Certification Report
EAL 2+ Evaluation of
Tactical Network-layer Gateway (2E2 IA): a GD Canada
MESHnet G2 Gateway product
Issued by:
Communications Security Establishment Canada
Certification Body
Canadian Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification Scheme
© 2009 Government of Canada, Communications Security Establishment Canada
Document number: 383-4-67-CR
Version: 1.0
Date: 10 February 2009
Pagination: i to iii, 1 to 10
CCS Certification Report Tactical Network-layer Gateway 2E2 IA
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DISCLAIMER
The Information Technology (IT) product identified in this certification report, and its
associated certificate, has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility – established
under the Canadian Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification Scheme (CCS) – using
the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 2.3, for
conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3. This
certification report, and its associated certificate, apply only to the identified version and
release of the product in its evaluated configuration. The evaluation has been conducted in
accordance with the provisions of the CCS, and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in
the evaluation report are consistent with the evidence adduced. This report, and its
associated certificate, are not an endorsement of the IT product by the Communications
Security Establishment Canada, or any other organization that recognizes or gives effect to
this report, and its associated certificate, and no warranty for the IT product by the
Communications Security Establishment Canada, or any other organization that recognizes
or gives effect to this report, and its associated certificate, is either expressed or implied.
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FOREWORD
The Canadian Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification Scheme (CCS) provides a
third-party evaluation service for determining the trustworthiness of Information Technology
(IT) security products. Evaluations are performed by a commercial Common Criteria
Evaluation Facility (CCEF) under the oversight of the CCS Certification Body, which is
managed by the Communications Security Establishment Canada.
A CCEF is a commercial facility that has been approved by the CCS Certification Body to
perform Common Criteria evaluations; a significant requirement for such approval is
accreditation to the requirements of ISO/IEC Standard 17025, General requirements for the
competence of testing and calibration laboratories. Accreditation is performed under the
Program for the Accreditation of Laboratories - Canada (PALCAN), administered by the
Standards Council of Canada.
The CCEF that carried out this evaluation is EWA-Canada located in Ottawa, Ontario.
By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, the CCS Certification Body asserts that the
product complies with the security requirements specified in the associated security target. A
security target is a requirements specification document that defines the scope of the
evaluation activities. The consumer of certified IT products should review the security
target, in addition to this certification report, in order to gain an understanding of any
assumptions made during the evaluation, the IT product's intended environment, its security
requirements, and the level of confidence (i.e., the evaluation assurance level) that the
product satisfies the security requirements.
This certification report is associated with the certificate of product evaluation dated 10
February 2009, and the security target identified in Section 4 of this report.
The certification report, certificate of product evaluation and security target are posted on the
CCS Certified Products list at: http://www.cse-cst.gc.ca/its-sti/services/cc/cp-pc-eng.html
and http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/.
This certification report makes reference to the following trademarked names:
• Microsoft and Windows, which are registered trademarks of Microsoft Corporation.
Reproduction of this report is authorized provided the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Disclaimer..................................................................................................................................................... i
Foreword..................................................................................................................................................... ii
Executive Summary.....................................................................................................................................1
1 Identification of Target of Evaluation ..............................................................................................2
2 TOE Description .................................................................................................................................2
3 Evaluated Security Functionality......................................................................................................2
4 Security Target....................................................................................................................................2
5 Common Criteria Conformance........................................................................................................2
6 Security Policy.....................................................................................................................................3
7 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope...........................................................................................3
7.1 SECURE USAGE ASSUMPTIONS .............................................................................................3
7.2 ENVIRONMENTAL ASSUMPTIONS..........................................................................................3
7.3 CLARIFICATION OF SCOPE.....................................................................................................4
8 Architectural Information .................................................................................................................4
9 Evaluated Configuration....................................................................................................................4
10 Documentation....................................................................................................................................5
11 Evaluation Analysis Activities ...........................................................................................................5
12 ITS Product Testing ...........................................................................................................................6
12.1 ASSESSING DEVELOPER TESTS .............................................................................................6
12.2 INDEPENDENT FUNCTIONAL TESTING...................................................................................6
12.3 INDEPENDENT PENETRATION TESTING .................................................................................7
12.4 CONDUCT OF TESTING ..........................................................................................................8
12.5 TESTING RESULTS .................................................................................................................8
13 Results of the Evaluation....................................................................................................................8
14 Evaluator Comments, Observations and Recommendations .........................................................8
15 Acronyms, Abbreviations and Initializations...................................................................................9
16 References............................................................................................................................................9
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Executive Summary
Tactical Network-layer Gateway (2E2 IA): a GD Canada MESHnet Gateway product,
hereafter referred to as the TNG 2E2 IA, is the Target of Evaluation (TOE) for this
Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL) 2 augmented evaluation.
TNG 2E2 IA is a gateway that connects integrated digital voice and data systems. TNG 2E2
IA includes both the gateway itself, and the separate management console. TNG 2E2 IA
incorporates FIPS 140-2 validated encryption to secure Administrator communications.
EWA-Canada is the CCEF that conducted the evaluation. This evaluation was completed on
9 January 2009 and was carried out in accordance with the rules of the Canadian Common
Criteria Evaluation and Certification Scheme (CCS).
The scope of the evaluation is defined by the security target, which identifies assumptions
made during the evaluation, the intended environment for the TNG 2E2 IA, the security
requirements, and the level of confidence (evaluation assurance level) at which the product is
intended to satisfy the security requirements. Consumers are advised to verify that their
operating environment is consistent with that specified in the security target, and to give due
consideration to the comments, observations and recommendations in this certification
report.
The results documented in the Evaluation Technical Report (ETR)1
for this product provide
sufficient evidence that it meets the EAL 2 augmented assurance requirements for the
evaluated security functionality. The evaluation was conducted using the Common
Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 2.3 (with applicable
final interpretations), for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information Technology
Security Evaluation, version 2.3. The following augmentation is claimed: ALC_FLR.1 –
Basic flaw remediation.
Communications Security Establishment Canada, as the CCS Certification Body, declares
that the TNG 2E2 IA evaluation meets all the conditions of the Arrangement on the
Recognition of Common Criteria Certificates and that the product will be listed on the CCS
Certified Products list (CPL) and the Common Criteria portal (the official website of the
Common Criteria Project).
1
The ETR is a CCS document that contains information proprietary to the developer and/or the evaluator, and
is not releasable for public review.
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1 Identification of Target of Evaluation
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) for this Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL) 2 augmented
evaluation is the Tactical Network-layer Gateway (2E2 IA): a GD Canada MESHnet G2
Gateway product, hereafter referred to as the TNG 2E2 IA.
2 TOE Description
TNG 2E2 IA is a gateway that connects integrated digital voice and data systems. TNG 2E2
IA includes both the gateway itself, and the separate management console. TNG 2E2 IA
incorporates FIPS 140-2 validated encryption to secure Administrator communications.
3 Evaluated Security Functionality
The complete list of evaluated security functionality for TNG 2E2 IA is identified in Section
5 of the Security Target (ST).
Testing of the cryptographic algorithm implementations was accomplished under the
Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program (CAVP). The following Government of
Canada approved cryptographic algorithms were evaluated for correct implementation in
TNG 2E2 IA:
Cryptographic Algorithm Standard Certificate #
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) FIPS 197, Advanced
Encryption Standard (AES)
916
Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA-1) FIPS 180-2, Secure Hash
Standard
903
4 Security Target
The ST associated with this Certification Report is identified by the following nomenclature:
Title: Security Target for the Tactical Network-layer Gateway (2E2 IA): a GD Canada
MESHnet Gateway product
Version: 0.41
Date: 5 January 2009
5 Common Criteria Conformance
The evaluation was conducted using the Common Methodology for Information Technology
Security Evaluation, Version 2.3, for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information
Technology Security Evaluation, Version 2.3.
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TNG 2E2 IA is:
a. Common Criteria Part 2 conformant, with security functional requirements based only
upon functional components in Part 2;
b. Common Criteria Part 3 conformant, with security assurance requirements based only
upon assurance components in Part 3; and
c. Common Criteria EAL 2 augmented, containing all the security assurance requirements
in the EAL 2 package, as well as the following: ALC_FLR.1 - Basic Flaw Remediation.
6 Security Policy
TNG 2E2 IA implements the Unauthenticated Information Flow and the Authenticated User
Access Control security policies.
Unauthenticated Information Flow. The subjects under control of this policy are the TOE
interfaces that connect to unauthenticated end-users. Traffic flowing between interfaces is
controlled according to the policy rules and the traffic attributes. The policy is described
further in Section 2.4 of the ST.
Authenticated User Access Control. This policy provides a role-based access control
capability that defines tasks that are allowed to be performed by Administrators. This policy
is described further in Section 2.4 of the ST.
In addition, TNG 2E2 IA implements administration and security management, audit,
cryptography, TOE self-protection, trusted channel, and trusted path policies. Further details
on these security policies are found in Section 2.3.1 of the ST.
7 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
Consumers of TNG 2E2 IA should consider assumptions about usage and environmental
settings as requirements for the product’s installation and its operating environment. This
will ensure the proper and secure operation of TNG 2E2 IA.
7.1 Secure Usage Assumptions
The following Secure Usage Assumption is listed in the ST:
a. The administrators will be competent and will adhere to the applicable TOE guidance;
however they are capable of error.
7.2 Environmental Assumptions
The following Environmental Assumptions are listed in the ST:
a. Network resources shall be available to allow clients to satisfy mission requirements and
to transmit information.
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b. The TOE will be installed in a network infrastructure such that it can effectively control
the flow of the applicable information.
c. It is assumed that information cannot flow between the connected networks unless it
passes through the TOE.
d. There are no general-purpose computing or storage repository capabilities available on
the TNG Headquarters (HQ) portion of the TOE.
e. It is assumed that the maintenance port on the TNG (HQ) portion of the TOE will not be
used while the TNG (HQ) is in operational service.
f. It is assumed that the IT environment provides the TOE with appropriate physical
security, commensurate with the value of the IT assets protected by the TOE.
7.3 Clarification of Scope
TNG 2E2 IA provides a level of protection that is appropriate in environments where TNG
2E2 IA access is restricted to authorized personnel.
8 Architectural Information
TNG 2E2 IA comprises two main components: the TNG Equipment Management System
(TEMS) and the TNG (HQ) gateway.
The TEMS is a software application that provides the means for Administrators to configure,
control, and monitor the separate TNG (HQ) gateway. The TEMS runs on a Panasonic CF-29
Toughbook. The Toughbook and its operating system and applications are not included in the
evaluation.
The TNG (HQ) provides voice and data gateway facilities between networks. The evaluated
TNG (HQ) comprises the Objective Network Access Units (oNAUs): TNG (Core), TNG
(ISDN), and TNG (DTMF). Additional oNAUs (e.g. TNG (Fw) which is a firewall) may be
incorporated into the TNG (HQ) but are not included in the evaluation.
The Toughbook (TEMS application) connects to the TNG (HQ) using Ethernet. FIPS 140-2
validated encryption is used to secure communications between the TEMS and the TNG
(HQ).
Further details about the system architecture are proprietary to the developer, and are not
provided in this report.
9 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is identified as:
• TNG Equipment Management System (TEMS) – Version TNG SysMan Release 2E2
IA; and
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• TNG Headquarters (HQ) – Firmware Version 2E2 IA, and Hardware Versions
CORE: 723975-908, ISDN: 723974-908, and DTMF: 723973-903.
The workstation supporting the TEMS comprises a Panasonic CF-29 Toughbook with:
• Microsoft Windows 2000 Service Pack 4 with hotfixes and patches;
• HP ProtectTools Authentication Services;
• TNG Equipment Management Applications (TEMS and TNG (Fw));
• SSH Software & Certification Authority Key Material; and
• Microsoft .NET Framework version 1.1 & 2.0.
10 Documentation
The GD Canada documents provided to the consumer are as follows:
a. Lesson Plan Set up and Maintain the Tactical Network-layer Gateway 682283, 9 January
2007; and
b. TNG Equipment Management Program Help 8322C-1, 30 July 2008.
11 Evaluation Analysis Activities
The evaluation analysis activities involved a structured evaluation of the TNG, including the
following areas:
Configuration management: An analysis of the TNG 2E2 IA configuration management
system and associated documentation was performed. The evaluators found that the TNG
2E2 IA configuration items were clearly marked, and could be modified and controlled. The
developer’s configuration management system was observed during a site visit, and it was
found to be mature and well developed.
Secure delivery and operation: The evaluators examined the delivery documentation and
determined that it described all of the procedures required to maintain the integrity of TNG
2E2 IA during distribution to the consumer. The evaluators examined and tested the
installation, generation and start-up procedures, and determined that they were complete and
sufficiently detailed to result in a secure configuration. The developer’s delivery system and
procedures were observed during a site visit, and found to be complete and secure.
Design documentation: The evaluators analysed the TNG 2E2 IA functional specification
and high-level design; they determined that the documents were internally consistent, and
completely and accurately instantiated all interfaces and security functions. The evaluators
also independently verified that the correspondence mappings between the design documents
were correct.
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Guidance documents: The evaluators examined the TNG 2E2 IA administrator guidance
documentation and determined that it sufficiently and unambiguously described how to
securely use and administer the product, and that it was consistent with the other documents
supplied for evaluation.
Life-cycle support: The evaluators reviewed the flaw remediation procedures used by GD
Canada for the TNG 2E2 IA. During a site visit, the evaluators also examined the evidence
generated by adherence to the procedures. The evaluators concluded that the procedures are
adequate to track and correct security flaws, and distribute the flaw information and
corrections to consumers of the product.
Vulnerability assessment: The TNG 2E2 IA ST’s strength of function claims were
validated through independent evaluator analysis. The evaluators examined the developer’s
vulnerability analysis for TNG 2E2 IA and found that it sufficiently described each of the
potential vulnerabilities along with a sound rationale as to why it was not exploitable in the
intended environment. Additionally, the evaluators conducted an independent review of
public domain vulnerability databases, and all evaluation deliverables to provide assurance
that the developer has considered all potential vulnerabilities.
All these evaluation activities resulted in PASS verdicts.
12 ITS Product Testing
Testing at EAL 2 consists of the following three steps: assessing developer tests, performing
independent functional tests, and performing penetration tests.
12.1 Assessing Developer Tests
The evaluators verified that the developer has met their testing responsibilities by examining
their test evidence, and reviewing their test results, as documented in the ETR2
.
GD Canada employs a rigorous testing process that tests the changes and fixes in each
release of TNG 2E2 IA. Comprehensive regression testing is conducted for all releases.
The evaluators analyzed the developer’s test coverage analysis and found it to be complete
and accurate. The correspondence between the tests identified in the developer’s test
documentation and the functional specification was complete.
12.2 Independent Functional Testing
During this evaluation, the evaluator developed independent functional tests by examining
design and guidance documentation, examining the developer's test documentation,
2
The ETR is a CCS document that contains information proprietary to the developer and/or the evaluator, and
is not releasable for public review.
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executing a sample of the developer's test cases, and creating test cases that augmented the
developer tests.
All testing was planned and documented to a sufficient level of detail to allow repeatability
of the testing procedures and results. Resulting from this test coverage approach was the
following list of EWA-Canada test goals:
a. Repeat of Developer's Tests. The objective of this test goal is to repeat a subset of the
developer's tests;
b. Initialization. The objective of this test goal is to provide the procedures for determining the
system configuration in order to ensure that the TOE that is tested is correct;
c. Identification and Authentication. The objective of this test goal is to ensure that the
identification and authentication requirements have been met;
d. Audit. The objective of this test goal is to ensure that the audit data is recorded and can be
viewed; and
e. Users and Roles. The objective of this test goal is to ensure the users and roles functionality
is correct.
12.3 Independent Penetration Testing
Subsequent to the examination of the developer's vulnerability analysis and the independent
review of public domain vulnerability databases and all evaluation deliverables, limited
independent evaluator penetration testing was conducted. The penetration tests focused on:
a. Host Scanning. Nmap and ping were used to scan the address range to identify “live”
hosts for use as potential targets the other tests.
b. Port Scanning. Nmap and netcat were used to scan TCP and UDP ports on the target
systems to identify which services were available.
c. TCP Fingerprinting. Nmap was used to scan the targets in an attempt to identify the
remote operating system and version.
d. Banner Grabbing. Nmap, netcat and telnet were used to connect to the targets in an
attempt to identify the service listening on a given port and its version.
e. Vulnerability Scanning. Nessus and Retina were used to conduct comprehensive
vulnerability scans of the target systems.
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f. Verification of Vulnerabilities. The vulnerabilities that were identified by the automated
and semi-automated tools were verified and an attempt was made to uncover other
vulnerabilities and issues that were not reported by the automated tools.
g. Security Restrictions Bypassing. Probing of the TOE was done in an attempt to bypass
security restrictions. This was achieved by verifying and testing the level of hardening on
the Toughbook and TNG (HQ) operating systems.
h. Tampering. Tampering of the TOE was done in an attempt to see if the TOE could be
misused by its users. This was achieved by verifying and testing the level of hardening on
the Toughbook and TNG (HQ) operating systems.
The independent penetration testing did not uncover any exploitable vulnerabilities in the
intended operating environment.
12.4 Conduct of Testing
TNG 2E2 IA was subjected to a comprehensive suite of formally documented, independent
functional and penetration tests. The testing took place at the GD Canada facility in Calgary,
Alberta. The detailed testing activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases,
expected results and observed results are documented in a separate Test Results document.
12.5 Testing Results
The developer’s tests and the independent functional tests yielded the expected results,
giving assurance that the TNG 2E2 IA behaves as specified in its ST and functional
specification.
13 Results of the Evaluation
This evaluation has provided the basis for an EAL 2 augmented level of assurance. The
overall verdict for the evaluation is PASS. These results are supported by evidence in the
ETR.
14 Evaluator Comments, Observations and Recommendations
GD Canada has a mature and comprehensive set of Operations Standard Procedures (OSPs)
that fully define configuration management, requirements management, and baseline
management.
GD Canada has a complete, thorough CM program encompassing the personnel, processes
and resources required to maintain configuration management during the development,
integration, testing, production, delivery and support phases of the TNG 2E2 IA project.
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15 Acronyms, Abbreviations and Initializations
Acronym/Abbreviation/
Initialization
Description
CAVP Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program
CCEF Common Criteria Evaluation Facility
CCS Canadian Common Criteria Evaluation and
Certification Scheme
CPL Certified Products list
CM Configuration Management
DTMF Dual Tone Multi-Frequency
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
ISDN Integrated Service Digital Network
IT Information Technology
ITSET Information Technology Security Evaluation
and Testing
GDC General Dynamics Canada
GD Canada General Dynamics Canada
oNAU Objective Network Access Unit
OSP Operations Standard Procedures
PALCAN Program for the Accreditation of Laboratories
- Canada
ST Security Target
TNG Tactical Network-layer Gateway
TOE Target of Evaluation
TNG (Core) Tactical Network-layer
Gateway Core
TNG (Fw) Tactical Network-layer Gateway Firewall
TNG (HQ) Tactical Network-layer Gateway
Headquarters
TEMS TNG Equipment Management System
16 References
This section lists all documentation used as source material for this report:
a. CCS Publication #4, Technical Oversight, Version 1.0, August 2005.
b. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 2.3, August
2005.
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c. Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, CEM, Version
2.3, August 2005.
d. Security Target for the Tactical Network-layer Gateway (2E2 IA): a GD Canada
MESHnet Gateway product, Revision No. 0.41, 5 January 2009.
e. Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) for EAL 2+ Common Criteria Evaluation of the
Tactical Network-layer Gateway v1.0: a GD Canada MESHnet G2 Gateway product,
Evaluation Number: 383-4-67, Document No. 1531-000-D002, Version 2.4, 9 January
2009.
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