Certification Report
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
BSI-DSZ-CC-0371-2006
for
SUSE Linux Enterprise Server V 8
with Service Pack 3
from
SUSE Linux Products GmbH
sponsored by
IBM Corporation
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 228 9582-0, Fax +49 228 9582-5455, Infoline +49 228 9582-111
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)3018 9582-0, Infoline +49 (0)3018 9582-111, Telefax +49 (0)3018 9582-455
BSI-DSZ-CC-0371-2006
SUSE Linux Enterprise Server V 8
with Service Pack 3
from
SUSE Linux Products GmbH
sponsored by
IBM Corporation
Common Criteria Arrangement
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an accredited and licensed/
approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Part 1
Version 0.6, Part 2 Version 1.0 extended by CEM supplementation “ALC_FLR – Flaw remediation”
for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.1 (ISO/IEC
15408:1999) and including final interpretations for compliance with Common Criteria Version 2.2
and Common Methodology Part 2, Version 2.2.
Evaluation Results:
PP Conformance: Controlled Access Protection Profile (CAPP), Issue 1.d, 08.10.1999
Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance Package: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL3 augmented by ALC_FLR.3 Systematic flaw remediation
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated
configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme
of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation
facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
The notes mentioned on the reverse side are part of this certificate.
Bonn, 06th
June 2006
SOGIS-MRA
The President of the Federal Office
for Information Security
Hange L.S.
The rating of the strength of functions does not include the cryptographic algorithms suitable for
encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2).
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty
of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
BSI-DSZ-CC-0371-2006 Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the
task of issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a
distributor, hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product
according to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised
security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the
BSI or by BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This
report contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the
detailed Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security
functionality of the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and
weaknesses) and instructions for the user.
1
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of
17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
V
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0371-2006
Contents
Part A: Certification
Part B: Certification Results
Part C: Excerpts from the Criteria
VI
BSI-DSZ-CC-0371-2006 Certification Report
A Certification
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down
in the following:
• BSIG2
• BSI Certification Ordinance3
• BSI Schedule of Costs4
• Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal
Ministry of the Interior)
• DIN EN 45011 standard
• BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
• Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.15
• Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM)
• Part 1, Version 0.6
• Part 2, Version 1.0
• BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS)
• CEM supplementation on “ALC_FLR – Flaw remediation”, Version 1.1,
February 2002
The use of Common Criteria Version 2.1, Common Methodology, part 2,
Version 1.0 and final interpretations as part of AIS 32 results in compliance of
the certification results with Common Criteria Version 2.2 and Common
Methodology Part 2, Version 2.2 as endorsed by the Common Criteria
recognition arrangement committees.
2
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of
17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 7 July 1992,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik (BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 22nd September 2000 in the
Bundesanzeiger p. 19445
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0371-2006
2 Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries
a mutual recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are
based on ITSEC or CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1 ITSEC/CC - Certificates
The SOGIS-Agreement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on
ITSEC became effective on 3 March 1998. This agreement was signed by the
national bodies of Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. This
agreement on the mutual recognition of IT security certificates was extended to
include certificates based on the CC for all evaluation levels (EAL 1 – EAL 7).
2.2 CC - Certificates
An arrangement (Common Criteria Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC evaluation assurance levels up to and including
EAL 4 was signed in May 2000. It includes also the recognition of Protection
Profiles based on the CC. The arrangement was signed by the national bodies
of Australia, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, United Kingdom and the United
States. Israel joined the arrangement in November 2000, Sweden in February
2002, Austria in November 2002, Hungary and Turkey in September 2003,
Japan in November 2003, the Czech Republic in September 2004, the Republic
of Singapore in March 2005, India in April 2005.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0371-2006 Certification Report
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform
procedure, a uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product SUSE Linux Enterprise Server V 8 with Service Pack 3 has
undergone the certification procedure at BSI. This is a re-certification based on
BSI-DSZ-CC-0327-2005.
The evaluation of the product SUSE Linux Enterprise Server V 8 with Service
Pack 3 was conducted by atsec information security GmbH. The atsec
information security GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)6
recognised by BSI.
The sponsor is:
IBM Italia, Communications Sector
Responsabile Relazioni Commerciali- Account Manager
Via Sciangai 53, 00144 Rome - Italy
The vendor and distributor is:
SUSE Linux Products GmbH
Maxfeldstraße 5
90409 Nuernberg, Germany
The certification is concluded with
• the comparability check and
• the production of this Certification Report.
This work was completed by the BSI on 06.06.2006.
The confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
• all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in
the following report, are observed,
• the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in the
following report.
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product indicated
here. The validity can be extended to new versions and releases of the product,
provided the sponsor applies for re-certification of the modified product, in
accordance with the procedural requirements, and the evaluation does not
reveal any security deficiencies.
For the meaning of the assurance levels and the confirmed strength of
functions, please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at the end of the
Certification Report.
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0371-2006
4 Publication
The following Certification Results contain pages B-1 to B-42.
The product SUSE Linux Enterprise Server V 8 with Service Pack 3 has been
included in the BSI list of the certified products, which is published regularly
(see also Internet: http:// www.bsi.bund.de). Further information can be obtained
from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the vendor7
of
the product. The Certification Report can also be downloaded from the above-
mentioned website.
7
SUSE Linux Products GmbH
Maxfeldstraße 5
90409 Nuernberg, Germany
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0371-2006 Certification Report
B Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
• the security target of the sponsor for the target of evaluation,
• the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
• complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0371-2006
Contents of the certification results
Preliminary Remarks V
Contents VI
A Certification 1
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure 1
2 Recognition Agreements 2
2.1 ITSEC/CC - Certificates 2
2.2 CC - Certificates 2
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification 3
4 Publication 4
B Certification Results 1
Contents of the certification results 2
1 Executive Summary 4
1.1 Assurance package 7
1.2 Functionality 7
1.3 Strength of Function 8
1.4 Summary of threats and Organisational Security Policies (OSPs)
addressed by the evaluated IT product 9
1.5 Special configuration requirements 9
1.6 Assumptions about the operating environment 11
1.7 Disclaimers 14
2 Identification of the TOE 15
3 Security Policy 19
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 20
4.1 Usage assumptions 20
4.2 Environmental assumptions 20
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0371-2006 Certification Report
4.3 Clarification of scope 20
5 Architectural Information 22
6 Documentation 28
7 IT Product Testing 29
8 Evaluated Configuration 32
9 Results of the Evaluation 34
10 Comments/Recommendations 36
11 Annexes 37
12 Security Target 38
13 Definitions 39
13.1 Acronyms 39
13.2 Glossary 40
14 Bibliography 42
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1 Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the SUSE Linux Enterprise Server V 8 with
Service Pack 3 (also named SLES in short).
It is a general purpose, multi-user, multitasking Linux based operating system. It
provides a platform for a variety of applications in the governmental and
commercial environment. SLES is available on a broad range of computer
systems, ranging from departmental servers to multi-processor enterprise
servers. The SLES evaluation covers a potentially distributed, but closed
network of IBM xSeries servers running the evaluated version of SLES.
The TOE includes Software components only and provides CAPP compliant
security functionality plus product specific extentions. Among these functions
are:
• Identification and Authentication
• Discretionary Access Control
• Secure Communication
• Audit
• Object reuse functionality
• Security Management
• TSF Protection
The evaluated version of the TOE can be run on IBM xSeries x346 platform. For
a detailed description of the systems the tests were performed on, please refer
to chapter 7 of this report.
The product SUSE Linux Enterprise Server V 8 is delivered by SUSE Linux
Products GmbH on a CD-ROM or DVD. In addition to the software delivered on
CD-ROM/DVD the Service Pack 3, Release Candidate 4 (RC4) and additional
packages have to be installed. The ISO images of the service pack and the
additional packages can be downloaded from the SUSE ftp-server.
During the installation process the user has to verify the integrity and
authenticity of the downloaded software as described in the Security Guide [10].
The base software installed from the CD/DVD allows the user to perform this
verification by checking the digital signatures of the ISO images and the
additional packages.
For a precise listing of packages making up the TOE please refer either to
chapter 2.3 of the Security Target [7] or chapter 2 of this report.
For a detailed listing of guidance documents to be followed by a user of the
TOE refer to chapter 6 of this report.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0371-2006 Certification Report
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) used in the Security Target
are Common Criteria Part 2 extended as shown in the following table:
Security
Functional
Requirement
Identifier
SFRs from CC Part 2, contained in CAPP
FAU_GEN.1 Audit Data Generation
FAU_GEN.2 User Identity Association
FAU_SAR.1 Audit Review
FAU_SAR.2 Restricted Audit Review
FAU_SAR.3 Selectable Audit Review
FAU_SEL.1 Selective Audit
FAU_STG.1 Protected Audit Trail Storage
FAU_STG.3 Action in Case of Possible Audit Data Loss
FAU_STG.4 Prevention of Audit Data Loss
FDP_ACC.1 Discretionary Access Control Policy
FDP_ACF.1 Discretionary Access Control Functions
FDP_RIP.2 Full Residual Information Protection
FIA_ATD.1 User Attribute Definition
FIA_SOS.1 Verification of Secrets
FIA_UAU.7 Protected Authentication Feedback
FIA_USB.1 User-Subject Binding
FMT_MSA.1 Management of Security Attributes
FMT_MSA.3 Static Attribute Initialisation
FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF Data
FMT_REV.1 Revocation
FMT_SMR.1 Security Roles
FPT_AMT.1 Abstract Machine Testing
FPT_RVM.1 Reference Mediation
FPT_SEP.1 Domain Separation
FPT_STM.1 Reliable Time Stamps
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0371-2006
Security
Functional
Requirement
Identifier
SFRs from CC Part 2, contained in CAPP, substituted by
hierarchical higher ones in the ST
FIA_UAU.2 User Authentication before any Action
FIA_UID.2 User Identification before any Action
SFRs not in CC Part 2 (Part 2 extended), contained in CAPP
„Note1“
(as in [9], chapter 5.2.4)
Subject Residual Information Protection
SFRs from CC Part 2, not contained in CAPP
FMT_SMF.18
Specification of Management Functions
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic Key Generation
FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic Key Distribution
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic Operation
FDP_UCT.1 Basic Data Exchange Confidentiality
FDP_UIT.1 Data Exchange Integrity
FMT_MSA.2 Secure Security Attributes
FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF Trusted Channel
Table 1: TOE Security Functional Requirements
Note that some of the SFRs have been iterated in the Security Target. For
details on the iteration and the required security functionality please refer to [7],
chapter 5.1.
The TOE SUSE Linux Enterprise Server V 8 with Service Pack 3 was evaluated
by atsec information security GmbH.
The evaluation was completed on 20.04.2006. The atsec information security
GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)9
recognised by BSI.
The sponsor is:
IBM Italia, Communications Sector
Responsabile Relazioni Commerciali- Account Manager
Via Sciangai 53, 00144 Rome - Italy
8
Added because of AIS32, Final Interpretation 065
9
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0371-2006 Certification Report
The vendor and distributor is:
SUSE Linux Products GmbH
Maxfeldstraße 5
90409 Nuernberg, Germany
1.1 Assurance package
The TOE security assurance requirements are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C of this report,
or [1], part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of assurance level EAL3+
(Evaluation Assurance Level 3 augmented).
The assurance level is augmented by: ALC_FLR.3 – Systematic flaw
remediation. For the evaluation of the CC component ALC_FLR.3 the mutually
recognised CEM supplementation “ALC_FLR – Flaw remediation”, Version 1.1,
February 2002 ([5]) was used.
1.2 Functionality
The TOE SUSE Linux Enterprise Server V 8 with Service Pack 3 provides the
following Security Functions:
Name Function
Identification and Authentication (IA)
IA.1 User Identification and Authentication Data Management
IA.2 Common Authentication Mechanism
IA.3 Interactive Login and Related Mechanisms
IA.4 User Identity Changing
IA.5 Login Processing
Audit (AU)
AU.1 Audit Configuration
AU.2 Audit Processing
AU.3 Audit Record Format
AU.4 Audit Post-Processing
Discretionary Access Control (DA)
DA.1 General DAC Policy
DA.2 Permission Bits
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Name Function
DA.3 Access Control Lists supported by SLES
DA.4 Discretionary Access Control: IPC Objects
Object Reuse (OR)
OR.1 Object Reuse: File System Objects
OR.2 Object Reuse: IPC Objects
OR.3 Object Reuse: Memory Objects
Security Management (SM)
SM.1 Roles
SM.2 Access Control Configuration and Management
SM.3 Management of User, Group and Authentication Data
SM.4 Management of Audit Configuration
SM.5 Reliable Time Stamps
Secure Communication (SC)
SC.1 Secure Protocols
TSF Protection (TP)
TP.1 TSF Invocation Guarantees
TP.2 Kernel
TP.3 Kernel Modules
TP.4 Trusted Processes
TP.5 TSF Databases
TP.6 Internal TOE Protection Mechanisms
TP.7 Testing the TOE Protection Mechanisms
Table 2: TOE Security Functions
Note: Only the acronyms and the titles of the SFs are provided here because
they are very granular and almost self-explanatory. Please refer for a precise
definition of the SF to the Security Target of the TOE ([7], chapter 6.2)
1.3 Strength of Function
The TOE’s strength of function is rated ‘SOF-medium’ only for the
authentication function (IA) using passwords (refer to [7], chapter 6.5).
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0371-2006 Certification Report
1.4 Summary of threats and Organisational Security Policies (OSPs)
addressed by the evaluated IT product
The following threats as defined in [7], chapter 3.2.1 are averted by the TOE:
T.UAUSER
An attacker (possibly, but not necessarily, an unauthorized user of the
TOE) may impersonate an authorized user of the TOE. This includes the
threat of an authorized user that tries to impersonate as another
authorized user without knowing the authentication information.
T.UAACCESS
An authorized user of the TOE may access information resources without
having permission from the person who owns, or is responsible for, the
information resource for the type of access.
T.COMPROT
An attacker (possibly, but not necessarily, an unauthorized user of the
TOE) may intercept a communication link between the TOE and another
trusted IT product to intercept or modify information transferred between
the TOE and the other trusted IT product (which may be another
instantiation of the TOE) using defined protocols (SSH or SSL) in a way
that can not be detected by the TOE or the other trusted IT product.
The TOE has to comply to the following Organisational Security Policies (OSPs)
as defined in the Security Target [7], chapter 3.2.3:
P.AUTHORISED_USERS
Only those users who have been authorized to access the information
within the system may access the system.
P.NEED_TO_KNOW
The organization must define a discretionary access control policy on a
need-to-know basis which can be modeled based on: (i) the owner of the
object; and (ii) the identity of the subject attempting the access; and (iii)
the implicit and explicit access rights to the object granted to the subject
by the object owner or an administrative user.
P.ACCOUNTABILITY
The users of the system shall be held accountable for their actions within
the system.
1.5 Special configuration requirements
The configuration requirements for the TOE are defined in chapter 2.4 and
subsequent chapters of the Security Target [7] and are summarised here
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0371-2006
(please refer to the Security Target for the precise and more detailed
description):
• The CC evaluated package set must be selected at install time in
accordance with the description provided in the Security Guide [10] and
installed accordingly;
• SLES supports the use of IPv4 and IPv6, only IPv4 is included within the
TOE;
• Both installation from CD and installation from a defined disk partition are
supported;
• The default configuration for identification and authentication are the defined
password based PAM modules. Support for other authentication options e.g.
smartcard authentication, is not included in the evaluation configuration;
• If the system console is used, it must be connected directly to the
workstation and requires the same physical protection as the workstation;
• The TOE comprises a single server machine (and optional peripherals)
running the allowed system software (refer to list of allowed packages). A
server running the allowed software is referred to as a “TOE server” in the
following. Details on the allowed peripherals can be found in [7], chapter
2.4.2.
• Several TOE servers may be interlinked by a LAN, which may be joined by
bridges/routers or by TOE workstations which act as routers / gateways.
• Each TOE server within this network implements its own security policy. No
synchronisation function for those policies exists.
• If other systems are connected to the network they need to be configured
and managed by the same authority using an appropriate security policy not
conflicting with the security policy of the TOE.
• The following file systems are supported: the Ext3 journaling filesystem, the
ISO 9660 file system for CD-ROM drives and the process file system,
procfs, the devpts virtual file system used to provide pseudo terminal
support, the shmfs virtual file system used for nonpersistent memory-backed
storage.
Note:
A graphical user interface for system administration or any other operation is
not included in the evaluated configuration.
The TOE environment also includes applications that are not evaluated, but are
used as unprivileged tools to access public system services. For example a
HTTP server using a port above 1024 (e. g. on port 8080) may be used as a
normal application running without root privileges on top of the TOE.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0371-2006 Certification Report
1.6 Assumptions about the operating environment
The following constraints concerning the allowed hardware and peripherals are
made in the Security Target (refer to [7], chapter 2.4.2):
Hardware Platform:
IBM xSeries x346 (Intel Xeon based multi processor server)
Peripherals:
All terminals and printers supported by the TOE
(except hot pluggable devices connected via USB or IEEE 1394
(Firewire) interfaces)
All storage devices and backup devices supported by the TOE (hard
disks, CDROM drives, streamer drives, floppy disk drives)
(except hot pluggable devices connected via USB or IEEE 1394
(Firewire) interfaces)
All Ethernet and Token-Ring network adapters supported by the TOE
Note: The peripherals are physical peripherals. Logical partitioning is not
supported on the above listed hardware platforms. Excluding hot pluggable
devices connected via USB does not exclude all USB devices. USB keyboards
and mice may be attached provided they are connected before booting the
operating system.
The following constraints concerning the operating environment are made in the
Security Target. The constraints are based on the assumptions defined in [7],
chapter 3.3:
A.LOCATE
The processing resources of the TOE will be located within controlled
access facilities which will prevent unauthorized physical access.
A.PROTECT
The TOE hardware and software critical to security policy enforcement will
be protected from unauthorized physical modification.
A.MANAGE
It is assumed that there are one or more competent individuals who are
assigned to manage the TOE and the security of the information it
contains.
A.NO_EVIL_ADMIN
The system administrative personnel are not careless, willfully negligent,
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or hostile, and will follow and abide by the instructions provided by the
administrator documentation.
A.COOP
Authorized users possess the necessary authorization to access at least
some of the information managed by the TOE and are expected to act in a
cooperating manner in a benign environment.
A.UTRAIN
Users are trained well enough to use the security functionality provided by
the system appropriately.
A.UTRUST
Users are trusted to accomplish some task or group of tasks within a
secure IT environment by exercising complete control over their data.
A.NET_COMP
All network components (like bridges and routers) are assumed to
correctly pass data without modification.
A.PEER
Any other systems with which the TOE communicates are assumed to be
under the same management control and operate under the same security
policy constraints. There are no security requirements which address the
need to trust external systems or the communications links to such
systems.
A.CONNECT
All connections to peripheral devices and all network connections not
using the secured protocols SSH v2 or SSL v3 reside within the controlled
access facilities. Internal communication paths to access points such as
terminals or other systems are assumed to be adequately protected.
The following constraints are based on Security Objectives which have to be
met by the TOE environment. They are defined in [7], chapter 4.2:
OE.ADMIN
Those responsible for the administration of the TOE are competent and
trustworthy individuals, capable of managing the TOE and the security of
the information it contains.
OE.CREDEN
Those responsible for the TOE must ensure that user authentication data
is stored securely and not disclosed to unauthorized individuals. In
particular: Procedures must be established to ensure that user passwords
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0371-2006 Certification Report
generated by an administrator during user account creation or modification
are distributed in a secure manner, as appropriate for the purpose of the
system. The media on which authentication data is stored must not be
physically removable from the system by other than administrative users.
Users must not disclose their passwords to other individuals.
OE.INSTALL
Those responsible for the TOE must establish and implement procedures
to ensure that the hardware, software and firmware components that
comprise the system are distributed, installed and configured in a secure
manner.
OE.PHYSICAL
Those responsible for the TOE must ensure that those parts of the TOE
critical to security policy are protected from physical attack which might
compromise IT security objectives.
OE.INFO_PROTECT
Those responsible for the TOE must establish and implement procedures
to ensure that information is protected in an appropriate manner. In
particular: DAC protections on security critical files (such as configuration
files and authentication databases) shall always be set up correctly.
Network and peripheral cabling must be approved for the transmittal of the
most sensitive data held by the system. Such physical links are assumed
to be adequately protected against threats to the confidentiality and
integrity of the data transmitted unless one of the secure protocols
provided by the TOE is used for the communication with another trusted
entity. This requires that users are trained to perform those tasks properly
and trustworthy to not deliberately miSUSE their access to information and
pass it on to somebody that does not have the right to access the
information.
OE.MAINTENANCE
Administrative users of the TOE must ensure that any diagnostics facilities
provided by the product are invoked at every scheduled preventative
maintenance period.
OE.RECOVER
Those responsible for the TOE must ensure that procedures and/or
mechanisms are provided to assure that, after system failure or other
discontinuity, recovery without a protection (i.e., security) compromise is
obtained.
OE.SOFTWARE_IN
Those responsible for the TOE shall ensure that the system shall be
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configured so that only an administrative user can introduce new trusted
software into the system.
OE.SERIAL_LOGIN
Those responsible for the TOE shall implement procedures to ensure that
users clear the screen before logging off where serial login devices (e.g.
IBM 3151 terminals) are used.
OE.HW_SEP
The underlying hardware must provide separation mechanism that can be
used by the TOE to protect the TSF and TSF data from unauthorized
access and modification.
OE.PROTECT
Those responsible for the TOE must ensure that procedures and/or
mechanisms exist to ensure that data transferred between servers is
secured from disclosure, interruption or tampering (when using
communication links not protected by the use of the SSL or SSH
protocols. Note that interruption of communication is not prevented by the
use of those protocols and if protection against interruption of
communication is required, adequate protection in the TOE environment
has to be established for all communication links!).
1.7 Disclaimers
The Certification Results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the
Certificate and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in
this Certification Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product
by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation
that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT
product by BSI or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0371-2006 Certification Report
2 Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation is called:
SUSE Linux Enterprise Server V 8
with Service Pack 3
The product SUSE Linux Enterprise Server V 8 is delivered by SUSE Linux
Products GmbH on a CD-ROM or DVD. In addition to the software delivered on
CD-ROM/DVD the Service Pack 3, Release Candidate 4 (RC4) and additional
packages have to be installed. The ISO images of the service pack and the
additional packages can be downloaded from the SUSE ftp-server.
During the installation process the user has to verify the integrity and
authenticity of the downloaded software as described in the Security Guide [10].
The base software installed from the CD/DVD allows the user to perform this
verification by checking the digital signatures of the ISO images and the
additional packages.
The following packages (rpm) make up the evaluated version of theTOE:
Package name Version
Number
UnitedLinux-build-key 1.0-23
aaa_base 2003.3.27-78
aaa_skel 2002.10.14-1
acl 2.0.19-88
amtu 0.1-5
ash 0.2-641
at 3.1.8-806
attr 2.4.2-55
attr-devel 2.4.2-55
bash 2.05b-50
bc 1.06-498
binutils 2.12.90.0.15-50
bzip2 1.0.2-51
certification-sles-eal3 1.2-5
cpio 2.5-54
cpp 3.2.2-38
cracklib 2.7-716
cron 3.0.1-839
curl 7.9.8-54
cyrus-sasl 1.5.27-280
db 4.0.14-194
devs 2006.1.10-2
dialog 0.62-618
diffutils 2.8.1-49
e2fsprogs 1.28-30
ed 0.2-611
expect 5.34-192
file 3.37-311
filesystem 2002.9.2-56
fileutils 4.1.11-107
fillup 1.10-32
findutils 4.1.7-435
flex 2.5.4a-48
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Package name Version
Number
freetype2 2.0.9-87
gawk 3.1.1-327
gcc 3.2.2-38
gcc-c++ 3.2.2-38
gdbm 1.8.0-689
glibc 2.2.5-235
glibc-devel 2.2.5-235
glibc-locale 2.2.5-235
gpg 1.0.7-183
gpm 1.20.1-47
grep 2.5.1-84
groff 1.17.2-403
grub 0.93-407
gzip 1.3-326
hdparm 5.2-33
heimdal-lib 0.4e-207
howtoenh 2002.9.6-6
hwinfo 5.62-1
iproute2 2.4.7-495
iputils ss020124-457
isapnp 1.26-235
k_smp 2.4.21-306
kbd 1.06-169
kernel-source 2.4.21-306
ksymoops 2.4.5-68
l2h-pngicons 99.2beta8-540
laus 0.1-59
laus-devel 0.1-55
less 376-127
libgcc 3.2.2-54
libstdc++ 3.2.2-54
libstdc++-devel 3.2.2-38
libxcrypt 1.1-54
libxml2 2.4.23-117
liby2util 2.6.24-4
lilo 22.3.2-57
logrotate 3.5.9-198
lprng 3.8.12-46
lsb-runtime 1.2-105
lukemftp 1.5-330
m4 1.4o-286
mailx 8.1.1-603
make 3.79.1-407
man 2.3.19deb4.0-712
man-pages 1.53-32
mktemp 1.5-482
modutils 2.4.25-53
ncurses 5.2-402
net-tools 1.60-568
netcat 1.10-612
netcfg 2002.9.4-13
openldap2-client 2.1.4-70
openssh 3.4p1-270
openssl 0.9.6g-132
openssl-devel 0.9.6g-132
pam 0.76-109
pam-laus 0.76-46
pam-modules 2002.8.29-12
parted 1.6.6-40
pciutils 2.1.10-99
pcre 3.9-267
perl 5.8.0-204
permissions 2005.10.20-3
popt 1.6-282
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Package name Version
Number
postfix 1.1.12-12
ps 2003.10.7-1
readline 4.3-53
rpm 3.0.6-418
sed 3.02.80-53
sh-utils 2.0-377
shadow 4.0.2-410
sitar 0.7.2-29
sles-admin-x86+x86-64_en 8.1.0.2-5
sles-inst-x86+x86-64_en 8.1.0.2-5
sles-release 8-7
star 1.4.2-2
stunnel 3.14-411
SUSE-build-key 1.0-198
sysconfig 0.23.22-66
syslogd 1.4.1-340
sysvinit 2.82-364
tar 1.13.25-328
tcl 8.4-60
telnet 1.0-306
terminfo 5.2-402
texinfo 4.2-48
textutils 2.1-39
timezone 2.2.5-213
tk 8.4-60
unitedlinux-release 1.0-218
utempter 0.5.2-391
util-linux 2.11u-134
vim 6.1-194
vsftpd 1.1.0-31
w3m 0.3.1-105
wget 1.8.2-233
xinetd 2.3.11-26
xshared 4.2.0-213
yast2 2.6.40-6
yast2-bootloader 2.6.77-2
yast2-core 2.6.56-3
yast2-country 2.6.35-1
yast2-installation 2.6.136-1
yast2-mouse 2.6.21-5
yast2-ncurses 2.6.24-19
yast2-network 2.6.39.1-2
yast2-online-update 2.6.17-59
yast2-packagemanager 2.6.51-49
yast2-packager 2.6.78-0
yast2-pam 2.6.5-64
yast2-runlevel 2.6.16-20
yast2-security 2.6.10-85
yast2-storage 2.6.69-2
yast2-sysconfig 2.6.14-20
yast2-theme-SUSELinux 2.6.8-0
yast2-theme-UnitedLinux 2.6.8-0
yast2-trans-en_US 2.6.7-1
yast2-transfer 2.6.1-149
yast2-update 2.6.23-2
yast2-users 2.6.37-7
yast2-xml 2.6.8-79
zlib 1.1.4-51
Table 3: Packages used in the TOE
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The following guidance documents are supplied together with the TOE. The
guidance documents have to be followed to ensure an certification conformant
operation of the TOE:
• SLES Security Guide [10]
• SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 8. Administration [11]
• SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 8 – Installation Manuals for the individual
platforms [12]
Please refer to chapter 6 for a more detailed listing of the guidance documents.
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3 Security Policy
The TOE is a Linux based multi-user multi-tasking operating system. The TOE
may provide services to several users at the same time. After successful login,
the users have access to a general computing environment, allowing the start-
up of user applications, issuing user commands at shell level, creating and
accessing files. The TOE provides adequate mechanisms to separate the users
and protect their data. Privileged commands are restricted to administrative
users.
The TOE uses the standard Unix model of normal (unprivileged) users and
administrative users that have the capability to get full root privileges.
The TOE is intended to operate in a networked environment with other
instantiations of the TOE as well as other well-behaved client systems operating
within the same management domain (refer to [7], chapter 6.1.5 for more
details). All those systems need to be configured in accordance with a defined
common security policy.
The TOE permits processors and attached peripheral and storage devices to be
used by multiple users to perform a variety of functions requiring controlled
shared access to the data stored on the system. Such installations are typical
for workgroup or enterprise computing systems accessed by users local to, or
with otherwise protected access to, the computer system.
It is assumed that responsibility for the safeguarding of the data protected by
the TOE can be delegated to the TOE users.
All data is under the control of the TOE. The data is stored in named objects,
and the TOE can associate with each controlled object a description of the
access rights to that object.
All individual users are assigned a unique user identifier within the single host
system that forms the TOE. This user identifier is used as the basis for access
control decisions. The TOE authenticates the claimed identity of the user before
allowing the user to perform any further actions.
The TOE enforces controls such that access to data objects can only take place
in accordance with the access restrictions placed on that object by its owner or
administrative users. Ownership of named objects may be transferred under the
control of the access control policy.
Access rights (e.g. read, write, execute) can be assigned to data objects with
respect to subjects (users). Once a subject is granted access to an object, the
content of that object may be freely used to influence other objects accessible
to this subject.
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4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
4.1 Usage assumptions
Based on the personnel assumptions the following usage conditions exist. Refer
to [7], chapter 3.3.2 or chapter 1.6 of this report for more details:
• A.MANAGE
• A.NO_EVIL_ADMIN
• A.COOP
• A.UTRAIN
• A.UTRUST
4.2 Environmental assumptions
The following assumptions about physical and connectivity aspects defined by
the Security Target have to be met (refer to Security Target [7], chapter 3.3.1
and 3.3.3 or chapter 1.6 of this report):
• A.LOCATE
• A.PROTECT
• A.NET_COMP
• A.PEER
• A.CONNECT
Please consider also the requirements for the evaluated configuration specified
in chapter 8 of this report.
4.3 Clarification of scope
The threats listed below have to be averted in order to support the TOE security
capabilities but are not addressed by the TOE itself. They have to be addressed
by the operating environment of the TOE (see also Security Target [7]).
TE.HWMF
An attacker with legitimate physical access to the hardware of the TOE
(examples are maintenance personnel or legitimate users) or
environmental conditions may cause a hardware malfunction with the
effect that a user (normal or administrative) is losing stored data due to
this hardware malfunction. An attacker may cause such a hardware
malfunction either by having physical access to the hardware the TOE is
running on or by executing software that capable of causing hardware
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malfunction. Note that such a hardware malfunction may be caused
accidentally without malicious intent by persons having physical access to
the TOE.
TE.COR_FILE
An attacker (possibly, but not necessarily, an unauthorized user of the
TOE) or environmental conditions like a hardware malfunction may
intentionally or accidentally modify or corrupt security enforcing or relevant
files of the TOE without an administrative user being able to detect this. An
attacker may corrupt such files either by having physical access to the
hardware the TOE is running on, by booting other software than the TOE
in its evaluated configuration or by modifying or corrupting files on backup
media. Note that such a corruption may be caused accidentally without
malicious intent by persons having legitimate access to media where such
data is stored.
TE.HW_SEP
An attacker (possibly, but not necessarily, an unauthorized user of the
TOE) with legitimate physical access to the hardware the TOE is running
on or environmental conditions may cause the underlying hardware
functions of the hardware the TOE is running on to not provide sufficient
capabilities to support the self-protection of the TSF from unauthorized
programs. Note that this also covers persons with legitimate access to the
TOE hardware causing such a problem accidentally without malicious
intent.
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5 Architectural Information
General Overview
SUSE Linux Enterprise Server V 8 with Service Pack 3 (also called SLES in
short) is a general purpose, multi-user, multitasking Linux based operating
system. It provides a platform for a variety of applications in the governmental
and commercial environment. SLES is available on a broad range of computer
systems, ranging from departmental servers to multi-processor enterprise
servers.
The SLES evaluation covers a potentially distributed, but closed network of IBM
servers (xSeries) running the evaluated version of SLES.
The TOE Security Functions (TSF) consist of functions of SLES that run in
kernel mode plus some trusted processes. These are the functions that enforce
the security policy as defined in this Security Target. Tools and commands
executed in user mode that are used by an administrative user need also to be
trusted to manage the system in a secure way. But they are not considered to
be part of this TSF.
The TOE includes installation from CDROM and from a local hard disk partition.
The TOE includes standard networking applications, such as ftp and ssh. xinetd
is used to protect network applications which might otherwise have security
exposures.
System administration tools include the standard commands. A graphical user
interface for system administration or any other operation is not included in the
evaluated configuration.
The TOE environment also includes applications that are not evaluated, but are
used as unprivileged tools to access public system services. For example a
HTTP server using a port above 1024 (e. g. on port 8080) may be used as a
normal application running without root privileges on top of the TOE.
Major structural units of the TOE
The TOE is structured in much the same way as many other operating systems,
especially Unix-type operating systems. It consists of a kernel, which runs in the
privileged state of the processor and provides services to applications (which
those can use by calling kernel services via the system call interface). Direct
access to the underlying abstract machine (hardware or partitioned
environment) is restricted to the kernel, so whenever an application wants to
access hardware like disk drives, network interfaces or other peripheral devices,
it has to call kernel services. The kernel then checks if the application has the
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required access rights and privileges and either performs the service or rejects
the request.
The kernel is also responsible to separate the different user processes. This is
done by the management of the virtual and real memory of the TOE which
ensures that processes executing with different attributes can not directly
access memory areas of other processes but have to do so using the inter-
process communication mechanism provided by the kernel as part of its system
call interface.
The TSF of the TOE also includes a set of trusted processes, which when
initiated by a user with a system call operate with extended privileges. The
programs that represent those trusted processes on the file system are
protected by the file system discretionary access control security function
enforced by the kernel.
In addition the execution of the TOE is controlled by a set of configuration files,
which are also called the TSF database. Also those configuration files are
protected by the file system discretionary access control security function
enforced by the kernel.
Normal users – after they have been successfully authenticated by a defined
trusted process – can start untrusted applications where the kernel enforces the
security policy of the TOE when those applications request services from the
kernel via the system call interface.
This structure is shown in the following figure:
Hardware
Trusted
Processes
TSF
DB
Untrusted
Processes
System Call Interface
Device Drivers Kernel Modules
User
Kernel
Hardware
Figure 1: Overall sttructure of the TOE
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The kernel itself is structured into a number of subsystems which are explained
in detail in the high level design of the TOE. Those are:
File and I/O Subsystem
Implements all file system object related functions. Functions include
those that allow a process to create, maintain, interact and delete file-
system objects, such as regular files, directories, symbolic links, hard links,
device special files, named pipes, and sockets.
Process Subsystem
Implements functions related to process and thread management.
Functions include those that allow the creation, scheduling, execution, and
deletion of process and thread subjects.
Memory Subsystem
Implements functions related to the management of a system’s memory
resources. Functions include those that create and manage virtual
memory, including management of page tables and paging algorithms.
Networking Subsystem
Implements UNIX and internet domain sockets as well as algorithms for
scheduling network packets.
IPC Subsystem
Implements functions related to inter-process communication
mechanisms. Functions include those that facilitate controlled sharing of
information between processes, allowing them to share data and
synchronise their execution in order to interact with a common resource.
Audit Subsystem
Implements the kernel functions required to intercept system calls and
audit them in accordance with the auditing policy defined by the system
administrator.
Kernel Modules Subsystem
Implements an infrastructure to support loadable modules. Functions
include those that load and unload kernel modules.
Device Driver Subsystem
Implements support for various hardware devices through common,
device independent interface.
The trusted processes include the following subsystems:
Identification and Authentication
This includes all the processes that require to identify and authenticate
users. All those processes share a common set of functions (pluggable
authentication modules (PAM)) that ensure the same policy to be enforced
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with respect to identification and authentication of users. Successful as
well as unsuccessful authentication attempts can be audited.
Network Applications
This includes the trusted processes implementing networking functions.
The TOE supports FTP and SSH v2 as well as setting up a secure
channel to another trusted system via the Stunnel client and server
processes using the SSL v3 protocol. The secure configuration as defined
in the Security Target restricts the cipher suites that can be used for
secure communication.
System Management
This includes the trusted commands a system administrator can use to
manage users and groups, set the time and date and check the integrity of
the underlying abstract machine.
Batch Processing
This includes the cron and at trusted processes that allow to execute user
programs at predefined time schedules. They ensure that the users are
restricted to the same security policy restrictions that also apply when they
start programs interactively.
User Level Audit
This includes all the trusted processes and commands outside of the
kernel required to collect, store and process audit records. In addition to
those functions the TOE includes a secure system initialisation function
which brings the TOE into a secure state after it is powered on or after a
reset. This function ensures that user interaction with the TOE can only
occur after the TOE is securely initialised and in a secure state.
Security Functions
The following security functions of the TOE are defined by the Security Target.
Please note that only a short summary for each function is provided here. For a
complete description please refer to [7], chapter 6.2:
Identification and Authentication
The TOE provides identification and authentication using pluggable
authentication modules (PAM) based upon user passwords. The quality of
the passwords used can be enforced through configuration options
controlled by SLES.
Other authentication methods (e. g. Kerberos authentication, token based
authentication) that are supported by SLES as pluggable authentication
modules are not part of the evaluated configuration.
Functions to ensure a basic password strength and limit the use of the su
command and restrict root login to specific terminals are also included.
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Audit
The TOE provides the capability to audit a large number of events
including individual system calls as well as events generated by trusted
processes. Audit data is collected in a configurable number of audit bin
files. When one of those files is full, the TOE switches to the next bin file
and starts an administrator defined program to process the audit records
in the bin file that just has been filled. The TOE provides a program for this
purpose that converts the audit records into a human readable format and
writes them to a sequential file or to a printer. The output could also be
redirected to a program that transfers the audit records to another
machine via a network connection.
The system administrator can define a rule base to restrict auditing to the
events he is interested in. This includes the ability to restrict auditing to
specific events, specific users, specific objects or a combination of all of
this.
Discretionary Access Control
Discretionary Access Control (DAC) restricts access to file system objects
based on Access Control Lists (ACLs) that include the standard UNIX
permissions for user, group and others. Access control mechanisms also
protect IPC objects from unauthorised access.
The TOE includes the ext3 file system, which supports POSIX ACLs. This
allows you to define access rights to files within this type of file system
down to the granularity of a single user.
Object Reuse
File system objects as well as memory and IPC objects will be cleared
before they can be reused by a process belonging to a different user.
Security Management
The management of the security critical parameters of SLES is performed
by administrative users. A set of commands that require root privileges are
used for system management. Security parameters are stored in specific
files that are protected by the access control mechanisms of the TOE
against unauthorised access by users that are not administrative users.
Secure Communication
The TOE supports the definition of trusted channels using either the SSH
v2 or the SSL v3 protocol. In the case of SSH the TOE includes the SSH
server and client functions. Password based authentication is supported.
To use the SSL v3 protocol the TOE provides the stunnel client and server
functions. Only a restricted number of cipher suites are supported for
those protocols in the evaluated configuration. They are listed in the
Security Target.
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TSF Protection
While in operation, the kernel software and data are protected by the
hardware memory protection mechanisms. The memory and process
management components of the kernel ensure a user process cannot
access kernel storage or storage belonging to other processes.
Non-kernel TSF software and data are protected by DAC and process
isolation mechanisms.
In the evaluated configuration, the reserved user ID root owns the
directories and files that define the TSF configuration. In general, files and
directories containing internal TSF data (e.g., configuration files, batch job
queues) are also protected from reading by DAC permissions.
The TOE and the hardware and firmware components are required to be
physically protected from unauthorised access. The system kernel
mediates all access to the hardware mechanisms themselves, other than
program visible CPU instruction functions.
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6 Documentation
The following documentation is provided with the product by the developer to
the customer:
• SLES Security Guide, Version 2.38, April 3, 2006 [10]
• SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 8. Administration. Books delivered in PDF
format as part of the following (platform specific) packages:
sles-admin-x86+x86-64_en 8.1.0.2-5 [11]
• SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 8 – Installation Manuals for the individual
platforms. Books delivered in PDF format as part of the following package:
sles-inst-x86+x86-64_en 8.1.0.2-5 [12]
A full description of the installation and configuration process to get the
evaluated configuration of the TOE can be found in [10]. The user will need [11]
and [12] just to obtain information on the use of the YaST user interface. All
steps required to install and configure the TOE for the evaluated configuration
are contained in [10].
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7 IT Product Testing
Test configuration
The Security Target defines the following hardware basis for the TOE:
• IBM xSeries, model x346
Tests have been performed on the following systems:
• IBM xSeries model 346: 2x Intel Xeon 2 GHz with Hyperthreading
The test system has been installed and configured following the information
provided in the Security Guide [10] with additional software packages required
for the test suite.
Depth/Coverage of Testing
The developer has done substantial functional testing of all externally visible
interfaces (TSFI) on the platform listed above. Internal interfaces of the High-
level design have been covered by direct and indirect testing. The evaluators
repeated the developer tests and conducted additional independent tests and
penetrations tests.
Summary of Developer Testing Effort
Test configuration:
The sponsor/developer has performed the tests on the hardware platform
defined above. The software was installed and configured as in the Guidance
Documents (refer to chapter 6). Additional software was installed on the system
to perform the tests. It was argued by the developer’s Test Plan that this
additional software was within the boundary defined by the Security Target and
did not constitute a violation of the evaluated configuration.
Testing approach:
The sponsor/developer used several test suites and manual tests to test the
TOE. One of the test suites used was the LTP test suite. It is an adapted
version of tests from the Linux Test Project of which the sponsor is a member.
The tests have a common framework in which individual test cases adhere to a
common structure for setup execution and cleanup of tests. Each test case may
contain several tests of the same function, stressing different parts (for
example, base functionality, behaviour with illegal parameters and reaction to
missing privileges). Each test within a test case reports PASS respectively OK
or FAIL and the test case summary in batch mode reports PASS if all the tests
within the test case passed, otherwise FAIL.
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Tests can be executed either manually by running the individual test case files
or run in batch mode by running an overall script.
Testing results:
All actual test results were consistent with the expected test results.
Summary of Evaluator Testing Effort
Test configuration:
The evaluator had the same machine available as the developer. Test have
been carried out on the IBM x346 platform. The machine was conformant to the
Security Target requirements and has been set up according to the Security
Guide [10].
Testing approach:
Since the this evaluation is a re-evaluation of a previous evaluation of the TOE
without changed security functionality the evaluator repeated all automated
developer tests on the hardware platform listed above. In addition the evaluator
attended the developer testing on all other platforms. Additional tests were
defined and executed by the evaluation facility in the following areas:
• Identification & Authentication
• Audit
• Access Control
• TSF Protection
• Object Reuse
Testing results:
All actual test results were consistent with the expected test results.
Evaluator penetration testing:
The evaluators have devised a set of penetration tests based on
• Common sources for vulnerabilities of the Linux Operating System,
• Findings of their evaluation work examination.
• The penetration testing addressed the following security functions:
• Audit
• Discretionary Access Control
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• TSF Protection
with some emphasis on the TSF Protection.
The penetration testing showed the existence of vulnerabilities but none of the
vulnerabilities were exploitable in the intended environment of the TOE and/or
the attack potential assumed for EAL3 (AVA_VLA.1).
Expansion of the results on other hardware platforms
The Security Target [7] defines the IBM xSeries model x346 with a set of
supported peripherals as the hardware base for the TOE.
The IBM xSeries models are multi-processor system using Intel XEON
processors with Hyperthreading technology. The tests have been performed
only using multi-processor version of the kernel.
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8 Evaluated Configuration
According to the Security Target the evaluated configuration of the TOE (as
specified in chapter 2 of this report) is defined as follows (refer also to the
Security Target [7]):
The TOE “SUSE Linux Enterprise Server V 8 with Service Pack 3” is delivered
by SUSE Linux Products GmbH a CD-ROM or DVD and via the internet. In
addition to the packages delivered on CD-ROM/DVD (SUSE Linux Enterprise
Server 8) the Release Candidate 4 of Service Pack 3 and additional packages
(refer to chapter 2 for a complete package listing) have to be downloaded from
the SUSE ftp-server. The integrity and authenticity of this software has to be
verified during the installation process. The packages (rpm) as specified in
chapter 2 make up the evaluated version of the TOE.
The configuration requirements for the TOE are defined in chapter 2.4 and
subsequent chapters of the Security Target [7] and are summarised here
(please refer to the Security Target for the precise and more detailed
description):
• The CC evaluated package set must be selected at install time in
accordance with the description provided in the Security Guide [10] and
installed accordingly;
• SLES supports the use of IPv4 and IPv6, only IPv4 is included within the
TOE;
• Both installation from CD and installation from a defined disk partition are
supported;
• The default configuration for identification and authentication are the defined
password based PAM modules. Support for other authentication options e.g.
smartcard authentication, is not included in the evaluation configuration;
• If the system console is used, it must be connected directly to the
workstation and requires the same physical protection as the workstation;
• The TOE comprises a single server machine (and optional peripherals)
running the allowed system software (refer to list of allowed packages). A
server running the allowed software is referred to as a “TOE server” in the
following. Details on the allowed peripherals can be found in [7], chapter
2.4.2.
• Several TOE servers may be interlinked by a LAN, which may be joined by
bridges/routers or by TOE workstations which act as routers / gateways.
• Each TOE server within this network implements its own security policy. No
synchronisation function for those policies exists.
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• If other systems are connected to the network they need to be configured
and managed by the same authority using an appropriate security policy not
conflicting with the security policy of the TOE.
• The following file systems are supported: the Ext3 journaling filesystem, the
ISO 9660 file system for CD-ROM drives and the process file system,
procfs, the devpts virtual file system used to provide pseudo terminal
support, the shmfs virtual file system used for nonpersistent memory-backed
storage.
Note:
A graphical user interface for system administration or any other operation is
not included in the evaluated configuration.
The TOE environment also includes applications that are not evaluated, but are
used as unprivileged tools to access public system services. For example a
HTTP server using a port above 1024 (e. g. on port 8080) may be used as a
normal application running without root privileges on top of the TOE.
For setting up / configuring the TOE all guidance documents (refer to chapter 6
of this report) especially document [10] has to be followed.
The following constraints concerning the allowed hardware and peripherals are
made in the Security Target (refer to [7], chapter 2.4.2):
Hardware Platform:
IBM xSeries x346 (Intel Xeon based multi processor server)
Peripherals:
All terminals and printers supported by the TOE
(except hot pluggable devices connected via USB or IEEE 1394
(Firewire) interfaces)
All storage devices and backup devices supported by the TOE (hard
disks, CDROM drives, streamer drives, floppy disk drives)
(except hot pluggable devices connected via USB or IEEE 1394
(Firewire) interfaces)
All Ethernet and Token-Ring network adapters supported by the TOE
Note: The peripherals are physical peripherals. Logical partitioning is not
supported on the above listed hardware platforms. Excluding hot pluggable
devices connected via USB does not exclude all USB devices. USB keyboards
and mice may be attached provided they are connected before booting the
operating system.
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9 Results of the Evaluation
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR), [8] was provided by the ITSEF
according to the Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of
the Scheme [3] and all interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as
relevant for the TOE.
The evaluation methodology CEM [2] was used for those components identical
with EAL3. For the component ALC_FLR.3 (Systematic flaw remediation) the
CEM supplementation on “ALC_FLR – Flaw remediation”, Version 1.1,
February 2002 has been used.
The verdicts for the CC, Part 3 assurance components (according to EAL3
augmented by ALC_FLR.3 and the class ASE for the Security Target
evaluation) are summarised in the following table.
Assurance Classes and Components Verdict
Security Target CC Class ASE PASS
TOE description ASE_DES.1 PASS
Security environment ASE_ENV.1 PASS
ST introduction ASE_INT.1 PASS
Security objectives ASE_OBJ.1 PASS
PP claims ASE_PPC.1 PASS
IT security requirements ASE_REQ.1 PASS
Explicitly stated IT security requirements ASE_SRE.1 PASS
TOE summary specification ASE_TSS.1 PASS
Configuration management CC Class ACM PASS
Authorisation controls ACM_CAP.3 PASS
TOE CM coverage ACM_SCP.1 PASS
Delivery and Operation CC Class ADO PASS
Delivery Procedures ADO_DEL.1 PASS
Installation, generation, and start-up procedures ADO_IGS.1 PASS
Development CC class ADV PASS
Informal functional specification ADV_FSP.1 PASS
Security enforcing high-level design ADV_HLD.2 PASS
Informal correspondence demonstration ADV_RCR.1 PASS
Guidance documents CC Class AGD PASS
Administrator guidance AGD_ADM.1 PASS
User guidance AGD_USR.1 PASS
Life cycle support CC Class ALC PASS
Identification of security measures ALC_DVS.1 PASS
Systematic flaw remediaton ALC_FLR.3 PASS
Tests CC Class ATE PASS
Analysis of coverage ATE_COV.2 PASS
Testing: high-level design ATE_DPT.1 PASS
Functional testing ATE_FUN.1 PASS
Independent testing - sample ATE_IND.2 PASS
Vulnerability assessment CC Class AVA PASS
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Assurance Classes and Components Verdict
Examination of guidance AVA_MSU.1 PASS
Strength of TOE security function evaluation AVA_SOF.1 PASS
Developer vulnerability analysis AVA_VLA.1 PASS
The current certification is a re-certification of BSI-DSZ-CC-0327-2005. There
have been no changes in the security functions of the TOE. Security updates
and patches have been applied and a different hardware platform has been
used in this certification.
The evaluation has shown that:
• the TOE is conform to the Protection Profile “Controlled Access
Protection Profile (CAPP), Issue 1.d, 08.10.1999” [9]
• Security Functional Requirements specified for the TOE are Common
Criteria Part 2 extended
• the assurance of the TOE is Common Criteria Part 3 conformant, EAL3
augmented by ALC_FLR.3 Systematic flaw remediation
• The following TOE Security Functions fulfil the claimed Strength of
Function: The authentication function (IA) using passwords
The rating of the strength of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms
suitable for encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2).
This holds for
(i) the security function Secure Communication (SC) and
(ii) Random number generation as part of the security function SC.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the SUSE Linux Enterprise
Server V 8 with Service Pack 3 in the evaluated configuration (list of packages
as outlined in chapter 2 of this report).
The validity can be extended to new versions and releases of the product,
provided the sponsor applies for re-certification or assurance continuity of the
modified product, in accordance with the procedural requirements, and the
evaluation of the modified product does not reveal any security deficiencies.
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10 Comments/Recommendations
The operational guidance documents as listed in chapter 6 of this report and the
Security Target [7] contain necessary information about the usage of the TOE
and all security hints therein have to be considered.
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11 Annexes
None.
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12 Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [7] of the Target of Evaluation
(TOE) is provided within a separate document.
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13 Definitions
13.1 Acronyms
ACL Access Control List
AMD Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.
AU Audit
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
DA/DAC Discretionary Access Control
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
HTTP Hyper Text Transfer Protocol
IA Identification and Authentication
IPC Interprocess Communication
ISO International Organisation for Standardisation
IEEE Institute of Electrical & Electronics Engineers
IT Information Technology
LTP Linux Test Project
OSP Organisational Security Policy
OR Object Reuse
PAM Password authentication module
PCMCIA Personal Computer Memory Card International Association
PP Protection Profile
RPM Red Hat Package Manager
SC Secure Communication
SF Security Function
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SOF Strength of Function
SM Security Management
SLES SUSE Linux Enterprise Server
SSH Secure Shell
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SSL Secure Sockets Layer
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TP TSF Protection
TSC TSF Scope of Control
TSF TOE Security Functions
TSP TOE Security Policy
TST TST mode of the DEP/PCI
USB Universal Serial Bus
YaST Yet Another Setup Tool
13.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more assurance component(s) from CC
Part 3 to an EAL or assurance package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not
contained in part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the
CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics
based on well-established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - An entity within the TSC that contains or receives information and
upon which subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent set of security require-
ments for a category of TOEs that meet specific consumer needs.
Security Function - A part or parts of the TOE that have to be relied upon for
enforcing a closely related subset of the rules from the TSP.
Security Target - A set of security requirements and specifications to be used
as the basis for evaluation of an identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined
semantics.
Strength of Function - A qualification of a TOE security function expressing
the minimum efforts assumed necessary to defeat its expected security
behaviour by directly attacking its underlying security mechanisms.
SOF-basic - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against casual breach of TOE
security by attackers possessing a low attack potential.
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SOF-medium - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows
that the function provides adequate protection against straightforward or
intentional breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a moderate attack
potential.
SOF-high - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against deliberately planned or
organised breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a high attack
potential.
Subject - An entity within the TSC that causes operations to be performed.
Target of Evaluation - An IT product or system and its associated
administrator and user guidance documentation that is the subject of an
evaluation.
TOE Security Functions - A set consisting of all hardware, software, and
firmware of the TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the
TSP.
TOE Security Policy - A set of rules that regulate how assets are managed,
protected and distributed within a TOE.
TSF Scope of Control - The set of interactions that can occur with or within a
TOE and are subject to the rules of the TSP.
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14 Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 2.1, August 1999
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
(CEM), Part 1, Version 0.6; Part 2: Evaluation Methodology, Version 1.0,
August 1999
[3] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4] Applicaton Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for
the TOE.
[5] Applicaton Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme AIS33, Version 2 –
“Methodologie zur Fehlerbehebung – Flaw Remediation”, 26.07.2002
[6] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148, BSI 7149), periodically
updated list published also on the BSI Web-site
[7] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0371, Version 2.11, 31.03.2006, SUSE
Linux Enterprise Server V 8 with Service Pack 3 Security Target for
CAPP Compliance, SUSE Linux Products GmbH, IBM Corporation
[8] Evaluation Technical Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0371, Version 2.0,
19.04.2006, atsec information security GmbH (confidential document)
[9] Controlled Access Protection Profile (CAPP), Version 1.d National
Security Agency, 1999-10-08
User Guidance Documentation:
[10] SLES Security Guide, Version 2.38, April 3, 2006
[11] SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 8. Administration. Books delivered in PDF
format as part of the following (platform specific) packages:
sles-admin-x86+x86-64_en 8.1.0.2-5 (for xSeries)
[12] SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 8 – Installation Manuals for the individual
platforms. Books delivered in PDF format as part of the following
package: sles-inst-x86+x86-64_en 8.1.0.2-5
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C Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part 1:
Caveats on evaluation results (chapter 5.4) / Final Interpretation 008
The conformance result indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is
met by a TOE or PP that passes its evaluation. This conformance result is presented
with respect to Part 2 (functional requirements), Part 3 (assurance requirements) and, if
applicable, to a pre-defined set of requirements (e.g., EAL, Protection Profile).
The conformance result consists of one of the following:
Part 2 conformant - A PP or TOE is Part 2 conformant if the functional requirements
are based only upon functional components in Part 2
Part 2 extended - A PP or TOE is Part 2 extended if the functional requirements
include functional components not in Part 2
plus one of the following:
Part 3 conformant - A PP or TOE is Part 3 conformant if the assurance requirements
are based only upon assurance components in Part 3
Part 3 extended - A PP or TOE is Part 3 extended if the assurance requirements
include assurance requirements not in Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance result may include a statement made with respect to sets
of defined requirements, in which case it consists of one of the following:
Package name Conformant - A PP or TOE is conformant to a pre-defined named
functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements (functions or
assurance) include all components in the packages listed as part of the conformance
result.
Package name Augmented - A PP or TOE is an augmentation of a pre-defined
named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements (functions
or assurance) are a proper superset of all components in the packages listed as part of
the conformance result.
Finally, the conformance result may also include a statement made with respect to
Protection Profiles, in which case it includes the following:
PP Conformant - A TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.
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CC Part 3:
Assurance categorisation (chapter 2.5)
„The assurance classes, families, and the abbreviation for each family are shown in
Table 2.1.
Assurance Class Assurance Family Abbreviated Name
Class ACM:
Configuration
management
CM automation ACM_AUT
CM capabilities ACM_CAP
CM scope ACM_SCP
Class ADO: Delivery
and operation
Delivery ADO_DEL
Installation, generation and start-up ADO_IGS
Class ADV:
Development
Functional specification ADV_FSP
High-level design ADV_HLD
Implementation representation ADV_IMP
TSF internals ADV_INT
Low-level design ADV_LLD
Representation correspondence ADV_RCR
Security policy modeling ADV_SPM
Class AGD: Guidance
documents
Administrator guidance AGD_ADM
User guidance AGD_USR
Class ALC: Life cycle
support
Development security ALC_DVS
Flaw remediation ALC_FLR
Life cycle definition ALC_LCD
Tools and techniques ALC_TAT
Class ATE: Tests Coverage ATE_COV
Depth ATE_DPT
Functional tests ATE_FUN
Independent testing ATE_IND
Class AVA:
Vulnerability
assessment
Covert channel analysis AVA_CCA
MiSUSE AVA_MSU
Strength of TOE security functions AVA_SOF
Vulnerability analysis AVA_VLA
Table 4: Assurance family breakdown and mapping
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Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 6)
„The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances
the level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of
assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE
at the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the
operational use of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from Part 3 are included in
the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable
assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be
considered for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide
utility.
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 6.1)
Table 6.1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically
ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the
resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.
As outlined in the next section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance
levels are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically
ordered inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The
increase in assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a
hierarchically higher assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e.
increasing rigour, scope, and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components
from other assurance families (i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as
described in chapter 2 of this Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than
one component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every
component are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of
assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation“ allows the addition of assurance
components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the
substitution of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance
component in the same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs
defined in the CC, only EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a
constituent assurance component“ is not recognised by the CC as a valid claim.
Augmentation carries with it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility
and added value of the added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be
extended with explicitly stated assurance requirements.
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Assurance
Class
Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1 EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6 EAL7
Configuration
management
ACM_AUT 1 1 2 2
ACM_CAP 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ACM_SCP 1 2 3 3 3
Delivery and
operation
ADO_DEL 1 1 2 2 2 3
ADO_IGS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Development ADV_FSP 1 1 1 2 3 3 4
ADV_HLD 1 2 2 3 4 5
ADV_IMP 1 2 3 3
ADV_INT 1 2 3
ADV_LLD 1 1 2 2
ADV_RCR 1 1 1 1 2 2 3
ADV_SPM 1 3 3 3
Guidance
documents
AGD_ADM 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_USR 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
support
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 2 2 3
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 2 2 3
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_CCA 1 2 2
AVA_MSU 1 2 2 3 3
AVA_SOF 1 1 1 1 1 1
AVA_VLA 1 1 2 3 4 4
Table 5: Evaluation assurance level summary
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Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 6.2.1)
„Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the
threats to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent
assurance is required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with
respect to the protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including
independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance
documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could be successfully
conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner
consistent with its documentation, and that it provides useful protection against
identified threats.“
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 6.2.2)
„Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design
information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the
developer than is consistent with good commercial practice. As such it should not
require a substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require
a low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready
availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when
securing legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.“
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked
(chapter 6.2.3)
„Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound
development practices.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation
of the TOE and its development without substantial re-engineering.“
Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and
reviewed (chapter 6.2.4)
„Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security
engineering based on good commercial development practices which, though rigorous,
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do not require substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the
highest level at which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing
product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require
a moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity
TOEs and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.“
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested
(chapter 6.2.5)
„Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering
based upon rigorous commercial development practices supported by moderate
application of specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be
designed and developed with the intent of achieving EAL5 assurance. It is likely that
the additional costs attributable to the EAL5 requirements, relative to rigorous
development without the application of specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require
a high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a
rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to
specialist security engineering techniques.“
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and
tested (chapter 6.2.6)
„Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security
engineering techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a
premium TOE for protecting high value assets against significant risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in
high risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional
costs.“
Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 6.2.7)
„Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely
high risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs.
Practical application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security
functionality that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.“
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Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF) (chapter 14.3)
AVA_SOF Strength of TOE security functions
„Objectives
Even if a TOE security function cannot be bypassed, deactivated, or corrupted, it may
still be possible to defeat it because there is a vulnerability in the concept of its
underlying security mechanisms. For those functions a qualification of their security
behaviour can be made using the results of a quantitative or statistical analysis of the
security behaviour of these mechanisms and the effort required to overcome them. The
qualification is made in the form of a strength of TOE security function claim.“
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA) (chapter 14.4)
AVA_VLA Vulnerability analysis
„Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether vulnerabilities identified,
during the evaluation of the construction and anticipated operation of the TOE or by
other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses), could allow users to violate the TSP.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that a user will be able to discover flaws
that will allow unauthorised access to resources (e.g. data), allow the ability to interfere
with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.“
„Application notes
A vulnerability analysis is performed by the developer in order to ascertain the
presence of security vulnerabilities, and should consider at least the contents of all the
TOE deliverables including the ST for the targeted evaluation assurance level. The
developer is required to document the disposition of identified vulnerabilities to allow
the evaluator to make use of that information if it is found useful as a support for the
evaluator's independent vulnerability analysis.“
„Independent vulnerability analysis goes beyond the vulnerabilities identified by the
developer. The main intent of the evaluator analysis is to determine that the TOE is
resistant to penetration attacks performed by an attacker possessing a low (for
AVA_VLA.2), moderate (for AVA_VLA.3) or high (for AVA_VLA.4) attack potential.“
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