National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
for the
QFX5120-48YM switch on JUNOS 23.4R2
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-VID11650-2026
Dated: April 08, 2026
Version: 1.0
National Institute of Standards and Technology Department of Defense
Information Technology Laboratory ATTN: NIAP, SUITE: 6982
100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6982
®
TM
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Validation Team
Sheldon Durrant
Jenn Dotson
Lisa Mitchell
Jaemond Reyes
Randy Heimann
Lori Sarem
Charles Schmidt
The MITRE Corporation
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
Furukh Siddique
Yogita Kore
Alex Fannin
Acumen Security, LLC
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Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary............................................................................................................... 5
2 Identification.......................................................................................................................... 6
3 Architectural Information .................................................................................................... 8
3.1 TOE Overview ................................................................................................................................................8
3.2 TOE Architecture...........................................................................................................................................8
3.3 TOE Evaluated Platforms..............................................................................................................................9
3.4 Physical Boundaries .......................................................................................................................................9
4 Security Policy...................................................................................................................... 10
4.1 Security Audit ...............................................................................................................................................10
4.2 Cryptographic Support................................................................................................................................10
4.3 Identification and Authentication ...............................................................................................................10
4.4 Security Management ..................................................................................................................................10
4.5 Protection of the TSF ...................................................................................................................................11
4.6 TOE Access ...................................................................................................................................................11
4.7 Trusted Path/Channels ................................................................................................................................11
5 Assumptions, Threats & Clarification of Scope ............................................................... 12
5.1 Assumptions..................................................................................................................................................12
5.2 Clarification of Scope...................................................................................................................................12
6 Documentation..................................................................................................................... 13
7 IT Product Testing............................................................................................................... 14
7.1 Developer Testing .........................................................................................................................................14
7.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing.......................................................................................................14
8 TOE Evaluated Configuration ........................................................................................... 15
8.1 Evaluated Configuration..............................................................................................................................15
8.2 Excluded Functionality ................................................................................................................................15
9 Results of the Evaluation .................................................................................................... 16
9.1 Evaluation of Security Target .....................................................................................................................16
9.2 Evaluation of Development Documentation...............................................................................................16
9.3 Evaluation of Guidance Documents............................................................................................................16
9.4 Evaluation of Life Cycle Support Activities...............................................................................................17
9.5 Evaluation of Test Documentation and the Test Activity .........................................................................17
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity ..............................................................................................................17
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results..................................................................................................................18
10 Validator Comments & Recommendations ...................................................................... 19
11 Annexes................................................................................................................................. 20
12 Security Target .................................................................................................................... 21
13 Glossary................................................................................................................................ 22
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14 Bibliography......................................................................................................................... 23
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1 Executive Summary
This Validation Report (VR) is intended to assist the end user of this product and any security
certification Agent for that end user in determining the suitability of this Information Technology (IT)
product for their environment. End users should review the Security Target (ST), which is where specific
security claims are made, in conjunction with this VR, which describes how those security claims were
tested and evaluated and any restrictions on the evaluated configuration. Prospective users should
carefully read the Assumptions and Clarification of Scope in Section 5 and the Validator Comments in
Section 10, where any restrictions on the evaluated configuration are highlighted.
This report documents the National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP) assessment of the
evaluation of the QFX5120-48YM switch on JUNOS 23.4R2 Series Target of Evaluation (TOE). It
presents the evaluation results, their justifications, and the conformance results. This VR is not an
endorsement of the TOE by any agency of the U.S. Government, and no warranty of the TOE is either
expressed or implied. This VR applies only to the specific version and configuration of the product as
evaluated and documented in the ST.
The evaluation was completed by Acumen Security in April 2026. The information in this report is
largely derived from the Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) and associated test report, all written by
Acumen Security. The evaluation determined that the product is both Common Criteria Part 2 Extended
and Part 3 Conformant and meets the assurance requirements of the PP-Configuration for Network
Devices and MACsec Ethernet Encryption, Version 2.0, 2024-04-25 [CFG_NDcPP-MACsec_V2.0] and
Functional Package for Secure Shell (SSH), Version 1.0, 13 May 2021 [PKG_SSH_V1.0]. The PP-
Configuration includes the following components: collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices,
Version 3.0e, 06 December 2023 (CPP_ND_V3.0E) and PP-Module for MACsec Ethernet Encryption,
Version 1.0, 2023-03-02 (MOD_MACsec_V1.0).
The TOE identified in this VR has been evaluated at a NIAP approved Common Criteria Testing
Laboratory using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev. 5) for
conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev. 5), as interpreted by
the Assurance Activities contained in the Protection Profile (PP). This VR applies only to the specific
version of the TOE as evaluated. The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of
the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme and the conclusions of the testing
laboratory in the ETR are consistent with the evidence provided.
The validation team provided guidance on technical issues and evaluation processes and reviewed the
individual work units documented in the ETR and the Assurance Activities Report (AAR). The validation
team found that the evaluation showed that the product satisfies all of the functional requirements and
assurance requirements stated in the ST. Based on these findings, the validation team concludes that the
testing laboratory's findings are accurate, the conclusions justified, and the conformance results are
correct. The conclusions of the testing laboratory in the ETR are consistent with the evidence produced.
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2 Identification
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product evaluations.
Under this program, security evaluations are conducted by commercial testing laboratories called
Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs). CCTLs evaluate products against PPs containing
Assurance Activities, which are interpretations of Common Evaluation Methodology (CEM) work
units specific to the technology described by the PP.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality and consistency
across evaluations. Developers of IT products desiring a security evaluation contract with a CCTL and
pay a fee for their product's evaluation. Upon successful completion of the evaluation, the product is
added to NIAP's Product Compliant List.
Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:
• The Target of Evaluation (TOE): the fully qualified identifier of the product as evaluated.
• The Security Target (ST), describing the security features, claims, and assurances of the product.
• The conformance result of the evaluation.
• The Protection Profile(s) to which the product is conformant.
• The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation.
Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers
Item Identifier
Evaluation Scheme United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
TOE QFX5120-48YM switch on JUNOS 23.4R2
Protection Profile PP-Configuration for Network Devices and MACsec Ethernet Encryption, Version 2.0,
2024-04-25 [CFG_NDcPP-MACsec_v2.0].
This PP-Configuration includes the following:
• collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 3.0e, 06 December
2023 [CPP_ND_V3.0E]
• PP-Module for MACsec Ethernet Encryption, Version 1.0, 2023-03-02
[MOD_MACsec_V1.0]
Additional Package is claimed as follows:
• Functional Package for Secure Shell (SSH), Version 1.0, May 13,
2021[PKG_SSH_V1.0].
Security Target QFX5120-48YM switch on JUNOS 23.4R2 Security Target, v1.0, March 27, 2026
Evaluation Technical
Report
Evaluation Technical Report for QFX5120-48YM switch on JUNOS 23.4R2, version
0.5, March 27, 2026
CC Version Version 3.1, Revision 5
Conformance Result CC Part 2 Extended and CC Part 3 Conformant
Sponsor HPE Juniper Networking
Developer HPE Juniper Networking
Common Criteria
Testing Lab (CCTL)
Intertek Acumen Security,
2400 Research Blvd
Suite 395
Rockville, MD 20850
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Item Identifier
CCEVS Validators Sheldon Durrant
Jenn Dotson
Lisa Mitchell
Jaemond Reyes
Randy Heimann
Lori Sarem
Charles Schmidt
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3 Architectural Information
Note: The following description is based on the information presented in Section 1 of the ST.
3.1 TOE Overview
The TOE is the Juniper Networks Inc QFX5120-48YM switch on JUNOS 23.4R2 with MACsec and is
comprised of both hardware and software. The following appliance models constitute the variations of the
TOE:
• QFX5120 with Junos OS 23.4R2 software, offering 48 25GbE (SFP28)/10GbE (SFP+)/1GbE
(SFP) ports.
• AES ECB 128bit & 256bit Encryption/Decryption Engine (BCM82391)
The TOE is a secure network device that protects itself largely by offering only a minimal logical
interface to the network and attached nodes. It includes the Junos OS firmware, JUNOS OS 23.4R2,
which is a special purpose OS offering no general-purpose computing capabilities. Junos OS implements
both management and control functions as well as all IP routing.
The appliance’s primary function is to support the definition and enforcement of information flow
policies among network nodes. Each information flow from one network node to other passes through an
instance of the TOE. Information flow is controlled based on network node addresses and protocol. The
TOE also ensures that security-relevant activity is audited and implements the necessary tools to manage
all security functions.
The TOE implements MACsec between adjacent devices. All traffic communicated between the devices
including frames for LLDP (Link Layer Discovery Protocol), DHCP (Dynamic Host Configuration
Protocol), ARP (Address Resolution Protocol), STP (Spanning Tree Protocol), Ethernet Control frames,
etc. (the exceptions to this protection are Destination MAC and Source MAC addresses in MACsec and
MKA frames).
3.2 TOE Architecture
The TOE implements a variety of high-speed interfaces (only Ethernet is in the scope of the evaluation)
for enterprise branch, campus, and data center networks. The appliance is physically self-contained,
housing the firmware and hardware necessary to perform all routing functions. The architecture
components of the TOE are:
• Switch fabric – the switch fabric boards/modules provide a highly scalable, non-blocking,
centralized switch fabric matrix through which all network data passes.
• Routing Engine (Control Board) – the Routing Engine (RE) runs the Junos firmware and
implements Layer 3 routing services and Layer 2 switching services. The RE also implements the
management functions for configuration and operation of the TOE and controls the flow of
information through the TOE, including support for appliance interface control and control plane
functions such as chassis component, system management and user access to the appliance.
• Layer 2 switching services, Layer 3 switching/routing services and network management for all
operations necessary for the configuration and operation of the TOE and controls the flow of
information through the TOE.
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• Packet Forwarding Engine (PFE) – The PFE implements all operations necessary for transit
packet forwarding. The PFE implements an extensive set of Layer 2 and Layer 3 services that can
be deployed in any combination of L2- L3 applications.
• Power – The TOE includes non-PoE ports. Power supply bays allow flexibility for provisioning
and redundancy. The power supplies connect to the midplane, which distributes the different
output voltages produced by the power supplies to the appliance components, depending on their
voltage requirements.
The appliance supports numerous routing and switching standards for flexibility and scalability. Juniper’s
Virtual Chassis technology allows multiple interconnected switches to operate as a single, logical unit,
enabling users to manage all platforms as one virtual device. The functions of the appliances can all be
managed through the Junos firmware, either from a connected terminal console or via a network
connection. Network management is secured using the SSH protocol. All management, whether from a
user connecting to a terminal or from the network, requires successful authentication. In the evaluated
deployment the TOE is managed and configured via Command Line Interface, either via a directly
connected console or over the network secured using the SSH protocol.
3.3 TOE Evaluated Platforms
Detail regarding the evaluated configuration and any excluded functionality is provided in
Section 8.
3.4 Physical Boundaries
The following figure provides a visual depiction of an example TOE deployment, including physical
boundaries and other components in the operational environment.
Figure 1 Representative TOE Deployment
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4 Security Policy
The TOE provides the security functions required by the CFG_NDcPP-MACsec_v2.0 and
PKG_SSH_V1.0.
4.1 Security Audit
The TOE generates audit events for all start-up and shutdown functions as well as all auditable events
specified in Error! Reference source not found.. Auditable events are stored in the syslog files on the
appliance and can be sent to an external log server (via Netconf over SSH). Auditable events include
start-up and shutdown of the audit functions, authentication events, and all SFR-specific events required
by the applicable Protection Profiles. Audit records include the date and time, event category, event type,
username, and the outcome of the event (success or failure). Local syslog storage limits are configurable
and are monitored. If the storage limit is reached the oldest logs will be overwritten.
4.2 Cryptographic Support
The TOE implements an SSH server to support protected communications for administrators to establish
secure sessions and to connect to external syslog servers. The TOE requires that applications exchanging
information with it are successfully authenticated prior to any exchange (i.e. applications connecting over
SSH). Communication over point-to-point links between Juniper appliances can be secured using
MACsec. The TOE includes cryptographic modules that implement the underlying cryptographic
services, including key management and protection of stored keys, algorithms, random bit generation and
crypto administration. The cryptographic modules provide confidentiality and integrity services for
authentication and for protecting communications with connecting applications. Details on cryptographic
implementations by the TOE are documented in the ST.
4.3 Identification and Authentication
The TOE supports Role Based Access Control. All users must be authenticated to the TOE prior to being
granted access to any management actions. The TOE supports password-based authentication and public
key based authentication. Based on the assigned role, a user is granted a set of privileges to access the
system. Administrative users must provide unique identification and authentication data before any
administrative access to the system is granted. Authentication data entered and stored on the TOE is
protected.
4.4 Security Management
The TOE provides a Security Administrator role that is responsible for
• configuration and maintenance of cryptographic elements related to the establishment of secure
connections to and from the evaluated product;
• regular review of all audit data;
• initiation of trusted update function;
• administration of MACsec functionality;
• all administrative tasks (e.g., creating the security policy).
The devices are managed through a Command Line Interface (CLI). The CLI is accessible through local
(serial) console connection or remote administrative (SSH) session.
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4.5 Protection of the TSF
The TOE protects all passwords, pre-shared keys, symmetric keys and private keys from unauthorized
disclosure. Passwords are stored using sha256 or sha512. The TOE executes self-tests during initial start-
up to ensure correct operation and enforcement of its security functions. An administrator can install
software updates to the TOE. The TOE internally maintains the date and time.
4.6 TOE Access
The TOE displays a customizable banner before any administrative session can be established with it. The
TOE will terminate local or remote interactive sessions after a specified period of session inactivity
configured by an administrator. An administrator can terminate their own interactive local or remote
sessions.
4.7 Trusted Path/Channels
The TOE supports SSH for secure communications with authorized IT entities such as syslog servers. The
TOE supports SSHv2 (remote CLI) for secure remote administration. The TOE also supports MACsec for
securing data at Layer 2 between TOE and MACsec supporting peer device.
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5 Assumptions & Clarification of Scope
5.1 Assumptions
The Security Problem Definition, including the assumptions, may be found in the following documents:
• collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 3.0e, 6 December 2023
(NDcPP30E)
• PP-Module for MACsec Ethernet Encryption, Version 1.0, 02 March 2023
(MOD_MACsec_V1.0)
• Functional Package for Secure Shell (SSH), Version 1.0, 13 May 2021 (PKG_SSH_V1.0)
That information has not been reproduced here. The NDcPP30E/ MOD_MACsec_V1.0/ PKG_SSH_V1.0
should be consulted if there is interest in that material.
5.2 Clarification of Scope
The scope of this evaluation was limited to the functionality and assurances covered in the NDcPP30E/
MOD_MACsec_V1.0/ PKG_SSH_V1.0 as described for this TOE in the Security Target. Other
functionality included in the product was not assessed as part of this evaluation. All other functionality
provided by the devices needs to be assessed separately, and no further conclusions can be drawn about
their effectiveness.
All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that need
clarifying. This text covers some of the more important limitations and clarifications of this evaluation.
Note that:
• This evaluation only shows that the evaluated configuration meets the security claims made, with
a certain level of assurance. The level of assurance for this evaluation is defined within the
NDcPP30E/ MOD_MACsec_V1.0/ PKG_SSH_V1.0.
• Apart from the Admin Guide, additional customer documentation for the specific TOE models
was not included in the scope of the evaluation and should not be relied upon when configuring
or operating the device in the evaluated configuration.
• Consistent with the expectations of the PP, this evaluation did not specifically search for, nor
seriously attempt to counter, vulnerabilities that were not “obvious” or vulnerabilities to
objectives not claimed in the ST. The CEM defines an “obvious” vulnerability as one that is
easily exploited with a minimum of understanding of the TOE, technical sophistication and
resources.
• The evaluation of security functionality of the product was limited to the functionality specified
in the claimed PPs. Any additional security related functional capabilities included in the product
were not covered by this evaluation.
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6 Documentation
The following documents were provided by the vendor with the TOE for evaluation:
• QFX5120-48YM switch on JUNOS 23.4R2 Security Target, v1.0, March 27, 2026
• Common Criteria Evaluated Configuration Guide for QFX5120-48YM Device, 2026-03-27
To use the product in the evaluated configuration, the product must be configured as specified in the
Guidance Documentation listed above. Consumers are encouraged to download the configuration
guide from the NIAP website to ensure the device is configured as evaluated.
Any additional customer documentation provided with the product, or that is available online, was not
included in the scope of the evaluation and, therefore, should not be relied upon when configuring or
operating the device as evaluated.
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7 IT Product Testing
This section describes the testing efforts of the developer and the evaluation team. It is derived from
information contained in the following proprietary document:
• Evaluation Technical Report for QFX5120-48YM switch on JUNOS 23.4R2, version 0.5, March
27, 2026
The AAR provides an overview of testing and the prescribed assurance activities.
7.1 Developer Testing
No evidence of developer testing is required in the Assurance Activities for this product.
7.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing
The evaluation team verified the product according to the vendor-provided guidance documentation and
ran the tests specified in the NDcPP30E/ MOD_MACsec_V1.0/ PKG_SSH_V1.0. The Independent
Testing activity is documented in the AAR, which is publicly available, and is not duplicated here.
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8 TOE Evaluated Configuration
8.1 Evaluated Configuration
The evaluated configuration consists of the QFX5120-48YM switch with the JUNOS 23.4R2 operating
system and the AES ECB 128bit & 256bit Encryption/Decryption Engine.
8.2 Excluded Functionality
The following product functionality is not included in the CC evaluation:
• Telnet
• FTP
• SNMP
• HTTPS and SSL, including management via J-Web, JUNOScript and JUNOScope
• NTP
• CLI account with super-user privileges, and
• Linux root account(s)
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9 Results of the Evaluation
The results of the assurance requirements are generally described in this section and are presented in
detail in the proprietary documents: the Detailed Test Report (DTR) and the ETR. The reader of this
document can assume that all activities and work units received a passing verdict.
A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to the
corresponding evaluator action elements. The evaluation was conducted based upon CC version 3.1 Rev.
5 and CEM version 3.1 Rev. 5. The evaluation determined the QFX5120-48YM switch on JUNOS
23.4R2 to be Part 2 extended, and meets the SARs contained in the PP. Additionally, the evaluator
performed the Assurance Activities specified in the claimed PP.
9.1 Evaluation of Security Target
The evaluation team applied each ASE CEM work unit. The ST evaluation ensured the ST contains a
description of the environment in terms of policies and assumptions, a statement of security requirements
claimed to be met by the NDcPP30E/ MOD_MACsec_V1.0/ PKG_SSH_V1.0 that are consistent with the
Common Criteria, and product security function descriptions that support the requirements. Additionally,
the evaluator performed an assessment of the Assurance Activities specified in NDcPP30E/
MOD_MACsec_V1.0/ PKG_SSH_V1.0.
The validation team reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in
accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team
was justified.
9.2 Evaluation of Development Documentation
The evaluation team applied each ADV CEM work unit. The evaluation team assessed the design
documentation and found it adequate to aid in understanding how the TSF provides the security
functions. The design documentation consists of a functional specification contained in the ST's TOE
Summary Specification. Additionally, the evaluator performed the Assurance Activities specified in
NDcPP30E/ MOD_MACsec_V1.0/ PKG_SSH_V1.0 related to the examination of the information
contained in the TOE Summary Specification.
The validation team reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in
accordance with the Assurance Activities, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team was
justified.
9.3 Evaluation of Guidance Documents
The evaluation team applied each AGD CEM work unit. The evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the
user guidance in describing how to use the operational TOE. Additionally, the evaluation team ensured
the adequacy of the administrator guidance in describing how to securely administer the TOE. The guides
were assessed during the design and testing phases of the evaluation to ensure they were complete.
Additionally, the evaluator performed the Assurance Activities specified in NDcPP30E/
MOD_MACsec_V1.0/ PKG_SSH_V1.0 related to the examination of the information contained in the
operational guidance documents.
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The validation team reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in
accordance with the Assurance Activities, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team was
justified.
9.4 Evaluation of Life Cycle Support Activities
The evaluation team applied each ALC CEM work unit. The evaluation team found that the TOE was
identified.
The validation team reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in
accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team
was justified.
9.5 Evaluation of Test Documentation and the Test Activity
The evaluation team applied each ATE CEM work unit. The evaluation team ran the set of tests specified
by the Assurance Activities in NDcPP30E/ MOD_MACsec_V1.0/ PKG_SSH_V1.0 and recorded the
results in a Test Report, summarized in the ETR and AAR.
The validation team reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence was
provided by the evaluation team to show that the evaluation activities addressed the test activities in
NDcPP30E/ MOD_MACsec_V1.0/ PKG_SSH_V1.0, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation
team was justified.
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity
The evaluation team applied each AVA CEM work unit. The evaluation team performed a public search
for vulnerabilities, performed vulnerability testing and did not discover any issues with the TOE.
The evaluation team performed a public search against the following sources to ensure there are no
publicly known and exploitable vulnerabilities in the TOE:
• National Vulnerability Database (https://web.nvd.nist.gov/vuln/search),
• Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog
https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog),
• CVE Database (https://www.cve.org/),
• Security Advisories (https://kb.juniper.net)
The initial vulnerability searches were performed in March 2025, January 2026, February 2026. A final
search was carried out on March 27th, 2026, to ensure no additional vulnerabilities were found. No open
vulnerabilities applicable to the TOE were identified. The search was conducted with the following
terms:
• JunOS 23.4R2 (cpe:2.3:o:juniper:junos:23.4:r2:*:*:*:*:*:*)
• Juniper QFX5120 (cpe:2.3:h:juniper:qfx5120:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*)
• Openssl 1.1.1zb
• Openssh 9.7p1 (cpe:2.3:a:openbsd:openssh:9.7:p1:*:*:*:*:*:*)
• Intel Xeon D-1627
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• Junos libMD
• Broadcom BCM82391
The validation team reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation addressed the
vulnerability analysis Assurance Activities in NDcPP30E/ MOD_MACsec_V1.0/ PKG_SSH_V1.0, and
that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team was justified.
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results
The evaluation team's assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims in the ST are
met. Additionally, the evaluation team's test activities also demonstrated the accuracy of the claims in the
ST. The validation team's assessment of the evidence provided by the evaluation team is that it
demonstrates that the evaluation team performed the Assurance Activities in NDcPP30E/
MOD_MACsec_V1.0/ PKG_SSH_V1.0, and correctly verified that the product meets the claims in the
ST.
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10 Validator Comments & Recommendations
The validation team notes that the evaluated configuration is dependent upon the TOE being configured
per the evaluated configuration instructions in the Common Criteria Evaluated Configuration Guide for
QFX5120-48YM Device, Release 23.4R2, March 27, 2026. As stated in the Clarification of Scope, the
evaluated functionality is scoped exclusively to the security functional requirements specified in the ST,
and the only evaluated functionality was that which was described by the SFRs claimed in the ST. All
other functionality provided by the TOE needs to be assessed separately and no further conclusions can be
drawn about its effectiveness.
Consumers employing the TOE must follow the configuration instructions provided in the Configuration
Guidance documentation listed in Section 6 to ensure the evaluated configuration is established and
maintained. It is important to note the excluded functionality listed in Section 8.2 and follow the
configuration instructions to ensure that this functionality is disabled.
Evaluation activities are strictly bound by the assurance activities described NDcPP30E/
MOD_MACsec_V1.0/ PKG_SSH_V1.0 and accompanying Supporting Documents. Consumers and
integrators of this TOE are advised to understand the inherent limitations of these activities and take
additional measures as needed to ensure proper TOE behavior when integrated into an operational
environment.
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11 Annexes
Not applicable.
21
12 Security Target
The ST for this product’s evaluation is the QFX5120-48YM switch on JUNOS 23.4R2 Security Target,
v1.0, March 27, 2026.
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13 Glossary
The following definitions are used throughout this document:
• Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL). An IT security evaluation facility accredited
by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and approved by the
CCEVS Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based evaluations.
• Conformance. The ability to demonstrate in an unambiguous way that a given implementation is
correct with respect to the formal model.
• Evaluation. The assessment of an IT product against the Common Criteria using the Common
Criteria Evaluation Methodology to determine whether or not the claims made are justified; or the
assessment of a protection profile against the Common Criteria using the Common Evaluation
Methodology to determine if the Profile is complete, consistent, technically sound and hence
suitable for use as a statement of requirements for one or more TOEs that may be evaluated.
• Evaluation Evidence. Any tangible resource (information) required from the sponsor or
developer by the evaluator to perform one or more evaluation activities.
• Feature. Part of a product that is either included with the product or can be ordered separately.
• Target of Evaluation (TOE). A group of IT products configured as an IT system, or an IT
product, and associated documentation that is the subject of a security evaluation under the CC.
• Validation. The process carried out by the CCEVS Validation Body leading to the issue of a
Common Criteria certificate.
• Validation Body. A governmental organization responsible for carrying out validation and for
overseeing the day-to-day operation of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation
Scheme.
23
14 Bibliography
The validation team used the following documents to produce this Validation Report:
1. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part 1: Introduction and
general model, Version 3.1 Revision 5.
2. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part 2: Security functional
requirements, Version 3.1 Revision 5.
3. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part 3: Security assurance
requirements, Version 3.1 Revision 5.
4. Common Evaluation Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1
Revision 5.
5. PP-Configuration for Network Devices and MACsec Ethernet Encryption, Version 2.0, 2024-04-
25 [CFG_NDcPP-MACsec_v2.0].
6. collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 3.0e, 06 December 2023
[CPP_ND_V3.0E].
7. PP-Module for MACsec Ethernet Encryption, Version 1.0, 02 March 2023
[MOD_MACsec_V1.0].
8. Functional Package for Secure Shell (SSH), Version 1.0, 13 May 2021 [PKG_SSH_V1.0].
9. QFX5120-48YM switch on JUNOS 23.4R2 Security Target, v1.0, March 27, 2026.
10. Common Criteria Evaluated Configuration Guide for QFX5120-48YM Device, 2026-03-27.
11. Assurance Activity Report for QFX5120-48YM switch on JUNOS 23.4R2, V0.5, April 2026.
12. Evaluation Technical Report for QFX5120-48YM switch on JUNOS 23.4R2, Version 0.5, March
27, 2026.Vulnerability Assessment for QFX5120-48YM switch on JUNOS 23.4R2, Version 0.4,
March 27, 2026.
13. Test Plan for QFX5120-48YM SWITCH on JUNOS 23.4R2, Version 1.1, March 27, 2026.