TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V.
Head Office:
Westervoortsedijk 73
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P.O. Box 2220
NL-6802 CE Arnhem
The Netherlands
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info@nl.tuv.com
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Tel. +31 (0)88 888 7 888
Fax +31 (0)88 888 7 879
TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. is a
registered company at the
Netherlands Chamber of Commerce
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Version
2022-01
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Certification Report
NesLib 6.7.4 on ST33K1M5A and ST33K1M5M B01
Sponsor and developer: STMicroelectronics
Lambroekstraat, 5 Building B
1831 Diegem
Belgium
Evaluation facility: SGS Brightsight B.V.
Brassersplein 2
2612 CT Delft
The Netherlands
Report number: NSCIB-CC-0587353-CR2
Report version: 1
Project number: 0587353_2
Author(s): Jordi Mujal
Date: 24 November 2022
Number of pages: 12
Number of appendices: 0
Reproduction of this report is authorised only if the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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CONTENTS
Foreword 3
Recognition of the Certificate 4
International recognition 4
European recognition 4
1 Executive Summary 5
2 Certification Results 6
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation 6
2.2 Security Policy 6
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 7
2.3.1 Assumptions 7
2.3.2 Clarification of scope 7
2.4 Architectural Information 7
2.5 Documentation 7
2.6 IT Product Testing 8
2.6.1 Testing approach and depth 8
2.6.2 Independent penetration testing 9
2.6.3 Test configuration 9
2.6.4 Test results 9
2.7 Reused Evaluation Results 9
2.8 Evaluated Configuration 10
2.9 Evaluation Results 10
2.10 Comments/Recommendations 10
3 Security Target 11
4 Definitions 11
5 Bibliography 12
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Foreword
The Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security (NSCIB) provides a third-party
evaluation and certification service for determining the trustworthiness of Information Technology (IT)
security products. Under this NSCIB, TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. has the task of issuing
certificates for IT security products, as well as for protection profiles and sites.
Part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product, protection profile or site
according to the Common Criteria assessment guidelines published by the NSCIB. Evaluations are
performed by an IT Security Evaluation Facility (ITSEF) under the oversight of the NSCIB Certification
Body, which is operated by TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. in cooperation with the Ministry of the
Interior and Kingdom Relations.
An ITSEF in the Netherlands is a commercial facility that has been licensed by TÜV Rheinland
Nederland B.V. to perform Common Criteria evaluations; a significant requirement for such a licence is
accreditation to the requirements of ISO Standard 17025 “General requirements for the accreditation
of calibration and testing laboratories”.
By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. asserts that the product or
site complies with the security requirements specified in the associated (site) security target, or that
the protection profile (PP) complies with the requirements for PP evaluation specified in the Common
Criteria for Information Security Evaluation. A (site) security target is a requirements specification
document that defines the scope of the evaluation activities.
The consumer should review the (site) security target or protection profile, in addition to this
certification report, to gain an understanding of any assumptions made during the evaluation, the IT
product's intended environment, its security requirements, and the level of confidence (i.e., the
evaluation assurance level) that the product or site satisfies the security requirements stated in the
(site) security target.
Reproduction of this report is authorised only if the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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Recognition of the Certificate
The presence of the Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement (CCRA) and the SOG-IS logos on the
certificate indicates that this certificate is issued in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA and
the SOG-IS Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOG-IS MRA) and will be recognised by the participating
nations.
International recognition
The CCRA was signed by the Netherlands in May 2000 and provides mutual recognition of certificates
based on the Common Criteria (CC). Since September 2014 the CCRA has been updated to provide
mutual recognition of certificates based on cPPs (exact use) or STs with evaluation assurance
components up to and including EAL2+ALC_FLR.
For details of the current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, see
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
European recognition
The SOG-IS MRA Version 3, effective since April 2010, provides mutual recognition in Europe of
Common Criteria and ITSEC certificates at a basic evaluation level for all products. A higher
recognition level for evaluation levels beyond EAL4 (respectively E3-basic) is provided for products
related to specific technical domains. This agreement was signed initially by Finland, France,
Germany, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Italy joined the SOG-IS
MRA in December 2010.
For details of the current list of signatory nations, approved certification schemes and the list of
technical domains for which the higher recognition applies, see https://www.sogis.eu.
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1 Executive Summary
This Certification Report states the outcome of the Common Criteria security evaluation of the NesLib
6.7.4 on ST33K1M5A and ST33K1M5M B01. The developer of the NesLib 6.7.4 on ST33K1M5A and
ST33K1M5M B01 is STMicroelectronics located in Digiem, Belgium and they also act as the sponsor
of the evaluation and certification. A Certification Report is intended to assist prospective consumers
when judging the suitability of the IT security properties of the product for their particular requirements.
The TOE consists of a certified hardware platform and a secure cryptographic library, built on this
platform. The HW platform is a serial access microcontroller compliant with [PP_0084]. For details of
the hardware platform, see the corresponding security target [HW-ST-lite] and certification report [HW-
CERT]. The secure cryptographic library is a software library, providing additional cryptographic
functions that can be operated on the hardware platform.
The TOE was evaluated initially by SGS Brightsight B.V. located in Delft, The Netherlands and was
certified on 16 August 2022. The re-evaluation of the TOE has also been conducted by SGS
Brightsight B.V. and was completed on 24 November 2022 with the approval of the ETR. The re-
certification procedure has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Netherlands
Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security [NSCIB].
This second issue of the Certification Report is a result of a “recertification with major changes”.
The major changes are:
- A new Hardware revision (Rev B) in addition to the already certified hardware Rev A
- A new Firmware version (FW v3.1.4) on Hardware Rev B in addition to the already certified Firmware
version (FW v3.1.3) on Hardware Rev A
The security evaluation reused the evaluation results of previously performed evaluations. A full, up-
to-date vulnerability analysis has been made, as well as renewed testing.
The scope of the evaluation is defined by the security target [ST], which identifies assumptions made
during the evaluation, the intended environment for the NesLib 6.7.4 on ST33K1M5A and
ST33K1M5M B01, the security requirements, and the level of confidence (evaluation assurance level)
at which the product is intended to satisfy the security requirements. Consumers of the NesLib 6.7.4
on ST33K1M5A and ST33K1M5M B01 are advised to verify that their own environment is consistent
with the security target, and to give due consideration to the comments, observations and
recommendations in this certification report.
The results documented in the evaluation technical report [ETR]
1
for this product provide sufficient
evidence that the TOE meets the EAL5 augmented (EAL5+) assurance requirements for the evaluated
security functionality. This assurance level is augmented with ALC_DVS.2 (Sufficiency of security
measures), ALC_FLR.1 (Basic Flaw Remediation) and AVA_VAN.5 (Advanced methodical
vulnerability analysis).
The evaluation was conducted using the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 [CEM] for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information
Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 [CC] (Parts I, II and III).
TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V., as the NSCIB Certification Body, declares that the evaluation meets
all the conditions for international recognition of Common Criteria Certificates and that the product will
be listed on the NSCIB Certified Products list. Note that the certification results apply only to the
specific version of the product as evaluated.
1
The Evaluation Technical Report contains information proprietary to the developer and/or the
evaluator, and is not available for public review.
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2 Certification Results
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) for this evaluation is the NesLib 6.7.4 on ST33K1M5A and
ST33K1M5M B01 from STMicroelectronics located in Digiem, Belgium.
The TOE is comprised of the following main components:
Delivery
item type
Identifier Version
Hardware
ST33K1M5A
IC Maskset name: K4A0, Master identification number:0x0260,
IC version: A or B
ST33K1M5M
IC Maskset name: K4A0, Master identification number:0x024B,
IC version: A or B
Software Firmware 3.1.3 (IC version A) or 3.1.4 (IC version B)
Software
NesLib on
ST33K1M5A and
ST33K1M5M B01
6.7.4
To ensure secure usage a set of guidance documents is provided, together with the NesLib 6.7.4 on
ST33K1M5A and ST33K1M5M B01. For details, see section 2.5 “Documentation” of this report.
For a detailed and precise description of the TOE lifecycle, see the [ST-lite], Chapter 1.7.
2.2 Security Policy
The HW Platform offers multiple features for high level security (see [HW-CERT] for more details):
 Two instances of the Arm® Cortex-M35P CPU connected in lockstep mode
 Die integrity
 Monitoring of environmental parameters
 Protection against faults
 AIS20/31 class PTG.2 compliant True Random Number Generator
 Memory Protection Unit and Library Protection Unit
 Hardware security enhanced AES accelerator
 Hardware security enhanced 3-key triple DES accelerator
 Secure Flash Loader
 NESCRYPT LLP coprocessor for public key cryptography algorithm (the TOE offers this
functionality, there is no TOE security requirement that relies on this coprocessor however, in
order to support a composite evaluation, the Vendor asked the Lab to carry out additional testing
that is included in the [HW-ETRfc]).
Specific to the Crypto Library:
 A symmetric key cryptographic support module whose base algorithm is the Data Encryption
Standard algorithm (DES) and Triple DES.
 A symmetric key cryptographic support module whose base algorithm is the Advanced Encryption
Standard cryptographic algorithm (AES).
 A cryptographic support module that provides hash functions (SHA-1, SHA-2, SHA-3, Keccak, and
a toolbox for cryptography based on Keccak-p, the permutation underlying SHA-3).
 An asymmetric key cryptographic support module, supporting secure modular arithmetic with large
integers, with specialized functions for Rivest, Shamir & Adleman Standard cryptographic
algorithm (RSA), and Diffie-Hellman.
 An asymmetric key cryptographic support module that provides very efficient basic functions to
build up protocols using Elliptic Curves Cryptography on prime fields GF(p) with elliptic curves in
short Weierstrass form, and provides support for ECDH key agreement and ECDSA generation
and verification.
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 A module for supporting elliptic curve cryptography on curve edwards25519, in particular ed25519
signature generation, verification and point decompression.
 A module for supporting elliptic curve cryptography on curve curve25519, in particular X25519 for
key agreement.
 Support for Deterministic Random Bit Generators (DRBG).
 Prime number generation and RSA key pairs generation.
 It also provides a set of basic functions to securely manipulate data: Copy, Compare, Swap, Shift,
XOR.
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
2.3.1 Assumptions
The assumptions defined in the Security Target are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead
to specific Security Objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. For detailed information on the
security objectives that must be fulfilled by the TOE environment, see section 4.2 of the [ST-lite].
2.3.2 Clarification of scope
The evaluation did not reveal any threats to the TOE that are not countered by the evaluated security
functions of the product.
Please note that although the TOE contains HW accelerators for SM4, MIFARE, CRC and public key
cryptography (NESCRYPT LLP - when not used through NESLIB interface), the functionality and
security of these features have not explicitly been addressed in the HW evaluation [HW-CERT].
Therefore, if these features are required by the composite product the developer/evaluator should do
their own security analysis and/or testing. In case of usage of NESCRYPT LLP without NESLIB, in
order to support this analysis, the Vendor asked the Lab to carry out additional testing that is included
in the [HW-ETRfC].
2.4 Architectural Information
The TOE architecture is depicted below.
2.5 Documentation
The following documentation is provided with the product by the developer to the customer:
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Identifier (NesLib) Version Date
NesLib cryptographic library NesLib 6.7 – User manual 4 02 December 2021
NesLib 6.7 security recommendations for the ST33K
platform secure microcontrollers –Application note
4
22 February 2022
NesLib 6.7.4 for ST33K Platforms – Release note 1 24 August 2021
Identifier (HW Plaftorm) Version Date
Automotive, high-speed secure MCU with 32-bit Arm
Cortex-M35P CPU with SWP, ISO, SPI and I²C
interfaces and high-density Flash memory - ST33K1M5A
Datasheet, DS_ST33K1M5A
0.6 May 2022
High-speed secure MCU with 32-bit Arm® Cortex®-
M35P CPU with SWP, ISO, SPI and I²C interfaces and
high-density Flash memory - ST33K1M5M Datasheet,
DS_ST33K1M5M
0.7 May 2022
Security Guidance of the ST33K Secure MCU platform -
Application note, AN_SECU_ST33K
1.0 September 2021
ST33K platform firmware V3 - User manual,
UM_ST33K_FW
6 April 2022
Arm® Cortex®-M35P Processor Technical Reference
Manual, 100883_0101_00_en
r1p1 December 2018
Arm® Cortex®-M35P Armv8-M Architecture Supplement,
PJDOC-466751330-1229
1.0 November 2018
Random number generation V1.4 - User manual,
UM_ST_TRNG14
6 May 2022
ST33K Platform- TRNG Reference implementation:
Compliance tests, AN_ST33K_TRNG
1 October 2020
2.6 IT Product Testing
Testing (depth, coverage, functional tests, independent testing): The evaluators examined the
developer’s testing activities documentation and verified that the developer has met their testing
responsibilities.
2.6.1 Testing approach and depth
The developer performed extensive testing on functional specification, subsystem and module level.
All parameter choices were addressed at least once. All boundary cases identified were tested
explicitly, and additionally the near-boundary conditions were covered probabilistically. The testing
was largely automated using industry standard and proprietary test suites. Test scripts were used
extensively to verify that the functions return the expected values.
The underlying hardware test results are extendable to composite evaluations, because the underlying
platform is operated according to its guidance and the composite evaluation requirements are met.
For the testing performed by the evaluators, the developer provided samples and a test environment.
In the baseline evaluation the evaluators reproduced a selection of the developer tests, as well as a
small number of test cases designed by the evaluator.
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During this re-evaluation, the developer repeated all the functional tests. The evaluators considered
the impact of the TOE changes and how these had been demonstrated through the developer testing,
and as a result, the functional testing done by evaluators was not repeated.
2.6.2 Independent penetration testing
The independent vulnerability analysis performed was conducted along the following steps:
 When evaluating the evidence in the classes ASE, ADV and AGD the evaluator considered
whether potential vulnerabilities could already be identified due to the TOE type and/or specified
behaviour in such an early stage of the evaluation.
 For ADV_IMP a thorough implementation representation review was performed on the TOE.
During this attack-oriented analysis the protection of the TOE was analysed using the knowledge
gained from all evaluation classes. This resulted in the identification of (additional) potential
vulnerabilities. This analysis was performed using the attack methods in [JIL-AM] and [JIL-AAPS].
 All potential vulnerabilities were analysed using the knowledge gained from all evaluation classes
and information from the public domain. A judgment was made on how to assure that these
potential vulnerabilities are not exploitable. The potential vulnerabilities were addressed by
penetration testing, a guidance update or in other ways that are deemed appropriate.
The total test effort expended by the evaluators during baseline evaluation was 24 weeks. During that
test campaign, 20% of the total time was spent on Perturbation attacks, 80% on side-channel testing.
During this re-certification, the total test effort was 4 weeks. During that test campaign, 25% of the
total time was spent on Perturbation attacks and 75% on side-channel testing.
2.6.3 Test configuration
The configuration of the sample used for independent evaluator testing and penetration testing was
the same as described in the [ST]. Specifically, during this re-evaluation the hardware version B was
used with firmware version 3.1.4 for independent evaluator testing and penetration testing. In addition,
during baseline evaluation and this re-evaluation, some specific additional testing was based on a
derivative hardware platform. The minor differences between the TOE and the derivative hardware
platform were assessed by the Lab, and the Lab determined that the test results on the derivative
hardware platform are equally applicable to the TOE.
2.6.4 Test results
The testing activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected results and observed
results are summarised in the [ETR], with references to the documents containing the full details.
The developer’s tests and the independent functional tests produced the expected results, giving
assurance that the TOE behaves as specified in its [ST] and functional specification.
No exploitable vulnerabilities were found with the independent penetration tests.
The algorithmic security level of cryptographic functionality has not been rated in this certification
process, but the current consensus on the algorithmic security level in the open domain, i.e., from the
current best cryptanalytic attacks published, has been taken into account.
Not all key sizes specified in the [ST] have sufficient cryptographic strength for satisfying the
AVA_VAN.5 “high attack potential”. The TOE supports a wider range of key sizes (see [ST]), including
those with sufficient algorithmic security level to exceed 100 bits as required for high attack potential
(AVA_VAN.5).
The strength of the implementation of the cryptographic functionality has been assessed in the
evaluation, as part of the AVA_VAN activities.
For composite evaluations, please consult the [ETRfC] and [HW-ETRfC] for details.
2.7 Reused Evaluation Results
This is a re-certification. Documentary evaluation results of the earlier version of the TOE have been
reused, but vulnerability analysis and penetration testing has been renewed.
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There has been extensive reuse of the ALC aspects for the sites involved in the software component
of the TOE. Sites involved in the development and production of the hardware platform were reused
by composition.
No sites have been visited as part of this evaluation.
2.8 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is defined uniquely by its name and version number NesLib 6.7.4 on ST33K1M5A and
ST33K1M5M B01.
2.9 Evaluation Results
The evaluation lab documented their evaluation results in the [ETR], which references an ASE
Intermediate Report and other evaluator documents. To support composite evaluations according to
[COMP] a derived document [ETRfC] was provided and approved. This document provides details of
the TOE evaluation that must be considered when this TOE is used as platform in a composite
evaluation. Please, note that this document needs to be used together with the [HW-ETRfc].
The verdict of each claimed assurance requirement is “Pass”.
Based on the above evaluation results the evaluation lab concluded the NesLib 6.7.4 on ST33K1M5A
and ST33K1M5M B01, to be CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 conformant and to meet the
requirements of EAL 5 augmented with AVA_VAN.5, ALC_DVS.2 and ALC_FLR.1. Check that both
the EAL and augmentation are in bold text when fields are updated. This implies that the product
satisfies the security requirements specified in Security Target [ST].
The Security Target claims ’strict’ conformance to the Protection Profile [PP_0084].
2.10 Comments/Recommendations
The user guidance as outlined in section 2.5 contains necessary information about the usage of the
TOE.
In addition, all aspects of assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not
covered by the TOE itself must be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk
management process. For the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, the
customer should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the TOE is required and thus
requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms and protocols was not rated in the course of this
evaluation. This specifically applies to the following proprietary or non-standard algorithms, protocols
and implementations: none.
Not all key sizes specified in the [ST] have sufficient cryptographic strength to satisfy the AVA_VAN.5
“high attack potential”. To be protected against attackers with a "high attack potential", appropriate
cryptographic algorithms with sufficiently large cryptographic key sizes shall be used (references can
be found in national and international documents and standards).
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3 Security Target
The NesLib 6.7.4 on ST33K1M5A and ST33K1M5M B01 Security Target,
SMD_NL6_7_ST33K1M5AM_ST_21_001, Rev. 02.0, July 2022 [ST] is included here by reference.
Please note that, to satisfy the need for publication, a public version [ST-lite] has been created and
verified according to [ST-SAN].
4 Definitions
This list of acronyms and definitions contains elements that are not already defined by the CC or CEM:
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
CBC Cipher Block Chaining (a block cipher mode of operation)
CBC-MAC Cipher Block Chaining Message Authentication Code
DES Data Encryption Standard
DFA Differential Fault Analysis
DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generators
ECDH Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman algorithm
ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
EMA Electromagnetic Analysis
IC Integrated Circuit
IT Information Technology
ITSEF IT Security Evaluation Facility
JIL Joint Interpretation Library
NSCIB Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the area of IT Security
PP Protection Profile
RNG Random Number Generator
RSA Rivest-Shamir-Adleman Algorithm
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SPA/DPA Simple/Differential Power Analysis
TOE Target of Evaluation
TRNG True Random Number Generator
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5 Bibliography
This section lists all referenced documentation used as source material in the compilation of this
report.
[CC] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Parts I, II and
III, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
[COMP] Joint Interpretation Library, Composite product evaluation for Smart Cards and
similar devices, Version 1.5.1, May 2018 Must be retained for all composite
smartcard TOEs
[ETR] Evaluator Assessment of Changes Report (EAR) NesLib 6.7.4 on ST33K1M5A
and ST33K1M5M B01 – Partial ETR, 22-RPT-847, version 5.0, 27 September
2022
[ETRfC] Evaluation Technical Report for Composition “NesLib 6.7.4 on ST33K1M5A
and ST33K1M5M B01” – EAL5+, 22-RPT-974, version 3.0, 27 October 2022
[HW-CERT] Certification Report ST33K1M5A and ST33K1M5M B01, NSCIB-CC-0428014-
CR2, version 1, 17 August 2022
[HW-ETRfC] Evaluation Technical Report for Composition “ST33K1M5A and ST33K1M5M
B01” – EAL6+, 22-RPT-783, version 2.0, 03 August 2022.
[HW-ST-lite] ST33K1M5A and ST33K1M5M B01 SECURITY TARGET FOR
COMPOSITION, SMD_ST33K1M5AM_ST_21_002, Rev. B01.1, July 2022
[JIL-AAPS] JIL Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards, Version 3.1, June 2020
[JIL-AM] Attack Methods for Smartcards and Similar Devices, Version 2.4, January 2020
(sensitive with controlled distribution)
[NSCIB] Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security, Version 2.5,
28 March 2019
[PP_0084] Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation Packages, registered
under the reference BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014, Version 1.0, 13 January 2014
[ST] NesLib 6.7.4 on ST33K1M5A and ST33K1M5M B01 Security Target,
SMD_NL6_7_ST33K1M5AM_ST_21_001, Rev. 02.0, July 2022
[ST-lite] Cryptographic library NesLib 6.7.4 on ST33K1M5A and ST33K1M5M B01
Security Target FOR COMPOSITION,
SMD_NL6_7_ST33K1M5AM_ST_21_002, Rev. 02.0, September 2022
[ST-SAN] ST sanitising for publication, CC Supporting Document CCDB-2006-04-004,
April 2006
(This is the end of this report.)