Extreme Networks, Inc. SLX Product
Series operating with version 20.1.1aa
(NDcPP21) Security Target
Version 0.5
16 November 2020
Prepared for:
Extreme Networks, Inc.
6480 Via Del Oro, San Jose, CA 95119
Prepared By:
www.gossamersec.com
SLX Product Series operating with version 20.1.1aa (NDcPP21) Security Target Version 0.5, 16 November 2020
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1. SECURITY TARGET INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................3
1.1 SECURITY TARGET REFERENCE......................................................................................................................3
1.2 TOE REFERENCE............................................................................................................................................3
1.3 TOE OVERVIEW .............................................................................................................................................4
1.4 TOE DESCRIPTION .........................................................................................................................................4
1.4.1 TOE Architecture...................................................................................................................................4
1.4.2 TOE Documentation ..............................................................................................................................6
2. CONFORMANCE CLAIMS..............................................................................................................................7
2.1 CONFORMANCE RATIONALE...........................................................................................................................8
3. SECURITY OBJECTIVES ................................................................................................................................9
3.1 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT .....................................................................9
4. EXTENDED COMPONENTS DEFINITION ................................................................................................10
5. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS.......................................................................................................................11
5.1 TOE SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS .............................................................................................11
5.1.1 Security audit (FAU)............................................................................................................................12
5.1.2 Cryptographic support (FCS)..............................................................................................................14
5.1.3 Identification and authentication (FIA) ...............................................................................................18
5.1.4 Security management (FMT) ...............................................................................................................19
5.1.5 Protection of the TSF (FPT) ................................................................................................................20
5.1.6 TOE access (FTA)................................................................................................................................21
5.1.7 Trusted path/channels (FTP) ...............................................................................................................22
5.2 TOE SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS...............................................................................................22
5.2.1 Development (ADV).............................................................................................................................23
5.2.2 Guidance documents (AGD)................................................................................................................23
5.2.3 Life-cycle support (ALC) .....................................................................................................................24
5.2.4 Tests (ATE) ..........................................................................................................................................24
5.2.5 Vulnerability assessment (AVA)...........................................................................................................25
6. TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION..............................................................................................................26
6.1 SECURITY AUDIT ..........................................................................................................................................26
6.2 CRYPTOGRAPHIC SUPPORT ...........................................................................................................................26
6.3 IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION.......................................................................................................29
6.4 SECURITY MANAGEMENT .............................................................................................................................31
6.5 PROTECTION OF THE TSF .............................................................................................................................32
6.6 TOE ACCESS.................................................................................................................................................33
6.7 TRUSTED PATH/CHANNELS ...........................................................................................................................33
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1 TOE Security Functional Components...........................................................................................................12
Table 2 Assurance Components ..................................................................................................................................22
Table 3 Cryptographic Functions ................................................................................................................................27
Table 4 Cryptographic Keys and CSPs........................................................................................................................28
SLX Product Series operating with version 20.1.1aa (NDcPP21) Security Target Version 0.5, 16 November 2020
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1. Security Target Introduction
This section identifies the Security Target (ST) and Target of Evaluation (TOE) identification, ST conventions, ST
conformance claims, and the ST organization. The TOE is SLX Product Series operating with Version 20.1.1aa
provided by Extreme Networks, Inc. The TOE is being evaluated as a network device
The Security Target contains the following additional sections:
 Conformance Claims (Section 2)
 Security Objectives (Section 3)
 Extended Components Definition (Section 4)
 Security Requirements (Section 5)
 TOE Summary Specification (Section 6)
Conventions
The following conventions have been applied in this document:
 Security Functional Requirements – Part 2 of the CC defines the approved set of operations that may be
applied to functional requirements: iteration, assignment, selection, and refinement.
o Iteration: allows a component to be used more than once with varying operations. In the ST,
iteration is indicated by a parenthetical number placed at the end of the component. For example
FDP_ACC.1(1) and FDP_ACC.1(2) indicate that the ST includes two iterations of the FDP_ACC.1
requirement.
o Assignment: allows the specification of an identified parameter. Assignments are indicated using
bold and are surrounded by brackets (e.g., [assignment]). Note that an assignment within a selection
would be identified in italics and with embedded bold brackets (e.g., [[selected-assignment]]).
o Selection: allows the specification of one or more elements from a list. Selections are indicated
using bold italics and are surrounded by brackets (e.g., [selection]).
o Refinement: allows the addition of details. Refinements are indicated using bold, for additions, and
strike-through, for deletions (e.g., “… all objects …” or “… some big things …”).
 Other sections of the ST – Other sections of the ST use bolding to highlight text of special interest, such as
captions.
1.1 Security Target Reference
ST Title – Extreme Networks, Inc. SLX Product Series operating with Version 20.1.1aa (NDcPP21) Security Target
ST Version – Version 0.5
ST Date – 16 November 2020
1.2 TOE Reference
TOE Identification – Extreme Networks, Inc. SLX Product Series operating with Version 20.1.1aa
TOE Developer – Extreme Networks, Inc.
Evaluation Sponsor – Extreme Networks, Inc.
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1.3 TOE Overview
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the Extreme Networks, Inc. SLX Product Series operating with Version 20.1.1aa.
The TOE is a switching and routing platform.
1.4 TOE Description
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the SLX Product Series operating with Version 20.1.1aaError! Reference source
not found.. The SLX Product Series operating with Version 20.1.1aa are hardware appliances with embedded
software installed on a management processor. The embedded software is a version of Extreme Network’s proprietary
Operating System. The OS controls the switching and routing of network frames and packets among the connections
available on the hardware appliances.
All TOE appliances are configured at the factory with default parameters and an admin and user account with default
passwords. Users must login to access the system’s basic features through its Command Line Interface (CLI).
However, the product should be configured in accordance with the evaluated configuration prior to being placed into
operation. The CLI is a text based interface which is accessible from a directly connected terminal or via a remote
terminal using SSH. Administrator can also use REST APIs (over HTTPS) or NetConf (over SSH) for configuring
the TOE. The TOE uses SCP to download/compare software images. All of the remote management interfaces are
protected using encryption as explained later in this ST.
Model CPU
SLX 9640
Intel Broadwell processor
Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU D-1527
SLX 9150/9250
Intel Denverton processor
Intel(R) Atom(TM) CPU C3758
Table 1-1 Evaluated Models & Processors
1.4.1 TOE Architecture
The basic architecture of each TOE appliance begins with a hardware appliance with physical network connections.
Within the hardware appliance the TOE is designed to control and enable access to the available hardware functions
(e.g., program execution, device access, facilitate basic routing and switching functions).
1.4.1.1 Physical Boundaries
Each TOE appliance runs a version of the Extreme proprietary OS and has physical network connections to its
environment to facilitate routing and switching of network traffic. The TOE appliance can also be the destination of
network traffic, where it provides interfaces for its own management.
The TOE may be accessed and managed through a PC or terminal in the environment which can be remote from or
directly connected to the TOE.
The TOE can be configured to forward its audit records to a syslog server in the environment. This is generally
advisable given the limited audit log storage space on the evaluated appliances.
The TOE sets its internal clock using administrative commands issued at the CLI interface or can use an NTP server.
The evaluation includes an audit server, management workstation, NTP server and certificate authority in the IT
environment. The scope of the evaluation is limited to the requirements in the ST – all other functionality is outside
the scope of the evaluation.
1.4.1.2 Logical Boundaries
This section summarizes the security functions provided by SLX Product Series:
SLX Product Series operating with version 20.1.1aa (NDcPP21) Security Target Version 0.5, 16 November 2020
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 Security audit
 Cryptographic support
 Identification and authentication
 Security management
 Protection of the TSF
 TOE access
 Trusted path/channels
1.4.1.2.1 Security audit
The TOE generates audit events for numerous activities including policy enforcement, system management and
authentication. A syslog server in the environment is relied on to store audit records generated by the TOE. The TOE
generates a complete audit record including the IP address of the TOE, the event details, and the time the event
occurred. The time stamp is provided by the TOE appliance hardware.
1.4.1.2.2 Cryptographic support
The TOE contains CAVP-tested cryptographic implementations that provide key management, random bit generation,
encryption/decryption, digital signature and secure hashing and key-hashing features in support of higher level
cryptographic protocols including SSH and TLS.
1.4.1.2.3 Identification and authentication
The TOE authenticates administrative users. In order for an administrative user to access the TOE, a user account
including a user name and password must be created for the user, and an administrative role must be assigned. The
TOE performs the validation of the login credentials and also supports use of a RADIUS server.
1.4.1.2.4 Security management
The TOE provides Command Line Interface (CLI) commands to access the wide range of security management
functions to manage its security policies. The TOE also provides REST APIs (protected by TLS) and NetConf
(protected by SSH) to configure the TOE. Security management commands are limited to authorized users (i.e.,
administrators) and available only after they have provided acceptable user identification and authentication data to
the TOE. The security management functions are controlled through the use of privileges associated with roles that
can be assigned to TOE users. Among the available privileges, only the Authorized Administrator role can actually
manage the security policies provided by the TOE and the TOE offers a complete set of functions to facilitate effective
management.
1.4.1.2.5 Protection of the TSF
The TOE implements a number of features design to protect itself to ensure the reliability and integrity of its security
features.
It protects particularly sensitive data such as stored passwords and cryptographic keys so that they are not accessible
even by an administrator. It also provides its own timing mechanism to ensure that reliable time information is
available (e.g., for log accountability).
Note that the TOE is a single appliance or a closely grouped (e.g., in the same rack) collection of appliances acting as
a unit. As such, no intra-TOE communication is subject to any risks that may require special protection (e.g.,
cryptographic mechanisms).
The TOE includes functions to perform self-tests so that it might detect when it is failing. It also includes mechanisms
(i.e., verification of the digital signature of each new image) so that the TOE itself can be updated while ensuring that
the updates will not introduce malicious or other unexpected changes in the TOE.
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1.4.1.2.6 TOE access
The TOE can be configured to display a message of the day banner when an administrator establishes an interactive
session and subsequently will enforce an administrator-defined inactivity timeout value after which the inactive
session (local or remote) will be terminated.
1.4.1.2.7 Trusted path/channels
The TOE protects interactive communication with administrators using SSHv2 for CLI and NetConf access, ensuring
both integrity and disclosure protection. If the negotiation of an encrypted session fails or if the user does not have
authorization for remote administration, an attempted connection will not be established. The TOE also provides a
REST API interface for security management that is protected with TLS.
The TOE protects communication with network peers, such as a log server and RADIUS Server, using TLS
connections to prevent unintended disclosure or modification of logs. SSHv2 is used to support SCP which the TOE
uses for download of TOE updates.
1.4.2 TOE Documentation
Extreme Networks offers a series of documents that describe the installation process for the TOE as well as guidance
for subsequent use and administration of the applicable security features. The following list of documents was
examined as part of the evaluation:
 Extreme SLX-OS Common Criteria Configuration Guide, 20.1.1aa, 16 November 2020
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2. Conformance Claims
This TOE is conformant to the following CC specifications:
 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security functional components,
Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
 Part 2 Extended
 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security assurance components,
Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
 Part 3 Conformant
 Package Claims:
 collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.1, 11 March 2019 (NDcPP21)
 NIAP Technical Decisions
Technical
Decision
Applied Notes
TD0395 No SFR not claimed
TD0396 Yes
TD0397 Yes
TD0398 Yes
TD0399 Yes
TD0400 Yes
TD0401 Yes
TD0402 Yes
TD0407 Yes
TD0408 Yes
TD0409 Yes
TD0410 Yes
TD0411 No SFR not claimed
TD0412 Yes
TD0423 Yes
TD0424 Yes
TD0425 Yes
TD0447 Yes
TD0450 Yes
TD0451 No SFR not claimed
TD0453 No SFR not claimed
TD0475 Yes
TD0477 Yes
TD0478 Yes
TD0480 Yes
TD0481 Yes
TD0482 Yes
TD0483 Yes
TD0484 Yes
TD0528 Yes
TD0529 Yes
TD0530 Yes
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TD0531 Yes
TD0532 Yes
TD0533 Yes
TD0535 Yes
TD0536 Yes
TD0538 Yes
TD0547 Yes
2.1 Conformance Rationale
The ST conforms to the NDcPP21. As explained previously, the security problem definition, security objectives, and
security requirements have been drawn from the PP.
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3. Security Objectives
The Security Problem Definition may be found in the NDcPP21 and this section reproduces only the corresponding
Security Objectives for operational environment for reader convenience. The NDcPP21 offers additional information
about the identified security objectives, but that has not been reproduced here and the NDcPP21 should be consulted
if there is interest in that material.
In general, the NDcPP21 has defined Security Objectives appropriate for a network device and as such are applicable
to the SLX Product Series operating with Version 20.1.1aa TOE.
3.1 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment
OE.ADMIN_CREDENTIALS_SECURE The administrator's credentials (private key) used to access the TOE must
be protected on any other platform on which they reside.
OE.COMPONENTS_RUNNING (applies to distributed TOEs only) For distributed TOEs the Security
Administrator ensures that the availability of every TOE component is checked as appropriate to reduce the risk of an
undetected attack on (or failure of) one or more TOE components. The Security Administrator also ensures that it is
checked as appropriate for every TOE component that the audit functionality is running properly.
OE.NO_GENERAL_PURPOSE There are no general-purpose computing capabilities (e.g., compilers or user
applications) available on the TOE, other than those services necessary for the operation, administration and support
of the TOE.
OE.NO_THRU_TRAFFIC_PROTECTION The TOE does not provide any protection of traffic that traverses it. It
is assumed that protection of this traffic will be covered by other security and assurance measures in the operational
environment.
OE.PHYSICAL Physical security, commensurate with the value of the TOE and the data it contains, is provided by
the environment.
OE.RESIDUAL_INFORMATION The Security Administrator ensures that there is no unauthorized access possible
for sensitive residual information (e.g. cryptographic keys, keying material, PINs, passwords etc.) on networking
equipment when the equipment is discarded or removed from its operational environment.
OE.TRUSTED_ADMIN TOE Administrators are trusted to follow and apply all guidance documentation in a trusted
manner.
OE.UPDATES The TOE firmware and software is updated by an administrator on a regular basis in response to the
release of product updates due to known vulnerabilities.
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4. Extended Components Definition
All of the extended requirements in this ST have been drawn from the NDcPP21. The NDcPP21 defines the following
extended requirements and since they are not redefined in this ST the NDcPP21 should be consulted for more
information in regard to those CC extensions.
Extended SFRs:
 NDcPP21:FAU_STG_EXT.1: Protected Audit Event Storage
 NDcPP21:FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1: HTTPS Protocol
 NDcPP21:FCS_NTP_EXT.1: NTP Protocol
 NDcPP21:FCS_RBG_EXT.1: Random Bit Generation
 NDcPP21:FCS_SSHS_EXT.1: SSH Server Protocol
 NDcPP21:FCS_TLSC_EXT.1: TLS Client Protocol
 NDcPP21:FCS_TLSS_EXT.1: TLS Server Protocol
 NDcPP21:FIA_PMG_EXT.1: Password Management
 NDcPP21:FIA_UAU_EXT.2: Password-based Authentication Mechanism
 NDcPP21:FIA_UIA_EXT.1: User Identification and Authentication
 NDcPP21:FIA_X509_EXT.1/Rev: X.509 Certificate Validation
 NDcPP21:FIA_X509_EXT.2: X.509 Certificate Authentication
 NDcPP21:FIA_X509_EXT.3: X.509 Certificate Requests
 NDcPP21:FPT_APW_EXT.1: Protection of Administrator Passwords
 NDcPP21:FPT_SKP_EXT.1: Protection of TSF Data (for reading of all pre-shared, symmetric and private
keys)
 NDcPP21:FPT_STM_EXT.1: Reliable Time Stamps
 NDcPP21:FPT_TST_EXT.1: TSF testing
 NDcPP21:FPT_TUD_EXT.1: Trusted update
 NDcPP21:FTA_SSL_EXT.1: TSF-initiated Session Locking
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5. Security Requirements
This section defines the Security Functional Requirements (SFRs) and Security Assurance Requirements (SARs) that
serve to represent the security functional claims for the Target of Evaluation (TOE) and to scope the evaluation effort.
The SFRs have all been drawn from the NDcPP21. The refinements and operations already performed in the NDcPP21
are not identified (e.g., highlighted) here, rather the requirements have been copied from the NDcPP21 and any
residual operations have been completed herein. Of particular note, the NDcPP21 made a number of refinements and
completed some of the SFR operations defined in the Common Criteria (CC) and that PP should be consulted to
identify those changes if necessary.
The SARs are also drawn from the NDcPP21 which includes all the SARs for EAL 1. However, the SARs are
effectively refined since requirement-specific 'Assurance Activities' are defined in the NDcPP21 that serve to ensure
corresponding evaluations will yield more practical and consistent assurance than the EAL 1 assurance requirements
alone. The NDcPP21 should be consulted for the assurance activity definitions.
5.1 TOE Security Functional Requirements
The following table identifies the SFRs that are satisfied by the SLX Product Series operating with Version 20.1.1aa
TOE.
Requirement Class Requirement Component
FAU: Security audit NDcPP21:FAU_GEN.1: Audit Data Generation
NDcPP21:FAU_GEN.2: User identity association
NDcPP21:FAU_STG_EXT.1: Protected Audit Event Storage
FCS: Cryptographic support NDcPP21:FCS_CKM.1: Cryptographic Key Generation
NDcPP21:FCS_CKM.2: Cryptographic Key Establishment
NDcPP21:FCS_CKM.4: Cryptographic Key Destruction
NDcPP21:FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption: Cryptographic Operation (AES
Data Encryption/Decryption)
NDcPP21:FCS_COP.1/Hash: Cryptographic Operation (Hash Algorithm)
NDcPP21:FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash: Cryptographic Operation (Keyed
Hash Algorithm)
NDcPP21:FCS_COP.1/SigGen: Cryptographic Operation (Signature
Generation and Verification)
NDcPP21:FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1: HTTPS Protocol
NDcPP21:FCS_NTP_EXT.1: NTP Protocol
NDcPP21:FCS_RBG_EXT.1: Random Bit Generation
NDcPP21:FCS_SSHS_EXT.1: SSH Server Protocol
NDcPP21:FCS_TLSC_EXT.1: TLS Client Protocol
NDcPP21:FCS_TLSS_EXT.1: TLS Server Protocol
FIA: Identification and
authentication
NDcPP21:FIA_AFL.1: Authentication Failure Management
NDcPP21:FIA_PMG_EXT.1: Password Management
NDcPP21:FIA_UAU.7: Protected Authentication Feedback
NDcPP21:FIA_UAU_EXT.2: Password-based Authentication
Mechanism
NDcPP21:FIA_UIA_EXT.1: User Identification and Authentication
NDcPP21:FIA_X509_EXT.1/Rev: X.509 Certificate Validation
NDcPP21:FIA_X509_EXT.2: X.509 Certificate Authentication
NDcPP21:FIA_X509_EXT.3: X.509 Certificate Requests
FMT: Security management NDcPP21:FMT_MOF.1/ManualUpdate: Management of security
functions behaviour
NDcPP21:FMT_MTD.1/CoreData: Management of TSF Data
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NDcPP21:FMT_SMF.1: Specification of Management Functions
NDcPP21:FMT_SMR.2: Restrictions on Security Roles
FPT: Protection of the TSF NDcPP21:FPT_APW_EXT.1: Protection of Administrator Passwords
NDcPP21:FPT_SKP_EXT.1: Protection of TSF Data (for reading of all
pre-shared, symmetric and private keys)
NDcPP21:FPT_STM_EXT.1: Reliable Time Stamps
NDcPP21:FPT_TST_EXT.1: TSF testing
NDcPP21:FPT_TUD_EXT.1: Trusted update
FTA: TOE access NDcPP21:FTA_SSL.3: TSF-initiated Termination
NDcPP21:FTA_SSL.4: User-initiated Termination
NDcPP21:FTA_SSL_EXT.1: TSF-initiated Session Locking
NDcPP21:FTA_TAB.1: Default TOE Access Banners
FTP: Trusted path/channels NDcPP21:FTP_ITC.1: Inter-TSF trusted channel
NDcPP21:FTP_TRP.1/Admin: Trusted Path
Table 5-1 TOE Security Functional Components
5.1.1 Security audit (FAU)
5.1.1.1 Audit Data Generation (NDcPP21:FAU_GEN.1)
NDcPP21:FAU_GEN.1.1
The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable events:
a) Start-up and shut-down of the audit functions;
b) All auditable events for the not specified level of audit; and
c) All administrative actions comprising:
 Administrative login and logout (name of user account shall be logged if individual user
accounts are required for administrators).
 Changes to TSF data related to configuration changes (in addition to the information that
a change occurred it shall be logged what has been changed).
 Generating/import of, changing, or deleting of cryptographic keys (in addition to the
action itself a unique key name or key reference shall be logged).
 Resetting passwords (name of related user account shall be logged).
 [no other actions];
d) Specifically defined auditable events listed in Table 5-2
Table 5-2 Audit Events
Requirement Auditable Events Additional Content
NDcPP21:FAU_GEN.1
NDcPP21:FAU_GEN.2
NDcPP21:FAU_STG_EXT.1
NDcPP21:FCS_CKM.1
NDcPP21:FCS_CKM.2
NDcPP21:FCS_CKM.4
NDcPP21:FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption
NDcPP21:FCS_COP.1/Hash
NDcPP21:FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash
NDcPP21:FCS_COP.1/SigGen
NDcPP21:FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1 Failure to establish a HTTPS
Session.
Reason for failure.
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NDcPP21:FCS_NTP_EXT.1 Configuration of a new time
server Removal of configured
time server
Identity if new/removed
time server
NDcPP21:FCS_RBG_EXT.1
NDcPP21:FCS_SSHS_EXT.1 Failure to establish an SSH
session.
Reason for failure.
NDcPP21:FCS_TLSC_EXT.1 Failure to establish a TLS
Session.
Reason for failure.
NDcPP21:FCS_TLSS_EXT.1 Failure to establish a TLS
Session.
Reason for failure.
NDcPP21:FIA_AFL.1 Unsuccessful login attempt
limit is met or exceeded.
Origin of the attempt (e.g.,
IP address).
NDcPP21:FIA_PMG_EXT.1
NDcPP21:FIA_UAU.7
NDcPP21:FIA_UAU_EXT.2 All use of identification and
authentication mechanism.
Origin of the attempt (e.g.,
IP address).
NDcPP21:FIA_UIA_EXT.1 All use of identification and
authentication mechanism.
Origin of the attempt (e.g.,
IP address).
NDcPP21:FIA_X509_EXT.1/Rev Unsuccessful attempt to
validate a certificate. Any
addition, replacement or
removal of trust anchors in the
TOE's trust store
Reason for failure of
certificate validation
Identification of certificates
added, replaced or removed
as trust anchor in the TOE's
trust store
NDcPP21:FIA_X509_EXT.2
NDcPP21:FIA_X509_EXT.3
NDcPP21:FMT_MOF.1/ManualUpdate Any attempt to initiate a
manual update.
NDcPP21:FMT_MTD.1/CoreData All management activities of
TSF data.
NDcPP21:FMT_MTD.1/CryptoKeys Management of cryptographic
keys.
NDcPP21:FMT_SMF.1 All management activities of
TSF data.
NDcPP21:FMT_SMR.2
NDcPP21:FPT_APW_EXT.1
NDcPP21:FPT_SKP_EXT.1
NDcPP21:FPT_STM_EXT.1 Discontinuous changes to time
- either Administrator actuated
or changed via an automated
process. (Note that no
continuous changes to time
need to be logged. See also
application note on
FPT_STM_EXT.1)
For discontinuous changes
to time: The old and new
values for the time. Origin
of the attempt to change
time for success and failure
(e.g., IP address).
NDcPP21:FPT_TST_EXT.1
NDcPP21:FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Initiation of update; result of
the update attempt (success or
failure).
NDcPP21:FTA_SSL.3 The termination of a remote
session by the session locking
mechanism.
NDcPP21:FTA_SSL.4 The termination of an
interactive session.
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NDcPP21:FTA_SSL_EXT.1 (if 'lock the session' is
selected) Any attempts at
unlocking of an interactive
session. (if 'terminate the
session' is selected) The
termination of a local session
by the session locking
mechanism.
NDcPP21:FTA_TAB.1
NDcPP21:FTP_ITC.1 Initiation of the trusted
channel. Termination of the
trusted channel. Failure of the
trusted channel functions.
Identification of the
initiator and target of failed
trusted channels
establishment attempt.
NDcPP21:FTP_TRP.1/Admin Initiation of the trusted path.
Termination of the trusted
path. Failure of the trusted
path functions.
NDcPP21:FAU_GEN.1.2
The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following information:
a) Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity, and the outcome (success or
failure) of the event; and
b) For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the functional
components included in the cPP/ST, information specified in column three of Table 5-2.
5.1.1.2 User identity association (NDcPP21:FAU_GEN.2)
NDcPP21:FAU_GEN.2.1
For audit events resulting from actions of identified users, the TSF shall be able to associate each
auditable event with the identity of the user that caused the event.
5.1.1.3 Protected Audit Event Storage (NDcPP21:FAU_STG_EXT.1)
NDcPP21:FAU_STG_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall be able to transmit the generated audit data to an external IT entity using a trusted
channel according to FTP_ITC.1.
NDcPP21:FAU_STG_EXT.1.2
The TSF shall be able to store generated audit data on the TOE itself.
[TOE shall consist of a single standalone component that stores audit data locally,]
NDcPP21:FAU_STG_EXT.1.3
The TSF shall [overwrite previous audit records according to the following rule: [overwrite
previous audit records according to the following rule: [audit records are maintained in a
circular buffer and oldest records are overwritten first]] when the local storage space for audit
data is full.
5.1.2 Cryptographic support (FCS)
5.1.2.1 Cryptographic Key Generation (NDcPP21:FCS_CKM.1)
NDcPP21:FCS_CKM.1.1
The TSF shall generate asymmetric cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key generation algorithm: [
- RSA schemes using cryptographic key sizes of 2048-bit or greater that meet the
following: FIPS PUB 186-4, 'Digital Signature Standard (DSS)', Appendix B.3,
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- ECC schemes using 'NIST curves' [P-256, P-384, P-521 ] that meet the following: FIPS
PUB 186-4, 'Digital Signature Standard (DSS)', Appendix B.4
- FFC Schemes using Diffie-Hellman group 14 that meet the following: RFC 3526,
Section 3].
5.1.2.2 Cryptographic Key Establishment (NDcPP21:FCS_CKM.2)
NDcPP21:FCS_CKM.2.1
The TSF shall perform cryptographic key establishment in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key establishment method: [
- RSA-based key establishment schemes that meet the following: RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 as
specified in Section 7.2 of RFC 8017, Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1:
RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1 (TD0402 applied),
- Elliptic curve-based key establishment schemes that meet the following: NIST Special
Publication 800-56A Revision 2, 'Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment
Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography',
- Key establishment scheme using Diffie-Hellman group 14 that meets the following: RFC
3526, Section 3].
5.1.2.3 Cryptographic Key Destruction (NDcPP21:FCS_CKM.4)
NDcPP21:FCS_CKM.4.1
The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key
destruction method
- For plaintext keys in volatile storage, the destruction shall be executed by a [single overwrite
consisting of [zeroes]];
- For plaintext keys in non-volatile storage, the destruction shall be executed by the invocation
of an interface provided by a part of the TSF that [o logically addresses the storage location
of the key and performs a [single] overwrite consisting of [zeroes]]
that meets the following: No Standard.
5.1.2.4 Cryptographic Operation (AES Data Encryption/Decryption)
(NDcPP21:FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption)
NDcPP21:FCS_COP.1.1/DataEncryption
The TSF shall perform encryption/decryption in accordance with a specified cryptographic
algorithm AES used in [CBC, CTR] mode and cryptographic key sizes [128 bits, 256 bits] that
meet the following: AES as specified in ISO 18033-3, [CBC as specified in ISO 10116, CTR as
specified in ISO 10116].
5.1.2.5 Cryptographic Operation (Hash Algorithm) (NDcPP21:FCS_COP.1/Hash)
NDcPP21:FCS_COP.1.1/Hash
The TSF shall perform cryptographic hashing services in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm [SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512] and message digest sizes [160,
256, 512] that meet the following: ISO/IEC 10118-3:2004.
5.1.2.6 Cryptographic Operation (Keyed Hash Algorithm) (NDcPP21:FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash)
NDcPP21:FCS_COP.1.1/KeyedHash
The TSF shall perform keyed-hash message authentication in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm [HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-512] and
cryptographic key sizes [160, 256, 512] and message digest sizes [160, 256, 512] bits that meet the
following: ISO/IEC 9797-2:2011, Section 7 'MAC Algorithm 2'.
SLX Product Series operating with version 20.1.1aa (NDcPP21) Security Target Version 0.5, 16 November 2020
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5.1.2.7 Cryptographic Operation (Signature Generation and Verification) (NDcPP21:FCS_COP.1/SigGen)
NDcPP21:FCS_COP.1.1/SigGen
The TSF shall perform cryptographic signature services (generation and verification) in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [
- RSA Digital Signature Algorithm and cryptographic key sizes (modulus) [2048 bits]
- Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm and cryptographic key sizes [256, and 384 bits]]
that meet the following: [
- For RSA schemes: FIPS PUB 186-4, 'Digital Signature Standard (DSS)', Section 5.5,
using PKCS #1 v2.1 Signature Schemes RSASSA-PSS and/or RSASSA-PKCS1v1_5;
ISO/IEC 9796-2, Digital signature scheme 2 or Digital Signature scheme 3
- For ECDSA schemes: FIPS PUB 186-4, 'Digital Signature Standard (DSS)', Section 6 and
Appendix D, Implementing 'NIST curves' [P-256, P-384, P-521]; ISO/IEC 14888-3,
Section 6.4].
5.1.2.8 HTTPS Protocol (NDcPP21:FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1)
NDcPP21:FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall implement the HTTPS protocol that complies with RFC 2818.
NDcPP21:FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1.2
The TSF shall implement HTTPS using TLS.
NDcPP21:FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1.3
If a peer certificate is presented, the TSF shall [not require client authentication] if the peer
certificate is deemed invalid.
5.1.2.9 NTP Protocol (NDcPP21:FCS_NTP_EXT.1)
NDcPP21:FCS_NTP_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall use only the following NTP version(s) [NTP v3 (RFC 1305) and NTPv4 (RFC
5905)].
NDcPP21:FCS_NTP_EXT.1.2
The TSF shall update its system time using [Authentication using [SHA1] as the message digest
algorithm(s) to provide trusted communication between itself and an NTP time source.].
NDcPP21:FCS_NTP_EXT.1.3
The TSF shall not update NTP timestamp from broadcast and/or multicast addresses
NDcPP21:FCS_NTP_EXT.1.4
The TSF shall support configuration of at least three (3) NTP time sources.
5.1.2.10 Random Bit Generation (NDcPP21:FCS_RBG_EXT.1)
NDcPP21:FCS_RBG_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall perform all deterministic random bit generation services in accordance with
ISO/IEC 18031:2011 using [CTR_DRBG (AES)].
NDcPP21:FCS_RBG_EXT.1.2
The deterministic RBG shall be seeded by at least one entropy source that accumulates entropy
from [[one] software-based noise source] with a minimum of [256 bits] of entropy at least equal
to the greatest security strength, according to ISO/IEC 18031:2011Table C.1 'Security Strength
Table for Hash Functions', of the keys and hashes that it will generate.
5.1.2.11 SSH Server Protocol (NDcPP21:FCS_SSHS_EXT.1)
NDcPP21:FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall implement the SSH protocol that complies with RFC(s) [4251, 4252, 4253, 4254].
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NDcPP21:FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.2
The TSF shall ensure that the SSH protocol implementation supports the following authentication
methods as described in RFC 4252: public key-based, [password-based].
NDcPP21:FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.3
The TSF shall ensure that, as described in RFC 4253, packets greater than [256K] bytes in an SSH
transport connection are dropped.
NDcPP21:FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.4
The TSF shall ensure that the SSH transport implementation uses the following encryption
algorithms and rejects all other encryption algorithms: [aes128-cbc, aes256-cbc, aes128-ctr,
aes256-ctr].
NDcPP21:FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.5
The TSF shall ensure that the SSH public-key based authentication implementation uses [ssh-rsa,
x509v3-ssh-rsa, ecdsa-sha2-nistp256, x509v3-rsa2048-sha256] as its public key algorithm(s) and
rejects all other public key algorithms.
NDcPP21:FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.6
The TSF shall ensure that the SSH transport implementation uses [hmac-sha1, hmac-sha2-256,
hmac-sha2-512] as its MAC algorithm(s) and rejects all other MAC algorithm(s).
NDcPP21:FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.7
The TSF shall ensure that [diffie-hellman-group14-sha1, ecdh-sha2-nistp256] and [no other
methods] are the only allowed key exchange methods used for the SSH protocol.
NDcPP21:FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.8
The TSF shall ensure that within SSH connections, the same session keys are used for a threshold
of no longer than one hour, and each encryption key is used to protect no more than one gigabyte
of data. After any of the thresholds are reached, a rekey needs to be performed. (TD0475 applied)
5.1.2.12 TLS Client Protocol (NDcPP21:FCS_TLSC_EXT.1)
NDcPP21:FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall implement [TLS 1.2 (RFC 5246), TLS 1.1 (RFC 4346)] and reject all other TLS
and SSL versions. The TLS implementation will support the following ciphersuites:
[TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 3268,
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 3268,
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5246,
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5246].
NDcPP21:FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.2
The TSF shall verify that the presented identifiers of the following types [IPv4 address in CN or
SAN, IPv6 address in the CN or SAN] are matched to reference identifiers. (TD0481 applied)
NDcPP21:FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.3
When establishing a trusted channel, by default the TSF shall not establish a trusted channel if the
server certificate is invalid. The TSF shall also [Not implement any administrator override
mechanism].
NDcPP21:FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.4
The TSF shall [not present the Supported Elliptic Curves Extension] in the Client Hello.
5.1.2.13 TLS Server Protocol (NDcPP21:FCS_TLSS_EXT.1)
NDcPP21:FCS_TLSS_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall implement [TLS 1.2 (RFC 5246), TLS 1.1 (RFC 4346)] and reject all other TLS
and SSL versions. The TLS implementation will support the following ciphersuites:
[TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 3268,
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 3268,
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5246,
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_ SHA256 as defined in RFC 5246
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289,
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289,
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TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289,
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289].
NDcPP21:FCS_TLSS_EXT.1.2
The TSF shall deny connections from clients requesting SSL 2.0, SSL 3.0, TLS 1.0, and [none].
NDcPP21:FCS_TLSS_EXT.1.3
The TSF shall [
 perform RSA key establishment with key size [2048 bits],
 generate EC Diffie-Hellman parameters over NIST curves [secp256r1, secp384r1,
secp521r1] and no other curves].
5.1.3 Identification and authentication (FIA)
5.1.3.1 Authentication Failure Management (NDcPP21:FIA_AFL.1)
NDcPP21:FIA_AFL.1.1
The TSF shall detect when an Administrator configurable positive integer within [1-6]
unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to Administrators attempting to authenticate
remotely using a password. (TD0408 applied)
NDcPP21:FIA_AFL.1.2
When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been met, the TSF shall
[prevent the offending Administrator from successfully establishing remote session using any
authentication method that involves a password until an Administrator defined time period has
elapsed]. (TD0408 applied)
5.1.3.2 Password Management (NDcPP21:FIA_PMG_EXT.1)
NDcPP21:FIA_PMG_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall provide the following password management capabilities for administrative
passwords:
a) Passwords shall be able to be composed of any combination of upper and lower case
letters, numbers, and the following special characters: ['!', '@', '$', '%', '^', '*', '(', ')'];
b) Minimum password length shall be configurable to between [8] and [32] characters.
5.1.3.3 Protected Authentication Feedback (NDcPP21:FIA_UAU.7)
NDcPP21:FIA_UAU.7.1
The TSF shall provide only obscured feedback to the administrative user while the authentication
is in progress at the local console.
5.1.3.4 Password-based Authentication Mechanism (NDcPP21:FIA_UAU_EXT.2)
NDcPP21:FIA_UAU_EXT.2.1
The TSF shall provide a local [password-based, SSH public key-based, certificate-based,
[Radius]] authentication mechanism to perform local administrative user authentication. (TD0408
applied)
5.1.3.5 User Identification and Authentication (NDcPP21:FIA_UIA_EXT.1)
NDcPP21:FIA_UIA_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall allow the following actions prior to requiring the non-TOE entity to initiate the
identification and authentication process:
- Display the warning banner in accordance with FTA_TAB.1;
- [[network routing and SAN services]].
NDcPP21:FIA_UIA_EXT.1.2
The TSF shall require each administrative user to be successfully identified and authenticated
before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that administrative user.
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5.1.3.6 X.509 Certificate Validation (NDcPP21:FIA_X509_EXT.1/Rev)
NDcPP21:FIA_X509_EXT.1.1/Rev
The TSF shall validate certificates in accordance with the following rules:
- RFC 5280 certificate validation and certification path validation supporting a minimum path
length of three certificates.
- The certification path must terminate with a trusted CA certificate designated as a trust
anchor.
- The TSF shall validate a certification path by ensuring that all CA certificates in the
certification path contain the basicConstraints extension with the CA flag set to TRUE.
- The TSF shall validate the revocation status of the certificate using [the Online Certificate
Status Protocol (OCSP) as specified in RFC 6960]
- The TSF shall validate the extendedKeyUsage field according to the following rules:
 Certificates used for trusted updates and executable code integrity verification shall have
the Code Signing purpose (id-kp 3 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.3) in the extendedKeyUsage
field.
 Server certificates presented for TLS shall have the Server Authentication purpose (id-kp
1 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
 Client certificates presented for TLS shall have the Client Authentication purpose (id-kp
2 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
 OCSP certificates presented for OCSP responses shall have the OCSP Signing purpose
(id-kp 9 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.9) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
NDcPP21:FIA_X509_EXT.1.2/Rev
The TSF shall only treat a certificate as a CA certificate if the basicConstraints extension is
present and the CA flag is set to TRUE.
5.1.3.7 X.509 Certificate Authentication (NDcPP21:FIA_X509_EXT.2)
NDcPP21:FIA_X509_EXT.2.1
The TSF shall use X.509v3 certificates as defined by RFC 5280 to support authentication for
[SSH, TLS], and [no additional uses].
NDcPP21:FIA_X509_EXT.2.2
When the TSF cannot establish a connection to determine the validity of a certificate, the TSF
shall [not accept the certificate].
5.1.3.8 X.509 Certificate Requests (NDcPP21:FIA_X509_EXT.3)
NDcPP21:FIA_X509_EXT.3.1
The TSF shall generate a Certification Request as specified by RFC 2986 and be able to provide
the following information in the request: public key and [Common Name, Organization,
Organizational Unit, Country].
NDcPP21:FIA_X509_EXT.3.2
The TSF shall validate the chain of certificates from the Root CA upon receiving the CA
Certificate Response.
5.1.4 Security management (FMT)
5.1.4.1 Management of security functions behaviour (NDcPP21:FMT_MOF.1/ManualUpdate)
NDcPP21:FMT_MOF.1.1/ManualUpdate
The TSF shall restrict the ability to enable the functions to perform manual update to Security
Administrators.
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5.1.4.2 Management of TSF Data (NDcPP21:FMT_MTD.1/CoreData)
NDcPP21:FMT_MTD.1.1/CoreData
The TSF shall restrict the ability to manage the TSF data to Security Administrators.
5.1.4.3 Management of TSF data (NDcPP21:FMT_MTD.1/CryptoKeys)
NDcPP21:FMT_MTD.1.1/CryptoKeys
The TSF shall restrict the ability to manage the cryptographic keys to Security Administrators.
5.1.4.4 Specification of Management Functions (NDcPP21:FMT_SMF.1)
NDcPP21:FMT_SMF.1.1
The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions:
- Ability to administer the TOE locally and remotely;
- Ability to configure the access banner;
- Ability to configure the session inactivity time before session termination or locking;
- Ability to update the TOE, and to verify the updates using [digital signature] capability prior
to installing those updates;
- Ability to configure the authentication failure parameters for FIA_AFL.1;
- - [ o Ability to configure audit behavior,
o Ability to modify the behavior of the transmission of audit data to an external IT
entity, the handling of audit data, the audit functionality when Local Audit Storage
Space is full,
o Ability to manage the cryptographic keys,
o Ability to configure the cryptographic functionality,
o Ability to manage the TOE's trust store and designate X509.v3 certificates as trust
anchors,
o Ability to import X509v3 certificates to the TOE's trust store,
o Ability to configure thresholds for SSH rekeying
o Ability to set the time which is used for time-stamps;
o Ability to configure NTP,
o No other capabilities].
5.1.4.5 Restrictions on Security Roles (NDcPP21:FMT_SMR.2)
NDcPP21:FMT_SMR.2.1
The TSF shall maintain the roles: - Security Administrator.
NDcPP21:FMT_SMR.2.2
The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
NDcPP21:FMT_SMR.2.3
The TSF shall ensure that the conditions
- The Security Administrator role shall be able to administer the TOE locally;
- The Security Administrator role shall be able to administer the TOE remotely are
satisfied.
5.1.5 Protection of the TSF (FPT)
5.1.5.1 Protection of Administrator Passwords (NDcPP21:FPT_APW_EXT.1)
NDcPP21:FPT_APW_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall store administrative passwords in non-plaintext form.
NDcPP21:FPT_APW_EXT.1.2
The TSF shall prevent the reading of plaintext administrative passwords. (TD0483 applied)
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5.1.5.2 Protection of TSF Data (for reading of all pre-shared, symmetric and private keys)
(NDcPP21:FPT_SKP_EXT.1)
NDcPP21:FPT_SKP_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall prevent reading of all pre-shared keys, symmetric keys, and private keys.
5.1.5.3 Reliable Time Stamps (NDcPP21:FPT_STM_EXT.1)
NDcPP21:FPT_STM_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall be able to provide reliable time stamps for its own use.
NDcPP21:FPT_STM_EXT.1.2
The TSF shall [allow the Security Administrator to set the time, synchronise time with an NTP
server].
5.1.5.4 TSF testing (NDcPP21:FPT_TST_EXT.1)
NDcPP21:FPT_TST_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall run a suite of the following self-tests [during initial start-up (on power on)] to
demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF: [Cryptographic Known Answer Test (KAT) -
Continuous Tests for entropy and RNG, - Firmware load test].
5.1.5.5 Trusted update (NDcPP21:FPT_TUD_EXT.1)
NDcPP21:FPT_TUD_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall provide Security Administrators the ability to query the currently executing version
of the TOE firmware/software and [no other TOE firmware/software version].
NDcPP21:FPT_TUD_EXT.1.2
The TSF shall provide Security Administrators the ability to manually initiate updates to TOE
firmware/software and [no other update mechanism].
NDcPP21:FPT_TUD_EXT.1.3
The TSF shall provide means to authenticate firmware/software updates to the TOE using a
[digital signature mechanism] prior to installing those updates.
5.1.6 TOE access (FTA)
5.1.6.1 TSF-initiated Termination (NDcPP21:FTA_SSL.3)
NDcPP21:FTA_SSL.3.1
The TSF shall terminate a remote interactive session after a Security Administrator-configurable
time interval of session inactivity.
5.1.6.2 User-initiated Termination (NDcPP21:FTA_SSL.4)
NDcPP21:FTA_SSL.4.1
The TSF shall allow Administrator-initiated termination of the Administrator's own interactive
session.
5.1.6.3 TSF-initiated Session Locking (NDcPP21:FTA_SSL_EXT.1)
NDcPP21:FTA_SSL_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall, for local interactive sessions, [- terminate the session]
after a Security Administrator-specified time period of inactivity.
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5.1.6.4 Default TOE Access Banners (NDcPP21:FTA_TAB.1)
NDcPP21:FTA_TAB.1.1
Before establishing an administrative user session the TSF shall display a Security Administrator-
specified advisory notice and consent warning message regarding use of the TOE.
5.1.7 Trusted path/channels (FTP)
5.1.7.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel (NDcPP21:FTP_ITC.1)
NDcPP21:FTP_ITC.1.1
The TSF shall be capable of using [TLS] to provide a trusted communication channel between
itself and authorized IT entities supporting the following capabilities: audit server, [authentication
server] that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured
identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from disclosure and detection of
modification of the channel data.
NDcPP21:FTP_ITC.1.2
The TSF shall permit the TSF or the authorized IT entities to initiate communication via the
trusted channel.
NDcPP21:FTP_ITC.1.3
The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for [exporting audit events and
authenticating users through RADIUS].
5.1.7.2 Trusted Path (NDcPP21:FTP_TRP.1/Admin)
NDcPP21:FTP_TRP.1.1/Admin
The TSF shall be capable of using [SSH, TLS, HTTPS] to provide a communication path between
itself and authorized remote Administrators that is logically distinct from other communication
paths and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the communicated
data from disclosure and provides detection of modification of the channel data.
NDcPP21:FTP_TRP.1.2/Admin
The TSF shall permit remote Administrators to initiate communication via the trusted path.
NDcPP21:FTP_TRP.1.3/Admin
The TSF shall require the use of the trusted path for initial Administrator authentication and all
remote administration actions.
5.2 TOE Security Assurance Requirements
The SARs for the TOE are the components as specified in Part 3 of the Common Criteria. Note that the SARs have
effectively been refined with the assurance activities explicitly defined in association with both the SFRs and SARs.
Requirement Class Requirement Component
ADV: Development ADV_FSP.1: Basic Functional Specification
AGD: Guidance documents AGD_OPE.1: Operational User Guidance
AGD_PRE.1: Preparative Procedures
ALC: Life-cycle support ALC_CMC.1: Labelling of the TOE
ALC_CMS.1: TOE CM Coverage
ATE: Tests ATE_IND.1: Independent Testing - Conformance
AVA: Vulnerability assessment AVA_VAN.1: Vulnerability Survey
Table 5-3 Assurance Components
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5.2.1 Development (ADV)
5.2.1.1 Basic Functional Specification (ADV_FSP.1)
ADV_FSP.1.1d
The developer shall provide a functional specification.
ADV_FSP.1.2d
The developer shall provide a tracing from the functional specification to the SFRs.
ADV_FSP.1.1c
The functional specification shall describe the purpose and method of use for each SFR-enforcing
and SFR-supporting TSFI.
ADV_FSP.1.2c
The TSF shall support mutual authentication of TLS clients using X.509v3 certificates.
ADV_FSP.1.3c
The functional specification shall provide rationale for the implicit categorization of interfaces as
SFR-non-interfering.
ADV_FSP.1.4c
The tracing shall demonstrate that the SFRs trace to TSFIs in the functional specification.
ADV_FSP.1.1e
The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and
presentation of evidence.
ADV_FSP.1.2e
The evaluator shall determine that the functional specification is an accurate and complete
instantiation of the SFRs.
5.2.2 Guidance documents (AGD)
5.2.2.1 Operational User Guidance (AGD_OPE.1)
AGD_OPE.1.1d
The developer shall provide operational user guidance.
AGD_OPE.1.1c
The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role, the useraccessible functions and
privileges that should be controlled in a secure processing environment, including appropriate
warnings.
AGD_OPE.1.2c
The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role, how to use the available interfaces
provided by the TOE in a secure manner.
AGD_OPE.1.3c
The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role, the available functions and
interfaces, in particular all security parameters under the control of the user, indicating secure
values as appropriate.
AGD_OPE.1.4c
The operational user guidance shall, for each user role, clearly present each type of security-
relevant event relative to the user-accessible functions that need to be performed, including
changing the security characteristics of entities under the control of the TSF.
AGD_OPE.1.5c
The operational user guidance shall identify all possible modes of operation of the TOE (including
operation following failure or operational error), their consequences, and implications for
maintaining secure operation.
AGD_OPE.1.6c
The operational user guidance shall, for each user role, describe the security measures to be
followed in order to fulfill the security objectives for the operational environment as described in
the ST.
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AGD_OPE.1.7c
The operational user guidance shall be clear and reasonable.
AGD_OPE.1.1e
The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and
presentation of evidence.
5.2.2.2 Preparative Procedures (AGD_PRE.1)
AGD_PRE.1.1d
The developer shall provide the TOE, including its preparative procedures.
AGD_PRE.1.1c
The preparative procedures shall describe all the steps necessary for secure acceptance of the
delivered TOE in accordance with the developer's delivery procedures.
AGD_PRE.1.2c
The preparative procedures shall describe all the steps necessary for secure installation of the TOE
and for the secure preparation of the operational environment in accordance with the security
objectives for the operational environment as described in the ST.
AGD_PRE.1.1e
The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and
presentation of evidence.
AGD_PRE.1.2e
The evaluator shall apply the preparative procedures to confirm that the TOE can be prepared
securely for operation.
5.2.3 Life-cycle support (ALC)
5.2.3.1 Labelling of the TOE (ALC_CMC.1)
ALC_CMC.1.1d
The developer shall provide the TOE and a reference for the TOE.
ALC_CMC.1.1c
The TOE shall be labelled with its unique reference.
ALC_CMC.1.1e
The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and
presentation of evidence.
5.2.3.2 TOE CM Coverage (ALC_CMS.1)
ALC_CMS.1.1d
The developer shall provide a configuration list for the TOE.
ALC_CMS.1.1c
The configuration list shall include the following: the TOE itself; and the evaluation evidence
required by the SARs.
ALC_CMS.1.2c
The configuration list shall uniquely identify the configuration items.
ALC_CMS.1.1e
The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and
presentation of evidence.
5.2.4 Tests (ATE)
5.2.4.1 Independent Testing - Conformance (ATE_IND.1)
ATE_IND.1.1d
The developer shall provide the TOE for testing.
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ATE_IND.1.1c
The TOE shall be suitable for testing.
ATE_IND.1.1e
The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and
presentation of evidence.
ATE_IND.1.2e
The evaluator shall test a subset of the TSF to confirm that the TSF operates as specified.
5.2.5 Vulnerability assessment (AVA)
5.2.5.1 Vulnerability Survey (AVA_VAN.1)
AVA_VAN.1.1d
The developer shall provide the TOE for testing.
AVA_VAN.1.1c
The TOE shall be suitable for testing.
AVA_VAN.1.1e
The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and
presentation of evidence..
AVA_VAN.1.2e
The evaluator shall perform a search of public domain sources to identify potential vulnerabilities
in the TOE.
AVA_VAN.1.3e
The evaluator shall conduct penetration testing, based on the identified potential vulnerabilities, to
determine that the TOE is resistant to attacks performed by an attacker possessing Basic attack
potential.
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6. TOE Summary Specification
This chapter describes the security functions:
 Security audit
 Cryptographic support
 Identification and authentication
 Security management
 Protection of the TSF
 TOE access
 Trusted path/channels
6.1 Security audit
The TOE is designed to produce syslog conformant messages in a number of circumstances including warnings about
the device itself (such as temperature, power failures, etc.) as well as security relevant events (the success and failure
login of the user, regardless of the authentication mechanism; changing a user’s password; adding and deleting user
accounts; modification, addition and deletion of ACLs; and violations of the ACL rules). In each case the audit record
includes the time and date, identification of the responsible subject (e.g., by network address or user ID), the type of
event, the outcome of the event, and other information depending on the event type.
The audit records are stored in a log (internal to the TOE appliance) that is protected so that only an authorized TOE
User can read (for which tools accessible via the CLI are provided) or otherwise access them. The protection results
from the fact that the logs can be accessed only after a user logs in.
The log stores up to 1000 entries after which the audit entries will be overwritten, oldest first. The administrator (with
Authorized Administrator privilege) can choose to configure one or more external syslog servers where the TOE will
send a copy of the audit records. The TOE can be configured to use TLS to protect audit logs exported to an external
server. Audit records are recorded locally and sent to the remote server simultaneously when configured. Only an
authorized administrator can read audit data.
The TOE includes a hardware clock that is used to provide reliable time information for the audit records it generates.
The Security audit function satisfies the following security functional requirements:
 NDcPP21:FAU_GEN.1: The TOE can generate audit records for events include starting and stopping the
audit function, administrator commands, and all other events identified in section 5.1.1. Furthermore, each
audit record identifies the date/time, event type, outcome of the event, responsible subject/user, as well as
the additional event-specific content indicated in section 5.1.1. For cryptographic keys, the act of importing
and deleting a key is audited and the associated administrator account that performed the action is recorded.
Keys are identified in audit records using the key-pair name assigned by the administrator when the key is
imported/created.
 NDcPP21:FAU_GEN.2: The TOE identifies the responsible user for each event based on the specific
administrator or network entity (identified by IP address) that caused the event.
 NDcPP21:FAU_STG_EXT.1: The TOE can be configured to export audit records to an external SYSLOG
server. This communication is protected with the use of TLS.
6.2 Cryptographic support
The TOE supports a range of cryptographic services provided by the Extreme SLX FIPS Cryptographic Library
Version EXTR-SLX-CRYPTO-VER-1.0 (Firmware) running on Intel processors shown in the evaluated TOE
models identified in section Error! Reference source not found.. The following functions have been CAVP tested.
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Functions Requirement Cert #
Encryption/Decryption
AES CBC (128 and 256 bits)
AES CTR (128 and 256 bits)
FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption C1676
Cryptographic signature services
RSA Digital Signature Algorithm (rDSA)
(modulus 2048)
FCS_COP.1/SigGen C1676
ECDSA Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)
P-256, P-384 and P-521
Cryptographic hashing
SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-512 (digest sizes 160,
256, 512)
FCS_COP.1/Hash C1676
Keyed-hash message authentication
HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-
SHA-512 (digest sizes 160, 256, 512)
FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash C1676
Random bit generation
CTR_DRBG with sw based noise sources with a
minimum of 256 bits of non-determinism
FCS_RBC_EXT.1 C1676
Key Generation
RSA Key Generation (2048-bit) FCS_CKM.1 C1676
ECDSA Key Generation (P-256, P-384 and P-
521)
Key Establishment
RSA Key Establishment FCS_CKM.2 Vendor assertion
ECDSA Key Generation
Curves P-256, P-384 and P-521
C1676
Table 6-1 Cryptographic Functions
The TOE uses a software-based random bit generator that complies with Special Publication 800-90 using
CTR_DRBG when operating in the FIPS mode. AES-256 is used in conjunction with a minimum of 256 bits of
entropy.
The TOE supports the SSHv2 (compliant with RFCs 4251, 4252, 4253, and 4254) and TLS v1.1 (RFC4346), and
TLS v1.2 (RFC 5246) secure communication protocols.
The TOE supports TLSv1.1, and v1.2 with the following ciphersuites when the TOE is a client:
 TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
 TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
 TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
 TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_ SHA256
The TOE supports TLSv1.1, and v1.2 with the following ciphersuites when the TOE is a server:
 TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
 TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
 TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
 TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_ SHA256
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 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384,
 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
The TOE supports SSHv2 with AES (CBC and CTR) 128 or 256 bit ciphers, in conjunction with HMAC-SHA-1,
HMAC-SHA2-256, HMAC-SHA-512 for message integrity. The TOE supports the following public key methods –
ssh-rsa, x509v3-ssh-rsa, ecdsa-sha2-nistp256, x509v3-rsa2048-sha256. The TOE offers the following key exchange
methods - diffie-hellman-group14-sha1 and ecdh-sha2-nistp256.
The TOE allows users to perform SSHv2 authentication using password based authentication and allows users to
upload a public key for SSHv2 public key client authentication. The TOE also allows users to be identified using
public keys within x509v3 certificates as defined by x509v3-ssh-rsa and x509v3-rsa2048-sha256 public key methods.
The TOE’s SSHv2 implementation limits SSH packets to a size of 256K bytes. Whenever the timeout period or
authentication retry limit is reached, the TOE closes the applicable TCP connection and releases the SSH session
resources. As SSH packets are being received, the TOE uses a buffer to build all packet information. Once complete,
the packet is checked to ensure it can be appropriately decrypted. However, if it is not complete when the buffer
becomes full (256K bytes) the packet will be dropped and the connection terminated. There is a TOE initiated rekey
before 1 hour or before 1GB whichever comes first. These are the default rekey values but they can be modified by
the administrator.
The TOE supports the following secret keys, private keys and CSPs:
Key or CSP: Zeroized upon: Stored in: Zeroized by:
SSH host private key Command Flash Overwriting once with zeros
SSH host public key Command Flash Overwriting once with zeros
SSH client public key Command Flash Overwriting once with zeros
SSH session key End of session RAM Overwriting once with zeros
TLS host private key Command Flash Overwriting once with zeros
TLS host digital certificate Command Flash Overwriting once with zeros
TLS pre-master secret Handshake done RAM Overwriting once with zeros
TLS session key Close of session RAM Overwriting once with zeros
User Password Command Flash Overwriting once with zeros
DRBG Seed Every 100ms RAM Overwritten with new value
Table 6-2 Cryptographic Keys and CSPs
The TOE stores all persistent secret and private keys in FLASH and stores all ephemeral keys in RAM (as indicated
in the above table). Note that zeroization occurs as follows: 1) when deleted from FLASH, the previous value is
overwritten once with zeroes; 2) when added or changed in FLASH, any old value is overwritten completely with the
new value; and, 3) the zeroization of values in RAM is achieved by overwriting once with zeroes.
Scheme Protocol Service
RSA SSH Remote Administration (TOE is Server)
TLS Syslog and Radius (TOE is client)
DH 14 SSH Remote Administration (TOE is Server)
ECC TLS Syslog and Radius (TOE is client)
Table 6-3 Service, Protocol and Key Establishment Scheme Mapping
The Cryptographic support function satisfies the following security functional requirements:
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 NDcPP21:FCS_CKM.1: The TOE supports asymmetric key generation using RSA (key size 2048) and ECC
key establishment as part of TLS and SSH as described in the section above. The TOE acts as both a client
and a server for TLS (RSA, ECC) and a server for SSH (RSA, ECC, DH-14 key generation). The TOE
supports DH group 14 key establishment scheme that meets standard RFC 3526, section 3 for interoperability
 NDcPP21:FCS_CKM.2: FCS_CKM.2: See FCS_CKM.1.
 NDcPP21:FCS_CKM.4: All data is cleared as identified above.
 NDcPP21:FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption: The TOE performs encryption and decryption using AES in CBC
or CTR mode with key sizes of either 128 or 256. The corresponding CAVP certificate is identified in the
table above.
 NDcPP21:FCS_COP.1/Hash: The TOE supports cryptographic hashing services using SHA-1, SHA-256,
and SHA-512 with digest sizes 160, 256, and 512. The corresponding CAVP certificate is identified in the
table above.
 NDcPP21:FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash: The TOE supports keyed-hash message authentication using HMAC-
SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-256, and HMAC-SHA-512 using SHA-1/256/512 with 160/256/512-bit keys to
produce a 160/256/384 output MAC. The SHA-1/256 and 512 algorithms have block sizes of 512 and 1024-
bits respectively. The corresponding CAVP certificate is identified in the table above.
 NDcPP21:FCS_COP.1/SigGen: The TOE supports the use of RSA with 2048 bit key sizes for cryptographic
signatures. Digital signatures are used in TLS and SSH communications and on product updates. The
corresponding CAVP certificate is identified in the table above.
 NDcPP21:FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1: The TOE provides a REST API interface for remote administration and
fully supports RFC 2818. The TOE acts as an HTTPS server and waits for client connections on TCP port
443. The TOE’s HTTPS server supports TLS version 1.1/1.2 only and will deny connection requests from
TLS clients with lower versions.
 NDcPP21:FCS_NTP_EXT.1: The TOE provides the ability to synchronize its time with a NTP server. The
TOE supports NTPv3 (RFC 1305) and NTPv4 (RFC 5905) by meeting the RFCs. The time data is protected
by SHA1. The TOE can support up to eight NTP time sources.
 NDcPP21:FCS_RBG_EXT.1: The product uses an SP 800-90A AES-256 CTR_DRBG with software based
noise sources with a minimum of 256 bits of non-determinism.
 NDcPP21:FCS_SSHS_EXT.1: The TOE supports SSHv2 as described above for CLI management.
 NDcPP21:FCS_TLSC_EXT.1: The TOE supports TLS v1.1 and v1.2 with the ciphersuites listed above for
its syslog connections. The TOE does not support certificate pinning. The TOE supports the use of IPv4 and
IPv6 addresses as reference identifiers within a certificate’s CommonName or Subject Alternate Name
(SAN) extension. Wildcards are not allowed in certificates.
 NDcPP21:FCS_TLSS_EXT.1: The TOE supports TLS v1.1 and v1.2 with the ciphersuites listed above for
the REST API interface. The TOE will reject all SSL and older TLS versions (1.0) for connection attempts.
The key agreement parameters of the server key exchange message are specified in the RFC 5246 (section
7.4.3) for TLSv1.2 and RFC 4346 (section 7.4.3) for TLSv1.1. The TOE conforms to both RFCs supporting
RSA and ECC key establishment.
6.3 Identification and authentication
The TOE requires users to be identified and authenticated before they can use functions mediated by the TOE, except
to display warning banners and to permit network traffic to flow through the TOE without identification or
authentication so long as it conforms to the information flow policy rules. The TOE authenticates TOE Users against
their user name and password or through public-key based authentication.
The Authorized Administrator is able to define local user (or TOE User) accounts and to assign passwords and
privilege levels to the accounts. Each user account has a user name, password, and a privilege level associated with it.
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There is a default privilege level account associated with each privilege level and each has its own password. It is up
to the Authorized Administrator to decide whether or how to use these legacy accounts. Note however, that each has
an identity, password, and privilege level.
While the Authorized Administrator can create or otherwise modify accounts freely, other users cannot change their
own (or any other) security attributes. Note that the TOE supports a password enforcement configuration where the
minimum password length can be set by an administrator up to 32 characters. Passwords can be created using any
alphabetic, numeric, and a wide range of special characters (identified in FIA_PMG_EXT.1).
Alternative authentication mechanisms can also be configured by an Authorized Administrator using an
Authentication Method List. This allows some flexibility in setting up authentication mechanisms when desired. The
available mechanisms include Local User Accounts configured on the device. Local authentication methods include
both password-based and public-key-based authentication. When authentication is successful, the TOE provides the
associated user with applicable (role-based) privileges.
The Authentication Method List is ordered so that it will be processed from first to last. In each case, the user
authentication will succeed, fail, or result in an error. If a given authentication method succeeds, the user will be
logged in and will be able to perform functions according to their privilege level. If a given authentication mechanism
fails, the user will be denied a login session. If the point is reached where every authentication method on the list
fails, only an authorized administrator whose password is not rejected will succeed in logging in to the system.
The Authorized Administrator can set a lockout failure count for remote login attempts (the default is 3 attempts). If
the count is exceeded, the targeted account is locked until a configured amount of time passes. The local administrator
account never gets locked out.
The Identification and authentication function satisfies the following security functional requirements:
 NDcPP21:FIA_AFL.1: The administrator can set a maximum remote login failure number. If that is
exceeded, the account is locked until a configured amount of time passes.
 NDcPP21:FIA_PMG_EXT.1: The TOE implements a rich set of password composition constraints as
described above.
 NDcPP21:FIA_UAU.7: The TOE does not echo passwords as they are entered; rather ‘*’ characters are
echoed when entering passwords.
 NDcPP21:FIA_UAU_EXT.2: The TOE uses local password-based authentication, SSH public key, SSH
X.509 certificates and RADIUS authentication to login authorized administrative users remotely and locally.
 NDcPP21:FIA_UIA_EXT.1: The TOE does not offer any services or access to its functions, except for the
networking and SAN services and displaying a message of the day banner, without requiring a user to be
identified and authenticated.
 NDcPP21:FIA_X509_EXT.1/Rev: OCSP is supported for X509v3 certificate validation for TLS and SSH.
Certificates are validated as part of the authentication process when they are presented to the TOE and when
they are loaded into the TOE. The revocation checking is the same in both instances. The following fields
are verified as appropriate: SAN checks, CN checks, key usages, chain validation, and lastly expiration status.
The common name (or SAN values if present) needs to be an IP address (IPv4 or IPv6). Wildcards are not
allowed in certificates.
 NDcPP21:FIA_X509_EXT.2: Certificates are checked and if found not valid are not accepted or if the OCSP
server cannot be contacted for validity checks, then the certificate is not accepted.
 NDcPP21:FIA_X509_EXT.3: The TOE generates certificate requests and validates the CA used to sign the
certificates.
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6.4 Security management
The TOE associates each defined user account with a privilege level. The most privileged level is Authorized
Administrator (with regards to the requirements in this Security Target users with lesser privilege levels are referred
to collectively simply as TOE users). The TOE implements an internal access control mechanism that bases decisions
about the use of functions and access to TOE data on those privilege levels. In this manner, the TOE is able to ensure
that only the Authorized Administrator can access audit configuration data, information flow policy ACLs, user and
administrator security attributes (including passwords and privilege levels), the logon failure threshold, the remote
access user list; and cryptographic support settings including trust store access.
Other than the Authorized Administrator role, the TOE implements a Read Only level where only basic commands
can be issued and no changes can be made and a Port Configuration level where non-security device parameters can
be managed. Collectively, this ST refers to all users of the TOE as “TOE Users” where the “Authorized Administrator”
is a subset of that broader role.
The TOE offers command line functions which are accessible via the CLI. The CLI is a text-based interface which
can be accessed from a directly connected terminal or via a remote terminal using SSH. These command line functions
can be used to effectively manage every security policy, as well as the non-security relevant aspects of the TOE. The
administrator can use the REST API and NetConf interface to perform the same functions as the CLI.
Once authenticated (none of these functions is available to any user before being identified and authenticated),
authorized administrators have access to the following security functions:
 Ability to administer the TOE locally and remotely;
 Ability to update the TOE, and to verify the updates using digital signature capability
prior to installing those updates;
 Ability to configure a login banner;
 Ability to configure the session inactivity time before session termination or locking;
 Ability to configure the authentication failure parameters for FIA_AFL.1;
 Ability to configure audit behavior;
 Ability to set the time which is used for time-stamps;
 Ability to modify the behavior of the transmission of audit data to an external IT entity,
the handling of audit data, and the audit functionality when Local Audit Storage Space
is full;
 Ability to manage the cryptographic keys;
 Ability to configure the cryptographic functionality;
 Ability to manage the cryptographic keys;
 Ability to manage the TOE's trust store and designate X509.v3 certificates as trust
anchors;
 Ability to import X509v3 certificates to the TOE's trust store;
 Ability to configure thresholds for SSH rekeying;
 Ability to set the time which is used for time-stamps;
 Ability to configure NTP
The Security management function satisfies the following security functional requirements:
 NDcPP21:FMT_MOF.1/ManualUpdate: Only the authorized administrator can update the TOE.
 NDcPP21:FMT_MTD.1/CoreData: Security management is restricted to administrators.
 NDcPP21:FMT_MTD.1/CryptoKeys: Only administrators can perform management operations including
the command to generate and delete cryptographic keys.
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 NDcPP21:FMT_SMF.1: The TOE provides administrative interfaces to perform the functions identified
above.
 NDcPP21:FMT_SMR.2: The TOE maintains administrative user roles.
6.5 Protection of the TSF
The TOE is an appliance and as such is designed to work independent of other components. While the administrative
interface is function rich, the TOE is designed specifically to not provide access to locally stored passwords and also,
while cryptographic keys can be entered, the TOE does not disclose any cryptographic keys stored in the TOE. All
cryptographic keys are stored in an area of the filesystem not accessible to users and no user interface is provided to
access the cryptographic keys. Dynamically generated cryptographic keys, such as for SSH sessions, are stored in
RAM only. Cryptographic keys that are stored in the filesystem are protected from access by administrators.
The TOE is a hardware appliance that includes a hardware-based real-time clock. The TOE’s embedded OS manages
the clock and exposes administrator clock-related functions. The clock is used to provide timestamp for audit records,
measuring session inactivity, and supporting timing elements of cryptographic functions. The TOE also implements
the timing elements through timeout functionality due to inactivity for terminating both local and remote sessions.
The TOE performs cryptographic algorithm tests, firmware integrity and load tests, and critical function tests.
Furthermore, the TOE is designed to query each pluggable module which in turn includes its own diagnostics that will
serve to help identify any failing modules. The TOE also includes a set of power on self-tests for the cryptographic
functions.
The TOE supports loading a new software image manually by the administrator using CLI commands. From the CLI,
an administrator can use either TFTP or SCP in order to download a software image. In either case, prior to actually
installing and using the new software image, its digital signature is verified by the TOE. An unverified image cannot
be installed.
The Protection of the TSF function satisfies the following security functional requirements:
 NDcPP21:FPT_APW_EXT.1: The TOE does not offer any functions that will disclose to any user a plain
text password. Furthermore, locally defined passwords are not stored in plaintext form.
 NDcPP21:FPT_SKP_EXT.1: The TOE does not offer any functions that will disclose to any users a stored
cryptographic key.
 NDcPP21:FPT_STM_EXT.1: The TOE includes its own hardware clock and can synchronize with a NTP
server.
 NDcPP21:FPT_TST_EXT.1: The TOE includes a number of power-on diagnostics and cryptographic self-
tests that will serve to ensure the TOE is functioning properly. The tests include cryptographic known answer
tests, firmware integrity tests, ensure memory and flash can be accessed as expected, to ensure that software
checksums are correct, and also to test the presence and function of plugged devices.
The firmware signature is validated before it is loaded and executed.
The random number generator is tested before all the algorithm testing is started.
The known answer tests include AES-128-CBC, RSA-2048-SHA256, SHA256, SHA384, SHA512, HMAC-
SHA224, HMAC-SHA256 and HMAC-SHA512.
 Upon failing any of its cryptographic-based power-on self-tests, the TOE will continuously reboot.
 NDcPP21:FPT_TUD_EXT.1: The TOE provides function to query the version and upgrade the software
embedded in the TOE appliance. When installing updated software, digital signatures are used to authenticate
the update to ensure it is the update intended and originated by Extreme Networks.
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6.6 TOE access
The TOE can be configured to display a login banner. The login banner can be configured to display welcome
information in conjunction with login prompts. It will be displayed when accessing the TOE via the console and SSH.
The TOE can be configured by an administrator to set a session timeout value (any value up to 240 minutes, with 0
disabling the timeout) – the default timeout is disabled. A session (local or remote) that is inactive (i.e., no commands
issuing from the local or remote client) for the defined timeout value will be terminated.
The user will be required to login in after any session has been terminated due to inactivity or after voluntary
termination. Administrators can logout of local or remote sessions at any time.
The TOE access function satisfies the following security functional requirements:
 NDcPP21:FTA_SSL.3: The TOE terminates remote sessions that have been inactive for an administrator-
configured period of time.
 NDcPP21:FTA_SSL.4: The TOE provides the function to logout (or terminate) the both local and remote
user sessions as directed by the user.
 NDcPP21:FTA_SSL_EXT.1: The TOE terminates local sessions that have been inactive for an
administrator-configured period of time.
 NDcPP21:FTA_TAB.1: The TOE can be configured to display administrator-defined advisory banners when
administrators successfully establish interactive sessions with the TOE, allowing administrators to terminate
their session prior to performing any functions
6.7 Trusted path/channels
The TOE provides a trusted path for its remote administrative users accessing the TOE via the Ethernet ports provided
on the TOE using the CLI over SSH, NetConf over SSH, or REST APIs over HTTPS/TLS. Note that local
administrator access via the serial port is also allowed for command line access. However this access is protected by
physical protection of the serial interface along with the TOE itself.
When an administrator attempts to connect to the TOE remotely, the TOE attempts to negotiate a session. If the session
cannot be negotiated, the connection is dropped.
Remote connections to third-party servers are supported for exporting audit records to an external audit server.
Communication with an external servers is protected using TLS (as specified earlier).
In all cases, the endpoints are assured by virtue of the certificates installed, trusted, and reviewable when connecting
and by virtue of user authentication.
The Trusted path/channels function satisfies the following security functional requirements:
 NDcPP21:FTP_ITC.1: In the evaluated configuration, the TOE must be configured to use TLS to ensure that
exported audit records are sent only to the configured server so they are not subject to inappropriate disclosure
or modification as the TOE validates the audit server and against the TOE configuration using the certificates
presented during TLS negotiation. The TOE also uses TLS to protect RADIUS communications.
 NDcPP21:FTP_TRP.1/Admin: The TOE provides SSH, NetConf, and REST APIs (HTTPS) to ensure secure
remote administration. In each case, the administrator can initiate the remote session, the remote session is
secured (disclosure and modification) using CAVP tested cryptographic operations, and all remote security
management functions require the use of one of these secure channels.