National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
for
Google Pixel Devices on Android 13
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-11317-2023
Dated: January 24, 2023
Version: 1.0
National Institute of Standards and Technology Department of Defense
Information Technology Laboratory ATTN: NIAP, Suite 6982
100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Fort Meade, MD 20755-6982
Google Pixel Devices on Android 13 Validation Report Version1.0 , January 24, 2023
ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Validation Team
Jenn Dotson
Lauren Hardy
Randy Heimann
Lisa Mitchell
Linda Morrison
Clare Parran
Lori Sarem
The MITRE Corporation
Jerome Meyers
The Aerospace Corporation
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
Tammy Compton
Allison Keenan
John Messiha
Raymond Smoley
Rizheng Sun
Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc.
Columbia, MD
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Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary.................................................................................................... 1
2 Identification............................................................................................................... 2
3 Architectural Information ........................................................................................... 3
3.1 Evaluated Configuration ..................................................................................... 3
3.2 TOE Architecture................................................................................................ 3
3.3 Physical Boundaries............................................................................................ 4
4 Security Policy............................................................................................................ 4
4.1 Security audit ...................................................................................................... 5
4.2 Cryptographic support ........................................................................................ 5
4.3 User data protection ............................................................................................ 5
4.4 Identification and authentication......................................................................... 5
4.5 Security management.......................................................................................... 6
4.6 Protection of the TSF.......................................................................................... 6
4.7 TOE access.......................................................................................................... 6
4.8 Trusted path/channels ......................................................................................... 7
5 Assumptions & Clarification of Scope ....................................................................... 7
5.1 Assumptions........................................................................................................ 7
5.2 Clarification of scope.......................................................................................... 7
6 Documentation............................................................................................................ 8
7 IT Product Testing ...................................................................................................... 8
7.1 Developer Testing............................................................................................... 8
7.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing ............................................................... 8
8 Results of the Evaluation ............................................................................................ 9
8.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE)............................................................ 9
8.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV).............................................................. 9
8.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD) ................................................. 9
8.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)................................... 10
8.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE) ............... 10
8.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)....................................................... 10
8.7 Summary of Evaluation Results........................................................................ 11
9 Validator Comments/Recommendations .................................................................. 11
10 Annexes..................................................................................................................... 11
11 Security Target.......................................................................................................... 11
12 Glossary .................................................................................................................... 11
13 Bibliography ............................................................................................................. 12
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1 Executive Summary
This report documents the assessment of the National Information Assurance Partnership
(NIAP) Validation team of the evaluation of Google Pixel Devices on Android 13 solution
provided by Google LLC. It presents the evaluation results, their justifications, and the
conformance results. This Validation Report (VR) is not an endorsement of the Target of
Evaluation (TOE) by any agency of the U.S. government, and no warranty is either expressed
or implied.
The evaluation was performed by the Gossamer Security Solutions (Gossamer) Common
Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL) in Columbia, MD, United States of America, and was
completed in January 2023. The information in this report is largely derived from the
Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) and associated test reports, all written by Gossamer
Security Solutions. The evaluation determined that the product is both Common Criteria Part
2 Extended and Part 3 Extended, and meets the assurance requirements of the PP-
Configuration for Mobile Device Fundamentals, Biometric enrollment and verification – for
unlocking the device, Bluetooth, and WLAN Clients, Version 1.0, 11 October 2022
(CFG_MDF-BIO-BT-WLANC_V1.0), Base PP: Protection Profile for Mobile Device
Fundamentals, Version 3.3, 12 September 2022 (PP_MDF_V3.3) with the collaborative PP-
Module for Biometric enrolment and verification - for unlocking the device [BIOPP-
Module], Version 1.1, September 12 2022 (MOD_BIO_V1.1), the PP-Module for Bluetooth,
Version 1.0, 15 April 2021 (MOD_BT_V1.0), the PP-Module for WLAN Clients, Version
1.0, 31 March 2022 (MOD_WLAN_CLI_V1.0), and Functional Package for Transport
Layer Security (TLS), Version 1.1, 12 February 2019 (PKG_TLS_V1.1).
The TOE is the Google Pixel Devices on Android 13. The TOE identified in this VR has
been evaluated at a NIAP approved Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL) using the
Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 5) for conformance to
the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 5). This VR applies only
to the specific version of the TOE as evaluated. The evaluation has been conducted in
accordance with the provisions of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation
Scheme (CCEVS) and the conclusions of the testing laboratory in the ETR are consistent
with the evidence provided.
The Validation team monitored the activities of the Evaluation team, provided guidance on
technical issues and evaluation processes, and reviewed the individual work units and
successive versions of the ETR. The Validation team found that the evaluation showed that
the product satisfies all the functional requirements and assurance requirements stated in the
Security Target (ST). Therefore, the Validation team concludes that the testing laboratory’s
findings are accurate, the conclusions justified, and the conformance results are correct. The
conclusions of the testing laboratory in the ETR are consistent with the evidence produced.
The technical information included in this report was obtained from the Google Pixel Devices
on Android 13 - Security Target, Version 1.0, January 23, 2023, and analysis performed by
the Validation team.
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2 Identification
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product
evaluations. Under this program, security evaluations are conducted by commercial testing
laboratories called Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs) using the Common
Evaluation Methodology (CEM) in accordance with National Voluntary Laboratory
Assessment Program (NVLAP) accreditation.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality and
consistency across evaluations. Developers of information technology products desiring a
security evaluation contract with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product’s evaluation. Upon
successful completion of the evaluation, the product is added to NIAP’s Validated Products
List.
Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:
• The TOE: the fully qualified identifier of the product as evaluated.
• The ST, describing the security features, claims, and assurances of the product.
• The conformance result of the evaluation.
• The Protection Profile (PP) to which the product is conformant.
• The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation.
Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers
Item Identifier
Evaluation Scheme United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
TOE Google Pixel Devices on Android 13
(Specific models identified in Section 3.1)
Protection Profile Protection Profile for Mobile Device Fundamentals, Version 3.3, 12 September
2022 (PP_MDF_V3.3) with the collaborative PP-Module for Biometric enrolment
and verification - for unlocking the device [BIOPP-Module], Version 1.1,
September 12 2022 (MOD_BIO_V1.1), the PP-Module for Bluetooth, Version
1.0, 15 April 2021 (MOD_BT_V1.0), the PP-Module for WLAN Clients, Version
1.0, 31 March 2022 (MOD_WLAN_CLI_V1.0), and Functional Package for
Transport Layer Security (TLS), Version 1.1, 12 February 2019 (PKG_TLS_V1.1)
ST Google Pixel Devices on Android 13 - Security Target, Version 1.0, January 23,
2023
Evaluation Technical
Report
Evaluation Technical Report for Google Pixel Devices on Android 13 , Version
0.4, January 23, 2023
CC Version Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
rev 5
Conformance Result CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 extended
Sponsor Google LLC
Developer Google LLC
Google Pixel Devices on Android 13 Validation Report Version1.0 , January 24, 2023
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Item Identifier
Common Criteria
Testing Lab (CCTL)
Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc.
Columbia, MD
CCEVS Validators Jenn Dotson, Lauren Hardy, Randy Heimann, Jerome Myers, Lisa Mitchell, Linda
Morrison, Clare Parran, Lori Sarem
3 Architectural Information
Note: The following architectural description is based on the description presented in the
Security Target.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is Google Pixel Phones on Android 13. The TOE allows
basic telephony features (make and receive phone calls, send and receive SMS/MMS
messages) as well as advanced network connectivity (allowing connections to both 802.11
Wi-Fi and 2G/3G/4G LTE/5G mobile data networks). The TOE supports using client
certificates to connect to access points offering WPA2/WPA3 networks with 802.1x/EAP-
TLS, or alternatively connecting to cellular base stations when utilizing mobile data.
3.1 Evaluated Configuration
Google manufacturers some of the phones in multiple variants, differing in size (the
designations vary from the “base” device not having any and other models having something
like “a” or “Pro”) or build materials (entry and premium).
The evaluated configuration consists of the following models and versions:
Product Model # SoC Kernel
Google Pixel 7 Pro GVU6C, G03Z5, GQML3 Google Tensor G2 5.10
Google Pixel 7 GE2AE, GFE4J, GP4BC Google Tensor G2 5.10
Google Pixel 6 Pro GF5KQ, G8V0U, GLU0G Google Tensor 5.10
Google Pixel 6 GR1YH, GB7N6, G9S9B Google Tensor 5.10
Google Pixel 6a GX7AS, GB62Z, G1AZG, GB17L Google Tensor 5.10
Google Pixel 5a-5G G4S1M Qualcomm Snapdragon™ 765 4.19
Google Pixel 5 GD1YQ, GTT9Q, G5NZ6 Qualcomm Snapdragon™ 765 4.19
Google Pixel 4a-5G G025E/I/H, G6QU3 Qualcomm Snapdragon™ 765 4.19
Google Pixel 4a G025J/M/N Qualcomm Snapdragon™ 730 4.14
3.2 TOE Architecture
The TOE offers mobile applications an Application Programming Interface (API) including
that provided by the Android framework and supports API calls to the Android Management
APIs. The TOE provides users installing an application the option to either approve or reject
an application based upon the API access that the application requires (or to grant
applications access at runtime).
The TOE also provides users with the ability to protect Data-At-Rest with AES encryption,
including all user and mobile application data stored in the user’s data partition. The TOE
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uses a key hierarchy that combines a Root Encryption Key (REK) with the user’s password
to provide protection to all user and application cryptographic keys stored in the TOE.
The TOE includes an additional hardware security chip (Titan M or Titan M2, depending on
the device, collectively called Titan security chip) that provides dedicated key storage1
. The
TOE makes this secure, hardware key storage available to mobile applications through the
StrongBox extensions to the Android Keystore. Currently, the StrongBox extension is not
used for any system keys but remains an option for applications to use should they desire the
protections it provides.
Finally, the TOE can interact with a Mobile Device Management (MDM) system (not part
of this evaluation) to allow enterprise control of the configuration and operation of the device
so as to ensure adherence to enterprise-wide policies (for example, restricting use of a
corporate provided device’s camera, forced configuration of maximum login attempts,
pulling of audit logs off the TOE, etc.) as well as policies governing enterprise applications
and data (in a an employee-owned device [BYOD] scenario). The MDM is made up of two
parts: the MDM agent and MDM server. The MDM Agent is installed on the phone as an
administrator with elevated permissions (allowing it to change the relevant settings on the
phone) while the MDM Server is used to issue the commands to the MDM Agent. Neither
portion of the MDM process is considered part of the TOE, and therefore not being directly
evaluated.
The TOE includes several different levels of execution including (from lowest to highest):
hardware, a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE), Android’s bootloader, and Android’s
user space, which provides APIs allowing applications to leverage the cryptographic
functionality of the device.
3.3 Physical Boundaries
The TOE’s physical boundary is the physical perimeter of its enclosure. The TOE runs
Android as its software/OS, executing on the Google Tensor or Qualcomm Snapdragon
processors. The TOE does not include the user applications that run on top of the operating
system but does include controls that limit application behavior. Further, the device provides
support for downloadable MDM agents to be installed to limit or permit different
functionality of the device. There is no built-in MDM agent pre-installed on the device.
The TOE communicates and interacts with 802.11-2012 Access Points and mobile data
networks to establish network connectivity, and through that connectivity interacts with
MDM servers that allow administrative control of the TOE.
4 Security Policy
This section summaries the security functionality of the TOE:
1. Security audit
2. Cryptographic support
3. User data protection
4. Identification and authentication
1
Does not apply to the Pixel 6 Pro/6/6a
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5. Security management
6. Protection of the TSF
7. TOE access
8. Trusted path/channels
4.1 Security audit
The TOE implements the SecurityLog and logcat that are stored in a circular memory buffers.
An MDM agent can read/fetch the logs (both the SecurityLog and logcat) and then handle
appropriately (potentially storing the log to Flash or transmitting its contents to the MDM
server). These log methods meet the logging requirements outlined by FAU_GEN.1 in
PP_MDF_V3.3.
4.2 Cryptographic support
The TOE includes multiple cryptographic libraries with CAVP certified algorithms for a
wide range of cryptographic functions including the following: asymmetric key generation
and establishment, symmetric key generation, encryption/decryption, cryptographic hashing
and keyed-hash message authentication. These functions are supported with suitable random
bit generation, key derivation, salt generation, initialization vector generation, secure key
storage, and key and protected data destruction. These primitive cryptographic functions are
used to implement security protocols such as TLS, EAP-TLS, and HTTPS and to encrypt the
media (including the generation and protection of data and key encryption keys) used by the
TOE. Many of these cryptographic functions are also accessible as services to applications
running on the TOE allowing application developers to ensure their application meets the
required criteria to remain compliant to PP_MDF_V3.3 standards.
4.3 User data protection
The TOE controls access to system services by hosted applications, including protection of
the Trust Anchor Database. Additionally, the TOE protects user and other sensitive data
using encryption so that even if a device is physically lost, the data remains protected. The
TOE’s evaluated configuration supports Android Enterprise profiles to provide additional
separation between application and application data belonging to the Enterprise profile.
Please see the Admin Guide for additional details regarding how to set up and use Enterprise
profiles.
4.4 Identification and authentication
The TOE supports several features related to identification and authentication. From a user
perspective, except for FCC mandated (making phone calls to an emergency number) or non-
sensitive functions (e.g., choosing the keyboard input method or taking screen shots), a
password (i.e., Password Authentication Factor) must be correctly entered to unlock the
TOE. Also, even when unlocked, the TOE requires the user re-enter the password to change
the password. Passwords are obscured when entered so they cannot be read from the TOE's
display and the frequency of entering passwords is limited. Additionally, when a configured
number of failures occurs, the TOE will be wiped to protect its contents. Passwords can be
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constructed using upper and lower cases characters, numbers, and special characters.
Passwords up to 16 characters are supported. The TOE can also be configured to utilize a
biometric authentication factor (fingerprints) to unlock the device (this only works after the
password has been entered after the device powers on).
The TOE can also serve as an 802.1X supplicant and can both use and validate X.509v3
certificates for EAP-TLS, TLS, and HTTPS exchanges.
4.5 Security management
The TOE provides all the interfaces necessary to manage the security functions identified
throughout the Security Target as well as other functions commonly found in mobile devices.
Many of the available functions are available to users of the TOE, while many are restricted
to administrators operating through a MDM solution once the TOE has been enrolled. Once
the TOE has been enrolled and then un-enrolled, it will remove Enterprise applications and
remove MDM policies.
4.6 Protection of the TSF
The TOE implements a number of features to protect itself to ensure the reliability and
integrity of its security features. It protects particularly sensitive data such as cryptographic
keys so that they are not accessible or exportable through the use of the application
processor’s hardware. The TOE disallows all read access to the REK and retains all keys
derived from the REK within its TEE. Application software can only use keys derived from
the REK by reference and receive the result.
The TOE also provides its own timing mechanism to ensure that reliable time information is
available (e.g., for log accountability). It enforces read, write, and execute memory page
protections, uses address space layout randomization, and stack-based buffer overflow
protections to minimize the potential to exploit application flaws. It also protects itself from
modification by applications as well as to isolate the address spaces of applications from one
another to protect those applications.
The TOE includes functions to perform self-tests and software/firmware integrity checking
so that it might detect when it is failing or may be corrupt. If any self-tests fail, the TOE will
not go into an operational mode. It also includes mechanisms (i.e., verification of the digital
signature of each new image) so that the TOE itself can be updated while ensuring that the
updates will not introduce malicious or other unexpected changes in the TOE. Digital
signature checking also extends to verifying applications prior to their installation as all
applications must have signatures (even if self-signed).
4.7 TOE access
The TOE can be locked, obscuring its display, by the user or after a configured interval of
inactivity. The TOE also has the capability to display an administrator specified (using the
TOE’s MDM API) advisory message (banner) when the user unlocks the TOE for the first
use after reboot.
The TOE is also able to attempt to connect to wireless networks as configured.
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4.8 Trusted path/channels
The TOE supports the use of IEEE 802.11-2012, 802.1X, and EAP-TLS and TLS, HTTPS
to secure communications channels between itself and other trusted network devices.
5 Assumptions & Clarification of Scope
5.1 Assumptions
The Security Problem Definition, including the assumptions, may be found in the following
documents:
• Protection Profile for Mobile Device Fundamentals, Version 3.3, 12 September
2022 (PP_MDF_V3.3)
• PP-Module for Biometric enrolment and verification - for unlocking the device
[BIOPP-Module], Version 1.1, September 12 2022 (MOD_BIO_V1.1)
• PP-Module for Bluetooth, Version 1.0, 15 April 2021 (MOD_BT_V1.0)
• PP-Module for WLAN Clients, Version 1.0, 31 March 2022
(MOD_WLAN_CLI_V1.0)
• Functional Package for Transport Layer Security (TLS), Version 1.1, 12 February
2019 (PKG_TLS_V1.1)
That information has not been reproduced here and the
PP_MDF_V3.3/MOD_BIO_V1.1/MOD_BT_V1.0/MOD_WLAN_CLI_V1.0 and the
PKG_TLS_V1.1 should be consulted if there is interest in that material.
5.2 Clarification of scope
The scope of this evaluation was limited to the functionality and assurances covered in the
PP_MDF_V3.3/MOD_BIO_V1.1/MOD_BT_V1.0/MOD_WLAN_CLI_V1.0 and the
PKG_TLS_V1.1as described for this TOE in the ST. Other functionality included in the
product was not assessed as part of this evaluation. All other functionality provided by the
devices needs to be assessed separately, and no further conclusions can be drawn about their
effectiveness.
All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that
need clarification. This text covers some of the more important limitations and clarifications
of this evaluation. Note that:
• As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated configuration
meets the security claims made with a certain level of assurance (the assurance
activities specified in the Mobile Device Fundamentals Protection Profile with the
Biometric, Bluetooth, and WLAN Clients Modules and the TLS Functional Package
and performed by the Evaluation team).
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• This evaluation covers only the specific device models and software as identified in
this document, and not any earlier or later versions released or in process.
• Apart from the Admin Guide identified in Section 6, additional customer
documentation for the specific Mobile Device models was not included in the scope
of the evaluation and therefore should not be relied upon when configuring or
operating the device as evaluated.
• This evaluation did not specifically search for, nor attempt to exploit, vulnerabilities
that were not “obvious” or vulnerabilities to objectives not claimed in the ST. The
CEM defines an “obvious” vulnerability as one that is easily exploited with a
minimum of understanding of the TOE, technical sophistication and resources.
• The functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the security functional
requirements specified in the PP_MDF_V3.3/MOD_BIO_V1.1/MOD_BT_V1.0/
MOD_WLAN_CLI_V1.0 and the PKG_TLS_V1.1 and applicable Technical
Decisions. Any additional security related functional capabilities of the TOE were
not covered by this evaluation. In particular, as explained in Section 3.2, the MDM
process is not directly covered by this evaluation.
6 Documentation
The following documents were available with the TOE for evaluation:
• Google Pixel Devices on Android 13 Administrator Guidance Documentation,
Version 1.0, 01/20/2023
This document is the only documentation that should be trusted to set-up, administer, or use
the product in the evaluated configuration. Additional documentation was not included in the
scope of the evaluation and should not be relied upon when configuring or operating the
device as evaluated.
7 IT Product Testing
This section describes the testing efforts of the developer and the Evaluation Team. It is
derived from information contained in the proprietary Detailed Test Report for Google Pixel
Devices on Android 13, Version 0.3, 01/20/2023 (DTR), as summarized in the evaluation
Assurance Activity Report for Google Pixel Devices on Android 13, Version 0.4, 01/23/2023
(AAR).
7.1 Developer Testing
No evidence of developer testing is required in the assurance activities for this product.
7.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing
The evaluation team verified the product according to a Common Criteria Certification
document and ran the tests specified in the PP_MDF_V3.3/MOD_BIO_V1.1/
MOD_BT_V1.0/MOD_WLAN_CLI_V1.0 and the PKG_TLS_V1.1 including the tests
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associated with optional requirements. The AAR, in sections 1.1 and 3.4.1 lists the tested
devices, provides a list of test tools, and has diagrams of the test environment.
8 Results of the Evaluation
The results of the assurance requirements are generally described in this section and are
presented in detail in the proprietary ETR. The reader of this document can assume that all
assurance activities and work units received a passing verdict.
A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to the
corresponding evaluator action elements. The evaluation was conducted based upon CC
version 3.1 rev 5 and CEM version 3.1 rev 5. The evaluation determined the Pixel Devices
on Android 13 TOE to be Part 2 extended and Part 3 extended, and to meet the SARs
contained in the PP_MDF_V3.3/MOD_BIO_V1.1/MOD_BT_V1.0/
MOD_WLAN_CLI_V1.0.
8.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE)
The Evaluation team applied each ASE CEM work unit. The ST evaluation ensured the ST
contains a description of the environment in terms of policies and assumptions, a statement
of security requirements claimed to be met by the Google Pixel Devices on Android 13
products that are consistent with the Common Criteria, and product security function
descriptions that support the requirements.
The Validation team reviewed the work of the Evaluation team and found that sufficient
evidence and justification was provided by the Evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation
was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion
reached by the Evaluation team was justified.
8.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV)
The Evaluation team applied each ADV CEM work unit. The Evaluation team assessed the
design documentation and found it adequate to aid in understanding how the TSF provides
the security functions. The design documentation consists of a functional specification
contained in the Security Target and Guidance documents. Additionally, the evaluator
performed the assurance activities specified in the PP_MDF_V3.3/MOD_BIO_V1.1/
MOD_BT_V1.0/MOD_WLAN_CLI_V1.0 and the PKG_TLS_V1.1 related to the
examination of the information contained in the TOE Summary Specification (TSS).
The Validation team reviewed the work of the Evaluation team and found that sufficient
evidence and justification was provided by the Evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation
was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion
reached by the Evaluation team was justified.
8.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD)
The Evaluation team applied each AGD CEM work unit. The Evaluation team ensured the
adequacy of the user guidance in describing how to use the operational TOE. Additionally,
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the Evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the administrator guidance in describing how
to securely administer the TOE. All of the guides were assessed during the design and testing
phases of the evaluation to ensure they were complete.
The Validation team reviewed the work of the Evaluation team and found that sufficient
evidence and justification was provided by the Evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation
was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion
reached by the Evaluation team was justified.
8.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)
The Evaluation team applied each ALC CEM work unit. The Evaluation team found that the
TOE was identified.
The Validation team reviewed the work of the Evaluation team and found that sufficient
evidence and justification was provided by the Evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation
was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion
reached by the Evaluation team was justified.
8.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE)
The Evaluation team applied each ATE CEM work unit. The Evaluation team ran the set of
tests specified by the assurance activities in the PP_MDF_V3.3/MOD_BIO_V1.1/
MOD_BT_V1.0/MOD_WLAN_CLI_V1.0 and the PKG_TLS_V1.1 and recorded the
results in the proprietary DTR, summarized in the AAR.
The Validation team reviewed the work of the Evaluation team and found that sufficient
evidence and justification was provided by the Evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation
was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion
reached by the Evaluation team was justified.
8.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)
The Evaluation team applied each AVA CEM work unit. The vulnerability analysis is in
the Detailed Test Report (DTR) prepared by the evaluator. The vulnerability analysis
includes a public search for vulnerabilities. The public search for vulnerabilities did not
uncover any residual vulnerability.
The evaluator searched the National Vulnerability Database
(https://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/search) and Vulnerability Notes Database
(http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/) on 01/17/2023 with the following search terms: "Google",
"Google, LLC", "Google Tensor", "Google Tensor G2", "Qualcomm Snapdragon 730",
"Qualcomm Snapdragon 765", "Android 13", "Pixel 4a", "Pixel 4a5G", "Pixel 5", "Pixel
5a5G", "Pixel 6", "Pixel 6a", "Pixel 6 Pro", "Pixel 7", "Pixel 7 Pro", "BoringSSL", "Android
Locksettings service KBKDF", "QTI Crypto Engine Core", "QTI Inline Crypto Engine",
"QTI Random Number Generator".
The Validation team reviewed the work of the Evaluation team and found that sufficient
evidence and justification was provided by the Evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation
Google Pixel Devices on Android 13 Validation Report Version1.0 , January 24, 2023
11
was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion
reached by the Evaluation team was justified.
8.7 Summary of Evaluation Results
The Evaluation team’s assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims
in the ST are met. Additionally, the Evaluation team’s testing also demonstrated the accuracy
of the claims in the ST.
The Validation team’s assessment of the evidence provided by the Evaluation team is that it
demonstrates that the Evaluation team followed the procedures defined in the CEM, and
correctly verified that the product meets the claims in the ST.
9 Validator Comments/Recommendations
The Validation team notes that the evaluated configuration is dependent upon the TOE being
configured per the evaluated configuration instructions in the Google Pixel Devices on
Android 13 Administrator Guidance Documentation, Version 1.0, 01/20/2023. Consumers
are encouraged to download the configuration guide from the NIAP website to ensure the
device is configured as evaluated. As noted in Section 6, any additional customer
documentation provided with the product, or that is available online, was not included in the
scope of the evaluation and should not be relied upon when configuring or operating the
device as evaluated.
Please note that the functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the security functional
requirements specified in the ST. Other functionality included in the product was not
assessed as part of this evaluation. Other functionality provided by devices in the operational
environment, need to be assessed separately and no further conclusions can be drawn about
their effectiveness. No versions of the TOE and software, either earlier or later were
evaluated.
10 Annexes
Not applicable
11 Security Target
The Security Target is identified as: Google Pixel Devices on Android 13 - Security Target,
Version 1.0, January 23, 2023.
12 Glossary
The following definitions are used throughout this document:
• Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL). An IT security evaluation facility
accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and
approved by the CCEVS Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based
evaluations.
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• Conformance. The ability to demonstrate in an unambiguous way that a given
implementation is correct with respect to the formal model.
• Evaluation. The assessment of an IT product against the Common Criteria using the
Common Criteria Evaluation Methodology to determine whether or not the claims made
are justified; or the assessment of a protection profile against the Common Criteria using
the Common Evaluation Methodology to determine if the Profile is complete, consistent,
technically sound and hence suitable for use as a statement of requirements for one or
more TOEs that may be evaluated.
• Evaluation Evidence. Any tangible resource (information) required from the sponsor or
developer by the evaluator to perform one or more evaluation activities.
• Feature. Part of a product that is either included with the product or can be ordered
separately.
• Target of Evaluation (TOE). A group of IT products configured as an IT system, or an
IT product, and associated documentation that is the subject of a security evaluation
under the CC.
• Validation. The process carried out by the CCEVS Validation Body leading to the issue
of a Common Criteria certificate.
• Validation Body. A governmental organization responsible for carrying out validation
and for overseeing the day-to-day operation of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation
and Validation Scheme.
13 Bibliography
The Validation Team used the following documents to produce this Validation Report:
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation: Part 1:
Introduction and General Model, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
[2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security
functional components, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
[3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security
assurance components, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.
[4] Protection Profile for Mobile Device Fundamentals, Version 3.3, 12 September
2022 (PP_MDF_V3.3)
[5] collaborative PP-Module for Biometric enrolment and verification - for unlocking
the device [BIOPP-Module], Version 1.1, September 12 2022 (MOD_BIO_V1.1)
[6] PP-Module for Bluetooth, Version 1.0, 15 April 2021 (MOD_BT_V1.0)
[7] PP-Module for WLAN Clients, Version 1.0, 31 March 2022
(MOD_WLAN_CLI_V1.0).
[8] Functional Package for Transport Layer Security (TLS), Version 1.1, 12 February
2019 (PKG_TLS_V1.1)
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[9] Google Pixel Devices on Android 13 - Security Target, Version 1.0, January 23,
2023 (ST).
[10] Assurance Activity Report for Google Pixel Devices on Android 13, Version 0.4,
01/23/2023 (AAR).
[11] Detailed Test Report for Google Pixel Devices on Android 13, Version 0.3,
01/20/2023 (DTR).
[12] Evaluation Technical Report for Google Pixel Devices on Android 13, Version 0.4,
January 23, 2023 (ETR)
[13] Google Pixel Devices on Android 13 Administrator Guidance Documentation,
Version 1.0, 01/20/2023 (AGD)