

National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme



Validation Report

LG Electronics, Inc.

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LG G5, V10, and G4 Smartphones

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1 Executive Summary

This report documents the assessment of the National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP) validation team of the evaluation of LG G5, V10, and G4 Smartphones solution provided by LG Electronics, Inc. It presents the evaluation results, their justifications, and the conformance results. This Validation Report is not an endorsement of the Target of Evaluation by any agency of the U.S. government, and no warranty is either expressed or implied.

The evaluation was performed by the Gossamer Security Solutions (Gossamer) Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL) in Catonsville, MD, United States of America, and was completed in March 2016. The information in this report is largely derived from the Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) and associated test reports, all written by Gossamer Security Solutions. The evaluation determined that the product is both Common Criteria Part 2 Extended and Part 3 Conformant.

The Target of Evaluation (TOE) are the LG G5, V10, and G4 Smartphones.

The Target of Evaluation (TOE) identified in this Validation Report has been evaluated at a NIAP approved Common Criteria Testing Laboratory using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 4) for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 4). This Validation Report applies only to the specific versions of the TOE that were evaluated. The evaluation was conducted in accordance with the provisions of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme and the conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence provided.

The validation team monitored the activities of the evaluation team, provided guidance on technical issues and evaluation processes, and reviewed the individual work units and successive versions of the ETR. The validation team found that the evaluation showed that the product satisfies all of the functional requirements and assurance requirements stated in the Security Target (ST). Therefore the validation team concludes that the testing laboratory's findings are accurate, the conclusions justified, and the conformance results are correct. The conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence produced.

The Gossamer Security Solutions evaluation team concluded that the Common Criteria requirements are for Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL) 1.

The technical information included in this report was obtained from the LG Electronics Inc. G5, V10, and G4 Smartphones (MDFPP20) Security Target and analysis performed by the evaluation team.

2 Identification

The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product evaluations. Under this program, security evaluations are conducted by commercial testing laboratories called

Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs) using the Common Evaluation Methodology (CEM) in accordance with National Voluntary Laboratory Assessment Program (NVLAP) accreditation.

The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality and consistency across evaluations. Developers of information technology products desiring a security evaluation contract with a CCTL pay a fee for their product’s evaluation. Upon successful completion of the evaluation, the product is added to NIAP’s Validated Products List.

Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:

- The Target of Evaluation (TOE): the fully qualified identifier of the product as evaluated.
- The Security Target (ST), describing the security features, claims, and assurances of the product.
- The conformance result of the evaluation.
- The Protection Profile to which the product is conformant.
- The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation.

Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers

Item	Identifier
Evaluation Scheme	United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
TOE	LG G5, V10, and G4 Smartphones (Specific models identified in Section 3.1)
Protection Profile	Protection Profile For Mobile Device Fundamentals, Version 2.0, 17 September 2014
ST	LG G5, V10, and G4 Smartphones Security Target, version 0.8, April 14, 2016
Evaluation Technical Report	Evaluation Technical Report for LG G5, V10, and G4 Smartphones , version 0.3, April 14, 2016
CC Version	Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1, rev 4
Conformance Result	CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 conformant
Sponsor	LG Electronics, Inc.
Developer	LG Electronics, Inc.
Common Criteria Testing Lab (CCTL)	Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc.
CCEVS Validators	Stelios Melachrinoudis Kenneth Stutterheim

3 Architectural Information

Note: The following architectural description is based on the description presented in the Security Target.

The TOE is a mobile device designed to support enterprises and individual users alike. Based upon Android 6.0 and improved by LG, the TOE provides wireless connectivity and provides an execution environment for mobile applications.

The TOE allows basic telephony features (make and receive phone calls, send and receive SMS/MMS messages) as well as advanced network connectivity (allowing connections to both IEEE 802.11 Wi-Fi and 2G/3G/4G LTE mobile data networks). The TOE supports using client certificates to connect to access points offering WPA2 networks with IEEE 802.1x/EAP-TLS, or alternatively connecting to cellular base stations when utilizing mobile data.

The TOE offers mobile applications an Application Programming Interface (API) including that provided by the Android framework and extensions to the MDM API by LG.

The TOE provides users installing an application the option to either approve or reject an application based upon the API access that the application requires.

The TOE also provides users with the ability to protect Data-At-Rest with AES encryption, including all user and mobile application data stored in the user's data partition. The TOE affords protection to all user and application cryptographic keys stored in the TOE. Moreover, the TOE provides users the ability to AES encrypt data and files stored on an SD Card inserted into the device.

Finally, the TOE can interact with a suitable Mobile Device Management solution to allow for enterprise control of the configuration and operation of the devices to ensure adherence to enterprise-wide policies.

Note that in order to utilize the TOE in its evaluated configuration, the TOE must be configured into its Common Criteria Mode.

3.1 TOE Evaluated Platforms

The evaluated configuration for the G5, V10, and G4 Smartphones comes in the following different carrier versions:

Product	Carrier	Security SW Version	OS version	Build number	WFA Cert#
LG G5 H820	AT&T	MDF v2.0 Release 2	Android 6.0.1	MMB29M	63786
LG G5 VS987	Verizon	MDF v2.0 Release 2	Android 6.0.1	MMB29M	63656
LG G5 LS992	Sprint	MDF v2.0 Release 2	Android 6.0.1	MMB29M	63797
LG G5 H830	T-Mobile	MDF v2.0 Release 2	Android 6.0.1	MMB29M	63768
LG V10 H900	AT&T	MDF v2.0 Release 2	Android 6.0	MRA58K	61545
LG V10 VS990	Verizon	MDF v2.0 Release 2	Android 6.0	MRA58K	61481
LG V10 H901	T-Mobile	MDF v2.0 Release 2	Android 6.0	MRA58K	61546
LG G4 H810	AT&T	MDF v2.0 Release 2	Android 6.0	MRA58K	58690
LG G4 VS986	Verizon	MDF v2.0 Release 2	Android 6.0	MRA58K	58682
LG G4 LS991	Sprint	MDF v2.0 Release 2	Android 6.0	MRA58K	58680

Product	Carrier	Security SW Version	OS version	Build number	WFA Cert#
LG G4 H811	T-Mobile	MDF v2.0 Release 2	Android 6.0	MRA58K	58678

NOTE: Carrier specific versions of the evaluated product are released based upon that carrier's own schedule, so some carriers may not have released the evaluated version of the TOE by the time this report is published. Therefore, consumers should ensure that they have the evaluated version of the product software.

3.2 Physical Boundaries

The TOE's physical boundary is the physical perimeter of its enclosure (without the rear access cover present, so that one can access and replace the device's battery, SIM, and SD Card).

4 Security Policy

This section summarizes the security functionality of the TOE:

1. Cryptographic support
2. User data protection
3. Identification and authentication
4. Security Management
5. Protection of the TSF
6. TOE access
7. Trusted path/channels

4.1 Cryptographic support

The TOE includes cryptographic modules with CAVP certified algorithms for a range of cryptographic functions including: asymmetric key generation and establishment, symmetric key generation, encryption/decryption, cryptographic hashing and keyed-hash message authentication. These functions are supported with random bit generation, key derivation, salt generation, initialization vector generation, secure key storage, and key and protected data destruction. These primitive cryptographic functions are used to implement security protocols such as TLS and HTTPS and also to encrypt Data-At-Rest (including the generation and protection of keys and key encryption keys) used by the TOE. Cryptographic functions are also accessible as services to applications running on the TOE.

4.2 User data protection

The TOE controls access to system services by hosted applications, including protection of the Trust Anchor Database. Additionally, the TOE is designed to protect user and other data using encryption so that even if a device is physically lost, the data remains protected. The TOE supports Android for Work profiles to provide additional separation between

application and application data belonging to the Android for Work profile. Please see the Admin Guide for additional details regarding how to set up and use Android for Work profiles.

4.3 Identification and authentication

The TOE supports features related to identification and authentication. From a user perspective, except for making phone calls to an emergency number, a password (i.e., Password Authentication Factor) must be correctly entered to unlock the TOE. To change an existing password even if the TOE is unlocked, the existing password must be re-entered before the user is allowed to change that password. Passwords are obscured when entered so they cannot be read from the TOE's display. The frequency of entering passwords is limited such that when a configured number of password entry failures occurs, the TOE will be wiped to protect its contents. Passwords can be constructed using upper and lower case characters, numbers, and special characters. Passwords up to 16 characters are supported.

The TOE can also serve as an IEEE 802.1X supplicant and can use X.509v3 and validate certificates for EAP-TLS, TLS, and HTTPS exchanges.

4.4 Security management

The TOE provides interfaces to manage the security functions identified throughout this Security Target as well as other functions found in mobile devices. Some functions are available to users of the TOE while others are restricted to administrators operating through a Mobile Device Management solution; if the TOE has been enrolled. Once the TOE has been enrolled and then un-enrolled, it will remove Enterprise applications, remove MDM policies, and disable CC mode.

4.5 Protection of the TSF

The TOE implements mechanisms to protect itself and ensure the reliability and integrity of its security features. It protects sensitive data such as cryptographic keys so that they are not accessible or exportable. It provides its own timing mechanism to ensure that reliable time information is available (e.g., for log accountability). It enforces read, write, and execute memory page protections, the use of address space layout randomization, and stack-based buffer overflow protections to minimize the potential to exploit application flaws. The TOE employs mechanisms to protect itself from modification by applications as well as to isolate the address spaces of applications from each other to protect those applications.

The TOE includes functions to perform self-tests and software/firmware integrity checking so that it might detect when it is failing or may be corrupt. If any of the self-tests fail, the TOE will not enter into an operational mode. It also includes mechanisms (i.e., verification of the digital signature of each new image) so that the TOE itself can be updated while ensuring that the updates will not introduce malicious or other unexpected changes in the TOE. Digital signature checking also extends to verifying applications prior to their installation as all applications must have signatures even if self-signed.

4.6 TOE access

The TOE can be locked, by the user or after a configured interval of inactivity thereby obscuring its display. The TOE has the capacity to display an administrator specified (using an MDM) advisory message when the user unlocks the TOE for the first use after reboot.

The TOE can attempt to connect to wireless networks if so configured.

4.7 Trusted path/channels

The TOE supports the use of IEEE 802.11-2012, IEEE 802.1X, and EAP-TLS to secure communications channels between itself and other trusted network devices.

5 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope

The Security Problem Definition, including the assumptions, may be found in the Protection Profile For Mobile Device Fundamentals, Version 2.0, 17 September 2014 (MDFPP20). That information has not been reproduced here; the MDFPP20 should be consulted if there is interest in that material.

The scope of this evaluation was limited to the functionality and assurances covered in the MDFPP20 as described for this TOE in the Security Target. Other functionality included in the product was not assessed as part of this evaluation. All other functionality provided by the devices needs to be assessed separately, and no further conclusions can be drawn about their effectiveness.

All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that need clarification. This text covers some of the more important limitations and clarifications of this evaluation. Note that:

1. As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated configuration meets the security claims made with a certain level of assurance (the assurance activities specified in the Mobile Device Fundamentals Protection Profile and performed by the evaluation team).
2. This evaluation covers only the specific device models and software as identified in this document, and not any earlier or later versions released or in process.
3. Android for Work functionality can be used to account for BYOD scenarios where personal data and Enterprise data are separated; however, it is not required for the MDF PP. Therefore, its use is out of scope and it has not been evaluated.
4. This evaluation did not specifically search for, nor attempt to exploit, vulnerabilities that were not “obvious” or vulnerabilities to objectives not claimed in the ST. The CEM defines an “obvious” vulnerability as one that is easily exploited with a minimum of understanding of the TOE, technical sophistication and resources.

6 Documentation

The following documentation was used as evidence for the evaluation of the LG G5, V10, and G4 Smartphones:

- LG Electronics Inc. LG Android 6 devices (G5, V10, G4) Guidance Documentation, Version 0.5, 2016/04/06

Any additional customer documentation delivered with the product or available through download was not included in the scope of the evaluation and hence should not be relied upon when using the products as evaluated.

7 IT Product Testing

The detailed tests performed by the developer and the Evaluation Team were provided in proprietary format to the validation team in the Detailed Test Report for G5, V10, and G4 Smartphones, version 0.3, April 9, 2016 (DTR). The non-proprietary version of the testing evidence is included in the Assurance Activity Report for LG G5, V10, and G4 Smartphones, version 0.3, April 9, 2016.

The following diagrams depict the test environments used by the evaluators.




Figure 1 Developer Test Setup




Figure 2 Evaluator Test Setup

7.1 Developer Testing

No evidence of developer testing is required in the assurance activities for this product.

7.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing

The evaluation team verified the product according to the LG Electronics Inc. LG Android 6 devices (G5, V10, G4) Guidance Documentation, Version 0.5, 2016/04/06 document and ran the tests specified in the MDFPP20.

8 Evaluated Configuration

The evaluated configuration consists of the LG G5, V10, and G4 Smartphone devices.

To use the product in the evaluated configuration, the product must be configured as specified in LG Electronics Inc. LG Android 6 devices (G5, V10, G4) Guidance Documentation, Version 0.5, 2016/04/06.

9 Results of the Evaluation

The results of the assurance requirements are generally described in this section and are presented in detail in the proprietary ETR. The reader of this document can assume that all work units received a passing verdict.

A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to the corresponding evaluator action elements. The evaluation was conducted based upon CC version 3.1 rev 4 and CEM version 3.1 rev 4. The evaluation determined the LG G4, V10, and G5 Smartphones TOE to be Part 2 extended, and to meet Part 3 Evaluation Assurance.

9.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE)

The evaluation team applied each ASE CEM work unit. The ST evaluation ensured the ST contains a description of the environment in terms of policies and assumptions, a statement of security requirements claimed to be met by the LG G5, V10, and G4 Smartphone products that are consistent with the Common Criteria, and product security function descriptions that support the requirements.

The validation team reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team was justified.

9.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV)

The evaluation team applied each ADV CEM work unit. The evaluation team assessed the design documentation and found it adequate to aid in understanding how the TSF provides the security functions. The design documentation consists of a functional specification contained in the Security Target and Guidance documents. Additionally the evaluator performed the assurance activities specified in the MDFPP20 related to the examination of the information contained in the TSS.

The validation team reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team was justified.

9.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD)

The evaluation team applied each AGD CEM work unit. The evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the user guidance in describing how to use the operational TOE. Additionally, the evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the administrator guidance in describing how to securely administer the TOE. All of the guides were assessed during the design and testing phases of the evaluation to ensure they were complete.

The validation team reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team was justified.

9.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)

The evaluation team applied each ALC CEM work unit. The evaluation team found that the TOE was identified.

The validation team reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team was justified.

9.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE)

The evaluation team applied each ATE CEM work unit. The evaluation team ran the set of tests specified by the assurance activities in the MDFPP20 and recorded the results in a Test Report, summarized in the Assurance Activities Report.

The validation team reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team was justified.

9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)

The evaluation team applied each AVA CEM work unit. The evaluation team performed a public search for vulnerabilities. The search identified some general Android vulnerabilities which were addressed by the vendor prior to the completion of the evaluation.

The validation team reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team was justified.

9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results

The evaluation team's assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims in the ST are met. Additionally, the evaluation team's testing also demonstrated the accuracy of the claims in the ST.

The validation team's assessment of the evidence provided by the evaluation team is that it demonstrates that the evaluation team followed the procedures defined in the CEM, and correctly verified that the product meets the claims in the ST.

10 Validator Comments/Recommendations

The validators encourage the consumers of these products to understand the relationship between the products and any functionality that may be provided via Mobile Device Management solutions. This evaluation does not cover, nor does it endorse, the use of any particular MDM solution and only the MDM interfaces of the products were exercised as part of the evaluation. In practice, the LG MDM is not available, though its settings could

be managed via a suitable MDM and corresponding agent. Alternatively, LG has developed a downloadable application that can be utilized to put the device into CC mode – MDM Test.apk. The *LG Android 6 Devices (G5, V10, G4) Guidance Documentation* contains instructions on how the application can be acquired. As of the conclusion of this evaluation, an administrator can send an e-mail to support-enterprise-mobility@lge.com to request the application.

Note that the products must be configured into Common Criteria Mode as directed in the *LG Electronics Inc. LG Android 6 Devices (G5, V10, G4) Guidance Documentation*, version 0.5, Section 3.1 in order to be in the evaluated configuration.

Although Android for Work was used in testing to successfully demonstrate the TOEs ability to satisfy FDP_ACF_EXT.1.2 per the DoD Annex; Android for Work is not required in the Common Criteria evaluated configuration.

Over-The-Air (OTA) updates were not available during the evaluation; these are created by Google and the mobile device vendors, then distributed to the wireless carriers (Verizon, AT&T, etc), for deployment to the respective devices via the carriers network. Therefore the OTA update functionality was not tested. Users and enterprise administrators should remain cognizant of OTA updates and the update cycles offered by the carriers.

11 Annexes

Not applicable

12 Security Target

The Security Target is identified as: *LG G5, V10, and G4 Smartphones (MDFPP20) Security Target, Version 0.7, April 8, 2016.*

13 Glossary

The following definitions are used throughout this document:

- **Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL).** An IT security evaluation facility accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and approved by the CCEVS Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based evaluations.
- **Conformance.** The ability to demonstrate in an unambiguous way that a given implementation is correct with respect to the formal model.
- **Evaluation.** The assessment of an IT product against the Common Criteria using the Common Criteria Evaluation Methodology to determine whether or not the claims made are justified; or the assessment of a protection profile against the Common Criteria using the Common Evaluation Methodology to determine if the Profile is

complete, consistent, technically sound and hence suitable for use as a statement of requirements for one or more TOEs that may be evaluated.

- **Evaluation Evidence.** Any tangible resource (information) required from the sponsor or developer by the evaluator to perform one or more evaluation activities.
- **Feature.** Part of a product that is either included with the product or can be ordered separately.
- **Target of Evaluation (TOE).** A group of IT products configured as an IT system, or an IT product, and associated documentation that is the subject of a security evaluation under the CC.
- **Validation.** The process carried out by the CCEVS Validation Body leading to the issue of a Common Criteria certificate.
- **Validation Body.** A governmental organization responsible for carrying out validation and for overseeing the day-to-day operation of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme.

14 Bibliography

The Validation Team used the following documents to produce this Validation Report:

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- [2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security functional components, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012.
- [3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security assurance components, Version 3.1 Revision 4, September 2102.
- [4] Protection Profile For Mobile Device Fundamentals, Version 2.0, 17 September 2014
- [5] Gossamer Laboratories, *LG Electronics Inc. G5, V10, and G4 Smartphones (MDFPP20) Security Target*, version 0.8, April 14, 2016 (ST)
- [6] Gossamer Security Solutions, *Assurance Activity Report (MDFPP20) for LG Electronics Inc. G5, V10, and G4 Smartphones*, version 0.3, April 14, 2016 (AAR)
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