TrustCB B.V.
Registered address:
Van den Berghlaan 48, 2132 AT
Hoofddorp, The Netherlands
nscib@trustcb.com
https://trustcb.com/common-criteria/nscib/
https://nscib.nl
TrustCB B.V. is a registered company at the
Netherlands Chamber of Commerce (KVK),
under number 858360275.
Version
2022-03
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Certification Report
JPKI applet v1.0 on Sm@rtSIM CX Copernicus ST54J/K
Sponsor: The Government of Japan
Digital Agency, Tokyo Garden Terrace Kioicho 19F
Kioicho 1-3, Chiyoda-ku
Tokyo 102-0094
Japan
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications,
Kasumigaseki 1-2-1, Chiyoda-ku
Tokyo 100-8926
Japan
Developer: FeliCa Networks, Inc.
West Tower 16F, Gate City Osaki, 1-11-1
Osaki, Shinagawa-ku
Tokyo 141-0032
Japan
Evaluation facility: SGS Brightsight B.V.
Brassersplein 2
2612 CT Delft
The Netherlands
Report number: NSCIB-CC-2300011-01-CR
Report version: 1
Project number: NSCIB-2300011-01
Author(s): Kjartan Jæger Kvassnes
Date: 27 April 2023
Number of pages: 11
Number of appendices: 0
Reproduction of this report is authorised only if the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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CONTENTS
Foreword 3
Recognition of the Certificate 4
International recognition 4
European recognition 4
1 Executive Summary 5
2 Certification Results 6
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation 6
2.2 Security Policy 6
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 6
2.3.1 Assumptions 6
2.3.2 Clarification of scope 6
2.4 Architectural Information 7
2.5 Documentation 7
2.6 IT Product Testing 7
2.6.1 Testing approach and depth 7
2.6.2 Independent penetration testing 8
2.6.3 Test configuration 8
2.6.4 Test results 8
2.7 Reused Evaluation Results 8
2.8 Evaluated Configuration 8
2.9 Evaluation Results 8
2.10 Comments/Recommendations 9
3 Security Target 10
4 Definitions 10
5 Bibliography 11
Page: 3/11 of report number: NSCIB-CC-2300011-01-CR, dated 27 April 2023
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Foreword
The Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security (NSCIB) provides a third-party
evaluation and certification service for determining the trustworthiness of Information Technology (IT)
security products. Under this NSCIB, TrustCB B.V. has the task of issuing certificates for IT security
products, as well as for protection profiles and sites.
Part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product, protection profile or site
according to the Common Criteria assessment guidelines published by the NSCIB. Evaluations are
performed by an IT Security Evaluation Facility (ITSEF) under the oversight of the NSCIB Certification
Body, which is operated by TrustCB B.V. in cooperation with the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom
Relations.
An ITSEF in the Netherlands is a commercial facility that has been licensed by TrustCB B.V. to
perform Common Criteria evaluations; a significant requirement for such a licence is accreditation to
the requirements of ISO Standard 17025 “General requirements for the accreditation of calibration and
testing laboratories”.
By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, TrustCB B.V. asserts that the product or site complies with
the security requirements specified in the associated (site) security target, or that the protection profile
(PP) complies with the requirements for PP evaluation specified in the Common Criteria for
Information Security Evaluation. A (site) security target is a requirements specification document that
defines the scope of the evaluation activities.
The consumer should review the (site) security target or protection profile, in addition to this
certification report, to gain an understanding of any assumptions made during the evaluation, the IT
product's intended environment, its security requirements, and the level of confidence (i.e., the
evaluation assurance level) that the product or site satisfies the security requirements stated in the
(site) security target.
Reproduction of this report is authorised only if the report is reproduced in its entirety.
Page: 4/11 of report number: NSCIB-CC-2300011-01-CR, dated 27 April 2023
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Recognition of the Certificate
Presence of the Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement (CCRA) and the SOG-IS logos on the
certificate indicates that this certificate is issued in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA and
the SOG-IS Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOG-IS MRA) and will be recognised by the participating
nations.
International recognition
The CCRA was signed by the Netherlands in May 2000 and provides mutual recognition of certificates
based on the Common Criteria (CC). Since September 2014 the CCRA has been updated to provide
mutual recognition of certificates based on cPPs (exact use) or STs with evaluation assurance
components up to and including EAL2+ALC_FLR.
For details of the current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, see
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
European recognition
The SOG-IS MRA Version 3, effective since April 2010, provides mutual recognition in Europe of
Common Criteria and ITSEC certificates at a basic evaluation level for all products. A higher
recognition level for evaluation levels beyond EAL4 (respectively E3-basic) is provided for products
related to specific technical domains. This agreement was signed initially by Finland, France,
Germany, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Italy joined the SOG-IS
MRA in December 2010.
For details of the current list of signatory nations, approved certification schemes and the list of
technical domains for which the higher recognition applies, see https://www.sogis.eu.
Page: 5/11 of report number: NSCIB-CC-2300011-01-CR, dated 27 April 2023
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1 Executive Summary
This Certification Report states the outcome of the Common Criteria security evaluation of the JPKI
applet v1.0 on Sm@rtSIM CX Copernicus ST54J/K. The developer of the JPKI applet v1.0 on
Sm@rtSIM CX Copernicus ST54J/K is FeliCa Networks, Inc. located in Tokyo, Japan and The
Government of Japan was the sponsor of the evaluation and certification. A Certification Report is
intended to assist prospective consumers when judging the suitability of the IT security properties of
the product for their particular requirements.
The TOE is a Java Card system that provides a secure signature creation device (SSCD) with key
generation for creating an electronic signature and authenticating users. The TOE is embedded as a
secure element (eSE) on the mobile phones.
The TOE has been evaluated by SGS Brightsight B.V. located in Delft, The Netherlands. The
evaluation was completed on 27 April 2023 with the approval of the ETR. The certification procedure
has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Netherlands Scheme for Certification in
the Area of IT Security [NSCIB].
The scope of the evaluation is defined by the security target [ST], which identifies assumptions made
during the evaluation, the intended environment for the JPKI applet v1.0 on Sm@rtSIM CX
Copernicus ST54J/K, the security requirements, and the level of confidence (evaluation assurance
level) at which the product is intended to satisfy the security requirements. Consumers of the JPKI
applet v1.0 on Sm@rtSIM CX Copernicus ST54J/K are advised to verify that their own environment is
consistent with the security target, and to give due consideration to the comments, observations and
recommendations in this certification report.
The results documented in the evaluation technical report [ETR] 1
for this product provide sufficient
evidence that the TOE meets the EAL4 augmented (EAL4+) assurance requirements for the evaluated
security functionality. This assurance level is augmented with ALC_DVS.2 (Sufficiency of security
measures) and AVA_VAN.5 (Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis).
The evaluation was conducted using the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 [CEM] for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information
Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 [CC] (Parts I, II and III).
TrustCB B.V., as the NSCIB Certification Body, declares that the evaluation meets all the conditions
for international recognition of Common Criteria Certificates and that the product will be listed on the
NSCIB Certified Products list. Note that the certification results apply only to the specific version of the
product as evaluated.
1
The Evaluation Technical Report contains information proprietary to the developer and/or the
evaluator, and is not available for public review.
Page: 6/11 of report number: NSCIB-CC-2300011-01-CR, dated 27 April 2023
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2 Certification Results
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) for this evaluation is the JPKI applet v1.0 on Sm@rtSIM CX
Copernicus ST54J/K from FeliCa Networks, Inc. located in Tokyo, Japan.
The TOE is comprised of the following main components:
Delivery
item type
Identifier Version
Software
Sm@rtSIM CX Copernicus 2.0
JPKI applet 1.0
Hardware ST54J / ST54K Rev C
To ensure secure usage a set of guidance documents is provided, together with the JPKI applet v1.0
on Sm@rtSIM CX Copernicus ST54J/K. For details, see section 2.5 “Documentation” of this report.
The ST54J / ST54K identified in [HW-MAINT] is the same version as the one mentioned in the IC
certificate [HW-CERT] which was confirmed to be identical for the scope of the composite TOE.
For a detailed and precise description of the TOE lifecycle, see the [ST], Chapter 1.5.
2.2 Security Policy
The TOE is a Java Card configured to provide a contact and contactless integrated-circuit (IC) chip
containing components to securely create, use and manage signature-creation data (SCD) with key
generation. The TOE is embedded as a secure element on the mobile phone.
The TOE has the following features:
• generates SCD for digital signature and the correspondent SVD;
• generates SCD for user certification and the correspondent SVD;
• exports the SVDs for certification;
• is able to receive and store certificate info;
• is able to switch the TOE from a non-operational state to an operational state;
• creates digital signatures; and
• authenticates user for user certification.
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
2.3.1 Assumptions
The assumptions defined in the Security Target are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead
to specific Security Objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. For detailed information on the
security objectives that must be fulfilled by the TOE environment, see section 4.2 of the [ST].
2.3.2 Clarification of scope
The evaluation did not reveal any threats to the TOE that are not countered by the evaluated security
functions of the product.
Page: 7/11 of report number: NSCIB-CC-2300011-01-CR, dated 27 April 2023
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2.4 Architectural Information
The TOE is a Java Card system that provides a secure signature creation device (SSCD) with key
generation for creating an electronic signature and authenticating users. The TOE is embedded as a
secure element (eSE) on the mobile phone.
2.5 Documentation
The following documentation is provided with the product by the developer to the customer:
Identifier Version
[AGD DA] FeliCa Networks, JPKI applet, Delivery and acceptance
procedure
Version 1.0
[AGD IP] FeliCa Networks, JPKI applet, Installation procedure Version 1.0
[AGD UG] FeliCa Networks, JPKI applet User guidance Version 1.0
2.6 IT Product Testing
Testing (depth, coverage, functional tests, independent testing): The evaluators examined the
developer’s testing activities documentation and verified that the developer has met their testing
responsibilities.
2.6.1 Testing approach and depth
The developer performed extensive testing on functional specification, subsystem and module level.
All parameter choices were addressed at least once. All boundary cases identified were tested
explicitly, and additionally the near-boundary conditions were covered probabilistically. The testing
was largely automated using industry standard and proprietary test suites. Test scripts were used
extensively to verify that the functions return the expected values. The set of tests cases are defined
based on the applet specifications. A decision table is devised based on a big list of conditions
including command parameters, internal states and file system conditions. The test cases (scripts) are
automatically created based on these decision tables. A total of 2788 test cases are executed.
The underlying hardware and crypto-library test results are extendable to composite evaluations,
because the underlying platform is operated according to its guidance and the composite evaluation
requirements are met.
For the testing performed by the evaluators, the developer provided samples and a test environment.
The evaluators reproduced a selection of the developer tests, as well as a small number of test cases
designed by the evaluator.
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2.6.2 Independent penetration testing
The methodical analysis performed was conducted along the following steps:
• When evaluating the evidence in the classes ASE, ADV and AGD the evaluator considers
whether potential vulnerabilities can already be identified due to the TOE type and/or specified
behaviour in such an early stage of the evaluation.
• For ADV_IMP a thorough implementation representation review is performed on the TOE.
During this attack oriented analysis the protection of the TOE is analysed using the knowledge
gained from all previous evaluation classes. This results in the identification of (additional)
potential vulnerabilities. For this analysis will be performed according to the attack methods in
[JIL-AP]. An important source for assurance in this step is the technical report [ETRfC] of the
underlying platform.
• All potential vulnerabilities are analysed using the knowledge gained from all evaluation
classes and information from the public domain. A judgment was made on how to assure that
these potential vulnerabilities are not exploitable. The potential vulnerabilities are addressed
by penetration testing, a guidance update or in other ways that are deemed appropriate.
The total test effort expended by the evaluators was 21 days. During that test campaign, 16% of the
total time was spent on Perturbation attacks, 33% on side-channel testing and 50% on logical attacks.
2.6.3 Test configuration
The TOE was tested in the following configurations:
• JPKI Applet v1.0 on Sm@rtSIM CX Copernicus 2020 v2.0 using ISO 7816:
o CPLC:
§ IC fabricator: 00 02 (STMicroelectronics SA);
§ IC type: 00 10 (ST54JSEt1);
§ OS ID: A3 0D.
o Vendor proprietary tag DF77: 02 20 07 FF FF;
o JPKI Applet identifier: 0402.
2.6.4 Test results
The testing activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected results and observed
results are summarised in the [ETR], with references to the documents containing the full details.
The developer’s tests and the independent functional tests produced the expected results, giving
assurance that the TOE behaves as specified in its [ST] and functional specification.
No exploitable vulnerabilities were found with the independent penetration tests.
The algorithmic security level of cryptographic functionality has not been rated in this certification
process, but the current consensus on the algorithmic security level in the open domain, i.e., from the
current best cryptanalytic attacks published, has been taken into account.
2.7 Reused Evaluation Results
There has been extensive reuse of the ALC aspects for the sites involved in the development and
production of the TOE, by use of 1 site certificate and 2 Site Technical Audit Reports.
No sites have been visited as part of this evaluation.
2.8 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is defined uniquely by its name and version number JPKI applet v1.0 on Sm@rtSIM CX
Copernicus ST54J/K.
2.9 Evaluation Results
The evaluation lab documented their evaluation results in the [ETR], which references an ASE
Intermediate Report and other evaluator documents.
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The verdict of each claimed assurance requirement is “Pass”.
Based on the above evaluation results the evaluation lab concluded the JPKI applet v1.0 on
Sm@rtSIM CX Copernicus ST54J/K, to be CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 conformant, and to meet
the requirements of EAL 4 augmented with ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5. This implies that the
product satisfies the security requirements specified in Security Target [ST].
The Security Target claims ’strict’ conformance to the Protection Profile [EN419211-2] and
[EN419211-4].
2.10 Comments/Recommendations
The user guidance as outlined in section 2.5 “Documentation” contains necessary information about
the usage of the TOE. Certain aspects of the TOE’s security functionality, in particular the
countermeasures against attacks, depend on accurate conformance to the user guidance of both the
software and the hardware part of the TOE. There are no particular obligations or recommendations
for the user apart from following the user guidance. Please note that the documents contain relevant
details concerning the resistance against certain attacks.
In addition, all aspects of assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not
covered by the TOE itself must be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk
management process. For the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, the
customer should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the TOE is required and thus
requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms and protocols was not rated in the course of this
evaluation. This specifically applies to the following proprietary or non-standard algorithms, protocols
and implementations: <none>, which are out of scope as there are no security claims relating to these.
Not all key sizes specified in the [ST] have sufficient cryptographic strength to satisfy the AVA_VAN.5
“high attack potential”. To be protected against attackers with a "high attack potential", appropriate
cryptographic algorithms with sufficiently large cryptographic key sizes shall be used (references can
be found in national and international documents and standards).
Page: 10/11 of report number: NSCIB-CC-2300011-01-CR, dated 27 April 2023
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3 Security Target
The FeliCa Networks, Security Target for JPKI applet on Sm@rtSIM CX Copernicus ST54J/K, Version
1.2 [ST] is included here by reference.
4 Definitions
This list of acronyms and definitions contains elements that are not already defined by the CC or CEM:
IT Information Technology
ITSEF IT Security Evaluation Facility
JIL Joint Interpretation Library
NSCIB Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the area of IT Security
PP Protection Profile
TOE Target of Evaluation
eSE Embedded Secure Element
SSCD Secure Signature Creation Device
SCD Signature Creation Data
SVD Signature Verification Data
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5 Bibliography
This section lists all referenced documentation used as source material in the compilation of this
report.
[CC] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Parts I, II
and III, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
[EN419211-2] EN 419 211-2:2013, Protection profiles for secure signature creation device -
Part 2: Device with key generation, V2.0.1, registered under the reference
BSI-CC-PP-0059-2009-MA-02
[EN419211-4] EN 419 211-4:2013, Protection profiles for secure signature creation device -
Part 4: Extension for device with key generation and trusted channel to
certificate generation application, registered under the reference BSI-CC-PP-
0071-2012-MA-01
[ETR] Evaluation Technical Report JPKI applet on JCOP 4.1 – EAL4+, 22-RPT-
1447, Version 6.0, 25 April 2023
[HW-CERT] ANSSI, Certificat ANSSI-CC-2019/20-S04, ST54J / ST54K A05, 01 March
2023
[HW-ETRfC] Serma, Surveillance Technical Lite Report for ST54J/K, Version 1.0, 16
December 2022
[HW-ST] STMicroelectronics, ST54J A01 Security Target for composition, Rev A01.3,
issued in March 2019.
[HW-SUR] ANSSI, Rapport de surveillance ANSSI-CC-2019/20-S04, ST54J / ST54K
A05, 01 March 2023
[HW-MAINT] ANSSI, Rapport de maintenance ANSSI-CC-2019/20-M03, ST54J / ST54K
A05, 01 March 2023
[JIL-AAPS] JIL Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards, Version 3.1, June 2020
[JIL-AM] Attack Methods for Smartcards and Similar Devices, Version 2.4, January
2020 (sensitive with controlled distribution)
[NSCIB] Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security, Version 2.6,
22 August 2022
[PP_0084] Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation Packages,
registered under the reference BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014, Version 1.0, 13
January 2014
[ST] FeliCa Networks, Security Target for JPKI applet on Sm@rtSIM CX
Copernicus ST54J/K, Version 1.2
(This is the end of this report.)