National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
Panasonic of North America TOUGHBOOK®
N1 on
Android 9
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-VID11172-2021
Dated: June 11, 2021
Version: 1.0
National Institute of Standards and Technology National Security Agency
Information Technology Laboratory Information Assurance Directorate
100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road, Suite 6982
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Fort Meade, MD 20755-6982
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Validation Team
Patrick Mallett, PHD
Ken Elliott
The Aerospace Corporation
Farid Ahmed
Joyce Baidoo
John Hopkins University APL
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
Tammy Compton
Austin Kimbrell
Raymond Smoley
Kevin Cummings
Charles Rice
Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc.
Columbia, MD
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Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary............................................................................................................1
2 Identification.......................................................................................................................1
3 Architectural Information...................................................................................................2
3.1 TOE Evaluated Configuration....................................................................................3
3.2 TOE Architecture .......................................................................................................3
4 Security Policy....................................................................................................................4
4.1 Security audit..............................................................................................................4
4.2 Cryptographic support................................................................................................4
4.3 User data protection....................................................................................................4
4.4 Identification and authentication ................................................................................5
4.5 Security management .................................................................................................5
4.6 Protection of the TSF..................................................................................................5
4.7 TOE access .................................................................................................................6
4.8 Trusted path/channels.................................................................................................6
5 Assumptions & Clarification of Scope...............................................................................6
6 Documentation ...................................................................................................................7
7 IT Product Testing..............................................................................................................7
7.1 Developer Testing ......................................................................................................7
7.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing.......................................................................7
8 Results of the Evaluation....................................................................................................7
8.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE)....................................................................8
8.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV)......................................................................8
8.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD).........................................................8
8.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC).............................................8
8.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE).........................9
8.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN) ................................................................9
8.7 Summary of Evaluation Results .................................................................................9
9 Validator Comments/Recommendations............................................................................9
10 Annexes ............................................................................................................................10
11 Security Target .................................................................................................................10
12 Glossary............................................................................................................................10
13 Bibliography.....................................................................................................................10
Panasonic of North America Validation Report Version 1.0 June 11, 2021
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1 Executive Summary
This report documents the assessment of the National Information Assurance Partnership
(NIAP) validation team of the evaluation of Panasonic of North America TOUGHBOOK®
N1
on Android 9 solution provided by Panasonic of North America. It presents the evaluation
results, their justifications, and the conformance results. This Validation Report is not an
endorsement of the Target of Evaluation by any agency of the U.S. government, and no
warranty is either expressed or implied.
The evaluation was performed by the Gossamer Security Solutions (Gossamer) Common
Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL) in Columbia, MD, United States of America, and was
completed in June 2021. The information in this report is largely derived from the Evaluation
Technical Report (ETR) and associated test reports, all written by Gossamer Security Solutions.
The evaluation determined that the product is both Common Criteria Part 2 Extended and Part
3 Conformant, and meets the assurance requirements of the Protection Profile for Mobile
Device Fundamentals, Version 3.1, 16 June 2017 and General Purpose Operating Systems
Protection Profile/Mobile Device Fundamentals Protection Profile Extended Package (EP)
Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) Clients, Version 1.0, 08 February 2016.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the Panasonic of North America TOUGHBOOK®
N1 on
Android 9.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) identified in this Validation Report has been evaluated at a
NIAP approved Common Criteria Testing Laboratory using the Common Methodology for IT
Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 5) for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT
Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 5). This Validation Report applies only to the specific
version of the TOE as evaluated. The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the
provisions of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme and the
conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence provided.
The validation team monitored the activities of the evaluation team, provided guidance on
technical issues and evaluation processes, and reviewed the individual work units and
successive versions of the ETR. The validation team found that the evaluation showed that the
product satisfies all of the functional requirements and assurance requirements stated in the
Security Target (ST). Therefore, the validation team concludes that the testing laboratory’s
findings are accurate, the conclusions justified, and the conformance results are correct. The
conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence produced.
The technical information included in this report was obtained from the Panasonic of North
America TOUGHBOOK N1 on Android 9 Security Target, Version 1.5, 2021/06/10 and
analysis performed by the Validation Team.
2 Identification
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product
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evaluations. Under this program, security evaluations are conducted by commercial testing
laboratories called Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs) using the Common
Evaluation Methodology (CEM) in accordance with National Voluntary Laboratory
Assessment Program (NVLAP) accreditation.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality and
consistency across evaluations. Developers of information technology products desiring a
security evaluation contract with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product’s evaluation. Upon
successful completion of the evaluation, the product is added to NIAP’s Validated Products
List.
Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:
• The Target of Evaluation (TOE): the fully qualified identifier of the product as evaluated.
• The Security Target (ST), describing the security features, claims, and assurances of the
product.
• The conformance result of the evaluation.
• The Protection Profile to which the product is conformant.
• The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation.
Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers
Item Identifier
Evaluation Scheme United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
TOE Panasonic of North America TOUGHBOOK®
N1 on Android 9
Protection Profile (Specific models identified in Section 8)
Protection Profile for Mobile Device Fundamentals, Version 3.1, 16 June 2017
and General Purpose Operating Systems Protection Profile/Mobile Device
Fundamentals Protection Profile Extended Package (EP) Wireless Local Area
Network (WLAN) Clients, Version 1.0, 08 February 2016
ST Panasonic of North America TOUGHBOOK N1 on Android 9 Security Target,
Version 1.5, 2021/06/10
Evaluation Technical
Report
Evaluation Technical Report for Panasonic of North America TOUGHBOOK N1
on Android 9, Version 0.3, 2021/06/10
CC Version Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
rev 5
Conformance Result CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 conformant
Sponsor Panasonic of North America
Developer Panasonic of North America
Common Criteria
Testing Lab (CCTL)
Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc.
Columbia, MD
CCEVS Validators Patrick Mallett, Ken Elliott, Farid Ahmed, Joyce Baidoo
3 Architectural Information
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the Panasonic of North America TOUGHBOOK®
N1 on
Android 9.
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The Panasonic TOUGHBOOK®
N1 is a rugged handheld with an SDM660 chipset, angled rear-
facing barcode reader, optional stylus pen, and battery that is warm-swappable. The N1 uses
the Android operating system, providing access to applications from the Google Play store or
Panasonic's partners. The N1 features built-in multi-carrier 4G LTE and FirstNet Ready with
Band 14, voice capabilities, and dual SIM cards. The TOE supports using client certificates to
connect to access points offering WPA2/WPA3 networks with 802.1x/EAP-TLS, or
alternatively connecting to cellular base stations when utilizing mobile data.
The TOE offers mobile applications an Application Programming Interface (API) including
that provided by the Android framework and supports API calls to the Android Management
APIs.
The TOE provides a rich API to mobile applications and provides users installing an application
the option to either approve or reject an application based upon the API access that the
application requires (or to grant applications access at runtime).
The TOE also provides users with the ability to protect Data-At-Rest with AES encryption,
including all user and mobile application data stored in the user’s data partition. The TOE uses
a key hierarchy that combines a REK with the user’s password to provide protection to all user
and application cryptographic keys stored in the TOE.
The TOE can interact with a Mobile Device Management (MDM) system to allow enterprise
control of configuration and operation of the device. This capability is not part of this
evaluation.
The TOE includes several different levels of execution including (from lowest to highest):
hardware, a Trusted Execution Environment, Android’s Linux kernel, and Android’s user
space, which provides APIs allowing applications to leverage the cryptographic functionality
of the device.
3.1 TOE Evaluated Configuration
The following TOE model and version hardware and software is the evaluated configuration
when configured in accordance with the documentation specified in section 6.
Product Model # CPU Kernel Android OS version Security Patch Level
TOUGHBOOK® N1 SDM660 4.4.153 Android 9.0 March 2021
3.2 TOE Architecture
The TOE’s physical boundary is the physical perimeter of its enclosure. The TOE runs Android
as its software/OS, executing on a Qualcomm Snapdragon processor. The TOE does not include
the user applications that run on top of the operating system but does include controls that limit
application behavior. Further, the device provides support for downloadable MDM agents to be
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installed to limit or permit different functionality of the device. There is no built-in MDM agent
pre-installed on the device.
The TOE communicates and interacts with 802.11-2012 Access Points and mobile data
networks to establish network connectivity, and through that connectivity interacts with MDM
servers that allow administrative control of the TOE.
4 Security Policy
This section summarizes the security functions provided by the TOE:
- Security audit
- Cryptographic support
- User data protection
- Identification and authentication
- Security management
- Protection of the TSF
- TOE access
- Trusted path/channels
4.1 Security audit
The TOE implements a security log and logcat that are each stored in a circular memory buffer.
An MDM agent can read/fetch the security logs, can retrieve logcat logs, and then handle
appropriately (potentially storing the log to Flash or transmitting its contents to the MDM
server). These log methods meet the logging requirements outlined by FAU_GEN.1 in
MDFPPv3.1.
4.2 Cryptographic support
The TOE includes multiple cryptographic libraries with CAVP certified algorithms for a wide
range of cryptographic functions including the following: asymmetric key generation and
establishment, symmetric key generation, encryption/decryption, cryptographic hashing and
keyed-hash message authentication. These functions are supported with suitable random bit
generation, key derivation, salt generation, initialization vector generation, secure key storage,
and key and protected data destruction. Many of these cryptographic functions are also
accessible as services to applications running on the TOE allowing application developers to
ensure their application meets the required criteria to remain compliant to MDFPP standards.
4.3 User data protection
The TOE controls access to system services by hosted applications, including protection of the
Trust Anchor Database. Additionally, the TOE protects user and other sensitive data using
encryption so that even if a device is physically lost, the data remains protected. The TOE’s
evaluated configuration supports Android Enterprise profiles to provide additional separation
between application and application data belonging to the Enterprise profile. Please see the
Admin Guide for additional details regarding how to set up and use Enterprise profiles.
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4.4 Identification and authentication
The TOE supports a number of features related to identification and authentication. From a user
perspective, except for FCC mandated (making phone calls to an emergency number) or non-
sensitive functions (e.g., choosing the keyboard input method or taking screen shots), a
password (i.e., Password Authentication Factor) must be correctly entered to unlock the TOE.
Also, even when unlocked, the TOE requires the user re-enter the password to change the
password. Passwords are obscured when entered so they cannot be read from the TOE's display
and the frequency of entering passwords is limited and when a configured number of failures
occurs, the TOE will be wiped to protect its contents. Passwords can be constructed using upper
and lower cases characters, numbers, and special characters and passwords up to 16 characters
are supported.
The TOE can also serve as an 802.1X supplicant and can both use X.509v3 and validate
certificates for EAP-TLS, TLS, and HTTPS exchanges.
4.5 Security management
The TOE provides all the interfaces necessary to manage the security functions identified
throughout this Security Target as well as other functions commonly found in mobile devices.
Many of the available functions are available to users of the TOE while many are restricted to
administrators operating through a Mobile Device Management solution once the TOE has been
enrolled.
4.6 Protection of the TSF
The TOE implements a number of features to protect itself to ensure the reliability and integrity
of its security features. It protects particularly sensitive data such as cryptographic keys so that
they are not accessible or exportable through the use of the application processor’s hardware.
The TOE disallows all read access to the Root Encryption Key and retains all keys derived from
the REK within its Trusted Execution Environment (TEE). Application software can only use
keys derived from the REK by reference and receive the result.
The TOE also provides its own timing mechanism to ensure that reliable time information is
available (e.g., for log accountability). It enforces read, write, and execute memory page
protections, uses address space layout randomization, and stack-based buffer overflow
protections to minimize the potential to exploit application flaws. It also protects itself from
modification by applications as well as to isolate the address spaces of applications from one
another to protect those applications.
The TOE includes functions to perform self-tests and software/firmware integrity checking so
that it might detect when it is failing or may be corrupt. If any self-tests fail, the TOE will not
go into an operational mode. It also includes mechanisms (i.e., verification of the digital
signature of each new image) so that the TOE itself can be updated while ensuring that the
updates will not introduce malicious or other unexpected changes in the TOE. Digital signature
checking also extends to verifying applications prior to their installation as all applications must
have signatures (even if self-signed).
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4.7 TOE access
The TOE can be locked, obscuring its display, by the user or after a configured interval of
inactivity. The TOE also has the capability to display an administrator specified (using the
TOE’s MDM API) advisory message (banner) when the user unlocks the TOE for the first use
after reboot.
The TOE is also able to attempt to connect to wireless networks as configured.
4.8 Trusted path/channels
The TOE supports the use of IEEE 802.11-2012, 802.1X, and EAP-TLS and TLS, HTTPS to
secure communications channels between itself and other trusted network devices.
5 Assumptions & Clarification of Scope
Assumptions
The Security Problem Definition, including the assumptions, may be found in the following
documents:
• Protection Profile for Mobile Device Fundamentals, Version 3.1, 16 June 2017;
• General Purpose Operating Systems Protection Profile/Mobile Device Fundamentals
Protection Profile Extended Package (EP) Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN)
Clients, Version 1.0, 08 February 2016
That information has not been reproduced here and the MDFPP31/WLANCEP10 should be
consulted if there is interest in that material.
The scope of this evaluation was limited to the functionality and assurances covered in the
MDFPP31/WLANCEP10 as described for this TOE in the Security Target. Other functionality
included in the product was not assessed as part of this evaluation. All other functionality
provided by the devices needs to be assessed separately, and no further conclusions can be
drawn about their effectiveness.
Clarification of scope
All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that need
clarification. This text covers some of the more important limitations and clarifications of this
evaluation. Note that:
• As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated configuration
meets the security claims made with a certain level of assurance (the assurance activities
specified in the Protection Profile for Mobile Device Fundamentals, Extended Package
for WLAN Clients and performed by the evaluation team).
• This evaluation covers only the specific device models and software as identified in this
document, and not any earlier or later versions released or in process.
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• This evaluation did not specifically search for, nor attempt to exploit, vulnerabilities
that were not “obvious” or vulnerabilities to objectives not claimed in the ST. The CEM
defines an “obvious” vulnerability as one that is easily exploited with a minimum of
understanding of the TOE, technical sophistication and resources.
• The functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the security functional
requirements specified in the MDFPP31/WLANCEP10 and applicable Technical
Decisions. Any additional security related functional capabilities of the TOE were not
covered by this evaluation.
6 Documentation
• The following guidance documentation was examined during the evaluation. It is
delivered with the TOE.Panasonic of North America TOUGHBOOK N1 on Android 9
Administrator Guidance Documentation, Version 1.0.0, 2021/06/10
Only this Administrator Guide or specific sections of the other documents referenced by that
guide should be trusted for the installation, administration, and use of this product in its
evaluated configuration.
7 IT Product Testing
This section describes the testing efforts of the developer and the Evaluation Team. It is derived
from information contained in the Assurance Activity Report for Panasonic of North America
TOUGHBOOK N1 on Android 9, Version 0.3, 2021/06/10 (AAR).
7.1 Developer Testing
No evidence of developer testing is required in the assurance activities for this product.
7.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing
The evaluation team verified the product according to a Common Criteria Certification
document and ran the tests specified in the MDFPP31/WLANCEP10 including the tests
associated with optional requirements.
8 Results of the Evaluation
The results of the assurance requirements are generally described in this section and are
presented in detail in the proprietary ETR. The reader of this document can assume that all
assurance activities and work units received a passing verdict.
A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to the
corresponding evaluator action elements. The evaluation was conducted based upon CC
version 3.1 rev 5 and CEM version 3.1 rev 5. The evaluation determined the Panasonic of
North America TOUGHBOOK®
N1 on Android 9 TOEs to be Part 2 extended, and to meet the
SARs contained in the MDFPP31/WLANCEP10.
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8.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE)
The evaluation team applied each ASE CEM work unit. The ST evaluation ensured the ST
contains a description of the environment in terms of policies and assumptions, a statement of
security requirements claimed to be met by the Panasonic of North America TOUGHBOOK®
N1 on Android 9 products that are consistent with the Common Criteria, and product security
function descriptions that support the requirements.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted
in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the
evaluation team was justified.
8.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV)
The evaluation team applied each ADV CEM work unit. The evaluation team assessed the
design documentation and found it adequate to aid in understanding how the TSF provides the
security functions. The design documentation consists of a functional specification contained
in the Security target and Guidance documents. Additionally, the evaluator performed the
assurance activities specified in the MDFPP31/WLANCEP10 related to the examination of the
information contained in the TSS.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted
in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the
evaluation team was justified.
8.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD)
The evaluation team applied each AGD CEM work unit. The evaluation team ensured the
adequacy of the user guidance in describing how to use the operational TOE. Additionally, the
evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the administrator guidance in describing how to
securely administer the TOE. All of the guides were assessed during the design and testing
phases of the evaluation to ensure they were complete.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted
in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the
evaluation team was justified.
8.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)
The evaluation team applied each ALC CEM work unit. The evaluation team found that the
TOE was identified.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted
in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the
evaluation team was justified.
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8.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE)
The evaluation team applied each ATE CEM work unit. The evaluation team ran the set of tests
specified by the assurance activities in the MDFPP31/WLANCEP10 and recorded the results
in a Test Report, summarized in the AAR.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted
in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the
evaluation team was justified.
8.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)
The evaluation team applied each AVA CEM work unit. The vulnerability analysis is in the
Detailed Test Report (DTR) prepared by the evaluator. The vulnerability analysis includes a
public search for vulnerabilities. The public search for vulnerabilities conducted on April 5,
2021 did not uncover any residual vulnerability.
The evaluator searched the National Vulnerability Database
(https://web.nvd.nist.gov/vuln/search), Vulnerability Notes Database
(http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/) on 6/7/2021 with the following search terms: "Panasonic",
"Toughbook", "Toughbook N1", "Android", "Android 9", "Android P", "BoringSSL",
"System Call Policy Engine", "Android Locksettings serive KBKDF", "QTI Crypto Engine
Core", "QTI Inline Crypto Engine", "QTI Random Number Generator".
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
8.7 Summary of Evaluation Results
The evaluation team’s assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims in
the ST are met. Additionally, the evaluation team’s testing also demonstrated the accuracy of
the claims in the ST.
The validation team’s assessment of the evidence provided by the evaluation team is that it
demonstrates that the evaluation team followed the procedures defined in the CEM, and
correctly verified that the product meets the claims in the ST.
9 Validator Comments/Recommendations
The validation team notes that the evaluated configuration is dependent upon the TOE being
configured per the evaluated configuration instructions in the Panasonic of North America
TOUGHBOOK N1 on Android 9 Administrator Guidance Documentation, Version 1.0.0,
2021/06/10 document. No versions of the TOE and software, either earlier or later were
evaluated. Please note that the functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the security
functional requirements specified in the Security Target. Other functionality included in the
product was not assessed as part of this evaluation. Other functionality provided by devices in
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the operational environment, such as the syslog server, need to be assessed separately and no
further conclusions can be drawn about their effectiveness.
10 Annexes
Not applicable
11 Security Target
The Security Target is identified as: Panasonic of North America TOUGHBOOK N1 on
Android 9 Security Target, Version 1.5, 2021/06/10.
12 Glossary
The following definitions are used throughout this document:
• Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL). An IT security evaluation facility
accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and
approved by the CCEVS Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based evaluations.
• Conformance. The ability to demonstrate in an unambiguous way that a given
implementation is correct with respect to the formal model.
• Evaluation. The assessment of an IT product against the Common Criteria using the
Common Criteria Evaluation Methodology to determine whether or not the claims made
are justified; or the assessment of a protection profile against the Common Criteria using
the Common Evaluation Methodology to determine if the Profile is complete, consistent,
technically sound and hence suitable for use as a statement of requirements for one or more
TOEs that may be evaluated.
• Evaluation Evidence. Any tangible resource (information) required from the sponsor or
developer by the evaluator to perform one or more evaluation activities.
• Feature. Part of a product that is either included with the product or can be ordered
separately.
• Target of Evaluation (TOE). A group of IT products configured as an IT system, or an IT
product, and associated documentation that is the subject of a security evaluation under the
CC.
• Validation. The process carried out by the CCEVS Validation Body leading to the issue of
a Common Criteria certificate.
• Validation Body. A governmental organization responsible for carrying out validation and
for overseeing the day-to-day operation of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and
Validation Scheme.
13 Bibliography
The Validation Team used the following documents to produce this Validation Report:
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[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation: Part 1: Introduction
and General Model, Version 3.1, Revision 5, September 2017.
[2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security
functional components, Version 3.1, Revision 5, September 2017.
[3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security
assurance components, Version 3.1 Revision 5, September 2017.
[4] Protection Profile for Mobile Device Fundamentals, Version 3.1, 16 June 2017
[5] General Purpose Operating Systems Protection Profile/Mobile Device Fundamentals
Protection Profile Extended Package (EP) Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN)
Clients, Version 1.0, 08 February 2016.
[6] Panasonic of North America TOUGHBOOK N1 on Android 9 Security Target, Version
1.5, 2021/06/10 (ST).
[7] Assurance Activity Report for Panasonic of North America TOUGHBOOK N1 on
Android 9, Version 0.3, 2021/06/10 (AAR).
[8] Detailed Test Report for Panasonic of North America TOUGHBOOK N1 on Android
9, Version 0.3, 2021/06/10 (DTR).
[9] Evaluation Technical Report for Panasonic of North America TOUGHBOOK N1 on
Android 9, Version 0.3, 2021/06/10 (ETR)
[10] Panasonic of North America TOUGHBOOK N1 on Android 9 Administrator
Guidance Documentation Version 1.0.0, 2021/06/10 (Admin Guide)