which identifies assumptions made
during the evaluation, the intended environment for the ePass Applet on Sm@rtCafé® Expert 8.0 C2
v1.0, the security requirements, and the level of confidence (evaluation assurance level) at which the
product is intended to satisfy the security requirements. Consumers of the ePass Applet on
Sm@rtCafé® Expert 8.0 C2 v1.0 are advised to verify that their own environment is consistent with the
security target, and to give due consideration to the comments, observations and recommendations in
this certification report.
The results documented in the evaluation technical report [ETR] 1 for this product provide sufficient
evidence that the TOE meets the
• EAL5 augmented (EAL5+) assurance requirements for the evaluated security functionality
when authentication method PACE is used and EAC is not used. This assurance level is
augmented with ALC_DVS.2 (Sufficiency of security measures) and AVA_VAN.5
(Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis).
• EAL5 augmented (EAL5+) assurance requirements for the evaluated security functionality
when authentication method PACE and EAC are used. This assurance level is augmented
with ALC_DVS.2 (Sufficiency of security measures) and AVA_VAN.5 (Advanced
methodical vulnerability analysis).
• EAL4 augmented (EAL4+) assurance requirements for the evaluated security functionality
when authentication method BAC are used. This assurance level is augmented with
ALC_DVS.2 (Sufficiency of security measures) and ATE_DPT.2 (Testing: security
enforcing modules).
The evaluation was conducted using the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 [CEM] for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information
Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 [CC] (Parts I, II and III).
TrustCB B.V., as the NSCIB Certification Body, declares that the evaluation meets all the conditions
for international recognition of Common Criteria Certificates and that the product will be listed on the
NSCIB Certified Products list. Note that the certification results apply only to the specific version of the
product as evaluated.
1 The Evaluation Technical Report contains information proprietary to the developer and/or the
evaluator, and is not available for public review.
Page: 6/12 of report number: NSCIB-CC-2300051-01-CR, dated 12 December 2023
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2 Certification Results
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) for this evaluation is the ePass Applet on Sm@rtCafé® Expert 8.0 C2
v1.0 from Veridos GmbH, Identity Solutions by Giesecke+Devrient and Bundesdruckerei located in
München, Germany.
The TOE is comprised of the following main components:
Delivery
item type
Identifier Version
IC
Hardware
IFX SLC37GDA448/512
IFX_CCI_00002Dh, IFX_CCI_00003Ah,
IFX_CCI_000045h, IFX_CCI_000047h,
IFX_CCI_000049h, IFX_CCI_00004Bh,
IFX_CCI_00004Dh, IFX_CCI_00004Eh,
IFX_CCI_000039h, IFX_CCI_000044h,
IFX_CCI_000046h, IFX_CCI_000048h,
IFX_CCI_00004Ah, IFX_CCI_00004Ch
Registered under the certification id BSI-DSZ-CC-1107-
V3-2022
T11 (design
step)
Firmware
BOS & POWS (included in certification with id BSI-DSZ-
CC-1107-V3-2022)
80.306.16.0 &
80.306.16.1
Flash Loader (included in certification with id BSI-DSZ-CC-
1107-V3-2022)
09.12.0005
Software
UMSLC (included in certification with id BSI-DSZ-CC-
1107-V3-2022)
v01.30.0564
Platform
Software
(embedded)
Sm@rtCafé® Expert 8.0 registered under the certification
id NSCIB-CC-2300005-01
C2
Applet Software ePass Applet
V1.0 (build
25)
To ensure secure usage a set of guidance documents is provided, together with the ePass Applet on
Sm@rtCafé® Expert 8.0 C2 v1.0. For details, see section 2.5 “Documentation” of this report.
For a detailed and precise description of the TOE lifecycle, see the [ST], Chapter 2.3 or [ST-lite],
Chapter 2.3.
2.2 Security Policy
The TOE has the following main security features
• Verifying authenticity and integrity as well as securing confidentiality of user data in the
communication channel between the TOE and the connected terminal supporting the
protocols BAC, SAC(PACE) as per [ICAO_9303_11] and EAC as per [TR-03110_1]
• Averting of inconspicuous tracing of the travel document as per [TR-03110_1]
• Self-protection of the TOE security functionality and the data stored inside as per [TR-
03110_1]
• Means to check authenticity of the terminal, Terminal Authentication as per [TR-03110_1]
• Means to prove authenticity of the chip by means of Active Authentication or Chip
Authentication as per [TR-03110_1]
• Chip authentication followed by terminal authentication used as a precondition to provide
access to biometric data known as EAC, as per [TR-03110_1]
Page: 7/12 of report number: NSCIB-CC-2300051-01-CR, dated 12 December 2023
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2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
2.3.1 Assumptions
The assumptions defined in the Security Target are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead
to specific Security Objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. For detailed information on the
security objectives that must be fulfilled by the TOE environment, see section 5 of the [ST] or [ST-lite].
2.3.2 Clarification of scope
The evaluation did not reveal any threats to the TOE that are not countered by the evaluated security
functions of the product.
Note that the ICAO MRTD infrastructure critically depends on the objectives for the environment to be
met. These are not weaknesses of this particular TOE, but aspects of the ICAO MRTD infrastructure
as a whole.
The environment in which the TOE is personalised must perform proper and safe personalisation
according to the guidance and referred ICAO guidelines.
The environment in which the TOE is used must ensure that the inspection system protects the
confidentiality and integrity of the data send and read from the TOE.
2.4 Architectural Information
The logical architecture, originating from the Security Target [ST] of the TOE can be depicted as
follows:
The TOE is an applet named ePass applet based on Sm@rtCafé® Expert 8.0 C2 platform, which is
used as an ICAO eMRTD, which can be configured to support the different authentication
mechanisms.
2.5 Documentation
The following documentation is provided with the product by the developer to the customer:
Identifier Version
Guidance Documentation ePass Applet on Sm@rtCafé® Expert 8.0 C2
Main Document, dated 28 July 2023
0.7
Guidance Documentation for the Usage Phase, ePass Applet on
Sm@rtCafé® Expert 8.0 C2, dated 28 July 2023
0.9
Guidance Documentation for the Initialization and Personalization Phase
ePass Applet on Sm@rtCafé® Expert 8.0 C2, Version 1.7/Status
06.09.2022, dated 04 August 2023
1.7
EPASS Applet EPASS10-100, Personalization Concept, dated 09 March
2023
2.4
Page: 8/12 of report number: NSCIB-CC-2300051-01-CR, dated 12 December 2023
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EPASS Applet EPASS10-100, Usage Phase Commands, dated 17 July
2023
1.2
Operational User Guidance Sm@rtCafé® Expert 8.0 C2, dated 10 July
2023
2.7
2.6 IT Product Testing
Testing (depth, coverage, functional tests, independent testing): The evaluators examined the
developer’s testing activities documentation and verified that the developer has met their testing
responsibilities.
2.6.1 Testing approach and depth
The developer performed extensive testing on functional specification, subsystem and SFR-enforcing
module level. All parameter choices were addressed at least once. All boundary cases identified were
tested explicitly, and additionally the near-boundary conditions were covered probabilistically. The
testing was largely automated using industry standard and proprietary test suites. Test scripts were
used extensively to verify that the functions return the expected values.
The underlying hardware and crypto-library test results are extendable to composite evaluations,
because the underlying platform is operated according to its guidance and the composite evaluation
requirements are met.
For the testing performed by the evaluators, the developer provided samples and a test environment.
The evaluators reproduced a selection of the developer tests, as well as a small number of test cases
designed by the evaluator.
2.6.2 Independent penetration testing
The methodical analysis performed was conducted along the following steps:
• When evaluating the evidence in the classes ASE, ADV and AGD the evaluator considers
whether potential vulnerabilities can already be identified due to the TOE type and/or specified
behaviour in such an early stage of the evaluation.
• For ADV_IMP a thorough implementation representation review is performed on the TOE.
During this attack oriented analysis the protection of the TOE is analysed using the knowledge
gained from all previous evaluation classes. This results in the identification of (additional)
potential vulnerabilities. For this analysis will be performed according to the attack methods in
[JIL-AM]. An important source for assurance in this step is the technical report [ETRfC-
Platform] of the underlying platform.
• All potential vulnerabilities are analysed using the knowledge gained from all evaluation
classes and information from the public domain. A judgment was made on how to assure that
these potential vulnerabilities are not exploitable. The potential vulnerabilities are addressed
by penetration testing, a guidance update or in other ways that are deemed appropriate.
The total test effort expended by the evaluators was three weeks. During that test campaign, 50% of
the total time was spent on Perturbation attacks and 50% on logical tests.
2.6.3 Test configuration
The TOE was tested in the following configurations:
• ePass Applet on Sm@rtCafé® Expert 8.0 C2 v1.0.
2.6.4 Test results
The testing activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected results and observed
results are summarised in the [ETR], with references to the documents containing the full details.
The developer’s tests and the independent functional tests produced the expected results, giving
assurance that the TOE behaves as specified in its [ST] and functional specification.
Page: 9/12 of report number: NSCIB-CC-2300051-01-CR, dated 12 December 2023
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No exploitable vulnerabilities were found with the independent penetration tests.
The algorithmic security level of cryptographic functionality has not been rated in this certification
process, but the current consensus on the algorithmic security level in the open domain, i.e., from the
current best cryptanalytic attacks published, has been taken into account.
2.7 Reused Evaluation Results
This is a re-certification. Documentary evaluation results of the earlier version of the TOE have been
reused, but vulnerability analysis and penetration testing has been renewed.
There has been extensive reuse of the ALC aspects for the sites involved in the software component
of the TOE. Sites involved in the development and production of the hardware platform were reused
by composition.
No sites have been visited as part of this evaluation.
2.8 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is defined uniquely by its name and version number ePass Applet on Sm@rtCafé® Expert
8.0 C2 v1.0.
2.9 Evaluation Results
The evaluation lab documented their evaluation results in the [ETR], which references an ASE
Intermediate Report and other evaluator documents.
The verdict of each claimed assurance requirement is “Pass”.
Based on the above evaluation results the evaluation lab concluded the ePass Applet on
Sm@rtCafé® Expert 8.0 C2 v1.0, to be CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 conformant, and to meet the
requirements of EAL 5 ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5 when authentication method PACE is used and
EAC is not used in order to conform to [PP_0068], EAL 5 ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5 when
authentication method PACE and EAC are used in order to conform to [PP_0056] or EAL 4
ALC_DVS.2 and ATE_DPT.2 when authentication method BAC are used in order to conform to
[PP_0055]. This implies that the product satisfies the security requirements specified in Security
Target [ST].
The Security Target claims ’strict’ conformance to the Protection Profile [PP_0055], [PP_0056] and
[PP_0068].
2.10 Comments/Recommendations
The user guidance as outlined in section 2.5 “Documentation” contains necessary information about
the usage of the TOE. Certain aspects of the TOE’s security functionality, in particular the
countermeasures against attacks, depend on accurate conformance to the user guidance of both the
software and the hardware part of the TOE. There are no particular obligations or recommendations
for the user apart from following the user guidance. Please note that the documents contain relevant
details concerning the resistance against certain attacks.
In addition, all aspects of assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not
covered by the TOE itself must be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk
management process. For the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, the
customer should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the TOE is required and thus
requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms and protocols was not rated in the course of this
evaluation. This specifically applies to the following proprietary or non-standard algorithms, protocols
and implementations: <none>.
Not all key sizes specified in the [ST] have sufficient cryptographic strength to satisfy the AVA_VAN.5
“high attack potential”. To be protected against attackers with a "high attack potential", appropriate
cryptographic algorithms with sufficiently large cryptographic key sizes shall be used (references can
be found in national and international documents and standards).
Page: 10/12 of report number: NSCIB-CC-2300051-01-CR, dated 12 December 2023
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3 Security Target
The ePass Applet on Sm@rtCafé® Expert 8.0 C2 Security Target, Version 2.0, Dated 09 October
2023 [ST] is included here by reference.
Please note that, to satisfy the need for publication, a public version [ST-lite] has been created and
verified according to [ST-SAN].
4 Definitions
This list of acronyms and definitions contains elements that are not already defined by the CC or CEM:
BAC Basic Access Control
EAC Ectended Access Control
eMRTD electronic MRTD
IC Integrated Circuit
IT Information Technology
ITSEF IT Security Evaluation Facility
JIL Joint Interpretation Library
NSCIB Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the area of IT Security
PACE Password Authenticated Connection Establishment
PP Protection Profile
TOE Target of Evaluation
Page: 11/12 of report number: NSCIB-CC-2300051-01-CR, dated 12 December 2023
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5 Bibliography
This section lists all referenced documentation used as source material in the compilation of this
report.
[CC] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Parts I, II
and III, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
[COMP] Joint Interpretation Library, Composite product evaluation for Smart Cards
and similar devices, Version 1.5.1, May 2018
[ETR] Evaluation Technical Report “EPass Applet on Sm@rtCafé Expert 8.0 C2” –
EAL4+/EAL5+, 23-RPT-1105, Version 2.0, Dated 22 November 2023
[HW-CERT] BSI-DSZ-CC-1107-V3-2022 for IFX_CCI_00002Dh, IFX_CCI_000039h,
IFX_CCI_00003Ah, IFX_CCI_000044h, IFX_CCI_000045h,
IFX_CCI_000046h, IFX_CCI_000047h, IFX_CCI_000048h,
IFX_CCI_000049h, IFX_CCI_00004Ah, IFX_CCI_00004Bh,
IFX_CCI_00004Ch, IFX_CCI_00004Dh, IFX_CCI_00004Eh design step T11
with firmware 80.306.16.0 & 80.306.16.1, optional NRG SW 05.03.4097,
optional HSL v3.52.9708, UMSLC lib v01.30.0564, optional SCL v2.15.000
and v2.11.003, optional ACL v3.33.003 and v3.02.000, optional RCL
v1.10.007, optional HCL v1.13.002 and guidance, dated 16 May 2022
[HW-ETRfC] ETR for composite evaluation according to AIS 36 for BSI-DSZ-CC-1107-
V3-2022, Version 5, 2022-05-11, “ETR for Composition”, TÜV
Informationstechnik GmbH (confidential document)
[HW-ST] Security Target Lite BSI-DSZ-CC-1107-V3-2022, Version 4.3.1, 2022-05-10,
“IFX_CCI_00002Dh, IFX_CCI_000039h, IFX_CCI_00003Ah,
IFX_CCI_000044h, IFX_CCI_000045h, IFX_CCI_000046h,
IFX_CCI_000047h, IFX_CCI_000048h, IFX_CCI_000049h,
IFX_CCI_00004Ah, IFX_CCI_00004Bh, IFX_CCI_00004Ch,
IFX_CCI_00004Dh, IFX_CCI_00004Eh T11 Security Target Lite”, v 4.3.1,
dated 10 May 2022
[ICAO_9303_11] International Civil Aviation Organization, DOC 9303 Machine Readable
Travel Documents Seventh Edition – 2015 Part 11: Security Mechanisms for
MRTD's
[JIL-AAPS] JIL Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards, Version 3.2, November
2022
[JIL-AM] Attack Methods for Smartcards and Similar Devices, Version 2.4, January
2020 (sensitive with controlled distribution)
[NSCIB] Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security, Version 2.6,
02 August 2022
[PP_0055] Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document with “ICAO
Application”, Basic Access Control (MRTD-PP), Version 1.10, 25 March
2009, registered under the reference BSI-CC-PP-0055-2009
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[PP_0056] Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document with “ICAO
Application”, Extended Access Control with PACE (EAC PP), Version 1.3.2,
05 December 2012, registered under the reference BSI-CC-PP-0056-V2-
2012
[PP_0068] Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document using Standard
Inspection Procedure with PACE, Version 1.0.1, 22 July 2014, registered
under the reference BSI-CC-PP-0068-V2-MA-01
[ST] ePass Applet on Sm@rtCafé® Expert 8.0 C2 Security Target, Version 2.0,
Dated 09 October 2023
[ST-lite] ePass Applet on Sm@rtCafé® Expert 8.0 C2 Security Target Lite , Version
2.0, Dated 09 October 2023
[ST-SAN] ST sanitising for publication, CC Supporting Document CCDB-2006-04-004,
April 2006
[TR-03110_1] Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) Technical Guideline TR-03110-
1 Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine Readable Travel Documents
and eIDAS Token Part 1 - eMRTDs with BAC/PACEv2 and EACv1 Version
2.20, 26. February 2015
(This is the end of this report.)