TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V.
Head Office:
Westervoortsedijk 73
NL-6827 AV Arnhem
P.O. Box 2220
NL-6802 CE Arnhem
The Netherlands
Location Leek:
Eiberkamp 10
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P.O. Box 37
NL-9350 AA Leek
The Netherlands
info@nl.tuv.com
www.tuv.com/nl
Tel. +31 (0)88 888 7 888
Fax +31 (0)88 888 7 879
TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. is a
registered company at the
Netherlands Chamber of Commerce
(KVK), under number 27288788.
VAT number: NL815820380B01
IBAN: NL61DEUT0265155096
Version
2022-02
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Certification Report
Cisco Network Convergence System 540, 5500 and 5700
(NCS540, NCS5500, NCS5700) Series running IOS-XR,
version 7.4.1
Sponsor and developer: Cisco Systems Inc.
7025-2 Kit Creek Rd.
Morrisville, NC 27560
US
Evaluation facility: SGS Brightsight B.V.
Brassersplein 2
2612 CT Delft
The Netherlands
Report number: NSCIB-CC-0597525-CR
Report version: 1
Project number: 0597525
Author(s): Brian Smithson
Date: 21 April 2023
Number of pages: 15
Number of appendices: 0
Reproduction of this report is authorised only if the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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CONTENTS
Foreword 3
Recognition of the Certificate 4
International recognition 4
European recognition 4
1 Executive Summary 5
2 Certification Results 6
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation 6
2.2 Security Policy 6
2.2.1 Security Audit 6
2.2.2 User Data Protection 6
2.2.3 Identification and Authentication 6
2.2.4 Security Management 6
2.2.5 Protection of the TSF 7
2.2.6 TOE Access 7
2.2.7 Trusted Path/Channels 7
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 7
2.3.1 Assumptions 7
2.3.2 Clarification of scope 7
2.4 Architectural Information 8
2.4.1 Logical architecture 8
2.4.2 Physical architecture 8
2.5 Documentation 9
2.6 IT Product Testing 9
2.6.1 Testing approach and depth 9
2.6.2 Independent penetration testing 10
2.6.3 Test configuration 10
2.6.4 Test results 11
2.7 Reused Evaluation Results 11
2.8 Evaluated Configuration 11
2.9 Evaluation Results 12
2.10 Comments/Recommendations 12
3 Security Target 13
4 Definitions 13
5 Bibliography 15
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Foreword
The Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security (NSCIB) provides a third-party
evaluation and certification service for determining the trustworthiness of Information Technology (IT)
security products. Under this NSCIB, TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. has the task of issuing
certificates for IT security products, as well as for protection profiles and sites.
Part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product, protection profile or site
according to the Common Criteria assessment guidelines published by the NSCIB. Evaluations are
performed by an IT Security Evaluation Facility (ITSEF) under the oversight of the NSCIB Certification
Body, which is operated by TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. in cooperation with the Ministry of the
Interior and Kingdom Relations.
An ITSEF in the Netherlands is a commercial facility that has been licensed by TÜV Rheinland
Nederland B.V. to perform Common Criteria evaluations; a significant requirement for such a licence is
accreditation to the requirements of ISO Standard 17025 “General requirements for the accreditation
of calibration and testing laboratories”.
By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. asserts that the product or
site complies with the security requirements specified in the associated (site) security target, or that
the protection profile (PP) complies with the requirements for PP evaluation specified in the Common
Criteria for Information Security Evaluation. A (site) security target is a requirements specification
document that defines the scope of the evaluation activities.
The consumer should review the (site) security target or protection profile, in addition to this
certification report, to gain an understanding of any assumptions made during the evaluation, the IT
product's intended environment, its security requirements, and the level of confidence (i.e., the
evaluation assurance level) that the product or site satisfies the security requirements stated in the
(site) security target.
Reproduction of this report is authorised only if the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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Recognition of the Certificate
The presence of the Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement (CCRA) and the SOG-IS logos on the
certificate indicates that this certificate is issued in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA and
the SOG-IS Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOG-IS MRA) and will be recognised by the participating
nations.
International recognition
The CCRA was signed by the Netherlands in May 2000 and provides mutual recognition of certificates
based on the Common Criteria (CC). Since September 2014 the CCRA has been updated to provide
mutual recognition of certificates based on cPPs (exact use) or STs with evaluation assurance
components up to and including EAL2+ALC_FLR.
For details of the current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, see
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
European recognition
The SOG-IS MRA Version 3, effective since April 2010, provides mutual recognition in Europe of
Common Criteria and ITSEC certificates at a basic evaluation level for all products. A higher
recognition level for evaluation levels beyond EAL4 (respectively E3-basic) is provided for products
related to specific technical domains. This agreement was signed initially by Finland, France,
Germany, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Italy joined the SOG-IS
MRA in December 2010.
For details of the current list of signatory nations, approved certification schemes and the list of
technical domains for which the higher recognition applies, see https://www.sogis.eu.
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1 Executive Summary
This Certification Report states the outcome of the Common Criteria security evaluation of the Cisco
Network Convergence System 540, 5500 and 5700 (NCS540, NCS5500, NCS5700) Series running
IOS-XR, version 7.4.1. The developer of the Cisco Network Convergence System 540, 5500 and 5700
(NCS540, NCS5500, NCS5700) Series running IOS-XR, version 7.4.1 is Cisco Systems Inc. located in
Morrisville NC, US and they also act as the sponsor of the evaluation and certification. A Certification
Report is intended to assist prospective consumers when judging the suitability of the IT security
properties of the product for their particular requirements.
The TOE is the Cisco Network Convergence System 540, 5500 and 5700 Series (herein after also
referred to as Cisco NCS or TOE). The TOE is a purpose-built, routing platform that is designed for
redundancy, segment routing, programmable network management and primarily used for Wide Area
Network (WAN) aggregation.
The Cisco NCS 540 includes small and medium density routers. The Cisco NCS5500 is a high-
capacity modular routing series that is designed for redundancy, segment routing, programmable
network management and primarily used for WAN aggregation. The Cisco NCS5700 Series Routers
are designed for delivery of next-generation networking services, available in a 3-rack-unit compact
chassis along with the Modular Port Adapters (MPAs) providing interfaces ranging from 1GE to
400GE.
All of the NCS routers run Cisco IOS-XR 7.4.1, a distributed microkernel-based network operating
system.
The TOE has been evaluated by SGS Brightsight B.V. located in Delft, The Netherlands. The
evaluation was completed on 21 April 2023 with the approval of the [ETR]. The certification procedure
has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Netherlands Scheme for Certification in
the Area of IT Security [NSCIB].
The scope of the evaluation is defined by the security target [ST], which identifies assumptions made
during the evaluation, the intended environment for the Cisco Network Convergence System 540,
5500 and 5700 (NCS540, NCS5500, NCS5700) Series running IOS-XR, version 7.4.1, the security
requirements, and the level of confidence (evaluation assurance level) at which the product is
intended to satisfy the security requirements. Consumers of the Cisco Network Convergence System
540, 5500 and 5700 (NCS540, NCS5500, NCS5700) Series running IOS-XR, version 7.4.1 are
advised to verify that their own environment is consistent with the security target, and to give due
consideration to the comments, observations and recommendations in this certification report.
The results documented in the evaluation technical report [ETR] 1 for this product provide sufficient
evidence that the TOE meets the EAL2 augmented (EAL2+) assurance requirements for the evaluated
security functionality. This assurance level is augmented with ALC_FLR.2.
The evaluation was conducted using the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 [CEM] for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information
Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 [CC] (Parts I, II and III).
TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V., as the NSCIB Certification Body, declares that the evaluation meets
all the conditions for international recognition of Common Criteria Certificates and that the product will
be listed on the NSCIB Certified Products list. Note that the certification results apply only to the
specific version of the product as evaluated.
1 The Evaluation Technical Report contains information proprietary to the developer and/or the
evaluator, and is not available for public review.
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2 Certification Results
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) for this evaluation is the Cisco Network Convergence System 540,
5500 and 5700 (NCS540, NCS5500, NCS5700) Series running IOS-XR, version 7.4.1 from Cisco
Systems Inc. located in Morrisville NC, US.
The TOE is comprised of the following main components:
Delivery
item type
Identifier Version
Hardware
N540X-8Z16G-SYS-D
N540X-8Z16G-SYS-A
N540X-16Z4G8Q2C-D
N540X-16Z4G8Q2C-A
NCS-5504-SYS
NC55-32T16Q4H-A (line card for the NCS-5504-SYS)
NCS-57C3-MOD-SYS
N/A
Software Cisco IOS-XR 7.4.1
To ensure secure usage a set of guidance documents is provided, together with the Cisco Network
Convergence System 540, 5500 and 5700 (NCS540, NCS5500, NCS5700) Series running IOS-XR,
version 7.4.1. For details, see section 2.5 “Documentation” of this report.
2.2 Security Policy
2.2.1 Security Audit
The TOE generates audit messages that identify specific TOE operations and provides an interface
available for the Authorized Administrator to delete audit data stored locally on the TOE to manage the
audit log space. The logs can be viewed on the TOE using the CLI interfaces.
2.2.2 User Data Protection
The TOE provides the ability to control traffic flow into or out of the Cisco NCS routers. The following
types of traffic flow are controlled for both IPv4 and IPv6 traffic:
• Layer 3 Traffic – ACLs
• Layer 2 Traffic – Layer 2 Access Control Lists
• Virtual Routing and Forwarding - VRFs
2.2.3 Identification and Authentication
The TOE performs user authentication for the Authorized Administrator of the TOE and device level
authentication. The TOE requires Authorized Administrators to authenticate with username and
password prior to being granted access to any of the management functionality.
2.2.4 Security Management
The TOE provides secure administrative services for management of general TOE configuration and
the security functionality provided by the TOE. All CLI TOE administration occurs either through
SSHv2 secure connection or a direct local console connection. The TOE provides the ability to
securely manage:
• Administer the TOE remotely
• Manage audit functionality
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• Manage Information Flow Control Policies and Rules
• Manage Authorized Administrator’s security attributes
• Review audit record logs
• Configure and manage the system time
• Maintain the system
2.2.5 Protection of the TSF
The TOE protects against interference and tampering by untrusted subjects by implementing
identification and authentication, and limits configuration to the Authorized Administrator. Additionally,
Cisco IOS-XR is not a general-purpose operating system and access to memory space is restricted to
only IOS-XR functions. The TOE provides Information Flow Control Policies and Rules to ensure
routing protocol communications between the TOE and neighbour switches is logically isolated from
traffic.
2.2.6 TOE Access
The TOE enforces the termination of inactive sessions after an Authorized Administrator configurable
time-period has expired. Once a session has been terminated, the TOE requires the Authorized
Administrator to re-authenticate to establish a new session.
2.2.7 Trusted Path/Channels
The TOE allows trusted paths to be established to itself from remote administrators over SSHv2 for
remote CLI access.
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
2.3.1 Assumptions
The assumptions defined in the Security Target are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead
to specific Security Objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. For detailed information on the
security objectives that must be fulfilled by the TOE environment, see section 3.1 of the [ST].
2.3.2 Clarification of scope
None.
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2.4 Architectural Information
2.4.1 Logical architecture
The logical architecture, originating from the design of the TOE can be depicted as follows:
The non-TOE NTP and Syslog servers are not required. A non-TOE Management Workstation is
mandatory.
2.4.2 Physical architecture
The physical specifications of NCS models under evaluation are summarized in the table below:
Model Description Processor Interfaces
NCS540
N540X-8Z16G-SYS-D
N540X-8Z16G-SYS-A
4-core 2GHz CPU
8 GB DRAM 16 GB eMMC
1 + 1 Fixed redundant DC
1 + 1 Fixed redundant AC
Usable Rack Space: 1 RU
Marvell Cortex-A72
Armv8
8x 10/1GE
4x 1GE SFP
4x 1GE RJ45
8x 1GE SFP or 16x 1GE
cSFP
N540X-16Z4G8Q2C-D
N540X-16Z4G8Q2C-A
8-core 1.7GHz x86 CPU 8GB
DRAM
32GB storage
Fixed dual redundant DC
Modular Fan Tray with
redundant fans
Usable Rack Space: 1 RU
Intel Atom C3708
(Goldmont)
4x 1GE RJ-45 (10/100M)
16x 1GE/10GE
8x 1GE/10GE/25GE
2x 40GE/100GE
NCS5500
NCS-5504-SYS Supports up to 4 line cards, 6
switch fabric cards, 2 route
processors, 2 system
controllers, 3 fan trays, 4
power supplies (AC or DC).
Usable Rack Space: 7RU
Intel Xeon D-1528
(Broadwell)
Based on route
processors and line-cards
installed.
For this evaluation:
NC55-32T16Q4H-A
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Model Description Processor Interfaces
NC55-32T16Q4H-A 2 x 10GE SFP+, 16 x 25GE
SFP28 and 4x 100GE QSFP28
ports, 1 forwarding ASIC.
2 x 10GE SFP+
16 x 25GE SFP28
4x 100GE QSFP28
NCS5700
NCS-57C3-MOD-SYS 8 cores at 2 GHz
32GB DRAM
256GB Flash
2 hot-swappable power
supplies provide 1 + 1
redundancy
Front-to-back airflow6 hot-
swappable fan trays provide
5 + 1 redundant system
cooling
Usable Rack Space: 3RU
Intel Xeon D-1563N
(Broadwell)
1 USB
RJ-45 Console
Management Ethernet
Fixed 48x 1/10/25G
8x 100G
3x MPA Base Chassis
2.5 Documentation
The following documentation is provided with the product by the developer to the customer:
Identifier Version
Cisco Network Convergence System 540, 5500 and 5700 Series Common Criteria
Operational User Guidance and Preparative Procedures (EDCS: 23191545)
v1.1
23rd March 2023
2.6 IT Product Testing
The evaluators examined the developer’s testing activities documentation and verified that the
developer has met their testing responsibilities.
2.6.1 Testing approach and depth
As the TOE type belongs to the networking products, [NSI#08] permits tests to be performed remotely.
Since the tests are performed remotely, it is not in scope of ISO17025.
The developer enabled the evaluator to directly control the TOE as well as it’s environment to ensure
the tests are performed on the correct TOE with correct supporting environment. A WebEX link was
set up to share the control of the testing PC at the developer’s premises so the evaluator could directly
operate the TOE and its environment via WebEX. The developer also provided full support during the
testing. The evaluator remained responsible for installing and configuring the TOE within the test
environment by performing a various control mechanisms including verifying the TOE hardware
models and installation with photos, and verifying the TOE software by checking the version and the
hash value of the TOE software image installed on the hardware. The evaluator also performed
AGD_PRE activities to ensure the TOE is configured in the certified configuration.
The models in scope include fixed and modular chassis router of different size (RUs) and number of
ports. The differences are non-security relevant (computing power, interface type, memory size, power
supplies). All devices run the same software Cisco IOS-XR 7.4.1, all devices claim the same security
functionality, and none claims additional functionality.
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To eliminate any possibility for potential discrepancy across the different TOE models, all models have
been sampled for testing, either in developer tests or evaluator tests. However, some differences in
behavior among models were discovered during testing, and the relevant tests were repeated on all
models.
The developer provided test plans for each NCS model sampled for developer testing, consisting of
seven (7) test cases which cover the functionality claimed in the ST. As all SFRs are tested, all the
TSFIs are also tested. The repeated developer tests considered verification of SSH (as it is remotely
accessible), verification of user identification and role-based privileges, and verification of flow control
enforcement.
The evaluator created twelve (12) additional test cases test to confirm verification of the version of the
TOE, to supplement coverage of SFRs and/or TSFI, and to further exercise the behaviour of critical
functionality:
• Scanning to determine available services and potential undocumented ones.
• Tests that complement/extend the developer tests, such as negative tests for ACL
configuration and verifying user roles and attributes.
• Testing certain claims mentioned in Security Architecture and AGD
2.6.2 Independent penetration testing
SFR implementation details were examined in the SFR design analysis. During this examination
several potential vulnerabilities were identified:
• Using the CWE weaknesses collection, the evaluator collected a list of security questions and
related answers. During this examination, several potential vulnerabilities were identified.
• The evaluator runs vulnerability scanning tools to identify potential vulnerabilities.
• Several additional potential vulnerabilities were identified during a search in the public domain.
Ultimately, ten (10) penetration tests were devised to verify that the TOE, in its operational
environment is resistant to an attacker possessing a Basic attack potential.
The total test effort expended by the evaluators was three (3) weeks. During that test campaign, 100%
of the total time was spent on logical tests.
2.6.3 Test configuration
Tools used in the test environment:
Description Package Name Version
Operating system Kali (Virtual machine) 6.0.0
Terminal Linux terminal n/a
Packet capture Wireshark 4.0.1
Network enumeration NMAP 7.93
IP stack integrity checker isic 0.07
SSH client, key generation PuTTY 0.78
SSH fuzzing Metasploit 6.2.26-dev
Password bruteforce Hydra 9.4
Vulnerability scan tool Nessus 10.4.1 and 10.5.0
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Configuration for NCS 540 (small formfactor) and NCS 5500:
Configuration for NCS 5700 and NCS 540 (medium formfactor):
2.6.4 Test results
The testing activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected results and observed
results are summarised in the [ETR], with references to the documents containing the full details.
The developer’s tests and the independent functional tests produced the expected results, giving
assurance that the TOE behaves as specified in its [ST] and functional specification.
No exploitable vulnerabilities were found with the independent penetration tests.
2.7 Reused Evaluation Results
There is no reuse of evaluation results in this certification.
2.8 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is defined uniquely by its name and version number Cisco Network Convergence System
540, 5500 and 5700 (NCS540, NCS5500, NCS5700) Series running IOS-XR, version 7.4.1.
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2.9 Evaluation Results
The evaluation lab documented their evaluation results in the [ETR], which references an ASE
Intermediate Report and other evaluator documents.
The verdict of each claimed assurance requirement is “Pass”.
Based on the above evaluation results the evaluation lab concluded the Cisco Network Convergence
System 540, 5500 and 5700 (NCS540, NCS5500, NCS5700) Series running IOS-XR, version 7.4.1, to
be CC Part 2 conformant, CC Part 3 conformant, and to meet the requirements of EAL 2
augmented with ALC_FLR.2. This implies that the product satisfies the security requirements
specified in Security Target [ST].
2.10 Comments/Recommendations
The user guidance as outlined in section 2.5 “Documentation” contains necessary information about
the usage of the TOE.
In addition, all aspects of assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not
covered by the TOE itself must be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk
management process. For the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, the
customer should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the TOE is required and thus
requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms and protocols was not rated in the course of this
evaluation. This specifically applies to the following proprietary or non-standard algorithms, protocols
and implementations: <none>, which are out of scope as there are no security claims relating to these.
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3 Security Target
The Cisco Network Convergence System 540, 5500 and 5700 Series Common Criteria Security
Target, NCS_IOS-XR_7.4_EAL2_ST_v1.1, v1.1, 29 March 2023 [ST] is included here by reference.
4 Definitions
This list of acronyms and definitions contains elements that are not already defined by the CC or CEM:
IT Information Technology
ITSEF IT Security Evaluation Facility
JIL Joint Interpretation Library
NSCIB Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the area of IT Security
PP Protection Profile
TOE Target of Evaluation
AAA Administration, Authorization, and Accounting
ACL Access Control Lists
AES Advanced Encryption Standards
API Application Programming Interface
CC Common Criteria
CEM Common Evaluation Methodology
CLI Command Line Interface
CM Configuration Management
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
FC Fibre Channel
HDD Hard-disk drives
IP Internet Protocol
PACLs Port Access Control List
OS Operating System
RACLs Receive Access Control List
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFP Security Functional Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SM Service Module
SSD Solid-state disk
SSH Secure Shell
ST Security Target
TCP Transport Control Protocol
TCP/IP Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol
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TLS Transport Layer Security
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSC TSF Scope of Control
TSF TOE Security Function
TSP TOE Security Policy
UDP User datagram protocol
VLAN Virtual Local Area Network
VRF Virtual Routing and Forwarding
VSAN Virtual Storage Area Network
XML Extensible Markup Language
WAN Wide Area Network
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5 Bibliography
This section lists all referenced documentation used as source material in the compilation of this
report.
[ADV-AGD ref] ADV-AGD reference document Cisco NCS 5xx 5xxx Series, 22-RPT-961, v1.0,
21 December 2022
[AGD] Cisco Network Convergence System 540, 5500 and 5700 Series Common
Criteria Operational User Guidance and Preparative Procedures, EDCS:
23191545, v1.1, 23 March 2023
[CC] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Parts I, II and
III, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
[ETR] Evaluation Technical Report Cisco NCS EAL2+, 22-RPT-965, v1.0, 29 March
2023
[IR ADV] Cisco NCS 540 5500 5700 Series, 22-RPT-960, v1.0, 21 December 2022
[IR ALC] ALC presentation EAL 2+ Cisco Network Convergence, 22-RPT-962, v1.0, 21
December 2022
[IR ASE] Cisco NCS EAL2+ IR ASE, 22-RPT-966, v2.0, 16 December 2022
[IR-ATE_AVA] Cisco NCS 540 5500 5700 Series Presentation, 22-RPT-963, v2.0, 29 March
2023
[NSCIB] Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security, Version 2.5,
28 March 2019
[NSI#08] NSCIB Scheme Instruction 08 – Performing Testing, v2.7, 6 August 2021
[ST] Cisco Network Convergence System 540, 5500 and 5700 Series Common
Criteria Security Target, NCS_IOS-XR_7.4_EAL2_ST_v1.1, v1.1, 29 March
2023
[TEST_PLAN] ATE and AVA Test Report, 22-RPT-964, v2.0, 29 March 2023
(This is the end of this report.)