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© Government of Canada. This document is the property of the Government of Canada. It shall not be altered,
distributed beyond its intended audience, produced, reproduced or published, in whole or in any substantial part
thereof, without the express permission of CSE.
COMMON CRITERIA
CERTIFICATION REPORT
Fortinet FortiGate w/ FortiOS v5.6.7
22 May 2019
383-4-450
V1.0
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FOREWORD
This certification report is an UNCLASSIFIED publication, issued under the authority of the Chief,
Communications Security Establishment (CSE). Suggestions for amendments should be forwarded through
departmental communications security channels to your Client Services Representative at CSE.
The Information Technology (IT) product identified in this certification report, and its associated certificate, has
been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility – established under the Canadian Common Criteria Scheme –
using the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 4, for
conformance to the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 4.
This certification report, and its associated certificate, applies only to the identified version and release of the
product in its evaluated configuration. The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of
the Canadian CC Scheme, and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the evaluation report are consistent
with the evidence adduced. This report, and its associated certificate, are not an endorsement of the IT product
by the Communications Security Establishment, or any other organization that recognizes or gives effect to this
report, and its associated certificate, and no warranty for the IT product by the Communications Security
Establishment, or any other organization that recognizes or gives effect to this report, and its associated
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
If your department has identified a requirement for this certification report based on business needs and would
like more detailed information, please contact:
ITS Client Services
Telephone: (613) 991-7654
E-mail: itsclientservices@cse-cst.gc.ca
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OVERVIEW
The Canadian Common Criteria Scheme provides a third-party evaluation service for determining the
trustworthiness of Information Technology (IT) security products. Evaluations are performed by a commercial
Common Criteria Evaluation Facility (CCEF) under the oversight of the Certification Body, which is managed by
the Communications Security Establishment.
A CCEF is a commercial facility that has been approved by the Certification Body to perform Common Criteria
evaluations; a significant requirement for such approval is accreditation to the requirements of ISO/IEC
17025:2005, the General Requirements for the Competence of Testing and Calibration Laboratories.
By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, the Certification Body asserts that the product complies with the
security requirements specified in the associated security target. A security target is a requirements specification
document that defines the scope of the evaluation activities. The consumer of certified IT products should
review the security target, in addition to this certification report, in order to gain an understanding of any
assumptions made during the evaluation, the IT product's intended environment, the evaluated security
functionality, and the testing and analysis conducted by the CCEF.
The certification report, certificate of product evaluation and security target are posted to the Certified Products
list (CPL) for the Canadian CC Scheme and to the Common Criteria portal (the official website of the
International Common Criteria Project).
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Executive Summary........................................................................................................................................1
1 Identification of Target of Evaluation......................................................................................................2
1.1 Common Criteria Conformance..................................................................................................................2
1.2 TOE Description..........................................................................................................................................2
1.3 TOE Architecture ........................................................................................................................................3
2 Security Policy .......................................................................................................................................4
2.1 Cryptographic Functionality .......................................................................................................................4
3 Assumptions and Clarifications of Scope.................................................................................................5
3.1 Usage and Environmental Assumptions.....................................................................................................5
3.2 Clarification of Scope..................................................................................................................................5
4 Evaluated Configuration.........................................................................................................................6
4.1 Documentation...........................................................................................................................................6
5 Evaluation Analysis Activities .................................................................................................................8
5.1 Development..............................................................................................................................................8
5.2 Guidance Documents .................................................................................................................................8
5.3 Life-cycle Support.......................................................................................................................................8
6 Testing Activities....................................................................................................................................9
6.1 Assessment of Developer Tests..................................................................................................................9
6.2 Conduct of Testing......................................................................................................................................9
6.3 Independent Functional Testing.................................................................................................................9
6.4 Independent Penetration Testing ........................................................................................................... 10
7 Results of the Evaluation......................................................................................................................11
7.1 Recommendations/Comments................................................................................................................ 11
8 Supporting Content..............................................................................................................................12
8.1 List of Abbreviations................................................................................................................................ 12
8.2 References............................................................................................................................................... 13
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LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1 TOE Architecture ....................................................................................................................................3
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1 TOE Identification.......................................................................................................................................2
Table 2 Cryptographic Algorithm(s) ........................................................................................................................4
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Fortinet FortiGate w/ FortiOS v5.6.7 (hereafter referred to as the Target of Evaluation, or TOE), from Fortinet,
Inc., was the subject of this Common Criteria evaluation. A description of the TOE can be found in Section 1.2.
The results of this evaluation demonstrate that TOE meets the requirements of the conformance claim listed in
Table 1 for the evaluated security functionality.
Lightship Security is the CCEF that conducted the evaluation. This evaluation was completed 22 May 2019 and
was carried out in accordance with the rules of the Canadian Common Criteria Scheme.
The scope of the evaluation is defined by the security target, which identifies assumptions made during the
evaluation, the intended environment for TOE, and the security functional/assurance requirements. Consumers
are advised to verify that their operating environment is consistent with that specified in the security target, and
to give due consideration to the comments, observations and recommendations in this certification report.
Communications Security Establishment, as the Certification Body, declares that the TOE evaluation meets all
the conditions of the Arrangement on the Recognition of Common Criteria Certificates and that the product will
be listed on the Canadian Certified Products list (CPL) and the Common Criteria portal (the official website of the
International Common Criteria Project).
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1 IDENTIFICATION OF TARGET OF EVALUATION
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is identified as follows:
Table 1 TOE Identification
TOE Name and Version Fortinet FortiGate w/ FortiOS v5.6.7
Developer Fortinet, Inc.
Conformance Claim collaborative Protection Profile for Stateful Traffic Filter Firewalls,
v2.0e+20180314
1.1 COMMON CRITERIA CONFORMANCE
The evaluation was conducted using the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1 Revision 4, for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1 Revision 4.
1.2 TOE DESCRIPTION
The TOE is a firewall that includes Virtual Private Network (VPN) and Intrusion Prevention System (IPS)
capabilities. The TOE is typically deployed as a gateway between two networks, such as an internal office
network and the internet.
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1.3 TOE ARCHITECTURE
A diagram of the TOE architecture is as follows:
Figure 1 TOE Architecture
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2 SECURITY POLICY
The TOE implements policies pertaining to the following security functional classes:
• Security Audit
• Cryptographic Support
• Residual Data Protection
• Identification and Authentication
• Security Management
• Protection of the TSF
• TOE Access
• Trusted Path/Channels
• Stateful Traffic and Packet Filtering
Complete details of the security functional requirements (SFRs) can be found in the Security Target (ST)
referenced in section 8.2.
2.1 CRYPTOGRAPHIC FUNCTIONALITY
The following Government of Canada approved cryptographic algorithms were evaluated by the CAVP and used
by the TOE:
Table 2 Cryptographic Algorithm(s)
Cryptographic Algorithm Standard Certificate Number
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) FIPS 197 C468, C469, C530, C531, C610
Rivest Shamir Adleman (RSA) FIPS 186-4 C468, C469, C530, C531, C610
Secure Hash Algorithm (SHS) FIPS 180-3 C468, C469, C530, C531, C610
Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC) FIPS 198 C468, C469, C530, C531, C610
Deterministic Random Bit Generation (DRBG) SP 800-90A C529
Key Agreement Scheme SP 800-56A C468, C530, C531
Component Validation List SP 800-56A C468, C530
Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) FIPS 186-4 C468, C530, C531, C610
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3 ASSUMPTIONS AND CLARIFICATIONS OF SCOPE
Consumers of the TOE should consider assumptions about usage and environmental settings as requirements
for the product’s installation and its operating environment. This will ensure the proper and secure operation of
the TOE.
3.1 USAGE AND ENVIRONMENTAL ASSUMPTIONS
The following assumptions are made regarding the use and deployment of the TOE:
• The firewall device is assumed to be physically protected in its operational environment and not subject
to physical attacks that compromise the security and/or interfere with the firewall’s physical
interconnections and correct operation. This protection is assumed to be sufficient to protect the
firewall and the data it contains. As a result, the cPP will not include any requirements on physical
tamper protection or other physical attack mitigations. The cPP will not expect the product to defend
against physical access to the firewall that allows unauthorized entities to extract data, bypass other
controls, or otherwise manipulate the firewall.
• The firewall device is assumed to provide networking and filtering functionality as its core function and
not provide functionality/services that could be deemed as general purpose computing. For example,
the firewall device should not provide computing platform for general purpose applications (unrelated
to networking/filtering functionality).
• The Security Administrator(s) for the firewall device are assumed to be trusted and to act in the best
interest of security for the organization. This includes being appropriately trained, following policy, and
adhering to guidance documentation. Administrators are trusted to ensure passwords/credentials have
sufficient strength and entropy and to lack malicious intent when administering the firewall.
• The firewall device is not expected to be capable of defending against a malicious Administrator that
actively works to bypass or compromise the security of the firewall device.
• The firewall device firmware and software is assumed to be updated by an Administrator on a regular
basis in response to the release of product updates due to known vulnerabilities.
• The Administrator’s credentials (private key) used to access the firewall are protected by the host
platform on which they reside.
• The Administrator must ensure that there is no unauthorized access possible for sensitive residual
information (e.g. cryptographic keys, keying material, PINs, passwords etc.) on firewall equipment when
the equipment is discarded or removed from its operational environment.
3.2 CLARIFICATION OF SCOPE
Due to the limitations of the current CCRA, only the stateful firewall functionality of the TOE was included in this
version of the certification documents.
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4 EVALUATED CONFIGURATION
The evaluated configuration for the TOE comprises:
The TOE firmware (FortiOS 5.6.7 Build 1653) on the any of the following hardware platforms;
FG-30E FWF-60E-DSL FG-201E FG-1200D FG-3810D
FWF-30E FG-61E FG-300D FG-1500D FG-3815D
FG-50E FWF-61E FG-300E FG-2000E FG-3960E
FWF-50E FG-80E FG-301E FG-2500E FG-3980E
FG-51E FG-80E-PoE FG-400D FG-3000D FG-5001D1
FG-5001E
FWF-51E FG-81E FG-500D FG-100E
FG-52E FG-81E-PoE FG-500E FG-100EF
FG-60E FG-101E FG-501E FG-3100D
FG-60E-DSL FG-140E FG-600D FG-3200D
FG-60E-PoE FG-140E-PoE FG-900D FG-3700D
FWF-60E FG-200E FG-1000D FG-3800D
With support from the operating environment for;
• A FortiAnalyzer acting as an Audit Server
• CRL web Server capable of servicing up CRLs over HTTP
4.1 DOCUMENTATION
The following documents are provided to the consumer to assist in the configuration and installation of the TOE:
a. FIPS 140-2 and Common Criteria Compliant Operation for FortiOS 5.6, Doc No. 01-567-535352-
20190122
b. FortiOS Handbook - CLI Reference version 5.6.7, 01-567-498240-20190131
c. FortiOS 5.6.7 Log Reference, Doc No. 01-565-414447-20181127
d. FortiOS Handbook version 5.6.7, Doc No. 01-567-497911-20190219
e. Fortinet IPS Signature Syntax Guide, Doc No. 00-108-229429-20140522
1
Blade mounted in FortiGate 5144C rack mount ATCA chassis.
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f. FG-30E / FWF-30E / FG-50E / FWF-50E / FG-51E / FWF-51E. FortiGate/FortiWiFi 30E/50E/51E
Information, 01-540-269598-20180112
g. FG-52E. FortiGate 52E Information, 01-540-300075-20170907
h. FG-60E / FG-60E-PoE / FWF-60E / FG-61E / FWF-61E. FortiGate 60E/61E Series Information, 01-540-
367071-20180314
i. FG-60E-DSL / FWF-60E-DSL. FortiGate 60E-DSL Information, 01-560-442605-20171026
j. FG-80E / FG-81E. FortiGate 80E/81E Information, 01-543-402959-20180314
k. FG-80E-PoE / FG-81E-PoE. FortiGate 80E/81E-POE Information, 01-542-391830-20180314
l. FG-100E / FG-101E. FortiGate 100E/101E Information, 01-540-366134-20170913
m. FG-100EF. FortiGate 100EF Information, 01-543-403497-20170907
n. FG-140E / FG-140E-PoE. FortiGate 140E Series Information, 01-543-404092-20170905
o. FG-200E / FG-201E. FortiGate 200E/201E Information, 01-542-381079-20170907
p. FG-300D. FortiGate 300D Information, 01-506-238488-20170824
q. FG-400D. FortiGate 400D Information, 01-523-277788-20170824
r. FG-600D. FortiGate 600D Information, 01-523-278008-20170907
s. FG-500E / FG-501E. FortiGate 500E/501E Information, 01-560-440260-20180522
t. FG-300E / FG-301E. FortiGate 300E/301E Information, 01-560-440261-20180522
u. FG-900D. FortiGate 900D Information, 01-523-279315-20171122
v. FG-1000D. FortiGate 1000D Information, 01-503-237227-20170907
w. FG-1200D. FortiGate 1200D Information, 01-540-306494-20170907
x. FG-3000D. FortiGate 3000D Information, 01-522-266144-20170907
y. FG-3100D. FortiGate 3100D Information, 01-5011-275737-20170824
z. FG-3200D. FortiGate 3200D Information, 01-522-256537-20170824
aa. FG-500D. FortiGate 500D Information, 01-523-278008-20170815
bb. FG-1500D. FortiGate 1500D Information, 01-523-211767-20170907
cc. FG-3700D. FortiGate 3700D Information, 01-540-292415-20171013-M
dd. FG-3800D. FortiGate 3800D Information, 01-540-292415-20170901-M
ee. FG-3810D. FortiGate 3810D Information, 01-522-261444-20170901-M
ff. FG-3815D. FortiGate 3815D Information, 01-540-292419-20170901-M
gg. FG-5001D. FortiGate-5001D Security System Guide, 01-560-0242101-20170728
hh. FG-2000E / FG-2500E. FortiGate 2000E/2500E Information, 01-540-306896-20170907
ii. FG-3960E / FG-3980E. FortiGate 3960E/3980E Information, 01-540-376285-20180423
jj. FG-5001E. FortiGate-5001E Security System Guide, 01-560-410512-201700905
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5 EVALUATION ANALYSIS ACTIVITIES
The evaluation analysis activities involved a structured evaluation of the TOE. Documentation and process
dealing with Development, Guidance Documents, and Life-Cycle Support were evaluated.
5.1 DEVELOPMENT
The evaluators analyzed the documentation provided by the vendor; they determined that the design
completely and accurately describes the TOE security functionality (TSF) interfaces and how the TSF implements
the security functional requirements (SFRs). The evaluators determined that the initialization process is secure,
that the security functions are protected against tamper and bypass, and that security domains are maintained.
5.2 GUIDANCE DOCUMENTS
The evaluators examined the TOE preparative user guidance and operational user guidance and determined that
it sufficiently and unambiguously describes how to securely transform the TOE into its evaluated configuration
and how to use and administer the product. The evaluators examined and tested the preparative and
operational guidance, and determined that they are complete and sufficiently detailed to result in a secure
configuration.
Section 4.1 provides details on the guidance documents.
5.3 LIFE-CYCLE SUPPORT
An analysis of the TOE configuration management system and associated documentation was performed. The
evaluators found that the TOE configuration items were clearly marked.
The evaluators examined the delivery documentation and determined that it described all of the procedures
required to maintain the integrity of the TOE during distribution to the consumer.
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6 TESTING ACTIVITIES
Testing consists of the following three steps: assessing developer tests, performing independent functional tests,
and performing penetration tests.
6.1 ASSESSMENT OF DEVELOPER TESTS
The evaluators verified that the developer has met their testing responsibilities by examining their test evidence,
and reviewing their test results, as documented in the ETR. The correspondence between the tests identified in
the developer’s test documentation and the functional specification was complete.
6.2 CONDUCT OF TESTING
The TOE was subjected to a comprehensive suite of formally documented, independent functional and
penetration tests. The detailed testing activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected
results and observed results are documented in a separate Test Results document.
6.3 INDEPENDENT FUNCTIONAL TESTING
During this evaluation, the evaluator developed independent functional tests by examining design and guidance
documentation.
All testing was planned and documented to a sufficient level of detail to allow repeatability of the testing
procedures and results. The following testing activity was performed:
a. PP Assurance Activities: The evaluator performed the assurance activities listed in the claimed PP.
6.3.1 FUNCTIONAL TEST RESULTS
The developer’s tests and the independent functional tests yielded the expected results, providing assurance
that the TOE behaves as specified in its ST and functional specification.
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6.4 INDEPENDENT PENETRATION TESTING
Subsequent to the independent review of public domain vulnerability databases and all evaluation deliverables,
limited independent evaluator penetration testing was conducted. The penetration testing focused on:
a. Use of automated vulnerability scanning tools to discover potential network, platform and application
layer vulnerabilities such as Heartbleed, Shellshock, FREAK, POODLE, and GHOST.
6.4.1 PENETRATION TEST RESULTS
The independent penetration testing did not uncover any exploitable vulnerabilities in the intended operating
environment.
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7 RESULTS OF THE EVALUATION
This evaluation has provided the basis for the conformance claim documented in Table 1. The overall verdict for
this evaluation is PASS. These results are supported by evidence in the ETR.
The IT product identified in this report has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility established under
the Canadian Common Criteria Scheme using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 3.1
Revision 4, for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 4. These
evaluation results apply only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration and
in conjunction with the complete certification report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Canadian Common Criteria Scheme
and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the evaluation report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
This is not an endorsement of the IT product by CSE or by any other organization that recognizes or gives effect
to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by CSE or by any other organization that recognizes or gives
effect to this certificate, is expressed or implied.
7.1 RECOMMENDATIONS/COMMENTS
It is recommended that all guidance outlined in Section 4.1 be followed to configure the TOE in the evaluated
configuration.
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8 SUPPORTING CONTENT
8.1 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
Term Definition
CAVP Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program
CCEF Common Criteria Evaluation Facility
CM Configuration Management
CMVP Cryptographic Module Validation Program
CSE Communications Security Establishment
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
GC Government of Canada
IT Information Technology
ITS Information Technology Security
PP Protection Profile
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Function
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8.2 REFERENCES
Reference
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 4, September 2012.
Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, CEM, Version 3.1 Revision 4,
September 2012.
Security Target for Fortinet FortiGate v5.6.7, v1.3, 17/05/2019
Evaluation Technical Report for Fortinet FortiGate v5.6.7, v1.2, 22/05/2019