CombICAO Applet in EAC with PACE Configuration on Cosmo v9 Public Security Target © IDEMIA. All rights reserved. Specifications and information are subject to change without notice. The products described in this document are subject to continuous development and improvement. All trademarks and service marks referred to herein, whether registered or not in specific countries, are the properties of their respective owners. - Printed versions of this document are uncontrolled - CombICAO Applet in EAC with PACE Configuration on Cosmo v9 Public Security Target 2 | 104 DOCUMENT MANAGEMENT Business Unit – Department PSI Document type Public FQR Document Title CombICAO Applet in EAC with PACE Configuration on Cosmo v9 Public Security Target FQR No 110 9318 FQR Issue 3 DOCUMENT REVISION Date Revision Modification 14/10/2019 1.0 Creation based on the full ST 29/10/2019 2.0 Update AGD version 20/11/2019 3.0 Review and Update CombICAO Applet in EAC with PACE Configuration on Cosmo v9 Public Security Target 3 | 104 Table of contents TABLE OF CONTENTS ....................................................................................................... 3 TABLE OF FIGURES .......................................................................................................... 5 TABLE OF TABLES............................................................................................................. 5 1 GENERAL............................................................................................................... 6 1.1 INTRODUCTION................................................................................................................ 6 1.2 PRODUCT OVERVIEW ......................................................................................................... 6 2 ST INTRODUCTION............................................................................................... 7 2.1 ST REFERENCE AND TOE REFERENCE..................................................................................... 7 2.1.1 ST reference.......................................................................................................... 7 2.1.2 TOE reference........................................................................................................ 7 2.2 TOE OVERVIEW ............................................................................................................... 8 2.2.1 Usage and major security features of the TOE ......................................................... 8 2.2.2 TOE type ..............................................................................................................10 2.2.3 Required non-TOE hardware/Software/firmware .....................................................10 2.3 TOE DESCRIPTION ..........................................................................................................11 2.3.1 Physical scope of the TOE......................................................................................11 2.3.2 TOE delivery.........................................................................................................11 2.3.3 Logical scope of the TOE .......................................................................................13 2.3.4 Authentication Protocols ........................................................................................14 2.3.5 Other features ......................................................................................................15 2.3.6 TOE life cycle........................................................................................................16 2.3.7 Development Environment.....................................................................................17 2.3.8 Production Environment ........................................................................................17 2.3.9 Preparation Environment .......................................................................................18 2.3.10 Operational Environment .......................................................................................18 3 CONFORMANCE CLAIMS..................................................................................... 19 3.1 COMMON CRITERIA CONFORMANCE ......................................................................................19 3.2 PROTECTION PROFILE CONFORMANCE ...................................................................................19 3.2.1 Overview..............................................................................................................19 3.2.2 Assumptions .........................................................................................................19 3.2.3 Threats ................................................................................................................20 3.2.4 Organisational Security Policies..............................................................................20 3.2.5 Security Objectives................................................................................................20 3.3 CC CONFORMANCE AND USAGE IN REAL LIFE ...........................................................................21 4 SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION ..................................................................... 22 4.1 ASSETS.........................................................................................................................22 4.1.1 Biometric Data ......................................................................................................22 4.1.2 Authenticity of the MRTDs chip ..............................................................................23 4.1.3 User data stored on the TOE..................................................................................23 4.1.4 User data transferred between the TOE and the terminal connected ........................23 4.1.5 MRTD tracing data ................................................................................................23 4.1.6 Accessibility to the TOE functions and data only for authorised subjects ...................23 4.1.7 Genuineness of the TOE ........................................................................................23 4.1.8 TOE intrinsic secret cryptographic keys...................................................................24 4.1.9 MRTD communication establishment authorisation data ..........................................24 4.2 SUBJECTS......................................................................................................................25 CombICAO Applet in EAC with PACE Configuration on Cosmo v9 Public Security Target 4 | 104 4.3 THREATS.......................................................................................................................28 4.4 ORGANISATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES ..................................................................................32 4.5 ASSUMPTIONS ................................................................................................................34 5 SECURITY OBJECTIVES ...................................................................................... 35 5.1 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE TOE ...................................................................................35 5.2 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT ....................................................38 5.2.1 Issuing State or Organisation.................................................................................38 5.2.2 Receiving State or Organisation .............................................................................39 5.2.3 Travel document Issuer as the general responsible .................................................40 5.2.4 Travel document Issuer and CVCA: travel document's PKI (issuing) branch ..............40 5.2.5 Terminal operator: Terminal's receiving branch.......................................................41 5.2.6 Travel document holder Obligations .......................................................................41 5.3 SECURITY OBJECTIVES RATIONALE.......................................................................................41 5.3.1 Threats ................................................................................................................41 5.3.2 Organisational Security Policies ..............................................................................44 5.3.3 Assumptions .........................................................................................................46 5.3.4 SPD and Security Objectives ..................................................................................46 6 EXTENDED REQUIREMENTS ............................................................................... 50 6.1 EXTENDED FAMILIES ........................................................................................................50 6.1.1 Extended Family FPT_EMS - TOE Emanation...........................................................50 6.1.2 Extended Family FIA_API - Authentication Proof of Identity.....................................51 6.1.3 Extended Family FMT_LIM - Limited capabilities......................................................51 6.1.4 Extended Family FAU_SAS - Audit data storage.......................................................52 6.1.5 Extended Family FCS_RND - Generation of random numbers...................................53 7 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS ................................................................................ 54 7.1 SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS ................................................................................54 7.1.1 Class FCS Cryptographic Support ...........................................................................54 7.1.2 Class FIA Identification and Authentication .............................................................58 7.1.3 Class FDP User Data Protection..............................................................................61 7.1.4 Class FTP Trusted Path/Channels ...........................................................................64 7.1.5 Class FAU Security Audit........................................................................................65 7.1.6 Class FMT Security Management............................................................................65 7.1.7 Class FPT Protection of the Security Functions ........................................................70 7.2 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS RATIONALE ..................................................................................71 7.2.1 Objectives ............................................................................................................71 7.2.2 Rationale tables of Security Objectives and SFRs.....................................................77 7.2.3 Dependencies .......................................................................................................82 7.2.4 Rationale for the Security Assurance Requirements .................................................85 8 TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION......................................................................... 86 8.1 TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION...........................................................................................86 8.2 SFRS AND TSS...............................................................................................................90 8.2.1 SFRs and TSS - Rationale ......................................................................................90 8.2.2 Association tables of SFRs and TSS ........................................................................90 9 GLOSSARY AND ACRONYMS............................................................................... 95 9.1 GLOSSARY .....................................................................................................................95 9.2 ACRONYMS ..................................................................................................................102 10 REFERENCES..................................................................................................... 103 CombICAO Applet in EAC with PACE Configuration on Cosmo v9 Public Security Target 5 | 104 Table of figures Figure 1 Physical Form of the Module ............................................................................................11 Figure 2 TOE Boundaries ..............................................................................................................13 Figure 3 Life cycle Overview..........................................................................................................16 Table of tables Table 1 ST reference 7 Table 2 TOE reference 7 Table 3 PACE configuration 15 Table 4 Roles identification on the life cycle 16 Table 5 Image containing both Java Card platform and applet is loaded at IC manufacturer (Option 1) 18 Table 6 Cap file of CombICAO applet is loaded (using GP) (Option 2) 18 Table 7 Image containing both platform and applet is loaded through the loader of the IC (Option 3) 18 Table 8 Common Criteria conformance claim 19 Table 9 Protection Profile conformance 19 Table 10 Threats and Security Objectives - Coverage 47 Table 11 Security Objectives and Threats - Coverage 48 Table 12 OSPs and Security Objectives - Coverage 48 Table 13 Security Objectives and OSPs - Coverage 49 Table 14 Assumptions and Security Objectives for the Operational Environment - Coverage 49 Table 15 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment and Assumptions - Coverage 49 Table 16 Security Objectives and SFRs - Coverage 79 Table 17 SFRs and Security Objectives 81 Table 18 SFRs Dependencies 84 Table 19 SARs Dependencies 85 Table 20 SFRs and TSS - Coverage 93 Table 21 TSS and SFRs - Coverage 94 CombICAO Applet in EAC with PACE Configuration on Cosmo v9 Public Security Target 6 | 104 1 GENERAL 1.1 Introduction This public security target describes the security needs induced by the CombICAO Applet product in EAC with PACE configuration on IDEMIA underlying Java Card ID-ONE Cosmo V9 Essential, see 2.1.2 . The objectives of this Security Target are:  To describe the Target of Evaluation (TOE), its life cycle and to position it in the smart card life cycle,  To describe the security environment of the TOE including the assets to be protected and the threats to be countered by the TOE and by the operational environment during the platform active phases,  To describe the security objectives of the TOE and its supporting environment in terms of integrity and confidentiality of sensitive information. It includes protection of the TOE (and its documentation) during the product active phases,  To specify the security requirements which include the TOE functional requirements, the TOE assurance requirements and the security requirements for the environment,  To describe the summary of the TOE specification including a description of the security functions and assurance measures that meet the TOE security requirements,  To present evidence that this ST is a complete and cohesive set of requirements that the TOE provides on an effective set of IT security countermeasures within the security environment, and that the TOE summary specification addresses the requirements. 1.2 Product overview The product is designed to support the following usages: 1. eMRTD as per [ICAO_9303]; scope of the current ST 2. ISO compliant driving license as per [ISO/IEC_18013] and [ISO/IEC_19446]; (out of the scope of the current ST) 3. digital identity and electronic services; (out of the scope of the current ST) It is achieved thanks to a flexible design allowing to “build” during personalization of the applet the required application(s) by configuring accordingly:  the file system;  authentication protocols;  the user authentication credentials;  Access conditions on files. The product can be personalized to support an eMRTD application compliant with [ICAO_9303]. The TOE can be configured in four configurations ways. However, the current ST addresses CombICAO Applet in eMRTD configuration (1) below. 1) CombICAO Applet product in EAC with PACE configuration, 2) CombICAO Applet product in BAC configuration with CA, 3) CombICAO Applet product in EAC configuration, 4) CombICAO Applet product in PACE configuration with CA. CombICAO Applet in EAC with PACE Configuration on Cosmo v9 Public Security Target 7 | 104 2 ST INTRODUCTION 2.1 ST reference and TOE reference 2.1.1 ST reference Title CombICAO Applet in EAC with PACE configuration on Cosmo V9– Security Target ST Identification FQR 110 9318 ST Version 3 CC Version 3.1 revision 5 Authors IDEMIA ITSEF Brightsight Certification Body TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. EAL EAL5 augmented with:  ALC_DVS.2  AVA_VAN.5 PP [PP_EACwPACE] Table 1 ST reference 2.1.2 TOE reference Product Name CombICAO Applet TOE Name CombICAO Applet in EAC with PACE configuration on ID-ONE Cosmo V9 Essential Developer Name IDEMIA TOE Identification SAAAAR code: 203297 Platform Name ID-One Cosmo V9 Essential Platform Platform Identification 089233 Platform Certificate [PTF_CERT] Guidance Documents [Applet_Perso_Guide], [Applet_User_Guide] [PTF_AGD_OPE], [PTF_AGD_PRE], [PTF_AGD1], [PTF_AGD2] and [PTF_AGD_SEC_AC] Table 2 TOE reference In order to assure the authenticity of the card, the TOE Identification shall be verified by analyzing the response of the command GET DATA, see section 4 of [Applet_Perso_Guide]. CombICAO Applet in EAC with PACE Configuration on Cosmo v9 Public Security Target 8 | 104 2.2 TOE overview 2.2.1 Usage and major security features of the TOE A State or Organization issues MRTDs to be used by the holder for international travel. The traveler presents a MRTD to the inspection system to prove his or her identity. The MRTD in context of this Security Target contains (i) visual (eye readable) biographical data and portrait of the holder, (ii) a separate data summary (MRZ data) for visual and machine reading using OCR methods in the Machine readable zone (MRZ) and (iii) data elements on the MRTD’s chip according to LDS for contactless machine reading. The authentication of the traveler is based on (i) the possession of a valid MRTD personalized for a holder with the claimed identity as given on the biographical data page and (ii) optional biometrics using the reference data stored in the MRTD. The issuing State or Organization ensures the authenticity of the data of genuine MRTD’s. The receiving State trusts a genuine MRTD of an issuing State or Organization. The MRTD is viewed as unit of (a) the physical MRTD as travel document in form of paper, plastic and chip. It presents visual readable data including (but not limited to) personal data of the MRTD holder (1) the biographical data on the biographical data page of the passport book, (2) the printed data in the Machine-Readable Zone (MRZ) and (3) the printed portrait. (b) the logical MRTD as data of the MRTD holder stored according to the Logical Data Structure [ICAO_9303] as specified by ICAO on the contactless integrated circuit. It presents contactless readable data including (but not limited to) personal data of the MRTD holder (1) the digital Machine Readable Zone Data (digital MRZ data, EF.DG1), (2) the digitized portraits (EF.DG2), (3) the optional biometric reference data of finger(s) (EF.DG3) or iris image(s) (EF.DG4) or both (4) the other data according to LDS (EF.DG5 to EF.DG16) and (5) the Document security object. The issuing State or Organization implements security features of the MRTD to maintain the authenticity and integrity of the MRTD and their data. The MRTD as the passport book and the MRTD’s chip is uniquely identified by the Document Number. The physical MRTD is protected by physical security measures (e.g. watermark on paper, security printing), logical (e.g. authentication keys of the MRTD’s chip) and organizational security measures (e.g. control of materials, personalization procedures) [ICAO_9303]. These security measures include the binding of the MRTD’s chip to the passport book. The logical MRTD is protected in authenticity and integrity by a digital signature created by the document signer acting for the issuing State or Organization and the security features of the MRTD’s chip. The ICAO defines the baseline security methods Passive Authentication and the optional advanced security methods Basic Access Control to the logical MRTD, Extended Access Control to and the Data Encryption of additional sensitive biometrics as optional security measure in the ‘ICAO Doc 9303’ [ICAO_9303]. The Passive Authentication Mechanism and the Data Encryption are performed completely and independently on the TOE by the TOE environment. This Public Security Target addresses the protection of the logical travel document (i) in integrity by write-only-once access control and by physical means, and (ii) in confidentiality by the Extended CombICAO Applet in EAC with PACE Configuration on Cosmo v9 Public Security Target 9 | 104 Access Control Mechanism. Also it addresses the Chip Authentication Version 1 described in [TR_03110] as an alternative to the Active Authentication stated in [ICAO_9303]. If BAC is supported by the TOE, the travel document has to be evaluated and certified separately. This is due to the fact that [PP_BAC] does only consider extended basic attack potential to the Basic Access Control Mechanism (i.e. AVA_VAN.3). During the prepersonalization and personalisation, the Personalisation Agent, once authenticated, gets the rights (access control) for (1) reading and writing data,(2) instantiating the application, and (4) writing of personalization data. The Personalisation Agent can so create the file structure (MF / ADF) required for this configuration. Mutatis mutandis, the TOE may also be used as an ISO driving license, compliant to ISO/IEC 18013 or ISO/IEC TR 19446 supporting BAP-1 (the same protocol as BAC but used in the context of driving license), AA and CA, as both applications (MRTD and IDL) share the same protocols and data structure organization. Therefore, in the rest of the document, the word “MRTD” MAY be understood either as a MRTD in the sense of ICAO, or a driving license compliant to ISO/IEC 18013 or ISO/IEC TR 19446 depending on the targeted usage envisioned by the issuer. The table below indicates how terms and concept present in the current document shall be read when considering the TOE to be an ISO driving license: MRTD ISO driving licence MRTD IDL ICAO ISO/IEC ICAO 9303 ISO/IEC 18013 or ISO/IEC TR 19446 BAC BAP-1 DG3 DG7 DG4 DG8 DG15 DG13 MRZ or CAN MRZ or SAI (Scanning area identifier) Traveler Holder NB: the ISO driving license is out of the scope of the current ST and not evaluated. The protection of the communication provided by Password Authenticated Connection Establishment (PACE) is a mandatory security feature of the TOE. The travel document shall strictly conform to the ‘Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document using Standard Inspection Procedure with PACE ([PP_PACE]). Note that [PP_PACE] considers high attack potential. For the PACE protocol according to [ICAO_TR_SAC], the following steps shall be performed: (i) the travel document's chip encrypts a nonce with the shared password, derived from the MRZ resp. CAN data and transmits the encrypted nonce together with the domain parameters to the terminal. (ii) The terminal recovers the nonce using the shared password, by (physically) reading the MRZ resp. CAN data. (iii) The travel document's chip and terminal computer perform a Diffie-Hellmann key agreement together with the ephemeral domain parameters to create a shared secret. Both parties derive the session keys KMAC and KENC from the shared secret. (iv) Each party generates an authentication token, sends it to the other party and verifies the received token. After successful key negotiation the terminal and the travel document's chip provide private communication (secure messaging) [TR_03110], [ICAO_TR_SAC]. CombICAO Applet in EAC with PACE Configuration on Cosmo v9 Public Security Target 10 | 104 The Security Target requires the TOE to implement the Extended Access Control as defined in [TR_03110]. The Extended Access Control consists of two parts (i) the Chip Authentication Protocol Version 1 and (ii) the Terminal Authentication Protocol Version 1 (v.1). The Chip Authentication Protocol v.1 (i) authenticates the travel document’s chip to the inspection system and (ii) establishes secure messaging which is used by Terminal Authentication v.1 to protect the confidentiality and integrity of the sensitive biometric reference data during their transmission from the TOE to the inspection system. Therefore Terminal Authentication v.1 can only be performed if Chip Authentication v.1 has been successfully executed. The Terminal Authentication Protocol v.1 consists of (i) the authentication of the inspection system as entity authorized by the receiving State or Organisation through the issuing State, and (ii) an access control by the TOE to allow reading the sensitive biometric reference data only to successfully authenticated authorized inspection systems. The issuing State or Organisation authorizes the receiving State by means of certification the authentication public keys of Document Verifiers who create Inspection System Certificates. 2.2.2 TOE type The TOE is a composite product made up of an Embedded Software developed using Java Card technology, composed on a Java Card open platform. Both developed by IDEMIA. The underlying Java Card open platform has already been certified, please see [PTF_CERT]. The TOE embedded is the dual (contactless and/or contact) integrated circuit chip of machine readable travel documents (MRTD’s chip) programmed according to the Logical Data Structure (LDS) and providing :  Password Authenticated Connection Establishment (PACE)  Extended Access Control (EAC)  Chip Authentication (CA)  Terminal Authentication (TA) Please refer to 2.3.2 TOE delivery section for more details on TOE deliveries 2.2.3 Required non-TOE hardware/Software/firmware There is no explicit non-TOE hardware, software or firmware required by the TOE to perform its claimed security features. The TOE is defined to comprise the chip and the complete operating system and application. Note, the inlay holding the chip as well as the antenna and the booklet (holding the printed MRZ) are needed to represent a complete MRTD, nevertheless these parts are not inevitable for the secure operation of the TOE. Note: In particular, the TOE may be used in contact mode, without any inlay or antenna. CombICAO Applet in EAC with PACE Configuration on Cosmo v9 Public Security Target 11 | 104 2.3 TOE description 2.3.1 Physical scope of the TOE The TOE is physically made up of several components hardware and software. Once constructed, the TOE is a bare microchip with its external interfaces for communication. The physical medium on which the microchip is mounted is not part of the target of evaluation as it does not alter nor modify any security functions of the TOE. The TOE may be used on several physical medium within an inlay, or eCover; in a plastic card are not part of the TOE. The physical form of the module is depicted in Figure below. The cryptographic boundary of the module is the surface and edges of the die and associated bond pads, shown as circles in the following figure Figure 1 Physical Form of the Module 2.3.2 TOE delivery The TOE is composed of:  Circuitry of the MRTD’s chip (the IC) :  IC Dedicated Software with the parts IC Dedicated Test Software and IC Dedicated Support Software  ID-ONE Cosmo V9 Essential: see [ST_PTF] and [PTF_CERT]  CombICAO application  Associated guidance documentation (delivered in electronic version) CombICAO Applet in EAC with PACE Configuration on Cosmo v9 Public Security Target 12 | 104 This ST Lite will also be provided as a guidance document along with above-mentioned documents. TOE Component Identification Form Factor of Delivery Delivery method CombICAO applet for MRTD 203297 ID1 or ID3 Passport booklets ID1 cards or ID3 holder pages Antenna1 inlays Chip in modules on a reel CPS tool is used in the case of an Image delivery. Otherwise, trusted courier is used. Personalizing Agent [Applet_Perso_Guide] Electronic doc PGP-encrypted parts on USB or CD media, off- line registered distribution by trusted courier End User of the TOE [Applet_Uder_Guide] Underlying platform guidance [PTF_AGD_OPE] [PTF_AGD1] [PTF_AGD2] [PTF_AGD_SEC_AC] [PTF_AGD_PRE] Form factor and Delivery Preparation: 1. As per the Software Development Process of IDEMIA, upon completion of development activities, particular applet will be uploaded into CPS in CAP file format. Before uploading, the applet will be verified through Oracle verifier and IDEMIA verifier. 2. During Release for Sample as project milestone, status of the applet in CPS will be changed into “Pilot version” to be used further for manufacturing samples. 3. During Software Delivery Review as the final R&D project milestone, status of the applet in CPS will be changed into “Industrial release” to be used further for mass production. 1 The inlay production including the application of the antenna is not part of the TOE CombICAO Applet in EAC with PACE Configuration on Cosmo v9 Public Security Target 13 | 104 Figure 2 TOE Boundaries 2.3.3 Logical scope of the TOE The TOE is a smartcard, composed of :  IC,  Java Card Open Platform (OS) and  CombICAO application (data storage file structure) The TOE scope encompasses the following features:  Chip Authentication  Terminal Authentication  Password Authentication Connection Establishment (PACE v2)  Prepersonalization phase  Personalisation phase The prepersonalization and personalisation are performed by the Manufacturer and the Personalisation Agent, which controls the TOE. All along this phase, the TOE is self-protected, as it requires the authentication of the Manufacturer and the Personalisation Agent prior to any operation. By being authenticated, the Personalisation Agent gets the rights (access control) for (1) reading and writing data,(2) instantiating the application, and (4) writing of personalization data. The Personalisation Agent can so create the file structure (MF / ADF) required for this configuration. CombICAO Applet in EAC with PACE Configuration on Cosmo v9 Public Security Target 14 | 104 2.3.4 Authentication Protocols 2.3.4.1 Terminal Authentication (TA) This protocol enables the MRTD chip to verify that the terminal is entitled to access sensitive data. As the terminal may access sensitive data afterwards, all further communication MUST be protected appropriately. Terminal Authentication therefore also authenticates an ephemeral public key chosen by the terminal that was used to set up Secure Messaging with Chip Authentication. The MRTD chip MUST bind the terminal’s access rights to Secure Messaging established by the authenticated ephemeral public key of the terminal. Terminal Authentication v1 is part of the EACv1 procedure defined in [TR_03110]. 2.3.4.2 Chip Authentication (CA) The Chip Authentication Protocol is an ephemeral-static Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol that provides secure communication and unilateral authentication of the MRTD chip. The protocol establishes Secure Messaging between an MRTD chip and a terminal based on a static key pair stored on the MRTD chip. Chip Authentication is an alternative to the optional ICAO Active Authentication (AA protocol is not supported by the TOE), i.e. it enables the terminal to verify that the MRTD chip is genuine but has two advantages over the original protocol: Challenge Semantics are prevented because the transcripts produced by this protocol are non- transferable. Besides authentication of the MRTD chip this protocol also provides strong session keys. The protocol in version 1 provides implicit authentication of both the MRTD chip itself and the stored data by performing Secure Messaging using the new session keys. The protocol in Version 2 provides explicit authentication of the MRTD chip by verifying the authentication token and implicit authentication of the stored data by performing Secure Messaging using the new session keys. Chip Authentication v1 is part of the EACv1 procedure defined in [TR_03110]. 2.3.4.3 Password Authenticated Connection Establishment (PACE v2) PACE is an access control mechanism that is supplemental to BAC. It is a cryptographically stronger access control mechanism than BAC since it uses asymmetric cryptography compared to BAC’s symmetric cryptography. PACE is realized through five commands: 1. MSE SET – AT command 2. GENERAL AUTHENTICATE command – Encrypted Nonce 3. GENERAL AUTHENTICATE command – Map Nonce 4. GENERAL AUTHENTICATE command – Perform Key Agreement 5. GENERAL AUTHENTICATE command – Mutual Authentication Once the mutual authentication is performed, a secure messaging is available to protect the communication between the chip and the IS. This table lists the supported configurations for PACE protocol: Configuration Mapping Key Algo Key Length (in bytes) Secure Messaging Auth. Token Hash Algo PACE–ECDH–GM– 3DES Generic 3DES 2Key 16 CBC / Retail MAC Retail MAC SHA- 1 PACE–ECDH–GM– Generic AES 16 CBC / CMAC CMAC SHA- CombICAO Applet in EAC with PACE Configuration on Cosmo v9 Public Security Target 15 | 104 AES–128 1 PACE–ECDH–GM– AES–192 Generic AES 24 CBC / CMAC CMAC SHA- 256 PACE–ECDH–GM– AES–256 Generic AES 32 CBC / CMAC CMAC SHA- 256 PACE–ECDH–IM– 3DES Integrated 3DES 2Key 16 CBC / Retail MAC Retail MAC SHA- 1 PACE–ECDH–IM– AES–128 Integrated AES 16 CBC / CMAC CMAC SHA- 1 PACE–ECDH–IM– AES–192 Integrated AES 24 CBC / CMAC CMAC SHA- 256 PACE–ECDH–IM– AES–256 Integrated AES 32 CBC / CMAC CMAC SHA- 256 PACE–ECDH–CAM– AES–128 Chip Authenticatio n AES 16 CBC / CMAC CMAC SHA- 1 PACE–ECDH–CAM– AES–192 Chip Authenticatio n AES 24 CBC / CMAC CMAC SHA- 256 PACE–ECDH–CAM– AES–256 Chip Authenticatio n AES 32 CBC / CMAC CMAC SHA- 256 Table 3 PACE configuration 2.3.5 Other features 2.3.5.1 Automatic BAC phasing out The TOE also supports a mechanism allowing the automatic deactivation of the BAC protocol after the current date (of the TOE) has reached a reference date - chosen by the issuer and configured by the personalization Agent. The current date is the internal date updated through the EAC protocol. Thanks to this feature, it is possible to issue MRTD supporting both PACE and BAC as needed for interoperability reasons, and perform smooth phasing out of the BAC protocol in the medium term (due to its cryptographic weaknesses) during the life time of the issued MRTD, without having to wait for the complete renewal of issued MRTD (> 10 years). The automatic BAC phasing out is part of the TOE. 2.3.5.2 Enhanced protection over Sensitive biometric data reading The access to sensitive biometric data: the fingerprint and iris stored in DG3 and DG4 are protected in accordance with the requirements of the protection profile and specification. Beyond that, the TOE also provides a feature able to ensure a high level of confidentiality when reading these data. The TOE supports a mechanism enforcing to use a minimum cryptographic strength for the confidentiality, integrity and authenticity protection of these sensitive biometric data when being read. This may be useful for issuing authority that do not consider DES algorithm strong enough to ensure a sufficient level of confidentiality. This mechanism allows the TOE to enforce the terminal using a stronger algorithm such as AES 128, or 192 bits, or 256 bits when reading the sensitive biometric data, and deny access to them if this condition is not met (algorithm not strong enough). The enhanced protection over sensitive biometric data reading is part of the TOE. CombICAO Applet in EAC with PACE Configuration on Cosmo v9 Public Security Target 16 | 104 2.3.6 TOE life cycle 2.3.6.1 Life cycle overview The following table presents the TOE roles and the corresponding subject: Roles Subject IC developer IC Manufacturer TOE developer IDEMIA Manufacturer IC manufacturer IC Manufacturer MRTD packaging responsible IDEMIA or another agent IDEMIA Embedded software loading responsible IDEMIA Pre-personalization Agent (Manufacturer Role) IDEMIA or another agent Personalization Agent IDEMIA or another agent Table 4 Roles identification on the life cycle Several life cycles are available, depending when the Flash Code is loaded. The following tables present the subjects following TOE life cycle steps in accordance with the standard smart card life cycle [PP_IC], and describe for each of them, (1) the TOE delivery point and (2) the assurance coverage: The TOE life cycle in the following figure distinguishes stages for development, production, preparation and operational use in accordance with the standard smart card life cycle [PP_IC]. Figure 3 Life cycle Overview CombICAO Applet in EAC with PACE Configuration on Cosmo v9 Public Security Target 17 | 104 2.3.7 Development Environment In this environment, the following two phases take place:  Phase 1: IC Embedded Software Development (Java Card Open Platform components and CombICAO applet)  Phase 2: IC Development The IC Embedded Software Developer is in charge of the specification, development and validation of the software (Java Card Open Platform and CombICAO applet). The IC Developer designs the IC, develops the IC dedicated software and provides information, software or tools to the IC embedded software developer. Roles, actors, sites and coverage for this environment of the product life-cycle are listed in the table below: Role Actor Site Covered by CombICAO Applet Developer IDEMIA MANILA and Courbevoie R&D sites ALC Platform Developer IDEMIA IDEMIA R&D sites Refer to [PTF_CERT] ALC IC Developer IC Manufacturer IC Manufacturer Refer to [PTF_CERT] ALC 2.3.8 Production Environment In this environment, the following two phases take place:  Phase 3: IC manufacturing  Phase 4: Smart card loading The IC manufacturer is responsible for producing the IC (manufacturing, testing, and initialisation). Depending on the intention:  (Option 1) the developer sends the image (containing both the Java Card platform and the CombICAO applet) to be flashed in the IC to the IC manufacturer in the phase 3. Or  (Option 2) the platform developer sends the image (containing only the Java Card platform) to be flashed in the IC to the IC manufacturer in the phase 3. Once the Java Card platform has been loaded, the package of CombICAO is securely delivered from the applet developer to the smart card loader. The cap file of the applet is then loaded (using GP) in the Java Card platform by the smart card loader in phase 4 at IDEMIA audited site. Or  (Option 3) the developer sends the image (containing both the Java Card platform and the CombICAO applet) to be loaded in Flash (using the loader of the IC) to the smart card loader in phase 4. Several life cycles are available, depending when the Flash Code is loaded. The following tables present roles, actors, sites and coverage for this for this environment of the product life-cycle and describe for each of them the TOE delivery point. CombICAO Applet in EAC with PACE Configuration on Cosmo v9 Public Security Target 18 | 104 Role Package to be loaded Actor Site Covered by IC manufacturer Image containing both platform and applet manufactur er IC manufacturer production plants [PTF_CERT] ALC Smart card loader - - - - TOE Delivery Point Table 5 Image containing both Java Card platform and applet is loaded at IC manufacturer (Option 1) Role Package to be loaded Actor Site Covered by IC manufacturer Image containing only Java Card Platform manufactur er IC manufacturer production plants Refer to [PTF_CERT] ALC Smart card loader Cap file of the applet IDEMIA IDEMIA plant (Shenzhen, Haarlem, Vitré) ALC TOE Delivery Point Table 6 Cap file of CombICAO applet is loaded (using GP) (Option 2) Role Package to be loaded Actor Site Covered by IC manufacturer - - - - TOE Delivery Point Smart card loader Image containing both the platform and applet IDEMIA or another agent Any AGD Table 7 Image containing both platform and applet is loaded through the loader of the IC (Option 3) 2.3.9 Preparation Environment In this environment, the following two phases take place:  Phase 5: Prepersonalisation of the applet  Phase 6: Personalisation The preparation environment may not necessarily take place in a manufacturing site, but may be performed anywhere. All along these two phases, the TOE is self-protected as it requires the authentication of the prepersonalisation agent or personalisation agent prior to any operation. The CombICAO applet is prepersonalised and personalised according to [Applet_Perso_Guide]. At the end of phase 6, the TOE is constructed. These two phases are covered by [Applet_Perso_Guide] tasks of the TOE and [PTF_AGD_OPE] tasks of [PTF_CERT]. 2.3.10 Operational Environment The TOE is under the control of the User (Signatory and/or Administrator). During this phase, the TOE may be used as described in [Applet_User_Guide] of the TOE. This phase is covered by [Applet_User_Guide] tasks of the TOE and [PTF_AGD_OPE] tasks of [PTF_CERT]. CombICAO Applet in EAC with PACE Configuration on Cosmo v9 Public Security Target 19 | 104 3 Conformance claims 3.1 Common Criteria conformance This Public Security Target claims conformance to [CC_2] and [CC_3]. The conformance to the CC is claimed as follows: CC Conformance Claim Part 2 Conformance with extensions:  FAU_SAS.1 “Audit storage”,  FCS_RND.1 “Quality metric for random numbers”,  FIA_API.1 “Authentication Proof of Identity”,  FMT_LIM.1 “Limited capabilities”,  FMT_LIM.2 “Limited availability”,  FPT_EMS.1 “TOE Emanation”, Part 3 Conformance with package EAL5 augmented with:  ALC_DVS.2 “Sufficiency of security measures” defined in [CC_3],  AVA_VAN.5 “Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis” defined in [CC_3] Table 8 Common Criteria conformance claim 3.2 Protection Profile conformance 3.2.1 Overview This ST claims strict conformance to the following Protection Profile (PP): Title Common Criteria Protection Profile — Machine Readable Travel Document with “ICAO Application”, Extended Access Control with PACE (EAC PP) CC Version 3.1 (Revision 3) Assurance Level The minimum assurance level for this PP is EAL4 augmented Version Number Version 1.3.2, 05th December 2012 Registration BSI-CC-PP-0056-V2-2012 Table 9 Protection Profile conformance This ST also addresses the Manufacturing and Personalization phases at TOE level (cf. § 2.3.6). The additions do not contradict any of the threats, assumptions, organisational policies, objectives or SFRs stated in the [PP_EACwPACE] that covers the advanced security methods PACE and EAC in operational use phase. The following parts list assumptions, threats, OSP, OT and OE for this TOE (i.e. from [PP_EACwPACE] and additional). 3.2.2 Assumptions The following Assumptions are assumed for this TOE:  A.Insp_Sys “Inspection Systems for global interoperability” defined in [PP_EACwPACE],  A.Auth_PKI “PKI for Inspection Systems” defined in [PP_EACwPACE],  A.Passive_Auth “PKI for Passive Authentication” defined in [PP_EACwPACE], CombICAO Applet in EAC with PACE Configuration on Cosmo v9 Public Security Target 20 | 104 3.2.3 Threats The following threats are averted by this TOE:  T.Read_Sensitive_Data “Read the sensitive biometric reference data” defined in [PP_EACwPACE],  T.Counterfeit “Counterfeit of travel document chip data” defined in [PP_EACwPACE],  T.Skimming “Skimming travel document / Capturing Card-Terminal Communication” referenced in [PP_EACwPACE] and defined in [PP_PACE],  T.Eavesdropping “Eavesdropping on the communication between the TOE and the PACE terminal” referenced in [PP_EACwPACE] and defined in [PP_PACE],  T.Tracing “Tracing travel document” referenced in [PP_EACwPACE] and defined in [PP_PACE],  T.Forgery “Forgery of Data” referenced in [PP_EACwPACE] and defined in [PP_PACE],  T.Abuse-Func “Abuse of Functionality” referenced in [PP_EACwPACE] and defined in [PP_PACE],  T.Information_Leakage “Information Leakage from travel document” referenced in [PP_EACwPACE] and defined in [PP_PACE],  T.Phys-Tamper “Physical Tampering” referenced in [PP_EACwPACE] and defined in [PP_PACE],  T.Malfunction “Malfunction due to Environmental Stress” referenced in [PP_EACwPACE] and defined in [PP_PACE],  T.Configuration “Tampering attempt of the TOE during preparation” defined in this ST,  T. Forgery_Supplemental_Data “Forgery of supplemental data stored in the TOE” defined in this ST,  T. BAC_breaking “BAC protocol is broken” defined in this ST. 3.2.4 Organisational Security Policies This TOE complies with the following OSP:  P.Sensitive_Data “Privacy of sensitive biometric reference data” defined in [PP_EACwPACE],  P.Personalisation “Personalisation of the travel document by issuing State or Organisation only” defined in [PP_EACwPACE],  P.Pre-Operational “Pre-operational handling of the travel document” referenced in [PP_EACwPACE] and defined in [PP_PACE],  P.Card_PKI “PKI for Passive Authentication (issuing branch)” referenced in [PP_EACwPACE] and defined in [PP_PACE],  P.Trustworthy_PKI “Trustworthiness of PKI” referenced in [PP_EACwPACE] and defined in [PP_PACE],  P.Manufact “Manufacturing of the travel document’s chip” referenced in [PP_EACwPACE] and defined in [PP_PACE],  P.Terminal “Abilities and trustworthiness of terminals” referenced in [PP_EACwPACE] and defined in [PP_PACE]. 3.2.5 Security Objectives The Security Objectives for this TOE are the following:  OT.Sens_Data_Conf “Confidentiality of sensitive biometric reference data” defined in [PP_EACwPACE],  OT.Chip_Auth_Proof “Proof of the travel document’s chip authenticity” defined in [PP_EACwPACE],  OT.Data_Integrity “Integrity of Data” referenced in [PP_EACwPACE] and defined in [PP_PACE],  OT.Data_Authenticity “Authenticity of Data” referenced in [PP_EACwPACE] and defined in [PP_PACE], CombICAO Applet in EAC with PACE Configuration on Cosmo v9 Public Security Target 21 | 104  OT.Data_Confidentiality “Confidentiality of Data” referenced in [PP_EACwPACE] and defined in [PP_PACE],  OT.Tracing “Tracing travel document” referenced in [PP_EACwPACE] and defined in [PP_PACE],  OT.Prot_Abuse-Func “Protection against Abuse of Functionality” referenced in [PP_EACwPACE] and defined in [PP_PACE],  OT.Prot_Inf_Leak “Protection against Information Leakage” referenced in [PP_EACwPACE] and defined in [PP_PACE],  OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper “Protection against Physical Tampering” referenced in [PP_EACwPACE] and defined in [PP_PACE],  OT.Prot_Malfunction “Protection against Malfunctions” referenced in [PP_EACwPACE] and defined in [PP_PACE],  OT.Identification “Identification of the TOE” referenced in [PP_EACwPACE] and defined in [PP_PACE],  OT.AC_Pers “Access Control for Personalisation of logical MRTD” referenced in [PP_EACwPACE] and defined in [PP_PACE].  OT.Configuration “Protection of the TOE preparation” defined in this ST,  OT.Update_File “Modification of file in Operational Use Phase” defined in this ST,  OT.BAC_Expiration “Automatic deactivation of BAC protocol” defined in this ST,  OT.AC_SM_Level “Access control to sensitive biometric reference data according to SM level” defined in this ST. The Security Objectives for the environment of this TOE are the following:  OE.Auth_Key_Travel_Document “Travel document Authentication Key” defined in [PP_EACwPACE],  OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data “Authorization for Use of Sensitive Biometric Reference Data” defined in [PP_EACwPACE],  OE.Exam_Travel_Document “Examination of the physical part of the travel document” defined in [PP_EACwPACE],  OE.Prot_Logical_Travel_Document “Protection of data from the logical travel document” defined in [PP_EACwPACE],  OE.Ext_Insp_Systems “Authorization of Extended Inspection Systems” defined in [PP_EACwPACE],  OE.Legislative_Compliance “Issuing of the travel document” referenced in [PP_EACwPACE] and defined in [PP_PACE],  OE.Passive_Auth_Sign “Authentication of travel document by Signature” referenced in [PP_EACwPACE] and defined in [PP_PACE],  OE.Personalisation “Personalisation of travel document” referenced in [PP_EACwPACE] and defined in [PP_PACE],  OE.Terminal “Terminal operating” referenced in [PP_EACwPACE] and defined in [PP_PACE]  OE.Travel_Document_Holder “Travel document holder Obligations” referenced in [PP_EACwPACE] and defined in [PP_PACE]. 3.3 CC conformance and usage in real life In the real life, for interoperability purposes, the MRTD will most likely support BAC, PACE and EAC.  If the terminal reads the content of the MRTD by performing BAC then EAC, the security of the MRTD will be covered by the security evaluation of (1) the TOE described by the ST claiming compliance to [PP_BAC] and (2) the TOE described by the ST claiming compliance to [PP_EAC], assuming PACE is not supported (as not used for the inspection procedure)  If the terminal reads the content of the MRTD by performing PACE then EAC, the security of the MRTD will be covered by the security evaluation of the TOE described by the ST claiming compliance to [PP_EACwPACE], assuming BAC is not supported (as not used for the inspection procedure). CombICAO Applet in EAC with PACE Configuration on Cosmo v9 Public Security Target 22 | 104 4 Security Problem Definition 4.1 Assets Overview The following table presents the assets of the TOE and their corresponding phase(s) according to §1.3.6 TOE life cycle: Asset Step 5 Step 6 Step 7 Biometric Data No Yes Yes Personal Data No Yes Yes EF.COM No Yes Yes CA_SK No Yes Yes Session_K Yes Yes Yes PACE_Kmac No No Yes PACE_Kenc No No Yes ephem-Skpicc-PACE No No Yes PACE_PWD No Yes Yes Perso_K No Yes No LCS Yes Yes Yes Updatable data No Yes Yes Table: Assets of the TOE and their corresponding phase(s) The assets to be protected by the TOE include the User Data on the travel document’s chip, user data transferred between the TOE and the terminal, and travel document tracing data from the claimed [PP_PACE], chap 3.1. 4.1.1 Biometric Data Biometric Data The Biometric Data are the Logical MRTD sensitive User Data: sensitive biometric reference data (EF.DG3, EF.DG4). Application Note: (5 in [PP_EACwPACE]): Due to interoperability reasons the [ICAO_9303] requires that Basic Inspection Systems may have access to logical travel document data DG1, DG2, DG5 to DG16. The TOE is not in certified mode, if it is accessed using BAC [ICAO_9303]. Note that the BAC mechanism cannot resist attacks with high attack potential (cf. [PP_BAC]). If supported, it is therefore recommended to use PACE instead of BAC. If nevertheless BAC has to be used, it is recommended to perform Chip Authentication v.1 before getting access to data (except DG14), as this mechanism is resistant to high potential attacks. CombICAO Applet in EAC with PACE Configuration on Cosmo v9 Public Security Target 23 | 104 4.1.2 Authenticity of the MRTDs chip The authenticity of the MRTD’s chip personalized by the issuing State or Organisation for the MRTD holder is used by the traveler to prove his possession of a genuine MRTD. 4.1.3 User data stored on the TOE All data (being not authentication data) stored in the context of the ePassport application of the MRTD as defined in [ICAO_TR_SAC] and being allowed to be read out solely by an authenticated terminal acting as Basic Inspection System with PACE (in the sense of [ICAO_TR_SAC]). This asset covers ‘User Data on the MRTD’s chip’, ‘Logical MRTD Data’ and ‘Sensitive User Data’ in [PP_BAC]. It includes: Personal Data The Personal Data are the logical MRTD standard User Data of the MRTD holder (EF.DG1, EF.DG2, EF.DG5 to EF.DG13, EF.DG16). EF.COM The EF.COM is an elementary file containing the list of the existing elementary files (EF) with the user data. 4.1.4 User data transferred between the TOE and the terminal connected All data (being not authentication data) being transferred in the context of the ePassport application of the MRTD as defined in [ICAO_TR_SAC] between the TOE and an authenticated terminal acting as Basic Inspection System with PACE (in the sense of [ICAO_TR_SAC]). User data can be received and sent (exchange receive, send). 4.1.5 MRTD tracing data Technical information about the current and previous locations of the MRTD gathered unnoticeable by the MRTD holder recognising the TOE not knowing any PACE password. TOE tracing data can be provided / gathered. 4.1.6 Accessibility to the TOE functions and data only for authorised subjects Property of the TOE to restrict access to TSF and TSF-data stored in the TOE to authorised subjects only. 4.1.7 Genuineness of the TOE Property of the TOE to be authentic in order to provide claimed security functionality in a proper way. This asset also covers ‘Authenticity of the MRTD’s chip in [PP_BAC]. CombICAO Applet in EAC with PACE Configuration on Cosmo v9 Public Security Target 24 | 104 4.1.8 TOE intrinsic secret cryptographic keys Permanently or temporarily stored secret cryptographic material used by the TOE in order to enforce its security functionality. It includes: Chip Authentication Private Key (CA_SK) The Chip Authentication Private Key is used by the application to process Chip Authentication. Secure Messaging session keys (Session_K) Session keys are used to secure communication in confidentiality and authenticity. PACE session keys (PACE-Kmac, PACE-Kenc) PACE session keys are secure messaging keys for message authentication and for message encryption agreed between the TOE and a terminal as result of the PACE Protocol. Ephemeral private key PACE (ephem-Skpicc-PACE) The ephemeral PACE Authentication Key Pair is used for Key Agreement Protocol. 4.1.9 MRTD communication establishment authorisation data Restricted-revealable authorisation information for a human user being used for verification of the authorisation attempts as authorised user (PACE password). These data are stored in the TOE and are not to be send to it. It includes: PACE password (PACE_PWD) Password needed for PACE authentication, e.g. CAN or MRZ. Personalization Agent keys (Perso_K) This key set used for mutual authentication between the Personalization agent and the chip, and secure communication establishment. TOE Life Cycle State (LCS) This is the Life Cycle State of the TOE. Updatable Data Data other than Personal Data, Biometric Data, EF.COM, EF.SOD, CA_PK, CA_SK, Pre- Perso_K, Perso_K, Session_K, LCS and Configuration Data which can be modified in Operational Use phase. CombICAO Applet in EAC with PACE Configuration on Cosmo v9 Public Security Target 25 | 104 4.2 Subjects The following table presents the assets of the TOE and their corresponding phase(s) according to §1.2.1 Subject Step 3 Step 4 Step 5 Step 6 Step 7 MRTD Holder No No No No Yes Traveler No No No No Yes Basic Inspection System with PACE No No No No Yes Document Signer No No No Yes No Country Signing Certification Authority No No No Yes No Personalization Agent No No No Yes No IC manufacturer (Manufacturer role) Yes No No No No MRTD packaging responsible (Manufacturer role) No Yes No No No Embedded software loading responsible (Manufacturer role) No Yes No No No Pre-personalization Agent (Manufacturer role) No No Yes No No Country Verifying Certification Authority No No No No Yes Document Verifier No No No No Yes Terminal No No Yes Yes Yes Inspection System No No No No Yes Attacker Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Table – Subjects of the TOE and their corresponding phase(s) MRTD Holder MRTD holder is the travel document holder defined in [PP_PACE]: A person for whom the travel document Issuer has personalised the travel document. This entity is commensurate with ‘MRTD Holder’ in [PP_BAC]. Please note that a travel document holder can also be an attacker. Traveller A person presenting the travel document to a terminal and claiming the identity of the travel document holder. This external entity is commensurate with ‘Traveller’ in [PP_BAC]. Please note that a travel document presenter can also be an attacker. Basic Inspection System with PACE (BIS-PACE) A technical system being used by an inspecting authority and verifying the travel document presenter as the travel document holder (for ePassport: by comparing the real biometric data (face) of the travel document presenter with the stored biometric data (DG2) of the travel document holder). CombICAO Applet in EAC with PACE Configuration on Cosmo v9 Public Security Target 26 | 104 BIS-PACE implements the terminal’s part of the PACE protocol and authenticates itself to the travel document using a shared password (PACE password) and supports Passive Authentication. See also par. 1.2.5 in [PP_PACE]. Document Signer (DS) An organisation enforcing the policy of the CSCA and signing the Document Security Object stored on the travel document for passive authentication. A Document Signer is authorised by the national CSCA issuing the Document Signer Certificate, see [ICAO_9303]. This role is usually delegated to a Personalisation Agent. Country Signing Certification Authority (CSCA) An organisation enforcing the policy of the travel document Issuer with respect to confirming correctness of user and TSF data stored in the travel document. The CSCA represents the country specific root of the PKI for the travel document and creates the Document Signer Certificates within this PKI. The CSCA also issues the self-signed CSCA Certificate having to be distributed by strictly secure diplomatic means, see [ICAO_9303], 5.5.1. Personalisation Agent An organisation acting on behalf of the travel document Issuer to personalise the travel document for the travel document holder by some or all of the following activities: (i) establishing the identity of the travel document holder for the biographic data in the travel document, (ii) enrolling the biometric reference data of the travel document holder, (iii) writing a subset of these data on the physical travel document (optical personalisation) and storing them in the travel document (electronic personalisation) for the travel document holder as defined in [ICAO_9303], (iv) writing the document details data, (v) writing the initial TSF data, (vi) signing the Document Security Object defined in [ICAO_9303] (in the role of DS). Please note that the role ‘Personalisation Agent’ may be distributed among several institutions according to the operational policy of the travel document Issuer. This entity is commensurate with ‘Personalisation agent’ in [PP_BAC]. IC Manufacturer This additional subject is a refinement of the role Manufacturer as described in [PP_PACE]. It is the manufacturer of the IC. If scheme 1 is applied (cf. § 1.3.6), this subject is responsible for the embedded software downloading in the IC. This subject does not use Flash loader, even if it is embedded in the IC MRTD packaging responsible This additional subject is a refinement of the role Manufacturer as described in [PP_PACE]. This subject is responsible for the combination of the IC with hardware for the contactless and/or contact interface. Embedded software loading responsible This additional subject is a refinement of the role Manufacturer as described in [PP_PACE]. This subject is responsible for the embedded software loading when scheme 2 is applied (cf. § 1.3.6). This subject does not exist if scheme 1 is applied (cf. § 1.3.6). This subject used the Flash loader embedded in the IC. CombICAO Applet in EAC with PACE Configuration on Cosmo v9 Public Security Target 27 | 104 Pre-personalization Agent This additional subject is a refinement of the role Manufacturer as described in [PP_PACE]. This subject is responsible for the preparation of the card, i.e. creation of the MF and MRTD ADF. He also sets Personalization Agent keys and Configuration data. Country Verifying Certification Authority (CVCA) The Country Verifying Certification Authority (CVCA) enforces the privacy policy of the issuing State or Organisation with respect to the protection of sensitive biometric reference data stored in the travel document. The CVCA represents the country specific root of the PKI of Inspection Systems and creates the Document Verifier Certificates within this PKI. The updates of the public key of the CVCA are distributed in the form of Country Verifying CA Link-Certificates. Document Verifier (DV) The Document Verifier (DV) enforces the privacy policy of the receiving State with respect to the protection of sensitive biometric reference data to be handled by the Extended Inspection Systems. The Document Verifier manages the authorization of the Extended Inspection Systems for the sensitive data of the travel document in the limits provided by the issuing States or Organisations in the form of the Document Verifier Certificates. Terminal A terminal is any technical system communicating with the TOE through the contactless interface. Note: as the TOE may also be used in contact mode, the terminal may also communicate using the contact interface. Inspection system (IS) A technical system used by the border control officer of the receiving State (i) examining an travel document presented by the traveler and verifying its authenticity and (ii) verifying the traveler as travel document holder. The Extended Inspection System (EIS) performs the Advanced Inspection Procedure (figure1) and therefore (i) contains a terminal for the communication with the travel document’s chip, (ii) implements the terminals part of PACE and/or BAC; (iii) gets the authorization to read the logical travel document either under PACE or BAC by optical reading the travel document providing this information, (iv) implements the Terminal Authentication and Chip Authentication Protocols both Version 1 according to [TR_03110] and (v) is authorized by the issuing State or Organisation through the Document Verifier of the receiving State to read the sensitive biometric reference data. Security attributes of the EIS are defined by means of the Inspection System Certificates. BAC may only be used if supported by the TOE. If both PACE and BAC are supported by the TOE and the BIS, PACE must be used. Attacker Additionally to the definition from [PP_PACE], chap 3.1 the definition of an attacker is refined as followed: A threat agent trying (i) to manipulate the logical travel document without authorization, (ii) to read sensitive biometric reference data (i.e. EF.DG3, EF.DG4), (iii) to forge a genuine travel document, or (iv) to trace a travel document. Application Note: CombICAO Applet in EAC with PACE Configuration on Cosmo v9 Public Security Target 28 | 104 (7 in [PP_EACwPACE]): An impostor is attacking the inspection system as TOE IT environment independent on using a genuine, counterfeit or forged travel document. Therefore the impostor may use results of successful attacks against the TOE but the attack itself is not relevant for the TOE. 4.3 Threats T.Read_Sensitive_Data Adverse action: An attacker tries to gain the sensitive biometric reference data through the communication interface of the travel document’s chip. The attack T.Read_Sensitive_Data is similar to the threat T.Skimming (cf. [PP_BAC]) in respect of the attack path (communication interface) and the motivation (to get data stored on the travel document’s chip) but differs from those in the asset under the attack (sensitive biometric reference data vs. digital MRZ, digitized portrait and other data), the opportunity (i.e. knowing the PACE Password) and therefore the possible attack methods. Note, that the sensitive biometric reference data are stored only on the travel document’s chip as private sensitive personal data whereas the MRZ data and the portrait are visually readable on the physical part of the travel document as well. Threat agent: having high attack potential, knowing the PACE Password, being in possession of a legitimate travel document. Asset: confidentiality of logical travel document sensitive user data (i.e. biometric reference. T.Counterfeit Adverse action: AAn attacker with high attack potential produces an unauthorized copy or reproduction of a genuine travel document’s chip to be used as part of a counterfeit travel document. This violates the authenticity of the travel document’s chip used for authentication of a traveler by possession of a travel document. The attacker may generate a new data set or extract completely or partially the data from a genuine travel document’s chip and copy them to another appropriate chip to imitate this genuine travel document’s chip. Threat agent: having high attack potential, being in possession of one or more legitimate travel documents Asset: authenticity of user data stored on the TOE T.Skimming Adverse action: An attacker imitates an inspection system in order to get access to the user data stored on or transferred between the TOE and the inspecting authority connected via the contactless/contact interface of the TOE.. Threat agent: having high attack potential, cannot read and does not know the correct value of the shared password (PACE password) in advance Asset: confidentiality of logical travel document data Application Note: Application Note (10 in [PP_PACE]): A product using BIS-BAC cannot avert this threat in the context of the security policy defined in [PP_PACE]. Application Note (11 in [PP_PACE]): MRZ is printed and CAN is printed or stuck on the travel document. Please note that neither CAN nor MRZ effectively represent secrets, but are restricted-revealable, cf. OE.Travel_Document_Holder. CombICAO Applet in EAC with PACE Configuration on Cosmo v9 Public Security Target 29 | 104 T.Eavesdropping Adverse action: An attacker is listening to the communication between the travel document and the PACE authenticated BIS-PACE in order to gain the user data transferred between the TOE and the terminal connected. Threat agent: having high attack potential, cannot read and does not know the correct value of the shared password (PACE password) in advance. Asset: confidentiality of logical travel document data. Application Note: Application Note (12 in [PP_PACE]): A product using BIS-BAC cannot avert this threat in the context of the security policy defined in [PP_PACE] T.Tracing Adverse action: An attacker tries to gather TOE tracing data (i.e. to trace the movement of the travel document) unambiguously identifying it remotely by establishing or listening to a communication via the contactless/contact interface of the TOE. Threat agent: having high attack potential, cannot read and does not know the correct value of the shared password (PACE password) in advance. Asset: privacy of the travel document holder. Application Note: Application Note (13 in [PP_PACE]): This Threat completely covers and extends “T.Chip- ID” from [PP_BAC]. Application Note (14 in [PP_PACE]): A product using BAC (whatever the type of the inspection system is: BIS-BAC) cannot avert this threat in the context of the security policy defined in [PP_PACE], see also the par. 1.2.5 in [PP_PACE]. Application Note (15 in [PP_PACE]): Since the Standard Inspection Procedure does not support any unique-secret-based authentication of the travel document’s chip (no Chip Authentication), a threat like T.Counterfeit (counterfeiting travel document) cannot be averted by the current TOE. Application Note: As our TOE supports Chip Authentication in addition to Standard Inspection Procedure, the previous application note extracted from PP does not apply. T.Forgery Adverse action: An attacker fraudulently alters the User Data or/and TSF-data stored on the travel document or/and exchanged between the TOE and the terminal connected in order to outsmart the PACE authenticated BIS-PACE by means of changed travel document holder’s related reference data (like biographic or biometric data). The attacker does it in such a way that the terminal connected perceives these modified data as authentic one. Threat agent: having high attack potential. Asset: integrity of the travel document. T.Abuse-Func Adverse action: An attacker may use functions of the TOE which shall not be used in TOE operational phase in order (i) to manipulate or to disclose the User Data stored in the TOE, (ii) to manipulate or to disclose the TSF-data stored in the TOE or (iii) to manipulate (bypass, deactivate or modify) soft-coded security functionality of the TOE. This threat CombICAO Applet in EAC with PACE Configuration on Cosmo v9 Public Security Target 30 | 104 addresses the misuse of the functions for the initialisation and personalisation in the operational phase after delivery to the travel document holder. Threat agent: having high attack potential, being in possession of one or more legitimate travel documents integrity and authenticity of the travel document, availability of the functionality of the travel document Asset: integrity and authenticity of the travel document, availability of the functionality of the travel document. Application Note: Application Note (16 in [PP_PACE]): Details of the relevant attack scenarios depend, for instance, on the capabilities of the test features provided by the IC Dedicated Test Software being not specified here. T.Information_Leakage Adverse action: An attacker may exploit information leaking from the TOE during its usage in order to disclose confidential User Data or/and TSF-data stored on the travel document or/and exchanged between the TOE and the terminal connected. The information leakage may be inherent in the normal operation or caused by the attacker. Threat agent: having high attack potential. Asset: confidentiality of User Data and TSF-data of the travel document. Application Note: Application Note (17 in [PP_PACE]): Leakage may occur through emanations, variations in power consumption, I/O characteristics, clock frequency, or by changes in processing time requirements. This leakage may be interpreted as a covert channel transmission, but is more closely related to measurement of operating parameters which may be derived either from measurements of the contactless interface (emanation) or direct measurements (by contact to the chip still available even for a contactless chip) and can then be related to the specific operation being performed. Examples are Differential Electromagnetic Analysis (DEMA) and Differential Power Analysis (DPA). Moreover the attacker may try actively to enforce information leakage by fault injection (e.g. Differential Fault Analysis). T.Phys-Tamper Adverse action: An attacker may perform physical probing of the travel document in order (i) to disclose the TSF-data, or (ii) to disclose/reconstruct the TOE’s Embedded Software. An attacker may physically modify the travel document in order to alter (I) its security functionality (hardware and software part, as well), (ii) the User Data or the TSF-data stored on the travel document. Threat agent: having high attack potential, being in possession of one or more legitimate travel documents Asset: integrity and authenticity of the travel document, availability of the functionality of the travel document, confidentiality of User Data and TSF-data of the travel document. Application Note: Application Note (18 in [PP_PACE]): Physical tampering may be focused directly on the disclosure or manipulation of the user data (e.g. the biometric reference data for the inspection system) or the TSF data (e.g. authentication key of the travel document) or indirectly by preparation of the TOE to following attack methods by modification of security features (e.g. to enable information leakage through power analysis). Physical tampering requires a direct interaction with the travel document’s internals. Techniques CombICAO Applet in EAC with PACE Configuration on Cosmo v9 Public Security Target 31 | 104 commonly employed in IC failure analysis and IC reverse engineering efforts may be used. Before that, hardware security mechanisms and layout characteristics need to be identified. Determination of software design including treatment of the user data and the TSF data may also be a pre-requisite. The modification may result in the deactivation of a security function. Changes of circuitry or data can be permanent or temporary. T.Malfunction Adverse action: An attacker may cause a malfunction the travel document’s hardware and Embedded Software by applying environmental stress in order to (i) deactivate or modify security features or functionality of the TOE’ hardware or to (ii) circumvent, deactivate or modify security functions of the TOE’s Embedded Software. This may be achieved e.g. by operating the travel document outside the normal operating conditions, exploiting errors in the travel document’s Embedded Software or misusing administrative functions. To exploit these vulnerabilities an attacker needs information about the functional operation having information about the functional operation. Threat agent: having high attack potential, being in possession of one or more legitimate travel documents, having information about the functional operation Asset: integrity and authenticity of the travel document, availability of the functionality of the travel document, confidentiality of User Data and TSF-data of the travel document Application Note: Application note (19 in [PP_PACE]): A malfunction of the TOE may also be caused using a direct interaction with elements on the chip surface. This is considered as being a manipulation (refer to the threat T.Phys-Tamper) assuming a detailed knowledge about TOE’s internals T.Configuration Adverse action: An attacker may access to the TOE at Manufacturing and Personalization phases (steps 5 and 6) to try to (i) deactivate or modify security features or functions of the TOE or (ii) circumvent, deactivate or modify security functions of the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software. Threat agent: having high attack potential, being in possession of one or more MRTD in Pre-personalization or Personalization phases. Asset: authenticity of logical MRTD data. T. Forgery_Supplemental_Data Adverse action: An attacker alters fraudulently the data stored in files other than EF.DG1 to EF.DG16, EF.COM and EF document security object. This may lead the extended inspection system (EIS) using these data to be deceived Threat agent: having high attack potential, being in possession of one or more legitimate MRTDs. Asset: authenticity of data stored in files other than EF.DG1 to EF.DG16, EF.COM and EF document security object T. BAC_breaking Adverse action: An attacker manages to break the BAC protocol using cryptanalysis means and powerful computation capacity leading to threaten (1) the non traceability and (2) confidentiality of data. The attacker is able to intercept and record a log of BAC transaction during inspection at a border control. Then using computation capacity, he is CombICAO Applet in EAC with PACE Configuration on Cosmo v9 Public Security Target 32 | 104 able to perform reverse engineering over the logs, to break the protocol within a few minutes or less and get (1) the MRZ value, and (2) the log of plain text exchanged between the MRTD and the inspection system. This leads the attacker to (1) get the holder information and use it, and (2) trace the holder in real time. Threat agent: having high attack potential, being able to intercept transaction with MRTDs. Asset: confidentiality of data read from the MRTD, traceability of the MRTD 4.4 Organisational Security Policies P.Sensitive_Data The biometric reference data of finger(s) (EF.DG3) and iris image(s) (EF.DG4) are sensitive private personal data of the travel document holder. The sensitive biometric reference data can be used only by inspection systems which are authorized for this access at the time the travel document is presented to the inspection system (Extended Inspection Systems). The issuing State or Organisation authorizes the Document Verifiers of the receiving States to manage the authorization of inspection systems within the limits defined by the Document Verifier Certificate. The travel document’s chip shall protect the confidentiality and integrity of the sensitive private personal data even during transmission to the Extended Inspection System after Chip Authentication Version 1. P.Personalisation The issuing State or Organisation guarantees the correctness of the biographical data, the printed portrait and the digitized portrait, the biometric reference data and other data of the logical travel document with respect to the travel document holder. The personalisation of the travel document for the holder is performed by an agent authorized by the issuing State or Organisation only. P.Pre-Operational 1) The travel document Issuer issues the travel document and approves it using the terminals complying with all applicable laws and regulations. 2) The travel document Issuer guarantees correctness of the user data (amongst other of those, concerning the travel document holder) and of the TSF-data permanently stored in the TOE. 3) The travel document Issuer uses only such TOE’s technical components (IC) which enable traceability of the travel documents in their manufacturing and issuing life cycle phases, i.e. before they are in the operational phase, cf. sec. 1.2.3 in [PP_PACE]. 4) If the travel document Issuer authorises a Personalisation Agent to personalise the travel document for travel document holders, the travel document Issuer has to ensure that the Personalisation Agent acts in accordance with the travel document Issuer’s policy. P.Card_PKI 1) The travel document Issuer shall establish a public key infrastructure for the passive authentication, i.e. for digital signature creation and verification for the travel document. For this aim, he runs a Country Signing Certification Authority (CSCA). The travel document Issuer shall publish the CSCA Certificate (CCSCA). 2) The CSCA shall securely generate, store and use the CSCA key pair. The CSCA shall keep the CSCA Private Key secret and issue a self-signed CSCA Certificate (CCSCA) having CombICAO Applet in EAC with PACE Configuration on Cosmo v9 Public Security Target 33 | 104 to be made available to the travel document Issuer by strictly secure means, see [ICAO_9303], 5.5.1. The CSCA shall create the Document Signer Certificates for the Document Signer Public Keys (CDS) and make them available to the travel document Issuer, see [ICAO_9303], 5.5.1. 3) A Document Signer shall (i) generate the Document Signer Key Pair, (ii) hand over the Document Signer Public Key to the CSCA for certification, (iii) keep the Document Signer Private Key secret and (iv) securely use the Document Signer Private Key for signing the Document Security Objects of travel documents. Application Note: The description below states the responsibilities of involved parties and represents the logical, but not the physical structure of the PKI. Physical distribution ways shall be implemented by the involved parties in such a way that all certificates belonging to the PKI are securely distributed / made available to their final destination, e.g. by using directory services. P.Trustworthy_PKI The CSCA shall ensure that it issues its certificates exclusively to the rightful organisations (DS) and DSs shall ensure that they sign exclusively correct Document Security Objects to be stored on the travel document. P.Manufact The Initialization Data are written by the IC Manufacturer to identify the IC uniquely. The travel document Manufacturer writes the Pre-personalisation Data which contains at least the Personalisation Agent Key. P.Terminal The Basic Inspection Systems with PACE (BIS-PACE) shall operate their terminals as follows: 1) The related terminals (basic inspection system, cf. above) shall be used by terminal operators and by travel document holders as defined in [ICAO_9303]. 2) They shall implement the terminal parts of the PACE protocol [ICAO_TR_SAC], of the Passive Authentication [ICAO_9303] and use them in this order28. The PACE terminal shall use randomly and (almost) uniformly selected nonces, if required by the protocols (for generating ephemeral keys for Diffie-Hellmann). 3) The related terminals need not to use any own credentials. 4) They shall also store the Country Signing Public Key and the Document Signer Public Key (in form of CCSCA and CDS) in order to enable and to perform Passive Authentication (determination of the authenticity of data groups stored in the travel document, [ICAO_9303]). 5) The related terminals and their environment shall ensure confidentiality and integrity of respective data handled by them (e.g. confidentiality of PACE passwords, integrity of PKI certificates, etc.), where it is necessary for a secure operation of the TOE according to [PP_PACE]. CombICAO Applet in EAC with PACE Configuration on Cosmo v9 Public Security Target 34 | 104 4.5 Assumptions A.Insp_Sys The Extended Inspection System (EIS) for global interoperability (i) includes the Country Signing CA Public Key and (ii) implements the terminal part of PACE [ICAO_TR_SAC] and/or BAC [PP_BAC]. BAC may only be used if supported by the TOE. If both PACE and BAC are supported by the TOE and the IS, PACE must be used. The EIS reads the logical travel document under PACE or BAC and performs the Chip Authentication v.1 to verify the logical travel document and establishes secure messaging. EIS supports the Terminal Authentication Protocol v.1 in order to ensure access control and is authorized by the issuing State or Organisation through the Document Verifier of the receiving State to read the sensitive biometric reference data. Justification: The assumption A.Insp_Sys does not confine the security objectives of the [PP_PACE] as it repeats the requirements of P.Terminal and adds only assumptions for the Inspection Systems for handling the EAC functionality of the TOE. A.Auth_PKI The issuing and receiving States or Organisations establish a public key infrastructure for card verifiable certificates of the Extended Access Control. The Country Verifying Certification Authorities, the Document Verifier and Extended Inspection Systems hold authentication key pairs and certificates for their public keys encoding the access control rights. The Country Verifying Certification Authorities of the issuing States or Organisations are signing the certificates of the Document Verifier and the Document Verifiers are signing the certificates of the Extended Inspection Systems of the receiving States or Organisations. The issuing States or Organisations distribute the public keys of their Country Verifying Certification Authority to their travel document’s chip. Justification: This assumption only concerns the EAC part of the TOE. The issuing and use of card verifiable certificates of the Extended Access Control is neither relevant for the PACE part of the TOE nor will the security objectives of the [PP_PACE] be restricted by this assumption. For the EAC functionality of the TOE the assumption is necessary because it covers the pre-requisite for performing the Terminal Authentication Protocol Version 1. A.Passive_Auth The issuing and receiving States or Organisations establish a public key infrastructure for passive authentication i.e. digital signature creation and verification for the logical travel document. The issuing State or Organisation runs a Certification Authority (CA) which securely generates, stores and uses the Country Signing CA Key pair. The CA keeps the Country Signing CA Private Key secret and is recommended to distribute the Country Signing CA Public Key to ICAO, all receiving States maintaining its integrity. The Document Signer (i) generates the Document Signer Key Pair, (ii) hands over the Document Signer Public Key to the CA for certification, (iii) keeps the Document Signer Private Key secret and (iv) uses securely the Document Signer Private Key for signing the Document Security Objects of the travel documents. The CA creates the Document Signer Certificates for the Document Signer Public Keys that are distributed to the receiving States and Organisations. It is assumed that the Personalisation Agent ensures that the Document Security Object contains only the hash values of genuine user data according to [ICAO_9303]. CombICAO Applet in EAC with PACE Configuration on Cosmo v9 Public Security Target 35 | 104 5 Security Objectives 5.1 Security Objectives for the TOE OT.Sens_Data_Conf The TOE must ensure the confidentiality of the sensitive biometric reference data (EF.DG3 and EF.DG4) by granting read access only to authorized Extended Inspection Systems. The authorization of the inspection system is drawn from the Inspection System Certificate used for the successful authentication and shall be a non-strict subset of the authorization defined in the Document Verifier Certificate in the certificate chain to the Country Verifier Certification Authority of the issuing State or Organisation. The TOE must ensure the confidentiality of the logical travel document data during their transmission to the Extended Inspection System. The confidentiality of the sensitive biometric reference data shall be protected against attacks with high attack potential. OT.Chip_Auth_Proof The TOE must support the Inspection Systems to verify the identity and authenticity of the travel document’s chip as issued by the identified issuing State or Organisation by means of the Chip Authentication Version 1 as defined in [TR_03110]. The authenticity proof provided by travel document’s chip shall be protected against attacks with high attack potential. Application Note: The OT.Chip_Auth_Proof implies the travel document’s chip to have (i) a unique identity as given by the travel document’s Document Number, (ii) a secret to prove its identity by knowledge i.e. a private authentication key as TSF data. The TOE shall protect this TSF data to prevent their misuse. The terminal shall have the reference data to verify the authentication attempt of travel document’s chip i.e. a certificate for the Chip Authentication Public Key that matches the Chip Authentication Private Key of the travel document’s chip. This certificate is provided by (i) the Chip Authentication Public Key (EF.DG14) in the LDS defined in [ICAO_9303] and (ii) the hash value of DG14 in the Document Security Object signed by the Document Signer. OT.Data_Integrity Integrity of Data The TOE must ensure integrity of the User Data and the TSF-data stored on it by protecting these data against unauthorised modification (physical manipulation and unauthorised modifying).The TOE must ensure integrity of the User Data and the TSF- data during their exchange between the TOE and the terminal connected (and represented by PACE authenticated BIS-PACE) after the PACE Authentication. OT.Data_Authenticity Authenticity of Data The TOE must ensure authenticity of the User Data and the TSF- data stored on it by enabling verification of their authenticity at the terminal-side.The TOE must ensure authenticity of the User Data and the TSF-data during their exchange between the TOE and the terminal connected (and represented by PACE authenticated BIS-PACE) after the PACE Authentication. It shall happen by enabling such a verification CombICAO Applet in EAC with PACE Configuration on Cosmo v9 Public Security Target 36 | 104 at the terminal-side (at receiving by the terminal) and by an active verification by the TOE itself (at receiving by the TOE). OT.Data_Confidentiality Confidentiality of Data The TOE must ensure confidentiality of the User Data and the TSF-data by granting read access only to the PACE authenticated BIS-PACE connected. The TOE must ensure confidentiality of the User Data and the TSF-data during their exchange between the TOE and the terminal connected (and represented by PACE authenticated BIS-PACE) after the PACE Authentication. OT.Tracing Tracing travel document The TOE must prevent gathering TOE tracing data by means of unambiguous identifying the travel document remotely through establishing or listening to a communication via the contactless/contact interface of the TOE without knowledge of the correct values of shared passwords (PACE passwords) in advance. Application Note: Since the Standard Inspection Procedure does not support any unique-secret-based authentication of the travel document’s chip (no Chip Authentication), a security objective like OT.Chip_Auth_Proof (proof of travel document authenticity) cannot be achieved by the current TOE. As our TOE supports Chip Authentication in addition to Standard Inspection Procedure, the previous application note extracted from PP does not apply. OT.Prot_Abuse-Func Protection against Abuse of Functionality The TOE must prevent that functions of the TOE, which may not be used in TOE operational phase, can be abused in order (i) to manipulate or to disclose the User Data stored in the TOE, (ii) to manipulate or to disclose the TSF-data stored in the TOE, (iii) to manipulate (bypass, deactivate or modify) soft-coded security functionality of the TOE. OT.Prot_Inf_Leak Protection against Information Leakage The TOE must provide protection against disclosure of confidential User Data or/and TSF- data stored and/or processed by the travel document o by measurement and analysis of the shape and amplitude of signals or the time between events found by measuring signals on the electromagnetic field, power consumption, clock, or I/O lines, o by forcing a malfunction of the TOE and/or o by a physical manipulation of the TOE. Application Note: This objective pertains to measurements with subsequent complex signal processing due to normal operation of the TOE or operations enforced by an attacker. OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper Protection against Physical Tampering CombICAO Applet in EAC with PACE Configuration on Cosmo v9 Public Security Target 37 | 104 The TOE must provide protection of confidentiality and integrity of the User Data, the TSF-data and the travel document’s Embedded Software by means of o measuring through galvanic contacts representing a direct physical probing on the chip’s surface except on pads being bonded (using standard tools for measuring voltage and current) or o measuring not using galvanic contacts, but other types of physical interaction between electrical charges (using tools used in solid-state physics research and IC failure analysis), o manipulation of the hardware and its security functionality, as well as o controlled manipulation of memory contents (User Data, TSF-data) with a prior o reverse-engineering to understand the design and its properties and functionality. OT.Prot_Malfunction Protection against Malfunctions The TOE must ensure its correct operation. The TOE must prevent its operation outside the normal operating conditions where reliability and secure operation have not been proven or tested. This is to prevent functional errors in the TOE. The environmental conditions may include external energy (esp. electromagnetic) fields, voltage (on any contacts), clock frequency or temperature. The following TOE security objectives address the aspects of identified threats to be countered involving TOE’s environment. OT.Identification IIdentification of the TOE The TOE must provide means to store Initialisation and Pre-Personalisation Data in its non-volatile memory. The Initialisation Data must provide a unique identification of the IC during the manufacturing and the card issuing life cycle phases of the travel document. The storage of the Pre-Personalisation data includes writing of the Personalisation Agent Key(s). OT.AC_Pers Personalization of the Electronic Document The TOE must ensure that the logical travel document data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16, the Document Security Object according to LDS [ICAO_9303] and the TSF data can be written by authorized Personalisation Agents only. The logical travel document data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 and the TSF data may be written only during and cannot be changed after personalisation of the document. Application Note: The OT.AC_Pers implies that the data of the LDS groups written during personalisation for travel document holder (at least EF.DG1 and EF.DG2) can not be changed using write access after personalisation. OT.Configuration Protection of the TOE preparation During Pre-personalization and Personalization phases, the TOE must control the access to its sensitive information and its functions and must provide the means to secure exchanges using cryptographic functions. It must also ensure secure erasing of useless keys. CombICAO Applet in EAC with PACE Configuration on Cosmo v9 Public Security Target 38 | 104 OT.Update_File Modification of file in Operational Use Phase During Operational Use phase, the TOE must allow the modification of Updatable Data if the write access to these objects is fulfilled by the Terminal. OT.BAC_Expiration Automatic deactivation of BAC protocol OT.AC_SM_Level Access control to sensitive biometric reference data according to SM level OT.Chip_Auth_Proof_PACE_CAM The TOE must support the terminals to verify the identity and authenticity of the electronic document’s chip as issued by the identified issuing State or Organization by means of the PACE-Chip Authentication Mapping (PACE-CAM) as defined in [ICAO_9303]. The authenticity proof provided by electronic document’s chip shall be protected against attacks with high attack potential. 5.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment 5.2.1 Issuing State or Organisation The issuing State or Organisation will implement the following security objectives of the TOE environment. OE.Auth_Key_Travel_Document Travel document Authentication Key The issuing State or Organisation has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure in order to (i) generate the travel document’s Chip Authentication Key Pair, (ii) sign and store the Chip Authentication Public Key in the Chip Authentication Public Key data in EF.DG14 and (iii) support inspection systems of receiving States or Organisations to verify the authenticity of the travel document’s chip used for genuine travel document by certification of the Chip Authentication Public Key by means of the Document Security Object. Justification: This security objective for the operational environment is needed additionally to those from [PP_PACE] in order to counter the Threat T.Counterfeit as it specifies the pre-requisite for the Chip Authentication Protocol Version 1 which is one of the additional features of the TOE described only in this Protection Profile and not in [PP_PACE]. OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data Authorization for Use of Sensitive Biometric Reference Data The issuing State or Organisation has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure in order to limit the access to sensitive biometric reference data of travel document holders to authorized receiving States or Organisations. The Country Verifying Certification Authority of the issuing State or Organisation generates card verifiable Document Verifier Certificates for the authorized Document Verifier only. CombICAO Applet in EAC with PACE Configuration on Cosmo v9 Public Security Target 39 | 104 Justification: This security objective for the operational environment is needed additionally to those from [PP_PACE] in order to handle the Threat T.Read_Sensitive_Data, the Organisational Security Policy P.Sensitive_Data and the Assumption A.Auth_PKI as it specifies the pre-requisite for the Terminal Authentication Protocol v.1 as it concerns the need of an PKI for this protocol and the responsibilities of its root instance. The Terminal Authentication Protocol v.1 is one of the additional features of the TOE described only in this Protection Profile and not in [PP_PACE]. 5.2.2 Receiving State or Organisation The receiving State or Organisation will implement the following security objectives of the TOE environment. OE.Exam_Travel_Document Examination of the physical part of the travel document The inspection system of the receiving State or Organisation must examine the travel document presented by the traveller to verify its authenticity by means of the physical security measures and to detect any manipulation of the physical part of the travel document. The Basic Inspection System for global interoperability (i) includes the Country Signing CA Public Key and the Document Signer Public Key of each issuing State or Organisation, and (ii) implements the terminal part of PACE [ICAO_TR_SAC] and/or the Basic Access Control [ICAO_9303]. Extended Inspection Systems perform additionally to these points the Chip Authentication Protocol Version 1 to verify the Authenticity of the presented travel document’s chip. Justification: This security objective for the operational environment is needed additionally to those from [PP_PACE] in order to handle the Threat T.Counterfeit and the Assumption A.Insp_Sys by demanding the Inspection System to perform the Chip Authentication protocol v.1. OE.Exam_Travel_Document also repeats partly the requirements from OE.Terminal in [PP_PACE] and therefore also counters T.Forgery and A.Passive_Auth from [PP_PACE]. This is done because a new type of Inspection System is introduced in [PP_EACwPACE] as the Extended Inspection System is needed to handle the additional features of a travel document with Extended Access Control. OE.Prot_Logical_Travel_Document Protection of data from the logical travel document The inspection system of the receiving State or Organisation ensures the confidentiality and integrity of the data read from the logical travel document. The inspection system will prevent eavesdropping to their communication with the TOE before secure messaging is successfully established based on the Chip Authentication Protocol Version 1. Justification: This security objective for the operational environment is needed additionally to those from [PP_PACE] in order to handle the Assumption A.Insp_Sys by requiring the Inspection System to perform secure messaging based on the Chip Authentication Protocol v.1. OE.Ext_Insp_Systems Authorization of Extended Inspection Systems The Document Verifier of receiving States or Organisations authorizes Extended Inspection Systems by creation of Inspection System Certificates for access to sensitive biometric reference data of the logical travel document. The Extended Inspection System authenticates themselves to the travel document’s chip for access to the sensitive CombICAO Applet in EAC with PACE Configuration on Cosmo v9 Public Security Target 40 | 104 biometric reference data with its private Terminal Authentication Key and its Inspection System Certificate. Justification: This security objective for the operational environment is needed additionally to those from [PP_PACE] in order to handle the Threat T.Read_Sensitive_Data, the Organisational Security Policy P.Sensitive_Data and the Assumption A.Auth_PKI as it specifies the pre-requisite for the Terminal Authentication Protocol v.1 as it concerns the responsibilities of the Document Verifier instance and the Inspection Systems. 5.2.3 Travel document Issuer as the general responsible The travel document Issuer as the general responsible for the global security policy related will implement the following security objectives for the TOE environment: OE.Legislative_Compliance Issuing of the travel document The travel document Issuer must issue the travel document and approve it using the terminals complying with all applicable laws and regulations. 5.2.4 Travel document Issuer and CVCA: travel document's PKI (issuing) branch The travel document Issuer and the related CSCA will implement the following security objectives for the TOE environment: OE.Passive_Auth_Sign Authentication of travel document by Signature The travel document Issuer has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure as follows: the CSCA acting on behalf and according to the policy of the travel document Issuer must (i) generate a cryptographically secure CSCA Key Pair, (ii) ensure the secrecy of the CSCA Private Key and sign Document Signer Certificates in a secure operational environment, and (iii) publish the Certificate of the CSCA Public Key (CCSCA). Hereby authenticity and integrity of these certificates are being maintained. A Document Signer acting in accordance with the CSCA policy must (i) generate a cryptographically secure Document Signing Key Pair, (ii) ensure the secrecy of the Document Signer Private Key, (iii) hand over the Document Signer Public Key to the CSCA for certification, (iv) sign Document Security Objects of genuine travel documents in a secure operational environment only. The digital signature in the Document Security Object relates to all hash values for each data group in use according to [ICAO_9303]. The Personalisation Agent has to ensure that the Document Security Object contains only the hash values of genuine user data according to [ICAO_9303]. The CSCA must issue its certificates exclusively to the rightful organisations (DS) and DSs must sign exclusively correct Document Security Objects to be stored on travel document. OE.Personalisation Personalisation of travel document The travel document Issuer must ensure that the Personalisation Agents acting on his behalf (i) establish the correct identity of the travel document holder and create the biographical data for the travel document, (ii) enrol the biometric reference data of the travel document holder, (iii) write a subset of these data on the physical Passport (optical CombICAO Applet in EAC with PACE Configuration on Cosmo v9 Public Security Target 41 | 104 personalisation) and store them in the travel document (electronic personalisation) for the travel document holder as defined in [ICAO_9303], (iv) write the document details data, (v) write the initial TSF data, (vi) sign the Document Security Object defined in [ICAO_9303] (in the role of a DS). 5.2.5 Terminal operator: Terminal's receiving branch OE.Terminal Terminal operating The terminal operators must operate their terminals as follows: 1) The related terminals (basic inspection systems, cf. above) are used by terminal operators and by travel document holders as defined in [ICAO_9303]. 2) The related terminals implement the terminal parts of the PACE protocol [ICAO_TR_SAC], of the Passive Authentication [ICAO_TR_SAC] (by verification of the signature of the Document Security Object) and use them in this order. The PACE terminal uses randomly and (almost) uniformly selected nonces, if required by the protocols (for generating ephemeral keys for Diffie-Hellmann). 3) The related terminals need not to use any own credentials. 4) The related terminals securely store the Country Signing Public Key and the Document Signer Public Key (in form of C_CSCA and C_DS) in order to enable and to perform Passive Authentication of the travel document (determination of the authenticity of data groups stored in the travel document, [ICAO_9303]) 5) The related terminals and their environment must ensure confidentiality and integrity of respective data handled by them (e.g. confidentiality of the PACE passwords, integrity of PKI certificates, etc.), where it is necessary for a secure operation of the TOE according to the [PP_PACE]. Application Note: OE.Terminal completely covers and extends “OE.Exam_MRTD”, “OE.Passive_Auth_Verif“ and “OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD” from [PP_BAC]. 5.2.6 Travel document holder Obligations OE.Travel_Document_Holder Travel document holder Obligations The travel document holder may reveal, if necessary, his or her verification values of the PACE password to an authorized person or device who definitely act according to respective regulations and are trustworthy. 5.3 Security Objectives Rationale 5.3.1 Threats T.Read_Sensitive_Data The OSP P.Sensitive_Data “Privacy of sensitive biometric reference data”is fulfilled and the threat T.Read_Sensitive_Data “Read the sensitive biometric reference data” is countered by the TOE-objective OT.Sens_Data_Conf “Confidentiality of sensitive biometric reference data” requiring that read access to EF.DG3 and EF.DG4 (containing the sensitive biometric reference data) is only granted to authorized inspection systems. Furthermore it is required that the transmission of these data ensures the data’s confidentiality. The authorization bases on Document Verifier certificates issued by the issuing State or Organisation as required by OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data “Authorization for Use of Sensitive Biometric Reference Data”. CombICAO Applet in EAC with PACE Configuration on Cosmo v9 Public Security Target 42 | 104 The Document Verifier of the receiving State has to authorize Extended Inspection Systems by creating appropriate Inspection System certificates for access to the sensitive biometric reference data as demanded by OE.Ext_Insp_Systems “Authorization of Extended Inspection Systems”. This threat is also covered by OT.AC_SM_Level “Access control to sensitive biometric reference data according to SM level” that enhences this protection by allowing the issuing State or Organization to require the usage of a secure messaging with a minimum security level for accessing the sensitive biometric reference data. The strength of the secure messaging is tightly bound to the underlying block Cipher involved (DES, AES- 128/192/256). This objective allows an issuing State or Organization to set a secure messaging level it considers as sufficient to ensure a long term confidentiality of the sensitive biometric data of its citizen when being read. T.Counterfeit The threat T.Counterfeit “Counterfeit of travel document chip data”addresses the attack of unauthorized copy or reproduction of the genuine travel document's chip. This attack is thwarted by chip an identification and authenticity proof required by OT.Chip_Auth_Proof “Proof of the travel document’s chip authenticity”using an authentication key pair to be generated by the issuing State or Organisation. The Public Chip Authentication Key has to be written into EF.DG14 and signed by means of Documents Security Objects as demanded by OE.Auth_Key_Travel_Document “Travel document Authentication Key”. According to OE.Exam_Travel_Document “Examination of the physical part of the travel document” the General Inspection system has to perform the Chip Authentication Protocol Version 1 to verify the authenticity of the travel document’s chip. OT.Chip_Auth_Proof_PACE_CAM ensures that the chip in addition to CA also supports the PACE-Chip Authentication Mapping (PACE-CAM) protocol, which supports the same security functionality as CA does. PACE-CAM enables much faster authentication of the of the chip than running PACE with general mapping followed by CA. This threat is also covered by OE.Auth_Key_Travel_Document “Travel document Authentication Key”using a authentication key pair to be generated by the issuing State or Organization. T.Skimming The threat T.Skimming “Skimming travel document / Capturing Card-Terminal Communication” addresses accessing the User Data (stored on the TOE or transferred between the TOE and the terminal) using the TOE’s contactless/contact interface. This threat is countered by the security objectives OT.Data_Integrity “Integrity of Data”, OT.Data_Authenticity “Authenticity of Data” and OT.Data_Confidentiality “Confidentiality of Data” through the PACE authentication. The objective OE.Travel_Document_Holder “Travel document holder Obligations” ensures that a PACE session can only be established either by the travel document holder itself or by an authorised person or device, and, hence, cannot be captured by an attacker. T.Eavesdropping The threat T.Eavesdropping “Eavesdropping on the communication between the TOE and the PACE terminal” addresses listening to the communication between the TOE and a rightful terminal in order to gain the User Data transferred there. This threat is countered by the security objective OT.Data_Confidentiality “Confidentiality of Data” through a trusted channel based on the PACE authentication. T.Tracing The threat T.Tracing “Tracing travel document” addresses gathering TOE tracing data identifying it remotely by establishing or listening to a communication via the contactless/contact interface of the TOE, whereby the attacker does not a priori know the CombICAO Applet in EAC with PACE Configuration on Cosmo v9 Public Security Target 43 | 104 correct values of the PACE password. This threat is directly countered by security objectives OT.Tracing “Tracing travel document” (no gathering TOE tracing data) and OE.Travel_Document_Holder “Travel document holder Obligations” (the attacker does not a priori know the correct values of the shared passwords). T.Forgery The threat T.Forgery “Forgery of Data” addresses the fraudulent, complete or partial alteration of the User Data or/and TSF-data stored on the TOE or/and exchanged between the TOE and the terminal. The security objective OT.AC_Pers “Access Control for Personalisation of logical MRTD” requires the TOE to limit the write access for the travel document to the trustworthy Personalisation Agent (cf. OE.Personalisation). The TOE will protect the integrity and authenticity of the stored and exchanged User Data or/and TSF- data as aimed by the security objectives OT.Data_Integrity “Integrity of Data” and OT.Data_Authenticity “Authenticity of Data”, respectively. The objectives OT.Prot_Phys- Tamper “Protection against Physical Tampering” and OT.Prot_Abuse-Func “Protection against Abuse of Functionality” contribute to protecting integrity of the User Data or/and TSF-data stored on the TOE. A terminal operator operating his terminals according to OE.Terminal “Terminal operating” and performing the Passive Authentication using the Document Security Object as aimed by OE.Passive_Auth_Sign “Authentication of travel document by Signature” will be able to effectively verify integrity and authenticity of the data received from the TOE. Additionally to the security objectives from [PP_PACE] (see above) which counter this threat, the examination of the presented MRTD passport book according to OE.Exam_Travel_Document “Examination of the physical part of the travel document” shall ensure its authenticity by means of the physical security measures and detect any manipulation of the physical part of the travel document. T.Abuse-Func The threat T.Abuse-Func “Abuse of Functionality” addresses attacks of misusing TOE’s functionality to manipulate or to disclosure the stored User- or TSF-data as well as to disable or to bypass the soft-coded security functionality. The security objective OT.Prot_Abuse-Func “Protection against Abuse of Functionality” ensures that the usage of functions having not to be used in the operational phase is effectively prevented. T.Information_Leakage The threat T.Information_Leakage is typical for integrated circuits like smart cards under direct attack with high attack potential. The protection of the TOE against this threat is obviously addressed by the directly related security objective OT.Prot_Inf_Leak T.Phys-Tamper The threat T.Phys-Tamper is typical for integrated circuits like smart cards under direct attack with high attack potential. The protection of the TOE against this threat is obviously addressed by the directly related security objective OT.Prot_Phys- Tamper T.Malfunction The threat T.Malfunction is typical for integrated circuits like smart cards under direct attack with high attack potential. The protection of the TOE against this threat is obviously addressed by the directly related security objective OT.Prot_Malfunction T.Configuration The threat T.Configuration “Tampering attempt of the TOE during preparation” addresses attacks in Pre-personalization and Personalization phases. The CombICAO Applet in EAC with PACE Configuration on Cosmo v9 Public Security Target 44 | 104 attacker trying to access to unauthorized TOE functions, trying to access or to modify sensitive information exchanged between the TOE and the Personalization system. Protection of the TOE during these two phases is directly addressed by OT.Configuration “Protection of the TOE preparation”. T. Forgery_Supplemental_Data The threat T. Forgery_Supplemental_Data “Forgery of supplemental data stored in the TOE” addresses the fraudulent alteration of Updatable Data. The TOE protects the update of these data thanks to OT.Update_File “Modification of file in Operational Use Phase” that ensures inspection system are authenticated and data to be updated are sent through a secure channel ensuring integrity, authenticity and confidentiality. T. BAC_breaking The threat T. BAC_breaking “BAC protocol is broken” addresses the attack aiming at breaking the BAC protocol. The protection of the TOE against this threat is addressed by security objective OT.BAC_Expiration “Automatic deactivation of BAC protocol” which is directly related to it. It prevents an attacker to perform offline dictionary attacks on transaction log, in order to preserve confidentiality of data and avoid citizen traceability. 5.3.2 Organisational Security Policies P.Sensitive_Data The OSP P.Sensitive_Data “Privacy of sensitive biometric reference data”is fulfilled and the threat T.Read_Sensitive_Data “Read the sensitive biometric reference data” is countered by the TOE-objective OT.Sens_Data_Conf “Confidentiality of sensitive biometric reference data” requiring that read access to EF.DG3 and EF.DG4 (containing the sensitive biometric reference data) is only granted to authorized inspection systems. Furthermore it is required that the transmission of these data ensures the data’s confidentiality. The authorization bases on Document Verifier certificates issued by the issuing State or Organisation as required by OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data “Authorization for Use of Sensitive Biometric Reference Data”. The Document Verifier of the receiving State has to authorize Extended Inspection Systems by creating appropriate Inspection System certificates for access to the sensitive biometric reference data as demanded by OE.Ext_Insp_Systems “Authorization of Extended Inspection Systems”. This threat is also covered by OT.AC_SM_Level “Access control to sensitive biometric reference data according to SM level” that enhences this protection by allowing the issuing State or Organization to require the usage of a secure messaging with a minimum security level for accessing the sensitive biometric reference data. The strength of the secure messaging is tightly bound to the underlying block Cipher involved (DES, AES- 128/192/256). This objective allows an issuing State or Organization to set a secure messaging level it considers as sufficient to ensure a long term confidentiality of the sensitive biometric data of its citizen when being read P.Personalisation The OSP P.Personalisation “Personalisation of the travel document by issuing State or Organisation only” addresses the (i) the enrolment of the logical travel document by the Personalisation Agent as described in the security objective for the TOE environment OE.Personalisation “Personalisation of travel document”, and (ii) the access control for the user data and TSF data as described by the security objective OT.AC_Pers “Access Control for Personalisation of logical MRTD” Note the manufacturer equips the TOE with the Personalisation Agent Key(s) according to OT.Identification “Identification of the TOE”. The security objective OT.AC_Pers “Access Control for Personalisation of logical CombICAO Applet in EAC with PACE Configuration on Cosmo v9 Public Security Target 45 | 104 MRTD” limits the management of TSF data and the management of TSF to the Personalisation Agent. P.Pre-Operational The OSP P.Pre-Operational “Pre-operational handling of the travel document” is enforced by the following security objectives: OT.Identification “Identification of the TOE” is affine to the OSP’s property ‘traceability before the operational phase’; OT.AC_Pers “Access Control for Personalisation of logical MRTD” and OE.Personalisation “Personalisation of travel document” together enforce the OSP’s properties ‘correctness of the User- and the TSF-data stored’ and ‘authorisation of Personalisation Agents’; OE.Legislative_Compliance “Issuing of the travel document” is affine to the OSP’s property ‘compliance with laws and regulations’. P.Card_PKI The OSP P.Card_PKI “PKI for Passive Authentication (issuing branch)” is enforced by establishing the issuing PKI branch as aimed by the objectives OE.Passive_Auth_Sign “Authentication of travel document by Signature” (for the Document Security Object). P.Trustworthy_PKI The OSP P.Trustworthy_PKI “Trustworthiness of PKI” is enforced by OE.Passive_Auth_Sign “Authentication of travel document by Signature” (for CSCA, issuing PKI branch). P.Manufact The OSP P.Manufact “Manufacturing of the travel document’s chip” requires a unique identification of the IC by means of the Initialization Data and the writing of the Pre-personalisation Data as being fulfilled by OT.Identification “Identification of the TOE”. P.Terminal The OSP P.Terminal “Abilities and trustworthiness of terminals” is obviously enforced by the objective OE.Terminal “Terminal operating”, whereby the one-to-one mapping between the related properties is applicable. The OSP P.Terminal “Abilities and trustworthiness of terminals” is countered by the security objective OE.Exam_Travel_Document “Examination of the physical part of the travel document” additionally to the security objectives from [PP_PACE] (see above). OE.Exam_Travel_Document “Examination of the physical part of the travel document” enforces the terminals to perform the terminal part of the PACE protocol. CombICAO Applet in EAC with PACE Configuration on Cosmo v9 Public Security Target 46 | 104 5.3.3 Assumptions A.Insp_Sys The examination of the travel document addressed by the assumption A.Insp_Sys “Inspection Systems for global interoperability” is covered by the security objectives for the TOE environment OE.Exam_Travel_Document “Examination of the physical part of the travel document”which requires the inspection system to examine physically the travel document, the Basic Inspection System to implement the Basic Access Control, and the Extended Inspection Systems to implement and to perform the Chip Authentication Protocol Version 1 to verify the Authenticity of the presented travel document’s chip. The security objectives for the TOE environment OE.Prot_Logical_Travel_Document “Protection of data from the logical travel document” require the Inspection System to protect the logical travel document data during the transmission and the internal handling. A.Auth_PKI The assumption A.Auth_PKI “PKI for Inspection Systems” is covered by the security objective for the TOE environment OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data “Authorization for Use of Sensitive Biometric Reference Data” requires the CVCA to limit the read access to sensitive biometrics by issuing Document Verifier certificates for authorized receiving States or Organisations only. The Document Verifier of the receiving State is required by OE.Ext_Insp_Systems “Authorization of Extended Inspection Systems” to authorize Extended Inspection Systems by creating Inspection System Certificates. Therefore, the receiving issuing State or Organisation has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure A.Passive_Auth The assumption A.Passive_Auth “PKI for Passive Authentication” is directly covered by the security objective for the TOE environment OE.Passive_Auth_Sign “Authentication of travel document by Signature” from [PP_PACE] covering the necessary procedures for the Country Signing CA Key Pair and the Document Signer Key Pairs. The implementation of the signature verification procedures is covered by OE.Exam_Travel_Document “Examination of the physical part of the travel document”. 5.3.4 SPD and Security Objectives Threats Security Objectives Rationale T.Read_Sensitive_Data OT.Sens_Data_Conf, OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data, OE.Ext_Insp_Systems, OT.AC_SM_Level Section 5.3.1 T.Counterfeit OT.Chip_Auth_Proof, OE.Auth_Key_Travel_Document, OE.Exam_Travel_Document, OT.Chip_Auth_Proof_PACE_CAM Section 5.3.1 T.Skimming OT.Data_Integrity, OT.Data_Authenticity, OT.Data_Confidentiality, OE.Travel_Document_Holder Section 5.3.1 T.Eavesdropping OT.Data_Confidentiality Section 5.3.1 T.Tracing OT.Tracing, OE.Travel_Document_Holder Section 5.3.1 T.Forgery OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Authenticity, OT.Data_Integrity, OT.Prot_Abuse-Func, Section 5.3.1 CombICAO Applet in EAC with PACE Configuration on Cosmo v9 Public Security Target 47 | 104 OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper, OE.Personalisation, OE.Passive_Auth_Sign, OE.Terminal, OE.Exam_Travel_Document T.Abuse-Func OT.Prot_Abuse-Func Section 5.3.1 T.Information_Leakage OT.Prot_Inf_Leak Section 5.3.1 T.Phys-Tamper OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper Section 5.3.1 T.Malfunction OT.Prot_Malfunction Section 5.3.1 T.Configuration OT.Configuration Section 5.3.1 T. Forgery_Supplemental_Data OT.Update_File Section 5.3.1 T. BAC_breaking OT.BAC_Expiration Section 5.3.1 Table 10 Threats and Security Objectives - Coverage Security Objectives Threats OT.Sens_Data_Conf T.Read_Sensitive_Data OT.Chip_Auth_Proof T.Counterfeit OT.Data_Integrity T.Skimming, T.Forgery OT.Data_Authenticity T.Skimming, T.Forgery OT.Data_Confidentiality T.Skimming, T.Eavesdropping OT.Tracing T.Tracing OT.Prot_Abuse-Func T.Forgery, T.Abuse-Func OT.Prot_Inf_Leak T.Information_Leakage OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper T.Forgery, T.Phys-Tamper OT.Prot_Malfunction T.Malfunction OT.Identification OT.AC_Pers T.Forgery OT.Configuration T.Configuration OT.Update_File T. Forgery_Supplemental_Data OT.BAC_Expiration T. BAC_breaking OT.AC_SM_Level T.Read_Sensitive_Data OT.Chip_Auth_Proof_PACE_CAM T.Counterfeit OE.Auth_Key_Travel_Document T.Counterfeit OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data T.Read_Sensitive_Data OE.Exam_Travel_Document T.Counterfeit, T.Forgery OE.Prot_Logical_Travel_Document OE.Ext_Insp_Systems T.Read_Sensitive_Data CombICAO Applet in EAC with PACE Configuration on Cosmo v9 Public Security Target 48 | 104 OE.Legislative_Compliance OE.Passive_Auth_Sign T.Forgery OE.Personalisation T.Forgery OE.Terminal T.Forgery OE.Travel_Document_Holder T.Skimming, T.Tracing Table 11 Security Objectives and Threats - Coverage Organisational Security Policies Security Objectives Rationale P.Sensitive_Data OT.Sens_Data_Conf, OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data, OE.Ext_Insp_Systems, OT.AC_SM_Level Section 5.3.2 P.Personalisation OT.AC_Pers, OT.Identification, OE.Personalisation Section 5.3.2 P.Pre-Operational OT.Identification, OT.AC_Pers, OE.Personalisation, OE.Legislative_Compliance Section 5.3.2 P.Card_PKI OE.Passive_Auth_Sign Section 5.3.2 P.Trustworthy_PKI OE.Passive_Auth_Sign Section 5.3.2 P.Manufact OT.Identification Section 5.3.2 P.Terminal OE.Terminal, OE.Exam_Travel_Document Section 5.3.2 Table 12 OSPs and Security Objectives - Coverage Security Objectives Organisational Security Policies OT.Sens_Data_Conf P.Sensitive_Data OT.Chip_Auth_Proof OT.Data_Integrity OT.Data_Authenticity OT.Data_Confidentiality OT.Tracing OT.Prot_Abuse-Func OT.Prot_Inf_Leak OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper OT.Prot_Malfunction OT.Identification P.Personalisation, P.Pre-Operational, P.Manufact OT.AC_Pers P.Personalisation, P.Pre-Operational OT.Configuration OT.Update_File CombICAO Applet in EAC with PACE Configuration on Cosmo v9 Public Security Target 49 | 104 OT.BAC_Expiration OT.AC_SM_Level P.Sensitive_Data OT.Chip_Auth_Proof_PACE_CAM OE.Auth_Key_Travel_Document OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data P.Sensitive_Data OE.Exam_Travel_Document P.Terminal OE.Prot_Logical_Travel_Document OE.Ext_Insp_Systems P.Sensitive_Data OE.Legislative_Compliance P.Pre-Operational OE.Passive_Auth_Sign P.Card_PKI, P.Trustworthy_PKI OE.Personalisation P.Personalisation, P.Pre-Operational OE.Terminal P.Terminal OE.Travel_Document_Holder Table 13 Security Objectives and OSPs - Coverage Assumptions Security Objectives for the Operational Environment Rationale A.Insp_Sys OE.Exam_Travel_Document, OE.Prot_Logical_Travel_Document Section 5.3.3 A.Auth_PKI OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data, OE.Ext_Insp_Systems Section 5.3.3 A.Passive_Auth OE.Passive_Auth_Sign, OE.Exam_Travel_Document Section 5.3.3 Table 14 Assumptions and Security Objectives for the Operational Environment - Coverage Security Objectives for the Operational Environment Assumptions OE.Auth_Key_Travel_Document OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data A.Auth_PKI OE.Exam_Travel_Document A.Insp_Sys, A.Passive_Auth OE.Prot_Logical_Travel_Document A.Insp_Sys OE.Ext_Insp_Systems A.Auth_PKI OE.Legislative_Compliance OE.Passive_Auth_Sign A.Passive_Auth OE.Personalisation OE.Terminal OE.Travel_Document_Holder Table 15 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment and Assumptions - Coverage CombICAO Applet in EAC with PACE Configuration on Cosmo v9 Public Security Target 50 | 104 6 Extended Requirements 6.1 Extended Families 6.1.1 Extended Family FPT_EMS - TOE Emanation 6.1.1.1 Description The additional family FPT_EMS (TOE Emanation) of the Class FPT (Protection of the TSF) is defined here to describe the IT security functional requirements of the TOE. The TOE shall prevent attacks against the SCD and other secret data where the attack is based on external observable physical phenomena of the TOE. Examples of such attacks are evaluation of TOE?s electromagnetic radiation, simple power analysis (SPA), differential power analysis (DPA), timing attacks, radio emanation etc. This family describes the functional requirements for the limitation of intelligible emanations. The family FPT_EMS belongs to the Class FPT because it is the class for TSF protection. Other families within the Class FPT do not cover the TOE emanation. 6.1.1.2 Extended Components Extended Component FPT_EMS.1 Description This family defines requirements to mitigate intelligible emanations. FPT_EMS.1 TOE Emanation has two constituents:  FPT_EMS.1.1 Limit of Emissions requires to not emit intelligible emissions enabling access to TSF data or user data.  FPT_EMS.1.2 Interface Emanation requires to not emit interface emanation enabling access to TSF data or user data. Definition FPT_EMS.1 TOE Emanation FPT_EMS.1.1 The TOE shall not emit [assignment: types of emissions] in excess of [assignment: specified limits] enabling access to [assignment: list of types of TSF data]. FPT_EMS.1.2 The TSF shall ensure [assignment: type of users] are unable to use the following interface [assignment: type of connection] to gain access to [assignment: list of types of TSF data]. Dependencies: No dependencies. CombICAO Applet in EAC with PACE Configuration on Cosmo v9 Public Security Target 51 | 104 6.1.2 Extended Family FIA_API - Authentication Proof of Identity 6.1.2.1 Description To describe the IT security functional requirements of the TOE a sensitive family (FIA_API) of the Class FIA (Identification and authentication) is defined here. This family describes the functional requirements for the proof of the claimed identity for the authentication verification by an external entity where the other families of the class FIA address the verification of the identity of an external entity. Application note 10: The other families of the Class FIA describe only the authentication verification of users' identity performed by the TOE and do not describe the functionality of the user to prove their identity. The following paragraph defines the family FIA_API in the style of the Common Criteria part 2 (cf. [3], chapter 'Explicitly stated IT security requirements (APE_SRE)') from a TOE point of view. 6.1.2.2 Extended Components Extended Component FIA_API.1 Description The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT: Management of authentication information used to prove the claimed identity. Definition FIA_API.1 Authentication Proof of Identity FIA_API.1.1 The TSF shall provide a [assignment: authentication mechanism ] to prove the identity of the [assignment: authorized user or role ]. Dependencies: No dependencies. 6.1.3 Extended Family FMT_LIM - Limited capabilities 6.1.3.1 Description The family FMT_LIM describes the functional requirements for the test features of the TOE. The new functional requirements were defined in the class FMT because this class addresses the management of functions of the TSF. The examples of the technical mechanism used in the TOE show that no other class is appropriate to address the specific issues of preventing abuse of functions by limiting the capabilities of the functions and by limiting their availability. CombICAO Applet in EAC with PACE Configuration on Cosmo v9 Public Security Target 52 | 104 6.1.3.2 Extended Components Extended Component FMT_LIM.1 Description Definition FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities FMT_LIM.1.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so that in conjunction with ‘Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)’ the following policy is enforced [assignment: Limited capability and availability policy] Dependencies: No dependencies. Extended Component FMT_LIM.2 Description Definition FMT_LIM.2 Limited capabilities FMT_LIM.2.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so that in conjunction with ‘Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)’ the following policy is enforced [assignment: Limited capability and availability policy] Dependencies: No dependencies. 6.1.4 Extended Family FAU_SAS - Audit data storage 6.1.4.1 Description To describe the security functional requirements of the TOE, the family FAU_SAS of the class FAU (Security audit) is defined here. This family describes the functional requirements for the storage of audit data. It has a more general approach than FAU_GEN, because it does not necessarily require the data to be generated by the TOE itself and because it does not give specific details of the content of the audit records. The family ‘Audit data storage (FAU_SAS)’ is specified as follows: 6.1.4.2 Extended Components Extended Component FAU_SAS.1 Description Requires the TOE to provide the possibility to store audit data. CombICAO Applet in EAC with PACE Configuration on Cosmo v9 Public Security Target 53 | 104 Definition FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage FAU_SAS.1.1 The TSF shall provide [assignment: authorised users] with the capability to store [assignment: list of audit information] in the audit records. Dependencies: No dependencies. 6.1.5 Extended Family FCS_RND - Generation of random numbers 6.1.5.1 Description This family defines quality requirements for the generation of random numbers intended to be used for cryptographic purposes. 6.1.5.2 Extended Components Extended Component FCS_RND.1 Description Generation of random numbers requires that random numbers meet a defined quality metric. Definition FCS_RND.1 Quality metric for random numbers FCS_RND.1.1 The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate random numbers that meet [assignment: a defined quality metric ]. Dependencies: No dependencies. CombICAO Applet in EAC with PACE Configuration on Cosmo v9 Public Security Target 54 | 104 7 Security Requirements 7.1 Security Functional Requirements This section describes the requirements imposed on the TOE in order to achieve the security objectives laid down in the previous chapter. 7.1.1 Class FCS Cryptographic Support FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE Cryptographic key generation FCS_CKM.1.1/DH_PACE The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm ECDH compliant to [TR_03111] and specified cryptographic key sizes 192 to 512 bit that meet the following: [ICAO_TR_SAC]. FCS_CKM.1/CA Cryptographic key generation FCS_CKM.1.1/CA The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm see table below and specified cryptographic key sizes see table below that meet the following: see table below: Key Generation Algorithm Key Sizes Standard based on ECDH compliant to [ISO_11770] 192 to 512 bit [TR_03111] based on DH 1024, 1536 and 2048 [TR_03110] and PKCS#3 . FCS_CKM.1/CAM Cryptographic key generation FCS_CKM.1.1/CAM The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm based on ECDH compliant to [ISO_11770] and specified cryptographic key sizes 192 to 521 bit that meet the following: [TR_03110]. CombICAO Applet in EAC with PACE Configuration on Cosmo v9 Public Security Target 55 | 104 FCS_CKM.1/CA_DATA_GEN Cryptographic key generation FCS_CKM.1.1/CA_DATA_GEN The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm see table below and specified cryptographic key sizes see table below that meet the following: see table below Algorithm Key Size Standard Chip Authentication Data Generation using DH keys compliant to PKCS#3 1024 to 2048 bits in steps of 512 bits PKCS#3 Chip authentication data generation using ECDH keys compliant to [ISO_15946] 192 to 512 bits [TR_03111] . FCS_CKM.1/GP Cryptographic key generation FCS_CKM.1.1/GP The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm see table below and specified cryptographic key sizes see table below that meet the following: see table below: Key Generation Algorithm Key Sizes Standard Triple-DES in CBC mode 112 bit [GPC_SPE_034] AES in CBC mode 128, 192 and 256 [GPC_SPE_014] . FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction FCS_CKM.4.1 The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key destruction method zeroisation that meets the following: none. FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC Cryptographic operation FCS_COP.1.1/PACE_ENC The TSF shall perform refer to table below in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm refer to table below and cryptographic key sizes refer to table below that meet the following: refer to table below Cryptographic Operations Algorithms Key sizes Norms secure messaging-encryption and decryption AES in CBC mode 128, 192 and 256 bits [ICAO_TR_SAC] secure messaging-encryption and decryption TDES in CBC mode 112 bits [ICAO_TR_SAC] . CombICAO Applet in EAC with PACE Configuration on Cosmo v9 Public Security Target 56 | 104 FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC Cryptographic operation FCS_COP.1.1/PACE_MAC The TSF shall perform refer table below in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm refer table below and cryptographic key sizes refer table below that meet the following: refer table below Cryptographic Operations Algorithms Key sizes Norms secure messaging - message authentication code AES CMAC 128, 192 and 256 bits [ICAO_TR_SAC] secure messaging - message authentication code Retail MAC 112 bits [ICAO_TR_SAC] . FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC Cryptographic operation FCS_COP.1.1/CA_ENC The TSF shall perform refer to table below in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm refer to table below and cryptographic key sizes refer to table below that meet the following: refer to table below Cryptographic Operations Algorithms Key sizes Norms secure messaging-encryption and decryption AES in CBC mode 128, 192 and 256 bits [TR-03110] secure messaging-encryption and decryption TDES in CBC mode 112 bits [TR-03110] . FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER Cryptographic operation FCS_COP.1.1/SIG_VER The TSF shall perform see table below in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm see table below and cryptographic key sizes see table below that meet the following: see table below Cryptographic Operation Algorithm Key Sizes digital signature verification ECDSA with SHA-1, SHA-224 and SHA-256 as defined in [FIPS_186_3] 192 to 512 digital signature verification RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 with SHA-1, SHA-256 and SHA- 512 1024, 1536, 2048 digital signature verification RSA PKCS#1-PSS with SHA-1, SHA-256 and SHA- 512 1024, 1536, 2048 . CombICAO Applet in EAC with PACE Configuration on Cosmo v9 Public Security Target 57 | 104 FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC Cryptographic operation FCS_COP.1.1/CA_MAC The TSF shall perform refer table below in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm refer table below and cryptographic key sizes refer table below that meet the following: refer table below Cryptographic Operations Algorithms Key sizes Norms secure messaging - message authentication code AES CMAC 128, 192 and 256 bits [TR-03110] secure messaging - message authentication code Retail MAC 112 bits [TR-03110] FCS_COP.1/CAM Cryptographic operation FCS_COP.1.1/CAM The TSF shall perform the PACE-CAM protocol in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm PACE-CAM and cryptographic key sizes 192 to 521 bits that meet the following: [ICAO_9303]. FCS_COP.1/GP_ENC Cryptographic operation FCS_COP.1.1/GP_ENC The TSF shall perform see table below in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm see table below and cryptographic key sizes see table below that meet the following: see table below: Cryptographic Operation Algorithm Key Sizes Standard secure messaging (GP) – encryption and decryption Triple-DES in CBC mode 112 bit [FIPS_46_3] secure messaging (GP) – encryption and decryption AES in CBC mode 128, 192 and 256 bits [NIST_800_38A] FCS_COP.1/GP_MAC Cryptographic operation FCS_COP.1.1/GP_MAC The TSF shall perform see table below in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm see table below and cryptographic key sizes see table below that meet the following: see table below: Cryptographic Operation Algorithm Key Sizes Standard secure messaging – message authentication code Retail MAC 112 bit [ISO_9797_1] secure messaging – message authentication code AES CMAC 128, 198 and 256 bits [NIST_800_38B] CombICAO Applet in EAC with PACE Configuration on Cosmo v9 Public Security Target 58 | 104 FCS_COP.1/GP_AUTH Cryptographic operation FCS_COP.1.1/GP_AUTH The TSF shall perform see table below in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm see table below and cryptographic key sizes see table below that meet the following: see table below: Cryptographic Operation Algorithm Key Sizes Standard symmetric authentication – message authentication code Full 3DES MAC 112 bit [ISO_9797_1] symmetric authentication – message authentication code AES CMAC 128, 198 and 256 bits [NIST_800_38B] Application Note: The Authentication Mechanisms based on Triple-DES and AES is the authentication process performed in phases 5 and 6 FCS_COP.1/GP_KEY_DEC Cryptographic operation FCS_COP.1.1/GP_KEY_DEC The TSF shall perform see table below in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm see table below and cryptographic key sizes see table below that meet the following: see table below: Cryptographic Operation Algorithm Key Sizes Standard key decryption Triple-DES in ECB mode 112 bit [FIPS_46_3] key decryption AES in CBC mode 128, 192 and 256 bits [FIPS_197] FCS_RND.1 Quality metric for random numbers FCS_RND.1.1 The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate random numbers that meet the average Shannon entropy per internal random bit exceeds 0.999. 7.1.2 Class FIA Identification and Authentication FIA_UID.1/PACE Timing of identification FIA_UID.1.1/PACE The TSF shall allow o To establish a communication channel, o Carrying out the PACE protocol according to [ICAO_TR_SAC], o To read the Initialization Data if it is not disabled by TSF according to FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS CombICAO Applet in EAC with PACE Configuration on Cosmo v9 Public Security Target 59 | 104 o To carry out the Chip Authentication Mapping (PACE-CAM) according to [ICAO_9303] o To carry out the Chip Authentication Protocol v.1 according to [TR_03110] o To carry out the Terminal Authentication Protocol according to [TR_03110] on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified. FIA_UID.1.2/PACE The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user. FIA_UAU.1/PACE Timing of authentication FIA_UAU.1.1/PACE The TSF shall allow o to establish the communication channel, o carrying out the PACE Protocol according to [ICAO_TR_SAC] o to read the Initialization Data if it is not disable by TSF according to FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS, o to identify themselves by selection of the authentication key o to carry out the Chip Authentication Protocol v.1 according to [TR_03110] o To carry out the Terminal Authentication Protocol according to [TR_03110] o To carry out the authentiication of the Manufacturer and Personalization Agent on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated. FIA_UAU.1.2/PACE The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user. FIA_UAU.4/PACE Single-use authentication mechanisms FIA_UAU.4.1/PACE The TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to o PACE Protocol according to [ICAO_TR_SAC], o Authentication Mechanisms based on Triple-DES and AES o Terminal Authentication Protocol v.1 according to [TR_03110]. Application Note: The authentication mechanisms based on Triple-DES and AES is the authentication process performed in phases 5 and 6 CombICAO Applet in EAC with PACE Configuration on Cosmo v9 Public Security Target 60 | 104 FIA_UAU.5/PACE Multiple authentication mechanisms FIA_UAU.5.1/PACE The TSF shall provide o PACE Protocol according to [ICAO_TR_SAC] and PACE-CAM Protocol according to [ICAO_9303], o Passive Authentication according to [ICAO_9303], o Secure messaging in MAC-ENC mode according to [ICAO_TR_SAC] o Symmetric Authentication Mechanism based on Triple-DES and AES o Terminal Authentication Protocol v.1 according to [TR_03110] to support user authentication. FIA_UAU.5.2/PACE The TSF shall authenticate any user's claimed identity according to the following rules: o Having successfully run the PACE protocol the TOE accepts only received commands with correct message authentication code sent by means of secure messaging with the key agreed with the terminal by means of the PACE protocol. o The TOE accepts the authentication attempt as Personalisation Agent by the Authentication Mechanism with Personalization Agent Key(s). o After run of the Chip Authentication Protocol Version 1 the TOE accepts only received commands with correct message authentication code sent by means of secure messaging with key agreed with the terminal by means of the Chip Authentication Mechanism v1. o The TOE accepts the authentication attempt by means of the Terminal Authentication Protocol v.1 only if the terminal uses the public key presented during the Chip Authentication Mechanism v.1 or the terminal uses the public key presented during PACE-CAM and the secure messaging established during PACE. o The TOE accepts the authentication attempt as Personalisation Agent by the Authentication Mechanism with Personalization Agent Key(s). FIA_UAU.6/PACE Re-authenticating FIA_UAU.6.1/PACE The TSF shall re-authenticate the user under the conditions each command sent to the TOE after successful run of the PACE protocol shall be verified as being sent by the PACE terminal. FIA_UAU.6/EAC Re-authenticating FIA_UAU.6.1/EAC The TSF shall re-authenticate the user under the conditions each command sent to the TOE after successful run of the Chip Authentication Protocol Version 1 shall be verified as being sent by the Inspection System. CombICAO Applet in EAC with PACE Configuration on Cosmo v9 Public Security Target 61 | 104 FIA_UAU.6/MP Re-authenticating FIA_UAU.6.1/MP The TSF shall re-authenticate the user under the conditions each command sent to the TOE after successful authentication of the terminal with the Symmetric Authentication Mechanism shall be verified as being sent by the authenticated terminal. FIA_AFL.1/PACE Authentication failure handling FIA_AFL.1.1/PACE The TSF shall detect when 10 unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to authentication attempts using the PACE password as shared password. FIA_AFL.1.2/PACE When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been met, the TSF shall wait for an increasing time between receiving of the terminal challenge and sending of the TSF response during the PACE authentication attempts. Application Note: The PACE password being referred here are MRZ or CAN. FIA_AFL.1/MP Authentication failure handling FIA_AFL.1.1/MP The TSF shall detect when 1 unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to authentication of the Manufacturer and the Personalization Agent. FIA_AFL.1.2/MP When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been met, the TSF shall slow down exponentially the next authentication. FIA_API.1/CA Authentication Proof of Identity FIA_API.1.1/CA The TSF shall provide a Chip Authentication Protocol Version 1 according to [TR_03110] to prove the identity of the TOE. FIA_API.1/CAM Authentication Proof of Identity FIA_API.1.1/CAM The TSF shall provide a PACE-CAM according to [ICAO_9303] to prove the identity of the TOE. 7.1.3 Class FDP User Data Protection CombICAO Applet in EAC with PACE Configuration on Cosmo v9 Public Security Target 62 | 104 FDP_ACC.1/TRM Subset access control FDP_ACC.1.1/TRM The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP on terminals gaining access to user data and data stored in EF.SOD of the logical travel document. FDP_ACF.1/TRM Security attribute based access control FDP_ACF.1.1/TRM The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP to objects based on the following: 1. Subjects: a. Terminal, b. BIS-PACE, c. Extended Inspection System 2. Objects: a. data in EF.DG1, EF.DG2 and EF.DG5 to EF.DG16,EF.SOD and EF.COM of the logical travel document, b. data in EF.DG3 of the logical travel document, c. data in EF.DG4 of the logical travel document, d. all TOE intrinsic secret cryptographic keys stored in the travel document 3. Security attributes: a. PACE Authentication b. Terminal Authentication v.1 c. Authorisation of the Terminal. FDP_ACF.1.2/TRM The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: a BIS-PACE is allowed to read data objects from FDP_ACF.1/TRM according to [ICAO_TR_SAC] after a successful PACE authentication as required by FIA_UAU.1/PACE. FDP_ACF.1.3/TRM The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: none. FDP_ACF.1.4/TRM The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: o Any terminal being not authenticated as PACE authenticated BIS-PACE is not allowed to read, to write, to modify, to use any User Data stored on the travel document. o Terminals not using secure messaging are not allowed to read, to write, to modify, to use any data stored on the travel document. o Any terminal being not successfully authenticated as Extended Inspection System with the Read access to DG 3 (Fingerprint) granted by the relative certificate holder authorization encoding is not allowed to read the data objects 2b) of FDP_ACF.1.1/TRM. CombICAO Applet in EAC with PACE Configuration on Cosmo v9 Public Security Target 63 | 104 o Any terminal being not successfully authenticated as Extended Inspection System with the Read access to DG 4 (Iris) granted by the relative certificate holder authorization encoding is not allowed to read the data objects 2c) of FDP_ACF.1.1/TRM. o Nobody is allowed to read the data objects 2d) of FDP_ACF.1.1/TRM. o Terminals authenticated as CVCA or as DV are not allowed to read data in the EF.DG3 and EF.DG4. o Moreover, the Extended Inspection System shall communicate with at least the minimum secure messaging level identified at the creation of the DG3 and DG4, to be able to read these DGs. FDP_ACC.1/UPD_FILE Subset access control FDP_ACC.1.1/UPD_FILE The TSF shall enforce the UPD_FILE Access Control SFP on terminals gaining write, read and modification access to data in the file(s) other than EF.COM, EF.SOD, and EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD. FDP_ACF.1/UPD_FILE Security attribute based access control FDP_ACF.1.1/UPD_FILE The TSF shall enforce the UPD_FILE Access Control SFP to objects based on the following: o Subjects:  Personalization Agent,  Extended Inspection System  Terminal, o Objects:  data in the file(s)EF.COM, EF.SOD, and EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD o Security attributes  authentication status of terminals,. FDP_ACF.1.2/UPD_FILE The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: o the Personalization Agent is allowed to write, read and modify the data in the file(s) other than EF.COM, EF.SOD, and EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD, o the successfully authenticated Extended Inspection System following FMT_MTD.1.1/UPD_FILE is allowed to modify the data in the file(s) other than EF.COM, EF.SOD, and EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD. CombICAO Applet in EAC with PACE Configuration on Cosmo v9 Public Security Target 64 | 104 FDP_ACF.1.3/UPD_FILE The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: none. FDP_ACF.1.4/UPD_FILE The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: Any Terminal is not allowed to modify the data in the file(s) EF.COM, EF.SOD, and EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD. FDP_RIP.1 Subset residual information protection FDP_RIP.1.1 The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content of a resource is made unavailable upon the deallocation of the resource from the following objects: o Session Keys (immediately after closing related communication session), o the ephemeral private key ephem-SK picc -PACE (by having generated a DH shared secret K) o none. FDP_UCT.1/TRM Basic data exchange confidentiality FDP_UCT.1.1/TRM The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP to receive and transmit user data in a manner protected from unauthorised disclosure. FDP_UIT.1/TRM Data exchange integrity FDP_UIT.1.1/TRM The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP to transmit and receive user data in a manner protected from modification, deletion, insertion and replay errors. FDP_UIT.1.2/TRM The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data, whether modification, deletion, insertion and replay has occurred. 7.1.4 Class FTP Trusted Path/Channels CombICAO Applet in EAC with PACE Configuration on Cosmo v9 Public Security Target 65 | 104 FTP_ITC.1/PACE Inter-TSF trusted channel FTP_ITC.1.1/PACE The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and another trusted IT product that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from modification or disclosure. FTP_ITC.1.2/PACE The TSF shall permit another trusted IT product to initiate communication via the trusted channel. FTP_ITC.1.3/PACE [Editorially Refined] The TSF shall enforce communication via the trusted channel for any data exchange between the TOE and the Terminal. FTP_ITC.1/MP Inter-TSF trusted channel FTP_ITC.1.1/MP The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and another trusted IT product that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from modification or disclosure. FTP_ITC.1.2/MP The TSF shall permit another trusted IT product to initiate communication via the trusted channel. FTP_ITC.1.3/MP The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for loading sensitive data (Pre-Perso_K, Perso_K, PACE_PWD, CA_SK) shall be encrypted. 7.1.5 Class FAU Security Audit FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage FAU_SAS.1.1 The TSF shall provide the Manufacturer with the capability to store the Initialisation and Pre-Personalisation Data in the audit records. 7.1.6 Class FMT Security Management FMT_MOF.1/BAC_EXP Management of security functions behaviour FMT_MOF.1.1/BAC_EXP The TSF shall restrict the ability to enable the functions o deactivation of BAC protocol to Country Verifying Certification Authority and Domestic Document Verifier once the current date in the TOE has reached or passed the value set by FMT_MTD.1/BAC_EXP. CombICAO Applet in EAC with PACE Configuration on Cosmo v9 Public Security Target 66 | 104 Application Note: The BAC is automatically deactivated by the TOE once the authenticated subject (CVCA or Domestic Document Verifier) has updated the current date of the TOE with a date that reaches or passes the reference date configured by FMT_MTD.1/BAC_EXP FMT_MOF.1/GP Management of security functions behaviour FMT_MOF.1.1/GP The TSF shall restrict the ability to enable the functions o transmission of user data in a manner protected from unauthorized disclosure, o reception of user data in a manner protected from unauthorized disclosure, o transmission of user data in a manner protected from modification, deletion, insertion and replay errors, o reception of user data in a manner protected from modification, deletion, insertion and replay errors, to the manufacturer and personalization agent. FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions: o Initialization, o Pre-personalisation, o Personalisation, o Configuration, o Chip Authentication Protocol, o Protection of incoming user data, o Protection of outgoing user data, o Basic Access Control expiration. FMT_SMR.1/PACE Security roles FMT_SMR.1.1/PACE The TSF shall maintain the roles o Manufacturer, o Personalization Agent, o Terminal, o PACE authenticated BIS-PACE o Country Verifying Certificate Authority, o Document Verifier, o Domestic Extended Inspection System o Foreign Extended Inspection System. CombICAO Applet in EAC with PACE Configuration on Cosmo v9 Public Security Target 67 | 104 FMT_SMR.1.2/PACE The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles. Application Note: This SFR also applies to the refinement of the role Manufacturer. FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities FMT_LIM.1.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so that in conjunction with ‘Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)’ the following policy is enforced Deploying test features after TOE delivery do not allow o User Data to be manipulated and disclosed, o TSF data to be manipulated or disclosed, o software to be reconstructed, o substantial information about construction of TSF to be gathered which may enable other attacks, o sensitive User Data(EF.DG3 and EF.DG4) to be disclosed FMT_LIM.2 Limited capabilities FMT_LIM.2.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so that in conjunction with ‘Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)’ the following policy is enforced Deploying test features after TOE delivery do not allow o User Data to be manipulated and disclosed, o TSF data to be manipulated or disclosed, o software to be reconstructed, o substantial information about construction of TSF to be gathered which may enable other attacks, o sensitive User Data(EF.DG3 and EF.DG4) to be disclosed FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA Management of TSF data FMT_MTD.1.1/INI_ENA The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the Initialisation Data and the Pre-personalisation Data to the Manufacturer. Application Note: Please refer to F.ACW for details of the data written by the manufacturer. CombICAO Applet in EAC with PACE Configuration on Cosmo v9 Public Security Target 68 | 104 FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS Management of TSF data FMT_MTD.1.1/INI_DIS The TSF shall restrict the ability to read out the Initialisation Data and the Pre-personalisation Data to the Personalisation Agent. FMT_MTD.1/PA Management of TSF data FMT_MTD.1.1/PA The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the document Security Object (SO D) to the Personalization Agent. FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI Management of TSF data FMT_MTD.1.1/CVCA_INI The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the o initial Country Verifying Certification Authority Public Key, o initial Country Verifying Certification Authority Certificate, o Initial Current Date o none to the Personalization Agent. FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD Management of TSF data FMT_MTD.1.1/CVCA_UPD The TSF shall restrict the ability to update the o Country Verifying Certification Authority Public Key, o Country Verifying Certification Authority Certificate to Country Verifying Certification Authority. FMT_MTD.1/DATE Management of TSF data FMT_MTD.1.1/DATE The TSF shall restrict the ability to modify the Current Date to o Country Verifying Certification Authority o Document Verifier o Domestic Extended Inspection System. FMT_MTD.1/CAPK Management of TSF data FMT_MTD.1.1/CAPK The TSF shall restrict the ability to load or create the Chip Authentication private key to the personalization agent. CombICAO Applet in EAC with PACE Configuration on Cosmo v9 Public Security Target 69 | 104 FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ Management of TSF data FMT_MTD.1.1/KEY_READ The TSF shall restrict the ability to read the o PACE passwords, o Manufacturer Keys o Pre-personalization Agent Keys, o Personalisation Agent Keys, o Chip Authentication Private Key to none. FMT_MTD.1/PACE_PWD Management of TSF data FMT_MTD.1.1/PACE_PWD The TSF shall restrict the ability to load the PACE Password to Personalization Agent. FMT_MTD.1/LCS_PERS Management of TSF data FMT_MTD.1.1/LCS_PERS The TSF shall restrict the ability to switch the LCS from phase 6 to phase 7 to the Personalization Agent. FMT_MTD.1/BAC_EXP Management of TSF data FMT_MTD.1.1/BAC_EXP The TSF shall restrict the ability to set the BAC expiry date to Personalization Agent. Application Note: By default, BAC expiration feature is not activated FMT_MTD.1/UPD_FILE Management of TSF data FMT_MTD.1.1/UPD_FILE The TSF shall restrict the ability to set the identifiers of files that can be modified in phase 7(different from EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1 to EF.DG16) to the Personalization Agent. FMT_MTD.1/SM_LVL Management of TSF data FMT_MTD.1.1/SM_LVL The TSF shall restrict the ability to set the minimum Secure Messaging level required to access DG3 and DG4 to Personalization Agent. Application Note: Possible secure messaging levels are: DES, AES 128, AES 192 or AES 256 CombICAO Applet in EAC with PACE Configuration on Cosmo v9 Public Security Target 70 | 104 FMT_MTD.3 Secure TSF data FMT_MTD.3.1 [Editorially Refined] The TSF shall ensure that only secure values of the certificate chain are accepted for TSF data of the Terminal Authentication Protocol v.1 and the Access Control. Refinement: The certificate chain is valid if and only if  the digital signature of the Inspection System Certificate can be verified as correct with the public key of the Document Verifier Certificate and the expiration date of the Inspection System Certificate is not before the Current Date of the TOE,  the digital signature of the Document Verifier Certificate can be verified as correct with the public key in the Certificate of the Country Verifying Certification Authority and the expiration date of the Certificate of the Country Verifying Certification Authority is not before the Current Date of the TOE and the expiration date of the Document Verifier Certificate is not before the Current Date of the TOE,  the digital signature of the Certificate of the Country Verifying Certification Authority can be verified as correct with the public key of the Country Verifying Certification Authority known to the TOE. The Inspection System Public Key contained in the Inspection System Certificate in a valid certificate chain is a secure value for the authentication reference data of the Extended Inspection System. The intersection of the Certificate Holder Authorizations contained in the certificates of a valid certificate chain is a secure value for Terminal Authorization of a successful authenticated Extended Inspection System. 7.1.7 Class FPT Protection of the Security Functions FPT_EMS.1 TOE Emanation FPT_EMS.1.1 The TOE shall not emit power variations, timing variations during command execution in excess of non useful information enabling access to o Chip Authentication Session Keys, o PACE session keys (PACE-K mac, PACE-K enc), o The ephemeral private key ephem SK picc -PACE, o The ephemeral private key SK Map,PICC -PACE-CAM, o Personalization Agent Key(s), o Chip Authentication Private Key. FPT_EMS.1.2 The TSF shall ensure users are unable to use the following interface smart card circuit contacts to gain access to o Chip Authentication Session Keys, o PACE session keys (PACE-K mac, PACE-K enc), o The ephemeral private key ephem SK picc -PACE, o Personalization Agent Key(s), o Chip Authentication Private Key. CombICAO Applet in EAC with PACE Configuration on Cosmo v9 Public Security Target 71 | 104 FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state FPT_FLS.1.1 The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of failures occur: o Exposure to operating conditions causing a TOE malfunction, o Failure detected by TSF according to FPT_TST.1, o none. FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack FPT_PHP.3.1 The TSF shall resist physical manipulation and physical probing to the TSF by responding automatically such that the SFRs are always enforced. FPT_TST.1 TSF testing FPT_TST.1.1 The TSF shall run a suite of self tests at the conditions o At reset to demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF. FPT_TST.1.2 The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of TSF data. FPT_TST.1.3 The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of stored TSF executable code. 7.2 Security Requirements Rationale 7.2.1 Objectives 7.2.1.1 Security Objectives for the TOE OT.Sens_Data_Conf The security objective OT.Sense_Data_Conf “Confidentiality of sensitive biometric reference data” is enforced by the Access Control SFP defined in FDP_ACC.1/TRM and FDP_ACF.1/TRM allowing the data of EF.DG3 and EF.DG4 only to be read by successfully authenticated Extended Inspection System being authorized by a valid certificate according FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER. The SFRs FIA_UID.1/PACE and FIA_UAU.1/PACE require the identification and authentication of the inspection systems. The SFR FIA_UAU.5/PACE requires the successful Chip Authentication (CA) v.1 before any authentication attempt as Extended Inspection System. During the protected communication following the CA v.1 the reuse of authentication data is prevented by FIA_UAU.4/PACE. The SFR FIA_UAU.6/EAC and FDP_UCT.1/TRM requires the confidentiality protection of the transmitted data after Chip Authentication v.1 by means of secure messaging implemented by the cryptographic functions according to FCS_RND.1 (for the generation of the terminal authentication challenge), FCS_CKM.1/CA (for the CombICAO Applet in EAC with PACE Configuration on Cosmo v9 Public Security Target 72 | 104 generation of shared secret and for the derivation of the new session keys), FCS_CKM.1/CA_DATA_GEN for generation of Chip Authentication Data in personalization phase, and FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC and FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC for the ENC_MAC_Mode secure messaging. The session keys are destroyed according to FCS_CKM.4 after use. The SFR FMT_MTD.1/CAPK and FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ requires that the Chip Authentication Key cannot be written unauthorized or read afterwards. FIA_UAU.6/MP requires that the sensitive data is sent via Secure Messaging during personalization phase. To allow a verification of the certificate chain as in FMT_MTD.3 the CVCA’s public key and certificate as well as the current date are written or update by authorized identified role as of FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI, FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD and FMT_MTD.1/DATE. FMT_MOF.1/GP ensures all data is transmitted and received via secure messaging to ensure confidentiality OT.Chip_Auth_Proof The security objective OT.Chip_Auth_Proof “Proof of travel document’s chip authenticity” is ensured by the Chip Authentication Protocol v.1 provided by FIA_API.1/CA proving the identity of the TOE. The Chip Authentication Protocol v.1 defined by FCS_CKM.1/CA is performed using a TOE internally stored confidential private key as required by FMT_MTD.1/CAPK and FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ. The Chip Authentication Data is generated by using FCS_CKM.1/CA_DATA_GEN. The Chip Authentication Protocol v.1 [TR_03110] requires additional TSF according to FCS_CKM.1/CA (for the derivation of the session keys), FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC and FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC (for the ENC_MAC_Mode secure messaging).The SFRs FMT_SMF.1 and FMT_SMR.1/PACE support the functions and roles related. OT.Data_Integrity The security objective OT.Data_Integrity “Integrity of personal data” requires the TOE to protect the integrity of the logical travel document stored on the travel document’s chip against physical manipulation and unauthorized writing. Physical manipulation is addressed by FPT_PHP.3. Logical manipulation of stored user data is addressed by (FDP_ACC.1/TRM, FDP_ACF.1/TRM): only the Personalisation Agent is allowed to write the data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical travel document (FDP_ACF.1.2/TRM, rule 1) and terminals are not allowed to modify any of the data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical travel document (cf. FDP_ACF.1.4/TRM). FMT_MTD.1/PA requires that SOD containing signature over the User Data stored on the TOE and used for the Passive Authentication is allowed to be written by the Personalisation Agent only and, hence, is to be considered as trustworthy. The Personalisation Agent must identify and authenticate themselves according to FIA_UID.1/PACE and FIA_UAU.1/PACE before accessing these data. FIA_UAU.4/PACE, FIA_UAU.5/PACE and FCS_CKM.4 represent some required specific properties of the protocols used. The SFR FMT_SMR.1/PACE lists the roles and the SFR FMT_SMF.1 lists the TSF management functions. Unauthorised modifying of the exchanged data is addressed, in the first line, by FTP_ITC.1/PACE using FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC. For PACE secured data exchange, a prerequisite for establishing this trusted channel is a successful PACE Authentication (FIA_UID.1/PACE, FIA_UAU.1/PACE) using FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE and possessing the special properties FIA_UAU.5/PACE, FIA_UAU.6/PACE resp. FIA_UAU.6/EAC. The trusted channel is established using PACE, Chip Authentication v.1, and Terminal Authentication v.1. FDP_RIP.1 requires erasing the values of session keys (here: for KMAC). The TOE supports the inspection system detect any modification of the transmitted logical travel document data after Chip Authentication v.1. The SFR FIA_UAU.6/EAC and FDP_UIT.1/TRM requires the integrity protection of the transmitted data after Chip Authentication v.1 by means of secure messaging implemented by the cryptographic functions according to FCS_CKM.1/CA and FCS_CKM.1/CAM(for the generation of shared CombICAO Applet in EAC with PACE Configuration on Cosmo v9 Public Security Target 73 | 104 secret andfor the derivation of the new session keys), and FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC and FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC for the ENC_MAC_Mode secure messaging. The session keys are destroyed according to FCS_CKM.4 after use. The SFR FMT_MTD.1/CAPK and FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ requires that the Chip Authentication Key cannot be written unauthorized or read afterwards. The SFR FCS_RND.1 represents a general support for cryptographic operations needed. The SFRs FDP_ACC.1/UPD_FILE and FDP_ACF.1/UPD_FILE ensure that no terminal is allowed to modify the user data. FIA_UAU.6/MP and FMT_MOF.1/GP makes sure that the data is transmitted via secure messaging to maintain integrity. OT.Data_Authenticity The security objective OT.Data_Authenticity aims ensuring authenticity of the User- and TSF data (after the PACE Authentication) by enabling its verification at the terminal-side and by an active verification by the TOE itself.This objective is mainly achieved by FTP_ITC.1/PACE using FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC. A prerequisite for establishing this trusted channel is a successful PACE or Chip and Terminal Authentication v.1 (FIA_UID.1/PACE, FIA_UAU.1/PACE) using FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE resp. FCS_CKM.1/CA or FCS_CKM.1/CAM and possessing the special properties FIA_UAU.5/PACE, FIA_UAU.6/PACE resp. FIA_UAU.6/EAC. FIA_UAU.6/MP ensures the data that is reaching the TOE is coming from the personalization agent by maintaining secure messaging for all commands. FDP_RIP.1 requires erasing the values of session keys (here: for KMAC). FIA_UAU.4/PACE, FIA_UAU.5/PACE and FCS_CKM.4 represent some required specific properties of the protocols used. The SFR FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ restricts the access to the PACE passwords and the Chip Authentication Private Key. FMT_MTD.1/PA requires that SOD containing signature over the User Data stored on the TOE and used for the Passive Authentication is allowed to be written by the Personalisation Agent only and, hence, is to be considered as trustworthy.The SFR FCS_RND.1 represents a general support for cryptographic operations needed.The SFRs FMT_SMF.1 and FMT_SMR.1/PACE support the functions and roles related. CombICAO Applet in EAC with PACE Configuration on Cosmo v9 Public Security Target 74 | 104 OT.Data_Confidentiality The security objective OT.Data_Confidentiality aims that the TOE always ensures confidentiality of the User- and TSF-data stored and, after the PACE Authentication resp. Chip Authentication, of these data exchanged.This objective for the data stored is mainly achieved by (FDP_ACC.1/TRM, FDP_ACF.1/TRM). FIA_UAU.4/PACE, FIA_UAU.5/PACE and FCS_CKM.4 represent some required specific properties of the protocols used. This objective for the data exchanged is mainly achieved by FDP_UCT.1/TRM, FDP_UIT.1/TRM and FTP_ITC.1/PACE using FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC resp. FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC. A prerequisite for establishing this trusted channel is a successful PACE or Chip and Terminal Authentication v.1 (FIA_UID.1/PACE, FIA_UAU.1/PACE) using FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE resp. FCS_CKM.1/CA or FCS_CKM.1/CAM and possessing the special properties FIA_UAU.5/PACE, FIA_UAU.6/PACE resp. FIA_UAU.6/EAC and FIA_UAU.6/MP for Manufacture and Personalization Agent authentication. FDP_RIP.1 requires erasing the values of session keys (here: for Kenc). The SFR FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ restricts the access to the PACE passwords and the Chip Authentication Private Key. FMT_MTD.1/PA requires that SOD containing signature over the User Data stored on the TOE and used for the Passive Authentication is allowed to be written by the Personalisation Agent only and, hence, is to be considered trustworthy.The SFR FCS_RND.1 represents the general support for cryptographic operations needed.The SFRs FMT_SMF.1 and FMT_SMR.1/PACE support the functions and roles related. OT.Tracing The security objective OT.Tracing aims that the TOE prevents gathering TOE tracing data by means of unambiguous identifying the travel document remotely through establishing or listening to a communication via the contactless interface of the TOE without a priori knowledge of the correct values of shared passwords (CAN, MRZ).This objective is achieved as follows:(i) while establishing PACE communication with CAN or MRZ (non-blocking authorisation data) – by FIA_AFL.1/PACE;(ii) for listening to PACE communication (is of importance for the current PP, since SOD is card-individual) – FTP_ITC.1/PACE. OT.Prot_Abuse-Func The security objective OT.Prot_Abuse-Func “Protection against Abuse of Functionality” is ensured by the SFR FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2 which prevent misuse of test functionality of the TOE or other features which may not be used after TOE Delivery. OT.Prot_Inf_Leak The security objective OT.Prot_Inf_Leak “Protection against Information Leakage” requires the TOE to protect confidential TSF data stored and/or processed in the travel document’s chip against disclosure o by measurement and analysis of the shape and amplitude of signals or the time between events found by measuring signals on the electromagnetic field, power consumption, clock, or I/O lines which is addressed by the SFR FPT_EMS.1, o by forcing a malfunction of the TOE which is addressed by the SFR FPT_FLS.1 and FPT_TST.1, and/or o by a physical manipulation of the TOE which is addressed by the SFR FPT_PHP.3. OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper The security objective OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper “Protection against Physical Tampering” is covered by the SFR FPT_PHP.3. OT.Prot_Malfunction The security objective OT.Prot_Malfunction “Protection against Malfunctions” is covered by (i) the SFR FPT_TST.1 which requires self tests to demonstrate the correct operation and tests of authorized users to verify the integrity of CombICAO Applet in EAC with PACE Configuration on Cosmo v9 Public Security Target 75 | 104 TSF data and TSF code, and (ii) the SFR FPT_FLS.1 which requires a secure state in case of detected failure or operating conditions possibly causing a malfunction. OT.Identification The security objective OT.Identification “Identification of the TOE” addresses the storage of Initialisation and Pre-Personalisation Data in its non-volatile memory, whereby they also include the IC Identification Data uniquely identifying the TOE’s chip. This will be ensured by TSF according to SFR FAU_SAS.1. The SFR FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA allows only the Manufacturer to write Initialisation and Pre- personalisation Data (including the Personalisation Agent key). The SFR FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS requires the Personalisation Agent to disable access to Initialisation and Pre-personalisation Data in the life cycle phase ‘operational use’. The SFRs FMT_SMF.1 and FMT_SMR.1/PACE support the functions and roles related. OT.AC_Pers The security objective OT.AC_Pers “Access Control for Personalisation of logical travel document” addresses the access control of the writing the logical travel document. The justification for the SFRs FAU_SAS.1, FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA and FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS arises from the justification for OT.Identification above with respect to the Pre- personalisation Data. The write access to the logical travel document data are defined by the SFR FIA_UID.1/PACE, FIA_UAU.1/PACE, FDP_ACC.1/TRM and FDP_ACF.1/TRM in the same way: only the successfully authenticated Personalisation Agent is allowed to write the data of the groups EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical travel document only once. FMT_MTD.1/PA covers the related property of OT.AC_Pers (writing SOD and, in generally, personalisation data). The SFR FMT_SMR.1/PACE lists the roles (including Personalisation Agent) and the SFR FMT_SMF.1 lists the TSF management functions (including Personalisation). The SFRs FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ and FPT_EMS.1 restrict the access to the Personalisation Agent Keys and the Chip Authentication Private Key. The authentication of the terminal as Personalisation Agent shall be performed by TSF according to SFR FIA_UAU.4/PACE and FIA_UAU.5/PACE. If the Personalisation Terminal want to authenticate itself to the TOE by means of the Terminal Authentication Protocol v.1 (after Chip Authentication v.1) with the Personalisation Agent Keys the TOE will use TSF according to the FCS_RND.1 (for the generation of the challenge), FCS_CKM.1/CA (for the derivation of the new session keys after Chip Authentication v.1), FCS_CKM.1/CA_DATA_GEN for generation of CA Data in phase 6, and FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC and FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC (for the ENC_MAC_Mode secure messaging), FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER (as part of the Terminal Authentication Protocol v.1) and FIA_UAU.6/EAC (for the re-authentication). If the Personalisation Terminal wants to authenticate itself to the TOE by means of the Authentication Mechanism with Personalisation Agent Key the TOE will use TSF according to the FCS_RND.1 (for the generation of the challenge) and FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC (to verify the authentication attempt). The session keys are destroyed according to FCS_CKM.4 after use. The Personalisation Agent can load the PACE password according to FMT_MTD.1/PACE_PWD. FMT_MTD.1/LCS_PERS ensures only personalization agent can transfer the TOE from life cycle phase 6 to phase 7. FIA_UAU.6/MP ensures all commands in personalization phase are sent via secure messaging. FIA_AFL.1/MP helps block the Authentication in Phase 6 if too many failed authentication attempts occur to prevent attacks. FDP_ACC.1/UPD_FILE and FDP_ACF.1/UPD_FILE restrict write access to files to personalization agent. CombICAO Applet in EAC with PACE Configuration on Cosmo v9 Public Security Target 76 | 104 OT.Configuration The security objective OT.Configuration “Protection of the TOE preparation” addresses management of the Data Configuration, Pre-personalization Agent keys, Personalization Agent keys and the Life Cycle State of the TOE. The authentication of the terminal as Manufacturer is performed by TSF according to SFR FIA_UAU.4 and FIA_UAU.5/MP. The Manufacturer can be authenticated by using the symmetric authentication mechanism (FCS_COP.1/GP_AUTH) with the Pre-personalization key. FIA_UAU.6/MP describes the re-authentication. In case of failed authentication attempts FIA_AFL.1/MP enforces additional waiting time prolonging the necessary amount of time for facilitating a brute force attack. The SFR FTP_ITC.1/MP allows the Manufacturer to communicate with the OS. Once step 4 is done, the MRTD packaging responsible is allowed to set the Pre- personalization Agent keys according to the SFR FCS_COP.1/GP_KEY_DEC. The read access to the Pre-personalization keys is prevented by SFRs FPT_EMS.1, FPT_FLS.1 and FPT_PHP.3 the confidentially of these keys. In step 5, the authentication of the terminal as Manufacturer shall be performed by TSF according to SFR FIA_UAU.4 and FIA_UAU.5/MP. The Manufacturer shall be authenticated by using the symmetric authentication mechanism (FCS_COP.1/GP_AUTH). In case of failed authentication attempts FIA_AFL.1/MP enforces additional waiting time prolonging the necessary amount of time for facilitating a brute force attack The SFR FIA_UAU.6/MP describes the re-authentication and FDP_UCT.1/MP the protection of the transmitted data by means of secure messaging implemented by the cryptographic functions according to FCS_CKM.1/GP, FCS_RND.1 (for key generation), and FCS_COP.1/GP_ENC as well as FCS_COP.1/GP_MAC for the ENC_MAC_Mode. The SFR FCS_CKM.4 enforces the destruction of Secure Messaging session keys. The Manufacturer and the Personalization Agent can select the protection mode of user data following FMT_MOF.1.1/GP. The SFR FCS_CKM.4, FPT_EMS.1, FPT_FLS.1 and FPT_PHP.3 the confidentially of Personalization Agent keys. OT.Update_File The security objective OT.Update_File “Modification of file in Operational Use Phase” addresses the modification of Updatable Data as defined in FDP_ACC.1/UPD_FILE. The SFR FDP_ACF.1/UPD_FILE clarifies what can be done by which subject: after a correct authentication the Personalization Agent is allowed to write, read and modify these Updatable Data during Pre-Personalisation and Personalisation phases. Any Terminal is not allowed to modify them during Operational phase. Only a successfully authenticated Extended Inspection System is allowed to modify Updatable Data, only if with the name corresponding to the one (or beginning of the one) set following FMT_MTD.1/UPD_FILE by the Personalization Agent during Pre-Personalisation and Personalisation phases. OT.BAC_Expiration The security objective OT.BAC_Expiration “Automatic deactivation of BAC protocol” is ensured by the SFR FMT_SMF.1 and detailed in FMT_MOF.1/BAC_EXP regarding mechanism activation and FMT_MTD.1/BAC_EXP regarding mechanism configuration. OT.AC_SM_Level The security objective OT.AC_SM_Level “Access control to sensitive biometric reference data according to SM level” is covered by FMT_MTD.1/SM_LVL. CombICAO Applet in EAC with PACE Configuration on Cosmo v9 Public Security Target 77 | 104 OT.Chip_Auth_Proof_PACE_CAM OT.Chip_Auth_Proof_PACE_CAM aims to ensure the authenticity of the electronic document's chip by the PACE-CAM protocol. This is supported by FCS_CKM.1/CAM for cryptographic key-generation, and FIA_API.1/CAM and FCS_COP.1/CAM for the implementation itself, as well as FIA_UID.1/PACE and FIA_UAU.5/PACE, the latter supporting the PACE protocol. 7.2.2 Rationale tables of Security Objectives and SFRs Security Objectives Security Functional Requirements Rationale OT.Sens_Data_Conf FCS_CKM.1/CA, FCS_CKM.4, FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC, FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER, FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC, FCS_RND.1, FIA_UID.1/PACE, FIA_UAU.1/PACE, FIA_UAU.4/PACE, FIA_UAU.5/PACE, FIA_UAU.6/EAC, FIA_UAU.6/MP, FDP_ACC.1/TRM, FDP_ACF.1/TRM, FDP_UCT.1/TRM, FMT_MOF.1/GP, FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI, FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD, FMT_MTD.1/DATE, FMT_MTD.1/CAPK, FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ, FMT_MTD.3, FCS_CKM.1/CA_DATA_GEN Section 7.3.1 OT.Chip_Auth_Proof FCS_CKM.1/CA, FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC, FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC, FIA_API.1/CA, FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1/PACE, FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ, FMT_MTD.1/CAPK, FCS_CKM.1/CA_DATA_GEN Section 7.3.1 OT.Data_Integrity FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE, FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC, FIA_UAU.1/PACE, FIA_UAU.5/PACE, FIA_UAU.6/EAC, FIA_UID.1/PACE, FIA_UAU.4/PACE, FIA_UAU.6/PACE, FDP_ACF.1/TRM, FDP_ACC.1/TRM, FDP_UIT.1/TRM, FTP_ITC.1/PACE, FMT_MTD.1/PA, FMT_MTD.1/CAPK, FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ, FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC, FCS_CKM.1/CA, FCS_CKM.4, FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC, FDP_RIP.1, FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1/PACE, FPT_PHP.3, FIA_UAU.6/MP, FDP_ACC.1/UPD_FILE, FDP_ACF.1/UPD_FILE, FCS_RND.1, FMT_MOF.1/GP, FCS_CKM.1/CAM Section 7.3.1 OT.Data_Authenticity FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE, FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC, FIA_UAU.1/PACE, FIA_UAU.5/PACE, FIA_UAU.6/EAC, FIA_UID.1/PACE, FIA_UAU.4/PACE, FIA_UAU.6/PACE, Section 7.3.1 CombICAO Applet in EAC with PACE Configuration on Cosmo v9 Public Security Target 78 | 104 FTP_ITC.1/PACE, FMT_MTD.1/PA, FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ, FCS_CKM.1/CA, FCS_CKM.4, FDP_RIP.1, FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1/PACE, FIA_UAU.6/MP, FCS_RND.1, FCS_CKM.1/CAM OT.Data_Confidentiality FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE, FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC, FIA_UAU.1/PACE, FIA_UAU.5/PACE, FIA_UAU.6/EAC, FIA_UID.1/PACE, FIA_UAU.4/PACE, FIA_UAU.6/PACE, FDP_ACF.1/TRM, FDP_ACC.1/TRM, FDP_UCT.1/TRM, FDP_UIT.1/TRM, FTP_ITC.1/PACE, FMT_MTD.1/PA, FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ, FCS_CKM.1/CA, FCS_CKM.4, FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC, FDP_RIP.1, FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1/PACE, FIA_UAU.6/MP, FCS_RND.1, FCS_CKM.1/CAM Section 7.3.1 OT.Tracing FTP_ITC.1/PACE, FIA_AFL.1/PACE Section 7.3.1 OT.Prot_Abuse-Func FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2 Section 7.3.1 OT.Prot_Inf_Leak FPT_FLS.1, FPT_PHP.3, FPT_TST.1, FPT_EMS.1 Section 7.3.1 OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper FPT_PHP.3 Section 7.3.1 OT.Prot_Malfunction FPT_FLS.1, FPT_TST.1 Section 7.3.1 OT.Identification FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA, FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS, FAU_SAS.1, FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1/PACE Section 7.3.1 OT.AC_Pers FMT_MTD.1/PA, FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ, FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA, FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS, FAU_SAS.1, FIA_UAU.5/PACE, FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1/PACE, FIA_UAU.6/MP, FIA_AFL.1/MP, FDP_ACC.1/UPD_FILE, FDP_ACF.1/UPD_FILE, FMT_MTD.1/LCS_PERS, FCS_CKM.1/CA, FCS_CKM.4, FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC, FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER, FCS_RND.1, FIA_UID.1/PACE, FIA_UAU.1/PACE, FIA_UAU.4/PACE, FIA_UAU.6/EAC, FDP_ACC.1/TRM, FDP_ACF.1/TRM, FMT_MTD.1/PACE_PWD, FPT_EMS.1, FCS_CKM.1/CA_DATA_GEN, FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC Section 7.3.1 OT.Configuration FCS_CKM.1/GP, FCS_COP.1/GP_ENC, FCS_COP.1/GP_MAC, FCS_COP.1/GP_AUTH, FCS_COP.1/GP_KEY_DEC, Section 7.3.1 CombICAO Applet in EAC with PACE Configuration on Cosmo v9 Public Security Target 79 | 104 FTP_ITC.1/MP, FIA_AFL.1/MP, FIA_UAU.6/MP, FCS_CKM.4, FCS_RND.1, FPT_EMS.1, FPT_FLS.1, FPT_PHP.3 OT.Update_File FDP_ACC.1/UPD_FILE, FDP_ACF.1/UPD_FILE, FMT_MTD.1/UPD_FILE Section 7.3.1 OT.BAC_Expiration FMT_MOF.1/BAC_EXP, FMT_SMF.1, FMT_MTD.1/BAC_EXP Section 7.3.1 OT.AC_SM_Level FMT_MTD.1/SM_LVL Section 7.3.1 OT.Chip_Auth_Proof_PACE_CAM FCS_COP.1/CAM, FIA_UAU.5/PACE, FIA_API.1/CAM, FIA_UID.1/PACE, FCS_CKM.1/CAM Section 7.3.1 Table 16 Security Objectives and SFRs - Coverage Security Functional Requirements Security Objectives FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE OT.Data_Integrity, OT.Data_Authenticity, OT.Data_Confidentiality FCS_CKM.1/CA OT.Sens_Data_Conf, OT.Chip_Auth_Proof, OT.Data_Integrity, OT.Data_Authenticity, OT.Data_Confidentiality, OT.AC_Pers FCS_CKM.1/CAM OT.Data_Integrity, OT.Data_Authenticity, OT.Data_Confidentiality, OT.Chip_Auth_Proof_PACE_CAM FCS_CKM.1/CA_DATA_GEN OT.Sens_Data_Conf, OT.Chip_Auth_Proof, OT.AC_Pers FCS_CKM.1/GP OT.Configuration FCS_CKM.4 OT.Sens_Data_Conf, OT.Data_Integrity, OT.Data_Authenticity, OT.Data_Confidentiality, OT.AC_Pers, OT.Configuration FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC OT.Data_Confidentiality FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC OT.Data_Integrity, OT.Data_Authenticity FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC OT.Sens_Data_Conf, OT.Chip_Auth_Proof, OT.Data_Integrity, OT.Data_Confidentiality, OT.AC_Pers FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER OT.Sens_Data_Conf, OT.AC_Pers FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC OT.Sens_Data_Conf, OT.Chip_Auth_Proof, OT.Data_Integrity, OT.AC_Pers FCS_COP.1/CAM OT.Chip_Auth_Proof_PACE_CAM FCS_COP.1/GP_ENC OT.Configuration FCS_COP.1/GP_MAC OT.Configuration CombICAO Applet in EAC with PACE Configuration on Cosmo v9 Public Security Target 80 | 104 FCS_COP.1/GP_AUTH OT.Configuration FCS_COP.1/GP_KEY_DEC OT.Configuration FCS_RND.1 OT.Sens_Data_Conf, OT.Data_Integrity, OT.Data_Authenticity, OT.Data_Confidentiality, OT.AC_Pers, OT.Configuration FIA_UID.1/PACE OT.Sens_Data_Conf, OT.Data_Integrity, OT.Data_Authenticity, OT.Data_Confidentiality, OT.AC_Pers, OT.Chip_Auth_Proof_PACE_CAM FIA_UAU.1/PACE OT.Sens_Data_Conf, OT.Data_Integrity, OT.Data_Authenticity, OT.Data_Confidentiality, OT.AC_Pers FIA_UAU.4/PACE OT.Sens_Data_Conf, OT.Data_Integrity, OT.Data_Authenticity, OT.Data_Confidentiality, OT.AC_Pers FIA_UAU.5/PACE OT.Sens_Data_Conf, OT.Data_Integrity, OT.Data_Authenticity, OT.Data_Confidentiality, OT.AC_Pers, OT.Chip_Auth_Proof_PACE_CAM FIA_UAU.6/PACE OT.Data_Integrity, OT.Data_Authenticity, OT.Data_Confidentiality FIA_UAU.6/EAC OT.Sens_Data_Conf, OT.Data_Integrity, OT.Data_Authenticity, OT.Data_Confidentiality, OT.AC_Pers FIA_UAU.6/MP OT.Sens_Data_Conf, OT.Data_Integrity, OT.Data_Authenticity, OT.Data_Confidentiality, OT.AC_Pers, OT.Configuration FIA_AFL.1/PACE OT.Tracing FIA_AFL.1/MP OT.AC_Pers, OT.Configuration FIA_API.1/CA OT.Chip_Auth_Proof FIA_API.1/CAM OT.Chip_Auth_Proof_PACE_CAM FDP_ACC.1/TRM OT.Sens_Data_Conf, OT.Data_Integrity, OT.Data_Confidentiality, OT.AC_Pers FDP_ACF.1/TRM OT.Sens_Data_Conf, OT.Data_Integrity, OT.Data_Confidentiality, OT.AC_Pers FDP_ACC.1/UPD_FILE OT.Data_Integrity, OT.AC_Pers, OT.Update_File FDP_ACF.1/UPD_FILE OT.Data_Integrity, OT.AC_Pers, OT.Update_File FDP_RIP.1 OT.Data_Integrity, OT.Data_Authenticity, OT.Data_Confidentiality FDP_UCT.1/TRM OT.Sens_Data_Conf, OT.Data_Confidentiality FDP_UIT.1/TRM OT.Data_Integrity, OT.Data_Confidentiality FTP_ITC.1/PACE OT.Data_Integrity, OT.Data_Authenticity, OT.Data_Confidentiality, OT.Tracing CombICAO Applet in EAC with PACE Configuration on Cosmo v9 Public Security Target 81 | 104 FTP_ITC.1/MP OT.Configuration FAU_SAS.1 OT.Identification, OT.AC_Pers FMT_MOF.1/BAC_EXP OT.BAC_Expiration FMT_MOF.1/GP OT.Sens_Data_Conf, OT.Data_Integrity FMT_SMF.1 OT.Chip_Auth_Proof, OT.Data_Integrity, OT.Data_Authenticity, OT.Data_Confidentiality, OT.Identification, OT.AC_Pers, OT.BAC_Expiration FMT_SMR.1/PACE OT.Chip_Auth_Proof, OT.Data_Integrity, OT.Data_Authenticity, OT.Data_Confidentiality, OT.Identification, OT.AC_Pers FMT_LIM.1 OT.Prot_Abuse-Func FMT_LIM.2 OT.Prot_Abuse-Func FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA OT.Identification, OT.AC_Pers FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS OT.Identification, OT.AC_Pers FMT_MTD.1/PA OT.Data_Integrity, OT.Data_Authenticity, OT.Data_Confidentiality, OT.AC_Pers FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI OT.Sens_Data_Conf FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD OT.Sens_Data_Conf FMT_MTD.1/DATE OT.Sens_Data_Conf FMT_MTD.1/CAPK OT.Sens_Data_Conf, OT.Chip_Auth_Proof, OT.Data_Integrity FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ OT.Sens_Data_Conf, OT.Chip_Auth_Proof, OT.Data_Integrity, OT.Data_Authenticity, OT.Data_Confidentiality, OT.AC_Pers FMT_MTD.1/PACE_PWD OT.AC_Pers FMT_MTD.1/LCS_PERS OT.AC_Pers FMT_MTD.1/BAC_EXP OT.BAC_Expiration FMT_MTD.1/UPD_FILE OT.Update_File FMT_MTD.1/SM_LVL OT.AC_SM_Level FMT_MTD.3 OT.Sens_Data_Conf FPT_EMS.1 OT.Prot_Inf_Leak, OT.AC_Pers, OT.Configuration FPT_FLS.1 OT.Prot_Inf_Leak, OT.Prot_Malfunction, OT.Configuration FPT_PHP.3 OT.Data_Integrity, OT.Prot_Inf_Leak, OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper, OT.Configuration FPT_TST.1 OT.Prot_Inf_Leak, OT.Prot_Malfunction Table 17 SFRs and Security Objectives CombICAO Applet in EAC with PACE Configuration on Cosmo v9 Public Security Target 82 | 104 7.2.3 Dependencies 7.2.3.1 SFRs Dependencies Requirements CC Dependencies Satisfied Dependencies FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE (FCS_CKM.2 or FCS_COP.1) and (FCS_CKM.4) FCS_CKM.4, FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC, FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC FCS_CKM.1/CA (FCS_CKM.2 or FCS_COP.1) and (FCS_CKM.4) FCS_CKM.4, FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC, FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC FCS_CKM.1/CAM (FCS_CKM.2 or FCS_COP.1) and (FCS_CKM.4) FCS_CKM.4, FCS_COP.1/CAM FCS_CKM.1/CA_DATA_GEN (FCS_CKM.2 or FCS_COP.1) and (FCS_CKM.4) FCS_CKM.4, FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER FCS_CKM.1/GP (FCS_CKM.2 or FCS_COP.1) and (FCS_CKM.4) FCS_CKM.4, FCS_COP.1/GP_ENC, FCS_COP.1/GP_MAC FCS_CKM.4 (FCS_CKM.1 or FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2) FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE, FCS_CKM.1/CA, FCS_CKM.1/CA_DATA_GEN, FCS_CKM.1/GP FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC (FCS_CKM.1 or FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2) and (FCS_CKM.4) FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE, FCS_CKM.4 FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC (FCS_CKM.1 or FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2) and (FCS_CKM.4) FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE, FCS_CKM.4 FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC (FCS_CKM.1 or FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2) and (FCS_CKM.4) FCS_CKM.1/CA, FCS_CKM.4 FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER (FCS_CKM.1 or FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2) and (FCS_CKM.4) FCS_CKM.1/CA, FCS_CKM.4 FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC (FCS_CKM.1 or FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2) and (FCS_CKM.4) FCS_CKM.1/CA, FCS_CKM.4 FCS_COP.1/CAM (FCS_CKM.1 or FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2) and (FCS_CKM.4) FCS_CKM.1/CAM, FCS_CKM.4 FCS_COP.1/GP_ENC (FCS_CKM.1 or FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2) and (FCS_CKM.4) FCS_CKM.1/GP, FCS_CKM.4 FCS_COP.1/GP_MAC (FCS_CKM.1 or FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2) and (FCS_CKM.4) FCS_CKM.1/GP, FCS_CKM.4 FCS_COP.1/GP_AUTH (FCS_CKM.1 or FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2) and (FCS_CKM.4) FCS_CKM.1/GP, FCS_CKM.4 FCS_COP.1/GP_KEY_DEC (FCS_CKM.1 or FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2) and (FCS_CKM.4) FCS_CKM.1/GP, FCS_CKM.4 FCS_RND.1 No Dependencies FIA_UID.1/PACE No Dependencies FIA_UAU.1/PACE (FIA_UID.1) FIA_UID.1/PACE FIA_UAU.4/PACE No Dependencies FIA_UAU.5/PACE No Dependencies FIA_UAU.6/PACE No Dependencies FIA_UAU.6/EAC No Dependencies FIA_UAU.6/MP No Dependencies FIA_AFL.1/PACE (FIA_UAU.1) FIA_UAU.1/PACE FIA_AFL.1/MP (FIA_UAU.1) FIA_UAU.1/PACE FIA_API.1/CA No Dependencies FIA_API.1/CAM No Dependencies FDP_ACC.1/TRM (FDP_ACF.1) FDP_ACF.1/TRM CombICAO Applet in EAC with PACE Configuration on Cosmo v9 Public Security Target 83 | 104 FDP_ACF.1/TRM (FDP_ACC.1) and (FMT_MSA.3) FDP_ACC.1/TRM FDP_ACC.1/UPD_FILE (FDP_ACF.1) FDP_ACF.1/UPD_FILE FDP_ACF.1/UPD_FILE (FDP_ACC.1) and (FMT_MSA.3) FDP_ACC.1/UPD_FILE FDP_RIP.1 No Dependencies FDP_UCT.1/TRM (FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1) and (FTP_ITC.1 or FTP_TRP.1) FDP_ACC.1/TRM, FTP_ITC.1/PACE FDP_UIT.1/TRM (FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1) and (FTP_ITC.1 or FTP_TRP.1) FDP_ACC.1/TRM, FTP_ITC.1/PACE FTP_ITC.1/PACE No Dependencies FTP_ITC.1/MP No Dependencies FAU_SAS.1 No Dependencies FMT_MOF.1/BAC_EXP (FMT_SMF.1) and (FMT_SMR.1) FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1/PACE FMT_MOF.1/GP (FMT_SMF.1) and (FMT_SMR.1) FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1/PACE FMT_SMF.1 No Dependencies FMT_SMR.1/PACE (FIA_UID.1) FIA_UID.1/PACE FMT_LIM.1 No Dependencies FMT_LIM.2 No Dependencies FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA (FMT_SMF.1) and (FMT_SMR.1) FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1/PACE FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS (FMT_SMF.1) and (FMT_SMR.1) FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1/PACE FMT_MTD.1/PA (FMT_SMF.1) and (FMT_SMR.1) FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1/PACE FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI (FMT_SMF.1) and (FMT_SMR.1) FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1/PACE FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD (FMT_SMF.1) and (FMT_SMR.1) FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1/PACE FMT_MTD.1/DATE (FMT_SMF.1) and (FMT_SMR.1) FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1/PACE FMT_MTD.1/CAPK (FMT_SMF.1) and (FMT_SMR.1) FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1/PACE FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ (FMT_SMF.1) and (FMT_SMR.1) FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1/PACE FMT_MTD.1/PACE_PWD (FMT_SMF.1) and (FMT_SMR.1) FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1/PACE FMT_MTD.1/LCS_PERS (FMT_SMF.1) and (FMT_SMR.1) FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1/PACE FMT_MTD.1/BAC_EXP (FMT_SMF.1) and (FMT_SMR.1) FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1/PACE FMT_MTD.1/UPD_FILE (FMT_SMF.1) and (FMT_SMR.1) FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1/PACE FMT_MTD.1/SM_LVL (FMT_SMF.1) and (FMT_SMR.1) FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1/PACE FMT_MTD.3 (FMT_MTD.1) FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI, FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD FPT_EMS.1 No Dependencies CombICAO Applet in EAC with PACE Configuration on Cosmo v9 Public Security Target 84 | 104 FPT_FLS.1 No Dependencies FPT_PHP.3 No Dependencies FPT_TST.1 No Dependencies Table 18 SFRs Dependencies Rationale for the exclusion of Dependencies The dependency FMT_MSA.3 of FDP_ACF.1/TRM is discarded. The access control TSF according to FDP_ACF.1/TRM uses security attributes that have been defined during personalization, and that are fixed over the whole life time of the TOE. No management of these security attributes (i.e. SFR FMT_MSA.1 and FMT_MSA.3) is necessary. The dependency FMT_MSA.3 of FDP_ACF.1/UPD_FILE is discarded. The access control TSF according to FDP_ACF.1/UPD_FILE uses security attributes which are defined during the personalisation and are fixed over the whole life time of the TOE. No management of these security attribute (i.e. SFR FMT_MSA.1 and FMT_MSA.3) is necessary here. 7.2.3.2 SARs Dependencies Requirements CC Dependencies Satisfied Dependencies ADV_ARC.1 (ADV_FSP.1) and (ADV_TDS.1) ADV_FSP.5, ADV_TDS.4 ADV_FSP.5 (ADV_IMP.1) and (ADV_TDS.1) ADV_IMP.1, ADV_TDS.4 ADV_IMP.1 (ADV_TDS.3) and (ALC_TAT.1) ADV_TDS.4, ALC_TAT.2 ADV_TDS.4 (ADV_FSP.5) ADV_FSP.5 ADV_INT.2 (ADV_IMP.1) and (ADV_TDS.3) and (ALC_TAT.1) ADV_IMP.1, ADV_TDS.4, ALC_TAT.2 AGD_OPE.1 (ADV_FSP.1) ADV_FSP.5 AGD_PRE.1 No Dependencies ALC_CMC.4 (ALC_CMS.1) and (ALC_DVS.1) and (ALC_LCD.1) ALC_CMS.5, ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.1 ALC_CMS.5 No Dependencies ALC_DEL.1 No Dependencies ALC_DVS.2 No Dependencies ALC_LCD.1 No Dependencies ALC_TAT.2 (ADV_IMP.1) ADV_IMP.1 ASE_CCL.1 (ASE_ECD.1) and (ASE_INT.1) and (ASE_REQ.1) ASE_ECD.1, ASE_INT.1, ASE_REQ.2 ASE_ECD.1 No Dependencies ASE_INT.1 No Dependencies ASE_OBJ.2 (ASE_SPD.1) ASE_SPD.1 ASE_REQ.2 (ASE_ECD.1) and (ASE_OBJ.2) ASE_ECD.1, ASE_OBJ.2 ASE_SPD.1 No Dependencies ASE_TSS.1 (ADV_FSP.1) and (ASE_INT.1) and (ASE_REQ.1) ADV_FSP.5, ASE_INT.1, ASE_REQ.2 ATE_COV.2 (ADV_FSP.2) and (ATE_FUN.1) ADV_FSP.5, ATE_FUN.1 ATE_DPT.3 (ADV_ARC.1) and (ADV_TDS.4) and (ATE_FUN.1) ADV_ARC.1, ADV_TDS.4, ATE_FUN.1 ATE_FUN.1 (ATE_COV.1) ATE_COV.2 CombICAO Applet in EAC with PACE Configuration on Cosmo v9 Public Security Target 85 | 104 ATE_IND.2 (ADV_FSP.2) and (AGD_OPE.1) and (AGD_PRE.1) and (ATE_COV.1) and (ATE_FUN.1) ADV_FSP.5, AGD_OPE.1, AGD_PRE.1, ATE_COV.2, ATE_FUN.1 AVA_VAN.5 (ADV_ARC.1) and (ADV_FSP.4) and (ADV_IMP.1) and (ADV_TDS.3) and (AGD_OPE.1) and (AGD_PRE.1) and (ATE_DPT.1) ADV_ARC.1, ADV_FSP.5, ADV_IMP.1, ADV_TDS.4, AGD_OPE.1, AGD_PRE.1, ATE_DPT.3 Table 19 SARs Dependencies 7.2.4 Rationale for the Security Assurance Requirements The EAL5 was chosen to permit a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based upon rigorous commercial development practices supported by moderate application of specialist security engineering techniques. EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to specialist security engineering techniques. 7.2.4.1 AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis The selection of the component AVA_VAN.5 provides a higher assurance of the security by vulnerability analysis to assess the resistance to penetration attacks performed by an attacker possessing a high attack potential. This vulnerability analysis is necessary to fulfill the security objectives OT.Chip_Auth_Proof. The component AVA_VAN.5 has the following dependencies:  ADV_ARC.1 “Security architecture description”  ADV_FSP.4 “Security-enforcing functional specification”  ADV_TDS.3 “Basic modular design”  ADV_IMP.1 “Implementation representation of the TSF”  AGD_OPE.1 “Operational user guidance”  AGD_PRE.1 “Preparative procedures”  ATE_DPT.1 “Testing: basic design” All of these are met or exceeded in the EAL5 assurance package 7.2.4.2 ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures The selection of the component ALC_DVS.2 provides a higher assurance of the security of the MRTD’s development and manufacturing especially for the secure handling of the MRTD’s material. The component ALC_DVS.2 augmented to EAL5 has no dependencies to other security requirements. CombICAO Applet in EAC with PACE Configuration on Cosmo v9 Public Security Target 86 | 104 8 TOE Summary Specification 8.1 TOE Summary Specification The TOE provides the following Security Functions (TSF): TSF Acronym Step 5 Step 6 Step 7 Access Control in Reading F.ACR Yes Yes Yes Access Control in Writing F.ACW Yes Yes Yes Clear Residual Information F.CLR_INFO Yes Yes Yes Cryptographic Support F.CRYPTO Yes Yes Yes Extended Access Control F.EAC No No Yes PACE F.PACE No No Yes MRTD Personalisation F.PERS No Yes No Physical Protection F.PHY Yes Yes Yes MRTD Pre-Personalisation F.PREP Yes No No Safe State Management F.SS Yes Yes Yes Secure Messaging F.SM Yes Yes Yes Self Test F.STST No No Yes F.ACR - Access Control in Reading This function controls access to read functions and enforces the security policy for data retrieval. Prior to any data retrieval, it authenticates the actor trying to access the data, and checks the access conditions are fulfilled as well as the life cycle state. It ensures that at any time, the following keys are never readable: o Manufacturer Keys, o Pre-personalization Agent keys, o Personalization Agent keys, o CA private key, o PACE passwords It controls access to the Initialization and Pre-Personalization data by allowing read access without authentication prior to delivery. After delivery, only the personalization agent after authentication has read access to it. Regarding the file structure: In the Operational Use phase: o The terminal can read user data, the Document Security Object, (EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1 to EF.DG16) only after PACE or EAC authentication and through a valid secure channel. In the Production and preparation stage: The Manufacturer can read the Initialization Data in Stage 2 “Production”. The pre- personalization agent and the Personalization Agent can read only the random identifier in CombICAO Applet in EAC with PACE Configuration on Cosmo v9 Public Security Target 87 | 104 Stage 3 “Preparation” stored in the TOE. Other data-elements can only be read after they are authenticated by the TOE (using their authentication keys). It ensures as well that no other part of the memory can be accessed at anytime. F.ACW - Access Control in Writing This function controls access to write functions (in NVM) and enforces the security policy for data writing. Prior to any data update, it authenticates the actor, and checks the access conditions are fulfilled as well as the life cycle state. Regarding the file structure: In the Operational Use phase: It is not possible to create any files (system or data files). Furthermore, it is not possible to update any files (system or data files), except for the current date, the CVCA public key and the CVCA certificate which can be updated if the access conditions is verified by the subjects defined in FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD and FMT_MTD.1/DATE. In the Production and preparation stage: The Manufacturer can write all the Initialization and data for the Pre-personalization. The Personalization Agent can write through a valid secure channel all the data, PACE passwords, Chip Authentication Private Key and Country Verifying Certification Authority Public Key after it is authenticated by the TOE (using its authentication keys). The Pre-Personalization Agent can write through a valid secure channel data to be used by the personalization agent (after it is authenticated by the TOE using its authentication keys). The Pre-personalization agent is only active after delivery. The key that is written in the TOE for authentication purposes during manufacturing in meant for the pre- personalizaiton agent. the Pre-personalization agent (which is seen as a sub-role of thep Personalization agent) will refresh this key. F.CLR_INFO - Clear Residual Information This security function ensures clearing of sensitive information o Authentication state is securely cleared in case an error is detected or a new authentication is attempted o Authentication data related to GP authentication, PACE authentication and EAC is securely cleared to prevent reuse o Session keys is securely erased in case an error is detected or the secure communication session is closed o ephem-SK picc -PACE is securely erased F.CRYPTO - Cryptographic Support This Security Function provides the following cryptographic features: o Key Generation based on ECDH with key sizes 192 to 521 bits. o Key generation based on DH with key sizes 1024, 1536 and 2048. o Key generation for Triple-DES in CBC mode for 112 bits. o Key generation for AES in CBC mode with key sizes 128, 192 and 256 bits. o Secure messaging (encryption and decryption) using:  Triple DES in CBC mode (key size 112 bits).  AES in CBC mode (key sizes 128,192,256 bits). o Secure messaging (message authentication code) using: CombICAO Applet in EAC with PACE Configuration on Cosmo v9 Public Security Target 88 | 104  Retail MAC with key size 112 bits.  AES CMAC with key sizes 128,192 and 256 bits. o GP Secure Messaging (encryption and decryption) using:  Triple-DES in CBC mode with key size 112 bits as defined in [FIPS_46_3].  AES with key sizes 128, 192 and 256 bits as defined in [NIST_800_38A]. o Digital signature verification using:  ECDSA with SHA-1, SHA-224 and SHA-256 with key sizes 192 to 512 bits.  RSA PKCS#1v1.5 with SHA-1, SHA-256 and SHA-512 with key sizes 1024, 1536, 2048  RSA PKCS#1-PSS with SHA-1, SHA-256 and SHA-512 with key sizes 1024, 1536, 2048 o GP Secure Messaging (message authentication code) using:  Retail MAC with key size 112 bits as defined in [ISO_9797_1].  AES CMAC with key sizes 128, 192 and 256 bits as defined in [NIST_800_38B]. o Random number generation that meets the requirement the average Shannon entropy per internal random bit exceeds 0.999. o Symmetric Authentication - encryption and decryption using:  Full 3DES MAC with key size 112 bits as defined in [ISO_9797_1].  AES CMAC with key sizes 128, 192 and 256 bits as defined in [NIST_800_38B]. o Key decryption using:  Triple-DES in ECB mode with key size 112 bits as defined in [FIPS_46_3].  AES in CBC mode with key sizes 128, 192 and 256 bits as defined in [FIPS_197]. o Chip Authentication Data Generation using DH, with key sizes 1024 to 2048 bits in steps of 512 bits. o Chip Authentication Data Generation using ECDH, with key sizes 192 to 512 bits. o PACE-CAM as defined in [ICAO_9303] with key sizes 192 to 521 bits. F.EAC - Extended Access Control This TSF provides the Extended Access Control, authentication and session keys generation to be used by F.SM, as described in [TR_03110]. It also provides the following management functions: o Maintain the roles: Document Verifier, CVCA, Domestic EIS, Foreign EIS o Limit the ability to update the CVCA Public key and CVCA Certificate to the Country Verifying Certification Authority o Limit the ability to update the date to CVCA, Document Verifier and Domestic Extended Inspection System. F.PACE - Authentication using PACE This TSF provides the Password Authenticated Connection Establishment Authentication (all mappings) and session keys generation to be used by F.SM, as described in [ICAO_9303]. In case the number of consecutive failed authentication attempts crosses the administrator defined number defined in FIA_AFL.1/PACE the TSF will slow down further authentication attempts. CombICAO Applet in EAC with PACE Configuration on Cosmo v9 Public Security Target 89 | 104 F.PERS - MRTD Personalization This security functionality ensures that the TOE, when delivered to the Personalization Agent, provides and requires authentication for data exchange. This authentication is based on a Triple DES and AES authentication mechanism. This security function is also responsible for management operations during personalization phase. This function allows to: o Manage symmetric authentication using Personalization Agent keys, o Configuration of the TOE o Compute session keys to be used by F.SM, o Load user data, o Configure SM level for biometrical data access, o Load Chip Authentication keys in encrypted form, o Chip Authnetication Key Generation, o Load of key data PACE in encrypted form, o Configure BAC deactivation mechanism, o Set TOE life cycle to Operational Use phase, o set the files that are allowed to be modified in phase 7, o Write the Document Security Object (SO d), o Write the initial CVCA Public Key, CVCA Certificate and Current Date. In case the number of consecutive failed authentication attempts crosses 1 the TSF will slow down further authentication attempts. F.PHY - Physical Protection This Security Function protects the TOE against physical attacks, so that the integrity and confidentiality of the TOE is ensured, including keys, user data, configuration data and TOE life cycle. It detects physical tampering, responds automatically, and also controls the emanations sent out by the TOE. This Security Function also limits any physical emanations from the TOE so as to prevent any information leakge via these emanations that might reveal or provide access to sensitive data. Furthermore, it prevents deploying test features after TOE delivery. F.PREP - MRTD Pre-personalization This security functionality ensures that the TOE, when delivered to the Manufacturer, provides and requires an authentication mechanism for data exchange. This authentication is based on Triple DES and AES symmetric authentication mechanism. This function allows to: o Manage symmetric authentication using Pre-personalization Agent keys, o Compute session keys to be used by F.SM, o Initialization of the TOE, o Load Personalization Agent keys in encrypted form, o Store the Initialization and Pre-Personalization data in audit records. In case the number of consecutive failed authentication attempts crosses 1 the TSF will slow down further authentication attempts. CombICAO Applet in EAC with PACE Configuration on Cosmo v9 Public Security Target 90 | 104 F.SM - Secure Messaging This security functionality ensures the confidentiality, authenticity and integrity of the communication between the TOE and the interface device. In the operational phase, after a successful Authentication Procedure (i.e. PACE or CA), a secure channel is established. This security functionality also provides a Secure Messaging (SCP02 and SCP03) for the transmission of user data in Pre-personalization and Personalization phases. The protocols can be configured to protect the exchanges integrity and/or confidentiality. If an error occurs in the secure messaging layer or if the session is closed, the session keys are destroyed. This ensures protection against replay attacks as session keys are never reused. F.SS - Safe State Management This security functionality ensures that the TOE gets back to a secure state when: o a tearing occurs (during a copy of data in NVM). o an error due to self test as defined in FPT_TST.1. o any physical tampering is detected. This security functionality ensures that if such a case occurs, the TOE either is switched in the state "kill card" or becomes mute. F.STST - Self Test This security function implements self test features through platform functionalities at reset as defined in FPT_TST.1 to ensure the integrity of the TSF and TSF data. 8.2 SFRs and TSS 8.2.1 SFRs and TSS - Rationale Class FDP User Data Protection FDP_ACC.1/TRM is met by F.ACW - Access Control in Writing and F.ACR - Access Control in Reading that control read and write access to the data based on the current authentication state using authentication mechanism provided by F.PACE - Authentication using PACE FDP_ACF.1/TRM is met by F.ACW - Access Control in Writing and F.ACR - Access Control in Reading that control read and write access to the data based on the current authentication state using authentication mechanism provided by F.PACE - Authentication using PACE Class FTP Trusted Path/Channels FTP_ITC.1/MP is met by F.SM - Secure Messaging that establishes a secure channel for communication for loading of keys as defined in F.PERS - MRTD Personalization and F.PREP - MRTD Pre-personalization. 8.2.2 Association tables of SFRs and TSS CombICAO Applet in EAC with PACE Configuration on Cosmo v9 Public Security Target 91 | 104 Security Functional Requirements TOE Summary Specification FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE F.PACE - Authentication using PACE, F.CRYPTO - Cryptographic Support FCS_CKM.1/CA F.EAC - Extended Access Control, F.CRYPTO - Cryptographic Support, F.PACE - Authentication using PACE FCS_CKM.1/CAM F.CRYPTO - Cryptographic Support FCS_CKM.1/CA_DATA_GEN F.PERS - MRTD Personalization, F.CRYPTO - Cryptographic Support FCS_CKM.1/GP F.PERS - MRTD Personalization, F.PREP - MRTD Pre- personalization, F.CRYPTO - Cryptographic Support FCS_CKM.4 F.SM - Secure Messaging, F.CLR_INFO - Clear Residual Information FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC F.SM - Secure Messaging, F.CRYPTO - Cryptographic Support FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC F.SM - Secure Messaging, F.CRYPTO - Cryptographic Support FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC F.SM - Secure Messaging, F.CRYPTO - Cryptographic Support FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER F.EAC - Extended Access Control, F.CRYPTO - Cryptographic Support FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC F.SM - Secure Messaging, F.CRYPTO - Cryptographic Support FCS_COP.1/CAM F.CRYPTO - Cryptographic Support, F.PACE - Authentication using PACE FCS_COP.1/GP_ENC F.SM - Secure Messaging, F.CRYPTO - Cryptographic Support FCS_COP.1/GP_MAC F.SM - Secure Messaging, F.CRYPTO - Cryptographic Support FCS_COP.1/GP_AUTH F.PERS - MRTD Personalization, F.PREP - MRTD Pre- personalization, F.CRYPTO - Cryptographic Support FCS_COP.1/GP_KEY_DEC F.PERS - MRTD Personalization, F.CRYPTO - Cryptographic Support, F.SM - Secure Messaging FCS_RND.1 F.CRYPTO - Cryptographic Support FIA_UID.1/PACE F.EAC - Extended Access Control, F.PACE - Authentication using PACE, F.SM - Secure Messaging, F.PERS - MRTD Personalization, F.PREP - MRTD Pre-personalization, F.ACR - Access Control in Reading FIA_UAU.1/PACE F.ACR - Access Control in Reading, F.SM - Secure Messaging, F.EAC - Extended Access Control, F.PACE - Authentication using PACE, F.PERS - MRTD Personalization, F.PREP - MRTD Pre-personalization CombICAO Applet in EAC with PACE Configuration on Cosmo v9 Public Security Target 92 | 104 FIA_UAU.4/PACE F.CLR_INFO - Clear Residual Information FIA_UAU.5/PACE F.EAC - Extended Access Control, F.PACE - Authentication using PACE, F.PERS - MRTD Personalization, F.PREP - MRTD Pre-personalization FIA_UAU.6/PACE F.SM - Secure Messaging FIA_UAU.6/EAC F.SM - Secure Messaging FIA_UAU.6/MP F.SM - Secure Messaging FIA_AFL.1/PACE F.PACE - Authentication using PACE FIA_AFL.1/MP F.PERS - MRTD Personalization, F.PREP - MRTD Pre- personalization FIA_API.1/CA F.EAC - Extended Access Control FIA_API.1/CAM F.PACE - Authentication using PACE FDP_ACC.1/TRM F.ACR - Access Control in Reading, F.ACW - Access Control in Writing, F.PACE - Authentication using PACE FDP_ACF.1/TRM F.ACR - Access Control in Reading, F.ACW - Access Control in Writing, F.PACE - Authentication using PACE FDP_ACC.1/UPD_FILE F.ACR - Access Control in Reading, F.ACW - Access Control in Writing, F.PERS - MRTD Personalization, F.EAC - Extended Access Control FDP_ACF.1/UPD_FILE F.ACR - Access Control in Reading, F.ACW - Access Control in Writing, F.PERS - MRTD Personalization FDP_RIP.1 F.CLR_INFO - Clear Residual Information FDP_UCT.1/TRM F.SM - Secure Messaging FDP_UIT.1/TRM F.SM - Secure Messaging FTP_ITC.1/PACE F.SM - Secure Messaging, F.PACE - Authentication using PACE FTP_ITC.1/MP F.PERS - MRTD Personalization, F.PREP - MRTD Pre- personalization, F.SM - Secure Messaging FAU_SAS.1 F.PREP - MRTD Pre-personalization FMT_MOF.1/BAC_EXP F.PERS - MRTD Personalization FMT_MOF.1/GP F.SM - Secure Messaging FMT_SMF.1 F.PERS - MRTD Personalization, F.PREP - MRTD Pre- personalization, F.EAC - Extended Access Control, F.SM - Secure Messaging FMT_SMR.1/PACE F.PACE - Authentication using PACE, F.PERS - MRTD Personalization, F.PREP - MRTD Pre-personalization, F.EAC - Extended Access Control FMT_LIM.1 F.PHY - Physical Protection FMT_LIM.2 F.PHY - Physical Protection CombICAO Applet in EAC with PACE Configuration on Cosmo v9 Public Security Target 93 | 104 FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA F.ACW - Access Control in Writing FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS F.ACR - Access Control in Reading FMT_MTD.1/PA F.PERS - MRTD Personalization FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI F.ACW - Access Control in Writing, F.PERS - MRTD Personalization FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD F.EAC - Extended Access Control, F.ACW - Access Control in Writing FMT_MTD.1/DATE F.EAC - Extended Access Control, F.ACW - Access Control in Writing FMT_MTD.1/CAPK F.PERS - MRTD Personalization FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ F.ACR - Access Control in Reading FMT_MTD.1/PACE_PWD F.PERS - MRTD Personalization FMT_MTD.1/LCS_PERS F.PERS - MRTD Personalization FMT_MTD.1/BAC_EXP F.PERS - MRTD Personalization FMT_MTD.1/UPD_FILE F.ACW - Access Control in Writing, F.PERS - MRTD Personalization FMT_MTD.1/SM_LVL F.PERS - MRTD Personalization FMT_MTD.3 F.EAC - Extended Access Control FPT_EMS.1 F.PHY - Physical Protection FPT_FLS.1 F.SS - Safe State Management FPT_PHP.3 F.PHY - Physical Protection, F.SS - Safe State Management FPT_TST.1 F.STST - Self Test Table 20 SFRs and TSS - Coverage TOE Summary Specification Security Functional Requirements F.ACR - Access Control in Reading FIA_UID.1/PACE, FIA_UAU.1/PACE, FDP_ACC.1/TRM, FDP_ACF.1/TRM, FDP_ACC.1/UPD_FILE, FDP_ACF.1/UPD_FILE, FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS, FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ F.ACW - Access Control in Writing FDP_ACC.1/TRM, FDP_ACF.1/TRM, FDP_ACC.1/UPD_FILE, FDP_ACF.1/UPD_FILE, FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA, FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI, FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD, FMT_MTD.1/DATE, FMT_MTD.1/UPD_FILE F.CLR_INFO - Clear Residual Information FCS_CKM.4, FIA_UAU.4/PACE, FDP_RIP.1 F.CRYPTO - Cryptographic Support FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE, FCS_CKM.1/CA, FCS_CKM.1/CAM, FCS_CKM.1/CA_DATA_GEN, FCS_CKM.1/GP, FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC, FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC, FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC, FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER, FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC, FCS_COP.1/CAM, FCS_COP.1/GP_ENC, FCS_COP.1/GP_MAC, FCS_COP.1/GP_AUTH, FCS_COP.1/GP_KEY_DEC, CombICAO Applet in EAC with PACE Configuration on Cosmo v9 Public Security Target 94 | 104 FCS_RND.1 F.EAC - Extended Access Control FCS_CKM.1/CA, FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER, FIA_UID.1/PACE, FIA_UAU.1/PACE, FIA_UAU.5/PACE, FIA_API.1/CA, FDP_ACC.1/UPD_FILE, FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1/PACE, FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD, FMT_MTD.1/DATE, FMT_MTD.3 F.PACE - Authentication using PACE FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE, FCS_CKM.1/CA, FCS_COP.1/CAM, FIA_UID.1/PACE, FIA_UAU.1/PACE, FIA_UAU.5/PACE, FIA_AFL.1/PACE, FIA_API.1/CAM, FDP_ACC.1/TRM, FDP_ACF.1/TRM, FTP_ITC.1/PACE, FMT_SMR.1/PACE F.PERS - MRTD Personalization FCS_CKM.1/CA_DATA_GEN, FCS_CKM.1/GP, FCS_COP.1/GP_AUTH, FCS_COP.1/GP_KEY_DEC, FIA_UID.1/PACE, FIA_UAU.1/PACE, FIA_UAU.5/PACE, FIA_AFL.1/MP, FDP_ACC.1/UPD_FILE, FDP_ACF.1/UPD_FILE, FTP_ITC.1/MP, FMT_MOF.1/BAC_EXP, FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1/PACE, FMT_MTD.1/PA, FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI, FMT_MTD.1/CAPK, FMT_MTD.1/PACE_PWD, FMT_MTD.1/LCS_PERS, FMT_MTD.1/BAC_EXP, FMT_MTD.1/UPD_FILE, FMT_MTD.1/SM_LVL F.PHY - Physical Protection FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2, FPT_EMS.1, FPT_PHP.3 F.PREP - MRTD Pre-personalization FCS_CKM.1/GP, FCS_COP.1/GP_AUTH, FIA_UID.1/PACE, FIA_UAU.1/PACE, FIA_UAU.5/PACE, FIA_AFL.1/MP, FTP_ITC.1/MP, FAU_SAS.1, FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1/PACE F.SM - Secure Messaging FCS_CKM.4, FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC, FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC, FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC, FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC, FCS_COP.1/GP_ENC, FCS_COP.1/GP_MAC, FCS_COP.1/GP_KEY_DEC, FIA_UID.1/PACE, FIA_UAU.1/PACE, FIA_UAU.6/PACE, FIA_UAU.6/EAC, FIA_UAU.6/MP, FDP_UCT.1/TRM, FDP_UIT.1/TRM, FTP_ITC.1/PACE, FTP_ITC.1/MP, FMT_MOF.1/GP, FMT_SMF.1 F.SS - Safe State Management FPT_FLS.1, FPT_PHP.3 F.STST - Self Test FPT_TST.1 Table 21 TSS and SFRs - Coverage CombICAO Applet in EAC with PACE Configuration on Cosmo v9 Public Security Target 95 | 104 9 GLOSSARY AND ACRONYMS 9.1 Glossary Term Definition Accurate Terminal Certificate A Terminal Certificate is accurate, if the issuing Document Verifier is trusted by the travel document’s chip to produce Terminal Certificates with the correct certificate effective date, see [TR_03110]. Advanced Inspection Procedure (with PACE) A specific order of authentication steps between a travel document and a terminal as required by [ICAO_TR_SAC], namely (i) PACE, (ii) Chip Authentication v.1, (iii) Passive Authentication with SOD and (iv) Terminal Authentication v.1. AIP can generally be used by EIS-AIP-PACE. Agreement This term is used in the current PP in order to reflect an appropriate relationship between the parties involved, but not as a legal notion. Active Authentication Security mechanism defined in [ICAO_9303] option by which means the travel document’s chip proves and the inspection system verifies the identity and authenticity of the travel document’s chip as part of a genuine travel document issued by a known State of Organisation. Application note Optional informative part of the PP containing sensitive supporting information that is considered relevant or useful for the construction, evaluation, or use of the TOE. Audit records Write-only-once non-volatile memory area of the travel document's chip to store the Initialization Data and Pre-personalisation Data. Authenticity Ability to confirm the travel document and its data elements on the travel document’s chip were created by the issuing State or Organisation Basic Access Control (BAC) Security mechanism defined in [ICAO_9303] by which means the travel document’s chip proves and the inspection system protects their communication by means of secure messaging with Document Basic Access Keys (see there). Basic Inspection System with PACE protocol (BIS-PACE) A technical system being used by an inspecting authority and operated by a governmental organisation (i.e. an Official Domestic or Foreign Document Verifier) and verifying the travel document presenter as the travel document holder (for ePassport: by comparing the real biometric data (face) of the travel document presenter with the stored biometric data (DG2) of the travel document holder). The Basic Inspection System with PACE is a PACE Terminal additionally supporting/applying the Passive Authentication protocol and is authorised by the travel document Issuer through the Document Verifier of receiving state to read a subset of data stored on the travel document. Basic Inspection System (BIS) An inspection system which implements the terminals part of the Basic Access Control Mechanism and authenticates itself to the travel document’s chip using the Document Basic Access Keys derived from the printed MRZ data for reading the logical travel document. Biographical data (biodata) The personalised details of the travel document holder of the document appearing as text in the visual and machine readable zones on the biographical data page of a travel document. [ICAO_9303] Biometric reference data Data stored for biometric authentication of the travel document holder in the travel document’s chip as (i) digital portrait and (ii) optional biometric reference data. Card Access Number (CAN) Password derived from a short number printed on the front side of the data-page. Certificate chain A sequence defining a hierarchy certificates. The Inspection System Certificate is the lowest level, Document Verifier Certificate in between, and Country Verifying Certification Authority Certificates are on the highest level. A certificate of a lower level is signed with the private key corresponding to the public key in the certificate of the next higher level. Counterfeit An unauthorized copy or reproduction of a genuine security document made by whatever means. [ICAO_9303] Country Signing CA Certificate (CCSCA) Certificate of the Country Signing Certification Authority Public Key (KPuCSCA) issued by Country Signing Certification Authority stored in the inspection system. CombICAO Applet in EAC with PACE Configuration on Cosmo v9 Public Security Target 96 | 104 Term Definition Country Signing Certification Authority (CSCA) An organisation enforcing the policy of the travel document Issuer with respect to confirming correctness of user and TSF data stored in the travel document. The CSCA represents the country specific root of the PKI for the travel documents and creates the Document Signer Certificates within this PKI. The CSCA also issues the self-signed CSCA Certificate (CCSCA) having to be distributed by strictly secure diplomatic means, see. [ICAO_9303], 5.5.1. The Country Signing Certification Authority issuing certificates for Document Signers (cf. [ICAO_9303]) and the domestic CVCA may be integrated into a single entity, e.g. a Country Certification Authority. However, even in this case, separate key pairs must be used for different roles, see [TR_03110]. Country Verifying Certification Authority (CVCA) An organisation enforcing the privacy policy of the travel document Issuer with respect to protection of user data stored in the travel document (at a trial of a terminal to get an access to these data). The CVCA represents the country specific root of the PKI for the terminals using it and creates the Document Verifier Certificates within this PKI. Updates of the public key of the CVCA are distributed in form of CVCA Link-Certificates, see [TR_03110]. Since the Standard Inspection Procedure does not imply any certificate-based terminal authentication, the current TOE cannot recognise a CVCS as a subject; hence, it merely represents an organizational entity within this PP. The Country Signing Certification Authority (CSCA) issuing certificates for Document Signers (cf. [ICAO_9303]) and the domestic CVCA may be integrated into a single entity, e.g. a Country Certification Authority. However, even in this case, separate key pairs must be used for different roles, see [TR_03110]. Current date The maximum of the effective dates of valid CVCA, DV and domestic Inspection System certificates known to the TOE. It is used the validate card verifiable certificates. CV Certificate Card Verifiable Certificate according to [TR_03110]. CVCA link Certificate Certificate of the new public key of the Country Verifying Certification Authority signed with the old public key of the Country Verifying Certification Authority where the certificate effective date for the new key is before the certificate expiration date of the certificate for the old key. Document Basic Access Key Derivation Algorithm The [ICAO_9303] describes the Document Basic Access Key Derivation Algorithm on how terminals may derive the Document Basic Access Keys from the second line of the printed MRZ data. PACE passwords Passwords used as input for PACE. This may either be the CAN or the SHA-1-value of the concatenation of Serial Number, Date of Birth and Date of Expiry as read from the MRZ, see [ICAO_TR_SAC] Document Details Data Data printed on and electronically stored in the travel document representing the document details like document type, issuing state, document number, date of issue, date of expiry, issuing authority. The document details data are less-sensitive data. Document Security Object (SOD) A RFC3369 CMS Signed Data Structure, signed by the Document Signer (DS). Carries the hash values of the LDS Data Groups. It is stored in the travel document’s chip. It may carry the Document Signer Certificate (CDS). [ICAO_9303] Document Signer (DS) An organisation enforcing the policy of the CSCA and signing the Document Security Object stored on the travel document for passive authentication. A Document Signer is authorised by the national CSCA issuing the Document Signer Certificate (CDS), see [TR_03110] and [ICAO_9303]. This role is usually delegated to a Personalisation Agent. Document Verifier (DV) An organisation enforcing the policies of the CVCA and of a Service Provider (here: of a governmental organisation / inspection authority) and managing terminals belonging together (e.g. terminals operated by a State’s border police), by – inter alia – issuing Terminal Certificates. A Document Verifier is therefore a Certification Authority, authorised by at least the national CVCA to issue certificates for national terminals, see [TR_03110]. Since the Standard Inspection Procedure does not imply any certificate-based terminal authentication, the current TOE cannot recognise a DV as a subject; hence, it merely represents an organisational entity within this PP. There can be Domestic and Foreign DV: A domestic DV is acting under the policy of the domestic CVCA being run by the travel document Issuer; a foreign DV is acting under a policy of the respective foreign CVCA (in this case there shall be an appropriate agreement between the travel document Issuer und a foreign CVCA ensuring enforcing the travel document Issuer’s privacy policy).55 56 Eavesdropper A threat agent with high attack potential reading the communication between the travel document’s chip and the inspection system to gain the data on the travel document’s chip. CombICAO Applet in EAC with PACE Configuration on Cosmo v9 Public Security Target 97 | 104 Term Definition Enrolment The process of collecting biometric samples from a person and the subsequent preparation and storage of biometric reference templates representing that person's identity. [ICAO_9303] Travel document (electronic) The contact based or contactless smart card integrated into the plastic or paper, optical readable cover and providing the following application: ePassport. ePassport application A part of the TOE containing the non-executable, related user data (incl. biometric) as well as the data needed for authentication (incl. MRZ); this application is intended to be used by authorities, amongst other as a machine readable travel document (MRTD). See [TR_03110]. Extended Access Control Security mechanism identified in [ICAO_9303] by which means the travel document’s chip (i) verifies the authentication of the inspection systems authorized to read the optional biometric reference data, (ii) controls the access to the optional biometric reference data and (iii) protects the confidentiality and integrity of the optional biometric reference data during their transmission to the inspection system by secure messaging. Extended Inspection System (EIS) A role of a terminal as part of an inspection system which is in addition to Basic Inspection System authorized by the issuing State or Organisation to read the optional biometric reference data and supports the terminals part of the Extended Access Control Authentication Mechanism. Forgery Fraudulent alteration of any part of the genuine document, e.g. changes to the biographical data or the portrait. [ICAO_9303] Global Interoperability The capability of inspection systems (either manual or automated) in different States throughout the world to exchange data, to process data received from systems in other States, and to utilize that data in inspection operations in their respective States. Global interoperability is a major objective of the standardized specifications for placement of both eye-readable and machine readable data in all MRTDs. [ICAO_9303] IC Dedicated Software Software developed and injected into the chip hardware by the IC manufacturer. Such software might support special functionality of the IC hardware and be used, amongst other, for implementing delivery procedures between different players. The usage of parts of the IC Dedicated Software might be restricted to certain life phases. IC Dedicated Support Software That part of the IC Dedicated Software (refer to above) which provides functions after TOE Delivery. The usage of parts of the IC Dedicated Software might be restricted to certain phases. IC Dedicated Test Software That part of the IC Dedicated Software (refer to above) which is used to test the TOE before TOE Delivery but which does not provide any functionality thereafter. IC Embedded Software Software embedded in an IC and not being designed by the IC developer. The IC Embedded Software is designed in the design life phase and embedded into the IC in the manufacturing life phase of the TOE. IC Identification Data The IC manufacturer writes a unique IC identifier to the chip to control the IC as travel document material during the IC manufacturing and the delivery process to the travel document manufacturer. Impostor A person who applies for and obtains a document by assuming a false name and identity, or a person who alters his or her physical appearance to represent himself or herself as another person for the purpose of using that person’s document. [ICAO_9303] Improperly document person A person who travels, or attempts to travel with: (a) an expired travel document or an invalid visa; (b) a counterfeit, forged or altered travel document or visa; (c) someone else’s travel document or visa; or (d) no travel document or visa, if required. [ICAO_9303] Initialisation Process of writing Initialisation Data (see below) to the TOE (cf. sec. 1.2, TOE life-cycle, Phase 2, Step 3). Initialization Data Any data defined by the TOE Manufacturer and injected into the non-volatile memory by the Integrated Circuits manufacturer (Phase 2). These data are for instance used for traceability and for IC identification as travel document’s material (IC identification data). Inspection The act of a State examining an travel document presented to it by a traveller (the travel document holder) and verifying its authenticity. [ICAO_9303] CombICAO Applet in EAC with PACE Configuration on Cosmo v9 Public Security Target 98 | 104 Term Definition Inspection System (IS) A technical system used by the border control officer of the receiving State (i) examining an travel document presented by the traveller and verifying its authenticity and (ii) verifying the traveller as travel document holder. Integrated Circuit (IC) Electronic component(s) designed to perform processing and/or memory functions. The travel document’s chip is an integrated circuit. Integrity Ability to confirm the travel document and its data elements on the travel document’s chip have not been altered from that created by the issuing State or Organisation Issuing Organisation Organisation authorized to issue an official travel document (e.g. the United Nations Organization, issuer of the Laissez-passer). [ICAO_9303] Issuing State The Country issuing the travel document. [ICAO_9303] Logical Data Structure (LDS) The collection of groupings of Data Elements stored in the optional capacity expansion technology [ICAO_9303]. The capacity expansion technology used is the travel document’s chip. Logical travel document Data of the travel document holder stored according to the Logical Data Structure [ICAO_9303] as specified by ICAO on the contact based/contactless integrated circuit. It presents contact based/contactless readable data including (but not limited to) 1.personal data of the travel document holder 2.the digital Machine Readable Zone Data (digital MRZ data, EF.DG1), 3.the digitized portraits (EF.DG2), 4.the biometric reference data of finger(s) (EF.DG3) or iris image(s) (EF.DG4) or both and 5.the other data according to LDS (EF.DG5 to EF.DG16). 6.EF.COM and EF.SOD Machine Readable Travel Document (MRTD) Official document issued by a State or Organisation which is used by the holder for international travel (e.g. passport, visa, official document of identity) and which contains mandatory visual (eye readable) data and a separate mandatory data summary, intended for global use, reflecting essential data elements capable of being machine read. [ICAO_9303] Machine Readable Zone (MRZ) Fixed dimensional area located on the front of the travel document or MRP Data Page or, in the case of the TD1, the back of the travel document, containing mandatory and optional data for machine reading using OCR methods. [ICAO_9303] The MRZ-Password is a restricted-revealable secret that is derived from the machine readable zone and may be used for PACE. Machine-verifiable biometrics feature A unique physical personal identification feature (e.g. an iris pattern, fingerprint or facial characteristics) stored on a travel document in a form that can be read and verified by machine. [ICAO_9303] Manufacturer Generic term for the IC Manufacturer producing integrated circuit and the travel document Manufacturer completing the IC to the travel document. The Manufacturer is the default user of the TOE during the manufacturing life phase. The TOE itself does not distinguish between the IC Manufacturer and travel document Manufacturer using this role Manufacturer. CombICAO Applet in EAC with PACE Configuration on Cosmo v9 Public Security Target 99 | 104 Term Definition Metadata of a CV Certificate Data within the certificate body (excepting Public Key) as described in [TR_03110]. The metadata of a CV certificate comprise the following elements: - Certificate Profile Identifier, - Certificate Authority Reference, - Certificate Holder Reference, - Certificate Holder Authorisation Template, - Certificate Effective Date, - Certificate Expiration Date. ePassport application Non-executable data defining the functionality of the operating system on the IC as the travel document’s chip. It includes •the file structure implementing the LDS [ICAO_9303], •the definition of the User Data, but does not include the User Data itself (i.e. content of EF.DG1 to EF.DG13, EF.DG16, EF.COM and EF.SOD) and •the TSF Data including the definition the authentication data but except the authentication data itself. Optional biometric reference data Data stored for biometric authentication of the travel document holder in the travel document’s chip as (i) encoded finger image(s) (EF.DG3) or (ii) encoded iris image(s) (EF.DG4) or (iii) both. Note, that the European commission decided to use only fingerprint and not to use iris images as optional biometric reference data. Passive authentication (i) verification of the digital signature of the Document Security Object and (ii) comparing the hash values of the read LDS data fields with the hash values contained in the Document Security Object. PACE Password A password needed for PACE authentication, e.g. CAN or MRZ. Personalization The process by which the Personalisation Data are stored in and unambiguously, inseparably associated with the travel document. This may also include the optional biometric data collected during the “Enrolment” (cf. sec. 1.2, TOE life-cycle, Phase 3, Step 6). Personalization Agent An organisation acting on behalf of the travel document Issuer to personalise the travel document for the travel document holder by some or all of the following activities: (i)establishing the identity of the travel document holder for the biographic data in the travel document, (ii)enrolling the biometric reference data of the travel document holder, (iii)writing a subset of these data on the physical travel document (optical personalisation) and storing them in the travel document (electronic personalisation) for the travel document holder as defined in [TR_03110], (iv)writing the document details data, (v)writing the initial TSF data, (vi)signing the Document Security Object defined in [ICAO_9303] (in the role of DS). Please note that the role ‘Personalisation Agent’ may be distributed among several institutions according to the operational policy of the travel document Issuer. Generating signature key pair(s) is not in the scope of the tasks of this role. CombICAO Applet in EAC with PACE Configuration on Cosmo v9 Public Security Target 100 | 104 Term Definition Personalisation Data A set of data incl. (i)individual-related data (biographic and biometric data) of the travel document holder, (ii)dedicated document details data and (iii)dedicated initial TSF data (incl. the Document Security Object). Personalisation data are gathered and then written into the non-volatile memory of the TOE by the Personalisation Agent in the life-cycle phase card issuing. Personalization Agent Authentication Information TSF data used for authentication proof and verification of the Personalisation Agent. Personalization Agent Key Cryptographic authentication key used (i) by the Personalisation Agent to prove his identity and to get access to the logical travel document and (ii) by the travel document’s chip to verify the authentication attempt of a terminal as Personalisation Agent according to the SFR FIA_UAU.4/PACE, FIA_UAU.5/PACE and FIA_UAU.6/EAC. Physical travel document Travel document in form of paper, plastic and chip using secure printing to present data including (but not limited to) 1.biographical data, 2.data of the machine-readable zone, 3.photographic image and 4.other data. Pre-Personalisation Process of writing Pre-Personalisation Data (see below) to the TOE including the creation of the travel document Application (cf. sec. 1.2, TOE life-cycle, Phase 2, Step 5) Pre-personalization Data Any data that is injected into the non-volatile memory of the TOE by the travel document Manufacturer (Phase 2) for traceability of non-personalised travel document’s and/or to secure shipment within or between life cycle phases 2 and 3. It contains (but is not limited to) the Personalisation Agent Key Pair. Pre-personalized travel document’s chip travel document’s chip equipped with a unique identifier. Receiving State The Country to which the traveller is applying for entry. [ICAO_9303] reference data Data enrolled for a known identity and used by the verifier to check the verification data provided by an entity to prove this identity in an authentication attempt. RF-terminal A device being able to establish communication with an RF-chip according to ISO/IEC 14443. secondary image A repeat image of the holder’s portrait reproduced elsewhere in the document by whatever means. [ICAO_9303] Secure messaging in encrypted/combined mode Secure messaging using encryption and message authentication code according to ISO/IEC 7816-4 Service Provider An official organisation (inspection authority) providing inspection service which can be used by the travel document holder. Service Provider uses terminals (BIS-PACE) managed by a DV. Skimming Imitation of the inspection system to read the logical travel document or parts of it via the contactless communication channel of the TOE without knowledge of the printed MRZ data. Standard Inspection Procedure A specific order of authentication steps between an travel document and a terminal as required by [ICAO_TR_SAC], namely (i) PACE or BAC and (ii) Passive Authentication with SOD. SIP can generally be used by BIS-PACE and BIS-BAC. CombICAO Applet in EAC with PACE Configuration on Cosmo v9 Public Security Target 101 | 104 Term Definition Terminal A terminal is any technical system communicating with the TOE either through the contact based or contactless interface. A technical system verifying correspondence between the password stored in the travel document and the related value presented to the terminal by the travel document presenter. In this PP the role ‘Terminal’ corresponds to any terminal being authenticated by the TOE. Terminal may implement the terminal’s part of the PACE protocol and thus authenticate itself to the travel document using a shared password (CAN or MRZ). Terminal Authorization Intersection of the Certificate Holder Authorizations defined by the Inspection System Certificate, the Document Verifier Certificate and Country Verifying Certification Authority which shall be all valid for the Current Date. Terminal Authorisation Level Intersection of the Certificate Holder Authorisations defined by the Terminal Certificate, the Document Verifier Certificate and Country Verifying Certification Authority which shall be all valid for the Current Date. TOE tracing data Technical information about the current and previous locations of the travel document gathered by inconspicuous (for the travel document holder) recognising the travel document. Travel document Official document issued by a state or organisation which is used by the holder for international travel (e.g. passport, visa, official document of identity) and which contains mandatory visual (eye readable) data and a separate mandatory data summary, intended for global use, reflecting essential data elements capable of being machine read; see [ICAO_9303] (there “Machine readable travel document”). Travel Document Holder The rightful holder of the travel document for whom the issuing State or Organisation personalised the travel document. Travel document’s Chip A contact based/contactless integrated circuit chip complying with ISO/IEC 14443 and programmed according to the Logical Data Structure as specified by ICAO, [ICAO_9303], sec III. Travel document’s Chip Embedded Software Software embedded in a travel document’s chip and not being developed by the IC Designer. The travel document’s chip Embedded Software is designed in Phase 1 and embedded into the travel document’s chip in Phase 2 of the TOE life-cycle. Traveler Person presenting the travel document to the inspection system and claiming the identity of the travel document holder. TSF data Data created by and for the TOE that might affect the operation of the TOE (CC part 1 [CC_1]). Unpersonalised travel document The travel document that contains the travel document chip holding only Initialization Data and Pre-personalisation Data as delivered to the Personalisation Agent from the Manufacturer. User data All data (being not authentication data) (i) stored in the context of the ePassport application of the travel document as defined in [TR_03110] and (ii) being allowed to be read out solely by an authenticated terminal acting as Basic Inspection System with PACE . CC give the following generic definitions for user data: Data created by and for the user that does not affect the operation of the TSF ([CC_1]). Information stored in TOE resources that can be operated upon by users in accordance with the SFRs and upon which the TSF places no special meaning ([CC_2]). Verification The process of comparing a submitted biometric sample against the biometric reference template of a single enrollee whose identity is being claimed, to determine whether it matches the enrollee’s template. [ICAO_9303] Verification data Data provided by an entity in an authentication attempt to prove their identity to the verifier. The verifier checks whether the verification data match the reference data known for the claimed identity. CombICAO Applet in EAC with PACE Configuration on Cosmo v9 Public Security Target 102 | 104 9.2 Acronyms Acronym Term BIS Basic Inspection System BIS-PACE Basic Inspection System with PACE CA Chip Authentication CAN Card Access Number CC Common Criteria EAC Extended Access Control CPS Common Personalization System EF Elementary File ICCSN Integrated Circuit Card Serial Number. MF Master File MRZ Machine readable zone n.a. Not applicable OSP Organisational security policy PACE Password Authenticated Connection Establishment PCD Proximity Coupling Device PICC Proximity Integrated Circuit Chip PP Protection Profile PT Personalisation Terminal RF Radio Frequency SAR Security assurance requirements SFR Security functional requirement SIP Standard Inspection Procedure TA Terminal Authentication TOE Target of Evaluation TSF TOE Security Functions TSP TOE Security Policy (defined by the current document) CombICAO Applet in EAC with PACE Configuration on Cosmo v9 Public Security Target 103 | 104 10 REFERENCES [CC_1] Common Criteria for information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1: Introduction and general model", April 2017, Version 3.1 revision 5. [CC_2] "Common Criteria for information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2: Security Functional component", April 2017, Version 3.1 revision 5. [CC_3] "Common Criteria for information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3: Security Assurance components", April 2017, Version 3.1 revision 5. 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