Australian Information Security
Evaluation Program
Certification Report
Cisco Catalyst 8000V Edge (C8000V)
running IOS-XE 17.15
Version 1.0, 28 October 2025
Document reference: AISEP-CC-CR-2025-EFT-T059-CR-V1.0
(Certification expires five years from certification report date)
AISEP-CC-CR-2025-EFT-T059-CR-V1.0 ii
Table of contents
Executive Summary 1
Introduction 2
Overview 2
Purpose 2
Identification 2
Target of Evaluation 3
Overview 3
Description of the TOE 3
TOE Functionality 3
TOE Physical Boundary 3
Architecture 4
Clarification of Scope 5
Security 7
Secure Delivery 7
Version Verification 8
Documentation and Guidance 8
Secure Usage 8
Evaluation 9
Overview 9
Evaluation Procedures 9
Functional Testing 10
Entropy Testing 10
Penetration Testing 10
Certification 10
Overview 10
Assurance 11
Certification Result 11
AISEP-CC-CR-2025-EFT-T059-CR-V1.0 iii
Recommendations 11
Annex – References and Abbreviations 12
References 12
Abbreviations 13
AISEP-CC-CR-2025-EFT-T059-CR-V1.0 1
Executive Summary
This report describes the findings of the IT security evaluation of Cisco Catalyst 8000V Edge (C8000V) running IOS-XE
17.15 against Common Criteria approved Protection Profiles (PPs).
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is a purpose-built, virtual routing platform that includes VPN functionality provided by
the Cisco IOS-XE software operating within a virtual machine (VM). The TOE consists solely of the Cisco IOS-XE
software image running in the VM.
This report concludes that the Target of Evaluation (TOE) has complied with the following PPs [4]:
 Collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 3.0e, 6 December 2023. (CPP_ND_V3.0E)
 PP-Module for Virtual Private Network (VPN) Gateways, Version: 1.3, 16 August 2023. (MOD_VPNGW_V1.3)
 Functional Package for SSH Version 1.0, 13 May 2021. (PKG_SSH_V1.0).
Additionally, the above PPs are grouped together using a certified PP-Configuration. This evaluation used the
following PP-Configuration [4]:
 PP-Configuration for Network Devices and VPN Gateways, Version 2.0, 25 April 2024. (CFG_NDcPP-
VPNGW_V2.0)
The evaluation was conducted in accordance with the Common Criteria and the requirements of the Australian
Information Security Evaluation Program (AISEP). The evaluation was performed by Teron Labs with the final
Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) submitted on 02 October 2025.
With regard to the secure operation of the TOE, the Australian Certification Authority recommends that
administrators:
 ensure that the TOE is operated in the evaluated configuration and that assumptions concerning the TOE
security environment are understood
 configure and operate the TOE according to the vendor’s product administrator guidance and pay attention to
all security warnings
 verify the hash of any downloaded software, as advised in configuration guide for the TOE
 the system auditor should review the audit trail generated and exported by the TOE periodically.
Potential purchasers of the TOE should review the intended operational environment and ensure that they are
comfortable that the stated security objectives for the operational environment can be suitably addressed.
This report includes information about the underlying security policies and architecture of the TOE, and information
regarding the conduct of the evaluation.
It is the responsibility of the user to ensure that the TOE meets their requirements. For this reason, it is recommended
that a prospective user of the TOE refer to the Security Target [8] and read this Certification Report prior to deciding
whether to purchase the product.
AISEP-CC-CR-2025-EFT-T059-CR-V1.0 2
Introduction
Overview
This chapter contains information about the purpose of this document and how to identify the Target of Evaluation
(TOE).
Purpose
The purpose of this Certification Report is to:
 Report the certification of results of the IT security evaluation of the TOE against the requirements of the
Common Criteria [1,2,3] and Protection Profiles [4]
 provide a source of detailed security information about the TOE for any interested parties.
This report should be read in conjunction with the TOE’s Security Target [8] which provides a full description of the
security requirements and specifications that were used as the basis of the evaluation.
Identification
The TOE is Cisco Catalyst 8000V Edge (C8000V) running IOS-XE 17.15.
Description Version
Evaluation scheme Australian Information Security Evaluation Program
TOE Cisco Catalyst 8000V Edge (C8000V) running IOS-XE 17.15
Software version 17.15
Hardware platforms C8000V virtual with UCS C Series M7
Security Target Security Target Cisco Catalyst 8000V Edge (C8000V) running IOS-XE
17.15, Version 1.1, 29 September 2025
Evaluation Technical Report Evaluation Technical Report 1.0, dated 02 October 2025
Document reference EFT-T059-ETR 1.0
Criteria Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2
Extended and Part 3 Conformant, April 2017, Version 3.1 Rev 5
Methodology Common Methodology for Information Technology Security, April 2017
Version 3.1 Rev 5
Conformance Collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 3.0e, 6
December 2023. (CPP_ND_V3.0E)
AISEP-CC-CR-2025-EFT-T059-CR-V1.0 3
PP-Module for Virtual Private Network (VPN) Gateways, Version: 1.3, 16
August 2023. (MOD_VPNGW_V1.3)
Functional Package for SSH Version 1.0, 13 May 2021. (PKG_SSH_V1.0)
Developer Cisco Systems, Inc.
170 West Tasman Dr.
San Jose, CA 95134
Evaluation facility Teron Labs
Level 2, 14 Moore St,
Canberra ACT 2601
Australia
Target of Evaluation
Overview
This chapter contains information about the Target of Evaluation (TOE), including a description of functionality
provided, its architectural components, the scope of evaluation, its security policies and its secure usage.
Description of the TOE
The TOE is the Cisco Catalyst 8000V Edge (C8000V), a virtual router that functions as a virtual Network Device (vND) in
accordance with the evaluated configuration Case 1 of the NDcPP v3.0e. The TOE consists solely of the Cisco IOS-XE
software, version 17.15, and running as a Virtual Machine (VM) on a hypervisor. The underlying hardware platform
(Cisco UCS C-Series M7 server) and the ESXi 8.0 hypervisor are part of the Virtual System but are explicitly outside the
TOE boundary. The TOE includes a virtual Route Processor and a virtual Forwarding Processor, both implemented in
software within the VM.
TOE Functionality
The TOE functionality that was evaluated is described in section 1.6 of the Security Target [8].
TOE Physical Boundary
The TOE consists solely of the Cisco IOS-XE software image Release 17.15 running in a VM. The underlying hardware
and hypervisor (e.g., ESXi 8.0 on Cisco UCS C-Series M7) are part of the Virtual System and Evaluated Configuration
but are not part of the TOE.
The software is pre-installed in the VM and is also available for download from the Cisco website (login required). The
following table describes the underlying hardware and virtual configuration that supports the evaluated configuration;
this information is provided for completeness and clarity about the evaluated environment, but this hardware is not
part of the TOE.
The install image provided for the TOE is:
AISEP-CC-CR-2025-EFT-T059-CR-V1.0 4
 c8000v-universalk9.17.15.x86_64.iso
The software version reflects the detail reported for the Cisco IOS-XE when the “show version” command is executed
on the device.
Architecture
The TOE is the Cisco Catalyst 8000V Edge (C8000V), a virtual network device (vND) that operates as a virtual router
with integrated VPN capabilities. It runs the Cisco IOS-XE 17.15 software image within a virtual machine (VM) hosted
on a Cisco UCS C-Series M7 server using the VMware ESXi 8.0 hypervisor.
The TOE requires the following:
 Cisco UCS C-Series M7 Server with Intel Xeon Scalable 2nd Generation processors
 VMware ESXi 8.0 Hypervisor
 Virtual Machine (VM) Requirements: The following minimum technical specs are required on the Cisco UCS
Server to support the C8000V guest VM running Cisco IOS-XE version 17.15 software:
 A single virtual hard disk – 8 GB minimum
 One dedicated management port
 Two or more virtual network interfaces with adapter type VMXNET3 that are mapped to physical Ethernet
ports on the host server via ESXi
 The following virtual CPU/RAM configurations are supported:
— 1 virtual CPU, requiring 4 GB minimum of RAM
— 2 virtual CPUs, requiring 4 GB minimum of RAM
— 4 virtual CPUs, requiring 4 GB minimum of RAM
— 8 virtual CPUs, requiring 8 GB minimum of RAM
— 16 virtual CPUs, requiring 8 GB minimum of RAM
The TOE has two or more network interfaces and is connected to at least one internal and one external network. The
Cisco IOS-XE configuration determines how packets are handled to and from the TOE’s network interfaces. The router
configuration will determine how traffic flows received on an interface will be handled. Typically, packet flows are
passed through the internetworking device and forwarded to their configured destination.
Evaluated configuration for the UCS C-Series M7 Servers with Intel Scalable 4th Generation processors include the
following:
 Intel Xeon Platinum 8452Y (Sapphire Rapids)
 VMware ESXi 8.0
 VMXNET3 NIC (3 physical GbE port mapped to 3 virtual NICs (Mgmt, WAN, LAN)
 The Packet Forwarding Engine is incorporated in the TOE software to perform packet forwarding functons on top
of hardware-based link layer and routing engine capabilities.
AISEP-CC-CR-2025-EFT-T059-CR-V1.0 5
 1vCPU
 4GB RAM (virtual) / 64GB (physical)
 8GB HDD (virtual) / 2TB (physical)
The following figure provides a visual depiction of an example C8000V TOE:
NOTE: While the above image includes several non-TOE IT environment devices, the TOE is only the C8000V devices.
Clarification of Scope
The evaluation was conducted in accordance with the Common Criteria and associated methodologies.
The scope of the evaluation was limited to those claims made in the Security Target [8].
Evaluated Functionality
Functional tests performed during the evaluation were taken from the Protection Profiles [4] and Supporting
Documents [12] and sufficiently demonstrate the security functionality of the TOE. Some of the tests were combined
for ease of execution.
AISEP-CC-CR-2025-EFT-T059-CR-V1.0 6
Supported Non-TOE Hardware/Software/Firmware
The TOE supports the following hardware, software, and firmware in its environment when the TOE is configured in its
evaluated configuration:
Component Required Usage/Purpose Description for TOE performance
RADIUS AAA Server Yes This includes any IT environment RADIUS AAA server that
provides single-use authentication mechanisms. This can be
any RADIUS AAA server that provides single-use
authentication. The TOE correctly leverages the services
provided by this RADIUS AAA server to provide single-use
authentication to administrators.
Management Workstation with SSH
Client
Yes This includes any IT Environment Management workstation
with a SSH client installed that is used by the TOE
administrator to support TOE administration through SSH
protected channels. Any SSH client that supports SSHv2 may
be used.
Local Console Yes This includes any IT Environment Console that is directly
connected to the TOE via the Serial Console Port and is used
by the TOE administrator to support TOE administration.
Certificate Authority (CA) Yes This includes any IT Environment Certification Authority on
the TOE network. This can be used to provide the TOE with a
valid certificate during certificate enrolment.
Remote VPN Gateway/Peer Yes This includes any VPN Peer (Gateway, Endpoint, another
instance of the TOE) with which the TOE participates in VPN
communications. Remote VPN Peers may be any device that
supports IPsec VPN communications. Another instance of the
TOE used as a VPN Peer would be installed in the evaluated
configuration, and likely administered by the same
personnel.
Audit (syslog) Server Yes This includes any syslog server to which the TOE would
transmit syslog messages. Also referred to as audit server in
the ST.
NTP Server Yes The TOE supports communications with an NTP Server in
order to synchronize the date and time for a reliable
timestamp on the TOE.
AISEP-CC-CR-2025-EFT-T059-CR-V1.0 7
C8000V hardware
platform
Yes This includes the Cisco UCS C-Series M7 platform with Intel
Xeon Scalable 4th
Generation processors running ESXi 8.0.
Hardware specifications are described in Section, 1.7, Table 4
of the ST.
Non-evaluated Functionality and Services
Potential users of the TOE are advised that some functions and services have not been evaluated as part of the
evaluation. Potential users of the TOE should carefully consider their requirements for using functions and services
outside of the evaluated configuration.
Australian Government users should refer to the Australian Government Information Security Manual [5] for policy
relating to using an evaluated product in an unevaluated configuration.
Security
The TOE Security Policy is a set of rules that defines the required security behaviour of the TOE; how information
within the TOE is managed and protected. The Security Target [8] contains a summary of the functionality that is
evaluated.
Secure Delivery
The TOE delivery procedure is described the guidance documentation [6].
The following components are delivered to the consumer as part of the TOE:
 Cisco C8000V IOS-XE Software Image
 Common Criteria Operational User Guidance and Preparative Procedures
Software delivery procedures
To obtain the evaluated image, submit a request to Cisco Technical Assistance Centre (TAC)
(http://www.cisco.com/techsupport) specifying that the request be for the evaluated IOS XE 17.15.3a Special Image
CSCWO73590. Once approved, Cisco TAC will provide access to download the evaluated image.
The following file types are available in the Cisco Catalyst 8000V Edge software image package and are used to install
the Cisco Catalyst 8000V Edge software on a hypervisor.
 .OVA - Used for deploying the OVA template on a VM (in TAR format)
 .ISO - Used for installing the software image on a VM (requires manually creating the VM)
Hardware delivery procedures
There are several mechanisms provided in the delivery process to ensure that a customer receives a product that has
not been tampered with. In addition to the above procedures for the TOE software, the TOE requires hardware to run
AISEP-CC-CR-2025-EFT-T059-CR-V1.0 8
on, despite the hardware being out of scope of the TOE boundary, the customer should still perform the following
checks upon receipt of any hardware to verify the integrity of the platform:
 Shipping label—ensure that the shipping label correctly identifies the correct customer name and address as
well as the device.
 Outside packaging—Inspect the outside shipping box and tape. Ensure that the shipping tape has not been cut or
otherwise compromised. Ensure that the box has not been cut or damaged to allow access to the device.
 Inside packaging—inspect the plastic bag and seal. Ensure that the bag is not cut or removed. Ensure that the
seal remains intact.
If the customer identifies a problem during the inspection, he or she should immediately contact the supplier.
Provide the order number, tracking number, and a description of the identified problem to the supplier.
Installation of the TOE
The Configuration Guides [6] contains all relevant information for the secure configuration of the TOE.
Version Verification
The verification of the TOE is largely automatic, including the verification using hashes. The TOE cannot load a
modified image. Valid software images can be downloaded from http://www.cisco.com/techsupport by submitting a
request to Cisco TAC. The TOE will automatically display the hash verification on boot or by using the reload
command. The successful hash verification message will display on the successful verification of the boot image. If the
image was tampered with in any way, an error would display, and the image will not boot. The TOE confirms that the
C8000V loads the image correctly, completes internal self-checks and displays any cryptographic export warning on
the console.
Once the image is loaded into bootflash, to display information related to software authenticity for a specific image
file, use the verify command.
Security Administrators are able to query the current version of the TOE firmware using the CLI command ‘show
version’.
Documentation and Guidance
It is important that the TOE is used in accordance with guidance documentation in order to ensure secure usage. The
following documentation is available to the consumer when the TOE is purchased.
All Common Criteria guidance material is available at
https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/solutions/industries/government/global-government-certifications/common-
criteria.html
For the latest version of The Australian Government Information Security Manual, Please refer to the following link:
https://www.cyber.gov.au/ism [5].
Secure Usage
The evaluation of the TOE took into account certain assumptions about its operational environment. These
assumptions must hold in order to ensure the security objectives of the TOE are met.
AISEP-CC-CR-2025-EFT-T059-CR-V1.0 9
The network device is assumed to be physically secured within its operational environment, protected from physical
attacks that could compromise its security or interfere with its physical connections and correct operation. This level
of protection is expected to be sufficient to safeguard the device and the sensitive data it handles.
The TOE is expected to provide networking functionality as its primary purpose and should not offer any general-
purpose computing capabilities, such as running compilers or user applications unrelated to its networking functions.
This ensures that the device remains focused solely on its intended security and networking roles.
The network device's administrator(s) are assumed to be trustworthy, acting in the best interests of the organization’s
security. This includes being well-trained, adhering to established policies, and following all guidance documentation.
Administrators are responsible for ensuring that passwords and credentials used within the TOE are strong and
secure. The TOE is not expected to protect against a malicious administrator who deliberately seeks to bypass or
compromise its security features.
For TOEs supporting X.509v3 certificate-based authentication, the Security Administrator(s) are expected to fully
validate (e.g. offline verification) any CA certificate (root CA certificate or intermediate CA certificate) loaded into the
TOE’s trust store (aka 'root store', ' trusted CA Key Store', or similar) as a trust anchor prior to use (e.g. offline
verification).
The TOE’s firmware and software are assumed to be regularly updated by an administrator, particularly in response to
newly discovered vulnerabilities. This ensures that the TOE remains protected against emerging threats.
The credentials (such as private keys) used by administrators to access the TOE must be securely protected on any
platform where they are stored. Administrators must also ensure that sensitive residual information, including
cryptographic keys, keying material, PINs, and passwords, is not accessible to unauthorised individuals when
networking equipment is discarded or removed from service.
The TOE is assumed to be connected to distinct networks in a way that ensures its security policies are enforced on all
relevant network traffic flowing between these networks.
Evaluation
Overview
This chapter contains information about the procedures used in conducting the evaluation, the testing conducted as
part of the evaluation and the certification result.
Evaluation Procedures
The criteria against which the Target of Evaluation (TOE) has been evaluated are contained in the relevant Protection
Profiles [4] and Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Version 3.1 Revision 5, Parts 2 and 3
[1, 2].
Testing methodology was drawn from Common Methodology for Information Technology Security, April 2017 Version
3.1 Revision 5 [3] and relevant Supporting Documents [12].
The evaluation was carried out in accordance with the operational procedures of the Australian Information Security
Evaluation Program [10].
AISEP-CC-CR-2025-EFT-T059-CR-V1.0 10
In addition, the conditions outlined in the Arrangement on the Recognition of Common Criteria Certificates in the field
of Information Technology Security [9] and the document CC and CEM addenda, Exact Conformance, Selection-Based
SFRs, Optional SFRs [13] were also upheld.
Functional Testing
All functional tests performed by the evaluators were taken from the Protection Profiles [4] and Supporting
Documents [12]. The tests were designed to provide the required testing coverage for the security functions claimed
by the TOE.
Entropy Testing
The entropy design description, justification, operation and health tests are assessed and documented in a separate
report [11].
Penetration Testing
The evaluators performed the evaluation activities for vulnerability assessment specified by the NDcPP Supporting
Document [12] that follow a flaw hypothesis methodology. Accordingly, four types of flaw hypotheses have been
considered:
 Type 1 - public vulnerabilities
 Type 2 - ND-iTC (Network international Technical Community) sourced
 Type 3 - evaluation team generated
 Type 4 - tool generated.
The evaluators conducted a review of public vulnerability databases and technical community sources to determine
potential flaw hypotheses using searches that include TOE device name and components, protocols supported by the
TOE and terms relating to the device type of the TOE. These searches were conducted up to the 29 Aug 2025.
Coinciding with the conclusion of the evaluation. There was no identifiable Type 2 hypotheses for this evaluation.
The evaluation team devised one test to check a potential vulnerability within the TOE’s firmware for hard-coded
credentials or other sensitive information. Additional analysis concluded the TOE returned no sensitive values. The
evaluation team also conducted tool-generated vulnerability testing of the TOE as per the Supporting Document [12]
Based on the results of this testing, the evaluators determined that the TOE is resistant to an attacker possessing a
basic attack potential.
Certification
Overview
This chapter contains information about the result of the certification, an overview of the assurance provided and
recommendations made by the certifiers.
AISEP-CC-CR-2025-EFT-T059-CR-V1.0 11
Assurance
This certification focused on the evaluation of product compliance with Protection Profiles that cover the technology
area of network devices with added security functionality including VPN gateway functions and SSH. Organisations can
have confidence that the scope of an evaluation against an ASD-approved Protection Profiles cover the necessary
security functionality expected of the evaluated product and known threats will have been addressed.
The analysis is supported by testing as outlined in the PP Supporting Documents and Protection Profile Module
activities, and a vulnerability survey demonstrating resistance to penetration attackers with a basic attack potential.
Compliance also provides assurance through evidence of secure delivery procedures. Certification is not a guarantee
of freedom from security vulnerabilities.
The effectiveness and integrity of cryptographic functions are also within the scope of product evaluations performed
in line with the Protection Profiles (PPs). PPs provide assurance by providing a full Security Target, and an analysis of
the Security Functional Requirements in that Security Target, guidance documentation, and a basic description of the
architecture of the TOE.
Certification Result
Teron Labs has determined that the TOE upholds the claims made in the Security Target [8] and has met the
requirements of the Protection Profiles CPP_ND_V3.0E [4.a], PKG_SSH_V1. [4.b], MOD_VPNGW_V1.3 [4.c] and PP
configuration for Network device and VPN Gateway [4.d].
After due consideration of the conduct of the evaluation as reported to the certifiers, and of the Evaluation Technical
Report [7], the Australian Certification Authority certifies the evaluation of the Cisco Catalyst 8000V Edge (C8000V)
running IOS-XE 17.15 performed by the Australian Information Security Evaluation Facility, Teron Labs.
The Australian Certification Authority certifies that the Security Target [8] have met the requirements of the Network
Device Protection Profiles [4].
Certification is not a guarantee of freedom from security vulnerabilities.
Recommendations
Not all of the evaluated functionality present in the TOE may be suitable for Australian Government users. For further
guidance, Australian Government users should refer to the Australian Government Information Security Manual [5].
In addition to ensuring that the assumptions concerning the operational environment are fulfilled, and the guidance
document is followed, the Australian Certification Authority also recommends that users and administrators:
 ensure that the TOE is operated in the evaluated configuration and that assumptions concerning the TOE
security environment are fulfilled
 configure and operate the TOE according to the vendor’s product administrator guidance and pay attention to
all security warnings
 maintain the underlying environment in a secure manner so that the integrity of the TOE Security Function is
preserved
 the system auditor should review the audit trail generated and exported by the TOE periodically
These points ensure that the TOE remains in a CC compliant state throughout usage.
AISEP-CC-CR-2025-EFT-T059-CR-V1.0 12
Annex – References and Abbreviations
References
1. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security functional components April
2017, Version 3.1 Revision 5
2. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security assurance components April
2017, Version 3.1 Revision 5
3. Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Evaluation Methodology, April 2017,
Version 3.1 Revision 5
4. Protection Profiles:
a) Collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 3.0e, 6 December 2023
(CPP_ND_V3.0E)
b) Functional Package for SSH Version 1.0, 13 May 2021 (PKG_SSH_V1.0)
c) PP-Module for Virtual Private Network (VPN) Gateways, Version: 1.3, 16 August 2023
(MOD_VPNGW_V1.3)
d) PP-Configuration for Network Devices and VPN Gateways, Version 2.0, 25 April 2024 (CFG_NDcPP-
VPNGW_V2.0)
5. Australian Government Information Security Manual: https://www.cyber.gov.au/ism,
6. Cisco Catalyst 8000V Edge (C8000V) running IOS-XE 17.15, Operational User Guidance and Preparative
Procedures, Version 1.0, Published 26 September 2025.
7. Evaluation Technical Report Cisco Catalyst 8000V Edge (C8000V) running IOS-XE, Version 1.0, Dated 02
October 2025 (Document reference EFT-T059-ETR 1.0)
8. Security Target Cisco Catalyst 8000V Edge (C8000V) running IOS-XE 17.15, Version 1.1, 29 September 2025.
9. Arrangement on the Recognition of Common Criteria Certificates in the field of Information Technology
Security, 2 July 2014
10. AISEP Policy Manual (APM): https://www.cyber.gov.au/sites/default/files/2023-
03/2022_AUG_REL_AISEP_Policy_Manual_6.3.pdf , Version 6.3, release August 2022.
11. Entropy Documentation:
a) Entropy Information, Cisco Catalyst 8000V Edge (C8000V) running IOS-XE running IOS-XE 17.15,
Version 1.0, dated 26 September, 2025
12. Protection Profile Supporting Documents
a) Supporting Document, Evaluation Activities for Network Device cPP, Version 3.0e, 6 December 2023
(CPP_ND_V3.0E_SD)
b) Supporting Document, Mandatory Technical Document, PP-Module for Virtual Private Network (VPN)
Gateways, version 1.3, 16 August 2023 (MOD_VPNGW_V1.3_SD)
13. CC and CEM addenda, Exact Conformance, Selection-Based SFRs, Optional SFRs 30 September 2021, Version 2.0,
CCDB-013-v2.0
AISEP-CC-CR-2025-EFT-T059-CR-V1.0 13
Abbreviations
AAA Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting
AISEP Australian Information Security Evaluation Program
CA Certificate Authority
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CPU Central Processing Unit
GB Gigabyte
HDD Hard Disk Drive
IPsec Internet Protocol Security
NDcPP CCRA-approved collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices
ND-iTC Network international Technical Community
NIC Network Interface Card
NTP Network Time Protocol
LAN Local Area Network
Mgmt Management (shorthand)
PP Protection Profile
RAM Random Access Memory
SSH Secure Shell
TAC Cisco Technical Assistance Centre
TOE Target of Evaluation
UCS Cisco Unified Computing System
vND virtual Network Device
VM Virtual Machine
VPN Virtual Private Network
WAN Wide Area Network
Disclaimer
The material in this guide is of a general nature and should not be regarded as legal advice or relied on for assistance
in any particular circumstance or emergency situation. In any important matter, you should seek appropriate
independent professional advice in relation to your own circumstances.
The Commonwealth accepts no responsibility or liability for any damage, loss or expense incurred as a result of the
reliance on information contained in this guide.
Copyright
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