Blue Coat Systems, Inc.
ProxySG SG510, SG810, and SG9000 running SGOS v5.5
Security Target
Evaluation Assurance Level: EAL4+
Document Version: 1.3
Prepared for: Prepared by:
Blue Coat Systems, Inc. Corsec Security, Inc.
420 N. Mary Avenue
Sunnyvale, CA 94085
13135 Lee Jackson Memorial Highway, Suite 220
Fairfax, VA 22033
Phone: +1 (408) 220-2200 Phone: +1 (703) 267-6050
Email: usinfo@bluecoat.com Email: info@corsec.com
http://www.bluecoat.com http://www.corsec.com
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Revision History
Version Modification Date Modified By Description of Changes
0.1 2010-08-26 Matthew Williams Initial draft.
0.2 2010-09-28 Matthew Williams Made minor corrections to section 1.4.2.2 and Table 18.
0.3 2010-11-10 Matthew Williams Updated ST to EAL4+.
0.4 2011-04-25 Matthew Williams Addressed ASE OR1
0.5 2011-04-26 Matthew Williams Addressed ASE OR2
0.6 2011-06-03 Amy Nicewick Updated documentation list
0.7 2011-07-29 Shashi Karanam
Updated TOE Title, TOE reference, accelerator cards, and
cryptographic algorithms information. Updated Corsec’s
address.
0.8 2011-08-04 Shashi Karanam
Updated TOE Title, TOE reference, and physical scope
section.
0.9 2011-11-23 Shashi Karanam
Updated the SGOS Version number, and guidance
documentation references.
1.0 2011-11-29 Shashi Karanam Updated TOE Hardware Reference.
1.1 2011-11-30 Shashi Karanam Updated the Release Notes Information.
1.2 2011-12-09 Shashi Karanam Added the algorithm certificate numbers.
1.3 2012-02-23 Greg Milliken Addressed ORs.
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Table of Contents
REVISION HISTORY.................................................................................................................................................................2
TABLE OF CONTENTS...........................................................................................................................................................3
TABLE OF FIGURES.................................................................................................................................................................4
TABLE OF TABLES...................................................................................................................................................................5
1 INTRODUCTION.................................................................................................................................................................6
1.1 PURPOSE ........................................................................................................................................................................6
1.2 SECURITY TARGET AND TOE REFERENCES ...................................................................................................................7
1.3 TOE OVERVIEW ............................................................................................................................................................7
1.3.1 TOE Concepts....................................................................................................................... 9
1.3.2 TOE Environment............................................................................................................... 14
1.4 TOE DESCRIPTION....................................................................................................................................................... 14
1.4.1 Physical Scope.................................................................................................................... 15
1.4.2 Logical Scope ..................................................................................................................... 16
1.4.3 Product Physical/Logical Features and Functionality not included in the TSF................ 19
2 CONFORMANCE CLAIMS.............................................................................................................................................. 21
3 SECURITY PROBLEM..................................................................................................................................................... 22
3.1 THREATS TO SECURITY................................................................................................................................................ 22
3.2 ORGANIZATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES........................................................................................................................ 23
3.3 ASSUMPTIONS.............................................................................................................................................................. 23
4 SECURITY OBJECTIVES................................................................................................................................................ 25
4.1 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE TOE.......................................................................................................................... 25
4.2 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT .................................................................................. 26
4.2.1 IT Security Objectives......................................................................................................... 26
4.2.2 Non-IT Security Objectives................................................................................................. 26
5 EXTENDED COMPONENTS ........................................................................................................................................... 27
5.1 EXTENDED TOE SECURITY FUNCTIONAL COMPONENTS ............................................................................................. 27
5.1.1 Class FIA: Identification and Authentication.................................................................... 28
5.1.2 Class FRU: Resource Utilization....................................................................................... 29
5.2 EXTENDED TOE SECURITY ASSURANCE COMPONENTS............................................................................................... 31
6 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS ........................................................................................................................................ 32
6.1 CONVENTIONS ............................................................................................................................................................. 32
6.2 SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS ..................................................................................................................... 32
6.2.1 Class FAU: Security Audit ................................................................................................. 35
6.2.2 Class FCS: Cryptographic Support.................................................................................... 39
6.2.3 Class FDP: User Data Protection ..................................................................................... 43
6.2.4 Class FIA: Identification and Authentication..................................................................... 48
6.2.5 Class FMT: Security Management..................................................................................... 54
6.2.6 Class FPT: Protection of the TSF ...................................................................................... 59
6.2.7 Class FRU: Resource Utilization....................................................................................... 60
6.2.8 Class FTA: TOE Access ..................................................................................................... 61
6.3 SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS ...................................................................................................................... 62
ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS............................................................................................................................................. 62
6.4 TOE SECURITY ASSURANCE MEASURES ..................................................................................................................... 62
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6.4.1 ALC_CMC.4: Production support, acceptance procedures, and automation ................... 64
6.4.2 ALC_CMS.4: Problem tracking CM coverage................................................................... 64
6.4.3 ALC_DEL.1: Delivery Procedures..................................................................................... 64
6.4.4 ALC_DVS.1: Identification of Security Measures.............................................................. 64
6.4.5 ALC_LCD.1: Developer Defined Life Cycle Model........................................................... 64
6.4.6 ALC_FLR.2: Flaw Reporting Procedures.......................................................................... 64
6.4.7 ALC_TAT.1: Well-Defined Development Tools ................................................................. 64
6.4.8 ADV_ARC.1: Security Architecture Description .............................................................. 65
6.4.9 ADV_FSP.4: Complete Functional Specification .............................................................. 65
6.4.10ADV_IMP.1: Implementation Representation of the TSF.................................................. 65
6.4.11ADV_TDS.3: Basic Modular Design.................................................................................. 65
6.4.12AGD_OPE.1: Operational User Guidance........................................................................ 65
6.4.13AGD_PRE.1: Preparative Procedures............................................................................... 65
6.4.14ATE_COV.2: Analysis of Coverage ................................................................................... 66
6.4.15ATE_DPT.1: Testing: Basic Design................................................................................... 66
6.4.16ATE_FUN.1: Functional Testing ...................................................................................... 66
7 TOE SPECIFICATION...................................................................................................................................................... 67
7.1 TOE SECURITY FUNCTIONS......................................................................................................................................... 67
7.1.1 Security Audit ..................................................................................................................... 68
7.1.2 Cryptographic Support....................................................................................................... 69
7.1.3 Administrative Access SFP................................................................................................. 71
7.1.4 Proxy SFP........................................................................................................................... 71
7.1.5 WAN Optimization SFP...................................................................................................... 71
7.1.6 Identification and Authentication....................................................................................... 72
7.1.7 Security Management ......................................................................................................... 74
7.1.8 Protection of the TSF.......................................................................................................... 75
7.1.9 Resource Utilization........................................................................................................... 75
7.1.10TOE Access......................................................................................................................... 76
8 RATIONALE....................................................................................................................................................................... 77
8.1 CONFORMANCE CLAIMS RATIONALE........................................................................................................................... 77
8.2 SECURITY OBJECTIVES RATIONALE............................................................................................................................. 77
8.2.1 Security Objectives Rationale Relating to Threats............................................................. 77
8.2.2 Security Objectives Rationale Relating to Policies............................................................ 79
8.2.3 Security Objectives Rationale Relating to Assumptions..................................................... 81
8.3 RATIONALE FOR EXTENDED SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS ........................................................................ 82
8.4 RATIONALE FOR EXTENDED TOE SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS ................................................................. 82
8.5 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS RATIONALE ....................................................................................................................... 83
8.5.1 Rationale for Security Functional Requirements of the TOE Objectives........................... 83
8.5.2 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale...................................................................... 90
8.5.3 Dependency Rationale........................................................................................................ 90
9 ACRONYMS ....................................................................................................................................................................... 94
Table of Figures
FIGURE 1 - DEPLOYMENT CONFIGURATION OF THE TOE ................................................................................8
FIGURE 2 – TRANSPARENT FORWARD (GATEWAY) PROXY DEPLOYMENT ....................................................12
FIGURE 3 – EXPLICIT FORWARD (GATEWAY) PROXY DEPLOYMENT.............................................................12
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FIGURE 4 – REVERSE (SERVER) PROXY DEPLOYMENT..................................................................................13
FIGURE 5 - WAN OPTIMIZATION DEPLOYMENT............................................................................................13
FIGURE 6 – TOE BOUNDARY ........................................................................................................................15
FIGURE 7 – FIA_PCR_EXT PASSWORD CONTROLLED ROLE FAMILY DECOMPOSITION................................28
FIGURE 8 – FRU_ARP_EXT HEALTH CHECK ALARMS FAMILY DECOMPOSITION.........................................29
Table of Tables
TABLE 1 - ST AND TOE REFERENCES .............................................................................................................7
TABLE 2 – PLATFORM COMPARISON ...............................................................................................................7
TABLE 3 - CC AND PP CONFORMANCE .........................................................................................................21
TABLE 4 – THREATS......................................................................................................................................22
TABLE 5 - ORGANIZATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES ........................................................................................23
TABLE 6 – ASSUMPTIONS ..............................................................................................................................24
TABLE 7 - SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE TOE...........................................................................................25
TABLE 8 - IT SECURITY OBJECTIVES.............................................................................................................26
TABLE 9 - NON-IT SECURITY OBJECTIVES ....................................................................................................26
TABLE 10 - EXTENDED TOE SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS .........................................................27
TABLE 11 - TOE SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS............................................................................32
TABLE 12 - BASIC-LEVEL AUDITABLE EVENTS.............................................................................................35
TABLE 13 - CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY GENERATION STANDARDS ......................................................................39
TABLE 14 - CRYPTOGRAPHIC OPERATIONS ...................................................................................................40
TABLE 15 - CRYPTOGRAPHIC OPERATIONS PART 2.......................................................................................41
TABLE 16 - AUTHORISED ROLES ...................................................................................................................57
TABLE 17 - ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS ......................................................................................................62
TABLE 18 - ASSURANCE MEASURES MAPPING TO TOE SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS (SARS) ....63
TABLE 19 - MAPPING OF TOE SECURITY FUNCTIONS TO SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS ..............67
TABLE 20 - THREATS: OBJECTIVES MAPPING................................................................................................77
TABLE 21 - POLICIES: OBJECTIVES MAPPING ................................................................................................79
TABLE 22 - ASSUMPTIONS: OBJECTIVES MAPPING........................................................................................81
TABLE 23 - OBJECTIVES: SFRS MAPPING .....................................................................................................83
TABLE 24 - FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS DEPENDENCIES............................................................................90
TABLE 25 – ACRONYMS ................................................................................................................................94
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1 Introduction
This section identifies the Security Target (ST), Target of Evaluation (TOE), and the ST
organization. The Target of Evaluation is the Blue Coat ProxySG SG510, SG810, and
SG9000 running SGOS v5.5, and will hereafter be referred to as the TOE, or ProxySG,
throughout this document. The TOE is a proprietary operating system developed
specifically for use on a hardware appliance that serves as an Internet proxy and Wide
Area Network (WAN) optimizer. The purpose of the appliance is to provide a layer of
security between an Internal and External Network, typically an office network and the
Internet, and to provide acceleration and compression of transmitted data.
1.1 Purpose
This ST contains the following sections to provide mapping of the Security Environment
to the Security Requirements that the TOE meets in order to remove, diminish or mitigate
the defined threats:
 Introduction (Section 1) – Provides a brief summary of the ST contents and
describes the organization of other sections within this document. It also provides
an overview of the TOE security functions and describes the physical and logical
scope for the TOE, as well as the ST and TOE references.
 Conformance Claims (Section 2) – Provides the identification of any Common
Criteria (CC), Protection Profile, and Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL) package
claims. It also identifies whether the ST contains extended security requirements.
 Security Problem (Section 3) – Describes the threats, organizational security
policies, and assumptions that pertain to the TOE and its environment.
 Security Objectives (Section 4) – Identifies the security objectives that are satisfied
by the TOE and its environment.
 Extended Components (Section 5) – Identifies new components (extended Security
Functional Requirements (SFRs) and extended Security Assurance Requirements
(SARs)) that are not included in CC Part 2 or CC Part 3.
 Security Requirements (Section 6) – Presents the SFRs and SARs met by the TOE.
 TOE Specification (Section 7) – Describes the security functions provided by the
TOE that satisfy the security functional requirements and objectives.
 Rationale (Section 8) - Presents the rationale for the security objectives,
requirements, and SFR dependencies as to their consistency, completeness, and
suitability.
 Acronyms (Section 9) – Defines the acronyms used within this ST.
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1.2 Security Target and TOE References
Table 1 - ST and TOE References
ST Title Blue Coat Systems, Inc. ProxySG SG510, SG810, and SG9000 running SGOS
v5.5 Security Target
ST Version Version 1.3
ST Author Corsec Security, Inc.
Matt Williams
ST Publication Date 2012-02-23
TOE Reference Blue Coat ProxySG SG510, SG810, and SG9000 running SGOS v5.5.7.1, build
77648
Keywords Proxy, Blue Coat, Gateway, Traffic Filtering, Content Filtering, Transparent
Authentication, Proxy SFP, Administrative Access SFP, WAN Optimization SFP,
Web Security, Safe Browsing, WAN Optimization, ADN, Application Delivery
Network, VPM, Visual Policy Manager
1.3 TOE Overview
The TOE Overview summarizes the usage and major security features of the TOE. The
TOE Overview provides a context for the TOE evaluation by identifying the TOE type,
describing the product, and defining the specific evaluated configuration.
The ProxySG SG510, SG810, and SG9000 running SGOS v5.5 appliances (ProxySG) is
a proprietary operating system and hardware appliance that together serve as an Internet
proxy. The purpose of the appliance is to provide a layer of security between an Internal
and External Network (typically an office network and the Internet), and to provide WAN
optimization for traffic passing between networks.
The ProxySG is one of several appliances manufactured by Blue Coat Systems. The
TOE appliances include the SG510, SG810 and SG9000 lines of products. All
appliances run TOE software that differs only in platform specific configuration data,
which describes the intended hardware platform to the operating system. Differences
between product models allow for different capacity, performance and scalability options,
as depicted below in Table 2.
Table 2 – Platform Comparison
SG510 SG810 SG9000
Concurrent Users 200-Unlimited 2500-Unlimited Unlimited
Storage 2x80GB1
-2x320GB
SATA2
2x73GB – 4x300GB
SCSI3
Ultra 320
8x500GB – 10x500GB
SAS4
1
GB – Gigabyte
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Memory 2GB 2-6GB 8-16GB
Throughput  2x10/100/1000 Base-
T card (dual GigE)
 2x10/100/1000 Base
SX card (dual GigE
Fibre)
 4x10/100/1000 Base
T (quad GigE with
passthru)
 2x10/100/1000 Base-
T card (dual GigE)
 2x10/100/1000 Base
SX card (dual GigE
Fibre)
4x10/100/1000 Base T
(quad GigE with
passthru)
4x1000 Base-T (1x
management, 1x
auxilliary, 1 bridged pair)
Enclosure 1U5
x 19” 1U x 19” 4U x 19”
Figure 1 shows the details of the deployment configuration of the TOE:
` `
` `
` `
` `
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
Remote Office
Branch Office
Regional Office
Branch Office
SG9000
SG510
SG510
SG510
SG810
Public Internet Internal Network
Figure 1 - Deployment Configuration of the TOE
The security provided by the ProxySG can be used to control, protect, and monitor the
Internal Network’s use of controlled protocols on the External Network. The ProxySG
appliances offer a choice of two “editions” via licensing: Application Delivery Network
2
SATA – Serial Advanced Technology Attachment
3
SCSI – Small Computer System Interface
4
SAS – Serial Attached SCSI
5
U – Unit
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(ADN) and Proxy. The ADN edition appliances offer a subset of the Proxy’s services
and have some Proxy features disabled (as indicated below).
The controlled protocols implemented in the evaluated configuration are:
 Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP)
 Secure Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTPS)
 File Transfer Protocol (FTP)
 SOCKS (not included with ADN edition)
 Instant Messaging (AOL6
, MSN7
/Windows LIVE Messenger, and Yahoo!) (not
included with ADN edition)
 Common Internet File System (CIFS)
 Real-Time Streaming Protocol (RTSP)
 Microsoft Media Streaming (MMS)
 Messaging Application Programming Interface (MAPI)
 Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) tunnelling protocols (e.g., Secure Shell
(SSH), IMAP8
, POP39
, SMTP10
)
 Telnet
 Domain Name System (DNS)
Control is achieved by enforcing a configurable policy (Proxy SFP11
) on controlled
protocol traffic to and from the Internal Network users. The policy may include
authentication, authorization, content filtering, and auditing. In addition, the ProxySG
provides optimization of data transfer between ProxySG nodes on a WAN. Optimization
is achieved by enforcing a configurable policy (WAN Optimization SFP) on traffic
traversing the WAN.
1.3.1 TOE Concepts
The following paragraphs depict a brief description of the TOE components and
functionality.
1.3.1.1 Administrative Access
Administrative access to the TOE is provided by the ProxySG’s serial port and Ethernet
port. Administrators access the Serial Console using a terminal emulator over a direct
serial connection to the appliance. The Serial Console controls access to the Setup
Console (used for initial configuration only) and the Command Line Interface (CLI),
which is used for normal administrative operations. Administrators can also access the
CLI using SSH over an Ethernet connection. Administrators access the Java
6
AOL – America Online
7
MSN – The Microsoft Network
8
IMAP – Internet Message Access Protocol
9
POP3 – Post Office Protocol version 3
10
SMTP – Simple Mail Transfer Protocol
11
SFP – Security Functional Policy
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Management Console (JMC) using HTTPS over an Ethernet connection, and it is used for
normal administrative operations.
1.3.1.2 Initial Configuration
The TOE must be configured using the Setup Console before it is installed into the
client’s network. The Setup Console is used to specify the Internet Protocol (IP) address,
subnet mask, default gateway, Domain Name System (DNS) server, the Console
username and password, the Enable (privileged-mode) password (if applicable), the
edition of the software (ADN or Proxy), and the default policy for proxied services.
Note that in this evaluated configuration, once the TOE is operational, the Setup Console
is no longer used.
To perform first-time configuration of the TOE involves a three-step approach:
 Step 1: Entering the IP address, IP subnet mask, IP gateway address, DNS
address, Console password, “enable” password, setup password, and the choice of
edition (ADN or Proxy)
 Step 2: Enabling Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) mode through
the CLI on the Serial port, causing a reboot into FIPS mode
 Step 3: Entering the ADN Settings (optional), traffic types to be intercepted, and
initial policy
There are three ways to perform Step 1 of the first-time configuration:
 Front Panel configuration method (not permitted in the evaluated configuration)
 Automatic registration with the Director management application (not permitted in
the evaluated configuration)
 Serial Console configuration method
There are several ways to complete Step 3 of the first-time configuration:
 log on to the CLI through the serial connection, via SSH, or via Telnet12
using the
configured administrative credentials
 log on to the JMC through HTTP13
or HTTPS
After first-time configuration is completed, the administrator must log in to the TOE via
the ProxySG CLI or the JMC web interface to fully configure the appliance, and to
perform normal administrative activities. Administrators may also perform normal
administrative activities by logging on to the CLI through SSH. Note that first-time
configuration can be re-run at any time to change the values of the configuration settings
that are considered part of the first-time configuration.
12
Telnet access to the CLI is disabled by default and not included in the evaluated
configuration.
13
HTTP access to the JMC is not included in the evaluated configuration.
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1.3.1.3 Security Functional Policies
After initial configuration, the TOE is considered operational and behaves as a proxy that
either denies or allows all proxied transactions through the TOE. During initial
configuration, the administrator must choose which policy (allow or deny) is the default.
To further manage controlled protocol traffic flow, an administrator defines information
flow policy rules, which comprise the Proxy SFP.
These rules can require authentication of End Users. An administrator creates End Users
by using the management interfaces to create unique user accounts in a local user list, if a
local authentication realm is being used. If off-box authentication is in use, the
administrator does not have to create users on the appliance. End Users can be granted
administrative privileges by defining access control policy rules, which comprise the
Administrative Access SFP.
The policy rules that define the Proxy SFP, WAN Optimization SFP, and Administrative
Access SFP are expressed using the syntax and rules described in the Blue Coat Systems,
Inc. ProxySG Appliance Content Policy Language Reference, Version SGOS 5.5.x.
1.3.1.4 Explicit and Transparent Network Environments
In order to act as a proxy and manage controlled protocol traffic between the Internal and
External Network, all of the targeted traffic must flow through the appliance. Arranging
for controlled protocol traffic to flow through the appliance requires configuration of the
organization’s network environment. There are two kinds of network deployments:
explicit and transparent. In an explicit deployment, the users’ client software (e.g. a web
browser) is configured to access the External Network via the proxy. The client software
presents the traffic to the Internal Network port of the proxy for service. In a transparent
deployment, the network and proxy are configured so that the proxy can intercept
controlled protocol traffic intended for the External Network. The users’ software is not
changed and the user may be unaware that controlled protocol traffic is passing through
the proxy.
1.3.1.5 Deployment Configurations
ProxySG appliances are deployed in three different configurations: Transparent Forward
Proxy Deployment (or Gateway Proxy), Explicit Forward (Gateway) Proxy Deployment,
and Reverse Proxy Deployment (or Server Proxy). The Forward Proxy deployments are
more common for customers, and allow a ProxySG device to apply policy rules for
clients in a single area such as an office or LAN.
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Non-Controlled
Protocol Traffic
Controlled
Protocol Traffic
ProxySG
`
L4 Switch
Original Content
Servers
(OCS)
Browser Client
Public Internet
Local Area
Network (LAN)
Figure 2 – Transparent Forward (Gateway) Proxy Deployment
In the Transparent Forward Proxy deployment (depicted in Figure 2 above), all controlled
protocol traffic flows through the ProxySG, forcing browsers to access all Original
Content Servers (OCS) through the ProxySG. The browsers proceed as though they are
accessing the OCS directly. This allows ProxySG to act as a policy enforcement node
before serving up web pages. A layer-four switch can redirect all other traffic around the
ProxySG. In this configuration, non-controlled protocol traffic flows normally and
clients are unaware of the existence of the proxy. Thus, no client configuration is
required after ProxySG installation.
Controlled
Protocol Traffic
ProxySG
`
Original Content
Servers
(OCS)
Browser Client
Public Internet
Local Area
Network (LAN)
Figure 3 – Explicit Forward (Gateway) Proxy Deployment
In the Explicit Forward Proxy deployment (depicted in Figure 3 above), all controlled
protocol traffic flows through the ProxySG, forcing browsers to access all Original
Content Servers through the ProxySG. This allows ProxySG to act as a policy
enforcement node before serving up web pages. Client configuration is required after
ProxySG installation to point to the ProxySG.
ProxySG
Original Content Server
(OCS)
Browser Client
`
Public Internet
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Figure 4 – Reverse (Server) Proxy Deployment
In the Reverse Proxy deployment, a ProxySG is associated with an OCS web server (as
depicted in Figure 4 above). The ProxySG can cache and deliver pictures and other non-
variable content rapidly, offloading those efforts from the OCS. This frees the OCS to
perform application-based services (such as dynamic web page generation).
1.3.1.6 WAN Optimization
The ProxySG’s ADN implements byte caching14
and acceleration techniques to provide
WAN optimization for a network. ADNs require two-sided deployments, with a
ProxySG appliance at each end of the WAN link. ADN also uses bandwidth
management, data compression, and object caching15
to provide acceleration for the
WAN. Figure 5 (below) shows a typical WAN Optimization deployment for email
exchange across a WAN.
`
Exchange Server
WAN
ProxySG Peer with
Byte Caching
Dictionary
Outlook Client
B300111010B2
Dictionary
Tokens
ProxySG Peer with
Byte Caching
Dictionary
B0 = 00110110
B2 = 01010100
B1 = 10111011
B3 = 11010010
Byte Caching
Dictionary
Figure 5 - WAN Optimization Deployment
The components required for an ADN implementation include ADN nodes in branch
offices and data centres that can be authenticated and authorised, and an optional ADN
manager to provide routing information and control access to the ADN network. An
ADN node is any non-manager TOE appliance that is configured for ADN optimization
in the network. However, ADN managers may also act as ADN nodes.
14
Byte caching – technique in which the TOE replaces large blocks of repeated data with
small tokens representing that data prior to transmission.
15
Object caching - enables clients to retrieve previously received data from a cache,
rather than across the WAN.
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Traffic accelerated between nodes is automatically compressed before transmission. This
decreases bandwidth usage and optimizes response time. ADN compression is used in
conjunction with byte caching and object caching to increase optimization of data
transmission.
1.3.1.7 Protection of TOE Assets and Functions
The assets of the TOE are the:
 Local user list (if present)
 Proxy SFP rules
 Administrative Access SFP rules
 WAN Optimization SFP rules
 Audit logs
 System configuration
The two primary security capabilities of the TOE are (1) restricting controlled protocol
traffic between the Internal and External Networks and (2) managing the ProxySG. The
tangible assets and management functions are protected by restricting access to
administrators. Only administrators can log into the TOE management interfaces, access
the ProxySG software configuration, and configure policies.
1.3.2 TOE Environment
The TOE is intended to be deployed in a physically secured cabinet, room, or data centre
with the appropriate level of physical access control and physical protection (e.g. fire
control, locks, alarms, etc.). Access to the physical console port on the appliance itself
should be restricted via a locked data cabinet within the data centre as well. The TOE is
intended to be managed by administrators operating under a consistent security policy.
The TOE provides a layer of security between an Internal and External Network, and is
meant to control, protect, and monitor the Internal Network’s use of controlled protocols
on the External Network. For this to operate correctly, all controlled protocol traffic must
traverse the TOE. The TOE environment is required to provide for this configuration.
1.4 TOE Description
This section will primarily address the physical and logical components of the TOE
included in the evaluation. Figure 6 illustrates the boundaries of the overall solution and
ties together all of the components of the TOE and the constituents of the TOE
Environment.
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ProxySG
Public Internet Internal Network
Security
Management
Proxy SFP
Resource
Utilization
Admin SFP
Audit Cryptography
Core
WAN Opt
SFP
TSF
Protection
I/A
TOE Access
LEGEND:
TOE BOUNDARY
Figure 6 – TOE Boundary
1.4.1 Physical Scope
The TOE is a proprietary operating system and the custom, purpose-built hardware on
which it runs. The physical boundary includes the hardware, the Core and all of the
security and management engines of the software. The Core provides the basic operating
system functions, such as system resource management and communications between the
hardware and software, plus other core functionality, such as object store, network stack,
etc.
1.4.1.1 TOE Software and Hardware
The TOE is a software and hardware TOE. For the evaluated configuration, the TOE
software must be installed and run on one of the following Blue Coat appliance
configurations:
 ProxySG 510/810-5
 ProxySG 510/810-10, 510/810-20, 510/810-25 with a Cavium CN1010 PCI-
Extended (PCI-X) card, or a BCM5825 PCI-Extended (PCI-X) card
 ProxySG 9000-10, 9000-20, 9000-20B with a Cavium CN1620 PCI-Express (PCI-
e) card
For all the above appliance models, the appliance type can be either Mach5 edition (For
example, ProxySG 510-5-M5) for WAN optimization, or Proxy edition (For example,
ProxySG 510-5-PR) for Proxy and WAN optimization features.
1.4.1.2 Guidance Documentation
The following guides are required reading and part of the TOE:
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 Blue Coat Systems SGOS Administration Guide, Version 5.5.x, 231-03082,SGOS
5.5.4-01/2011
 Blue Coat SGOS 5.5.x. Release Notes, SGOS 5.5.7.1, 2.21, 11/20/2011
 Blue Coat Systems ProxySG Appliance Command Line Interface Reference,
version SGOS 5.5.x, 231-03035, SGOS 5.5.4-08/2011
 Blue Coat Systems ProxySG Appliance Content Policy Language Reference,
version SGOS 5.5.x, 231-03019, SGOS 5.5.4-07/2011
 Blue Coat Systems ProxySG Appliance SGOS 5.5.x Upgrade/Downgrade Feature
Change Reference, Version SGOS 5.5.x, 231-03034, SGOS 5.5.2-03/2010
 Blue Coat Systems ProxySG Appliance Visual Policy Manager Reference and
Advanced Policy Tasks, SGOS Version 5.5.x, 231-03015, SGOS 5.5.2-03/2010
 Blue Coat ProxySG Quick Start Guide ProxySG 210 ProxySG 510 ProxySG 810
ProxySG 9000 Series, 231-03122, Rev B.3
 Blue Coat Systems SG510 Series Installation Guide, Version: SGOS 5.2.x, 231-
02942, B.0
 Blue Coat Systems SG810 Series Installation Guide, Version: SGOS 5.2.x, 231-
02941, B.0
 Blue Coat 510/810 Series FIPS Compliant Tamper Evident Faceplate and Label
Installation Guide, 231-02995, A-0
 Blue Coat SG9000 Series FIPS Compliant Tamper Evident Shutter and Label
Installation Guide, 231-03063, A.1
 Blue Coat Using FIPS Mode on the ProxySG, 231-03154, March 2011
 Blue Coat Systems ProxySG Appliance, SGOS 5.5.x Upgrade/Downgrade Guide,
SGOS Version 5.5.x, N/A, Version 1.3 (03/2010)
 Blue Coat Systems, Inc. ProxySG SG510, SG810, and SG9000 running SGOS
v5.5 Guidance Supplement v0.5
1.4.2 Logical Scope
The logical boundary includes the security and management engines of ProxySG (see
Figure 6) that address the security functional requirements imposed on the TOE. The
security functional requirements implemented by the TOE are usefully grouped under the
following Security Function Classes:
 Security Audit
 Cryptographic Support
 Administrative Access SFP
 Proxy SFP
 WAN Optimization SFP
 Identification and Authentication
 Security Management
 Protection of the TOE Security Function (TSF)
 Resource Utilization
 TOE Access
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1.4.2.1 Security Audit
The ProxySG has two separate auditing capabilities to provide an audit trail of security
relevant events. These are System Event Logging and Access Logging. The System
Event Log records system boot events, authentication events, changes to the ProxySG
configuration, and errors like failed communication to external devices. The System
Event log can be viewed by Administrators and Privileged administrators.
Access Logging makes a record of all Proxy SFP-controlled protocol traffic that enters
the TOE. An administrator can specify exactly what information goes into these records.
Standard logging formats like Squid and NCSA17
are provided for convenience, and
custom log formats can be defined using W3C18
. Depending on the policy, the ProxySG
can create multiple log files for different policy actions. For example, single user actions
or group actions can be logged where necessary. If an access log ever fills to its
configured capacity, the oldest records will be overwritten with new records. Access logs
can be transferred to another machine (as configured by an administrator) for analysis.
Access logs can also be encrypted and digitally signed prior to storage.
1.4.2.2 Cryptographic Support
The Cryptographic Support function provides encryption and decryption of all data
transmitted between the TOE and the client running the CLI or JMC. TLS19
may also be
used for communication between the TOE and Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
(LDAP) and Integrated Windows Authentication (IWA) authentication servers. In
addition, access logs can be encrypted using a public key from an external certificate,
which is associated with a private key, and digitally signed using an external SSL
certificate guaranteed by a CA. The TOE uses SSL, CA, and external certificates that
conform to the x.509 v3 standard. These certificates are used to guarantee the integrity
and authenticity of signed audit logs as well as to authenticate and secure
communications between itself and OCSs, other ProxySGs, and between end users.
Cryptographic operations are performed by a FIPS 140-2-validated cryptographic
module, certificate #XXX.
1.4.2.3 User Data Protection
User data protection defines how users of the TOE are allowed to perform operations on
objects.
The TOE provides administrators with the ability to define security policies using the
ProxySG Content Policy Language (CPL). The CPL provides for the creation of rules
that perform certain actions based on a set of conditions. The conditions and actions
depend on the kind of policy being written. Policies written in CPL are evaluated
according to the rules described in the Blue Coat Systems, Inc. ProxySG Appliance
Content Policy Language Reference, Version SGOS 5.5.x.
17
NCSA – National Center for Supercomputing Applications
18
W3C – World Wide Web Consortium
19
TLS – Transport Layer Security
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1.4.2.3.1 Administrative Access SFP
An Administrative Access SFP is defined by the administrator to control access to the
administrative functions of the TOE. The conditions for these policies can be constructed
from attributes of the request, such as user identity and kind of access needed (read-only
or read/write). Other attributes include time of day and date. The actions include
requiring an authenticated session and allowing or denying access.
1.4.2.4 Proxy SFP
The Proxy security function defines how the TOE controls proxy services. A Proxy SFP
is defined by the administrator to manage controlled protocol traffic through the proxy
appliance. The conditions can be constructed from a set of attributes including whether
the traffic originated from the Internal Network or the External Network and any
combination of characteristics of the controlled protocol traffic.
The actions that policies can take are allow, deny, require an authenticated session, select
the authentication mode, rewrite a portion of the traffic (e.g. URL20
redirect), strip active
content, present corporate instructions to End Users, and email a warning. For example,
policies can be written to restrict access to certain URLs for some or all End Users,
restrict traffic for specified URLs to authorised End Users or to specific times of day, or
strip specific content types from controlled protocol traffic in either direction. These
policies can be applied based on characteristics such as the user, group, time of day, and
network address.
Administrators can create policies either by composing them in the Blue Coat CPL, or by
using the Visual Policy Manager (VPM), a user interface that creates underlying Blue
Coat CPL.
1.4.2.5 WAN Optimization SFP
The WAN Optimization security function defines how the TOE performs byte caching
and acceleration techniques such as compression and byte caching on data being
transmitted through the TOE. The TOE enforces the WAN Optimization SFP on
specified TOE subjects, objects, and operations. The architecture of the TOE ensures that
all operations between the specified objects and subjects are regulated by the TOE based
upon the criteria defined in the WAN Optimization SFP.
1.4.2.6 Identification and Authentication
The TOE provides the ability for administrators to manage the security functions of the
TOE. The Identification and Authentication security function ensures that access to this
management capability is restricted to administrators and protected by the entry of
credentials. Administrators are assigned a role to determine what aspects of the TOE
they are allowed to manage.
20
URL – Uniform Resource Locator
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1.4.2.7 Security Management
The Security Management function provides administrators with the ability to properly
manage and configure the TOE to store and access its IT21
assets. Using a proprietary
policy-drafting language (CPL), the ProxySG allows administrators to create
Administrative Access SFP rules that grant and govern administrative access, to create
Proxy SFP rules that control the flow of controlled protocol traffic, and to create WAN
Optimization SFP rules that control byte-caching, compression, and acceleration of
transmitted data.
1.4.2.8 Protection of the TSF
The TOE provides reliable timestamp information for its own use. The TOE software
retrieves the timestamp from the hardware clock, which is set during installation of the
appliance. The order of the audit records can be determined by the value of the
timestamps.
The time can be synchronized to Coordinated Universal Time manually through the
configuration settings. Administrators are assumed trusted and competent, and may
change the system time whenever necessary.
1.4.2.9 Resource Utilization
The TOE enforces administrator-defined quotas on the number and duration of network
connections and bandwidth utilization. The TOE can also be configured to send alerts to
notify the administrator of changes in the health status of the TOE.
1.4.2.10 TOE Access
The TOE restricts the number of concurrent sessions that belong to the same End User by
policy. If an End User exceeds the number of concurrent sessions permitted, the TOE
will log the user off of one or more sessions, depending on the number permitted.
The TOE will also terminate an End User session after an administrator-defined interval
of inactivity. Each time a login is completed, the inactivity-timeout value is reset. If the
time since the last activity time exceeds the inactivity-timeout value, the End User is
logged out.
1.4.3 Product Physical/Logical Features and Functionality not
included in the TSF
Features and functionalities that are not part of the evaluated configuration of the TSF
are:
 ProxyClient
 Remote management over Telnet
 Front panel configuration
 Remote management over HTTP
 XML authentication realm
21
IT – Information Technology
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 Session Monitor
 Unauthenticated access to the VPM
 Unauthenticated administrative access granted via policy
 All functionality excluded from FIPS mode
 Network Time Protocol (NTP)
 Link State Propagation feature
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2 Conformance Claims
This section provides the identification for any CC, Protection Profile (PP), and EAL
package conformance claims. Rationale is provided for any extensions or augmentations
to the conformance claims. Rationale for CC and PP conformance claims can be found in
Section 8.1.
Table 3 - CC and PP Conformance
Common Criteria
(CC) Identification
and Conformance
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Revision 3, July 2009; CC Part 2 extended; CC Part 3 conformant; Parts 2 and
3 Interpretations from the Interpreted CEM22
as of 2010/08/11 were reviewed,
and no interpretations apply to the claims made in this ST.
PP Identification None
Evaluation
Assurance Level
EAL4+ augmented with ALC_FLR.2
22
CEM – Common Criteria Evaluation Methodology
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3 Security Problem
This section describes the security aspects of the environment in which the TOE will be
used and the manner in which the TOE is expected to be employed. It provides the
statement of the TOE security environment, which identifies and explains all:
 Known and presumed threats countered by either the TOE or by the security
environment
 Organizational security policies with which the TOE must comply
 Assumptions about the secure usage of the TOE, including physical, personnel and
connectivity aspects
3.1 Threats to Security
This section identifies the threats to the IT assets against which protection is required by
the TOE or by the security environment. The threat agents are divided into three
categories:
 Attackers who are not TOE users: They have public knowledge of how the TOE
operates and are assumed to possess a basic skill level, limited resources to alter
TOE configuration settings/parameters and no physical access to the TOE.
 TOE users: They have extensive knowledge of how the TOE operates and are
assumed to possess a high skill level, moderate resources to alter TOE
configuration settings/parameters and physical access to the TOE. (TOE users are,
however, assumed not to be wilfully hostile to the TOE.)
 Agents or processes working either on behalf of attackers or autonomously: They
may or may not have knowledge of the public or proprietary TOE configuration
settings/parameters and typically take the form of bots or botnets designed to
exploit common vulnerabilities or deny others access to IT products and services.
Both are assumed to have a low level of motivation. The IT assets requiring protection
are the user data saved on or transitioning through the TOE and the hosts on the protected
network. Removal, diminution and mitigation of the threats are through the objectives
identified in Section 4 Security Objectives. The following threats are applicable:
Table 4 – Threats
Name Description
T.EXTERNAL_NETWORK A user or process on the internal network may access content on the
External Network that has been deemed inappropriate or potentially
harmful to the Internal Network.
T.HEALTH TOE users may perform actions that compromise the health of the
TOE.
T.MASQUERADE A user or process may masquerade as another entity in order to gain
unauthorised access to data or TOE resources.
T.NACCESS An unauthorised person or external IT entity may be able to view or
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modify data that is transmitted between the TOE and a remote
authorised external entity.
T.UNAUTHORISED_ACCESS A user may gain access to security data on the TOE for which they
are not authorized according to the TOE security policy through the
improper use of valid credentials.
T.RESOURCE TOE users or attackers may cause network connection resources to
become overused and therefore unavailable.
3.2 Organizational Security Policies
An Organizational Security Policy (OSP) is a set of security rules, procedures, or
guidelines imposed by an organization on the operational environment of the TOE. The
following OSPs are presumed to be imposed upon the TOE or its operational
environment by any organization implementing the TOE in the CC evaluated
configuration:
Table 5 - Organizational Security Policies
Name Description
P.ACTIVE_CONTENT The TOE shall provide a means to remove active content (e.g. Java,
JavaScript, ActiveX) in HTML pages delivered via controlled
protocols.
P.ADMIN Only authorised individuals shall have the ability to perform
administrative actions on the TOE.
P.AUDIT The TOE shall record events of security relevance at the “basic level”
of auditing. The TOE shall record the resulting actions of the Proxy
SFP.
P.CONTENT_TYPE End Users shall not access unauthorised content types via controlled
protocols on the External Network.
P.FILTERED_URLS End Users shall not access unauthorised URLs via controlled
protocols on the External Network.
P.MANAGE The TOE shall provide secure management of the system
configuration, the Proxy SFP, the WAN Optimization SFP, and the
Administrative SFP.
P.NON_ANONYMOUS Access to some resources via controlled protocols on the External
Network may be restricted to particular End Users.
P.PASS_TRAFFIC The TOE shall enforce the WAN Optimization SFP on traffic passing
between itself and another TOE.
P.POST_TYPE End Users shall not post unauthorised content types to the External
Network using controlled protocols.
3.3 Assumptions
This section describes the security aspects of the intended environment for the evaluated
TOE. The operational environment must be managed in accordance with assurance
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requirement documentation for delivery, operation, and user guidance. The following
specific conditions are required to ensure the security of the TOE and are assumed to
exist in an environment where this TOE is employed.
Table 6 – Assumptions
Name Description
A.ENVIRON The TOE is located in an environment that provides physical security,
uninterruptible power, air conditioning, and all other conditions
required for reliable operation of the hardware. Physical access to the
appliance is restricted to authorised persons.
A.INSTALL The TOE has been installed and configured according to the
appropriate installation guides.
A.NETWORK All Proxy SFP-controlled protocol traffic between the Internal and
External Networks traverses the ProxySG device; there is no other
connection between the Internal and External Networks for Proxy
SFP-controlled protocol traffic.
A.NO_EVIL_ADMIN Administrators are non-hostile and follow all administrator guidance
when using the TOE. Administration is competent and on-going.
A.PASSWORD Passwords for administrative access to the TOE and for End User
accounts are at least five characters in length, and are not dictionary
words.
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4 Security Objectives
Security objectives are concise, abstract statements of the intended solution to the
problem defined by the security problem definition (see Section 3). The set of security
objectives for a TOE form a high-level solution to the security problem. This high-level
solution is divided into two part-wise solutions: the security objectives for the TOE, and
the security objectives for the TOE’s operational environment. This section identifies the
security objectives for the TOE and its supporting environment.
4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE
The specific security objectives for the TOE are as follows:
Table 7 - Security Objectives for the TOE
Name Description
O.ALERT The TOE must alert the administrator of changes in TOE health.
O.AUDIT The TOE must record events of security relevance at the “basic level”
of auditing. The TOE must record the resulting actions of the Proxy
SFP. The TOE must protect the audit trail, and provide a mechanism
for administrators or external IT entities to view the audit trail.
O.AUTHENTICATE The TOE must require the Administrator to authenticate before
gaining access to the administrative interfaces of the TOE, and End
Users to authenticate if their controlled protocol traffic matches a
Proxy SFP rule which requires authentication.
O.MANAGE The TOE must provide secure management of the system
configuration, the Administrative Access SFP, the WAN Optimization
SFP, and the Proxy SFP.
O.PASS_TRAFFIC The TOE must pass traffic between itself and another TOE as defined
by the WAN Optimization SFP.
O.PROTECT The TOE must have the capability to protect management traffic from
unauthorised reading or modification.
O.QUOTA The TOE must be able to place quotas on exhaustible resources.
O.REMOVE_ACTIVE The TOE must be able to remove active content from HTML pages
delivered via a controlled protocol as defined by the Proxy SFP.
O.SCREEN_TYPE The TOE must disallow controlled protocol traffic of given content
types as defined by the Proxy SFP.
O.SCREEN_URL The TOE must disallow controlled protocol traffic for given URLs as
defined by the Proxy SFP.
O.TIMESTAMP The TOE must provide a timestamp for use by the TOE.
O.VALIDATED_CRYPTO The TOE shall provide cryptographic functions for its own use. These
functions will be provided by a FIPS 140-2 validated cryptographic
module.
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4.2 Security Objectives for the Operational
Environment
4.2.1 IT Security Objectives
The following IT security objectives are to be satisfied by the environment:
Table 8 - IT Security Objectives
Name Description
OE.NETWORK All Proxy-SFP controlled protocol traffic between the Internal and
External Networks must traverse the ProxySG device.
OE.PASSWORD Passwords for the Administrator and End User accounts and the
“enable” password will be at least five characters in length and not be
a dictionary word.
4.2.2 Non-IT Security Objectives
The following non-IT environment security objectives are to be satisfied without
imposing technical requirements on the TOE. That is, they will not require the
implementation of functions in the TOE hardware and/or software. Thus, they will be
satisfied largely through application of procedural or administrative measures.
Table 9 - Non-IT Security Objectives
Name Description
NOE.ADMIN The administrator must be non-malicious and competent, and must
follow all guidance.
NOE.ENVIRON The physical environment must be suitable for supporting a computing
device in a secure setting.
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5 Extended Components
This section defines the extended SFRs and extended SARs met by the TOE. These
requirements are presented following the conventions identified in Section 6.1.
5.1 Extended TOE Security Functional
Components
This section specifies the extended SFRs for the TOE. The extended SFRs are organized
by class. Table 10 identifies all extended SFRs implemented by the TOE.
Table 10 - Extended TOE Security Functional Requirements
Name Description
FIA_ PCR_EXT.1 Password controlled role
FRU_ARP_EXT.1 Health check alarms
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5.1.1 Class FIA: Identification and Authentication
Identification and Authentication functions establish and verify a claimed user identity.
The extended family FIA_ PCR_EXT.1: Password controlled role was modelled after
the CC family FIA_UAU: User authentication. The extended component FIA_
PCR_EXT.1: Password controlled role was modelled after the CC component
FIA_UAU.6: Re-authenticating.
5.1.1.1 Password Controlled Role (FIA_PCR_EXT)
Family Behaviour
This family defines the requirements for authenticating an authorised user to another role.
Component Levelling
Figure 7 – FIA_PCR_EXT Password Controlled Role family decomposition
FIA_ PCR_EXT.1 Password controlled role provides the capability to authenticate an
authorised user to another role.
Management: FIA_ PCR_EXT.1
The following actions could be considered for management functions in FMT:
 If an authorised user could request authentication as a new role, the management
includes an authentication request.
Audit: FIA_ PCR_EXT.1
The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN security audit data generation is
included in the PP/ST:
 Minimal: Failure of authentication to the new role;
 Basic: All authentication requests to the new role.
FIA_PCR_EXT.1 Password Controlled Role
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: No dependencies
This component will provide administrators the capability to authenticate as a new role.
FIA_PCR_EXT: Password Controlled Role 1
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FIA_ PCR_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall authenticate [assignment: user or role] under
the conditions that the [assignment: user or role] has requested the [assignment:
new role] role by [assignment: list of authentication actions taken].
5.1.2 Class FRU: Resource Utilization
Resource utilization functions support the availability of required resources such as
processing capability or storage capacity. The extended family FRU_ARP_EXT: Health
check alarms was modelled after the CC family FAU_ARP: Security audit automatic
response. The extended component FRU_ARP_EXT.1: Health check alarms was
modelled after the CC component FAU_ARP.1: Security alarms.
5.1.2.1 Health Check Alarms (FRU_ARP_EXT)
Family Behaviour
This family defines the response to be taken in case of a change in the health status of the
TOE.
Component Levelling
Figure 8 – FRU_ARP_EXT Health check alarms family decomposition
FRU_ARP_EXT.1 Health check alarms, the TSF shall take actions in case a change in
the state of the health of the TOE is detected.
Management: FRU_ARP_EXT.1
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
 The management (addition, removal, or modification) of actions.
Audit: FRU_ARP_EXT.1
The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation is
included in the PP/ST:
 Minimal: Actions taken due to change in health state.
FRU_ARP_EXT: Health Check Alarms 1
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FRU_ARP_EXT.1 Health check alarms
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: No dependencies
FRU_ARP_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall take [assignment: list of actions] upon detection
of a change in health check state.
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5.2 Extended TOE Security Assurance
Components
There are no extended SARs for this TOE.
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6 Security Requirements
This section defines the SFRs and SARs met by the TOE. These requirements are
presented following the conventions identified in Section 6.1.
6.1 Conventions
There are several font variations used within this ST. Selected presentation choices are
discussed here to aid the Security Target reader.
The CC allows for assignment, refinement, selection and iteration operations to be
performed on security functional requirements. All of these operations are used within
this ST. These operations are performed as described in Parts 2 and 3 of the CC, and are
shown as follows:
 Completed assignment statements are identified using [italicized text within brackets].
 Completed selection statements are identified using [underlined italicized text within
brackets].
 Refinements are identified using bold text. Any text removed is stricken
(Example: TSF Data) and should be considered as a refinement.
 Extended Functional and Assurance Requirements are identified using “_EXT” at
the end of the family name.
 Iterations are identified by appending a letter in parentheses following the
component title. For example, FAU_GEN.1(a) Audit Data Generation would be
the first iteration and FAU_GEN.1(b) Audit Data Generation would be the second
iteration.
6.2 Security Functional Requirements
This section specifies the SFRs for the TOE. This section organizes the SFRs by CC
class. Table 11 identifies all SFRs implemented by the TOE and indicates the ST
operations performed on each requirement.
Table 11 - TOE Security Functional Requirements
Name Description S A R I
FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation   
FAU_SAR.1(a) Audit review    
FAU_SAR.1(b) Audit review    
FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage    
FAU_STG.4 Prevention of audit data loss    
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation    
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction    
FCS_COP.1(a) Cryptographic operation    
FCS_COP.1(b) Cryptographic operation    
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FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control    
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control    
FDP_IFC.1(a) Subset information flow control    
FDP_IFC.1(b) Subset information flow control    
FDP_IFF.1(a) Simple security attributes    
FDP_IFF.1(b) Simple security attributes    
FIA_AFL.1 Authentication failure handlings    
FIA_PCR_EXT.1(a) Password controlled role    
FIA_PCR_EXT.1(b) Password controlled role    
FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication    
FIA_UAU.2 User authentication before any action    
FIA_UAU.5 Multiple authentication mechanism    
FIA_UAU.6(a) Re-authenticating    
FIA_UAU.6(b) Re-authenticating    
FIA_UAU.7(a) Protected authentication feedback    
FIA_UAU.7(b) Protected authentication feedback    
FIA_UID.1(a) Timing of identification    
FIA_UID.1(b) Timing of identification    
FIA_UID.2 User identification before any action    
FMT_MOF.1 Management of security functions behaviour    
FMT_MSA.1(a) Management of security attributes    
FMT_MSA.1(b) Management of security attributes    
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes    
FMT_MSA.3(a) Static attribute initialisation    
FMT_MSA.3(b) Static attribute initialisation    
FMT_MSA.3(c) Static attribute initialisation    
FMT_MTD.1(a) Management of TSF data    
FMT_MTD.1(b) Management of TSF data    
FMT_MTD.2 Management of limits on TSF data    
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions    
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles    
FMT_SMR.3 Assuming roles    
FPT_STM.1 Reliable timestamps    
FRU_ARP_EXT.1 Health check alarms    
FRU_RSA.1 Maximum quotas    
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FRU_RSA.2 Minimum and maximum quotas    
FTA_MCS.2 Per user attribute limitation on multiple
concurrent sessions
   
FTA_SSL.3 TSF-initiated termination    
Note: S=Selection; A=Assignment; R=Refinement; I=Iteration
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6.2.1 Class FAU: Security Audit
FAU_GEN.1 Audit Data Generation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FAU_GEN.1.1
The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable
events:
 Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions;
 All auditable events, for the [basic] level of audit; and
Application Note: Although the TOE does perform auditing at the basic level for
JMC password-based authentication attempts, certificate-based authentication
attempts are not logged in this version of the TOE.
 [Communication errors with external IT devices; and
 All actions resulting from the Proxy SFP].
Table 12 - Basic-Level Auditable Events
Component Level Auditable Event
FAU_SAR.1 Basic Reading of information from the audit records
FAU_STG.1 Basic All deletion attempts on audit records
FAU_STG.4 Basic Actions taken due to the audit storage failure
FCS_CKM.1 Basic The object attribute(s), and object value(s) excluding any sensitive
information (e.g., secret or private keys)
FCS_CKM.4 Basic The object attribute(s), and object value(s) excluding any sensitive
information (e.g., secret or private keys)
FCS_COP.1(a) Basic Any applicable cryptographic mode(s) of operation, subject attributes and
object attributes
FCS_COP.1(b) Basic Any applicable cryptographic mode(s) of operation, subject attributes and
object attributes
FDP_ACC.1 Basic All requests to establish a Privileged Administrative role over the selected
TOE interface.
FDP_ACF.1 Basic All requests to perform an operation on an object covered by the
Administrative Access SFP
FDP_IFC.1(a) Basic All attempts by external IT entities to send controlled protocol traffic
through the TOE.
FDP_IFC.1(b) Basic All hosts sending controlled data traffic to one another through the TOE
FDP_IFF.1(a) Basic All decisions on requests for information flow
FDP_IFF.1(b) Basic All decisions on requests for information flow
FIA_PCR_EXT.1(a) Basic All authentication requests to the new role
FIA_PCR_EXT.1(b) Basic All authentication requests to the new role at the serial console
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Component Level Auditable Event
FIA_AFL.1 Minimal Reaching the threshold for account lockout; the action taken, and the re-
enabling of the account
FIA_UAU.1 Basic All use of the authentication mechanism
FIA_UAU.2 Basic All use of the authentication mechanism
FIA_UAU.5 Basic The result of each activated mechanism together with the final decision
FIA_UAU.6(a) Basic All re-authentication attempts as an End-User
FIA_UAU.6(b) Basic All re-authentication attempts as an Administrator
FIA_UAU.7(a) Basic All authentication attempts in progress over the CLI management
interfaces.
FIA_UAU.7(b) Basic All authentication attempts in progress over the JMC.
FIA_UID.1(a) Basic All use of the user identification mechanisms, including the user identity
provided
FIA_UID.1(b) Basic All use of the user identification mechanisms on behalf of the Serial
Console
FIA_UID.2 Basic All use of the user identification mechanisms, including the user identity
provided
FMT_MOF.1 Basic All modifications in the behaviour of the functions in the TSF
FMT_MSA.1(a) Basic All modifications to the security attributes
FMT_MSA.1(b) Basic All modifications to the security attributes
FMT_MSA.2 Minimal All offered and rejected values for a security attribute
FMT_MSA.3(a) Basic Modifications of the default setting of permissive or restrictive rules
All modifications of the initial values of security attributes
FMT_MSA.3(b) Basic Modifications of the default setting of permissive or restrictive rules
All modifications of the initial values of security attributes
FMT_MSA.3(c) Basic Modifications of the default setting of permissive or restrictive rules
All modifications of the initial values of security attributes
FMT_MTD.1(a) Basic All modifications to the values of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1(b) Basic All modifications to the values of TSF data
FMT_MTD.2 Basic All modifications to the limits on TSF data
All modifications in the actions to be taken in case of violation of the
limits
FMT_SMF.1 Basic Use of the management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Minimal Modifications to the group of users that are part of a role
FMT_SMR.3 Minimal Explicit request to assume a role
FPT_STM.1 Minimal Changes to the time
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Component Level Auditable Event
FRU_ARP_EXT.1 Minimal Actions taken due to change in health status
FRU_RSA.1 Basic All attempted uses of the resource allocation functions for resources that
are under control of the TSF
FRU_RSA.2 Basic All attempted uses of the resource allocation functions for resources that
are under control of the TSF
FTA_MCS.2 Minimal Rejection of a new session based on the limitation of multiple concurrent
sessions
FTA_SSL.3 Minimal Termination of an interactive session by the session locking mechanism
FAU_GEN.1.2
The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following information:
 Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity (if applicable),
and the outcome (success or failure) of the event; and
 For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the
functional components included in the PP/ST, [for the Access Log, the
source IP address; for the Event Log, nothing].
Dependencies: FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps
FAU_SAR.1(a) Audit review
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FAU_SAR.1.1(a)
The TSF shall provide [Administrators and Privileged Administrators] with the
capability to read [all information in the System Event Log] from the audit
records.
FAU_SAR.1.2(a)
The TSF shall provide the audit records in a manner suitable for the user to
interpret the information.
Dependencies: FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
FAU_SAR.1(b) Audit review
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FAU_SAR.1.1(b)
The TSF shall provide [external IT entities configured as Access Log upload
targets by Privileged administrators] with the capability to read [all information
in Access Logs] from the audit records.
FAU_SAR.1.2(b)
The TSF shall provide the audit records in a manner suitable for the user to
interpret the information.
Dependencies: FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
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FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FAU_STG.1.1
The TSF shall protect the stored audit records in the audit trail from unauthorised
deletion.
FAU_STG.1.2
The TSF shall be able to [prevent] unauthorised modifications to the stored audit
records in the audit trail.
Dependencies: FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
FAU_STG.4 Prevention of audit data loss
Hierarchical to: FAU_STG.3 Action in case of possible audit data loss
FAU_STG.4.1
The TSF shall [„overwrite the oldest stored audit records‟] and [no other actions]
if the audit trail is full.
Dependencies: FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage
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6.2.2 Class FCS: Cryptographic Support
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_CKM.1.1
The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key generation algorithm [cryptographic key generation algorithm
– see table below] and specified cryptographic key sizes [cryptographic key sizes
– see table below] that meet the following: [list of standards – see table below].
Table 13 - Cryptographic Key Generation Standards
Key Generation Type Algorithm and
Key Size
Standards
(Certificate #)
Random Number
Generator (RNG)
N/A ANSI23
X9.31 (FIPS 186-2) (certificate # 987)
Rivest, Shamir, and
Adelman (RSA)
1024, 1536, 2048,
3072, 4096
ANSI X9.31 31 (FIPS 186-2) certificate # 962)
Dependencies: FCS_COP.1(a) Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1(b) Cryptographic operation
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_CKM.4.1
The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key destruction method [zeroization] that meets the following:
[FIPS 140-2 zeroization requirements].
Dependencies: FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation
FCS_COP.1(a) Cryptographic operation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_COP.1.1(a)
23
ANSI – American National Standards Institute
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The TSF shall perform [list of cryptographic operations – see table below] in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm –
see table below] and cryptographic key sizes [cryptographic key sizes – see table
below] that meet the following: [list of standards – see table below].
Table 14 - Cryptographic Operations
Algorithm
Standard
Software
Implementation
Certificate
Number
Hardware Accelerator Card
Appliance Card Certificate
Number
Symmetric Key Algorithms
AES: ECB24
, CBC25
, OFB26
,
CFB27
-128 bit mode for 128-
, 192-, and 256-bit key sizes
FIPS 197 1885 510 CN1010 105
BCM5825 397
600 CN501 105
810 CN1010 105
BCM5825 397
900 CN1610 1265
9000 CN1620 1265
Triple-DES28
: ECB, CBC,
CFB-64, OFB mode for
keying option 1 (3 different
keys)
FIPS 46-3 1224 510 CN1010 217
BCM5825 435
600 CN501 217
810 CN1010 217
BCM5825 435
900 CN1610 895
9000 CN1620 895
Asymmetric Key Algorithms
RSA PKCS29
#1 sign/verify –
1024-, 1536-, 2048-, 3072-,
4096- bit
ANSI X9.31
(FIPS 186-2 )
962 N/A
Hashing Functions
SHA30
-1 FIPS 180-2 1656
N/A
Message Authentication Code (MAC) Functions
24
ECB – Electronic Codebook
25
CBC – Cipher Block Chaining
26
OFB – Output Feedback
27
CFB – Cipher Feedback
28
DES – Data Encryption Standard
29
PKCS – Public Key Cryptography Standard
30
SHA – Secure Hash Algorithm
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Algorithm
Standard
Software
Implementation
Certificate
Number
Hardware Accelerator Card
Appliance Card Certificate
Number
HMAC31
with SHA-1 FIPS 198 1127
N/A
Dependencies: FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1(b) Cryptographic operation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_COP.1.1(b)
The TSF shall perform [list of cryptographic operations – see table below] in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm –
see table below] and cryptographic key sizes [cryptographic key sizes – see table
below] that meet the following: [list of standards – see table below] for data
passing between the TOE and the JMC.
Table 15 - Cryptographic Operations Part 2
Algorithm
Standard
Software
Implementation
Certificate
Number
Hardware Accelerator Card
Appliance Card Certificate
Number
Symmetric Key Algorithms
AES: ECB32
, CBC33
, OFB34
,
CFB35
-128 bit mode for 128-
, 192-, and 256-bit key sizes
FIPS 197 1885 510 CN1010 105
BCM5825 397
600 CN501 105
810 CN1010 105
BCM5825 397
900 CN1610 1265
9000 CN1620 1265
Triple-DES36
: ECB, CBC,
CFB-64, OFB mode for
FIPS 46-3 1224 510 CN1010 217
BCM5825 435
31
HMAC – Hash-Based Message Authentication Code
32
ECB – Electronic Codebook
33
CBC – Cipher Block Chaining
34
OFB – Output Feedback
35
CFB – Cipher Feedback
36
DES – Data Encryption Standard
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Algorithm
Standard
Software
Implementation
Certificate
Number
Hardware Accelerator Card
Appliance Card Certificate
Number
keying option 1 (3 different
keys)
600 CN501 217
810 CN1010 217
BCM5825 435
900 CN1610 895
9000 CN1620 895
Asymmetric Key Algorithms
RSA PKCS37
#1 sign/verify –
1024-, 1536-, 2048-, 3072-,
4096-bit
ANSI X9.31
(FIPS 186-2 )
962 N/A
Hashing Functions
SHA38
-1 FIPS 180-2 1656
N/A
Dependencies: FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
37
PKCS – Public Key Cryptography Standard
38
SHA – Secure Hash Algorithm
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6.2.3 Class FDP: User Data Protection
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FDP_ACC.1.1
The TSF shall enforce the [Administrative Access SFP] on [administrators
performing the operations “establish an administrative session” and “request the
Privileged Administrative role” over the selected TOE interface].
Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FDP_ACF.1.1
The TSF shall enforce the [Administrative Access SFP] to objects based on the
following:
[Administrator (subject) attributes:
1. Authenticated Identity
2. Group Membership
3. Time of Day/Date
And attributes of the operation:
1. admin.access
].
FDP_ACF.1.2
The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among
controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:
[
1. Establish an administrative session to the CLI via SSH or the Serial
port. Evaluate (with admin.access=READ) the <admin> layers of the
configured policy rules according to the CPL specification and permit
establishment if the resulting action is “allow,” otherwise deny
establishment.
2. Request the Privileged administrator role on the CLI via SSH or the
Serial Port. Evaluate (with admin.access=WRITE) the <admin>
layers of the configured policy rules according to the CPL
specification and permit execution if the resulting action is “allow,”
otherwise prevent execution39
3. Establish an administrative session via the JMC: evaluate (with
admin.access=WRITE) the <admin> layers of the configured policy
rules according to the CPL specification and permit execution of the
39
Note that execution of the “enable” command does not automatically result in the
Privileged Administrator role when using the Serial Console; an additional authentication
step is required as specified by FIA_UAU.6.1(b) and FIA_PCR_EXT.1.1(a).
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resulting action is “allow,” otherwise, evaluate (with
admin.access=READ) the ,admin/ layers of the configured policy rules
according to the CPL specification and permit execution if the
resulting action is “allow”, otherwise prevent execution.
].
FDP_ACF.1.3
The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the
following additional rules:
[
1. Establish an administrative session: establishment is permitted if the
administrator has credentials for “administrator” role access, or has
authenticated via the SSH RSA public key mechanism, and the
administrator‟s IP address is an allowed administrative interface.
2. Request the Privileged administrator role: execution is permitted if
the administrator has the proper credentials for “Privileged
administrator” role access (either configured username/password plus
“enable” password, or SSH RSA public key authentication plus
“enable” password)
].
FDP_ACF.1.4
The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on [no
additional rules].
Dependencies: FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FMT_MSA.3(a) Static attribute initialization
FDP_IFC.1(a) Subset information flow control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FDP_IFC.1.1(a)
The TSF shall enforce the [Proxy SFP] on
[
1. (Subjects) internal network users attempting to send or receive
controlled protocol traffic through the TOE and external network
traffic not previously requested by internal network user in a
transparent or explicit forward deployment, or external network users
attempting to send or receive controlled protocol traffic through the
TOE in a reverse (server) deployment,
2. (Information) controlled protocol traffic sent through the TOE to other
subjects,
3. (Operations) passing controlled protocol traffic through the TOE to
the other network
].
Dependencies: FDP_IFF.1(a) Simple security attributes
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FDP_IFF.1(a) Simple security attributes
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FDP_IFF.1.1(a)
The TSF shall enforce the [Proxy SFP] based on the following types of subject
and information security attributes:
[
Subject attributes:
1. Username
2. User group membership
Information attributes:
1. Source IP address
2. Destination IP address
3. Destination port
4. Protocol
5. URL
6. Time of day
7. Date
8. Originating application
9. MIME40
type
10. Request method (the requested operation)
11. Any part of an HTTP request other than the body (e.g. header
fields41
)
12. HTTP response header fields
13. HTTP response body
].
FDP_IFF.1.2(a)
The TSF shall permit an information flow between a controlled subject and
controlled information via a controlled operation if the following rules hold:
[Evaluate the configured policy rules and allow controlled protocol traffic to flow
40
MIME – Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions
41
Field matching is achieved by defining a string of text in the traffic which identifies
information of interest, such as a keyword for an HTTP header (for example, defining the
text of an HTTP header name and reading the value that immediately follows it).
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if the result of the evaluation is “allow,” otherwise controlled protocol traffic
flow is not permitted].
FDP_IFF.1.3(a)
The TSF shall enforce [no additional information flow control SFP rules].
FDP_IFF.1.4(a)
The TSF shall explicitly authorise an information flow based on [configured
policy rules governing transparent and explicit authentication of End Users].
FDP_IFF.1.5(a)
The TSF shall explicitly deny an information flow based on the following rules:
[If the information flow is from the External Network and the traffic is not in
response to a previous request forwarded by the ProxySG to the External
Network].
Dependencies: FDP_IFC.1(a) Subset information flow control
FMT_MSA.3(b) Static attribute initialisation
FDP_IFC.1(b) Subset information flow control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FDP_IFC.1.1(b)
The TSF shall enforce the [WAN Optimization SFP] on [hosts on either side of the
TOE (subjects), the TOE (subject), all data flowing between the subjects
(information), and the passing of controlled data traffic traversing the TOE in
accelerated form (operations)].
Dependencies: FDP_IFF.1(b) Simple security attributes
FDP_IFF.1(b) Simple security attributes
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FDP_IFF.1.1(b)
The TSF shall enforce the [WAN Optimization SFP] based on the following types
of subject and information security attributes: [
1) Subject attributes:
1. none
2) Information attributes:
1. Source IP address or subnet
2. Destination IP address or subnet
3. Source Port
4. Destination Port
5. Proxy service type
].
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FDP_IFF.1.2(b)
The TSF shall permit an information flow between a controlled subject and
controlled information via a controlled operation if the following rules hold: [All
network traffic traversing the TOE between a local network and a remote network
is allowed to flow in an accelerated form unless:
1. acceleration has been disabled for information with the specified
attribute(s).
If the above-listed condition applies, the information is permitted to flow only in
its original form
].
FDP_IFF.1.3(b)
The TSF shall enforce the [no additional WAN Optimization SFP rules].
FDP_IFF.1.4(b)
The TSF shall explicitly authorise an information flow based on the following
rules: [none].
FDP_IFF.1.5(b)
The TSF shall explicitly deny an information flow based on the following rules:
[none].
Dependencies: FDP_IFC.1(b) Subset information flow control
FMT_MSA.3(c) Static attribute initialisation
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6.2.4 Class FIA: Identification and Authentication
FIA_PCR_EXT.1(a) Password Controlled Role
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FIA_PCR_EXT.1.1(a)
The TSF shall authenticate [an administrator] under the conditions that the
[administrator] has requested the [Privileged administrator] role by [entering the
proper password at the “enable” command prompt in the CLI].
Dependencies: No dependencies
FIA_PCR_EXT.1(b) Password Controlled Role
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FIA_PCR_EXT.1.1(b)
The TSF shall authenticate [a Serial Console user] under the conditions that the
[Serial Console user] has requested the [Setup Console administrator] role by
[selecting the Setup Console in the Serial Console menu].
Dependencies: No dependencies
FIA_AFL.1 Authentication failure handling
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FIA_AFL.1.1
The TSF shall detect when [an administrator-configurable positive integer within
0 (no limit) to 2147483647] unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to
[administrative access authentication attempts using accounts subject to
automatic lockout since the unsuccessful authentication attempt counter for this
account has been reset by a successful authentication, re-enabling the account,
changing the password, or a preset length of time has passed since the last
unsuccessful authentication attempt].
FIA_AFL.1.2
When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been [met,
surpassed], the TSF shall take one of the following actions according to the
configuration:
[
1. Disable the account until it is manually re-enabled.
2. Disable the account for an administrator-configurable interval of time.
].
Dependencies: FIA_UAU.2 Timing of authentication
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FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FIA_UAU.1.1
The TSF shall allow [only the selection of the Setup Console or CLI on the Serial
Console] on behalf of the Serial Console user to be performed before the user is
authenticated.
FIA_UAU.1.2
The TSF shall require each Serial Console user to be successfully authenticated
before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1(b) Timing of identification
FIA_UAU.2 User authentication before any action
Hierarchical to: FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
FIA_UAU.2.1
The TSF shall require each JMC or CLI user to be successfully authenticated
before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
Dependencies: FIA_UID.2 Timing of identification
FIA_UAU.5 Multiple authentication mechanisms
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FIA_UAU.5.1
The TSF shall provide
[
1. Username and password access to the CLI via the serial port or SSH
2. Configured “enable” password for CLI privileged role access
3. Configured “setup” password for Setup Console access
4. Username and password for JMC access
5. RSA public key authentication for SSH access to the CLI
6. For End User authentication, the following authentication modes:
a. Auto
b. Proxy
c. Proxy-IP
d. Origin
e. Origin-IP
f. Origin-cookie
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g. Origin-cookie-redirect
h. Origin-IP-redirect
i. SG2
j. Form-IP
k. Form-cookie
l. Form-cookie-redirect
m. Form-IP-redirect
]
to support user authentication.
FIA_UAU.5.2
The TSF shall authenticate any user’s claimed identity according to the following
rules:
[
1. On the SSH Port,
a. verification of the SSH RSA public key credentials
authenticates the user as an administrator, and
b. if the “enable” command is entered, verification of the
“enable” password authenticates the use of the Privileged
administrator role;
2. On the SSH Port,
a. verification of the configured console username and password
authenticates the user as an administrator, and
b. If the “enable” command is entered, verification of the
“enable” password authenticates the use of the Privileged
administrator role;
3. On the SSH Port,
a. verification of the user‟s id and password against the
Administrative Access SFP authenticates the user as an
administrator, and
b. if the “enable” command is entered, verification of the user‟s
password authenticates the use of the Privileged administrator
role;
4. On the Serial Port, if the user selects the CLI menu item on the Serial
Console,
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a. verification of the configured console username and password
authenticates the user as an administrator, and
b. if the “enable” command is entered, verification of the user‟s
password authenticates the use of the Privileged administrator
role;
5. On the Serial Port, If the user selects the CLI menu item on the Serial
Console,
a. verification of the user‟s id and password against the
Administrative Access SFP authenticates the user as an
administrator, and
b. If the “enable” command is entered, verification of the user‟s
id and password authenticates the use of the Privileged
administrator role;
6. On the Setup Console, verification of the configured “setup”
password authenticates use of the Setup Console administrator role;
7. On the JMC,
a. verification of the configured console username and password,
or
b. verification of Administrative Access SFP policy rules
3) authenticates the user as an administrator or Privileged
administrator;
8. For End User requests, authentication will proceed according to the
configured authentication mode challenge type and credential type,
and the configured Proxy SFP rules.
].
Dependencies: No dependencies
FIA_UAU.6(a) Re-authenticating
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FIA_UAU.6.1(a)
The TSF shall re-authenticate the End User user under the conditions [that (1) the
user‟s controlled protocol traffic matches a Proxy SFP rule that requires
transparent authentication, as defined by FDP_IFF.1.4(a) and (2) the surrogate
credential is expired or invalid].
Dependencies: No dependencies
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FIA_UAU.6(b) Re-authenticating
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FIA_UAU.6.1(b)
The TSF shall re-authenticate an administrator the user under the conditions
[that the administrator has requested the role “Privileged administrator” by
invoking the “enable” command on the CLI].
Dependencies: No dependencies
FIA_UAU.7(a) Protected authentication feedback
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FIA_UAU.7.1(a)
The TSF shall provide only [no visual feedback] to the CLI user while the
authentication is in progress.
Dependencies: FIA_UAU.2 Timing of authentication
FIA_UAU.7(b) Protected authentication feedback
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FIA_UAU.7.1(b)
The TSF shall provide only [obscured visual feedback] to the JMC user while the
authentication is in progress.
Dependencies: FIA_UAU.2 Timing of authentication
FIA_UID.1(a) Timing of identification
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FIA_UID.1.1(a)
The TSF shall allow [only actions that match a Proxy SFP Rule that do not
require authentication] on behalf of the End User user to be performed before the
user is identified.
FIA_UID.1.2(a)
The TSF shall require each End User user to be successfully identified before
allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
Dependencies: No dependencies
FIA_UID.1(b) Timing of identification
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FIA_UID.1.1(b)
The TSF shall allow [only the selection of the Setup Console or CLI on the Serial
Console] on behalf of the Serial Console user to be performed before the user is
identified.
FIA_UID.1.2(b)
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The TSF shall require each Serial Console user to be successfully identified
before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
Dependencies: No dependencies
FIA_UID.2 User identification before any action
Hierarchical to: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FIA_UID.2.1
The TSF shall require each JMC user to be successfully identified before
allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
Dependencies: No dependencies
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6.2.5 Class FMT: Security Management
FMT_MOF.1 Management of security functions behaviour
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_MOF.1.1
The TSF shall restrict the ability to [modify the behaviour of] the functions [Proxy
SFP and Administrative Access SFP] to [Privileged administrators].
Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MSA.1(a) Management of security attributes
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_MSA.1.1(a)
The TSF shall enforce the [Administrative Access SFP] to restrict the ability to
[query] the security attributes [user group membership, user name, time of
day/date, admin.access] to [administrators].
Dependencies: FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MSA.1(b) Management of security attributes
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_MSA.1.1(b)
The TSF shall enforce the [Administrative Access SFP] to restrict the ability to
[modify, delete] the security attributes [user group membership, user password,
user name, time of day/date, admin.access] to [Privileged administrators].
Dependencies: FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_MSA.2.1
The TSF shall ensure that only secure values are accepted for [Username, User
group membership].
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset
information flow control] FMT_MSA.1 Management of
security attributes
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
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FMT_MSA.3(a) Static attribute initialisation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_MSA.3.1(a)
The TSF shall enforce the [Administrative Access SFP] to provide [restrictive]
default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.
FMT_MSA.3.2(a)
The TSF shall allow the [Privileged administrators] to specify alternative initial
values to override the default values when an object or information is created.
Dependencies: FMT_MSA.1(a and b) Management of security attributes
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MSA.3(b) Static attribute initialisation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_MSA.3.1(b)
The TSF shall enforce the [Proxy SFP] to provide [restrictive] default values for
security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.
FMT_MSA.3.2(b)
The TSF shall allow the [Privileged administrators] to specify alternative initial
values to override the default values when an object or information is created.
Dependencies: FMT_MSA.1(a and b) Management of security attributes
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MSA.3(c) Static attribute initialisation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_MSA.3.1(c)
The TSF shall enforce the [WAN Optimization SFP] to provide [restrictive]
default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.
FMT_MSA.3.2(c)
The TSF shall allow the [Privileged administrators] to specify alternative initial
values to override the default values when an object or information is created.
Dependencies: FMT_MSA.1(a and b) Management of security attributes
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MTD.1(a) Management of TSF data
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_MTD.1.1(a)
The TSF shall restrict the ability to [query] the [system configuration,
Administrative Access SFP, and Proxy SFP] to [administrators].
Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
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FMT_MTD.1(b) Management of TSF data
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_MTD.1.1(b)
The TSF shall restrict the ability to [modify] the [system configuration,
Administrative Access SFP, and Proxy SFP] to [Privileged administrators].
Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MTD.2 Management of limits on TSF data
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_MTD.2.1
The TSF shall restrict the specification of the limits for [audit logs] to [Privileged
administrators].
FMT_MTD.2.2
The TSF shall take the following actions, if the TSF data are at, or exceed, the
indicated limits: [overwrite the oldest audit records].
Dependencies: FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF data
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_SMF.1.1
The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions:
[
1. Proxy SFP management
2. Administrative Access SFP management
3. WAN Optimization SFP management
4. local user list management
5. system configuration (including settings for audit records and logs)
].
Dependencies: No Dependencies
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_SMR.1.1
The TSF shall maintain the roles [“administrator,” “Privileged administrator,”
and “Setup Console administrator,” as identified in Table 16].
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Table 16 - Authorised Roles
Role Method of Authentication
Administrator  The user authenticates over the SSH Port using SSH RSA public key
credentials.
 The user authenticates over the SSH Port using the configured console
username and password.
 The user authenticates over the SSH Port and against the Administrative
Access SFP using the user’s username and password.
 The user authenticates to the CLI over the Serial Port using the
configured console credentials.
 The user authenticates to the CLI over the Serial Port and against the
Administrative Access SFP using the user’s username and password.
 The user authenticates to the JMC and against the Administrative Access
SFP using the user’s username and password.
Privileged administrator  The user is an administrator authenticated over the SSH Port using SSH
RSA public key credentials, and then authenticates to the “enable” CLI
command using the configured enable password.
 The user is an administrator authenticated over the SSH Port using the
configured console username and password, and then authenticates to
the “enable” CLI command using the configured enable password.
 The user is an administrator authenticated over the SSH Port using the
user’s username and password against the Administrative Access SFP,
and then authenticates to the “enable” command using the user’s
password.
 The user is an administrator authenticated to the Serial Console using
the configured console username and password, and then authenticates
to the “enable” command using the configured “enable” password.
 The user is an administrator authenticated to the Serial Console using
the user’s username and password against the Administrative Access
SFP, and then authenticates to the “enable” command using the user’s
username and password.
 The user authenticates to the JMC using the configured console
username and password.
 The user authenticates to the JMC using a username and password that
is allowed access to the Privileged administrator role by the
Administrative Access SFP rules.
Setup Console
administrator
 The user is a Serial Console user and authenticates to the Setup Console
using the Setup Console password.
FMT_SMR.1.2
The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FMT_SMR.3 Assuming roles
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_SMR.3.1
The TSF shall require an explicit request to assume the following roles:
[Privileged administrator (via the CLI) and Setup Console administrator].
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Dependencies: FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
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6.2.6 Class FPT: Protection of the TSF
FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FPT_STM.1.1
The TSF shall be able to provide reliable time stamps.
Dependencies: No dependencies
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6.2.7 Class FRU: Resource Utilization
FRU_ARP_EXT.1 Health check alarms
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FRU_ARP_EXT.1.1The TSF shall take [one of the following notification actions:
email, event logging, SNMP42
trap] upon detection of a change in health check
state.
Dependencies: No dependencies
FRU_RSA.1 Maximum quotas
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FRU_RSA.1.1
The TSF shall enforce maximum quotas of the following resources: [number of
connections] that [subjects] can use [over a specified period of time].
Dependencies: No dependencies
FRU_RSA.2 Minimum and maximum quotas
Hierarchical to: FRU_RSA.1 Maximum quotas
FRU_RSA.2.1
The TSF shall enforce maximum quotas of the following resources: [bandwidth]
that [a defined group class of users traffic] can use [simultaneously].
FRU_RSA.2.2
The TSF shall ensure the provision of minimum quantity of each [bandwidth] that
is available for [a defined group class of users traffic] to use [simultaneously].
Dependencies: No dependencies
42
SNMP – Simple Network Management Protocol
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6.2.8 Class FTA: TOE Access
FTA_MCS.2 Per user attribute limitation on multiple concurrent sessions
Hierarchical to: FTA_MCS.1
FTA_MCS.2.1
The TSF shall restrict the maximum number of concurrent sessions that belong to
the same user according to the rules
[If an End User exceeds the number of concurrent logins defined by policy, the
End User will be logged out of one or more of the oldest sessions.].
FTA_MCS.2.2
The TSF shall enforce, by default, a limit of [an administrator-defined number of]
sessions per user.
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FTA_SSL.3 TSF-initiated termination
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FTA_SSL.3.1
The TSF shall terminate an interactive session, except for SSH sessions between
a Blue Coat Director appliance and a subjugated ProxySG, after a an
[administrator-defined time interval of user inactivity].
Dependencies: No dependencies
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6.3 Security Assurance Requirements
This section defines the assurance requirements for the TOE. Assurance requirements
are taken from the CC Part 3 and are EAL4 augmented with ALC_FLR.2. Table 17 -
Assurance Requirements summarizes the requirements.
Table 17 - Assurance Requirements
Assurance Requirements
Class ALC : Life Cycle Support ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance
procedures and automation
ALC_CMS.4 Problem tracking CM43
Coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery Procedures
ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security measures
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools
ALC_FLR.2 Flaw reporting procedures
Class ADV: Development ADV_ARC.1 Security Architecture Description
ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification
ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF
ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design
Class AGD: Guidance documents AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
Class ATE: Tests ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
ATE_DPT.1 Testing: Basic design
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample
Class AVA: Vulnerability assessment AVA_VAN.3 Focused vulnerability analysis
6.4 TOE Security Assurance Measures
EAL4+ was chosen to provide a comprehensive level of independently assured security.
This section of the Security Target maps the assurance requirements of the TOE for a CC
EAL4+ level of assurance to the assurance measures used for the development and
maintenance of the TOE. The following table provides a mapping of the appropriate
documentation to the TOE assurance requirements.
43
CM – Configuration Management
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Table 18 - Assurance Measures Mapping to TOE Security Assurance
Requirements (SARs)
Assurance
Component
Assurance Measure
ALC_CMC.4 Blue Coat ProxySG SG510, SG810, and SG9000 running SGOS v5.5 -
Configuration Management Document
ALC_CMS.4 Blue Coat ProxySG SG510, SG810, and SG9000 running SGOS v5.5 -
Configuration Management Document
ALC_DEL.1 Blue Coat ProxySG SG510, SG810, and SG9000 running SGOS v5.5 - Secure
Delivery Document
ALC_DVS.1 Blue Coat ProxySG SG510, SG810, and SG9000 running SGOS v5.5 - Life Cycle
Document
ALC_LCD.1 Blue Coat ProxySG SG510, SG810, and SG9000 running SGOS v5.5 - Life Cycle
Document
ALC_TAT.1 Blue Coat ProxySG SG510, SG810, and SG9000 running SGOS v5.5 - Life Cycle
Document
ALC_FLR.2 Blue Coat ProxySG SG510, SG810, and SG9000 running SGOS v5.5 - Flaw
Remediation Document
ADV_ARC.1 Blue Coat ProxySG SG510, SG810, and SG9000 running SGOS v5.5 -
Development and Architecture Document
ADV_FSP.4 Blue Coat ProxySG SG510, SG810, and SG9000 running SGOS v5.5 -
Development and Architecture Document
ADV_IMP.1 Blue Coat ProxySG SG510, SG810, and SG9000 running SGOS v5.5 -
Development and Architecture Document
ADV_TDS.3 Blue Coat ProxySG SG510, SG810, and SG9000 running SGOS v5.5 -
Development and Architecture Document
AGD_OPE.1 Blue Coat Systems ProxySG Appliance Configuration and Management Suite
(SGOS44
version 5.5)
Blue Coat SGOS 5.5.x Release Notes, Version: SGOS 5.5.x
Blue Coat ProxySG SG510, SG810, and SG9000 running SGOS v5.5 - Guidance
Document Supplement
AGD_PRE.1 Blue Coat Systems SG510 Series Installation Guide (Version: SGOS 5.5.x)
Blue Coat Systems SG810 Series Installation Guide (Version: SGOS 5.5.x)
Blue Coat Systems SG9000 Series Installation Guide (Version: SGOS 5.5.x)
Blue Coat ProxySG SG510, SG810, and SG9000 running SGOS v5.5 - Guidance
Document Supplement
ATE_COV.2 Blue Coat ProxySG SG510, SG810, and SG9000 running SGOS v5.5 - Tests:
Coverage, Depth
44
SGOS – (Proxy)SG Operating System
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Assurance
Component
Assurance Measure
ATE_DPT.1 Blue Coat ProxySG SG510, SG810, and SG9000 running SGOS v5.5 - Tests:
Coverage, Depth
ATE_FUN.1 Blue Coat ProxySG SG510, SG810, and SG9000 running SGOS v5.5 - Test:
Functional Tests
6.4.1 ALC_CMC.4: Production support, acceptance procedures,
and automation
The Configuration Management document provides a description of the various tools
used to control the configuration items and how they are used internally at Blue Coat.
This document provides a unique referencing scheme for each configuration item. The
documentation further details the TOE configuration items that are controlled by the
configuration management system.
6.4.2 ALC_CMS.4: Problem tracking CM coverage
The Configuration Management document details the TOE configuration items that are
controlled by the configuration management system.
6.4.3 ALC_DEL.1: Delivery Procedures
The Secure Delivery document provides a description of the secure delivery procedures
implemented by Blue Coat to protect against TOE modification during product delivery
to the customer.
6.4.4 ALC_DVS.1: Identification of Security Measures
The Life Cycle Document provides a description of the secure development procedures
implemented by Blue Coat to protect against TOE modification during product
development.
6.4.5 ALC_LCD.1: Developer Defined Life Cycle Model
The Life Cycle Document provides a description of the secure development procedures
implemented by Blue Coat to protect against TOE modification during product
developments.
6.4.6 ALC_FLR.2: Flaw Reporting Procedures
The Flaw Remediation document outlines the steps taken at Blue Coat to capture, track
and remove bugs. The documentation shows that all flaws are recorded and that the
system tracks them to completion.
6.4.7 ALC_TAT.1: Well-Defined Development Tools
The Life Cycle Document outlines tools and techniques used by Blue Coat to generate
the TOE.
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6.4.8 ADV_ARC.1: Security Architecture Description
The Developement and Architecture Document provides a description of the architecture-
oriented features of domain separation, TSF self-protection, and non-bypassability of the
security functionality.
6.4.9 ADV_FSP.4: Complete Functional Specification
The Development and Architecture Document provides a description of the security
functions provided by the TOE and a description of the external interfaces to the TSF.
The Functional Specification covers the purpose, method of use, parameters and
parameter descriptions for each external TSF interface. In addition, the Functional
Specification (FSP) describes the direct error messages that may result from security
enforcing effects. The FSP also provides a mapping from the FSP to the SFRs.
6.4.10 ADV_IMP.1: Implementation Representation of the TSF
The Development and Architecture Document provides the Implementation
Representation, which is a mapping to the source code modules that make up the TOE.
6.4.11 ADV_TDS.3: Basic Modular Design
The Development and Architecture Document provides the Basic Modular Design, which
is a design specification that refines the TSF functional specification into the major
constituent parts (subsystems) and minor constituent parts (modules) of the TSF for a
relatively simple TOE. The basic modular design identifies the basic structure of the
TSF, the major and minor elements, a listing of all interfaces, and a mapping from the
TSF interfaces of the FSP to the lowest level of decomposition available in the TOE
design.
6.4.12 AGD_OPE.1: Operational User Guidance
The Operational User Guidance provides information about the proper usage of the TOE
in its evaluated configuration. This guidance is intended to be used by all types of users:
end-users, persons responsible for maintaining and administering the TOE in a correct
manner for maximum security, and by others (e.g., programmers) using the TOE’s
external interfaces. Operational User Guidance describes the security functionality
provided by the TSF, provides instructions and guidelines (including warnings), helps
users to understand the TSF, and includes the security-critical information, and the
security-critical actions required, for its secure use.
6.4.13 AGD_PRE.1: Preparative Procedures
The Preparative Procedures are used to ensure that the TOE has been received and
installed in a secure manner as intended by the developer. The requirements for
preparation call for a secure transition from the delivered TOE to its initial operational
environment.
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6.4.14 ATE_COV.2: Analysis of Coverage
The Coverage Analysis demonstrates that testing is performed against the functional
specification. The Coverage Analysis demonstrates that all TSFI45
s in the FSP have been
tested.
6.4.15 ATE_DPT.1: Testing: Basic Design
The Depth Analysis demonstrates the level of detail to which the TSF has been tested by
the developer. Testing of the TSF is based upon increasing depth of information derived
from the security architecture description and the architectural design.
6.4.16 ATE_FUN.1: Functional Testing
Test Plans and Test Procedures, which detail the overall efforts of the testing effort and
break down the specific steps taken by a tester, are also provided in order to meet the
assurance requirement Functional Testing.
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TSFI – Target of Evaluation (TOE) Security Functional Interface
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7 TOE Specification
This section presents information to detail how the TOE meets the functional
requirements described in previous sections of this ST.
7.1 TOE Security Functions
Each of the security requirements and the associated descriptions correspond to the
security functions. Hence, each function is described by how it specifically satisfies each
of its related requirements. This serves to both describe the security functions and
rationalize that the security functions satisfy the necessary requirements.
Table 19 - Mapping of TOE Security Functions to Security Functional
Requirements
TOE Security Function SFR ID Description
Administrative Access SFP FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access
control
Cryptographic Support FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1(a) Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1(b) Cryptographic operation
Identification and Authentication FIA_AFL.1 Authentication failure handlings
FIA_PCR_EXT.1(a) Password controlled role
FIA_PCR_EXT.1(b) Password controlled role
FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
FIA_UAU.2 User authentication before any
action
FIA_UAU.5 Multiple authentication mechanism
FIA_UAU.6(a) Re-authenticating
FIA_UAU.6(b) Re-authenticating
FIA_UAU.7(a) Protected authentication feedback
FIA_UAU.7(b) Protected authentication feedback
FIA_UID.1(a) Timing of identification
FIA_UID.1(b) Timing of identification
FIA_UID.2 User identification before any
action
Protection of the TSF FPT_STM.1 Reliable timestamps
Proxy SFP FDP_IFC.1(a) Subset information flow control
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FDP_IFF.1(a) Simple security attributes
Resource utilisation FRU_ARP_EXT.1 Health check alarms
FRU_RSA.1 Maximum quotas
FRU_RSA.2 Minimum and maximum quotas
Security Audit FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
FAU_SAR.1(a) Audit review
FAU_SAR.1(b) Audit review
FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage
FAU_STG.4 Prevention of audit data loss
Security Management FMT_MOF.1 Management of security functions
behaviour
FMT_MSA.1(a) Management of security attributes
FMT_MSA.1(b) Management of security attributes
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
FMT_MSA.3(a) Static attribute initialisation
FMT_MSA.3(b) Static attribute initialisation
FMT_MSA.3(c) Static attribute initialisation
FMT_MTD.1(a) Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1(b) Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.2 Management of limits on TSF data
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management
functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMR.3 Assuming roles
TOE Access FTA_MCS.2 Per user attribute limitation on
multiple concurrent sessions
FTA_SSL.3 TSF-initiated termination
WAN Optimization SFP FDP_IFC.1(b) Subset information flow control
FDP_IFF.1(b) Simple security attributes
7.1.1 Security Audit
The ProxySG Audit function generates audit records for all system events related to
audit, authentication, administration activities, and communication with external IT
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devices46
. These records are stored in the Event Log. These event records contain, at
minimum, the following information:
 Date and time of the event
 Type of event
 Identity of subject
 Outcome of the event
The events stored in the Event Log can be displayed using the administrative interfaces;
this function is restricted to Administrators and Privileged administrators.
All actions related to information flow protection are stored in the Access Log. These
events record the outcome of every application of the Proxy SFP. These event records
include, at minimum, the following information:
 Date and time of the event
 Type of event
 Identity of the subject
 Outcome of the event
 Source IP address
Each controlled protocol can create an Access Log record at the end of each transaction
for that protocol. The ProxySG can create Access Logs in selectable log formats, and
additional log types can be created using custom or W3C Extended Log File Format
(ELFF) strings. The log file formats supported are:
 NCSA Common
 Squid (and Squid-compatible)
 Custom (using selectable strings)
 SmartReporter (using ELFF)
 SurfControl (using ELFF)
 Websense (using ELFF)
Access Logs can be uploaded to another system for later analysis. Configuring the target
systems and decisions regarding when and what to upload are restricted to Privileged
administrators. Additionally, the Event Log and the Access Log are protected against
unauthorised deletion and modification. If the space for logging becomes full, the oldest
stored records (on a per log basis) will be overwritten.
TOE Security Functional Requirements Satisfied: FAU_GEN.1, FAU_SAR.1(a),
FAU_SAR.1(b), FAU_STG.1, FAU_STG.4
7.1.2 Cryptographic Support
The Cryptographic Support function provides encryption and decryption of all data
transmitted between the TOE and the client running the SSH CLI and JMC. This data is
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Use of the “advanced-ruL” command is not logged by the TOE.
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transmitted using the SSH v2 or HTTPS protocols. The TOE username and password,
and the privileged mode passwords, which the administrator defines during initial
configuration, are encrypted prior to storage and display. In addition, TLS may be used
for communication between the TOE and LDAP and IWA authentication servers.
Passwords that the TOE uses to authenticate itself to outside services are encrypted using
3DES on the TOE appliance and using RSA public key encryption for output with the
show config CLI command. These passwords include the access log FTP client
passwords, the archive configuration FTP password, the RADIUS47
primary and alternate
secret, the LDAP search password, and the content filter download passwords.
The TOE uses x.509 v3 certificates in its implementation of Public Key Infrastructure
(PKI). X.509 specifies a standard format for public key certificates, which are used by
the ProxySG in the form of SSL/TLS certificates, Certificate Authority (CA) certificates,
and external certificates. These certificates provide a mechanism by which users and
devices can be authenticated to one another, and public keys are exchanged. The
ProxySG uses PKI to authenticate the identities of OCSs, other ProxySGs, and
administrators; and to exchange public keys used to encrypt data flowing between the
ProxySG and OCSs, other ProxySGs, and between end users wishing to communicate
privately over the organization’s intranet via WAN Optimization or proxied TLS.
Access logs are encrypted using an external certificate. Administrators can digitally sign
access logs to certify that a particular SG appliance wrote and uploaded a specific log file
to the TOE. Each log file has a signature file associated with it that contains the
certificate and the digital signature used for verifying the log file.
A number of cipher suites are included as part of the TOE. Cipher suites specify the
algorithms used to secure an encrypted connection. All cipher suites supported by the
TOE use the RSA key exchange algorithm, which uses the public key encoded in the
server’s certificate to encrypt a piece of secret data for transfer from the client to the
server. This secret is then used at both endpoints to compute encryption keys.
In addition, a default key ring (containing a public/private key pair with a customized key
length and a certificate or certificate signing request) is generated when the TOE boots
from the uninitialized state, and is used for accessing the JMC. The user can choose to
use a different key ring, however. The default key ring can also be used for other
purposes.
For two-way encrypted communication, symmetric keys are generated using an ANSI
X9.31 RNG algorithm. Each endpoint of the communication generates a symmetric
encryption key, encrypts it with the other endpoint’s public key, and then sends it.
The TOE destroys cryptographic keys in accordance with FIPS 140-2 zeroization
requirements.
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Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) enable checking server and client certificates against
lists provided and maintained by CAs that show certificates that are no longer valid. The
administrator can import CRLs from trusted CAs and then use them to determine if the
TOE’s certificates are still valid.
The TOE’s claimed cryptographic support is provided by a FIPS 140-2-valiated
cryptographic module in the TOE. The FIPS 140-2 certification for the TOE has been
issued by the National Institute of Standards and Technology, certificate #XXX.
TOE Security Functional Requirements Satisfied: FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.4,
FCS_COP.1(a), FCS_COP.1(b).
7.1.3 Administrative Access SFP
The ProxySG allows administrators to enforce a very flexible policy using the ProxySG
CPL. Using CPL, an administrator can craft policies controlling administrative access by
users (excluding administrators authenticating with console credentials, which are not
subject to the Administrative Access Control policy). This allows administrative access
to be granted or denied based on the username, the groups to which the user belongs, and
the time of day.
CPL also allows normal or privileged access to be granted or denied based on the same
information. An administrator authenticating with console credentials becomes a
Privileged administrator by executing the “enable” command and successfully
authenticating via its password challenge. A user with administrative access also gains
privileges via the “enable” command; however, the allowed privileges are subject to
policy control. The “enable” command will fail immediately if these administrators are
not allowed access for the condition “admin.access=WRITE”.
TOE Security Functional Requirements Satisfied: FDP_ACC.1, FDP_ACF.1
7.1.4 Proxy SFP
Using CPL, an administrator can craft policies to manage the controlled protocol traffic
exactly according to the deployment site’s security needs. The language is flexible
enough to allow rules based on subject attributes like username and group. The rules
may also use information attributes such as all IP related information, URL, time, date,
source application, MIME type, required bandwidth, content type, parts of the HTTP
request, and any part of the HTTP response. The actions that policies can take are allow,
deny, require an authenticated session, rewrite a portion of the traffic (e.g. URL redirect),
strip active content, prompt a user with a message, and email a warning. In addition,
external controlled protocol traffic is only allowed through the TOE if it is in response to
a previous request forwarded by the ProxySG to the External Network.
TOE Security Functional Requirements Satisfied: FDP_IFC.1(a), FDP_IFF.1(a)
7.1.5 WAN Optimization SFP
The WAN Optimization security function defines how the TOE performs caching and
acceleration techniques such as compression and object caching, byte-caching, and
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compression on data being transmitted to another TOE. The TOE enforces the WAN
Optimization SFP on specified TOE subjects, objects, and operations. The architecture
of the TOE ensures that all operations between the specified objects and subjects are
regulated by the TOE based upon the criteria defined in the WAN Optimization SFP.
The object attributes include source IP address, destination IP address, source port,
destination port, subnet address, and proxy service type. All data traversing a link
between the TOE and another TOE undergoes WAN Optimization, unless this has been
disabled for the specified traffic.
TOE Security Functional Requirements Satisfied: FDP_IFC.1(b), FDP_IFF.1(b)
7.1.6 Identification and Authentication
ProxySG users are identified by their usernames and in the evaluated configuration
authentication is via passwords. Authentication is tied to the session, either the
Administrative session or the End User session.
7.1.6.1 Administrator Authentication
When a terminal is connected to the Serial Console, a menu is offered presenting the
options of the Setup Console (used for installation) and the CLI (used for administration).
In the evaluated configuration, the Setup Console function is never used after the TOE is
operational, and its use is protected from End User access by a “setup” password. Serial
Console users are directed to always choose the CLI.
When a browser connects to the JMC port, the user is directed to enter a username and
password. JMC obscures the password by displaying asterisks instead of the actual
password as it is typed. The JMC GUI48
provides access to the setup functions as well as
the operational administrative functions. All administrators authenticated to the JMC
GUI gain the Privileged administrator role.
There are several authentication mechanisms for administrators. ProxySG makes use of a
Serial Console user (i.e. administrator) account that is set up during installation with a
username and password. Administrators authenticating with these credentials are
administrators, and are exempt from policy control. With the appropriate administrative
policy rules in place, user accounts can also be used for administration by employing a
username and supplying the associated password.
The Privileged administrator role (the only way to make configuration or policy changes)
is also subject to authentication. To assume the Privileged administrator role on the CLI,
an authenticated administrator must execute the “enable” command, which challenges for
a password. Administrators authenticate as Privileged administrators by supplying the
“enable” password that is part of system configuration. Administrators authenticate to
the “enable” command with their associated password from the local user list (access to
the “enable” command by ordinary administrators is controlled by policy). The
Privileged administrator role is assumed by any user logging in to the JMC with the
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administrator username and password, or when the configured policy grants read/write
access. The “enable” command is not required.
7.1.6.2 End User Authentication
End Users establish a session with the ProxySG when the user agent in use establishes a
TCP/IP connection with the ProxySG in preparation for accessing a resource on the
External Network. This session is initially unauthenticated. Requests for resources on
the External Network will be permitted on the unauthenticated connection provided the
request matches a Proxy SFP Rule that allows access without authentication. The first
time a request requiring authentication is made on the connection, the user will be
challenged for credentials. The information displayed to the End User during
authentication depends on the user agent the End User is employing. Once authenticated,
additional requests made using the same session (TCP/IP connection) will be considered
authenticated.
If an End User attempts to authenticate, but an authentication error occurs (such as an
external server failure), the TOE will check the error against an administrator-defined
authentication error list. If the error matches an error on the list, the End User will be
allowed to proceed unauthenticated. Otherwise, the authentication fails. If the End User
is permitted to continue unauthenticated, the End User will have no username, group
information, or surrogate credentials. Policy that uses the user, group, domain, or
attribute conditions does not match.
In the evaluated configuration, the ProxySG supports all available authentication modes:
automatic, proxy, proxy-IP, origin, origin-IP, origin-cookie, origin-cookie-redirect,
origin-IP-redirect, SG2, form-IP, form-cookie, form-cookie-redirect, and form-IP-
redirect. These modes designate what kind of challenge is issued (proxy, origin, or
origin-redirect), and the type of surrogate credentials used, if applicable (IP, cookie, or
connection). SG2 is used to allow any of the other mechanisms to be selected
automatically, based on the request, using the defined rules. This mechanism is named as
such as it was first introduced in SGOS 2.
Proxy-style challenges are sent from proxy servers to clients that are explicitly proxied.
Origin-style challenges are sent from original content servers, or from proxy servers
impersonating an OCS. Form-style challenges are presented to collect the user’s
credentials.
Surrogate credentials can be used to authenticate users in place of standard
username/password credentials. IP surrogate credentials authenticate the user based on
the IP address of the client. These credentials become invalid when an administrator
dissociates an IP address with a particular user. Cookie surrogate credentials use a
cookie constructed by the ProxySG as a surrogate. These credentials expire after an
administrator-configurable lifespan Connection surrogate credentials use the TCP/IP
connection to authenticate the user. These credentials expire when the connection is
closed.
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7.1.6.3 Automatic Account Lockout
In the evaluated configuration, automatic account lockout is enabled for administrative
access. The ProxySG counts the number of authentication failures for a given user
account, and if the number of failed attempts reaches an administrator configurable
positive integer within 0 (no limit) to 2147483647 (with a default of 60), the account will
be disabled. A disabled account cannot be used, even if the correct password is provided.
No information about whether a submitted password is valid is obtained from attempting
to authenticate to a disabled account. The account can be left disabled until manually re-
enabled, or it can be automatically re-enabled after an administrator-configurable preset
time period (with a default of 3600 seconds). The failed authentication counter is reset to
zero when the account is enabled or the password is changed.
TOE Security Functional Requirements Satisfied: FIA_ PCR_EXT.1(a),
FIA_PCR_EXT.1(b), FIA_AFL.1, FIA_UAU.1, FIA_UAU.2, FIA_UAU.5,
FIA_UAU.6(a), FIA_UAU.6(b), FIA_UAU.7(a), FIA_UAU.7(b), FIA_UID.1(a),
FIA_UID.1(b), FIA_UID.2
7.1.7 Security Management
ProxySG security is managed by administrators, who have varying degrees of authority
to review and modify the configuration of the security attributes of TOE. Levels of
administrative authority are based on the credentials used to authenticate and (for
“ordinary” administrators) any associated policies defined in the Administrative Access
SFP (refer to paragraph 7.1.6.1 for details regarding authentication methods for the
various administrators). All administrators are allowed to review such attributes as
credentials, audit settings, network settings, and policies. Privileged administrators can
also modify the TOE configuration and define Administrative Access SFP and the Proxy
SFP rules. CLI users that authenticate using the configured “enable” password at the
“enable” command challenge are granted full read/write privileges, while those
administrators defined by the local user list that are allowed Privileged access are granted
privileges based on policy.
There is also a Setup Console administrator role that, in the evaluated configuration of
the ProxySG, is used only for the initial configuration of the TOE before the TOE is
installed into the target network; once setup is complete, this role (and this function) is no
longer used. The Setup Console administrator role allows for the specification of the IP
address, subnet mask, default gateway, DNS server, console user credentials, and the
Privileged administrator password.
The attributes integral to the Proxy SFP, WAN Optimization SFP, and Administrative
Access SFPs are restrictive by default. After installation and until a policy is loaded, the
ProxySG will not pass any controlled protocol traffic and only an administrator is
configured for use.
TOE Security Functional Requirements Satisfied: FMT_MOF.1, FMT_MSA.1(a),
FMT_MSA.1(b), FMT_MSA.2, FMT_MSA.3(a), FMT_MSA.3(b), FMT_MSA.3(c),
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FMT_MTD.1(a), FMT_MTD.1(b), FMT_MTD.2, FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1,
FMT_SMR.3
7.1.8 Protection of the TSF
The hardware clock, which is set during installation of the appliance, determines the
order of the audit records by the value of the timestamps.
The time can be synchronized to Coordinated Universal Time manually through the
configuration settings. Administrators are assumed to be trusted and competent, and may
change the system time whenever necessary.
TOE Security Functional Requirements Satisfied: FPT_STM.1.
7.1.9 Resource Utilization
The TOE enforces administrator-defined quotas on the number and duration of network
connections and bandwidth utilization. The TSF enforces configured maximum quotas
on the number of connections, number of failed requests, and number of warnings that
defined classes of traffic can use over a specified interval. This enables attack detection
by the TSF, reducing the effects of Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) and port
scanning attacks. The TSF prevents attacks such as these by limiting the number of
simultaneous TCP connections from each client IP address. The TSF will either not
respond to connection attempts from a client at its limit, or it will reset the connection.
The TSF also enforces configured minimum and maximum quotas on bandwidth usage
that defined classes of traffic can use at the same time. All classes are assured of the
receiving at least the minimum quota of bandwidth configured, if the bandwidth is
available. A class can never receive more than the configured maximum quota.
The TOE can also be configured to send alerts to notify the administrator of changes in
the health status of the TOE. The TSF periodically tests the health status of the TOE,
thereby determining its availability to the network. Health checks test for network
connectivity, target responsiveness, and basic functionality of the upstream system or
service. Health checks are run on external resources, such as forwarding hosts, SOCKS
gateways, Dynamic Real-Time Rating (DRTR) services, authentication servers, DNS
servers, and ICAP49
or Websense off-box services. If the health check for an individual
host fails, the TSF can select a healthy host to take over, or report the failure to an
administrator, or both. When notifications are configured, the TSF may send email,
event log notifications, or SNMP traps to the administrator. Notifications can be
configured globally, for all health checks, or explicitly, for specific checks.
TOE Security Functional Requirements Satisfied: FRU_ARP_EXT.1, FRU_RSA.1,
FRU_RSA.2.
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7.1.10 TOE Access
The TOE restricts the number of concurrent sessions that belong to the same End User by
policy. If an End User exceeds the number of concurrent sessions permitted, the TOE
will log the user off one or more sessions, depending on the number permitted.
The TOE will also terminate an End User session after an administrator-defined interval
of inactivity. Each time a login is completed, the inactivity-timeout value is updated. If
the time since the last activity time exceeds the inactivity-timeout value, the End User is
logged out.
TOE Security Functional Requirements Satisfied: FTA_MCS.2, FTA_SSL.3.
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8 Rationale
8.1 Conformance Claims Rationale
This Security Target extends Part 2 and conforms to Part 3 of the Common Criteria
Standard for Information Technology Security Evaluations, version 3.1. The extended
SFRs contained within this ST are FIA_PCR_EXT.1(a), FIA_PCR_EXT.1(b), and
FRU_ARP_EXT.1. These were included to define the security functionality provided by
the use of the “enable” command and the setup password in administrator authentication
on the Serial Console and CLI, and the resource utilization monitoring functionality of
the ProxySG device.
There are no protection profile claims for this Security Target.
8.2 Security Objectives Rationale
This section provides a rationale for the existence of each threat, policy statement, and
assumption that compose the Security Target. Sections 8.2.1, 8.2.2, and 8.2.3
demonstrate the mappings between the threats, polices, and assumptions to the security
objectives is complete. The following discussion provides detailed evidence of coverage
for each threat, policy, and assumption.
8.2.1 Security Objectives Rationale Relating to Threats
Table 20 - Threats: Objectives Mapping
Threats Objectives Rationale
T.EXTERNAL_NETWORK
A user or process on the internal
network may access content on
the External Network that has
been deemed inappropriate or
potentially harmful to the Internal
Network.
O.REMOVE_ACTIVE
The TOE must be able to remove
active content from HTML pages
delivered via a controlled
protocol as defined by the Proxy
SFP.
O.REMOVE_ACTIVE ensures that
active content on HTML pages is
removed prior to being delivered
to the Internal Network, thereby
minimizing the risk of attack to
the Internal Network.
O.SCREEN_TYPE
The TOE must disallow controlled
protocol traffic of given content
types as defined by the Proxy SFP.
O.SCREEN_TYPE ensures that
controlled protocol traffic of the
specified content type(s) is
disallowed, thereby minimizing the
risk of Internal Network users
accessing the External Network
for non-approved activities.
O.SCREEN_URL
The TOE must disallow controlled
protocol traffic for given URLs as
defined by the Proxy SFP.
O.SCREEN_URL ensures that
controlled protocol traffic from
the specified URL(s) is disallowed,
thereby minimizing the risk of
Internal Network users accessing
the External Network for non-
approved activities.
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T.HEALTH
TOE users may perform actions
that compromise the health of the
TOE.
O.ALERT
The TOE must alert the
administrator of changes in TOE
health.
O.ALERT ensures that the TOE
alerts the administrator of
changes in TOE health status,
thereby enabling the administrator
to take action to repair the
condition.
O.QUOTA
The TOE must be able to place
quotas on exhaustible resources.
O.QUOTA ensures that the TOE
is capable of placing administrator-
defined quotas on the network
connection resources, thereby
ensuring that those resources
remain available.
T.MASQUERADE
A user or process may masquerade
as another entity in order to gain
unauthorised access to data or
TOE resources.
O.AUTHENTICATE
The TOE must require the
Administrator to authenticate
before gaining access to the
administrative interfaces of the
TOE, and End Users to
authenticate if their controlled
protocol traffic matches a Proxy
SFP rule which requires
authentication.
O.AUTHENTICATE ensures that
Administrators and End Users
supply login credentials (including
strong passwords) before being
granted access to services or
information, thereby reducing the
risk of access by masquerading.
T.NACCESS
An unauthorised person or
external IT entity may be able to
view or modify data that is
transmitted between the TOE and
a remote authorised external
entity.
O.PROTECT
The TOE must have the capability
to protect management traffic
from unauthorised reading or
modification.
O.PROTECT ensures that the
TOE has the capability to protect
management traffic from
unauthorised access, thereby
ensuring that no unauthorised
person or external entity may
view or modify the data.
O.VALIDATED_CRYPTO
The TOE shall provide
cryptographic functions for its
own use. These functions will be
provided by a FIPS 140-2 validated
cryptographic module.
O.VALIDATED_CRYPTO
ensures that the TOE provides
cryptographic functionality such as
encryption and certificate
authentication, ensuring that data
that is transmitted through the
TOE cannot be accessed.
T.UNAUTHORISED_ACCESS
A user may gain access to security
data on the TOE for which they
are not authorized according to
the TOE security policy through
the improper use of valid
credentials.
O.AUTHENTICATE
The TOE must require the
Administrator to authenticate
before gaining access to the
administrative interfaces of the
TOE, and End Users to
authenticate if their controlled
protocol traffic matches a Proxy
SFP rule which requires
authentication.
O.AUTHENTICATE ensures that
users supply login credentials
(including strong passwords)
before being granted access to any
security-related information,
thereby reducing the risk of
unauthorised access.
O.MANAGE
The TOE must provide secure
management of the system
configuration, the Administrative
Access SFP, the WAN
O.MANAGE provides the
capability for an administrator to
properly configure the
management mechanisms of the
TOE designed to mitigate this
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Optimization SFP, and the Proxy
SFP.
threat.
O.PROTECT
The TOE must have the capability
to protect management traffic
from unauthorised reading or
modification.
O.PROTECT ensures that the
TOE is capable of protecting the
management data transmitted
through the TOE from
unauthorised access, thereby
ensuring that security data that is
transmitted is protected from
unauthorised access.
O.VALIDATED_CRYPTO
The TOE shall provide
cryptographic functions for its
own use. These functions will be
provided by a FIPS 140-2 validated
cryptographic module.
O.VALIDATED_CRYPTO
ensures that data is protected
from unauthorised access, thereby
ensuring that the security data on
the TOE is protected from
unauthorised access.
T.RESOURCE
TOE users or attackers may cause
network connection resources to
become overused and therefore
unavailable.
O.ALERT
The TOE must alert the
administrator of changes in TOE
health.
O.ALERT ensures that the TOE
alerts the administrator of
changes in TOE health status,
thereby ensuring that the network
connection resources do not
become unavailable.
O.QUOTA
The TOE must be able to place
quotas on exhaustible resources.
O.QUOTA ensures that the TOE
is capable of placing administrator-
defined quotas on the network
connection resources, thereby
ensuring that those resources do
not become unavailable.
Every Threat is mapped to one or more Objectives in the table above. This complete
mapping demonstrates that the defined security objectives counter all defined threats.
8.2.2 Security Objectives Rationale Relating to Policies
Table 21 - Policies: Objectives Mapping
Policies Objectives Rationale
P.ACTIVE_CONTENT
The TOE shall provide a means to
remove active content (e.g. Java,
JavaScript, ActiveX) in HTML
pages delivered via controlled
protocols.
O.REMOVE_ACTIVE
The TOE must be able to remove
active content from HTML pages
delivered via a controlled
protocol as defined by the Proxy
SFP.
O.REMOVE_ACTIVE ensures that
active content delivered from the
External Network is removed as
defined by the Proxy’s policies,
minimizing the risk of this type of
exploit
P.ADMIN
Only authorised individuals shall
have the ability to perform
administrative actions on the TOE.
O.AUTHENTICATE
The TOE must require the
Administrator to authenticate
before gaining access to the
administrative interfaces of the
TOE, and End Users to
authenticate if their controlled
O.AUTHENTICATE ensures that
administrators enter credentials
before access to the
administrative interfaces of the
TOE is granted.
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protocol traffic matches a Proxy
SFP rule which requires
authentication.
O.MANAGE
The TOE must provide secure
management of the system
configuration, the Administrative
Access SFP, the WAN
Optimization SFP, and the Proxy
SFP.
O.MANAGE ensures that only
administrators are given
credentials allowing access to the
administrative functions of the
TOE.
P.AUDIT
The TOE shall record events of
security relevance at the “basic
level” of auditing. The TOE shall
record the resulting actions of the
Proxy SFP.
O.AUDIT
The TOE must record events of
security relevance at the “basic
level” of auditing. The TOE must
record the resulting actions of the
Proxy SFP. The TOE must
protect the audit trail, and
provide a mechanism for
administrators or external IT
entities to view the audit trail.
O.AUDIT ensures that events of
the appropriate security relevance
are recorded at the appropriate
level.
O.TIMESTAMP
The TOE must provide a
timestamp for use by the TOE.
O.TIMESTAMP ensures that
timestamps are provided for use
in the audit records.
P.CONTENT_TYPE
End Users shall not access
unauthorised content types via
controlled protocols on the
External Network.
O.SCREEN_TYPE
The TOE must disallow controlled
protocol traffic of given content
types as defined by the Proxy SFP.
O.SCREEN_TYPE ensures that
End Users are prevented from
accessing forbidden content types
via controlled protocols by
disallowing such traffic.
P.FILTERED_URLS
End Users shall not access
unauthorised URLs via controlled
protocols on the External
Network.
O.SCREEN_URL
The TOE must disallow controlled
protocol traffic for given URLs as
defined by the Proxy SFP.
O.SCREEN_URL ensures that End
Users are prevented from
accessing forbidden URLs via
controlled protocols by
disallowing such traffic.
P.MANAGE
The TOE shall provide secure
management of the system
configuration, the Proxy SFP, the
WAN Optimization SFP, and the
Administrative SFP.
O.MANAGE
The TOE must provide secure
management of the system
configuration, the Administrative
Access SFP, the WAN
Optimization SFP, and the Proxy
SFP.
O.MANAGE ensures that the
TOE provides a mechanism by
which it can be securely managed.
P.NON_ANONYMOUS
Access to some resources via
controlled protocols on the
External Network may be
restricted to particular End Users.
O.AUTHENTICATE
The TOE must require the
Administrator to authenticate
before gaining access to the
administrative interfaces of the
TOE, and End Users to
authenticate if their controlled
protocol traffic matches a Proxy
SFP rule which requires
authentication.
O.AUTHENTICATE ensures that
End Users authenticate to the
system before being allowed
access to controlled protocol
traffic (if required by the Proxy
SFP rules).
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P.PASS_TRAFFIC
The TOE shall enforce the WAN
Optimization SFP on traffic passing
between itself and another TOE.
O.PASS_TRAFFIC
The TOE must pass traffic
between itself and another TOE
as defined by the WAN
Optimization SFP.
O.PASS_TRAFFIC ensures that
traffic that passes from the
internal network to the external
network is controlled by the
WAN Optimization SFP.
P.POST_TYPE
End Users shall not post
unauthorised content types to the
External Network using controlled
protocols.
O.SCREEN_TYPE
The TOE must disallow controlled
protocol traffic of given content
types as defined by the Proxy SFP.
O.SCREEN_TYPE ensures that
End Users cannot post
unauthorised content types (as
defined by the Proxy SFP rules) to
the External Network via
controlled protocols.
Every policy is mapped to one or more Objectives in the table above. This complete mapping demonstrates
that the defined security objectives enforce all defined policies.
8.2.3 Security Objectives Rationale Relating to Assumptions
Table 22 - Assumptions: Objectives Mapping
Assumptions Objectives Rationale
A.ENVIRON
The TOE is located in an
environment that provides physical
security, uninterruptible power, air
conditioning, and all other
conditions required for reliable
operation of the hardware.
Physical access to the appliance is
restricted to authorised persons.
NOE.ENVIRON
The physical environment must be
suitable for supporting a
computing device in a secure
setting.
NOE.ENVIRON ensures that the
TOE IT environment is suitable to
ensure the proper, secure, and
on-going functioning of the TOE.
A.INSTALL
The TOE has been installed and
configured according to the
appropriate installation guides.
NOE.ADMIN
The administrator must be non-
malicious and competent, and
must follow all guidance.
NOE.ADMIN reduces the risk of
security vulnerabilities by ensuring
that the administrator responsible
for the ProxySG device installed
and configured the device
according to the documented
guidance.
A.NETWORK
All Proxy SFP-controlled protocol
traffic between the Internal and
External Networks traverses the
ProxySG device; there is no other
connection between the Internal
and External Networks for Proxy
SFP-controlled protocol traffic.
OE.NETWORK
All Proxy-SFP controlled protocol
traffic between the Internal and
External Networks must traverse
the ProxySG device.
OE.NETWORK ensures that the
IT environment is configured such
that no Proxy SFP-controlled
protocol traffic can travel
between the Internal and External
Networks without traversing the
ProxySG device.
A.NO_EVIL_ADMIN
Administrators are non-hostile and
follow all administrator guidance
when using the TOE.
Administration is competent and
on-going.
NOE.ADMIN
The administrator must be non-
malicious and competent, and
must follow all guidance.
NOE.ADMIN ensures that the
administrator is trusted, educated,
competent, and has no malicious
intent, thereby addressing this
assumption.
A.PASSWORD OE.PASSWORD OE.PASSWORD ensures that the
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Passwords for administrative
access to the TOE and for End
User accounts are at least five
characters in length, and are not
dictionary words.
Passwords for the Administrator
and End User accounts and the
“enable” password will be at least
five characters in length and not
be a dictionary word.
passwords selected by users are
of sufficient strength to provide
the desired level of security for
TOE access.
Every assumption is mapped to one or more Objectives in the table above. This complete mapping
demonstrates that the defined security objectives uphold all defined assumptions.
8.3 Rationale for Extended Security Functional
Requirements
A pair of explicitly-stated authentication requirements was created to specifically address
the security functionality provided by the use of the “enable” command and the setup
password in administrator authentication on the Serial Console and CLI. These
requirements have no dependencies since the stated requirements embody all the
necessary security functions. These requirements exhibit functionality that can be easily
documented in the ADV assurance evidence and thus do not require any additional
Assurance Documentation.
FIA_PCR_EXT.1(a) was stated explicitly (rather than use FIA_UAU.6) to specify that
the re-authentication process requires verification against Privileged administrator
credentials that are different than those that were originally entered by the administrator
on the Serial Console. FIA_PCR_EXT.1(b) was stated explicitly (rather than use
FIA_UAU.6) to specify that the re-authentication process requires verification against the
Setup Console administrator password that is different than the password that was
originally entered by the administrator on the Serial Console.
An explicitly-stated resource utilization requirement was created to address the security
functionality provided by the use of notifications in case of a change in status of the
health of the TOE. This requirement has no dependencies since the stated requirement
embodies all the necessary security functions. This requirement exhibits functionality
that can be easily documented in the ADV assurance evidence, and thus does not require
any additional Assurance Documentation.
FRU_ARP_EXT.1 was stated explicitly to specify that notifications will be sent out when
a change of health status occurs. This requirement was modelled after FAU_ARP.1,
which uses the audit records as the source of the analysis. FRU_ARP_EXT.1 uses the
health check status as the source of the analysis.
8.4 Rationale for Extended TOE Security
Assurance Requirements
No extended Security Assurance Requirements are defined for this Security Target.
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8.5 Security Requirements Rationale
The following discussion provides detailed evidence of coverage for each security
objective.
8.5.1 Rationale for Security Functional Requirements of the
TOE Objectives
Table 23 - Objectives: SFRs Mapping
Objective Requirements Addressing the
Objective
Rationale
O.MANAGE
The TOE must provide secure
management of the system
configuration, the Administrative
Access SFP, the WAN
Optimization SFP, and the Proxy
SFP.
FDP_ACC.1
Subset access control
This requirement supports
O.MANAGE by including a policy
language that enables
administrators to construct rules
that control the access of
administrators to the
administrative interfaces of the
TOE. The function then enforces
those rules and takes the action
specified.
FIA_PCR_EXT.1(a)
Password controlled role
This requirement supports O.
MANAGE by requiring a TOE
administrator to enter the proper
password before assuming the
Privileged Administrator role for
accessing administrative functions.
FIA_PCR_EXT.1(b)
Password controlled role
This requirement supports O.
MANAGE by requiring a TOE
administrator user to enter the
“setup” password before assuming
the Setup Console Administrator
role (which allows bypassing the
TSF) for accessing system
configuration functions on the
Serial Console.
FMT_MTD.2
Management of limits on TSF data
This requirement supports
O.MANAGE by permitting
Privileged administrators to
modify the limit on the size of the
audit logs.
FMT_MTD.1(b)
Management of TSF data
This requirement supports
O.MANAGE by permitting only
Privileged administrators to
modify the system configuration,
Administrative Access SFP rules,
WAN Optimization SFP rules, and
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Proxy SFP rules.
FMT_MTD.1(a)
Management of TSF data
This requirement supports
O.MANAGE by permitting all
TOE administrators to view the
system configuration,
Administrative Access SFP rules,
WAN Optimization SFP rules, and
Proxy SFP rules.
FMT_MSA.3(c)
Static attribute initialisation
This requirement supports
O.MANAGE. The WAN
Optimization SFP is restrictive by
default.
FMT_MSA.3(b)
Static attribute initialisation
This requirement supports
O.MANAGE. The Proxy SFP is
restrictive by default.
FMT_MSA.3(a)
Static attribute initialisation
This requirement supports
O.MANAGE. The Administrative
Access SFP is restrictive by
default.
FMT_MSA.2
Secure security attributes
This requirement supports
O.MANAGE by ensuring that only
secure values are accepted for
security attributes.
FMT_MSA.1(b)
Management of security attributes
This requirement supports
O.MANAGE by allowing only
Privileged administrators to
modify and delete the security
attributes user group membership
and user password.
FMT_MSA.1(a)
Management of security attributes
This requirement supports
O.MANAGE by allowing all TOE
administrators to query the
security attribute user group
membership.
FMT_SMR.1
Security roles
This requirement supports
O.MANAGE by supporting three
roles: Administrator, Privileged
Administrator, and Setup Console
Administrator.
FDP_ACF.1
Security attribute based access
control
This requirement supports
O.MANAGE by supporting
several attributes that can be used
in the Administrative Access SFP
to control access to the
administrative interfaces.
FMT_SMR.3
Assuming roles
This requirement supports
O.MANAGE by ensuring that
Serial Console users can assume
the Privileged Administrator and
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Setup Console Administrator
roles on the Serial Console only
by executing the required
command, and providing the
appropriate password.
FMT_MOF.1
Management of security functions
behaviour
This requirement supports O.
MANAGE by specifying which
functions of the TOE can be
managed, and defining who can
manage those functions.
FMT_SMF.1
Specification of management
functions
This requirement supports
O.MANAGE by specifying that the
TOE supports configuration of the
Proxy SFP.
O.ALERT
The TOE must alert the
administrator of changes in TOE
health.
FRU_ARP_EXT.1
Health check alarms
This requirement supports
O.ALERT by ensuring that the
TOE sends notifications by email,
SNMP traps, or event logging
whenever a change in the status of
the health of the TOE occurs.
O.AUDIT
The TOE must record events of
security relevance at the “basic
level” of auditing. The TOE must
record the resulting actions of the
Proxy SFP. The TOE must protect
the audit trail, and provide a
mechanism for administrators or
external IT entities to view the
audit trail.
FAU_GEN.1
Audit data generation
This requirement supports
O.AUDIT by requiring the TOE
to produce audit records for
system security events and for
actions caused by enforcement of
the Proxy SFP.
FAU_SAR.1(b)
Audit review
This requirement supports
O.AUDIT by requiring the TOE
to make the recorded audit
records available for review.
FAU_SAR.1(a)
Audit review
This requirement supports
O.AUDIT by requiring the TOE
to make the recorded audit
records available for review.
FAU_STG.1
Protected audit trail storage
This requirement supports
O.AUDIT by requiring the TOE
to prevent unauthorised deletion
of the audit records.
FAU_STG.4
Prevention of audit data loss
This requirement supports
O.AUDIT by requiring the TOE
to mitigate audit data loss due to
hardware limitations such as disk
full.
O.AUTHENTICATE
The TOE must require the
Administrator to authenticate
before gaining access to the
administrative interfaces of the
TOE, and End Users to
FTA_SSL.3
TSF-initiated termination
This requirement supports O.
AUTHENTICATE by ensuring End
Users are logged off after a period
of inactivity, ensuring that
unauthenticated users do not gain
access to the TOE through an
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authenticate if their controlled
protocol traffic matches a Proxy
SFP rule which requires
authentication.
unattended session.
FIA_PCR_EXT.1(a)
Password controlled role
This requirement supports O.
AUTHENTICATE by requiring a
TOE administrator to enter the
proper password before assuming
the Privileged Administrator role.
FIA_PCR_EXT.1(b)
Password controlled role
This requirement supports O.
AUTHENTICATE by requiring a
Serial Console user to enter the
“setup” password before assuming
the Setup Console Administrator
role (which allows bypassing the
TSF).
FIA_UID.2
User identification before any
action
This requirement supports O.
AUTHENTICATE by ensuring
administrators are identified
before any other TSF-mediated
actions taken on their behalf are
performed.
FIA_UID.1(b)
Timing of identification
This requirement supports O.
AUTHENTICATE by ensuring
that the only action permitted on
behalf of an unidentified Serial
Console user is the selection of
the Setup Console or the CLI on
the Serial Console.
FIA_UID.1(a)
Timing of identification
This requirement supports O.
AUTHENTICATE by ensuring the
End Users are identified before
any other TSF-mediated actions
taken on their behalf are
performed. Only actions that
match Proxy SFP rules not
requiring identification are
allowed before identification is
performed.
FIA_UAU.7(b)
Protected authentication feedback
This requirement supports O.
AUTHENTICATE by requiring
that characters are not echoed
when administrators type their
password on the Management
Console.
FIA_UAU.7(a)
Protected authentication feedback
This requirement supports O.
AUTHENTICATE by requiring
that characters are not echoed
when administrators type their
password on the CLI.
FIA_UAU.6(b)
Re-authenticating
This requirement supports O.
AUTHENTICATE by ensuring
that the only action permitted on
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behalf of an unauthenticated Serial
Console user is the selection of
the Setup Console or the CLI on
the Serial Console.
FIA_UAU.6(a)
Re-authenticating
This requirement supports O.
AUTHENTICATE by ensuring the
End Users are authenticated
before any other TSF-mediated
actions taken on their behalf are
performed. Only actions that
match Proxy SFP rules not
requiring identification are
allowed before authentication is
performed.
FIA_UAU.5
Multiple authentication mechanism
This requirement supports O.
AUTHENTICATE by defining the
authentication mechanisms for
End Users, Management Console
users, CLI userid, Serial Console
users, and Setup Console users.
FIA_UAU.2
User authentication before any
action
This requirement supports O.
AUTHENTICATE by ensuring
that no action is permitted on
behalf of an unauthenticated
Management Console user.
FIA_UAU.1
Timing of authentication
This requirement supports O.
AUTHENTICATE by ensuring
that the only action permitted on
behalf of an unauthenticated Serial
Console user is the selection of
the Setup Console or the CLI on
the Serial Console.
FIA_AFL.1
Authentication failure handlings
This requirement supports O.
AUTHENTICATE by ensuring
that users’ passwords are
protected from brute-force
guessing.
O.PROTECT
The TOE must have the capability
to protect management traffic
from unauthorised reading or
modification.
FCS_CKM.4
Cryptographic key destruction
This requirement supports
O.PROTECT by providing a
method for destroying
cryptographic keys, thereby
ensuring that the keys are not
accessed by an unauthorised
person or IT entity.
FCS_CKM.1
Cryptographic key generation
This requirement supports
O.PROTECT by providing
cryptographic key generation,
which can be used to ensure
cryptographic functionality on the
TOE.
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FTA_SSL.3
TSF-initiated termination
This requirement supports
O.PROTECT by ensuring that
unauthorised users do not gain
access to the TOE through an
unattended session.
FCS_COP.1(b)
Cryptographic operation
This requirement supports
O.PROTECT by providing
algorithms for cryptographic
operation, which can be used to
encrypt and decrypt data passing
between administrators and the
JMC over HTTPS or the CLI over
SSH.
O.PASS_TRAFFIC
The TOE must pass traffic between
itself and another TOE as defined
by the WAN Optimization SFP.
FDP_IFF.1(b)
Simple security attributes
This requirement supports
O.PASS_TRAFFIC by ensuring
that the TOE conforms to the
WAN Optimization SFP when
passing traffic from the internal
network to the external network.
FDP_IFC.1(b)
Subset information flow control
This requirement supports
O.PASS_TRAFFIC by ensuring
that the TOE conforms to the
WAN Optimization SFP when
passing traffic from the internal
network to the external network.
O.QUOTA
The TOE must be able to place
quotas on exhaustible resources.
FRU_RSA.2
Minimum and maximum quotas
This requirement supports
O.QUOTA by ensuring that the
TOE places minimum and
maximum quotas on the
bandwidth available for use by
different types of traffic.
FRU_RSA.1
Maximum quotas
This requirement supports
O.QUOTA by ensuring that the
TOE is capable of placing
maximum quotas on the number
of connections available during a
specified time period.
FTA_MCS.2
Per user attribute limitation on
multiple concurrent sessions
This requirement supports
O.QUOTA by ensuring that TOE
places a maximum quota on the
number of sessions End Users can
establish to the TOE.
O.TIMESTAMP
The TOE must provide a
timestamp for use by the TOE.
FPT_STM.1
Reliable timestamps
This requirement supports
O.TIMESTAMP by ensuring that
the TOE provides a timestamp for
the TOE’s use.
O.VALIDATED_CRYPTO
The TOE shall provide
cryptographic functions for its own
use. These functions will be
FCS_COP.1(b)
Cryptographic operation
This requirement supports
O.VALIDATED_CRYPTO by
providing algorithms for
cryptographic operation, which
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provided by a FIPS 140-2 validated
cryptographic module.
can be used to encrypt and
decrypt data passing between the
TOE and the Serial Console or
remote Management Console.
FCS_COP.1(a)
Cryptographic operation
This requirement supports
O.VALIDATED_CRYPTO by
providing algorithms for
cryptographic operation, which
can be used to encrypt and
decrypt data passing through or
being stored on the TOE.
FCS_CKM.4
Cryptographic key destruction
This requirement supports
O.VALIDATED_CRYPTO by
providing a method for destroying
cryptographic keys, thereby
ensuring that the keys are not
accessed by an unauthorised
person or IT entity.
FCS_CKM.1
Cryptographic key generation
This requirement supports
O.VALIDATED_CRYPTO by
providing cryptographic key
generation, which can be used to
ensure cryptographic functionality
on the TOE.
O.SCREEN_URL
The TOE must disallow controlled
protocol traffic for given URLs as
defined by the Proxy SFP.
FDP_IFF.1(a)
Simple security attributes
This requirement supports
O.SCREEN_URL by supporting a
wide range of attributes that can
be used in the Proxy SFP to
control the flow of information
between the Internal and External
Networks.
FDP_IFC.1(a)
Subset information flow control
This requirement supports
O.SCREEN_URL by providing a
policy language that enables
authorised administrators to
construct rules representing their
site’s information flow policy. The
function then enforces those rules
and takes the action specified.
O.SCREEN_TYPE
The TOE must disallow controlled
protocol traffic of given content
types as defined by the Proxy SFP.
FDP_IFF.1(a)
Simple security attributes
This requirement supports
O.SCREEN_TYPE by supporting a
wide range of attributes that can
be used in the Proxy SFP to
control the flow of information
between the Internal and External
Networks.
FDP_IFC.1(a)
Subset information flow control
This requirement supports
O.SCREEN_TYPE by including a
policy language that enables the
administrator to construct rules
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representing their site’s
information flow policy. The
function then enforces those rules
and takes the action specified.
O.REMOVE_ACTIVE
The TOE must be able to remove
active content from HTML pages
delivered via a controlled protocol
as defined by the Proxy SFP.
FDP_IFF.1(a)
Simple security attributes
This requirement supports
O.REMOVE_ACTIVE by
supporting a wide range of
attributes that can be used in the
Proxy SFP to control which
content the TOE will allow to
flow from the External Networks
to the Internal Network.
FDP_IFC.1(a)
Subset information flow control
This requirement supports
O.REMOVE_ACTIVE by including
a policy language that enables the
administrator to construct rules
which make up the TOE's
information flow policy. The
function then enforces the policy
and takes action such as
restricting access to content
provided by particular sources on
the External Networks, or
removing active content such as
JavaScript from HTML source.
8.5.2 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale
EAL4+ was selected because it is best suited to address the stated security objectives.
EAL4+ challenges vendors to use best (rather than average) commercial practices.
EAL4+ allows the vendor to evaluate their product at a detailed level while benefitting
from the Common Criteria Recognition Agreement. The chosen assurance level is
appropriate for the threats defined in the environment.
The augmentation of ALC_FLR.2 was added to specifically address requirements from
the Army Office of Information Assurance and Compliance.
8.5.3 Dependency Rationale
This ST does satisfy all the requirement dependencies of the Common Criteria. Table 24
lists each requirement to which the TOE claims conformance with a dependency and
indicates whether the dependent requirement was included. As the table indicates, all
dependencies have been met.
Table 24 - Functional Requirements Dependencies
SFR ID Dependencies Dependency Met Rationale
FAU_GEN.1 FPT_STM.1 
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FAU_SAR.1(a) FAU_GEN.1 
FAU_SAR.1(b) FAU_GEN.1 
FAU_STG.1 FAU_GEN.1 
FAU_STG.4 FAU_STG.1 
FCS_CKM.1 FCS_COP.1(a) 
FCS_COP.1(b) 
FCS_CKM.4 
FCS_CKM.4 FCS_CKM.1 
FCS_COP.1(a) FCS_CKM.1 
FCS_CKM.4 
FCS_COP.1(b) FCS_CKM.1 
FCS_CKM.4 
FDP_ACC.1 FDP_ACF.1 
FDP_ACF.1 FDP_ACC.1 
FMT_MSA.3(a) 
FDP_IFC.1(a) FDP_IFF.1(a) 
FDP_IFF.1(a) FDP_IFC.1(a) 
FMT_MSA.3(b) 
FDP_IFC.1(b) FDP_IFF.1(b) 
FDP_IFF.1(b) FDP_IFC.1(b) 
FMT_MSA.3(c) 
FIA_PCR_EXT.1
(a)
No dependencies 
FIA_PCR_EXT.1
(b)
No dependencies 
FIA_AFL.1 FIA_UAU.1 
FIA_UAU.1 FIA_UID.1(b) 
FIA_UAU.2 FIA_UID.2  FIA_UID.2 is hierarchical to
FIA_UID.1. This satisfies this
dependency.
FIA_UAU.5 No dependencies 
FIA_UAU.6(a) No dependencies 
FIA_UAU.6(b) No dependencies 
FIA_UAU.7(a) FIA_UAU.2  FIA_UAU.2 is hierarchical to
FIA_UAU.1. This satisfies this
dependency.
FIA_UAU.7(b) FIA_UAU.2  FIA_UAU.2 is hierarchical to
FIA_UAU.1. This satisfies this
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dependency.
FIA_UID.1(a) No dependencies 
FIA_UID.1(b) No dependencies 
FIA_UID.2 No dependencies 
FMT_MOF.1 FMT_SMF.1 
FMT_SMR.1 
FMT_MSA.1(a) FDP_ACC.1 
FMT_SMF.1 
FMT_SMR.1 
FMT_MSA.1(b) FDP_ACC.1 
FMT_SMF.1 
FMT_SMR.1 
FMT_MSA.2 FDP_ACC.1 or
FDP_IFC.1(a)

FMT_MSA.1 
FMT_SMR.1 
FMT_MSA.3(a) FMT_MSA.1(a) 
FMT_MSA.1(b) 
FMT_SMR.1 
FMT_MSA.3(b) FMT_MSA.1(a) 
FMT_MSA.1(b) 
FMT_SMR.1 
FMT_MSA.3(c) FMT_MSA.1(a) 
FMT_MSA.1(b) 
FMT_SMR.1 
FMT_MTD.1(a) FMT_SMF.1 
FMT_SMR.1 
FMT_MTD.1(b) FMT_SMF.1 
FMT_SMR.1 
FMT_MTD.2 FMT_MTD.1(b) 
FMT_SMR.1 
FMT_SMF.1 No dependencies 
FMT_SMR.1 FIA_UID.1 
FMT_SMR.3 FMT_SMR.1 
FPT_STM.1 No dependencies 
FRU_ARP_EXT. No dependencies 
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1
FRU_RSA.1 No dependencies 
FRU_RSA.2 No dependencies 
FTA_MCS.2 FIA_UID.1(a) 
FTA_SSL.3 No dependencies 
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9 Acronyms
The following table defines the Acronyms used in this document.
Table 25 – Acronyms
Acronym Definition
3DES Triple Data Encryption Standard
ADN Application Delivery Network
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
ANSI American National Standards Institute
AOL America Online
CA Certificate Authority
CBC Cipher Block Chaining
CC Common Criteria
CEM Common Criteria Evaluation Methodology
CFB Cipher Feedback
CIFS Common Internet File System
CLI Command Line Interface
CM Configuration Management
CPL Content Policy Language
CRL Certificate Revocation List
DDoS Distributed Denial of Service (attack)
DNS Domain Name System
DSA Digital Signature Algorithm
DRTR Dynamic Real-Time Rating
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ECB Electronic Codebook
ELFF Extended Log File Format
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard
FSP Functional Specification
FTP File Transfer Protocol
GB Gigabyte
GigE Gigabit Ethernet
GUI Graphical User Interface
HMAC Hash Message Authentication Code
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Acronym Definition
HTML Hypertext Markup Language
HTTP Hypertext Transfer Protocol
HTTPS Secure Hypertext Transfer Protocol
ICAP Internet Content Adaption Protocol
IMAP Internet Message Access Protocol
IP Internet Protocol
IT Information Technology
IWA Integrated Windows Authentication
LAN Local Area Network
LDAP Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
MAC Message Authentication Code
MAPI Messaging Application Programming Interface
MIME Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions
MMS Microsoft Media Streaming
MSN The Microsoft Network
NCSA National Center for Supercomputing Applications
NTP Network Time Protocol
OCS Original Content Server
OFB Output Feedback
OSP Organizational Security Policy
PKCS Public Key Cryptography Standard
PKI Public Key Infrastructure
POP3 Post Office Protocol version 3
PP Protection Profile
RADIUS Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service
RNG Random Number Generator
RSA Rivest, Shamir, and Adelman
RTSP Real-Time Streaming Protocol
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SAS Serial Attached SCSI
SCSI Small Computer System Interface
SFP Security Functional Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SGOS (Proxy)SG Operating System
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Acronym Definition
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SMTP Simple Mail Transfer Protocol
SNMP Simple Network Management Protocol
SSH Secure Shell
SSL Secure Sockets Layer
ST Security Target
TCP Transmission Control Protocol
TLS Transport Layer Security
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Function
TSFI TOE Security Functional Interface
U Unit
URL Uniform Resource Locator
VPM Visual Policy Manager
W3C World Wide Web Consortium
WAN Wide Area Network
Prepared by:
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Phone: +1 (703) 267-6050
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