National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation
Scheme
Validation Report
Aruba, a Hewlett Packard Enterprise Company
8000 Foothills Blvd
Roseville, CA 95747 USA
Aruba, a Hewlett Packard Enterprise Company
8320 and 8400 Switch Series
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-10919-2018
Dated: October 30, 2018
Version: 0.3
National Institute of Standards and Technology National Security Agency
Information Technology Laboratory Information Assurance Directorate
100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road STE 6940
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6940
Aruba HPE 8320 and 8400 Switch Series Validation Report Version 0.3, October 30, 2018
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Validation Team
Meredith Hennan
Kenneth Stutterheim
The Aerospace Corporation
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
Justin Bettencourt
Tammy Compton
Wasif Sikder
Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc.
Catonsville, MD
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Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary.................................................................................................... 1
2 Identification............................................................................................................... 1
3 Architectural Information ........................................................................................... 3
3.1 TOE Evaluated Platforms ................................................................................... 3
3.2 TOE Architecture................................................................................................ 3
3.3 Physical Boundaries............................................................................................ 3
4 Security Policy............................................................................................................ 4
4.1 Security audit ...................................................................................................... 4
4.2 Cryptographic support ........................................................................................ 4
4.3 Identification and authentication......................................................................... 4
4.4 Security management.......................................................................................... 5
4.5 Protection of the TSF.......................................................................................... 5
4.6 TOE access.......................................................................................................... 5
4.7 Trusted path/channels ......................................................................................... 5
5 Assumptions................................................................................................................ 5
6 Clarification of Scope ................................................................................................. 6
7 Documentation............................................................................................................ 6
8 IT Product Testing ...................................................................................................... 6
8.1 Developer Testing............................................................................................... 7
8.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing ............................................................... 7
8.3 Test Software ...................................................................................................... 7
8.4 Test Environment................................................................................................ 7
9 Evaluated Configuration ............................................................................................. 8
10 Results of the Evaluation ............................................................................................ 8
10.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE)............................................................ 8
10.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV).............................................................. 8
10.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD) ................................................. 9
10.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC) ..................................... 9
10.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE) ................. 9
10.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)......................................................... 9
10.7 Summary of Evaluation Results........................................................................ 10
11 Validator Comments/Recommendations .................................................................. 10
12 Annexes..................................................................................................................... 11
13 Security Target.......................................................................................................... 11
14 Glossary .................................................................................................................... 11
15 Bibliography ............................................................................................................. 12
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1 Executive Summary
This report documents the assessment of the National Information Assurance Partnership
(NIAP) validation team of the evaluation of Aruba, a Hewlett Packard Enterprise Company
8320 and 8400 Switch Series solution provided by Hewlett Packard Enterprise Company.
It presents the evaluation results, their justifications, and the conformance results. This
Validation Report is not an endorsement of the Target of Evaluation by any agency of the
U.S. government, and no warranty is either expressed or implied.
The evaluation was performed by the Gossamer Security Solutions (Gossamer) Common
Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL) in Catonsville, MD, United States of America, and
was completed in October 2018. The information in this report is largely derived from the
proprietary Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) and associated test reports, all written by
Gossamer Security Solutions and summarized in the publicly available Assurance Activity
Report (AAR) for this evaluation. The evaluation determined that the product is both
Common Criteria Part 2 Extended and Part 3 Conformant, and meets the assurance
requirements of the collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.0 +
errata 20180314, 14 March 2018.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the Aruba, a Hewlett Packard Enterprise Company 8320
and 8400 Switch Series running ArubaOS-CX version 10.01.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) identified in this Validation Report has been evaluated at a
NIAP approved Common Criteria Testing Laboratory using the Common Methodology for
IT Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 4) for conformance to the Common Criteria for
IT Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 4). This Validation Report applies only to the
specific version of the TOE as evaluated. The evaluation has been conducted in
accordance with the provisions of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation
Scheme and the conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are
consistent with the evidence provided.
The validation team monitored the activities of the evaluation team, provided guidance on
technical issues and evaluation processes, and reviewed the individual work units and
successive versions of the ETR. The validation team found that the evaluation showed that
the product satisfies all of the functional requirements and assurance requirements stated in
the Security Target (ST). Therefore the validation team concludes that the testing
laboratory’s findings are accurate, the conclusions justified, and the conformance results
are correct. The conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are
consistent with the evidence produced.
The technical information included in this report was obtained from the Aruba, a Hewlett
Packard Enterprise Company 8320 and 8400 Switch Series (NDcPP20E) Security Target,
Version 0.3, October 22, 2018 and analysis performed by the Validation Team.
2 Identification
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product
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evaluations. Under this program, security evaluations are conducted by commercial testing
laboratories called Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs) using the Common
Evaluation Methodology (CEM) in accordance with National Voluntary Laboratory
Assessment Program (NVLAP) accreditation.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality and
consistency across evaluations. Developers of information technology products desiring a
security evaluation contract with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product’s evaluation.
Upon successful completion of the evaluation, the product is added to NIAP’s Validated
Products List.
Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:
 The Target of Evaluation (TOE): the fully qualified identifier of the product as
evaluated.
 The Security Target (ST), describing the security features, claims, and assurances of the
product.
 The conformance result of the evaluation.
 The Protection Profile to which the product is conformant.
 The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation.
Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers
Item Identifier
Evaluation Scheme United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
TOE Aruba, a Hewlett Packard Enterprise Company 8320 and 8400 Switch Series
running ArubaOS-CX version 10.01
Protection Profile
(Specific models identified in Section 3.1)
collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.0 + errata
20180314, 14 March 2018
ST Aruba, a Hewlett Packard Enterprise Company 8320 and 8400 Switch Series
(NDcPP20E) Security Target, Version 0.3, October 22, 2018
Evaluation Technical
Report
Evaluation Technical Report for Aruba, a Hewlett Packard Enterprise Company
8320 and 8400 Switch Series, Version 0.2, October 25, 2018
CC Version Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
rev 4
Conformance Result CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 conformant
Sponsor Aruba, a Hewlett Packard Enterprise Company
Developer Aruba, a Hewlett Packard Enterprise Company
Common Criteria
Testing Lab (CCTL)
Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc.
CCEVS Validators Meredith Hennan, Kenneth Stutterheim
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3 Architectural Information
Note: The following architectural description is based on the description presented in the
Security Target.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is Aruba, a Hewlett Packard Enterprise Company 8320
and 8400 Switch Series running ArubaOS-CX version 10.01.
The TOE offers a comprehensive Layer 2 and Layer 3 feature set including BGP, OSPF,
VRF, and IPv6 functionalities. The HPE Aruba 8320 and 8400 Switch Series provides
security, scalability, and ease of use for enterprise edge deployments.
3.1 TOE Evaluated Platforms
The evaluated configuration consists of the following models running ArubaOS-CX
version 10.01:
Series Identifier Hardware Models
Aruba 8320
Switch Series
JL479A – Aruba 8320 48p 10G SFP/SFP+ and 6p 40G QSFP+ Switch
JL579A - Aruba 8320 32p 40G QSFP+ Switch
JL581A - Aruba 8320 48p 1G/10GBase-T and 6p 40G QSFP+ Switch
Aruba 8400
Switch Series
JL376A – Aruba 8400 Bundle includes:
 JL375A – Aruba 8400 8-slot chassis
 JL363A – Aruba 8400 32p 10G SFP+ MACsec
 JL365A – Aruba 8400 8p 40G QSFP+ Adv Module
 JL367A – Aruba 7.2Tbps Fabric Module
 JL368A – Management Module
JL366A – Aruba 8400 6p 40G/100G QFSP 28p Adv Module
3.2 TOE Architecture
The underlying architecture of each TOE appliance consists of hardware that supports
physical network connections, memory, processor and software that implements switching
functions, configuration information and drivers. While hardware varies between different
appliance models, the software code is shared across all platforms. It is in the software code
that all the security functions claimed in this security target are enforced.
3.3 Physical Boundaries
Each TOE appliance runs a version of the ArubaOS-CX 10.01 software and has physical
network connections to its environment to facilitate the switching of network traffic. The
TOE appliance can also be the destination of network traffic, where it provides interfaces
for its own management.
The TOE may be accessed and managed through a PC or terminal in the environment
which can be remote from or directly connected to the TOE.
The TOE can be configured to forward its audit records to an external SYSLOG server in
the network environment.
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4 Security Policy
This section summaries the security functionality of the TOE:
1. Security audit
2. Cryptographic support
3. Identification and authentication
4. Security management
5. Protection of the TSF
6. TOE access
7. Trusted path/channels
4.1 Security audit
The TOE is able to generate logs for a wide range of security relevant events. The TOE
can be configured to store the logs locally so they can be accessed by an administrator and
also to send the logs to a designated log server using SSH to protect the logs while in
transit on the network. Once configured to export audit records, the TOE attempts to
transmit all logs in real-time, will temporarily maintain unsent records in the event of a
disrupted syslog connection, and send those records when the remote audit server
successfully reestablishes the connection.
4.2 Cryptographic support
The TOE provides CAVP certified cryptography in support of its SSHv2 protocol
implementation. Cryptographic services include key management, random bit generation,
encryption/decryption, digital signature and secure hashing.
4.3 Identification and authentication
The TOE requires users to be identified and authenticated before they can use functions
mediated by the TOE, with the exceptions of passing network traffic in accordance with its
configured switching rules and the reading of the login banner. It provides the ability to
assign attributes (user names, passwords and roles) and to authenticate users against those
attributes.
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4.4 Security management
The TOE provides Command Line Interface (CLI) commands to access the wide range of
security management functions to manage its security policies. All administrative activity
and functions including security management commands are limited to authorized users
(i.e., administrators) only after they have provided acceptable user identification and
authentication data to the TOE. The security management functions are controlled through
the use of roles that can be assigned to TOE users. The TOE supports the following roles:
Administrators and Operators. The Administrators role can make changes to the TOE
configuration while the Operators role is a read-only role.
4.5 Protection of the TSF
The TOE implements measures to protect the integrity of its security features. The TOE
protects stored passwords and cryptographic keys so they are not directly accessible in
plaintext. The TOE also ensures that reliable time information is available for both log
accountability and synchronization with the operating environment. The TOE employs
both dedicated communication channels as well as cryptographic means to protect
communication between itself and other components in the operation environment. The
TOE performs self-tests to detect failure and protect itself from malicious updates.
4.6 TOE access
The TOE can be configured to display a logon banner before and after (a post-login banner)
a user session is established. The TOE also enforces inactivity timeouts for local and
remote sessions.
4.7 Trusted path/channels
The TOE protects interactive communication with administrators using SSH to protect the
CLI interface, ensuring integrity and preventing disclosure. If the negotiation of an
encrypted session fails or if the user does not have authorization for remote administration,
an attempted connection will not be established.
The TOE protects communication with network peers, such as a log server using SSH
connections to prevent unintended disclosure or modification of logs.
5 Assumptions
The Security Problem Definition, including the assumptions, may be found in the following
documents:
 collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.0 + errata
20180314, 14 March 2018
That information has not been reproduced here and the NDcPP20E should be consulted if
there is interest in that material.
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The scope of this evaluation was limited to the functionality and assurances covered in the
NDcPP20E as described for this TOE in the Security Target. Other functionality included
in the product was not assessed as part of this evaluation. All other functionality provided
by the devices needs to be assessed separately, and no further conclusions can be drawn
about their effectiveness.
6 Clarification of Scope
All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that
need clarification. This text covers some of the more important limitations and
clarifications of this evaluation. Note that:
 As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated configuration
meets the security claims made with a certain level of assurance (the assurance
activities specified in the collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices and
performed by the evaluation team).
 This evaluation covers only the specific device models and software as identified in
this document, and not any earlier or later versions released or in process.
 This evaluation did not specifically search for, nor attempt to exploit, vulnerabilities
that were not “obvious” or vulnerabilities to objectives not claimed in the ST. The
CEM defines an “obvious” vulnerability as one that is easily exploited with a
minimum of understanding of the TOE, technical sophistication and resources.
 The functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the security functional
requirements specified in the NDcPP20E and applicable Technical Decisions. Any
additional security related functional capabilities of the TOE were not covered by
this evaluation.
7 Documentation
The following documents were available with the TOE for evaluation:
 Common Criteria Admin Guide Network Device Collaboration Protection Profile,
Target of Evaluation: Aruba 8320 and 8400 Switch Series, Version 1.1, October
24, 2018
To use the product in the evaluated configuration, the product must be configured as
specified in that guide. Any additional customer documentation provided with the product,
or that which may be available online was not included in the scope of the evaluation and
therefore should not be relied upon to configure or operate the device in its evaluated
configuration. Consumers are encouraged to download the CC configuration guide from
the NIAP website to ensure the device is configured as evaluated.
8 IT Product Testing
This section describes the testing efforts of the developer and the Evaluation Team. It is
derived from information contained in the Assurance Activity Report (NDcPP20E) for
Aruba, a Hewlett Packard Enterprise Company 8320 and 8400 Switch Series, version 0.2,
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October 25, 2018 (AAR). The AAR shows the test configuration, provides the tested
platforms and lists the test tools.
8.1 Developer Testing
No evidence of developer testing is required in the assurance activities for this product.
8.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing
The evaluation team verified the product according a Common Criteria Certification
document and ran the tests specified in the NDcPP20E and the Supporting Document,
Evaluation Activities for Network Device cPP Version 2.0 + Errata 20180314, March,
2018, including the tests associated with optional requirements.
8.3 Test Software
 Ubuntu 16.04.3 LTS
 Openssh-client version 7.2p2
 Big Packet Putty version 6.2
 Nmap version 7.01
 Tcpdump version 4.9.2
 Libpcap version 1.7.4
 Openssl version 1.0.2g
 Rsyslog version 8.16.0
 Wireshark version 2.4.2
 Putty version 0.68 (used to connect to device console and Ubuntu environment)
 HxD (Hexeditor) version 1.7.7.0
8.4 Test Environment
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9 Evaluated Configuration
The evaluated configuration consists of the following series and models running ArubaOS-
CX version 10.01:
Series Identifier Hardware Models
Aruba 8320
Switch Series
JL479A – Aruba 8320 48p 10G SFP/SFP+ and 6p 40G QSFP+ Switch
JL579A - Aruba 8320 32p 40G QSFP+ Switch
JL581A - Aruba 8320 48p 1G/10GBase-T and 6p 40G QSFP+ Switch
Aruba 8400
Switch Series
JL376A – Aruba 8400 Bundle includes:
 JL375A – Aruba 8400 8-slot chassis
 JL363A – Aruba 8400 32p 10G SFP+ MACsec
 JL365A – Aruba 8400 8p 40G QSFP+ Adv Module
 JL367A – Aruba 7.2Tbps Fabric Module
 JL368A – Management Module
JL366A – Aruba 8400 6p 40G/100G QFSP 28p Adv Module
10 Results of the Evaluation
The results of the assurance requirements are generally described in this section and are
presented in detail in the proprietary ETR as characterized in the publicly available
Assurance Activity Report for this evaluation. The reader of this document can assume that
all assurance activities and work units received a passing verdict.
A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to
the corresponding evaluator action elements. The evaluation was conducted based upon
CC version 3.1 rev 4 and CEM version 3.1 rev 4. The evaluation determined the Aruba
8320 and 8400 Switch Series TOE to be Part 2 extended, and to meet the SARs contained
in the NDcPP20E.
10.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE)
The evaluation team applied each ASE CEM work unit. The ST evaluation ensured the ST
contains a description of the environment in terms of policies and assumptions, a statement
of security requirements claimed to be met by the Aruba, a Hewlett Packard Enterprise
Company 8320 and 8400 Switch Series products that are consistent with the Common
Criteria, and product security function descriptions that support the requirements.
The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion
reached by the evaluation team was justified.
10.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV)
The evaluation team applied each ADV CEM work unit. The evaluation team assessed the
design documentation and found it adequate to aid in understanding how the TSF provides
the security functions. The design documentation consists of a functional specification
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contained in the Security Target and Guidance documents. Additionally the evaluator
performed the assurance activities specified in the NDcPP20E related to the examination of
the information contained in the TSS.
The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion
reached by the evaluation team was justified.
10.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD)
The evaluation team applied each AGD CEM work unit. The evaluation team ensured the
adequacy of the user guidance in describing how to use the operational TOE. Additionally,
the evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the administrator guidance in describing how
to securely administer the TOE. The guide was assessed during the design and testing
phases of the evaluation to ensure it was complete.
The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion
reached by the evaluation team was justified.
10.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)
The evaluation team applied each ALC CEM work unit. The evaluation team found that
the TOE was identified.
The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion
reached by the evaluation team was justified.
10.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE)
The evaluation team applied each ATE CEM work unit. The evaluation team ran the set of
tests specified by the assurance activities in the NDcPP20E and Supporting Document (SD)
and recorded the results in a proprietary Detailed Test Report, as summarized in the
publicly available AAR.
The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion
reached by the evaluation team was justified.
10.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)
The evaluation team applied each AVA CEM work unit. The vulnerability analysis is in the
Detailed Test Report (DTR) prepared by the evaluator. The vulnerability analysis includes
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a public search for vulnerabilities. The public search conducted on September 18, 2018 for
vulnerabilities did not uncover any residual vulnerability.
The evaluator searched the following sources for vulnerabilities:
 National Vulnerability Database (https://web.nvd.nist.gov/vuln/search),
 Vulnerability Notes Database (http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/),
 Rapid7 Vulnerability Database (https://www.rapid7.com/db/vulnerabilities),
 Tipping Point Zero Day Initiative (http://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories)
 Exploit / Vulnerability Search Engine (http://www.exploitsearch.net),
 SecurITeam Exploit Search (http://www.securiteam.com),
 Tenable Network Security (http://nessus.org/plugins/index.php?view=search),
 Offensive Security Exploit Database (https://www.exploit-db.com/)
Each site was searched using the following terms:
 TCP
 Yocto
 OpenSSL
 SSH
 Aruba 8320
 Aruba 8400
The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion
reached by the evaluation team was justified.
10.7 Summary of Evaluation Results
The evaluation team’s assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims
in the ST are met. Additionally, the evaluation team’s testing also demonstrated the
accuracy of the claims in the ST.
The validation team’s assessment of the evidence provided by the evaluation team is that it
demonstrates that the evaluation team followed the procedures defined in the CEM, and
correctly verified that the product meets the claims in the ST.
11 Validator Comments/Recommendations
Administrators should take special note of the remote audit storage configuration. To
comply with the evaluated configuration when logging with remote syslog server is
required, the connection is secured using SSH reverse tunnel. Once configured to export
audit records, the TOE attempts to transmit all logs in real-time, and will temporarily
maintain unsent records in the event of a disrupted syslog connection, and send those
records when the remote audit server successfully reestablishes the connection. Note that
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the SSH reverse tunnel must be restarted from the audit server if the connection is
unintentionally broken. There are three sources of audit on the switches. Administrators
should ensure the configuration for audit meets the requirements imposed by their
operational security requirements.
The switch includes a USB port to receive a flash drive for deploying, troubleshooting,
backing up configurations, or updating switches. This port should be administratively
disabled when not in use. The port can be temporarily enabled when needed and then
immediately disabled after the required task is completed. Administrators should always
disable the USB interface after use.
12 Annexes
Not applicable
13 Security Target
The Security Target is identified as: Aruba, a Hewlett Packard Enterprise Company 8320
and 8400 Switch Series (NDcPP20E) Security Target, Version 0.3, October 22, 2018.
14 Glossary
The following definitions are used throughout this document:
 Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL). An IT security evaluation facility
accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and
approved by the CCEVS Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based
evaluations.
 Conformance. The ability to demonstrate in an unambiguous way that a given
implementation is correct with respect to the formal model.
 Evaluation. The assessment of an IT product against the Common Criteria using the
Common Criteria Evaluation Methodology to determine whether or not the claims
made are justified; or the assessment of a protection profile against the Common
Criteria using the Common Evaluation Methodology to determine if the Profile is
complete, consistent, technically sound and hence suitable for use as a statement of
requirements for one or more TOEs that may be evaluated.
 Evaluation Evidence. Any tangible resource (information) required from the sponsor
or developer by the evaluator to perform one or more evaluation activities.
 Feature. Part of a product that is either included with the product or can be ordered
separately.
 Target of Evaluation (TOE). A group of IT products configured as an IT system, or
an IT product, and associated documentation that is the subject of a security evaluation
under the CC.
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 Validation. The process carried out by the CCEVS Validation Body leading to the
issue of a Common Criteria certificate.
 Validation Body. A governmental organization responsible for carrying out validation
and for overseeing the day-to-day operation of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation
and Validation Scheme.
15 Bibliography
The Validation Team used the following documents to produce this Validation Report:
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation: Part 1:
Introduction and General Model, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012.
[2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security
functional components, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012.
[3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security
assurance components, Version 3.1 Revision 4, September 2102.
[4] collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.0 + errata
20180314, 14 March 2018.
[5] Aruba, a Hewlett Packard Enterprise Company 8320 and 8400 Switch Series
(NDcPP20E) Security Target, Version 0.3, October 22, 2018 (ST).
[6] Assurance Activity Report (NDcPP20E) for Aruba, a Hewlett Packard Enterprise
Company 8320 and 8400 Switch Series, Version 0.2, October 25, 2018 (AAR).
[8] Common Criteria Admin Guide Network Device Collaboration Protection Profile,
Target of Evaluation: Aruba 8320 and 8400 Switch Series, Version 1.1, October
24, 2018 (AGD)
[9] Evaluation Technical Report for Aruba, A Hewlett Packard Enterprise Company
8320 and 8400 Switch Series, Version 0.2, October 25, 2018. (ETR) <Evaluation
Sensitive>
[10] Detailed Test Report (NDcPP20E) for HPE Aruba 8320 and 8400 Switch Series,
Version 0.2, October 25, 2018. (DTR) <HPE Proprietary>
[11] Supporting Document, Evaluation Activities for Network Device cPP Version 2.0 +
Errata 20180314, March 2018