Ärendetyp: 6 Diarienummer: 19FMV5994-49:1
Dokument ID 7DFAYPHQVZ4V-
1834444990-2014
Enligt säkerhetsskyddslagen (2018:585)
SEKRETESS
Enligt offentlighets- och
Sekretesslagen (2009:400)
2020-05-25
Försvarets materielverk
Swedish Defence Material Administration
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report - KYOCERA TASKalfa 352ci,
TA Triumph-Adler/UTAX 357ci, with SSD and Data
Security Kit
Issue: 1.0, 2020-maj-25
Authorisation: Ulf Noring, Lead Certifier , CSEC
Ärendetyp: 6 Diarienummer: 19FMV5994-49:1
Dokument ID 7DFAYPHQVZ4V-
1834444990-2014
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report - KYOCERA TASKalfa 352ci, TA Triumph-Adler/UTAX 357ci, with SSD
and Data Security Kit
19FMV5994-49:1 1.0 2020-05-25
7DFAYPHQVZ4V-
1834444990-2014
2 (21)
Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary 3
2 Identification 5
3 Security Policy 6
3.1 User Management 6
3.2 Data Access 6
3.3 FAX Data Flow Control 6
3.4 Solid State Disk Encryption 6
3.5 Security Management 6
3.6 Network Protection 6
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 7
4.1 Usage Assumptions 7
4.2 Clarification of Scope 7
5 Architectural Information 9
5.1 Physical Configuration of the TOE 9
5.2 Logical Configuration of the TOE 10
6 Documentation 11
7 IT Product Testing 12
7.1 Developer Testing 12
7.2 Evaluator Testing 12
7.3 Penetration Testing 13
8 Evaluated Configuration 14
8.1 Dependencies to Other Hardware, Firmware and Software 14
8.2 Excluded from the TOE Evaluated Configuration 14
9 Results of the Evaluation 15
10 Evaluator Comments and Recommendations 16
11 Glossary 17
12 Bibliography 18
12.1 General 18
12.2 Documentation 18
Appendix A Scheme Versions 20
A.1 Scheme/Quality Management System 20
A.2 Scheme Notes 20
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report - KYOCERA TASKalfa 352ci, TA Triumph-Adler/UTAX 357ci, with SSD
and Data Security Kit
19FMV5994-49:1 1.0 2020-05-25
7DFAYPHQVZ4V-
1834444990-2014
3 (21)
1 Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) consists of the hardware and firmware of the follow-
ing multifunction printer (MFP) models with Solid State Disk and Data Security Kit:
KYOCERA:
TASKalfa 352ci
TA Triumph-Adler:
357ci
UTAX:
357ci
The TSF and its execution environment are the same in all the listed models above.
The only difference between them are sales destinations. The following firmware is
used by the system:
System firmware: 2V1_S0IS.C02.011
The above models provide copying, scanning, printing, faxing and box functionality.
The evaluated security features include user management, data access control, fax data
flow control, job authorization, solid state disk encryption, security management, and
network protection (IPSec and TLS).
The following functionality is excluded from the evaluation:
- The maintenance interface
- Network authentication
- The installation of Java applications on the MFP
The TOE is delivered to the customer by a courier trusted by KYOCERA Document
Solutions Inc. The main MFP printer unit is delivered separately from the SSD and
Data Security Kit add-ons. The TOE can be purchased from a KYOCERA Document
Solutions Inc. group corporation directly or from a dealer. A service person from the
organisation that sold the TOE will set it up for the customer.
The evaluation has been performed by Combitech AB in their premises in Sundbyberg
and Bromma, Sweden with testing done in the developer's premises in Osaka, Japan
and was completed on the 20th of April, 2020.
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report - KYOCERA TASKalfa 352ci, TA Triumph-Adler/UTAX 357ci, with SSD
and Data Security Kit
19FMV5994-49:1 1.0 2020-05-25
7DFAYPHQVZ4V-
1834444990-2014
4 (21)
The evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of Common Crite-
ria, version 3.1, revision 5, and the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation,
version 3.1, revision 5. The evaluation conforms to evaluation assurance level EAL 2,
augmented by ALC_FLR.2. The evaluation does not claim conformance to any Pro-
tection Profile.
Combitech AB is a licensed evaluation facility for Common Criteria under the Swe-
dish Common Critera Evaluation and Certification Scheme. Combitech AB is also ac-
credited by the Swedish accreditation body SWEDAC according to ISO/IEC
17025:2018 for Common Criteria evaluation.
The certifier monitored the activities of the evaluator by reviewing all successive ver-
sions of the evaluation reports. The certifier determined that the evaluation results
confirm the security claims in the Security Target [ST] and have been reached in
agreement with the requirements of the Common Criteria and the Common Methodol-
ogy for the evaluation assurance level EAL 2 + ALC_FLR.2.
The technical information in this report is based on the Security Target [ST] and the
Final Evaluation Report [FER] produced by Combitech AB.
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the cer-
tificate, and on the condition that all the stipulations in the Security Target are met.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by CSEC or any other organ-
isation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT
product by CSEC or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate is either expressed or implied.
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report - KYOCERA TASKalfa 352ci, TA Triumph-Adler/UTAX 357ci, with SSD
and Data Security Kit
19FMV5994-49:1 1.0 2020-05-25
7DFAYPHQVZ4V-
1834444990-2014
5 (21)
2 Identification
Certification Identification
Certification ID CSEC2019020
Name and version of the
certified IT product
KYOCERA TASKalfa 352ci
TA Triumph-Adler 357ci
UTAX 357ci
The SSD option HD-7 and the Data Security Kit (E)
option for the above printer models
System Firmware: 2V1_S0IS.C02.011
Security Target Identification TASKalfa 352ci Series with SSD and Data Security
Kit Security Target
EAL EAL 2 + ALC_FLR.2
Sponsor Kyocera Document Solutions Inc.
Developer Kyocera Document Solutions Inc.
ITSEF Combitech AB
Common Criteria version 3.1 revision 5
CEM version 3.1 revision 5
QMS version 1.23.1
Scheme Notes Release 14.0
Recognition Scope CCRA, SOGIS and EA/MLA
Certification date 2020-05-26
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report - KYOCERA TASKalfa 352ci, TA Triumph-Adler/UTAX 357ci, with SSD
and Data Security Kit
19FMV5994-49:1 1.0 2020-05-25
7DFAYPHQVZ4V-
1834444990-2014
6 (21)
3 Security Policy
The TOE consists of six security functions, listed below together with a short descrip-
tion of each function.Summary of the security services the TOE provides.
3.1 User Management
Identifies and authenticates whether persons are authorized users when users intend to
operate the TOE from the operation panel or client PCs. When the TOE is used from
the Operation Panel or a Web browser, the login screen is displayed and a user is re-
quired to enter his or her login user name and login password. When the TOE is ac-
cessed from the printer driver or TWAIN driver, the TOE identifies and authenticates
if the person is authorized by referring to the login user name and login user password
obtained from the job sent by the user. If the logon procedure fails consecutively for a
certain amount of times, the user is locked out of their account for an amount of time
set by the administrator. Users are automatically logged out after a certain period of
inactivity.
3.2 Data Access
Allows authorized users to only access their own image and job data stored in the
TOE using each of the TOE basic function such as copy, scan to send, print, fax and
box function. Users who own boxes can give other users permission to view the con-
tents of a particular box, and also set a password to further protect the box.
3.3 FAX Data Flow Control
Makes sure that data received on the fax line interface is forwarded on to the internal
network that the TOE is connected to.
3.4 Solid State Disk Encryption
A function that encrypts information assets stored in the SSD in order to prevent leak-
age of data stored in the SSD inside the TOE.
3.5 Security Management
The security management function allows only authorized users to edit user infor-
mation, set the TOE security functions, and manage TSF. The Security management
function can be performed from the Operation Panel and Client PCs. A web browser is
used for operation from Client PCs.
3.6 Network Protection
The network protection function verifies the propriety of the destination to connect to
and protects targeted information assets against leaking and altering by applying en-
cryption when using the Scan to Send Function, Print Function, Box Function, the Box
Function from a Client PC (web browser), or the Security Management Function from
a Client PC (web browser). Communication with a computer directly connected with
the MFP is not encrypted.
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report - KYOCERA TASKalfa 352ci, TA Triumph-Adler/UTAX 357ci, with SSD
and Data Security Kit
19FMV5994-49:1 1.0 2020-05-25
7DFAYPHQVZ4V-
1834444990-2014
7 (21)
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
4.1 Usage Assumptions
The Security Target [ST] makes four assumptions on the usage of the TOE.
A.ACCESS
The hardware and software that the TOE is composed of are located in a protected en-
vironment from security invasion such as illegal analysis and alteration.
A.NETWORK
The TOE is connected to the internal network that is protected from illegal access
from the external network.
A.USER_EDUCATION
The TOE users are aware of the security policies and procedures of their organization,
and are educated to follow those policies and procedures.
A.DADMIN_TRUST
The TOE's administrators are competent to manage devices properly as a device ad-
ministrator and have a reliability not to use their privileged access rights for malicious
purposes.
4.2 Clarification of Scope
The Security Target contains three threats which have been considered during the
evaluation.
T.SETTING_DATA
Malicious person may have unauthorized access to, to change, or to leak TOE setting
data via the operation panel or client PCs.
T.IMAGE_DATA
Malicious person may illegally access not authorized box document data via the op-
eration panel or Client PC and leak or alter them.
T.NETWORK
Malicious person may illegally eavesdrop or alter document data or TOE setting data
on the internal network.
The Security Target contains two Organisational Security Policies (OSPs) which have
been considered during the evaluation.
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report - KYOCERA TASKalfa 352ci, TA Triumph-Adler/UTAX 357ci, with SSD
and Data Security Kit
19FMV5994-49:1 1.0 2020-05-25
7DFAYPHQVZ4V-
1834444990-2014
8 (21)
P.SSD_ENCRYPTION
TOE must encrypt document data and TOE setting data stored on SSD.
P.FAX_CONTROL
TOE must control not to forward the data received from a public line to the internal
network that the TOE is connected.
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report - KYOCERA TASKalfa 352ci, TA Triumph-Adler/UTAX 357ci, with SSD
and Data Security Kit
19FMV5994-49:1 1.0 2020-05-25
7DFAYPHQVZ4V-
1834444990-2014
9 (21)
5 Architectural Information
5.1 Physical Configuration of the TOE
The TOE consists of an Operation Panel, a Scanner Unit, a Printer Unit, a Control
Board, a solid state disk (SSD), the system firmware, and the guidance documents.
The different parts (except for the guidance documentation) are depicted in the dia-
gram below.
The Operation Panel is the hardware that displays status and results upon receipt of
input by the TOE user. The Scanner and Printer units are the hardware that input doc-
uments into the TOE and output documents as printed material.
The Control Board is the circuit board that controls the entire TOE. A system firm-
ware is installed on a NAND which is positioned on the Control Board. The Control
Board has a Network Interface (NIC), a Local Interface (USB Port), and a Public Line
for sending and receiving faxes (NCU). There is also an ASIC on the Main Board. The
ASIC includes a Security Chip which implements security arithmetic processing for
the SSD encryption function.
The NAND stores device settings while the Volatile Memory is used as a working ar-
ea. The SSD that stores image data and job data is connected to the Control Board.
Any of the above memory mediums are not removable. Device setting data related to
Box functionality is stored in the SSD.
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report - KYOCERA TASKalfa 352ci, TA Triumph-Adler/UTAX 357ci, with SSD
and Data Security Kit
19FMV5994-49:1 1.0 2020-05-25
7DFAYPHQVZ4V-
1834444990-2014
10 (21)
5.2 Logical Configuration of the TOE
The below diagram illustrates the logical scope of the TOE:
Please see section 1.4.3 in the [ST] for a more detailed description of the functionality
shown in the diagram. There is no interface for any user or administrator to directly in-
teract with the TOE operating system, all interactions must be made via one of the
standard application functions or the hardware interfaces of the TOE.
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report - KYOCERA TASKalfa 352ci, TA Triumph-Adler/UTAX 357ci, with SSD
and Data Security Kit
19FMV5994-49:1 1.0 2020-05-25
7DFAYPHQVZ4V-
1834444990-2014
11 (21)
6 Documentation
The following guidance documents are available:
[NOTICE]
Notice
[QG]
TASKalfa 351ci / TASKalfa 352ci First Steps Quick Guide
[OG]
TASKalfa 351ci / TASKalfa 352ci Operation Guide
[SG]
TASKalfa 351ci / TASKalfa 352ci Safety Guide
[OG-FAX]
TASKalfa 351ci / TASKalfa 352ci FAX Operation Guide
[OG-DSK]
Data Security Kit (E) Operation Guide
[UG-CCRX]
Command Center RX User Guide
[UG-PD]
ECOSYS M6635cidn / ECOSYS M6630cidn / ECOSYS M6235cidn / ECOSYS
M6230cidn / ECOSYS P7240cdn / ECOSYS P6235cdn / ECOSYS P6230cdn /
TASKalfa 351ci / TASKalfa 352ci Printer Driver User Guide
[UG-NDP]
KYOCERA Net Direct Print User Guide
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report - KYOCERA TASKalfa 352ci, TA Triumph-Adler/UTAX 357ci, with SSD
and Data Security Kit
19FMV5994-49:1 1.0 2020-05-25
7DFAYPHQVZ4V-
1834444990-2014
12 (21)
7 IT Product Testing
7.1 Developer Testing
The developer performed extensive manual tests on the following printer models:
TASKalfa 352ci
Since the TSF and its execution environment are the same in the model listed above
and the other TOE models listed in chapter 1, and the only differences between them
are sales destinations, this covers all of the TOE models listed in chapter 1.
The developer testing was done on the following firmware:
2V1_S0IS.C02.011
The developer's testing covers the security functional behaviour of all TSFIs and most
SFRs. Some gaps to the SFRs were identified and covered by evaluator independent
testing. All test results were as expected. The testing was performed on the developer's
premises in Osaka, Japan.
7.2 Evaluator Testing
The evaluator's independent tests were chosen to complement the developer's manual
tests in order to complement the cover of the security functional behaviour of the
SFRs. The evaluator repeated a sample of the developer's test cases and performed in-
dividual and penetration test cases. The tests included:
TOE Installation
Identification and Authentication
Data Access Control
Security Management
Network Protection
7.2.1 Test Environment
The evaluator performed the tests on the developer's premises in Osaka, Japan using
the same test environment as the developer. This was accepted since the only differ-
ence between the different TOE models is the sales destination. The test environment
was set up according to the below diagram:
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report - KYOCERA TASKalfa 352ci, TA Triumph-Adler/UTAX 357ci, with SSD
and Data Security Kit
19FMV5994-49:1 1.0 2020-05-25
7DFAYPHQVZ4V-
1834444990-2014
13 (21)
7.3 Penetration Testing
The evaluators penetration tested the TOE using the same test environment as de-
scribed above in chapter 7.2.1. The following types of penetration tests were per-
formed:
- Port scan
- Vulnerability scan including web application vulnerability scan
- JPG fuzzing
- TLS scanning
Port scans were run after installation and configuration had been done according the
guidance documentation. The purpose was to check that no unexpected ports were
opened unfiltered and no unexpected services available. The Nmap (www.nmap.org)
port scan tool was used. Four different modes were used: TCP Connect, TCP SYN,
UDP, and IP protocol scans. All possible 65535 ports were scanned for TCP/UDP.
Nessus (www.tenable.com) basic network vulnerability scans were run. No high, me-
dium, or low severity issues concerning the evaluated configuration were found.
A JPG picture were fuzzed approximate 110 times using the Peach fuzzing tool.
All penetration testing had negative outcome, i.e. no vulnerabilities were found.
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report - KYOCERA TASKalfa 352ci, TA Triumph-Adler/UTAX 357ci, with SSD
and Data Security Kit
19FMV5994-49:1 1.0 2020-05-25
7DFAYPHQVZ4V-
1834444990-2014
14 (21)
8 Evaluated Configuration
A notice [NOTICE] included with the TOE details verification procedures of the TOE,
explains that use of applications on the TOE is not allowed in the evaluated configura-
tion, and guides users to follow the Data Security Kit (E) Operation Guide [OG-DSK]
to configure the TOE. The Data Security Kit (E) Operation Guide [OG-DSK] de-
scribes how to configure the TOE to reach evaluated configuration in the chapter
named "Installing the Security Kit", in the subchapter "After Installation". The instruc-
tions need to be followed in order to use the evaluated configuration.
8.1 Dependencies to Other Hardware, Firmware and Soft-
ware
The TOE is the hardware and firmware of the various MFP models listed in chapter 1
as well as the guidance needed to configure and operate the TOE.
To be fully operational, any combination of the following items may be connected to
the MFP:
- A LAN for network connectivity.
- A telephone line for fax capability.
- IT systems that submit print jobs to the TOE via the network using standard print
protocols.
- IT systems that send/and or receive faxes via the telephone line
- An SMTP server/FTP server/client PC/other FAX system/USB memory that will re-
ceive any input sent to the MFP if the MFP is configured to send it to them.
- A USB memory that can be used as an input source for print jobs (i.e. print from
USB), or to copy documents to from a box.
8.2 Excluded from the TOE Evaluated Configuration
The following features of the TOE are outside of the evaluated configuration:
- The maintenance interface
- Networked user authentication such as LDAP
Expanding functionality by installing Java applications is not allowed in the TOE
evaluated configuration. The user manual [OG] calls the Java applications "applica-
tions". More information can be found in chapter 5-10, "Application", in [OG].
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report - KYOCERA TASKalfa 352ci, TA Triumph-Adler/UTAX 357ci, with SSD
and Data Security Kit
19FMV5994-49:1 1.0 2020-05-25
7DFAYPHQVZ4V-
1834444990-2014
15 (21)
9 Results of the Evaluation
The evaluators applied each work unit of the Common Methodology [CEM] within
the scope of the evaluation, and concluded that the TOE meets the security objectives
stated in the Security Target [ST] for an attack potential of Basic.
The certifier reviewed the work of the evaluators and determined that the evaluation
was conducted in accordance with the Common Criteria [CC].
The evaluators' overall verdict is PASS.
The verdicts for the assurance classes and components are summarised in the follow-
ing table:
Assurance Class Name / Assurance Family Name Short name (includ-
ing component iden-
tifier for assurance
families)
Verdict
Security Target Evaluation
ST Introduction
Conformance claims
Security Problem Definition
Security objectives
Extended components definition
Derived security requirements
TOE summary specification
ASE
ASE_INT.1
ASE_CCL.1
ASE_SPD.1
ASE_OBJ.2
ASE_ECD.1
ASE_REQ.2
ASE_TSS.1
PASS
PASS
PASS
PASS
PASS
PASS
PASS
PASS
Life-cycle support
Use of a CM system
Parts of the TOE CM Coverage
Delivery procedures
Flaw reporting procedures
ALC
ALC_CMC.2
ALC_CMS.2
ALC_DEL.1
ALC_FLR.2
PASS
PASS
PASS
PASS
PASS
Development
Security architecture description
Security-enforcing functional specification
Basic design
ADV
ADV_ARC.1
ADV_FSP.2
ADV_TDS.1
PASS
PASS
PASS
PASS
Guidance documents
Operational user guidance
Preparative procedures
AGD
AGD_OPE.1
AGD_PRE.1
PASS
PASS
PASS
Tests
Evidence of coverage
Functional testing
Independent testing - sample
ATE
ATE_COV.1
ATE_FUN.1
ATE_IND.2
PASS
PASS
PASS
PASS
Vulnerability Assessment
Vulnerability analysis
AVA
AVA_VAN.2
PASS
PASS
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report - KYOCERA TASKalfa 352ci, TA Triumph-Adler/UTAX 357ci, with SSD
and Data Security Kit
19FMV5994-49:1 1.0 2020-05-25
7DFAYPHQVZ4V-
1834444990-2014
16 (21)
10 Evaluator Comments and Recommendations
None.
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report - KYOCERA TASKalfa 352ci, TA Triumph-Adler/UTAX 357ci, with SSD
and Data Security Kit
19FMV5994-49:1 1.0 2020-05-25
7DFAYPHQVZ4V-
1834444990-2014
17 (21)
11 Glossary
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security, document describing the
methodology used in Common Criteria evaluations
CM Configuration Management
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
HDD Hard Disk Drive
IPSec Internet Protocol Security
ISO International Organization for Standardization
IT Information Technology
ITSEF IT Security Evaluation Facility, test laboratory licensed to operate with-
in an evaluation and certification scheme
LAN Local Area Network
MFP Multi-Function Printer
NCU Network Control Unit
OSP Organizational Security Policy
PP Protection Profile
SMTP Simple Mail Transport Protocol
SSD Solid State Disk
ST Security Target, document containing security requirements and speci-
fications , used as the basis of a TOE evaluation
TLS Transport Layer Security
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
TSFI TSF Interface
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report - KYOCERA TASKalfa 352ci, TA Triumph-Adler/UTAX 357ci, with SSD
and Data Security Kit
19FMV5994-49:1 1.0 2020-05-25
7DFAYPHQVZ4V-
1834444990-2014
18 (21)
12 Bibliography
12.1 General
CCp1 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1,
version 3.1, revision 5, April 2017, CCMB-2017-04-001
CCp2 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2,
version 3.1, revision 5, April 2017, CCMB-2017-04-002
CCp3 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3:,
version 3.1, revision 5, April 2017, CCMB-2017-04-003
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
version 3.1, revision 5, April 2017, CCMB-2017-04-004
ST ECOSYS M3860idnf Series with HDD Security Target, KYOCERA Doc-
ument Solutions Inc., 2019-03-31, document version 1.02
SP-002 SP-002 Evaluation and Certification, CSEC, 2019-09-24, document ver-
sion 31.0
SP-188 SP-188 Scheme Crypto Policy, CSEC, 2019-09-25, document version 9.0
12.2 Documentation
NOTICE Notice, TASKalfa 352ci, 357ci, KYOCERA Document Solutions Inc.,
2020-01, document version 303MS5641001
QG First Steps Quick Guide, TASKalfa 351ci, TASKalfa 352ci, KYOCERA
Document Solutions Inc., 2019-09, document version 3V2VW5601101
OG Operation Guide, TASKalfa 351ci, TASKalfa 352ci, KYOCERA Doc-
ument Solutions Inc., 2019-09, document version 2VWKDEN002
SG TASKalfa 351ci/TASKalfa 352ci Safety Guide, KYOCERA Document
Solutions Inc., 2019-09, document version 3V2VW5621101
OG-FAX FAX Operation Guide, TASKalfa 351ci, TASKalfa 352ci, KYOCERA
Document Solutions Inc., 2019-09, document version 2VWKDEN501
OG-DE Data Security Kit (E), Operation Guide, ECOSYS M6635cidn, ECO-
SYS M6630cidn, ECOSYS M6235cidn, ECOSYS M6230cidn,
TASKalfa 352ci, TASKalfa 351ci, KYOCERA Document Solutions
Inc., 2019-11, document version 3MS2V1KDEN4
UG-CCRX Command Center RX, User Guide, KYOCERA Document Solutions
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report - KYOCERA TASKalfa 352ci, TA Triumph-Adler/UTAX 357ci, with SSD
and Data Security Kit
19FMV5994-49:1 1.0 2020-05-25
7DFAYPHQVZ4V-
1834444990-2014
19 (21)
Inc., 2017-10, document version CCRXKDEN13
UG-PD ECOSYS M6635cidn / ECOSYS M6630cidn / ECOSYS M6235cidn /
ECOSYS M6230cidn / ECOSYS P7240cdn / ECOSYS P6235cdn /
ECOSYS P6230cdn / TASKalfa 351ci / TASKalfa 352ci Printer Driver
User Guide, KYOCERA Document Solutions Inc., 2019-09, document
version 2ZLCLKTEN750
UG-NDP KYOCERA Net Direct Print, User Guide, KYOCERA Document Solu-
tions Inc., 2016-02, document version DirectPrintKDEN1.2016.02
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report - KYOCERA TASKalfa 352ci, TA Triumph-Adler/UTAX 357ci, with SSD
and Data Security Kit
19FMV5994-49:1 1.0 2020-05-25
7DFAYPHQVZ4V-
1834444990-2014
20 (21)
Appendix A Scheme Versions
During the certification the following versions of the Swedish Common Criteria Eval-
uation and Certification scheme have been used.
A.1 Scheme/Quality Management System
Version Introduced Impact of changes
1.23.1 2020-03-06 None
1.23 Application Original version
A.2 Scheme Notes
Scheme
Note
Version Title Applicability
SN-15 3.0 Demonstration of
test coverage
Clarify demonstration of test cover-
age at EAL2: evaluator + developer
tests together provide full coverage
of the TSFI.
SN-18 1.0 Highlighted Re-
quirements on
the Security Tar-
get
Clarifications on the content of the
ST.
SN-22 1.0 Vulnerability
Assessment
Vulnerability assessment needs to be
redone if 30 days or more has passed
between AVA and the final version
of the final evaluation report.