CEITECSA 5.410.052 1
Security Target Lite for CEITEC
ePassport Module CTC21001 with EAC
Version 2.0 – 12/Dec/2016
Document History
1.0 First version
2.0 Clarifications to section 7.1
CEITECSA 5.410.052 2
Table of contents
1 Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 4
1.1 ST reference and TOE reference ................................................................................... 4
1.2 TOE overview ................................................................................................................ 4
1.2.1 Usage and major security features for operational use........................................ 5
1.2.2 TOE type................................................................................................................ 7
1.2.3 Required non-TOE hardware/software/firmware ................................................ 7
1.3 TOE description............................................................................................................. 7
1.3.1 Physical Scope of the TOE ..................................................................................... 8
Table 1 – TOE component identification............................................................................... 9
1.3.2 Logical Scope of the TOE ....................................................................................... 9
1.4 TOE life-cycle............................................................................................................... 10
Table 2 – Roles in the TOE life-cycle.................................................................................... 11
1.4.1 Phase 1 “Development”...................................................................................... 11
1.4.2 Phase 2 “Manufacturing”.................................................................................... 11
1.4.3 Phase 3 “Personalization of the MRTD”.............................................................. 12
1.4.4 Phase 4 “Operational Use”.................................................................................. 12
2 Conformance claims............................................................................................................ 13
2.1 Common Criteria conformance................................................................................... 13
2.2 Protection Profile conformance.................................................................................. 13
2.3 Package conformance ................................................................................................. 13
3 Security problem definition ................................................................................................ 14
3.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................ 14
3.2 Assumptions................................................................................................................ 16
3.3 Threats......................................................................................................................... 18
3.4 Organizational security policies (OSPs)....................................................................... 22
4 Security objectives .............................................................................................................. 24
4.1 Security objectives for the TOE................................................................................... 24
4.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment................................................ 26
4.3 Security Objective Rationale ....................................................................................... 30
5 Extended Components Definition....................................................................................... 34
5.1 Definition of the Family FAU_SAS ............................................................................... 34
5.2 Definition of the Family FCS_RND............................................................................... 34
CEITECSA 5.410.052 3
5.3 Definition of the Family FIA_API ................................................................................. 35
5.4 Definition of the Family FMT_LIM............................................................................... 36
5.5 Definition of the Family FPT_EMSEC........................................................................... 38
6 Security requirements......................................................................................................... 40
6.1 Security functional requirements for the TOE ............................................................ 40
6.1.1 Class FAU Security Audit...................................................................................... 40
6.1.2 Class Cryptographic Support (FCS)...................................................................... 40
6.1.3 Class FIA Identification and Authentication........................................................ 43
6.1.4 Class FDP User Data Protection........................................................................... 46
6.1.5 Class FMT Security Management........................................................................ 49
6.1.6 Class FPT Protection of the Security Functions................................................... 54
6.2 Security Assurance Requirements for the TOE ........................................................... 56
6.3 Security Requirements Rationale................................................................................ 56
6.3.1 Security Functional Requirements Rationale...................................................... 56
6.3.2 Dependency Rationale ........................................................................................ 60
6.3.3 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale ...................................................... 63
6.3.4 Security Requirements – Mutual Support and Internal Consistency.................. 63
7 TOE summary specification................................................................................................. 65
7.1 SF.AC_Pers: Access Control for Personalization.......................................................... 65
7.1.1 Chip authentication............................................................................................. 65
7.1.2 Terminal authentication...................................................................................... 65
7.1.3 Personalization access control............................................................................ 65
7.2 SF.Data_Int: Integrity of Personal Data....................................................................... 66
7.3 SF.Sens_Data_Conf: Confidentiality of Sensitive Biometric Reference Data.............. 66
7.4 SF.Identification: Identification and Authentication of the TOE................................. 67
7.5 SF.Chip_Auth_Proof: Proof of MRTD´s Chip Authenticity........................................... 67
7.6 SM.Prot_Abuse_Func: Protection against Abuse of Functionality ............................. 68
7.7 SM.Prot_Inf_Leak: Protection against Information Leakage ...................................... 68
7.8 SM.Prot_Phys_Tamper: Protection against Physical Tampering................................ 68
7.9 SM.Prot_Malfunction: Protection against Malfunctions ............................................ 68
8 List of abbreviations............................................................................................................ 69
9 References........................................................................................................................... 70
CEITECSA 5.410.052 4
1 Introduction
1.1 ST Lite reference and TOE reference
ST Lite identification: CEITECSA 5.410.052, version 2.0
Author: Product and Business Development Department (DP&N), CEITEC S.A.
Date: 12 December 2016
TOE identification: CEITEC ePassport Module, CTC21001, version 1.0
Applicant: CEITEC S.A., Porto Alegre, Brazil
Compliant to: BSI-CC-PP-0056, “Machine Readable Travel Document with ‘ICAO
Application’, Extended Access Control” [1]
Assurance level: EAL4 augmented by ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5
Keywords: ePassport, MRTD, machine readable travel document, EAC, extended
access control, ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization.
1.2 TOE overview
The TOE is an electronic module for machine readable travel documents (MRTDs) based on the
requirements of the International Civil Aviation Organization, as defined in ICAO Doc 9303 [2].
The TOE is developed and produced by CEITEC and delivered to the Passport Manufacturer as
micro modules.
The Passport Manufacturer makes an ePassport book by embedding the TOE and an antenna
into an ePassport book. Neither the antenna nor the ePassport book is part of the TOE. The
Passport Manufacturer delivers the ePassport books with the antenna and the TOE installed on
them to a Personalization Agent.
The Personalization Agent personalizes the MRZ information and biometric data of the face
and fingerprints of the ePassport holder into the TOE along with the TSF data for
authentication and secure messaging between the TOE and the Inspection System. The
Personalization Agent is required to perform an authentication procedure in order to be
allowed to personalize the module with the holder data.
After the personalization, an Inspection System shall be able to verify the ePassport presented
by the ePassport holder using the secure messaging protocol defined by ICAO. The Inspection
System is required to perform the Basic Access Control (BAC) procedure in order to be allowed
to read the passport holder data. The Inspection System is required to perform the Extended
Access Control (EAC) procedure in order to be allowed to read the optional passport holder
biometric data.
CEITECSA 5.410.052 5
1.2.1 Usage and major security features for operational use
A State or Organization issues MRTDs to be used by the holder for international travel. The
TOE’s access control function for personalization contributes to assure the authenticity of the
MRTD by verifying the access rights of the Personalization Agent. The TOE does not allow the
holder data in a personalized MRTD to be altered or deleted. The traveler presents a MRTD to
the Inspection System to prove his or her identity.
The Inspection System is also required by the TOE to undergo an identification and
authentication procedure before being granted access to the data stored in the MRTD. The
Inspection System is required to perform the Basic Access Control (BAC) authentication
procedure in order to be allowed to read the passport holder data and the Extended Access
Control (EAC) authentication procedure in order to be allowed to read the optional passport
holder biometric data. EAC and all subsequent communication takes place over a secure
channel established by BAC.
The traveler presents a MRTD to the Inspection System to prove his or her identity. The MRTD
in context of this ST contains (i) visual (eye-readable) biographical data and portrait of the
holder, (ii) a separate data summary (MRZ data) for visual and machine reading using OCR
methods in the Machine-Readable Zone (MRZ) and (iii) data elements on the MRTD’s chip
according to LDS for contactless machine reading. The authentication of the traveler is based
on (i) the possession of a valid MRTD personalized for a holder with the claimed identity as
given on the biographical data page and (ii) optional biometrics using the reference data
stored in MRTD. The issuing State or Organization ensures the authenticity of the data of
genuine MRTD’s. The receiving State trusts a genuine MRTD of an issuing State or
Organization.
For this ST the MRTD is viewed as unit of
(a) the physical MRTD as travel document in form of paper, plastic and chip. It presents
visual readable data including (but not limited to) personal data of the MRTD Holder
(1) the biographical data on the biographical data page of the passport book,
(2) the printed data in the Machine-Readable Zone (MRZ), and
(3) the printed portrait.
(b) the logical MRTD as data of the MRTD Holder stored according to the Logical Data
Structure [2] as specified by ICAO on the contactless integrated circuit. It presents
contactless readable data including (but not limited to) personal data of the MRTD
Holder
(1) the digital Machine-Readable Zone Data (digital MRZ data, EF.DG1),
(2) the digitized portrait(s) (EF.DG2),
(3) optional biometric reference data of finger(s) (EF.DG3) or iris image(s)
(EF.DG4) or both,
CEITECSA 5.410.052 6
(4) other data according to LDS (EF.DG5 to EF.DG16), and
(5) the Document Security Object.
The issuing State or Organization implements security features of the MRTD to maintain the
authenticity and integrity of the MRTD and their data. The MRTD as the ePassport book and
the MRTD’s chip is uniquely identified by the Document Number.
The physical MRTD is protected by physical security measures (e.g. watermark on paper,
security printing), logical (e.g. authentication keys of the MRTD’s chip) and organizational
security measures (e.g. control of materials, personalization procedures). These security
measures include the binding of the MRTD’s chip to the ePassport book.
The logical MRTD is protected in authenticity and integrity by a digital signature created by the
document signer acting for the issuing State or Organization and the security features of the
MRTD’s chip.
ICAO defines the baseline security methods Passive Authentication and the optional advanced
security methods Basic Access Control to the logical MRTD, Active Authentication of the
MRTD’s chip, Extended Access Control to and the Data Encryption of additional sensitive
biometrics as optional security measure in the ‘ICAO Doc 9303’ [2]. The Passive Authentication
Mechanism and the Data Encryption are performed completely and independently on the TOE
by the TOE environment.
This ST addresses the protection of the logical MRTD (i) in integrity by write only-once access
control and by physical means, and (ii) in confidentiality by the Extended Access Control
Mechanism. This ST addresses the Chip Authentication described in [3] as an alternative to the
Active Authentication stated in [2].
The TOE implements Chip Authentication defined in [3]. Chip Authentication prevents data
traces described in [2], informative appendix 7, A7.3.3. The Chip Authentication is provided by
the following steps: (i) the inspection system communicates by means of secure messaging
established by Basic Access Control, (ii) the inspection system reads and verifies by means of
the Passive Authentication the authenticity of the MRTD’s Chip Authentication Public Key using
the Document Security Object, (iii) the inspection system generates an ephemeral key pair, (iv)
the TOE and the inspection system agree on two session keys for secure messaging in
ENC_MAC mode according to the Diffie-Hellman Primitive and (v) the inspection system
verifies by means of received message authentication codes whether the MRTD’s chip was
able or not to run this protocol properly (i.e. the TOE proves to be in possession of the Chip
Authentication Private Key corresponding to the Chip Authentication Public Key used for
derivation of the session keys). The Chip Authentication requires collaboration of the TOE and
the TOE environment.
The TOE implements Extended Access Control as defined in [3]. Extended Access Control
consists of two parts (i) the Chip Authentication Protocol and (ii) the Terminal Authentication
Protocol. The Chip Authentication Protocol (i) authenticates the MRTD’s chip to the inspection
system and (ii) establishes secure messaging which is used by Terminal Authentication to
protect the confidentiality and integrity of the sensitive biometric reference data during their
CEITECSA 5.410.052 7
transmission from the TOE to the inspection system. Therefore Terminal Authentication can
only be performed if Chip Authentication has been successfully executed. The Terminal
Authentication Protocol consists of (i) the authentication of the inspection system as entity
authorized by the receiving State or Organization through the issuing State, and (ii) an access
control by the TOE to allow reading the sensitive biometric reference data only to successfully
authenticated authorized inspection systems. The issuing State or Organization authorizes the
receiving State by means of certification of the authentication public keys of Document
Verifiers who create Inspection System Certificates.
1.2.2 TOE type
The TOE is an electronic module for machine readable travel documents (MRTDs) based on the
requirements of the International Civil Aviation Organization, as defined in ICAO Doc 9303 [2].
The TOE is developed and produced by CEITEC and delivered to the Passport Manufacturer as
micro modules.
1.2.3 Required non-TOE hardware/software/firmware
There is no explicit non-TOE hardware, software or firmware required by the TOE to perform
its claimed security features. The TOE is defined to comprise the chip encapsulated in a micro
module and the IC Embedded Software. The inlay holding the chip as well as the antenna and
the booklet (holding the printed MRZ) are needed to represent a complete MRTD,
nevertheless these parts are not inevitable for the secure operation of the TOE.
1.3 TOE description
The TOE is the CEITEC ePassport Module CTC21001, containing one contactless integrated
circuit programmed according to the Logical Data Structure (LDS) and providing the Extended
Access Control according to [3].
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) comprises
(a) at the physical level:
 the contactless integrated circuit chip encapsulated on a micro module;
 IC Software, programmed on the chip;
 data necessary to enable the MRTD personalization (Pre-personalization Data),
programmed on the chip; and
 the associated guidance documentation, i.e. guidance documentation delivered to
the MRTD Manufacturer and personalization facility on a secure construction and
personalization of the ePassport books using the TOE.
(b) at the logical level, functions that provide:
 access control for personalization;
 integrity of personal data;
 confidentiality of personal data;
 identification and authentication;
CEITECSA 5.410.052 8
 protection against abuse of functionality;
 protection against information leakage;
 protection against physical tampering; and
 protection against malfunctions.
Application Note 1: The antenna and the inlay substrate that will be embedded along with the
encapsulated chip into the passport book are not part of the TOE.
1.3.1 Physical Scope of the TOE
In this ST the physical TOE comprises the MRTD chip, encapsulated on a micro module, which
provides the contacts for an external antenna. The non-volatile memory of the chip contains
the IC Software and the Pre-personalization Data. The TOE also includes the MRTD
Manufacturer and personalization facility guidance. The MRTD Manufacturer may provide
additional guidance to the personalization facility but that additional guidance is not part of
the TOE. The MRTD Manufacturer or the personalization facility may also provide guidance to
the MRTD Holder but that guidance is not part of the TOE.
The antenna and its supporting substrate are not part of the TOE.
Figure 1 – Parts of the TOE and additional physical parts
The physical components of the TOE can be identified as follows:
CEITECSA 5.410.052 9
Component Version
Silicon Integrated Circuit COP V1R0 R
IC Software 1.0.0.719
CEITECSA 5.410.031 - CTC21001 User Guidance 4.0
CEITECSA 5.410.022 - Personalization Protocol 5.0
CEITECSA 5.420.014 - Micromodule CTC21001 MM R00
Table 1 – TOE component identification
The Pre-personalization Data written on the chip comprise:
 The IC identification number;
 The IC Private Key;
 The Personalization Agent Key;
 The inspection certificate chain;
 The personalization certificate chain; and
 The verification data for the certificates
1.3.2 Logical Scope of the TOE
Functions performed by the TOE include:
 identification and authentication;
 access control for personalization;
 protection of integrity of personal data;
 protection of confidentiality of personal data;
 protection against abuse of functionality;
 protection against information leakage;
 protection against physical tampering; and
 protection against malfunctions.
Identification and authentication functions concern with the TOE personalization and with the
operational stage of the TOE. At the personalization stage, the Personalization Agent must be
successfully authenticated before the TOE will grant the access rights for the Personalization
Agent to create and write the user data files.
At the operational stage, the Inspection System must authenticate himself using a BAC
mechanism with keys derived from the MRZ information in order to read the biographical data
of the MRTD Holder and TSF data. The optional biometric data can only be read after the
Inspection System successfully performs a Chip Authentication and a Terminal Authentication
procedure (i.e. EAC).
The authentication protocols and the data access control performed by the TOE assure that
only authorized Personalization Agents are given access to TOE functions or data stored in the
TOE memory, and that the access is selective depending on the agent role and authentication
level.
CEITECSA 5.410.052 10
Integrity of the personal data is protected via control of the TOE life-cycle stage. The TOE
enforces a unidirectional sequence of life-cycle phases, enabling or disabling TOE functions
depending on the current phase. The life-cycle management checks the result of the
Personalization Agent authentication and decides whether the TOE can be switched to the
personalization state, kept in the pre-personalized state (awaiting a new agent authentication
attempt) or be permanently disabled (if a potentially unsecure condition has been detected).
The TOE will only transition to the “Operational Use” phase if the personalization is complete.
Any interrupted personalization (e.g. due to power loss) will be discarded and the
personalization process will have to be executed from scratch on the next attempt. Changes
and additions to data on a personalized TOE are prevented.
Confidentiality of personal data is protected by a secure communication mechanism between
the TOE and external systems and via access control to regulate access to the assets stored on
the TOE.
A secure communication session is established between the TOE and the Inspection System
once the BAC and EAC procedures are successfully executed. The secure communication uses
data encryption and message authentication according to [2] in order to protect the MRTD
Holder’s data from eavesdropping and unauthorized access. If the communication session is
finished or interrupted, the session keys are destroyed and the TOE requires that the
Inspection System be re-authenticated by the BAC and EAC in order to resume the message
exchange.
Assets stored in the TOE are protected by measures that enforce their confidentiality and/or
integrity. The TOE private key for Chip Authentication and the code memory are not accessible
externally after the “Manufacturing” phase of the TOE. Correct software execution is enforced
by the use of logical constructs and techniques designed to detect perturbations in the
program flow.
The integrated circuit of the TOE provides a number of hardware security features aimed at
protecting the stored information against leakage or disclosure.
1.4 TOE life-cycle
The TOE life-cycle is described in terms of the four life-cycle phases. (With respect to [4], the
TOE life-cycle is additionally subdivided into 7 steps.)
The roles in each phase of the TOE life-cycle are played by the following entities:
CEITECSA 5.410.052 11
Role Entity
IC Developer CEITEC S.A.
Software Developer CEITEC S.A.
IC Manufacturer Third-party IC foundry providing services for CEITEC S.A.
Module Manufacturer CEITEC S.A.
MRTD Manufacturer The entity that assembles the passport, embedding the TOE in the
booklet
Personalization Agent The entity that personalizes the MRTD with the MRTD Holder data
MRTD Holder Passport owner; traveler
Table 2 – Roles in the TOE life-cycle
1.4.1 Phase 1 “Development”
(Step 1) The TOE is developed in phase 1. The IC developer develops the integrated circuit, the
IC Dedicated Software and the guidance documentation associated with these TOE
components. This guidance documentation consists of manufacturing documentation intended
for the IC Manufacturer and SW development guidance intended for the embedded SW
Developer. Neither of the guidance is delivered to the MRTD Manufacturer or to the MRTD
Holder.
(Step 2) The Software Developer uses the guidance documentation for the integrated circuit
and the guidance documentation for relevant parts of the IC Dedicated Software and develops
the IC Embedded Software and the guidance documentation associated with these TOE
components. This guidance documentation is intended for the ePassport Manufacturer and
Personalization Agent but is not delivered to the MRTD Holder. Guidance for the MRTD Holder
is not part of the TOE and is to be authored and delivered by the MRTD Manufacturer and/or
the Personalization Agent.
The manufacturing documentation of the IC is securely delivered to the IC Manufacturer.
Application Note 2: The development of the TOE is entirely conducted by CEITEC, therefore
there is no institutional separation between the IC Developer and the Software Developer.
1.4.2 Phase 2 “Manufacturing”
(Step 3) In a first step the TOE integrated circuit is produced in accordance with the
manufacturing documentation by the IC Manufacturer. The IC is securely delivered from the IC
Manufacturer to the Module Manufacturer (i.e. CEITEC).
(Step 4) The Module Manufacturer writes the IC Software, the IC Private Key, the
Personalization Agent Key, and the remaining Pre-personalization Data onto the chip. The IC is
mounted on and connected to an electronic module base. The finished module is securely
delivered from the Module Manufacturer to the MRTD Manufacturer along with the guidance
documentation for the MRTD Manufacturer. The Personalization Agent Key is delivered to the
Personalization Agent via a secure communication channel by the Module Manufacturer.
Application Note 3: The MRTD application is included in the IC Software, therefore there is no
need to create the MRTD application as in [1].
CEITECSA 5.410.052 12
Application Note 4: This ST defines the TOE delivery to take place at the end of Step 4.
Therefore, the subsequent steps (5 through to 7) are not applicable to the TOE.
(Step 5) The MRTD Manufacturer combines the module with hardware for the contactless
interface in the passport book.
The pre-personalized MRTD is securely delivered from the MRTD Manufacturer to the
Personalization Agent. The MRTD Manufacturer also provides the relevant parts of the
guidance documentation to the Personalization Agent.
1.4.3 Phase 3 “Personalization of the MRTD”
(Step 6) The personalization of the MRTD includes (i) the survey of the MRTD Holder’s
biographical data, (ii) the enrolment of the MRTD Holder biometric reference data (i.e. the
digitized portraits and the optional biometric reference data), (iii) the printing of the visual
readable data onto the physical MRTD, (iv) the writing of the TOE User Data and TSF Data into
the logical MRTD and (v) configuration of the TSF if necessary. Activity (iv) is performed by the
Personalization Agent and includes but is not limited to the creation of (a) the digital MRZ data
(EF.DG1), (b) the digitized portrait (EF.DG2), and (c) the Document Security Object.
The signing of the Document Security Object by the Document Signer [2] finalizes the
personalization of the genuine MRTD for the MRTD Holder. The personalized MRTD (together
with appropriate guidance for TOE use if necessary) is handed over to the MRTD Holder for
operational use.
1.4.4 Phase 4 “Operational Use”
(Step 7) The TOE is used as MRTD chip by the traveler and the Inspection Systems in the
“Operational Use” phase. The user data can be read according to the security policy of the
issuing State or Organization and can be used according to the security policy of the issuing
State but they can never be modified.
Application Note 5: It is not possible to add data to the MRTD application data groups during
the “Operational Use” phase.
CEITECSA 5.410.052 13
2 Conformance claims
2.1 Common Criteria conformance
This ST claims conformance to
 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1:
Introduction and general model, September 2012, Version 3.1, Revision 4, CCMB-
2012-09-001 [5]
 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2: Security
functional components, September 2012, Version 3.1, Revision 4, CCMB-2012-09-
002 [6]
 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3: Security
assurance components, September 2012, Version 3.1, Revision 4, CCMB-2012-09-
003 [7]
as follows:
 Part 2 extended,
 Part 3 conformant.
2.2 Protection Profile conformance
This ST claims strict conformance to
Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO
Application”, Extended Access Control, BSI-CC-PP-0056, Version 1.10, 25th March 2009
[1].
2.3 Package conformance
This ST claims conformance to assurance package EAL4 augmented with ALC_DVS.2 and
AVA_VAN.5 defined in CC part 3.
CEITECSA 5.410.052 14
3 Security problem definition
3.1 Introduction
Assets
The assets to be protected by the TOE include the User Data on the MRTD’s chip.
Logical MRTD Data
The logical MRTD data consists of EF.COM, EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 (with different security needs)
and the Document Security Object EF.SOD according to LDS [2]. These data are user data of the
TOE. EF.COM lists the existing elementary files (EF) with the user data. EF.DG1 to EF.DG13 and
EF.DG16 contain personal data of the MRTD Holder. The Chip Authentication Public Key
(EF.DG14) is used by the Inspection System for the Chip Authentication. EF.SOD is used by the
Inspection System for Passive Authentication of the logical MRTD. Due to interoperability
reasons required by ‘ICAO Doc 9303’ [2] the TOE described in this ST implements a BAC
mechanism with resistance against enhanced basic attack potential granting access to
 Logical MRTD standard User Data (i.e. Personal Data) of the MRTD Holder (EF.DG1,
EF.DG2, EF.DG5 to EF.DG13, EF.DG16);
 Chip Authentication Public Key in EF.DG14;
 Document Security Object (SOD) in EF.SOD; and
 Common data in EF.COM.
Access to the following sensitive User Data is granted by the TOE only for Extended Inspection
Systems that successfully perform the EAC mechanism:
 Sensitive biometric reference data (EF.DG3, EF.DG4).
A sensitive asset is the following more general one.
Authenticity of the MRTD’s chip
The authenticity of the MRTD’s chip personalized by the issuing State or Organization for the
MRTD Holder is used by the traveler to prove his possession of a genuine MRTD.
Subjects
This ST considers the following subjects:
Manufacturer
The generic term for the IC Manufacturer producing the integrated circuit and the MRTD
Manufacturer completing the IC to the MRTD´s chip. The manufacturer is the default user of
the TOE during Phase 2 Manufacturing.
CEITECSA 5.410.052 15
Application Note 6: The Specific TOE only implements a subset of the MRTD life-cycle. This is
discussed in Sect. 1.4. Therefore, for the purposes of this ST the role Manufacturer is further
decomposed into three types of manufacturer which all play a different role in the
manufacturing process of the TOE. Where necessary, these manufacturer roles shall be
referred to instead of generic Manufacturer in order to avoid ambiguity. In general, the role
Manufacturer (as in e.g. FMT_SMR.1) refers to the Module Manufacturer. Module
Manufacturer has access to the security management functions available to the Manufacturer
(FMT_SMF.1), namely to writing the initialization and pre-personalization data to the TOE.
These functions shall be disabled prior to the TOE being delivered to the MRTD Manufacturer.
1. IC Manufacturer is an external party operating the foundry where the wafers
containing the IC are manufactured;
2. Module Manufacturer is the party completing the TOE, assembling the IC into the
modules based and writing the IC Software and the Pre-personalization Data on it. This
role is carried out by CEITEC; and
3. MRTD Manufacturer is the agent that manufactures the ePassport booklet, embedding
the TOE and the antenna.
Personalization Agent
The agent is acting on behalf of the issuing State or Organization to personalize the MRTD for
the holder by some or all of the following activities (i) establishing the identity the holder for
the biographic data in the MRTD, (ii) enrolling the biometric reference data of the MRTD
Holder i.e. the portrait and the encoded finger image(s), (iii) writing these data on the physical
and logical MRTD for the holder as defined for global, international and national
interoperability, and (iv) signing the Document Security Object defined in [2].
Country Verifying Certification Authority
The Country Verifying Certification Authority (CVCA) enforces the privacy policy of the issuing
State or Organization with respect to the protection of sensitive biometric reference data
stored in the MRTD. The CVCA represents the country specific root of the PKI of Inspection
Systems and creates the Document Verifier Certificates within this PKI. The updates of the
public key of the CVCA are distributed in the form of Country Verifying CA Link-Certificates.
Document Verifier
The Document Verifier (DV) enforces the privacy policy of the receiving State with respect to
the protection of sensitive biometric reference data to be handled by the Extended Inspection
Systems. The Document Verifier manages the authorization of the Extended Inspection
Systems for the sensitive data of the MRTD in the limits provided by the issuing States or
Organizations in the form of the Document Verifier Certificates.
Terminal
A terminal is any technical system communicating with the TOE through the contactless
interface.
CEITECSA 5.410.052 16
Inspection System (IS)
A technical system used by the border control officer of the receiving State (i) examining an
MRTD presented by the traveler and verifying its authenticity and (ii) verifying the traveler as
MRTD Holder. The Basic Inspection System (BIS) (i) contains a terminal for the contactless
communication with the MRTD’s chip, (ii) implements the terminals part of the Basic Access
Control Mechanism and (iii) gets the authorization to read the logical MRTD under the Basic
Access Control by optical reading the MRTD or other parts of the passport book providing this
information. The General Inspection System (GIS) is a Basic Inspection System which
implements additionally the Chip Authentication Mechanism. The Extended Inspection System
(EIS) in addition to the General Inspection System (i) implements the Terminal Authentication
Protocol and (ii) is authorized by the issuing State or Organization through the Document
Verifier of the receiving State to read the sensitive biometric reference data. The security
attributes of the EIS are defined of the Inspection System Certificates.
MRTD Holder
The rightful holder of the MRTD for whom the issuing State or Organization personalized the
MRTD.
Traveler
Person presenting the MRTD to the Inspection System and claiming the identity of the MRTD
Holder.
Attacker
A threat agent trying (i) to manipulate the logical MRTD without authorization t, (ii) to read
sensitive biometric reference data (i.e. EF.DG3, EF.DG4) or (iii) to forge a genuine MRTD.
Application Note 7: Note that an attacker trying to identify and to trace the movement of the
MRTD’s chip remotely (i.e. without knowing or optically reading the physical MRTD) is not
considered by this ST since this can only be averted by the BAC mechanism using the “weak”
Document Basic Access Keys that is covered by [1]. The same holds for the confidentiality of
the user data EF.DG1, EF.DG2, EF.DG5 to EF.DG16 as well as EF.SOD and EF.COM.
Application Note 8: An impostor is attacking the Inspection System as TOE IT environment
independent on using a genuine, counterfeit or forged MRTD. Therefore the impostor may use
results of successful attacks against the TOE but the attack itself is not relevant for the TOE.
3.2 Assumptions
The assumptions describe the security aspects of the environment in which the TOE will be
used or is intended to be used.
A.MRTD_Manufac MRTD manufacturing on steps 4 to 6
It is assumed that appropriate functionality testing of the MRTD is used. It is assumed that
security procedures are used during all manufacturing and test operations to maintain
CEITECSA 5.410.052 17
confidentiality and integrity of the MRTD and of its manufacturing and test data (to prevent
any possible copy, modification, retention, theft or unauthorized use).
A.MRTD_Delivery MRTD delivery during steps 4 to 6
Procedures shall guarantee the control of the TOE delivery and storage process and
conformance to its objectives:
 Procedures shall ensure protection of TOE material/information under delivery
and storage;
 Procedures shall ensure that corrective actions are taken in case of improper
operation in the delivery process and storage; and
 Procedures shall ensure that people dealing with the procedure for delivery have
got the required skill.
A.Pers_Agent Personalization of the MRTD’s chip
The Personalization Agent ensures the correctness of (i) the logical MRTD with respect to the
MRTD Holder, (ii) the Document Basic Access Keys, (iii) the Chip Authentication Public Key
(EF.DG14) if stored on the MRTD’s chip, and (iv) the Document Signer Public Key Certificate (if
stored on the MRTD’s chip). The Personalization Agent signs the Document Security Object.
The Personalization Agent bears the Personalization Agent Authentication to authenticate
himself to the TOE by symmetric cryptographic mechanisms.
A.Insp_Sys Inspection Systems for global interoperability
The Inspection System is used by the border control officer of the receiving State (i) examining
an MRTD presented by the traveler and verifying its authenticity and (ii) verifying the traveler
as MRTD Holder. The Basic Inspection System for global interoperability (i) includes the
Country Signing CA Public Key and the Document Signer Public Key of each issuing State or
Organization, and (ii) implements the terminal part of the Basic Access Control [2]. The Basic
Inspection System reads the logical MRTD under Basic Access Control and performs the Passive
Authentication to verify the logical MRTD.
The General Inspection System in addition to the Basic Inspection System implements the Chip
Authentication Mechanism. The General Inspection System verifies the authenticity of the
MRTD’s chip during inspection and establishes secure messaging with keys established by the
Chip Authentication Mechanism. The Extended Inspection System in addition to the General
Inspection System (i) supports the Terminal Authentication Protocol and (ii) is authorized by
the issuing State or Organization through the Document Verifier of the receiving State to read
the sensitive biometric reference data.
A.Signature_PKI PKI for Passive Authentication
The issuing and receiving States or Organizations establish a public key infrastructure for
passive authentication i.e. digital signature creation and verification for the logical MRTD. The
issuing State or Organization runs a Certification Authority (CA) which securely generates,
stores and uses the Country Signing CA Key pair. The CA keeps the Country Signing CA Private
CEITECSA 5.410.052 18
Key secret and is recommended to distribute the Country Signing CA Public Key to ICAO, all
receiving States maintaining its integrity. The Document Signer (i) generates the Document
Signer Key Pair, (ii) hands over the Document Signer Public Key to the CA for certification, (iii)
keeps the Document Signer Private Key secret and (iv) uses securely the Document Signer
Private Key for signing the Document Security Objects of the MRTDs. The CA creates the
Document Signer Certificates for the Document Signer Public Keys that are distributed to the
receiving States and Organizations.
A.Auth_PKI PKI for Inspection Systems
The issuing and receiving States or Organizations establish a public key infrastructure for card
verifiable certificates of the Extended Access Control. The Country Verifying Certification
Authorities, the Document Verifier and Extended Inspection Systems hold authentication key
pairs and certificates for their public keys encoding the access control rights. The Country
Verifying Certification Authorities of the issuing States or Organizations are signing the
certificates of the Document Verifier and the Document Verifiers are signing the certificates of
the Extended Inspection Systems of the receiving States or Organizations. The issuing States or
Organizations distribute the public keys of their Country Verifying Certification Authority to
their MRTD’s chip.
3.3 Threats
This section describes the threats to be averted by the TOE independently or in collaboration
with its IT environment. These threats result from the TOE method of use in the operational
environment and the assets stored in or protected by the TOE.
Application Note 9: The threats T.Chip_ID and T.Skimming (cf. [1]) are averted by the
mechanisms described in the BAC PP [1] (cf. P.BAC-PP) which cannot withstand an attack with
high attack potential thus these are not addressed here. T.Chip_ID addresses the threat of
tracing the movement of the MRTD by identifying remotely the MRTD’s chip by establishing or
listening to communications through the contactless communication interface. T.Skimming
addresses the threat of imitating the inspection system to read the logical MRTD or parts of it
via the contactless communication channel of the TOE. Both attacks are conducted by an
attacker who cannot read the MRZ or who does not know the physical MRTD in advance.
The TOE in collaboration with its IT environment shall avert the threats as specified below.
T.Read_Sensitive_Data Read the sensitive biometric reference data
Adverse action An attacker tries to gain the sensitive biometric reference data through the
communication interface of the MRTD’s chip. The attack
T.Read_Sensitive_Data is similar to the threat T.Skimming (cf. [1]) in respect
of the attack path (communication interface) and the motivation (to get
data stored on the MRTD’s chip) but differs from those in the asset under
the attack (sensitive biometric reference data vs. digital MRZ, digitized
portrait and other data), the opportunity (i.e. knowing Document Basic
Access Keys) and therefore the possible attack methods. Note, that the
sensitive biometric reference data are stored only on the MRTD’s chip as
CEITECSA 5.410.052 19
private sensitive personal data whereas the MRZ data and the portrait are
visually readable on the physical MRTD as well. MRZ data printed on the
MRTD data page but the attacker does not know these data in advance.
Threat agent Having high attack potential, knowing the Document Basic Access Keys,
being in possession of a legitimate MRTD.
Asset Confidentiality of sensitive logical MRTD (i.e. biometric reference) data.
T.Forgery Forgery of data on MRTD’s chip
Adverse action An attacker alters fraudulently the complete stored logical MRTD or any
part of it including its security related data in order to deceive on an
Inspection System by means of the changed MRTD Holder’s identity or
biometric reference data. This threat comprises several attack scenarios of
MRTD forgery. The attacker may alter the biographical data on the
biographical data page of the passport book, in the printed MRZ and in the
digital MRZ to claim another identity of the traveler. The attacker may alter
the printed portrait and the digitized portrait to overcome the visual
inspection of the inspection officer and the automated biometric
authentication mechanism by face recognition. The attacker may alter the
biometric reference data to defeat automated biometric authentication
mechanism of the Inspection System. The attacker may combine data
groups of different logical MRTDs to create a new forged MRTD, e.g. the
attacker write the digitized portrait and optional biometric reference finger
data read from the logical MRTD of a traveler into another MTRD’s chip
leaving their digital MRZ unchanged to claim the identity of the holder this
MRTD. The attacker may also copy the complete unchanged logical MRTD
to another contactless chip.
Threat agent Having high attack potential, being in possession of one or more legitimate
MRTDs.
Asset Authenticity of logical MRTD data.
T.Counterfeit MRTD’s chip
Adverse action An attacker with high attack potential produces an unauthorized copy or
reproduction of a genuine MRTD’s chip to be used as part of a counterfeit
MRTD. This violates the authenticity of the MRTD’s chip used for
authentication of a traveler by possession of a MRTD. The attacker may
generate a new data set or extract completely or partially the data from a
genuine MRTD’s chip and copy them on another appropriate chip to imitate
this genuine MRTD’s chip.
Threat agent Having high attack potential, being in possession of one or more legitimate
MRTDs.
CEITECSA 5.410.052 20
Asset Authenticity of logical MRTD data.
The TOE shall avert the threat as specified below.
T.Abuse-Func Abuse of Functionality
Adverse action An attacker may use functions of the TOE which shall not be used in the
phase “Operational Use” in order
i. to manipulate User Data;
ii. to manipulate (explore, bypass, deactivate or change) security features or
functions of the TOE; or
iii. to disclose or to manipulate TSF Data.
This threat addresses the misuse of the functions for the initialization and
the personalization in the operational state after delivery to MRTD Holder.
Threat agent Having high attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate MRTD.
Asset Confidentiality and authenticity of logical MRTD and TSF data, correctness
of TSF.
T.Information_Leakage Information Leakage from MRTD’s chip
Adverse action An attacker may exploit information which is leaked from the TOE during its
usage in order to disclose confidential TSF data. The information leakage
may be inherent in the normal operation or caused by the attacker.
Leakage may occur through emanations, variations in power consumption,
I/O characteristics, clock frequency, or by changes in processing time
requirements. This leakage may be interpreted as a covert channel
transmission but is more closely related to measurement of operating
parameters, which may be derived either from measurements of the
contactless interface (emanation) or direct measurements (by contact to
the chip still available even for a contactless chip) and can then be related
to the specific operation being performed. Examples are the Differential
Electromagnetic Analysis (DEMA) and the Differential Power Analysis (DPA).
Moreover the attacker may try actively to enforce information leakage by
fault injection (e.g. Differential Fault Analysis).
Threat agent Having high attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate MRTD.
Asset Confidentiality logical MRTD and TSF data.
T.Phys_Tamper Physical Tampering
Adverse action An attacker may perform physical probing of the MRTD’s chip in order
i. to disclose TSF Data; or
CEITECSA 5.410.052 21
ii. to disclose/reconstruct the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software.
An attacker may physically modify the MRTD’s chip in order to
i. modify security features or functions of the MRTD’s chip;
ii. modify security functions of the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software;
iii. modify User Data; or
iv. modify TSF data.
The physical tampering may be focused directly on the disclosure or
manipulation of TOE User Data (e.g. the biometric reference data for the
Inspection System) or TSF Data (e.g. authentication key of the MRTD’s chip)
or indirectly by preparation of the TOE to following attack methods by
modification of security features (e.g. to enable information leakage
through power analysis). Physical tampering requires direct interaction with
the MRTD’s chip internals. Techniques commonly employed in IC failure
analysis and IC reverse engineering efforts may be used. Before that, the
hardware security mechanisms and layout characteristics need to be
identified. Determination of software design including treatment of User
Data and TSF Data may also be a pre-requisite. The modification may result
in the deactivation of a security function. Changes of circuitry or data can
be permanent or temporary.
Threat agent Having high attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate MRTD.
Asset Confidentiality and authenticity of logical MRTD and TSF data, correctness
of TSF.
T.Malfunction Malfunction due to Environmental Stress
Adverse action An attacker may cause a malfunction of TSF or of the MRTD’s chip
Embedded Software by applying environmental stress in order to
i. deactivate or modify security features or functions of the TOE; or
ii. circumvent, deactivate or modify security functions of the MRTD’s chip
Embedded Software.
This may be achieved e.g. by operating the MRTD’s chip outside the normal
operating conditions, exploiting errors in the MRTD’s chip Embedded
Software or misusing administration function. To exploit these
vulnerabilities an attacker needs information about the functional
operation.
Threat agent Having high attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate MRTD.
CEITECSA 5.410.052 22
Asset Confidentiality and authenticity of logical MRTD and TSF data, correctness
of TSF.
3.4 Organizational security policies (OSPs)
The TOE shall comply with the following Organizational Security Policies (OSP) as security rules,
procedures, practices, or guidelines imposed by an organization upon its operations (see CC
part 1, sec. 3.2).
P.BAC-PP Fulfillment of the Basic Access Control Protection Profile.
The issuing State or Organization ensures that successfully authenticated Basic Inspection
Systems have read access to logical MRTD data DG1, DG2, DG5 to DG16 the ‘ICAO Doc 9303’
[2] defines1
as well as to the data groups Common and Security Data. The MRTD is successfully
evaluated and certified in accordance with the ‘Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine
Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application", Basic Access Control’ [1]in order to ensure
the confidentiality of standard user data and preventing the traceability of the MRTD data.
Application Note 10: The organizational security policy P.Personal_Data drawn from the ‘ICAO
Doc 9303’ [2] is addressed by the [1](cf. P.BAC-PP). The confidentiality of the personal data
other than EF.DG3 and EF.DG4 is ensured by the BAC mechanism. Note the BAC mechanisms
may not resist attacks with high attack potential (cf. [2]). The TOE shall protect the sensitive
biometric reference data in EF.DG3 and EF.DG4 against attacks with high attack potential. Due
to the different resistance the protection of EF.DG3 and EF.DG4 on one side and the other
EF.SOD, EF.COM, EF.DG1, EF.DG2 and EF.DG5 to EF.DG16 are addressed separated protection
profiles, which is assumed to result in technically separated evaluations (at least for classes
ASE and VAN) and certificates (cf. also to application note 1).
P.Sensitive_Data Privacy of sensitive biometric reference data
The biometric reference data of finger(s) (EF.DG3) and iris image(s) (EF.DG4) are sensitive
private personal data of the MRTD Holder. The sensitive biometric reference data can be used
only by inspection systems which are authorized for this access at the time the MRTD is
presented to the inspection system (Extended Inspection Systems). The issuing State or
Organization authorizes the Document Verifiers of the receiving States to manage the
authorization of inspection systems within the limits defined by the Document Verifier
Certificate. The MRTD’s chip shall protect the confidentiality and integrity of the sensitive
private personal data even during transmission to the Extended Inspection System after Chip
Authentication.
P.Manufact Manufacturing of the MRTD’s chip
The Initialization Data are written by the IC Manufacturer to identify the IC uniquely. The
MRTD Manufacturer writes the Pre-personalization Data which contains at least the
Personalization Agent Key.
Application Note 11: The following deviations from P.Manufact shall be followed in this ST to
take into account the specific TOE life-cycle as described in Sect. 1.4:
1
Word ´defines´ added to correct an obvious typing/grammatical error in BSI-CC-PP-0056.
CEITECSA 5.410.052 23
1. Instead of the IC Manufacturer, the Initialization Data is written by the Module
manufacturer upon receiving the wafers from the IC Manufacturer and producing the
modules on which the TOE is initialized and pre-personalized; and
2. The Pre-personalization Data is written on the TOE by the Module Manufacturer prior
to the delivery of the TOE to the MRTD Manufacturer as modules.
P.Personalization Personalization of the MRTD by issuing State or
Organization only
The issuing State or Organization guarantees the correctness of the biographical data, the
printed portrait and the digitized portrait, the biometric reference data and other data of the
logical MRTD with respect to the MRTD Holder. The personalization of the MRTD for the
holder is performed by an agent authorized by the issuing State or Organization only.
CEITECSA 5.410.052 24
4 Security objectives
This chapter describes the security objectives for the TOE and the security objectives for the
TOE environment. The security objectives for the TOE environment are separated into security
objectives for the development and production environment and security objectives for the
operational environment.
4.1 Security objectives for the TOE
This section describes the security objectives for the TOE addressing the aspects of identified
threats to be countered by the TOE and organizational security policies to be met by the TOE.
OT.AC_Pers Access Control for Personalization of logical MRTD
The TOE must ensure that the logical MRTD data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16, the Document Security
Object according to LDS [2] and the TSF data can be written by authorized Personalization
Agents only. The logical MRTD data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16, the Document Security Object and
the TSF data may be written only during and cannot be changed after its personalization. The
Document security object can be updated by authorized Personalization Agents if data in the
data groups EF.DG3 to EF.DG16 are added.
Application Note 12: The TOE does not support the addition of LDS groups other than EF.DG1,
EF.DG2 and EF.DG3 by the Personalization Agent. The TOE does not support addition of data to
the existing LDS groups during the “Operational Use” phase.
OT.Data_Int Integrity of personal data
The TOE must ensure the integrity of the logical MRTD stored on the MRTD’s chip against
physical manipulation and unauthorized writing. The TOE must ensure the integrity of the
logical MRTD data during their transmission to the General Inspection System after Chip
Authentication.
OT.Sens_Data_Conf Confidentiality of sensitive biometric reference
data
The TOE must ensure the confidentiality of the sensitive biometric reference data (EF.DG3 and
EF.DG4) by granting read access only to authorized Extended Inspection Systems. The
authorization of the inspection system is drawn from the Inspection System Certificate used
for the successful authentication and shall be a non-strict subset of the authorization defined
in the Document Verifier Certificate in the certificate chain to the Country Verifier Certification
Authority of the issuing State or Organization. The TOE must ensure the confidentiality of the
logical MRTD data during their transmission to the Extended Inspection System. The
confidentiality of the sensitive biometric reference data shall be protected against attacks with
high attack potential.
OT.Identification Identification and Authentication of the TOE
The TOE must provide means to store IC Identification and Pre-personalization Data in its non-
volatile memory. The IC Identification Data must provide a unique identification of the IC
CEITECSA 5.410.052 25
during Phase 2 “Manufacturing” and Phase 3 “Personalization of the MRTD”. The storage of
the Pre-personalization Data includes writing of the Personalization Agent Key(s).
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof Proof of MRTD’s chip authenticity
The TOE must support the General Inspection Systems to verify the identity and authenticity of
the MRTD’s chip as issued by the identified issuing State or Organization by means of the Chip
Authentication as defined in [3]. The authenticity proof provided by MRTD’s chip shall be
protected against attacks with high attack potential.
Application Note 13: The OT.Chip_Auth_Proof implies the MRTD’s chip to have (i) a unique
identity as given by the MRTD’s Document Number, (ii) a secret to prove its identity by
knowledge i.e. a private authentication key as TSF data. The TOE shall protect this TSF data to
prevent their misuse. The terminal shall have the reference data to verify the authentication
attempt of MRTD’s chip i.e. a certificate for the Chip Authentication Public Key that matches
the Chip Authentication Private Key of the MRTD’s chip. This certificate is provided by (i) the
Chip Authentication Public Key (EF.DG14) in the LDS [2] and (ii) the hash value of the Chip
Authentication Public Key in the Document Security Object signed by the Document Signer.
The following TOE security objectives address the protection provided by the MRTD’s chip
independent of the TOE environment.
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func Protection against Abuse of Functionality
After delivery of the TOE to the MRTD Holder, the TOE must prevent the abuse of test and
support functions that may be maliciously used to
(i) disclose critical User Data, (ii) manipulate critical User Data of the IC Embedded Software,
(iii) manipulate Soft-coded IC Embedded Software or (iv) bypass, deactivate, change or explore
security features or functions of the TOE.
Details of the relevant attack scenarios depend, for instance, on the capabilities of the Test
Features provided by the IC Dedicated Test Software which are not specified here.
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak Protection against Information Leakage
The TOE must provide protection against disclosure of confidential TSF data stored and/or
processed in the MRTD’s chip
 by measurement and analysis of the shape and amplitude of signals or the time
between events found by measuring signals on the electromagnetic field, power
consumption, clock, or I/O lines and
 by forcing a malfunction of the TOE and/or
 by a physical manipulation of the TOE.
Application Note 14: This objective pertains to measurements with subsequent complex
signal processing due to normal operation of the TOE or operations enforced by an attacker.
Details correspond to an analysis of attack scenarios which is not given here.
CEITECSA 5.410.052 26
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper Protection against Physical Tampering
The TOE must provide protection of the confidentiality and integrity of the User Data, the TSF
Data, and the IC Embedded Software. This includes protection against attacks with enhanced-
basic attack potential by means of
 measuring through galvanic contacts which is direct physical probing on the chips
surface except on pads being bonded (using standard tools for measuring voltage
and current) or
 measuring not using galvanic contacts but other types of physical interaction
between charges (using tools used in solid-state physics research and IC failure
analysis)
 manipulation of the hardware and its security features, as well as
 controlled manipulation of memory contents (User Data, TSF Data)
with a prior
 reverse-engineering to understand the design and its properties and functions.
OT.Prot_Malfunction Protection against Malfunctions
The TOE must ensure its correct operation. The TOE must prevent its operation outside the
normal operating conditions where reliability and secure operation has not been proven or
tested.
This is to prevent errors. The environmental conditions may include external energy (esp.
electromagnetic) fields, voltage (on any contacts), clock frequency, or temperature.
Application Note 15: A malfunction of the TOE may also be caused using a direct interaction
with elements on the chip surface. This is considered as being a manipulation (refer to the
objective OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper) provided that details about the TOE´s internals are known.
4.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment
Issuing State or Organization
The issuing State or Organization will implement the following security objectives of the TOE
environment.
OE.MRTD_Manufact Protection of the MRTD Manufacturing
Appropriate functionality testing of the TOE shall be used in step 4 to 6.
During all manufacturing and test operations, security procedures shall be used through
phases 4, 5 and 6 to maintain confidentiality and integrity of the TOE and its manufacturing
and test data.
CEITECSA 5.410.052 27
OE.MRTD_ Delivery Protection of the MRTD delivery
Procedures shall ensure protection of TOE material/information under delivery including the
following objectives:
 non-disclosure of any security relevant information;
 identification of the element under delivery;
 meet confidentiality rules (confidentiality level, transmittal form, reception
acknowledgment);
 physical protection to prevent external damage;
 secure storage and handling procedures (including rejected TOE’s); and
 traceability of TOE during delivery including the following parameters:
o origin and shipment details,
o reception, reception acknowledgement,
o location material/information.
Procedures shall ensure that corrective actions are taken in case of improper operation in the
delivery process (including if applicable any non-conformance to the confidentiality
convention) and highlight all non-conformance to this process.
Procedures shall ensure that people (shipping department, carrier, reception department)
dealing with the procedure for delivery have got the required skill, training and knowledge to
meet the procedure requirements and be able to act fully in accordance with the above
expectations.
OE.Personalization Personalization of logical MRTD
The issuing State or Organization must ensure that the Personalization Agents acting on behalf
of the issuing State or Organization (i) establish the correct identity of the holder and create
biographical data for the MRTD, (ii) enroll the biometric reference data of the MRTD Holder i.e.
the portrait, the encoded finger image(s) and/or the encoded iris image(s), and (iii) personalize
the MRTD for the holder together with the defined physical and logical security measures to
protect the confidentiality and integrity of these data.
OE.Pass_Auth_Sign Authentication of logical MRTD by Signature
The issuing State or Organization must (i) generate a cryptographic secure Country Signing CA
Key Pair, (ii) ensure the secrecy of the Country Signing CA Private Key and sign Document
Signer Certificates in a secure operational environment, and (iii) distribute the Certificate of
the Country Signing CA Public Key to receiving States and Organizations maintaining its
authenticity and integrity. The issuing State or Organization must (i) generate a cryptographic
secure Document Signer Key Pair and ensure the secrecy of the Document Signer Private Keys,
(ii) sign Document Security Objects of genuine MRTD in a secure operational environment
only, and (iii) distribute the Certificate of the Document Signer Public Key to receiving States
and Organizations. The digital signature in the Document Security Object relates all data in the
data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 if stored in the LDS according to [2].
CEITECSA 5.410.052 28
OE.Auth_Key_MRTD MRTD Authentication Key
The issuing State or Organization has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure in
order to (i) generate the MRTD’s Chip Authentication Key Pair, (ii) sign and store the Chip
Authentication Public Key in the Chip Authentication Public Key data in EF.DG14 and (iii)
support inspection systems of receiving States or organizations to verify the authenticity of the
MRTD’s chip used for genuine MRTD by certification of the Chip Authentication Public Key by
means of the Document Security Object.
OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data Authorization for Use of Sensitive Biometric
Reference Data
The issuing State or Organization has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure in
order to limit the access to sensitive biometric reference data of MRTD’s holders to authorized
receiving States or Organizations. The Country Verifying Certification Authority of the issuing
State or Organization generates card verifiable Document Verifier Certificates for the
authorized Document Verifier only.
OE.BAC_PP Fulfillment of the Basic Access Control Protection Profile.
It has to be ensured by the issuing State or Organization, that the TOE is additionally
successfully evaluated and certified in accordance with the ‘Common Criteria Protection
Profile Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application", Basic Access Control’ [1].
This is necessary to cover the BAC mechanism ensuring the confidentiality of standard user
data and preventing the traceability of the MRTD data. Note that due to the differences within
the assumed attack potential the addressed evaluation and certification is a technically
separated process.
Receiving State or Organization
The receiving State or Organization will implement the following security objectives of the TOE
environment.
OE.Exam_MRTD Examination of the MRTD passport book
The Inspection System of the receiving State or Organization must examine the MRTD
presented by the traveler to verify its authenticity by means of the physical security measures
and to detect any manipulation of the physical MRTD. The Basic Inspection System for global
interoperability (i) includes the Country Signing CA Public Key and the Document Signer Public
Key of each issuing State or Organization, and (ii) implements the terminal part of the Basic
Access Control [2]. Additionally General Inspection Systems and Extended Inspection Systems
perform the Chip Authentication Protocol to verify the Authenticity of the presented MRTD’s
chip.
OE.Passive_Auth_Verif Verification by Passive Authentication
The border control officer of the receiving State uses the Inspection System to verify the
traveler as MRTD Holder. The Inspection Systems must have successfully verified the signature
of Document Security Objects and the integrity data elements of the logical MRTD before they
CEITECSA 5.410.052 29
are used. The receiving States and Organizations must manage the Country Signing CA Public
Key and the Document Signer Public Key maintaining their authenticity and availability in all
Inspection Systems.
OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD Protection of data from the logical MRTD
The Inspection System of the receiving State or Organization ensures the confidentiality and
integrity of the data read from the logical MRTD. The inspection system will prevent
eavesdropping to their communication with the TOE before secure messaging is successfully
established based on the Chip Authentication Protocol.
Application Note 16: The figure 2.1 in [3] supposes that the GIS and the EIS follow the order (i)
running the Basic Access Control Protocol, (ii) reading and verifying only those parts of the
logical MRTD that are necessary to know for the Chip Authentication Mechanism (i.e.
Document Security Object and Chip Authentication Public Key), (iii) running the Chip
Authentication Protocol, and (iv) reading and verifying the less-sensitive data of the logical
MRTD after Chip Authentication. The supposed sequence has the advantage that the less-
sensitive data are protected by secure messaging with cryptographic keys based on the Chip
Authentication Protocol which quality is under control of the TOE. The inspection system will
prevent additionally eavesdropping to their communication with the TOE before secure
messaging is successfully established based on the Chip Authentication Protocol. Note that
reading the less sensitive data directly after Basic Access Control Mechanism is allowed and is
not assumed as threat in this PP. But the TOE ensures that reading of sensitive data is possible
after successful Chip Authentication and Terminal Authentication Protocol only.
OE.Ext_Insp_Systems Authorization of Extended Inspection Systems
The Document Verifier of receiving States or Organizations authorizes Extended Inspection
Systems by creation of Inspection System Certificates for access to sensitive biometric
reference data of the logical MRTD. The Extended Inspection System authenticates themselves
to the MRTD’s chip for access to the sensitive biometric reference data with its private
Terminal Authentication Key and its Inspection System Certificate.
CEITECSA 5.410.052 30
4.3 Security Objective Rationale
The following table provides an overview for security objectives coverage.
OT.AC_Pers
OT.Data_Int
OT.Sens_Data_Conf
OT.Identification
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
OT.Prot_Malfunction
OE.MRTD_Manufact
OE.MRTD_Delivery
OE.Personalization
OE.Pass_Auth_Sign
OE.Auth_Key_MRTD
OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data
OE.BAC-PP
OE.Exam_MRTD
OE.Passive_Auth_Verif
OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD
OE.Ext_Insp_Systems
T.Read_Sensitive
_Data
x
x x
T.Forgery x x x x x x
T.Counterfeit x x x
T.Abuse-Func x
T.Information_L
eakage
x
T.Phys-Tamper x
T.Malfunction x
P.BAC-PP x
P.Sensitive_Data x x x
P.Manufact x
P.Personalizatio
n
x x x
A.MRTD_Manuf
act
x
A.MRTD_Deliver
y
x
A.Pers_Agent x
A.Insp_Sys x x
A.Signature_PKI x x
A.Auth_PKI x x
Table 3 - security objectives coverage
The OSP P. BAC-PP is directly addressed by the OE.BAC-PP.
The OSP P.Manufact “Manufacturing of the MRTD’s chip” requires a unique identification of
the IC by means of the Initialization Data and the writing of the Pre-personalization Data as
being fulfilled by OT.Identification.
The OSP P.Personalization “Personalization of the MRTD by issuing State or Organization only”
addresses the (i) the enrolment of the logical MRTD by the Personalization Agent as described
in the security objective for the TOE environment OE.Personalization “Personalization of
CEITECSA 5.410.052 31
logical MRTD”, and (ii) the access control for the user data and TSF data as described by the
security objective OT.AC_Pers “Access Control for Personalization of logical MRTD”. Note the
manufacturer equips the TOE with the Personalization Agent Key(s) according to
OT.Identification “Identification and Authentication of the TOE”. The security objective
OT.AC_Pers limits the management of TSF data and management of TSF to the Personalization
Agent.
The OSP P.Sensitive_Data “Privacy of sensitive biometric reference data” is fulfilled and the
threat T.Read_Sensitive_Data “Read the sensitive biometric reference data” is countered by
the TOE-objective OT.Sens_Data_Conf “Confidentiality of sensitive biometric reference data”
requiring that read access to EF.DG3 and EF.DG4 (containing the sensitive biometric reference
data) is only granted to authorized inspection systems. Furthermore it is required that the
transmission of these data ensures the data’s confidentiality. The authorization bases on
Document Verifier certificates issued by the issuing State or Organization as required by
OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data “Authorization for use of sensitive biometric reference data”. The
Document Verifier of the receiving State has to authorize Extended Inspection Systems by
creating appropriate Inspection System certificates for access to the sensitive biometric
reference data as demanded by OE.Ext_Insp_Systems “Authorization of Extended Inspection
Systems”.
The threat T.Forgery “Forgery of data on MRTD’s chip” addresses the fraudulent alteration of
the complete stored logical MRTD or any part of it. The security objective OT.AC_Pers “Access
Control for Personalization of logical MRTD” requires the TOE to limit the write access for the
logical MRTD to the trustworthy Personalization Agent (cf. OE.Personalization). The TOE will
protect the integrity of the stored logical MRTD according the security objective OT.Data_Int
“Integrity of personal data” and OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper “Protection against Physical
Tampering”. The examination of the presented MRTD passport book according to
OE.Exam_MRTD “Examination of the MRTD passport book” shall ensure that passport book
does not contain a sensitive contactless chip which may present the complete unchanged
logical MRTD. The TOE environment will detect partly forged logical MRTD data by means of
digital signature which will be created according to OE.Pass_Auth_Sign “Authentication of
logical MRTD by Signature” and verified by the Inspection System according to
OE.Passive_Auth_Verif “Verification by Passive Authentication”.
The threat T.Counterfeit “MRTD’s chip” addresses the attack of unauthorized copy or
reproduction of the genuine MRTD chip. This attack is thwarted by chip an identification and
authenticity proof required by OT.Chip_Auth_Proof “Proof of MRTD’s chip authentication”
using a authentication key pair to be generated by the issuing State or Organization. The Public
Chip Authentication Key has to be written into EF.DG14 and signed by means of Documents
Security Objects as demanded by OE.Auth_Key_MRTD “MRTD Authentication Key”. According
to OE.Exam_MRTD “Examination of the MRTD passport book” the General Inspection system
has to perform the Chip Authentication Protocol to verify the authenticity of the MRTD’s chip.
The threat T.Abuse-Func “Abuse of Functionality” addresses attacks of misusing MRTD’s
functionality to disable or bypass the TSFs. The security objective for the TOE OT.Prot_Abuse-
Func “Protection against abuse of functionality” ensures that the usage of functions which may
CEITECSA 5.410.052 32
not be used in the “Operational Use” phase is effectively prevented. Therefore attacks
intending to abuse functionality in order to disclose or manipulate critical (User) Data or to
affect the TOE in such a way that security features or TOE’s functions may be bypassed,
deactivated, changed or explored shall be effectively countered.
The threats T.Information_Leakage “Information Leakage from MRTD’s chip”, T.Phys-Tamper
“Physical Tampering” and T.Malfunction “Malfunction due to Environmental Stress” are typical
for integrated circuits like smart cards under direct attack with high attack potential. The
protection of the TOE against these threats is addressed by the directly related security
objectives OT.Prot_Inf_Leak “Protection against Information Leakage”, OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
“Protection against Physical Tampering” and T.Prot_Malfunction “Protection against
Malfunctions”.
The assumption A.MRTD_Manufact “MRTD manufacturing on step 4 to 6” is covered by the
security objective for the TOE environment OE.MRTD_Manufact “Protection of the MRTD
Manufacturing” that requires to use security procedures during all manufacturing steps.
The assumption A.MRTD_Delivery “MRTD delivery during step 4 to 6” is covered by the
security objective for the TOE environment OE.MRTD_ Delivery “Protection of the MRTD
delivery” that requires to use security procedures during delivery steps of the MRTD.
The assumption A.Pers_Agent “Personalization of the MRTD’s chip” is covered by the security
objective for the TOE environment OE.Personalization “Personalization of logical MRTD”
including the enrolment, the protection with digital signature and the storage of the MRTD
Holder personal data.
The examination of the MRTD passport book addressed by the assumption A.Insp_Sys
“Inspection Systems for global interoperability” is covered by the security objectives for the
TOE environment OE.Exam_MRTD “Examination of the MRTD passport book” which requires
the inspection system to examine physically the MRTD, the Basic Inspection System to
implement the Basic Access Control, and the General Inspection Systems and Extended
Inspection Systems to implement and to perform the Chip Authentication Protocol to verify
the Authenticity of the presented MRTD’s chip. The security objectives for the TOE
environment OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD “Protection of data from the logical MRTD” require the
Inspection System to protect the logical MRTD data during the transmission and the internal
handling.
The assumption A.Signature_PKI “PKI for Passive Authentication” is directly covered by the
security objective for the TOE environment OE.Pass_Auth_Sign “Authentication of logical
MRTD by Signature” covering the necessary procedures for the Country Signing CA Key Pair
and the Document Signer Key Pairs. The implementation of the signature verification
procedures is covered by OE.Exam_MRTD “Examination of the MRTD passport book”.
The assumption A.Auth_PKI “PKI for Inspection Systems” is covered by the security objective
for the TOE environment OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data “Authorization for use of sensitive biometric
reference data” requires the CVCA to limit the read access to sensitive biometrics by issuing
Document Verifier certificates for authorized receiving States or Organizations only. The
CEITECSA 5.410.052 33
Document Verifier of the receiving State is required by OE.Ext_Insp_Systems “Authorization of
Extended Inspection Systems” to authorize Extended Inspection Systems by creating
Inspection System Certificates. Therefore, the receiving issuing State or Organization has to
establish the necessary public key infrastructure.
CEITECSA 5.410.052 34
5 Extended Components Definition
This ST uses components defined as extensions to CC part 2. Some of these components are
defined in [8], other components are defined in this ST.
5.1 Definition of the Family FAU_SAS
To define the security functional requirements of the TOE a sensitive family (FAU_SAS) of the
Class FAU (Security Audit) is defined here. This family describes the functional requirements
for the storage of audit data. It has a more general approach than FAU_GEN, because it does
not necessarily require the data to be generated by the TOE itself and because it does not give
specific details of the content of the audit records.
The family “Audit data storage (FAU_SAS)” is specified as follows.
FAU_SAS Audit data storage
Family behavior
This family defines functional requirements for the storage of audit data.
Component leveling:
FAU_SAS.1 Requires the TOE to provide the possibility to store audit data.
Management: FAU_SAS.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FAU_SAS.1
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FAU_SAS.1.1 The TSF shall provide [assignment: authorized users] with the capability
to store [assignment: list of audit information] in the audit records.
5.2 Definition of the Family FCS_RND
To define the IT security functional requirements of the TOE a sensitive family (FCS_RND) of
the Class FCS (cryptographic support) is defined here. This family describes the functional
requirements for random number generation used for cryptographic purposes. The
FAU_SAS Audit data storage 1
CEITECSA 5.410.052 35
component FCS_RND is not limited to generation of cryptographic keys unlike the component
FCS_CKM.1.
The similar component FIA_SOS.2 is intended for non-cryptographic use.
The family “Generation of random numbers (FCS_RND)” is specified as follows.
FCS_RND Generation of random numbers
Family behavior
This family defines quality requirements for the generation of random numbers which are
intended to be used for cryptographic purposes.
Component leveling:
FCS_RND.1 Generation of random numbers requires that random numbers meet a
defined quality metric.
Management: FCS_RND.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FCS_RND.1
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
FCS_RND.1 Quality metric for random numbers
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FCS_RND.1.1 TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate random numbers that meet
[assignment: a defined quality metric].
5.3 Definition of the Family FIA_API
To describe the IT security functional requirements of the TOE a sensitive family (FIA_API) of
the Class FIA (Identification and authentication) is defined here. This family describes the
functional requirements for the proof of the claimed identity for the authentication
verification by an external entity where the other families of the class FIA address the
verification of the identity of an external entity.
Application Note 17: The other families of the Class FIA describe only the authentication
verification of users’ identity performed by the TOE and do not describe the functionality of
the user to prove their identity. The following paragraph defines the family FIA_API in the style
of the Common Criteria part 2 (cf. [3], chapter “Explicitly stated IT security requirements
FCS_RND Generation of random numbers 1
CEITECSA 5.410.052 36
(APE_SRE)”) from a TOE point of view.
FIA_API Authentication Proof of Identity
Family behavior
This family defines functions provided by the TOE to prove their identity and to be verified by
an external entity in the TOE IT environment.
Component leveling:
FIA_API.1 Authentication Proof of Identity.
Management: FIA_API.1
The following actions could be considered for the management
functions in FMT: Management of authentication information used to
prove the claimed identity.
Audit: There are no actions defined to be auditable.
FIA_API.1 Authentication Proof of Identity
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA_API.1.1 The TSF shall provide a [assignment: authentication mechanism] to
prove the identity of the [assignment: authorized user or role].
5.4 Definition of the Family FMT_LIM
The family FMT_LIM describes the functional requirements for the Test Features of the TOE.
The new functional requirements were defined in the class FMT because this class addresses
the management of functions of the TSF. The examples of the technical mechanism used in the
TOE show that no other class is appropriate to address the specific issues of preventing the
abuse of functions by limiting the capabilities of the functions and by limiting their availability.
The family “Limited capabilities and availability (FMT_LIM)” is specified as follows.
FMT_LIM Limited capabilities and availability
Family behavior
FIA_API Authentication Proof of Identity 1
CEITECSA 5.410.052 37
This family defines requirements that limit the capabilities and availability of functions in a
combined manner. Note that FDP_ACF restricts the access to functions whereas the Limited
capability of this family requires the functions themselves to be designed in a specific manner.
Component leveling:
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities requires that the TSF is built to provide only the
capabilities (perform action, gather information) necessary for its
genuine purpose.
FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability requires that the TSF restrict the use of functions
(refer to Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)). This can be achieved, for
instance, by removing or by disabling functions in a specific phase of
the TOE’s lifecycle.
Management: FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
To define the IT security functional requirements of the TOE a sensitive family (FMT_LIM) of
the Class FMT (Security Management) is defined here. This family describes the functional
requirements for the Test Features of the TOE. The new functional requirements were defined
in the class FMT because this class addresses the management of functions of the TSF. The
examples of the technical mechanism used in the TOE show that no other class is appropriate
to address the specific issues of preventing the abuse of functions by limiting the capabilities of
the functions and by limiting their availability.
The TOE Functional Requirement “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)” is specified as follows.
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability.
FMT_LIM.1.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so
that in conjunction with “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” the
following policy is enforced [assignment: Limited capability and
availability policy].
FMT_LIM Limited capabilities and availability
1
2
CEITECSA 5.410.052 38
The TOE Functional Requirement “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” is specified as follows.
FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities.
FMT_LIM.2.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so
that in conjunction with “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)” the
following policy is enforced [assignment: Limited capability and
availability policy].
Application Note 18: The functional requirements FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2 assume that
there are two types of mechanisms (limited capabilities and limited availability) which together
shall provide protection in order to enforce the policy. This also allows that (i) the TSF is
provided without restrictions in the product in its user environment but its capabilities are so
limited that the policy is enforced or conversely (ii) the TSF is designed with test and support
functionality that is removed from, or disabled in, the product prior to the “Operational Use”
Phase.
The combination of both requirements shall enforce the policy.
5.5 Definition of the Family FPT_EMSEC
The sensitive family FPT_EMSEC (TOE Emanation) of the Class FPT (Protection of the TSF) is
defined here to describe the IT security functional requirements of the TOE. The TOE shall
prevent attacks against the TOE and other secret data where the attack is based on external
observable physical phenomena of the TOE. Examples of such attacks are evaluation of TOE’s
electromagnetic radiation, simple power analysis (SPA), differential power analysis (DPA),
timing attacks, etc. This family describes the functional requirements for the limitation of
intelligible emanations which are not directly addressed by any other component of CC part 2
[6].
The family “TOE Emanation (FPT_EMSEC)” is specified as follows.
Family behavior
This family defines requirements to mitigate intelligible emanations.
Component leveling:
FPT_EMSEC.1 TOE emanation has two constituents:
FPT_EMSEC.1.1 Limit of Emissions requires to not emit intelligible emissions enabling
access to TSF data or user data.
FPT_EMSEC TOE emanation 1
CEITECSA 5.410.052 39
FPT_EMSEC.1.2 Interface Emanation requires to not emit interface emanation enabling
access to TSF data or user data.
Management: FPT_EMSEC.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FPT_EMSEC.1
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
FPT_EMSEC.1 TOE Emanation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_EMSEC.1.1 The TOE shall not emit [assignment: types of emissions] in excess of
[assignment: specified limits] enabling access to [assignment: list of
types of TSF data] and [assignment: list of types of user data].
FPT_EMSEC.1.2 The TSF shall ensure [assignment: type of users] are unable to use the
following interface [assignment: type of connection] to gain access to
[assignment: list of types of TSF data] and [assignment: list of types of
user data].
CEITECSA 5.410.052 40
6 Security requirements
6.1 Security functional requirements for the TOE
This section on security functional requirements for the TOE is divided into sub-section
following the main security functionality.
6.1.1 Class FAU Security Audit
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Audit storage (FAU_SAS.1)” as specified below (Common
Criteria Part 2 extended).
FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FAU_SAS.1.1 The TSF shall provide the Manufacturer2
with the capability to store
the IC Identification Data3
in the audit records.
Application Note 19: The Manufacturer herein refers to the Module Manufacturer.
6.1.2 Class Cryptographic Support (FCS)
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic key generation (FCS_CKM.1)” as specified
below (Common Criteria Part 2). The iterations are caused by different cryptographic key
generation algorithms to be implemented and key to be generated by the TOE.
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.1.1 The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key generation algorithm based on the
key Diffie-Hellman key derivation Protocol compliant to
PKCS#34
, and specified cryptographic key sizes 1024 bit5
that
meet the following: [3], Annex A.16
.
Application Note 20: The TOE generates a shared secret value with the terminal during the
Chip Authentication Protocol, see [3], sec. 3.1 and Annex A.1. This protocol is based on the
2
[assignment: authorized users]
3
[assignment: list of audit information]
4
[selection: based on the key Diffie-Hellman key derivation Protocol compliant to PKCS#3, ECDH compliant to ISO
15946 ]
5
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
6
[assignment: list of standards]
CEITECSA 5.410.052 41
Diffie-Hellman-Protocol compliant to PKCS#3 (i.e. modulo arithmetic based cryptographic
algorithm, cf. [9]). The shared secret value is used to derive the Triple-DES key for encryption
and the Retail-MAC Chip Session Keys according to the Document Basic Access Key Derivation
Algorithm [2], normative appendix 5, A5.1, for the TSF required by FCS_COP.1/SYM and
FCS_COP.1/MAC.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic key destruction (FCS_CKM.4)” as specified
below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction - MRTD
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4.1 The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key destruction method: overwriting the memory data7
that meets the following: none8
.
Application Note 21: The TOE shall destroy the BAC Session Keys (i) after detection of an error
in a received command by verification of the MAC, and (ii) after successful run of the Chip
Authentication Protocol. The TOE shall destroy the Chip Session Keys after detection of an
error in a received command by verification of the MAC. The TOE shall clear the memory area
of any session keys before starting the communication with the terminal in a new power-on-
session.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1)” as specified
below (Common Criteria Part 2). The iterations are caused by different cryptographic
algorithms to be implemented by the TOE.
FCS_COP.1/SHA Cryptographic operation – Hash for Key Derivation by
MRTD
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1/SHA The TSF shall perform hashing in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm SHA-19
and cryptographic key sizes none10
that meet the following: FIPS 180-411
[10].
7
[assignment: cryptographic key destruction method]
8
[assignment: list of standards]
9
[selection: SHA-1 or other approved algorithms]
CEITECSA 5.410.052 42
Application Note 22: For the purposes of this ST, SHA-1 concerns with the Chip Authentication
Protocol.
FCS_COP.1/SYM Cryptographic operation – Symmetric Encryption /
Decryption
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1/SYM The TSF shall perform secure messaging – encryption and decryption
12
in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm Triple-DES in
CBC mode13
and cryptographic key sizes 112 bit14
that meet the
following: TR-03110 [3]15
.
FCS_COP.1/MAC Cryptographic operation –MAC
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1/MAC The TSF shall perform secure messaging – message authentication
code16
in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm Retail
MAC17
and cryptographic key sizes 112 bit18
that meet the following:
TR-03110 [3]19
.
Application Note 23: The TOE implements cryptographic primitives for secure messaging with
encryption (3DES) and message authentication (Retail MAC) of transmitted data. The key is
agreed upon by Chip Authentication Protocol.
FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER Cryptographic operation – Signature verification by
MRTD
Hierarchical to: No other components.
10
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
11
[selection: FIPS 180-2 or other approved standards]
12
[assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
13
[assignment: cryptographic algorithm]
14
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
15
[assignment: list of standards]
16
[assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
17
[assignment: cryptographic algorithm]
18
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
19
[assignment: list of standards]
CEITECSA 5.410.052 43
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1/SIG_VER The TSF shall perform digital signature verification20
in accordance
with a specified cryptographic algorithm RSA21
and cryptographic key
sizes 1024-bit modulus22
that meet the following: [11]23
.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Quality metric for random numbers (FCS_RND.1)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2 extended).
FCS_RND.1 Quality metric for random numbers
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FCS_RND.1.1 The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate random numbers that
meet AIS-31 class PTG.224
[12].
6.1.3 Class FIA Identification and Authentication
Application Note 24: The table below provides an overview on the authentication mechanisms
used.
Name SFR for the TOE
Symmetric Authentication Mechanism for
Personalization Agents
FIA_UAU.4
Chip Authentication Protocol FIA_API.1, FIA_UAU.5, FIA_UAU.6
Terminal Authentication Protocol FIA_ UAU.5
Table 4 – Authentication Mechanisms
Note the Chip Authentication Protocol as defined in this ST includes
 the BAC authentication protocol as defined in ‘ICAO Doc 9303’ [2] in order to gain
access to the Chip Authentication Public Key in EF.DG14;
20
[assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
21
[assignment: cryptographic algorithm]
22
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
23
[assignment: list of standards]
24
[assignment: a defined quality metric]
CEITECSA 5.410.052 44
 the asymmetric key agreement to establish symmetric secure messaging keys between
the TOE and the terminal based on the Chip Authentication Public Key and the
Terminal Public Key used later in the Terminal Authentication Protocol; and
 the check whether the TOE is able to generate the correct message authentication
code with the expected key for any message received by the terminal.
The BAC mechanism does not provide a security function on their own. The Chip
Authentication Protocol may be used independent of the Terminal Authentication Protocol.
But if the Terminal Authentication Protocol is used the terminal shall use the same public key
as presented during the Chip Authentication Protocol.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Timing of identification (FIA_UID.1)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2).
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA_UID.1.1 The TSF shall allow
1. to establish the communication channel,
2. to read the Initialization Data if it is not disabled by TSF according
to FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS,
3. to carry out the Chip Authentication Protocol28
on behalf of the
user to be performed before the user is identified.
FIA_UID.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before
allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Timing of authentication (FIA_UAU.1)” as specified
below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification.
FIA_UAU.1.1 The TSF shall allow
1. to establish the communication channel,
2. to read the Initialization Data if it is not disabled by TSF according
to FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS,
3. to identify themselves by selection of the authentication key,
28
[assignment: list of TSF-mediated actions]
CEITECSA 5.410.052 45
4. to carry out the Chip Authentication Protocol29
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated.
FIA_UAU.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before
allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
The TOE shall meet the requirements of “Single-use authentication mechanisms (FIA_UAU.4)”
as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FIA_UAU.4 Single-use authentication mechanisms - Single-use
authentication of the Terminal by the TOE
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA_UAU.4.1 The TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to
1. Terminal Authentication Protocol,
2. Authentication Mechanism based on Triple-DES30
.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Multiple authentication mechanisms (FIA_UAU.5)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FIA_UAU.5 Multiple authentication mechanisms
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA_UAU.5.1 The TSF shall provide
1. Terminal Authentication Protocol,
2. Secure messaging in MAC-ENC mode,
3. Symmetric Authentication Mechanism based on Triple-DES31
to
support user authentication.
FIA_UAU.5.2 The TSF shall authenticate any user’s claimed identity according to the
following rules:
1. The TOE accepts the authentication attempt as Personalization
Agent by the Terminal Authentication Protocol with Personalization
Agent Keys.
2. After run of the Chip Authentication Protocol the TOE accepts only
received commands with correct message authentication code sent
by means of secure messaging with key agreed with the terminal by
means of the Chip Authentication Mechanism.
29
[assignment: list of TSF-mediated actions]
30
[assignment: identified authentication mechanism(s)]
31
[assignment: list of multiple authentication mechanisms]
CEITECSA 5.410.052 46
3. The TOE accepts the authentication attempt by means of the
Terminal Authentication Protocol only if the terminal uses the public
key presented during the Chip Authentication Protocol and the
secure messaging established by the Chip Authentication
Mechanism32
.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Re-authenticating (FIA_UAU.6)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2).
FIA_UAU.6 Re-authenticating – Re-authenticating of Terminal by
the TOE
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA_UAU.6.1 The TSF shall re-authenticate the user under the conditions each
command sent to the TOE after successful run of the Chip
Authentication Protocol shall be verified as being sent by the GIS33
.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Authentication Proof of Identity (FIA_API.1)” as specified
below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FIA_API.1 Authentication Proof of Identity
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA_API.1.1 The TSF shall provide a Chip Authentication Protocol according to [3]34
to prove the identity of the TOE35
.
6.1.4 Class FDP User Data Protection
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Subset access control (FDP_ACC.1)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2).
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACC.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP 36
on terminals gaining
write, read and modification access to data in the EF.COM, EF.SOD,
EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD37
.
32
[assignment: rules describing how the multiple authentication mechanisms provide
authentication]
33
[assignment: list of conditions under which re-authentication is required]
34
[assignment: authentication mechanism]
35
[assignment: authorized user or role]
CEITECSA 5.410.052 47
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Security attribute based access control (FDP_ACF.1)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
FDP_ACF.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP38
to objects based on the
following:
1. Subjects:
a. Personalization Agent,
b. Extended Inspection System,
c. Terminal,
2. Objects:
a. data EF.DG1, EF.DG2 and EF.DG5 to EF.DG16 of the logical
MRTD,
b. data EF.DG3 and EF.DG4 of the logical MRTD,
c. data in EF.COM,
d. data in EF.SOD,
3. Security attributes
a. authentication status of terminals.
b. Terminal Authorization39
.
FDP_ACF.1.2 The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation
among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:
1. the successfully authenticated Personalization Agent is allowed
to write and to read the data of the EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1 to
EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD,
2. the successfully authenticated Extended Inspection System with
the Read access to DG 3 (Fingerprint) granted by the relative
certificate holder authorization encoding is allowed to read the
data in EF.DG3 of the logical MRTD,
3. the successfully authenticated Extended Inspection System with
the Read access to DG 4 (Iris) granted by the relative certificate
36
[assignment: access control SFP]
37
[assignment: list of subjects, objects, and operations among subjects and objects covered by the SFP]
38
[assignment: access control SFP]
39
[assignment: list of subjects and objects controlled under the indicated SFP, and. for each, the SFP-relevant
security attributes, or named groups of SFP-relevant security attributes]
CEITECSA 5.410.052 48
holder authorization encoding is allowed to read the data in
EF.DG4 of the logical MRTD40
.
FDP_ACF.1.3 The TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects based on
the following additional rules: none41
FDP_ACF.1.4 The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the
rule:
1. A terminal authenticated as CVCA is not allowed to read data in
the EF.DG3,
2. A terminal authenticated as CVCA is not allowed to read data in
the EF.DG4,
3. A terminal authenticated as DV is not allowed to read data in the
EF.DG3,
4. A terminal authenticated as DV is not allowed to read data in the
EF.DG4,
5. Any terminal is not allowed to modify any of the EF.DG1 to
EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD,
6. Any terminal not being successfully authenticated as Extended
Inspection System is not allowed to read the EF.DG3 to EF.DG4 of
the logical MRTD42
.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Basic data exchange confidentiality (FDP_UCT.1)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FDP_UCT.1 Basic data exchange confidentiality - MRTD
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or
FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path]
[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FDP_UCT.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP43
to be able to transmit
and receive44
user data in a manner protected from unauthorized
disclosure after Chip Authentication45
.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Data exchange integrity (FDP_UIT.1)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2).
40
[assignment: rules governing access among controlled subjects and controlled objects using controlled operations
on controlled objects]
41
[assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects]
42
[assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly deny access of subjects to objects]
43
[assignment: access control SFP(s) and/or information flow control SFP(s)]
44
[selection: transmit, receive]
45
Refinement as per BSI-CC-PP-0056
CEITECSA 5.410.052 49
FDP_UIT.1 Data exchange integrity
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
[FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or
FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path]
FDP_UIT.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP 46
to be able to transmit
and receive47
user data in a manner protected from modification,
deletion, insertion and replay48
errors after Chip Authentication49
.
FDP_UIT.1.2 The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data, whether
modification, deletion, insertion and replay 50
has occurred after Chip
Authentication51
.
Rationale for Refinement: The refinement follows the wording of BSI-PP-CC-0056 [13].
6.1.5 Class FMT Security Management
Application Note 25: The SFR FMT_SMF.1 and FMT_SMR.1 provide basic requirements to the
management of the TSF data.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Specification of Management Functions (FMT_SMF.1)”
as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No Dependencies
FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management
functions:
1. Initialization,
2. Pre-personalization,
3. Personalization52
.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Security roles (FMT_SMR.1)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2).
46
[assignment: access control SFP(s) and/or information flow control SFP(s)]
47
[selection: transmit, receive]
48
[selection: modification, deletion, insertion, replay]
49
Refinement as per BSI-CC-PP-0056
50
[selection: modification, deletion, insertion, replay]
51
refinement
52
[assignment: list of management functions to be provided by the TSF]
CEITECSA 5.410.052 50
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification.
FMT_SMR.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the roles
1. Manufacturer,
2. Personalization Agent,
3. Country Verifying Certification Authority,
4. Document Verifier,
5. domestic Extended Inspection System,
6. foreign Extended Inspection System53
.
FMT_SMR.1.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2 extended).
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability.
FMT_LIM.1.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so
that in conjunction with “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” the
following policy is enforced:
Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow
1. User Data to be manipulated,
2. Sensitive User Data (EF.DG3 and EF.DG4) to be disclosed,
3. TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated,
4. software to be reconstructed and
5. substantial information about construction of TSF to be gathered
which may enable other attacks54
.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2 extended).
FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities.
53
[assignment: the authorized identified roles]
54
[assignment: Limited capability and availability policy]
CEITECSA 5.410.052 51
FMT_LIM.2.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so
that in conjunction with “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)” the
following policy is enforced:
Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow
1. User Data to be manipulated,
2. Sensitive User Data (EF.DG3 and EF.DG4) to be disclosed,
3. TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated,
4. software to be reconstructed and
5. substantial information about construction of TSF to be gathered
which may enable other attacks55
.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Management of TSF data (FMT_MTD.1)” as specified
below (Common Criteria Part 2). The iterations address different management functions and
different TSF data.
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA Management of TSF data – Writing of
Initialization Data and Pre-personalization Data
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MTD.1.1/INI_ENA The TSF shall restrict the ability to write56
the Initialization
Data and Pre-personalization Data57
to the Manufacturer58
.
Application Note 26: The Manufacturer refers to the Module Manufacturer.
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS Management of TSF data – Disabling of
Read Access to Initialization Data and Pre-personalization Data
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MTD.1.1/INI_DIS The TSF shall restrict the ability to disable read access for users
to59
the Initialization Data60
to the Personalization Agent61
.
55
[assignment: Limited capability and availability policy]
56
[selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]]
57
[assignment: list of TSF data]
58
[assignment: the authorized identified roles]
59
[selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]]
60
[assignment: list of TSF data]
61
[assignment: the authorized identified roles]
CEITECSA 5.410.052 52
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI Management of TSF data – Initialization of CVCA
Certificate and Current Date
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MTD.1.1/CVCA_INI The TSF shall restrict the ability to write62
the
1. initial Country Verifying Certification Authority Public Key,
2. initial Country Verifying Certification Authority Certificate,
3. initial Current Date63
to the Manufacturer64
.
Application Note 27: The Manufacturer is the Module Manufacturer.
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD Management of TSF data – Country Verifying
Certification Authority
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MTD.1.1/CVCA_UPD The TSF shall restrict the ability to update65
the
1. Country Verifying Certification Authority Public Key,
2. Country Verifying Certification Authority Certificate66
to Country Verifying Certification Authority67
.
FMT_MTD.1/DATE Management of TSF data – Current date
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MTD.1.1/DATE The TSF shall restrict the ability to modify68
the Current date69
to
1. Country Verifying Certification Authority,
2. Document Verifier,
3. domestic Extended Inspection System70
.
62
[selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]]
63
[assignment: list of TSF data]
64
[assignment: the authorized identified roles]
65
[selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]]
66
[assignment: list of TSF data]
67
[assignment: the authorized identified roles]
68
[selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]]
69
[assignment: list of TSF data]
70
[assignment: the authorized identified roles]
CEITECSA 5.410.052 53
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE Management of TSF data – Key Write
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MTD.1.1/KEY_WRITE The TSF shall restrict the ability to write71
the
Document Basic Access Keys 72
to the Personalization
Agent73
.
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK Management of TSF data – Chip Authentication
Private Key
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MTD.1.1/CAPK The TSF shall restrict the ability to create74
the Chip Authentication
Private Key75
to the Manufacturer76
.
Application Note 28: The Manufacturer is the Module Manufacturer.
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ Management of TSF data – Key Read
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MTD.1.1/KEY_READ The TSF shall restrict the ability to read77
the
1. Document Basic Access Keys,
2. Chip authentication Private Key,
3. Personalization Agent Keys78
to none79
.
FMT_MTD.3 Secure TSF data
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF data
71
[selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]]
72
[assignment: list of TSF data]
73
[assignment: the authorized identified roles]
74
[selection: create, load]
75
[assignment: list of TSF data]
76
[assignment: the authorized identified roles]
77
[selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]]
78
[assignment: list of TSF data]
79
[assignment: the authorized identified roles]
CEITECSA 5.410.052 54
FMT_MTD.3.1 The TSF shall ensure that only secure values of the certificate chain80
are accepted for TSF data of the Terminal Authentication Protocol
and the Access Control81
.
Refinement82
: The certificate chain is valid if and only if
(1) the digital signature of the Inspection System Certificate can be verified as correct
with the public key of the Document Verifier Certificate and the expiration date of
the Inspection System Certificate is not before the Current Date of the TOE,
(2) the digital signature of the Document Verifier Certificate can be verified as correct
with the public key in the Certificate of the Country Verifying Certification
Authority and the expiration date of the Document Verifier Certificate is not before
the Current Date of the TOE,
(3) the digital signature of the Certificate of the Country Verifying Certification
Authority can be verified as correct with the public key of the Country Verifying of
the Country Verifying Certification Authority is not before the Current Date of the
TOE.
The Inspection System Public Key contained in the Inspection System Certificate in a valid
certificate chain is a secure value for the authentication reference data of the Extended
Inspection System.
The intersection of the Certificate Holder Authorizations contained in the certificates of a
valid certificate chain is a secure value for Terminal Authorization of a successful
authenticated Extended Inspection System.
6.1.6 Class FPT Protection of the Security Functions
The TOE shall prevent inherent and forced illicit information leakage for User Data and TSF
Data. The security functional requirement FPT_EMSEC.1 addresses the inherent leakage. With
respect to the forced leakage they have to be considered in combination with the security
functional requirements “Failure with preservation of secure state (FPT_FLS.1)” and “TSF
testing (FPT_TST.1)” on the one hand and “Resistance to physical attack (FPT_PHP.3)” on the
other. The SFRs “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)”, “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” and
“Resistance to physical attack (FPT_PHP.3)” together with the SAR “Security architecture
description” (ADV_ARC.1) prevent bypassing, deactivation and manipulation of the security
features or misuse of TOE functions.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “TOE Emanation (FPT_EMSEC.1)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2 extended).
FPT_EMSEC.1 TOE Emanation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
80
Refinement as per BSI-CC-PP-0056
81
[assignment: list of TSF data]
82
As per BSI-CC-PP-0056
CEITECSA 5.410.052 55
Dependencies: No Dependencies.
FPT_EMSEC.1.1 The TOE shall not emit electromagnetic fields and power consumption
information83
in excess of non-useful information84
enabling access to
Personalization Agent Key(s) and Chip Authentication Private Key85
and data stored in EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1 to EF.DG1686
.
FPT_EMSEC.1.2 The TSF shall ensure any users87
are unable to use the following
interface smart card circuit contacts88
to gain access to
Personalization Agent Key(s) and Chip Authentication Private Key89
and data stored in EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1 to EF.DG1690
.
Application Note 29: The TOE shall prevent attacks against the listed secret data where the
attack is based on external observable physical phenomena of the TOE. Such attacks may be
observable at the interfaces of the TOE or may be originated from internal operation of the
TOE or may be caused by an attacker that varies the physical environment under which the
TOE operates. The set of measurable physical phenomena is influenced by the technology
employed to implement the smart card.
The following security functional requirements address the protection against forced illicit
information leakage including physical manipulation.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Failure with preservation of secure state (FPT_FLS.1)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No Dependencies.
FPT_FLS.1.1 The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of
failures occur:
1. Exposure to out-of-range operating conditions where therefore a
malfunction could occur,
2. failure detected by TSF according to FPT_TST.191
.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “TSF testing (FPT_TST.1)” as specified below (Common
Criteria Part 2).
FPT_TST.1 TSF testing
Hierarchical to: No other components.
83
[assignment: types of emissions]
84
[assignment: specified limits]
85
[assignment: list of types of TSF data]
86
[assignment: list of types of user data]
87
[assignment: type of users]
88
[assignment: type of connection]
89
[assignment: list of types of TSF data]
90
[assignment: list of types of user data]
91
[assignment: list of types of failures in the TSF]
CEITECSA 5.410.052 56
Dependencies: No Dependencies.
FPT_TST.1.1 The TSF shall run a suite of self-tests during initial start-up,
periodically during normal operation, at the conditions request of
random numbers and after cryptographic operations92
to
demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF93
.
FPT_TST.1.2 The TSF shall provide authorized users with the capability to verify the
integrity of TSF data94
.
FPT_TST.1.3 The TSF shall provide authorized users with the capability to verify the
integrity of stored TSF executable code95
.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Resistance to physical attack (FPT_PHP.3)” as specified
below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_PHP.3.1 The TSF shall resist physical manipulation and physical probing96
to
the TSF97
by responding automatically such that the SFRs are always
enforced.
6.2 Security Assurance Requirements for the TOE
The for the evaluation of the TOE and its development and operating environment are those
taken from the Evaluation Assurance Level 4 (EAL4) and augmented by taking the following
components:
ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5.
6.3 Security Requirements Rationale
6.3.1 Security Functional Requirements Rationale
The following table provides an overview for security functional requirements coverage.
92
[selection: during initial start-up, periodically during normal operation, at the request of the authorized user, at
the conditions [assignment: conditions under which self-test should occur]]
93
[selection: [assignment: parts of TSF], the TSF]
94
[selection: [assignment: parts of TSF], TSF data]
95
[selection: [assignment: parts of TSF], TSF]
96
[assignment: physical tampering scenarios]
97
[assignment: list of TSF devices/elements]
CEITECSA 5.410.052 57
OT.AC_Pers
OT.Data_Int
OT.Sens_Data_Conf
OT.Identification
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
OT.Prot_Malfunction
FAU_SAS.1 X
FCS_CKM.1 X X X X
FCS_CKM.4 X X X
FCS_COP.1/SHA X X X X
FCS_COP.1/SYM X X X X
FCS_COP.1/MAC X X X X
FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER X X
FCS_RND.1 X X
FIA_UID.1 X X X
FIA_UAU.1 X X X
FIA_UAU.4 X X X
FIA_UAU.5 X X X
FIA_UAU.6 X X X
FIA_API.1 X
FDP_ACC.1 X X X
FDP_ACF.1 X X X
FDP_UCT.1 X
FDP_UIT.1 X
FMT_SMF.1 X X
FMT_SMR.1 X X
FMT_LIM.1 X
FMT_LIM.2 X
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA X
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS X
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI X
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD X
FMT_MTD.1/DATE X
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE X
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK X X X
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ X X X X
FMT_MTD.3 X
FPT_EMSEC.1 X X
FPT_TST.1 X X
FPT_FLS.1 X X
FPT_PHP.3 X X
Table 5 - Coverage of Security Objective for the TOE by SFR
CEITECSA 5.410.052 58
The security objective OT.AC_Pers “Access Control for Personalization of logical MRTD”
addresses the access control of the writing the logical MRTD. The write access to the logical
MRTD data are defined by the SFR FIA_UID.1, FUI_UAU.1, FDP_ACC.1 and FDP_ACF.1 in the
same way: only the successfully authenticated Personalization Agent is allowed to write the
data of the groups EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD only once. The SFR FMT_SMR.1 lists
the roles (including Personalization Agent) and the SFR FMT_SMF.1 lists the TSF management
functions (including Personalization). The Personalization Agent handles the Document Basic
Access Keys according to the SFR FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE as authentication reference data for
Basic Access Control.
The authentication of the terminal as Personalization Agent shall be performed by TSF
according to SRF FIA_UAU.4 and FIA_UAU.5. If the Personalization Terminal want to
authenticate itself to the TOE by means of the Terminal Authentication Protocol (after Chip
Authentication) with the Personalization Agent Keys the TOE will use TSF according to the
FCS_RND.1 (for the generation of the challenge), FCS_CKM.1, FCS_COP.1/SHA (for the
derivation of the new session keys after Chip Authentication), and FCS_COP.1/SYM and
FCS_COP.1/MAC (for the ENC_MAC_Mode secure messaging), FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER (as part of
the Terminal Authentication Protocol) and FIA_UAU.6 (for the re-authentication). If the
Personalization Terminal wants to authenticate itself to the TOE by means of the Symmetric
Authentication Mechanism with Personalization Agent Key the TOE will use TSF according to
the FCS_RND.1 (for the generation of the challenge) and FCS_COP.1/SYM (to verify the
authentication attempt). The session keys are destroyed according to FCS_CKM.4 after use.
The SFR FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ prevents read access to the secret key of the Personalization
Agent Keys and ensures together with the SFR FPT_EMSEC.1 the confidentially of these keys.
The security objective OT.Data_Int “Integrity of personal data” requires the TOE to protect the
integrity of the logical MRTD stored on the MRTD’s chip against physical manipulation and
unauthorized writing. The write access to the logical MRTD data is defined by the SFR
FDP_ACC.1 and FDP_ACF.1 in the same way: only the Personalization Agent is allowed to write
the data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD (FDP_ACF.1.2, rule 1) and terminals are not
allowed to modify any of the data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD (cf. FDP_ACF.1.4).
The Personalization Agent must identify and authenticate themselves according to FIA_UID.1
and FIA_UAU.1 before accessing these data. The SFR FMT_SMR.1 lists the roles and the SFR
FMT_SMF.1 lists the TSF management functions.
The TOE supports the inspection system detect any modification of the transmitted logical
MRTD data after Chip Authentication. The authentication of the terminal as Personalization
Agent shall be performed by TSF according to SRF FIA_UAU.4, FIA_UAU.5 and FIA_UAU.6. The
SFR FIA_UAU.6 and FDP_UIT.1 requires the integrity protection of the transmitted data after
chip authentication by means of secure messaging implemented by the cryptographic
functions according to FCS_CKM.1 (for the generation of shared secret), FCS_COP.1/SHA (for
the derivation of the new session keys), and FCS_COP.1/SYM and FCS_COP.1/MAC for the
ENC_MAC_Mode secure messaging. The session keys are destroyed according to FCS_CKM.4
after use.
CEITECSA 5.410.052 59
The SFR FMT_MTD.1/CAPK and FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ requires that the Chip Authentication
Key cannot be written unauthorized or read afterwards.
The security objective OT.Sense_Data_Conf “Confidentiality of sensitive biometric reference
data” is enforced by the Access Control SFP defined in FDP_ACC.1 and FDP_ACF.1 allowing the
data of EF.DG3 and EF.DG4 only to be read by successfully authenticated Extended Inspection
System being authorized by a validly verifiable certificate according FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER.
The SFR FIA_UID.1 and FIA_UAU.1 requires the identification and authentication of the
inspection systems. The SFR FIA_UAU.5 requires the successful Chip Authentication (CA)
before any authentication attempt as Extended Inspection System. During the protected
communication following the CA the reuse of authentication data is prevented by FIA_UAU.4.
The SFR FIA_UAU.6 and FDP_UCT.1 requires the confidentiality protection of the transmitted
data after chip authentication by means of secure messaging implemented by the
cryptographic functions according to FCS_RND.1 (for the generation of the terminal
authentication challenge), FCS_CKM.1 (for the generation of shared secret), FCS_COP.1/SHA
(for the derivation of the new session keys), and FCS_COP.1/SYM and FCS_COP.1/MAC for the
ENC_MAC_Mode secure messaging. The session keys are destroyed according to FCS_CKM.4
after use. The SFR FMT_MTD.1/CAPK and FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ requires that the Chip
Authentication Key cannot be written unauthorized or read afterwards.
To allow a verification of the certificate chain as in FMT_MTD.3 the CVCA’s public key and
certificate as well as the current date are written or update by authorized identified role as of
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI, FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD and FMT_MTD.1/DATE.
The security objective OT.Identification “Identification and Authentication of the TOE” address
the storage of the IC Identification Data uniquely identifying the MRTD’s chip in its non-volatile
memory. This will be ensured by TSF according to SFR FAU_SAS.1.
The SFR FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA allows only the Manufacturer to write Initialization Data and
Pre-personalization Data (including the Personalization Agent key). The SFR
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS allows the Personalization Agent to disable Initialization Data if their
usage in the phase 4 “Operational Use” violates the security objective OT.Identification.
The security objective OT.Chip_Auth_Proof “Proof of MRTD’s chip authenticity” is ensured by
the Chip Authentication Protocol provided by FIA_API.1 proving the identity of the TOE. The
Chip Authentication Protocol defined by FCS_CKM.1 is performed using a TOE internally stored
confidential private key as required by FMT_MTD.1/CAPK and FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ. The
Chip Authentication Protocol [3] requires additional TSF according to FCS_COP.1/SHA (for the
derivation of the session keys), FCS_COP.1/SYM and FCS_COP.1/MAC (for the
ENC_MAC_Mode secure messaging).
The security objective OT.Prot_Abuse-Func “Protection against Abuse of Functionality” is
ensured by the SFR FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2 which prevent misuse of test functionality of
the TOE or other features which may not be used after TOE Delivery.
CEITECSA 5.410.052 60
The security objective OT.Prot_Inf_Leak “Protection against Information Leakage” requires the
TOE to protect confidential TSF data stored and/or processed in the MRTD’s chip against
disclosure
 by measurement and analysis of the shape and amplitude of signals or the time
between events found by measuring signals on the electromagnetic field, power
consumption, clock, or I/O lines which is addressed by the SFR FPT_EMSEC.1,
 by forcing a malfunction of the TOE which is addressed by the SFR FPT_FLS.1 and
FPT_TST.1, and/or
 by a physical manipulation of the TOE which is addressed by the SFR FPT_PHP.3.
The security objective OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper “Protection against Physical Tampering” is
covered by the SFR FPT_PHP.3.
The security objective OT.Prot_Malfunction “Protection against Malfunctions” is covered by (i)
the SFR FPT_TST.1 which requires self-tests to demonstrate the correct operation and tests of
authorized users to verify the integrity of TSF data and TSF code, and (ii) the SFR FPT_FLS.1
which requires a secure state in case of detected failure or operating conditions possibly
causing a malfunction.
6.3.2 Dependency Rationale
The dependency analysis for the security functional requirements shows that the basis for
mutual support and internal consistency between all defined functional requirements is
satisfied. All dependencies between the chosen functional components are analyzed, and non-
dissolved dependencies are appropriately explained.
The table below shows the dependencies between the SFR of the TOE.
SFR Dependencies Support of the Dependencies
FAU_SAS.1 No dependencies n.a.
FCS_CKM.1 [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key
distribution or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic
operation],
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key
destruction,
Fulfilled by FCS_COP.1/SYM
and FCS_COP.1/MAC,
Fulfilled by FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.4 [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data
without security attributes,
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data
with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key
generation]
Fulfilled by FCS_CKM.1,
FCS_COP.1/SHA [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data
without security attributes,
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data
with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key
generation],
justification 1 for non-satisfied
dependencies,
CEITECSA 5.410.052 61
SFR Dependencies Support of the Dependencies
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key
destruction
Fulfilled by FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/SYM [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data
without security attributes,
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data
with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key
generation],
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key
destruction
Fulfilled by FCS_CKM.1,
Fulfilled by FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/MAC [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data
without security attributes,
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data
with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key
generation],
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key
destruction
Fulfilled by FCS_CKM.1,
Fulfilled by FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data
without security attributes,
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data
with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key
generation],
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key
destruction
Fulfilled by FCS_CKM.1,
Fulfilled by FCS_CKM.4
FCS_RND.1 No dependencies n.a.
FIA_UID.1 No dependencies n.a.
FIA_UAU.1 FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification Fulfilled by FIA_UID.1
FIA_UAU.4 No dependencies n.a.
FIA_UAU.5 No dependencies n.a
FIA_UAU.6 No dependencies n.a.
FDP_ACC.1 FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute
based access control
Fulfilled by FDP_ACF.1
FDP_ACF.1 FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control,
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute
initialization
Fulfilled by FDP_ACC.1,
justification 2 for non-satisfied
dependencies
FDP_UCT.1 [FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted
channel, or
FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path],
[FDP_IFC.1 Subset information
flow control or FDP_ACC.1 Subset
access control]
justification 3 for non-satisfied
dependencies
Fulfilled by FDP_ACC.1
FDP_UIT.1 [FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted
channel, or
FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path],
justification 3 for non-satisfied
dependencies
CEITECSA 5.410.052 62
SFR Dependencies Support of the Dependencies
[FDP_IFC.1 Subset information
flow control or FDP_ACC.1 Subset
access control]
Fulfilled by FDP_ACC.1
FMT_SMF.1 No dependencies n.a.
FMT_SMR.1 FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification Fulfilled by FIA_UID.1
FMT_LIM.1 FMT_LIM.2 Fulfilled by FMT_LIM.2
FMT_LIM.2 FMT_LIM.1 Fulfilled by FMT_LIM.1
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA FMT_SMF.1 Specification of
management functions,
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Fulfilled by FMT_SMR.1
Fulfilled by FMT_SMF.1
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS FMT_SMF.1 Specification of
management functions,
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Fulfilled by FMT_SMR.1
Fulfilled by FMT_SMF.1
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI FMT_SMF.1 Specification of
management functions,
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Fulfilled by FMT_SMF.1
Fulfilled by FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD FMT_SMF.1 Specification of
management functions,
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Fulfilled by FMT_SMF.1
Fulfilled by FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1/DATE FMT_SMF.1 Specification of
management functions,
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Fulfilled by FMT_SMF.1
Fulfilled by FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE FMT_SMF.1 Specification of
management functions,
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Fulfilled by FMT_SMF.1
Fulfilled by FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK FMT_SMF.1 Specification of
management functions,
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Fulfilled by FMT_SMF.1
Fulfilled by FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ FMT_SMF.1 Specification of
management functions,
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Fulfilled by FMT_SMF.1
Fulfilled by FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.3 FMT_MTD.1 Fulfilled by
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI and
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD
FPT_EMSEC.1 No dependencies n.a.
FPT_FLS.1 No dependencies n.a.
FPT_PHP.3 No dependencies n.a.
FPT_TST.1 No dependencies n.a.
Table 6 - Dependencies between the SFR for the TOE
Justification for non-satisfied dependencies between the SFR for TOE:
No. 1: The hash algorithm required by the SFR FCS_COP.1/SHA does not need any key material.
Therefore neither key generation (FCS_CKM.1) nor key import (FDP_ITC.1/2) is necessary.
No. 2: The access control TSF according to FDP_ACF.1 uses security attributes which are
defined during the personalization and are fixed over the whole life time of the TOE. No
management of these security attributes (i.e. SFR FMT_MSA.1 and FMT_MSA.3) is necessary
here.
CEITECSA 5.410.052 63
No. 3: The SFR FDP_UCT.1 and FDP_UIT.1 require the use of secure messaging between the
MRTD and the GIS. There is no need for SFR FTP_ITC.1, e.g. to require this communication
channel to be logically distinct from other communication channels since there is only one
channel. Since the TOE does not provide a direct human interface a trusted path as required by
FTP_TRP.1 is not applicable here.
No. 4: The TOE consists of the software and its underlying hardware on which it is running.
Thus there is no abstract machine to be tested.
6.3.3 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale
The EAL4 was chosen to permit a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security
engineering based on good commercial development practices which, though rigorous, do not
require substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the highest level at
which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line. EAL4 is
applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate to high level
of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs and are prepared to incur
sensitive security specific engineering costs.
The selection of the component ALC_DVS.2 provides a higher assurance of the security of the
MRTD’s development and manufacturing especially for the secure handling of the MRTD’s
material.
The selection of the component AVA_VAN.5 provides a higher assurance of the security by
vulnerability analysis to assess the resistance to penetration attacks performed by an attacker
possessing a high attack potential. This vulnerability analysis is necessary to fulfill the security
objectives OT.Sens_Data_Conf and OT.Chip_Auth_Proof.
The component ALC_DVS.2 has no dependencies.
The component AVA_VAN.5 has the following dependencies:
 ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description;
 ADV_FSP.2 Security-enforcing functional specification;
 ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design;
 ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF;
 AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance; and
 AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures.
All of these are met or exceeded in the EAL4 assurance package.
6.3.4 Security Requirements – Mutual Support and Internal Consistency
The following part of the security requirements rationale shows that the set of security
requirements for the TOE consisting of the security functional requirements (SFRs) and the
security assurance requirements (SARs) together form a mutually supportive and internally
consistent whole.
CEITECSA 5.410.052 64
The analysis of the TOE´s security requirements with regard to their mutual support and
internal consistency demonstrates:
The dependency analysis in section 6.3.2 Dependency Rationale for the security functional
requirements shows that the basis for mutual support and internal consistency between all
defined functional requirements is satisfied. All dependencies between the chosen functional
components are analyzed, and non-satisfied dependencies are appropriately explained.
The assurance class EAL4 is an established set of mutually supportive and internally consistent
assurance requirements. The dependency analysis for the sensitive assurance components in
section 6.3.3 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale shows that the assurance
requirements are mutually supportive and internally consistent as all (sensitive) dependencies
are satisfied and no inconsistency appears.
Inconsistency between functional and assurance requirements could only arise if there are
functional-assurance dependencies which are not met, a possibility which has been shown not
to arise in sections 6.3.2 Dependency Rationale and 6.3.3 Security Assurance Requirements
Rationale. Furthermore, as also discussed in section 6.3.3 Security Assurance Requirements
Rationale, the chosen assurance components are adequate for the functionality of the TOE. So
the assurance requirements and security functional requirements support each other and
there are no inconsistencies between the goals of these two groups of security requirements.
CEITECSA 5.410.052 65
7 TOE summary specification
This section provides a description of the TOE’s security functions and mechanisms and the
corresponding SFRs that are met by each function or mechanism.
7.1 SF.AC_Pers: Access Control for Personalization
The authentication protocol for personalization, together with corresponding access control
(FDP_ACC.1, FDP_ACF.1) and security management features, ensure that only a legitimate
Personalization Agent (FMT_SMR.1) is granted access to the Personalization functions of the
TOE. All protocol messages are protected against violations of confidentiality and integrity to
ensure that unauthentic parties shall not succeed in reading or modifying the protocol
messages during personalization.
This security function concerns with the confidentiality of the personalization data of the
MRTD. The security measures are largely overlapping with the security measures for the
security function concerning with the integrity of the personal data of MRTD holders
(SF.Data_Int) and confidentiality of the MRTD holder´s biometric data (SF.Sens_Data_Conf).
The TOE implents a rich set of mechanisms and cryptographic operations (FCS_COP.1/SHA,
FCS_COP.1/SYM, FCS_COP.1/MAC, FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.4, FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER, FCS_RND.1)
to identify and authenticate the Personalization Agent (FIA_UID.1, FIA_UAU.1, FIA_UAU.4,
FIA_UAU.5, FIA_UAU.6, FMT_MTD.3), to establish a secure communication channel with the
Persoanlization Agent, and to allow the Personalization Agent to recognize the TOE as
authentic (FIA_API.1) using the private key stored on the TOE by the Module Manufacturer
(FMT_MTD.1/CAPK).
Only the Personalization Agent is allowed to disable read access to the initialization data
stored during the TOE initialization (FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS) and write the Document Basic
Access Keys (FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE). The initialization and pre-personalization data,
including the IC identification data, can only be written by the Manufacturer (specifically, the
Module Manufacturer) (FAU_SAS.1, FMT_MTD/INI_ENA). Initialization, pre-personalization
and personalization are well defined management functions (FMT_SMF.1) and Manufacturer
and Personalization Agent are well defined TOE user roles (FMT_SMR.1). Reading of the
initialization data is allowed prior to identification and authentication of users unless disabled
by the Personalization Agent (FIA_UID.1, FIA_UAU.1).
Once the private keys Document Basic Access Key, Chip Authentication Private Key, or
Personalization Agent Keys are written to the TOE during initialization, manufacturing or
personalization, nobody is allowed to read them (FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ).
The access control restrictions together with the communication between the TOE and the
reader ensure that any communication between the TOE and a Terminal is protected for
confidentiality and integrity (FDP_UIT.1, FDP_UCT.1). All cryptographic computations by the
TOE are implemented in such a manner that no intelligible emanations are emitted in
quantities which could be used for constituting successful cryptoanalytical attacks against the
TOE and that probing of the TOE contacts does not allow an attacker to harvest information in
sufficient quantities as to facilitate successful attacks against the TOE (FPT_EMSEC.1).
CEITECSA 5.410.052 66
7.2 SF.Data_Int: Integrity of Personal Data
This security function concerns with the integrity of the MRTD Holder´s personal data during
personalization. This is achieved by using the authentication protocol por personalization and
subsequent secure channels for any communication between the TOE and the (authenticated)
Personalization Agent. These measures are largely overlapping with the measures
implemented to achieve confidentiality of the personalization data. They specifically prevent
violations of integrity of the protocol messages (FDP_UIT.1).
The TOE maintains a well-defined set of roles and only allows an authorized Personalization
Agent (FMT_SMR.1) to personalize the TOE (FMT_SMF.1) and only allows the Module
Manufacturer (FMT_SMR.1) to write the private key used for chip authentication protocol
(FMT_MTD.1/CAPK). This ensures that no unauthorized party can violate the integrity of the
MRTD by successfully injecting unauthentic personal data on the MRTD. No party is allowed to
read the cryptographic keys stored on the TOE (FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ) and the TOE
measures ensure that the TOE resists attacks which would allow user data to be manipulated
or allow deployment of features disabled when the TOE is moved to subsequent life-cycle
stages (FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2). Hence, only after a successful cryptoanalytical attack would
an unauthentic party succeed in masquerading as a legitimate Personalization Agent which
may not occur in practice as the TOE uses random number generators of good quality,
recognized cryptographic primitives and key derivation techniques, and ensures that all
residual key material is erased once no longer used.
7.3 SF.Sens_Data_Conf: Confidentiality of Sensitive Biometric
Reference Data
The confidentiality of the sensitive biometric reference data is protected by the TOE by
numerous means:
1. Access to the biometric reference data (EF.DG3 and EF.DG4) is only granted to a
legitimate Extended Inspection System after successful authentication of the terminal
as such (FDP_ACF.1, FDP_ACC.1). Any terminal not successfully authenticated as
Extended Inspection System shall not be granted access to the biometric reference
data. Terminals authenticated as Country Verification Certification Authorities ( CVCA)
or Document Verifiers (DV) are not granted access to the biometric reference data
(FDP_ACF.1, FDP_ACC.1, FMT_SMR.1).The access control rules specifically ensure that
any data communicated between the TOE and a terminal after successful terminal
authentication is protected from disclosure to unauthorized parties (FDP_UCT.1).;
2. All inspection systems must be identified and authenticated prior to the establishment
of the secure sessions between the terminal and the TOE and the TOE restricts the
functions available to the terminals not identified and authenticated only to the basic
accesses required for identification and authentication (FIA_UID.1, FIA_UAU.1);
3. A rich set of authentication mechanisms is implemented by the TOE to authenticate
various parties as described in Sect. 7.1. Only upon successful Chip Authentication and
Terminal Authentication shall a Terminal be assigned to a role Extended Inspection
System and granted a read access to the biometric reference data (FDP_ACF.1,
FDP_ACC.1, FMT_SMR.1). The role Extended Inspection System is further divided into
CEITECSA 5.410.052 67
domestic and foreign based on the Document Verified Certificate. The Extended
Inspection System is domestic if the Document Verified Certificate belongs to the same
State as the Country Verifying Certification Authority and foreign if the Document
Verifier Certificate does not belong to the same state is the Country Verifying
Certification Authority. From the MRTD’s point of view the domestic Document
Verifier belongs to the issuing State or Organization;
4. All communication between the TOE and the Extended Inspection System is protected
against violations of confidentiality and integrity so that any party eavesdropping the
communication shall fail in learning the sensitive biometric reference data of
Travelers.
5. The credentials for users to enter roles CVCA or DV (incl. the original date) are initially
written on the TOE by the Manufacturer (FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI) and can only be
updated by the CVCA (FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD);
6. Only the successfully authenticated Country Verifying Certification Authority,
Document Verifier, or domestic Extended Inspection System is allowed to modify the
Current Date stored on the TOE (FMT_MTD.1/DATE); and
7. Given that the security objectives of the environment of the TOE concerning with
issuing states and organizations only granting certificates giving access to the sensitive
biometric data are only issued to legitimate parties (OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data and
OE.Ext_Insp_Systems), the measures implemented by the TOE under
SF.Sens_Data_Conf are sufficient to prevent disclosure of biometric reference data to
unauthentic parties.
7.4 SF.Identification: Identification and Authentication of the TOE
The TOE allows the Manufacturer to write the IC Identification and Pre-personalization data,
including the Personalization Agent Key during Phase 2 “Manufacturing” (FAU_SAS.1,
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA). The IC Identification can only be read by the Personalization Agent
during Phase 3 “Personalization of the MRTD”, but it is not accessible to the Inspection System
during Phase 4 “Operational Use” (FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS) if disabled by the Personalization
Agent.
7.5 SF.Chip_Auth_Proof: Proof of MRTD´s Chip Authenticity
The TOE implements a chip authentication protocol to provide a terminal an ability to assert
the identity of the TOE (FIA_API.1). The protocol is based in a Diffie-Hellman key exchange
(FCS_CKM.1) of keys from which a symmetric session key is derived and used for a symmetric
mutual authentication of the terminal and the chip (FCS_COP.1/SYM). The secure messaging
channel over which the authentication is performed uses secure hash functions
(FCS_COP.1/SHA) and cryptographic message authentication codes (FCS_COP.1/MAC). The
chip authentication results are trustworthy as only the Manufacturer is allowed to write the
Chip Authentication Private Key used in the Chip authentication protocol (FMT_MTD.1/CAPK)
and the TOE ensures that no party is able to read the key (FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ), hence
preventing the possibility of an unauthentic party masquerading as the TOE.
CEITECSA 5.410.052 68
7.6 SM.Prot_Abuse_Func: Protection against Abuse of Functionality
During the Phase 2, “Manufacturing” the connection to the test interface of the chip is
disabled before the chip is mounted onto the module. This prevents the direct access to the
chip circuit and functions (FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2).
7.7 SM.Prot_Inf_Leak: Protection against Information Leakage
The TOE provides protection against disclosure of confidential TSF data stored and/or
processed in the MRTD’s chip by observation of its electromagnetic emanations
(FPT_EMSEC.1). Data disclosure by direct physical manipulation of the TOE or by forcing
malfunctions is prevented by the features listed in 7.8 and 7.9 (FPT_FLS.1, FPT_TST.1,
FPT_PHP.3).
7.8 SM.Prot_Phys_Tamper: Protection against Physical Tampering
The TOE provides protection of the confidentiality and integrity of the User Data, the TSF Data,
and the IC Embedded Software against direct reading with physical probing or forced
disclosure due to perturbation injections (FPT_PHP.3). The IC of the TOE additionally provides
a rich set of hardware countermeasures against physical tampering which prevent
construction of intelligible data from any information obtained by physically tampering with
the TOE.
7.9 SM.Prot_Malfunction: Protection against Malfunctions
The TOE is protected against malfunctions due to abnormal operation conditions by a set of
sensors (FPT_FLS.1) and self-tests (FPT_TST.1).
CEITECSA 5.410.052 69
8 List of abbreviations
AES Advanced Encryption System
BAC Basic Access Control
BIS Basic Inspection System
BSI Bundesamt für Sichereit in der Informationstechnik
CBC Cipher-Block Chaining
CC Common Criteria
CDS DS Public Key Certificate
DES Data Encryption System
DG Data Group
DP&N Desenvolvimento de Produtos e Negócios
DPA Differential Power Analysis
EAC Extended Access Control
EAL Assurance Level
EF Elementary File
EIS Extended Inspection System
GIS General Inspection System
IC Integrated Circuit
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization
ICCSN Integrated Circuit Card Serial Number
IS Inspection System
LDS Logical Data Structure
LDS Logical Data Security
MAC Message Authentication Code
MRTD Machine Readable Travel Document
MRZ Machine-Readable Zone
n.a. Not Applicable
OCR Optical Character Recognition
OSP Organization Security Policy
PA Personalization Agent
PP Protection Profile
PS Personalization System
RFID Radio Frequency Identification
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SOD Document Security Object
SPA Simple Power Analysis
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functions
CEITECSA 5.410.052 70
9 References
[1] Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, “Common Criteria Protection Profile
Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application”, Basic Access Control,” 2009.
[2] International Civil Aviation Organization, “ICAO Doc 9303, Machine Readable Travel
Documents, part 1 – Machine Readable Passports,” 2006.
[3] Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, “Technical Guideline Advanced
Security Mechanisms for Machine Readable Travel Documents – Extended Access Control
(EAC)”.
[4] Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, “Security IC Platform Protection
Profile,” 2007.
[5] “Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1: Introduction
and General Model, Version 3.1, Revision 4,” 2012.
[6] “Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2: Security
Functional Components, Version 3.1, Revision 4,” 2012.
[7] “Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3: Security
Assurance Requirements, Version 3.1, Revision 4,” 2012.
[8] Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, “PP conformant to Smartcard IC
Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0,” 2001.
[9] RSA Laboratories, “PKCS #3: Diffie-Hellman Key-Agreement Standard, Version 1.4,” 1993.
[10] U.S. Department Of Commerce/National Institute of Standards and Technology, “Secure
Hash Standard (SHS),” 2012.
[11] RSA Laboratories, “PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Standard, Version 2.1,” 2002.
[12] Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, “Funktionalitätsklassen und
Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische Zufallszahlengeneratoren,” 2013.
[13] Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, “Common Criteria Protection Profile
Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application", Extended Access Control,”
2009.
[14] ISO, “Identification cards - Integrated circuit cards - Part 2: Cards with contacts -
Dimensions and location of the contacts,” 2007.
CEITECSA 5.410.052 71
[15] CEITEC, Security Target for CEITEC ePassport Module CTC21001 with BAC.
[16] U.S. Department Of Commerce/National Institute of Standards and Technology, “Data
Encryption Standard (DES),” 1999.
[17] U.S. Department Of Commerce/National Institute of Standards and Technology,
“Advanced Encryption Standard (AES),” 2001.
[18] ISO, “Information technology - Security techniques - Message Authentication Codes
(MACs) - Part 1: Mechanisms using a block cipher,” 2011.
[19] Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, “Common Criteria Protection Profile
Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application", Extended Access Control,
BSI-PP-0056, Version 1.10,” 25th March, 2009.
[20] Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, "Technical Guideline TR-03110-1,"
Bonn, 2012.
[21] G. Ilha, CTC21001 APDU Specification version 1 (*preliminary*), 02/apr/2015.
[22] CEITEC SA, CEITECSA 5.410.028 - ST ePassport Module BAC.
[23] CEITEC SA, CEITECSA 5.410.029 - ST ePassport Module EAC.
[24] CEITEC SA, Copernicus Architecture Specification Document version 1.0 (*preliminary*),
2015.
[25] CEITEC SA, CEITECSA 5.420.014 - Micromodule CTC21001 MM - (*preliminary*).
[26] International Civil Aviation Organization, Doc 9303 - Machine Readable Travel Documents
- Part 1, 6 ed., vol. 2, ICAO, 2006.