TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V.
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Version
2020-2
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Certification Report
Cryptomathic Signer SAM version 5.1 for Utimaco
Cryptoserver CP5
Sponsor and developer: Cryptomathic A/S
Jargergardsgade 118
DK-8000 Aarhus C
Denmark
Evaluation facility: Brightsight
Brassersplein 2
2612 CT Delft
The Netherlands
Report number: NSCIB-CC-159381-CR2
Report version: 1
Project number: 159381
Author(s): Wouter Slegers
Date: 21 April 2020
Number of pages: 11
Number of appendices: 0
Reproduction of this report is authorized provided the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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CONTENTS:
Foreword 3
Recognition of the certificate 4
International recognition 4
European recognition 4
eIDAS-Regulation 4
1 Executive Summary 5
2 Certification Results 6
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation 6
2.2 Security Policy 6
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 6
2.4 Architectural Information 7
2.5 Documentation 7
2.6 IT Product Testing 7
2.7 Re-used evaluation results 8
2.8 Evaluated Configuration 8
2.9 Results of the Evaluation 8
2.10 Comments/Recommendations 9
3 Security Target 10
4 Definitions 10
5 Bibliography 11
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Foreword
The Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security (NSCIB) provides a third-party
evaluation and certification service for determining the trustworthiness of Information Technology (IT)
security products. Under this NSCIB, TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. has the task of issuing
certificates for IT security products, as well as for protection profiles and sites.
Part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product, protection profile or site
according to the Common Criteria assessment guidelines published by the NSCIB. Evaluations are
performed by an IT Security Evaluation Facility (ITSEF) under the oversight of the NSCIB Certification
Body, which is operated by TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. in cooperation with the Ministry of the
Interior and Kingdom Relations.
An ITSEF in the Netherlands is a commercial facility that has been licensed by TÜV Rheinland
Nederland B.V. to perform Common Criteria evaluations; a significant requirement for such a license is
accreditation to the requirements of ISO Standard 17025 “General requirements for the accreditation
of calibration and testing laboratories”.
By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. asserts that the product or
site complies with the security requirements specified in the associated (site) security target, or that
the protection profile (PP) complies with the requirements for PP evaluation specified in the Common
Criteria for Information Security Evaluation. A (site) security target is a requirements specification
document that defines the scope of the evaluation activities.
The consumer should review the (site) security target or protection profile, in addition to this
certification report, in order to gain an understanding of any assumptions made during the evaluation,
the IT product's intended environment, its security requirements, and the level of confidence (i.e., the
evaluation assurance level) that the product or site satisfies the security requirements stated in the
(site) security target.
Reproduction of this report is authorized provided the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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Recognition of the certificate
Presence of the Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement and SOG-IS logos on the certificate
indicates that this certificate is issued in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA and the SOG-IS
agreement and will be recognised by the participating nations.
International recognition
The CCRA has been signed by the Netherlands in May 2000 and provides mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC. Starting September 2014 the CCRA has been updated to provide mutual
recognition of certificates based on cPPs (exact use) or STs with evaluation assurance components
up to and including EAL2+ALC_FLR. The current list of signatory nations and approved certification
schemes can be found on: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
European recognition
The European SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) version 3 effective from April
2010 provides mutual recognition of Common Criteria and ITSEC certificates at a basic evaluation
level for all products. A higher recognition level for evaluation levels beyond EAL4 (resp. E3-basic) is
provided for products related to specific technical domains. This agreement was initially signed by
Finland, France, Germany, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Italy
joined the SOGIS-MRA in December 2010. The current list of signatory nations, approved certification
schemes and the list of technical domains for which the higher recognition applies can be found on:
http://www.sogisportal.eu.
eIDAS-Regulation
TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V., operating the Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT
Security (NSCIB), has been notified as a Designated Certification Body from The Netherlands under
Article 30(2) and 39(2) of Regulation 910/2014 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE
COUNCIL of 23 July 2014 [EU-REG].
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1 Executive Summary
This Certification Report states the outcome of the Common Criteria security evaluation of the
Cryptomathic Signer SAM version 5.1 for Utimaco Cryptoserver CP5. The developer of the
Cryptomathic Signer SAM version 5.1 for Utimaco Cryptoserver CP5 is Cryptomathic A/S located in
Aarhus C, Denmark and they also act as the sponsor of the evaluation and certification. A Certification
Report is intended to assist prospective consumers when judging the suitability of the IT security
properties of the product for their particular requirements.
The TOE enables authenticated users to create digital signatures. Thanks to secure protocols, the
protection of a tamper evident environment, and the strict administration procedures enforced by the
trust service providers operating the service, it is possible to provide an electronic signature service to
key owners.
The TOE offers remote signing using an HSM containing the Cryptographic module and which, when
operated according to guidelines, provides a tamper protected environment. The TOE is the software
component (SAM) loaded as a local application onto the protected environment of the HSM. It is
created to be responsible for all logic performed and for making the final access decisions about
whether to allow the usage of a given signing key.
The TOE has been originally evaluated by Brightsight B.V. located in Delft, The Netherlands and was
certified on 15-11-2019. The re-evaluation also took place by Brightsight B.V. and was completed on
21-04-2020 with the approval of the ETR. The re-certification procedure has been conducted in
accordance with the provisions of the Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security
[NSCIB].
This second issue of the Certification Report is a result of a “recertification with major changes”.
The major change is the addition of signing keys based on elliptic curve cryptography (ECC).
The security evaluation re-used the evaluation results of previously performed evaluations. A full, up to
date vulnerability analysis has been made, as well as renewed testing.
The scope of the evaluation is defined by the security target [ST], which identifies assumptions made
during the evaluation, the intended environment for the Cryptomathic Signer SAM version 5.1 for
Utimaco Cryptoserver CP5, the security requirements, and the level of confidence (evaluation
assurance level) at which the product is intended to satisfy the security requirements. Consumers of
the Cryptomathic Signer SAM version 5.1 for Utimaco Cryptoserver CP5 are advised to verify that their
own environment is consistent with the security target, and to give due consideration to the comments,
observations and recommendations in this certification report.
The results documented in the evaluation technical report [ETR]
1
for this product provides sufficient
evidence that the TOE meets the EAL4 augmented (EAL4+) assurance requirements for the evaluated
security functionality. This assurance level is augmented with AVA_VAN.5 (Advanced methodical
vulnerability analysis).
The evaluation was conducted using the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 [CEM] and the Dutch Conformity Assessment Process [DCAP], for
conformance to the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, version 3.1
Revision 5 [CC].
TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V., as the NSCIB Certification Body, declares that the evaluation meets
all the conditions for international recognition of Common Criteria Certificates and that the product
meets the requirements laid down in Annex II of Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 OF THE EUROPEAN
PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 23 July 2014. The product meets the requirements defined
in [EU-REG] article 29 and article 39 and thus is a QSCD in the sense of [EU-REG]. It will be listed on
the NSCIB Certified Products list and will be notified to the European Commission (eIDAS). It should
be noted that the certification results only apply to the specific version of the product as evaluated.
1
The Evaluation Technical Report contains information proprietary to the developer and/or the
evaluator, and is not releasable for public review.
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2 Certification Results
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) for this evaluation is the Cryptomathic Signer SAM version 5.1 for
Utimaco Cryptoserver CP5 from Cryptomathic A/S located in Aarhus C, Denmark.
The TOE is comprised of the following main components:
Delivery
item type
Identifier Version
Hardware
One of the following:
Utimaco CryptoServer CP5 Se12
Utimaco CryptoServer CP5 Se52
Utimaco CryptoServer CP5 Se500
Utimaco CryptoServer CP5 Se1500
5.1.0.0
Software Cryptomathic Signer SAM for Utimaco 5.1
To ensure secure usage a set of guidance documents is provided together with the Cryptomathic
Signer SAM version 5.1 for Utimaco Cryptoserver CP5. Details can be found in section 2.5 of this
report.
2.2 Security Policy
The TOE enables authenticated users to create digital signatures. Thanks to secure protocols, the
protection of a tamper evident environment, and the strict administration procedures enforced by the
trust service providers operating the service, it is possible to provide an electronic signature service to
key owners.
The TOE offers remote signing using an HSM containing the Cryptographic module and which, when
operated according to guidelines, provides a tamper protected environment. The TOE is the software
component (SAM) loaded as a local application onto the protected environment of the HSM. It is
created to be responsible for all logic performed and for making the final access decisions about
whether to allow the usage of a given signing key.
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
2.3.1 Assumptions
The assumptions defined in the Security Target are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead
to specific Security Objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. Detailed information on these
security objectives that must be fulfilled by the TOE environment can be found in section 4.2 of the
[ST].
2.3.2 Clarification of scope
The evaluation did not reveal any threats to the TOE that are not countered by the evaluated security
functions of the product.
Note that EN 419241-2 Protection Profile claims the environment for the TOE protects against loss or
theft of the TOE, deters and detects physical tampering, protects against attacks based on
emanations of the TOE, and protects against unauthorised software and configuration changes on the
TOE and the hardware appliance it is contained in (“OE.Env Protected operating environment”).
The ST follows the PP and also claims OE.Env, thus the environment in which the TOE is used must
ensure the above protection.
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Any threats violating these objectives for the environment are not considered.
2.4 Architectural Information
The TOE is the SAM software component and is loaded onto an HSM which is tamper protected. The
HSM is installed with firmware which comprises the Cryptographic Module functionality.
2.5 Documentation
The following documentation is provided with the product by the developer to the customer:
Identifier Version
Cryptomathic Signer SAM CC Guidance: AGD-PRE 2.0
Cryptomathic Signer SAM CC Guidance: AGD-OPE 3.2
Cryptomathic Signer 5.1 HSM Environment Requirements 2.0
Cryptomathic Signer SAM CC Compliant Role Configuration 2.0
Cryptomathic HSM Setup and Maintenance with SCE. Utimaco
CryptoServer CP5
1.4
2.6 IT Product Testing
Testing (depth, coverage, functional tests, independent testing): The evaluators examined the
developer’s testing activities documentation and verified that the developer has met their testing
responsibilities.
2.6.1 Testing approach and depth
The developer has performed extensive testing on functional specification, subsystem and SFR-
enforcing module level. The testing was largely automated using test suites. Test scripts were
extensively used to verify that the functions return the expected values.
The underlying hardware test results are extendable to composite evaluations, as the underlying
platform is operated according to its guidance and the composite evaluation requirements are met.
For the testing performed by the evaluators, the developer has provided the TOE and a test
environment. The evaluators have reproduced all developer tests, as well as a small number of test
cases designed by the evaluator.
2.6.2 Independent Penetration Testing
Given the restrictions imposed by the PP (which prevents any physical attack and any side channel
attack that requires physical proximity to the TOE), the evaluator focused on vulnerabilities related to
design/architectural flaws that would lead intended users to abuse the TOE. The methodology
involves the following five steps:
1. The first step of this type of vulnerability analysis is the identification of areas of concern (as
defined in [CEM] and the [CWE]).
•The areas of concern are identified by the evaluator using the generic weaknesses enumeration
database [CWE] version 3.1 as inspiration and the [CEM, Appendix B]. The CWE database is an
open source publicly maintained dictionary of SW weaknesses.
•Examples of areas of concern are Accessibility, Cryptography, and Secure Channel.
2. Collecting possible vulnerabilities from the design assessment by asking security questions
inspired by generic weaknesses separately for all security implementations of the TOE.
3. Collecting possible vulnerabilities from applicable attack lists and public vulnerability search.
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4. These security relevant questions are then translated into TOE-specific possible vulnerabilities in
the TOE.
5. The evaluator argues whether a possible vulnerability is removed or sufficiently mitigated by the
TOE implementation and/or functional testing evidence. If yes, the possible vulnerability is
considered as solved, otherwise it is uniquely labelled as potential vulnerability POT_VUL_xxx.
Potential vulnerabilities are then addressed in the context of further assessment, penetration tests
and/or further code review.
If the assessment of a potential vulnerability leads to a penetration test (or penetration tests), they are
collected in the penetration test plan. In this evaluation, four penetration tests were devised.
2.6.3 Test Configuration
The TOE was tested in the configuration of the Utimaco CryptoServer Se 1500 Gen2. The [ETRfC] of
the underling hardware concluded that all Utimaco CryptoServer hardware models listed in the ST are
no difference from a security perspective. Therefore test on one Utimaco HSM model sufficiently
represent the behavior of the Cryptomathic Signer SAM software on other Utimato HSM models listed
in the ST.
2.6.4 Testing Results
The testing activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected results and observed
results are summarised in the [ETR], with references to the documents containing the full details.
The developer’s tests and the independent functional tests produced the expected results, giving
assurance that the TOE behaves as specified in its [ST] and functional specification.
No exploitable vulnerabilities were found with the independent penetration tests.
The algorithmic security level of cryptographic functionality has not been rated in this certification
process, but the current consensus on the algorithmic security level in the open domain, i.e. from the
current best cryptanalytic attacks published, has been taken into account.
Not all key sizes specified in the [ST] have sufficient cryptographic strength for satisfying the
AVA_VAN.5 “high attack potential”.
The algorithmic security level exceeds 100 bits for all evaluated cryptographic functionality as required
for high attack potential (AVA_VAN.5).
2.7 Re-used evaluation results
This is a re-certification. Documentary evaluation results of the earlier version of the TOE have been
re-used, but vulnerability analysis and penetration testing has been renewed.
There has been extensive re-use of the ALC aspects for the sites involved in the software component
of the TOE. Sites involved in the development and production of the hardware platform were re-used
by composition.
No sites have been visited as part of this evaluation.
2.8 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is defined uniquely by its name and version number Cryptomathic Signer SAM version 5.1
for Utimaco Cryptoserver CP5.
2.9 Results of the Evaluation
The evaluation lab documented their evaluation results in the [ETR] which references a ASE
Intermediate Report and other evaluator documents. To support composite evaluations according to
[CCDB-2007-09-01] a derived document [ETRfC] was provided and approved. This document
provides details of the TOE evaluation that have to be considered when this TOE is used as platform
in a composite evaluation.
The verdict of each claimed assurance requirement is “Pass”.
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Based on the above evaluation results the evaluation lab concluded the Cryptomathic Signer SAM
version 5.1 for Utimaco Cryptoserver CP5, to be CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 conformant and to
meet the requirements of EAL 4 augmented with AVA_VAN.5. This implies that the product satisfies
the security requirements specified in Security Target [ST].
The Security Target claims ’strict’ conformance to the Protection Profile [PP].
2.10 Comments/Recommendations
The user guidance as outlined in section 2.5 contains necessary information about the usage of the
TOE.
In addition all aspects of assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not
covered by the TOE itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk
management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, he
should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the TOE is required and thus requested from
the sponsor of the certificate.
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms and protocols was not rated in the course of this
evaluation. This specifically applies to the following proprietary or non-standard algorithms, protocols
and implementations: <none>
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3 Security Target
The Cryptomathic Signer SAM v. 5.1 Security Target for Utimaco Cryptoserver CP5, v5.5, 12 March
2020 [ST] is included here by reference.
4 Definitions
This list of Acronyms and the glossary of terms contains elements that are not already defined by the
CC or CEM:
IT Information Technology
ITSEF IT Security Evaluation Facility
JIL Joint Interpretation Library
NSCIB Netherlands scheme for certification in the area of IT security
PKI Public Key Infrastructure
PP Protection Profile
QSCD Qualified Signature Creation Device
TOE Target of Evaluation
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5 Bibliography
This section lists all referenced documentation used as source material in the compilation of this
report:
[CC] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Parts I, II and III,
Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1
Revision 5, April 2017.
[CR-SSCD-PP2] Certification Report for Protection profiles for secure signature creation device —
Part 2: Device with key Generation, CEN/TC 224, BSI-CC-PP-0059-2009-MA-02,
Version 2.0.1, 30 June 2016.
[DCAP] Dutch Conformity Assessment Process v3.0, dated 28-02-2019.
[ETR] Evaluation Technical Report Cryptomathic Signer SAM version 5.1 for Utimaco
Cryptoserver CP5, 20-RPT-245, Version 3.0, 21 April 2020.
[EU-REG] REGULATION (EU) No 910/2014 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF
THE COUNCIL of 23 July 2014 on electronic identification and trust services for
electronic transactions in the internal market and repealing Directive 1999/93/EC.
[HW-CERT] Certification Report CryptoServer CP5 Se12 5.1.0.0, CryptoServer CP5 Se52
5.1.0.0, CryptoServer CP5 Se500 5.1.0.0, CryptoServer CP5 Se1500 5.1.0.0,
NSCIB-CC-222073-CR, version 1.1, dated 14 March 2019
Maintenance Report CryptoServer CP5 Se12 5.1.0.0, CryptoServer CP5 Se52
5.1.0.0, CryptoServer CP5 Se500 5.1.0.0, CryptoServer CP5 Se1500 5.1.0.0,
NSCIB-CC-222073-MR, version 1.0, dated 21 April 2020.
[HW-ETRfC] ETR for Composition of CryptoServer Se-Series Gen2 CP5 EAL4+, 18-RPT-622,
v6.0, 21 April 2020.
[HW-ST] CryptoServer Security Target for CryptoServer Se-Series Gen2 CP5 2.0.2, 1 April
2020.
[NSCIB] Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security, Version 2.5, 28
March 2019.
[PP] prEN 419 241-2 Trustworthy Systems Supporting Server Signing Part 2: Protection
Profile for QSCD for Server Signing, version 0.16.
[ST] Cryptomathic Signer SAM v. 5.1 Security Target for Utimaco Cryptoserver CP5,
v5.5, 12 March 2020.
(This is the end of this report).