National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
for
One Identity Safeguard for Privileged Sessions 6.9
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-VID11214-2022
Dated: 04 March 2022
Version: 1.0
National Institute of Standards and Technology
Information Technology Laboratory
100 Bureau Drive
Gaithersburg, MD 20899
Department of Defense
ATTN: NIAP, Suite 6982
9800 Savage Road
Fort Meade, MD 20755-6982
®
TM
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Acknowledgements
Validation Team
Patrick Mallett, PhD
Jerome Myers, PhD
Marybeth Panock
The Aerospace Corporation
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
Leidos Inc.
Columbia, MD
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Contents
1 Executive Summary................................................................................................................... 1
2 Identification............................................................................................................................. 2
3 TOE Architecture....................................................................................................................... 4
4 Security Policy........................................................................................................................... 5
4.1 Security Audit................................................................................................................................5
4.2 Cryptographic Support..................................................................................................................5
4.3 Identification and Authentication.................................................................................................5
4.4 Security Management...................................................................................................................5
4.5 Protection of the TSF ....................................................................................................................5
4.6 TOE Access ....................................................................................................................................5
4.7 Trusted Path/Channels .................................................................................................................5
5 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.................................................................................... 6
5.1 Assumptions..................................................................................................................................6
5.2 Clarification of Scope ....................................................................................................................7
6 Documentation ......................................................................................................................... 8
7 IT Product Testing ..................................................................................................................... 9
7.1 Test Configuration.........................................................................................................................9
8 TOE Evaluated Configuration.................................................................................................. 12
8.1 Evaluated Configuration .............................................................................................................12
8.2 Excluded Functionality................................................................................................................12
9 Results of the Evaluation ........................................................................................................ 14
9.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ST) (ASE)...............................................................................14
9.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV)........................................................................................14
9.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD)...........................................................................14
9.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)..................................................................14
9.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE) ...........................................15
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (AVA).....................................................................................15
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results ..................................................................................................15
10 Validator Comments/Recommendations ............................................................................... 16
11 Security Target........................................................................................................................ 17
12 Abbreviations and Acronyms.................................................................................................. 18
13 Bibliography ............................................................................................................................ 19
List of Tables
Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers 2
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1 Executive Summary
This Validation Report (VR) documents the National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP) assessment
of the evaluation of One Identity Safeguard for Privileged Sessions 6.9 (the Target of Evaluation, or TOE).
It presents the evaluation results, their justifications, and the conformance results. This VR is not an
endorsement of the TOE by any agency of the U.S. Government and no warranty of the TOE is either
expressed or implied.
This VR is intended to assist the end-user of this product and any security certification agent for that end-
user in determining the suitability of this Information Technology (IT) product in their environment. End-
users should review the Security Target (ST), which is where specific security claims are made, in
conjunction with this VR, which describes how those security claims were evaluated and tested and any
restrictions on the evaluated configuration. This VR applies only to the specific version and configuration
of the product as evaluated and as documented in the ST. Prospective users should carefully read the
Assumptions and Clarification of Scope in Section 5 and the Validator Comments in Section 10, where any
restrictions on the evaluated configuration are highlighted.
The evaluation was performed by Leidos Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL) in Columbia,
Maryland, USA, and was completed in March 2022. The information in this report is largely derived from
the Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) and associated test report written by Leidos. The evaluation
determined that the TOE is:
• Common Criteria Part 2 Extended and Common Criteria Part 3 Conformant
and demonstrates exact conformance to:
• collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.2e, 23 March 2020
as clarified by all applicable Technical Decisions.
The TOE is One Identity Safeguard for Privileged Sessions 6.9.
The TOE identified in this VR has been evaluated at a NIAP approved CCTL using the Common
Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev. 5) for conformance to the Common Criteria for
IT Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev. 5). The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the
provisions of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme (CCEVS) and the conclusions
of the testing laboratory in the ETR are consistent with the evidence provided.
The validation team monitored the activities of the evaluation team, provided guidance on technical
issues and evaluation processes, and reviewed the individual work units documented in the ETR and the
Assurance Activities Report (AAR). The validation team found that the evaluation showed that the product
satisfies all of the functional requirements and assurance requirements stated in the ST. The conclusions
of the testing laboratory in the ETR are consistent with the evidence produced. Therefore, the validation
team concludes that the testing laboratory's findings are accurate, the conclusions justified, and the
conformance results are correct.
The Leidos evaluation team determined that the TOE is conformant to the claimed Protection Profile (PP)
and, when installed, configured and operated as specified in the evaluated guidance documentation,
satisfies all the security functional requirements stated in the ST.
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2 Identification
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST) effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product evaluations. Under this
program, commercial testing laboratories called Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs) use the
Common Criteria (CC) and Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM) to conduct security
evaluations, in accordance with National Voluntary Laboratory Assessment Program (NVLAP)
accreditation.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality and consistency across
evaluations. Developers of IT products desiring a security evaluation contract with a CCTL and pay a fee
for their product’s evaluation. Upon successful completion of the evaluation, the product is added to
NIAP’s Product Compliant List (PCL).
Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:
• The TOE—the fully qualified identifier of the product as evaluated
• The ST—the unique identification of the document describing the security features, claims, and
assurances of the product
• The conformance result of the evaluation
• The PP/PP-Modules to which the product is conformant
• The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation.
Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers
Item Identifier
Evaluation Scheme United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
TOE One Identity Safeguard for Privileged Sessions 6.9
Security Target One Identity Safeguard for Privileged Sessions 6.9 Security Target,
Version 1.0, 20 January 2022
Sponsor & Developer One Identity
4 Polaris Way
Aliso Viejo, CA 92656
Completion Date March 2022
CC Version Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1, Release 5, April 2017
CEM Version Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation:
Version 3.1, Release 5, April 2017
PP collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.2e, 23
March 2020
Conformance Result PP Compliant, CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 conformant
CCTL Leidos
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
6841 Benjamin Franklin Drive
Columbia, MD 21046
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Item Identifier
Evaluation Personnel Justin Fisher
Pascal Patin
Furukh Siddique
Validation Personnel Patrick Mallett
Jerome Myers
Marybeth Panock
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3 TOE Architecture
Note: The following architectural description is based on the description presented in the ST.
The TOE is a standalone network device consisting of a hardware appliance (3000/3500) pre-installed with
the One Identity Safeguard for Privileged Sessions (SPS) 6.9 software/firmware. The SPS
software/firmware is based on Ubuntu Linux LTS 18.04, hardened according to the official Ubuntu guides.
The appliance is installed in-line between clients and servers to facilitate communications and enforce
access control, authorization, and accounting methods on application-layer protocols. The TOE supports
local and remote administration. The TOE provides Web UI and REST API management interfaces that an
administrator can access via Ethernet ports as well as a local console that can be accessed via serial port.
Remote administration is protected using HTTPS.
The TOE provides a local password-based identification and authentication method for its local and
remote administrative interfaces. Authentication for remote interfaces can also be configured to use
LDAP/AD password-based authentication.
The TOE is evaluated as a network device offering CAVP certified cryptographic functions, security
auditing, secure administration, trusted updates, self-tests, and secure connections with external IT
entities (assets and audit server), protected using SSH, TLS, or HTTPS.
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4 Security Policy
The TOE enforces the following security policies as described in the ST.
Note: Much of the description of the security policy has been derived from the ST and the Final ETR.
4.1 Security Audit
The TOE generates security relevant audit records, stores them locally, and can be configured to forward
them to a syslog server over TLS. The locally stored audit records are protected from unauthorized access.
4.2 Cryptographic Support
The TOE uses OpenSSL with NIST-validated algorithm implementations in support of its cryptographic
functions. The TOE uses these algorithms to implement TLS, HTTPS, and SSH in accordance with defined
standards.
4.3 Identification and Authentication
The TOE provides identification and authentication and password management functions for its
administrative interface. It also supports X.509 certificate services in support of authentication for
cryptographic channels, including certificate revocation checking using CRL.
4.4 Security Management
The TOE provides security management functions and defines roles that can be associated with users in
order to manage the TOE locally or remotely. The management functions are provided through a Web UI,
REST API, and local Console.
4.5 Protection of the TSF
The TOE implements features designed to protect itself to ensure the reliability and integrity of its
security features to include protecting sensitive data and providing its own timing mechanism to ensure
that reliable time information is available (e.g., for log accountability).
The TOE includes functions to perform self-tests so that it can detect when it is failing and transition to a
secure, maintenance state. It also includes a mechanism to verify TOE updates to prevent malicious or
other unexpected changes in the TOE.
4.6 TOE Access
The TOE displays a Security Administrator-specified advisory notice and consent warning message prior
to establishing an administrative user session. The TOE terminates local and remote administrator
interactive sessions after a Security Administrator-specified time period of inactivity. The TOE allows
administrator-initiated termination of the administrator’s own interactive session.
4.7 Trusted Path/Channels
The TOE provides trusted paths and channels for remote administrators and trusted IT entities. The TOE
can be configured to send audit records to external syslog server(s) using TLS in real-time.
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5 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
5.1 Assumptions
The ST references the PP to which it claims conformance for assumptions about the use of the TOE. Those
assumptions, drawn from the claimed PP, are as follows:
• The Network Device is assumed to be physically protected in its operational environment and not
subject to physical attacks that compromise the security or interfere with the device’s physical
interconnections and correct operation. This protection is assumed to be sufficient to protect the
device and the data it contains. As a result, the cPP does not include any requirements on physical
tamper protection or other physical attack mitigations. The cPP does not expect the product to
defend against physical access to the device that allows unauthorized entities to extract data,
bypass other controls, or otherwise manipulate the device. For virtual Network Devices (vNDs),
this assumption applies to the physical platform on which the virtual machine (VM) runs.
• The device is assumed to provide networking functionality as its core function and not provide
functionality/services that could be deemed as general purpose computing. For example, the
device should not provide a computing platform for general purpose applications (unrelated to
networking functionality).
In the case of vNDs, the virtualization system (VS) is considered part of the TOE with only one vND
instance for each physical hardware platform. The exception being where components of the
distributed TOE run inside more than one virtual machine (VM) on a single VS. There are no other
guest VMs on the physical platform providing non-Network Device functionality.
• A standard/generic Network Device does not provide any assurance regarding the protection of
traffic that traverses it. The intent is for the Network Device to protect data that originates on or
is destined to the device itself, to include administrative data and audit data. Traffic that is
traversing the Network Device, destined for another network entity, is not covered by the ND cPP.
It is assumed that this protection will be covered by cPPs and PP-Modules for particular types of
Network Devices (e.g., firewall).
• The Security Administrator(s) for the Network Device are assumed to be trusted and to act in the
best interest of security for the organization. This includes appropriately trained, following policy,
and adhering to guidance documentation. Administrators are trusted to ensure
passwords/credentials have sufficient strength and entropy and to lack malicious intent when
administering the device. The Network Device is not expected to be capable of defending against
a malicious Administrator that actively works to bypass or compromise the security of the device.
For TOEs supporting X.509v3 certificate-based authentication, the Security Administrator(s) are
expected to fully validate (e.g. offline verification) any CA certificate (root CA certificate or
intermediate CA certificate) loaded into the TOE’s trust store (aka 'root store', ' trusted CA Key
Store', or similar) as a trust anchor prior to use (e.g. offline verification).
• The Network Device firmware and software is assumed to be updated by an Administrator on a
regular basis in response to the release of product updates due to known vulnerabilities.
• The Administrator’s credentials (private key) used to access the Network Device are protected by
the platform on which they reside.
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• The Administrator must ensure that there is no unauthorized access possible for sensitive residual
information (e.g. cryptographic keys, keying material, PINs, passwords etc.) on networking
equipment when the equipment is discarded or removed from its operational environment.
5.2 Clarification of Scope
All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that need clarifying.
This text covers some of the more important limitations and clarifications of this evaluation. Note that:
• As with any evaluation, this evaluation shows only that the evaluated configuration meets the
security claims made, with a certain level of assurance (the evaluation activities specified in
Supporting Document Mandatory Technical Document: Evaluation Activities for Network Device
cPP, Version 2.2, December 2019 and performed by the evaluation team).
• This evaluation covers only the specific software distribution and version identified in this
document, and not any earlier or later versions released or in process.
• The evaluation of security functionality of the product was limited to the functionality specified
in One Identity Safeguard for Privileged Sessions 6.9 Security Target, Version 1.0, 20 January 2022.
Any additional security related functional capabilities included in the product were not covered
by this evaluation. In particular, the functionality mentioned in Section 8.2 of this document is
excluded from the scope of the evaluation.
• This evaluation did not specifically search for, nor attempt to exploit, vulnerabilities that were not
“obvious”, vulnerabilities to objectives not claimed in the ST, or vulnerabilities that would
explicitly require a violation of the assumptions claimed in the ST. The CEM defines an “obvious”
vulnerability as one that is easily exploited with a minimum of understanding of the TOE, technical
sophistication and resources.
• The TOE must be installed, configured and managed as described in the documentation
referenced in Section 6 of this VR.
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6 Documentation
The vendor offers guidance documents describing the installation process for the TOE as well as guidance
for subsequent administration and use of the applicable security features. The guidance documentation
examined during the evaluation and delivered with the TOE is as follows:
• One Identity Safeguard for Privileged Sessions 6.9.3 Common Criteria Evaluated Configuration
Guidance (CCECG), Version 1.1, January 26, 2022
• One Identity Safeguard for Privileged Sessions 6.9.3 Administration Guide, April 30, 2021
• One Identity Safeguard for Privileged Sessions 6.9.3 Installation Guide, April 30, 2021
• One Identity Safeguard for Privileged Sessions 6.9.3 REST API Reference Guide, April 30, 2021
• One Identity Safeguard for Privileged Sessions 6.9.3 Packaging Checklist, April 30, 2021
• One Identity Safeguard for Privileged Sessions 6.9.3 Upgrade Guide, April 30, 2021
• Super SC113 Chassis Series User’s Manual, Version 1.0d.
• Supermicro SuperServer 1029U-T Series User’s Manual, Revision 1.0i
• Super X9 SMT IPMI User Guide, Revision 1.0
• One Identity Safeguard for Privileged Sessions 6.9.4 Release Notes, 27 January 2022
To use the product in the evaluated configuration, the product must be configured as specified in this
documentation.
Any additional customer documentation provided with the product, or that which may be available online,
was not included in the scope of the evaluation and therefore should not be relied upon to configure or
operate the TOE as evaluated. Consumers are encouraged to download the evaluated administrative
guidance documentation from the NIAP website.
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7 IT Product Testing
This section describes the testing efforts of the evaluation team. It is derived from information contained
in the following proprietary document:
• One Identity Safeguard for Privileged Sessions 6.9 Common Criteria Test Report and Procedures,
Version 1.1, 28 February 2022
A non-proprietary description of the tests performed, and their results is provided in Section 3.5 of the
following document:
• Assurance Activities Report for One Identity Safeguard for Privileged Sessions 6.9, Version 1.0, 28
February 2022
The purpose of the testing activity was to confirm the TOE behaves in accordance with the TOE security
functional requirements as specified in the ST for a product that claims conformance to collaborative
Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.2e, 23 March 2020.
The evaluation team devised a Test Plan based on the Test Activities specified in Supporting Document
Mandatory Technical Document: Evaluation Activities for Network Device cPP, Version 2.2, December
2019. The Test Plan described how each test activity was to be instantiated within the TOE test
environment. The evaluation team executed the tests specified in the Test Plan and documented the
results in the team test report listed above.
Independent testing took place at Leidos CCTL facilities in Columbia, Maryland, from September 2021 to
February 2022.
The evaluators received the TOE in the form that customers would receive it, installed and configured the
TOE in accordance with the provided guidance, and exercised the Team Test Plan on equipment
configured in the testing laboratory.
Given the complete set of test results from the test procedures exercised by the evaluators, the testing
requirements for collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices were fulfilled.
7.1 Test Configuration
This section identifies the devices used for testing the TOE and describes the test configuration. The test
configuration is shown below:
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TOE
OneIdentity SPS Model 3000 running firmware version 6.9.4.
Web GUI Client
Microsoft Windows 2016 Server Datacenter
Google Chrome Version 97
Putty release 0.71
TLS Test and Syslog Server
Ubuntu 18.04
Wireshark 2.6.10
SSLyze 2.1.4
OpenSSL 1.1.1
Python
Leidos Proprietary TLS tools
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Kali Linux and SSH Test Client
Kali Linux Release 2020.4
Wireshark 2.6.10
XCA Certificate Authority 2.0.1
SSLyze 2.1.4
Apache Web Server 2.4.4.1 (for CRL distribution)
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8 TOE Evaluated Configuration
8.1 Evaluated Configuration
The evaluated configuration consists of the hardware and software listed below when configured in accordance with
the documentation specified in Section 6. The TOE consists of the following hardware components:
• Model 3000 with Intel Xeon E3-1275 CPU (Kaby Lake)
• Model 3500 with 2 x Intel Xeon Silver 4110 CPU (Skylake)
These hardware components include the One Identity Safeguard for Privileged Sessions 6.9 software/firmware, which
runs on a modified version of Ubuntu Linux LTS 18.04 as its base operating system plus additional software/firmware
needed to support the product’s functionality. The software/firmware is obtained and installed as a single bundle that
includes the underlying operating system; it is not installed as a separate application on a general-purpose server
operating system.
Depending on configuration, the TOE in its evaluated configuration may require the following components
in its operational environment:
• A TLS-protected syslog server that receives audit events from the TOE,
• A TLS-protected LDAP server used for remote administrator authentication, if configured
• Administrative workstation
• SSH clients/servers (for which the TOE acts as a session proxy between them)
• A client workstation for administrator access to the local console and web UI with:
o A supported operating system: Windows 2008 Server, Windows 7, Windows 2012 Server,
Windows 2012 R2 Server, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 2016, or any
recent version of Linux. The OS must have the ability to run fairly recent web browser
browser.
o A supported browser: current version of Mozilla Firefox, current version of Google
Chrome, Microsoft Edge, and Microsoft Internet Explorer 11 or newer. The browser must
support TLS-encrypted HTTPS connections, and JavaScript/cookies must be enabled.
o A physical interface that allows for serial port connectivity to the local console port.
8.2 Excluded Functionality
The list below identifies features or protocols that are not evaluated or must be disabled and the rationale
why.
Feature Description
Cluster and HA Deployments Cluster and HA deployments were not evaluated.
Desktop Player Application Excluded from the evaluation boundary since its
functionality does not relate to the NDcPP
requirements.
Privileged Analytics Privileged Analytics is enabled for the evaluated
configuration of the product but is outside the
evaluation boundary since its functionality does
not relate to the NDcPP requirements. Enabling
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this feature shows that it is “non-interfering” with
respect to the product’s ability to meet the
claimed security requirements
RADIUS RADIUS must be disabled in the evaluated
configuration because it does not use a
cryptographic channel (e.g. RadSec).
Safeguard for Privileged Passwords (SPP) Use of SPP for any purpose (i.e. user-initiated and
SPS-initiated) is excluded. The channel must not
be configured/used.
TLS break-and-inspect functionality (TLS/HTTPS
proxy)
Excluded from the evaluated configuration since
its functionality is not related to the NDcPP
requirements.
SSH administrative access Administrative access using SSH is disabled in the
evaluated configuration.
Any features not associated with SFRs in [NDcPP] NDcPP forbids adding additional requirements to
the Security Target (ST). If additional
functionalities or products are mentioned in the
ST, it is for completeness only.
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9 Results of the Evaluation
The results of the evaluation of the TOE against its target assurance requirements are generally described
in this section and are presented in detail in the proprietary Evaluation Technical Report for One Identity
Safeguard for Privileged Sessions 6.9. The reader of this VR can assume that all assurance activities and
work units received passing verdicts.
A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to the
corresponding evaluator action elements. The evaluation was conducted based upon CC version 3.1,
revision 5 and CEM version 3.1, revision 5, and the specific evaluation activities specified in Supporting
Document Mandatory Technical Document: Evaluation Activities for Network Device cPP, Version 2.2,
December 2019). The evaluation determined the TOE satisfies the conformance claims made in the One
Identity Safeguard for Privileged Sessions 6.9 Security Target, of Part 2 extended and Part 3 conformant.
The TOE satisfies the requirements specified in:
• collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.2e, 23 March 2020.
The Validators reviewed all the work of the evaluation team and agreed with their practices and findings.
9.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ST) (ASE)
The evaluation team performed each TSS assurance activity and ASE CEM work unit. The ST evaluation
ensured the ST contains an ST introduction, TOE overview, TOE description, security problem definition in
terms of threats, policies and assumptions, description of security objectives for the operational
environment, a statement of security requirements claimed to be met by the product that are consistent
with the claimed Protection Profile, and security function descriptions that satisfy the requirements.
9.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV)
The evaluation team performed each ADV assurance activity and applied each ADV_FSP.1 CEM work unit.
The evaluation team assessed the evaluation evidence and found it adequate to meet the requirements
specified in the claimed Protection Profile for design evidence. The ADV evidence consists of the TSS
descriptions provided in the ST and product guidance documentation providing descriptions of the TOE
external interfaces.
9.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD)
The evaluation team performed each guidance assurance activity and applied each AGD work unit. The
evaluation team determined the adequacy of the operational user guidance in describing how to operate
the TOE in accordance with the descriptions in the ST. The evaluation team followed the guidance in the
TOE preparative procedures to test the installation and configuration procedures to ensure the
procedures result in the evaluated configuration. The guidance documentation was assessed during the
design and testing phases of the evaluation to ensure it was complete.
9.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)
The evaluation team performed each ALC assurance activity and applied each ALC_CMC.1 and ALC_CMS.1
CEM work unit, to the extent possible given the evaluation evidence required by the claimed Protection
Profile. The evaluation team ensured the TOE is labeled with a unique identifier consistent with the TOE
identification in the evaluation evidence, and that the ST describes how timely security updates are made
to the TOE.
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9.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE)
The evaluation team performed each test activity and applied each ATE_FUN.1 CEM work unit. The
evaluation team ran the set of tests specified by the claimed PP and recorded the results in the Test
Report, summarized in the AAR.
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (AVA)
The evaluation team performed each AVA assurance activity and applied each AVA_VAN.1 CEM work unit.
The evaluation team performed a vulnerability analysis following the processes described in the claimed
PP. This comprised a search of public vulnerability databases.
Searches of public vulnerability repositories were performed on 3 March 2022.
The evaluation team searched the following public vulnerability repositories.
• National Vulnerability Database (http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/search)
• US-CERT Vulnerability Notes Database (https://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/)
• The vendor’s notifications and alerts page for the product (https://support.oneidentity.com/one-
identity-safeguard-for-privileged-sessions/all/alerts-notifications)
• Ubuntu Security Notices (for the Ubuntu 18.04 LTS operating system that the TOE relies on)
(https://ubuntu.com/security/notices?order=newest&release=bionic&details=)
• Ubuntu CVEs (for the Ubuntu 18.04 LTS operating system that the TOE relies on)
(https://ubuntu.com/security/cves)
The evaluation team used the following search terms in the searches of these repositories:
• one identity/one identity safeguard/safeguard for privileged sessions/balabit (product name,
current developer, former developer)
• intel/xeon/kaby lake/skylake (processor make and model)
• sc113/superserver/1029u-t/supermicro (hardware chassis make and model)
• ubuntu 18.04 LTS (TOE base operating system)
• nginx (TOE web server)
• openssl (TOE TLS and general cryptographic engine)
• postgresql/rabbitmq/cherrypy/openldap/freerdp/log4j/syslog-ng/sudo/angular2 (significant
third-party software components contained within the TOE software)
• (significant third-party software components contained within the TOE software)
The results of these searches did not identify unmitigated vulnerabilities that are applicable to the TOE.
The conclusion drawn from the vulnerability analysis is that no residual vulnerabilities exist that are
exploitable by attackers with Basic Attack Potential as defined by the Certification Body in accordance
with the guidance in the CEM.
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results
The evaluation team’s assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims in the ST are
met, sufficient to satisfy the assurance activities specified in the claimed Protection Profile. Additionally,
the evaluation team’s testing also demonstrated the accuracy of the claims in the ST.
The validation team’s assessment of the evidence provided by the evaluation team is that it demonstrates
that the evaluation team followed the procedures defined in the CEM, and correctly verified that the
product meets the claims in the ST.
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10 Validator Comments/Recommendations
The validators suggest that the consumer pay particular attention to the evaluated configuration of the
TOE. As stated in the Clarification of Scope, the evaluated functionality is scoped exclusively to the security
functional requirements specified in the Security Target, and the only evaluated functionality was that
which was described by the SFRs claimed in the Security Target. All other functionality provided by the
TOE needs to be assessed separately and no further conclusions can be drawn about its effectiveness.
Consumers employing the TOE must follow the configuration instructions provided in the Configuration
Guidance documentation listed in Section 6 to ensure the evaluated configuration is established and
maintained.
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11 Security Target
The ST for this product’s evaluation is One Identity Safeguard for Privileged Sessions 6.9 Security Target,
Version 1.0, 20 January 2022.
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12 Abbreviations and Acronyms
This section identifies abbreviations and acronyms used in this document.
AD Active Directory
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
CRL Certificate Revocation List
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard
HTTP(S) Hypertext Transfer Protocol (Secure)
LDAP Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
OE Operational Environment
OS Operating System
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SPS Safeguard for Privileged Sessions (the TOE)
SSH Secure Shell
ST Security Target
TLS Transport Layer Security
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functions
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13 Bibliography
The validation team used the following documents to produce this VR:
[1] Common Criteria Project Sponsoring Organisations. Common Criteria for Information Technology
Security Evaluation: Part 1: Introduction and general model, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
[2] Common Criteria Project Sponsoring Organisations. Common Criteria for Information Technology
Security Evaluation: Part 2: Security functional components, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
[3] Common Criteria Project Sponsoring Organisations. Common Criteria for Information Technology
Security Evaluation: Part 3: Security assurance requirements, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
[4] Common Criteria Project Sponsoring Organisations. Common Evaluation Methodology for
Information Technology Security, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
[5] collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.2e, 23 March 2020.
[6] Supporting Document Mandatory Technical Document: Evaluation Activities for Network Device
cPP, Version 2.2, December 2019
[7] One Identity Safeguard for Privileged Sessions 6.9 Security Target, Version 1.0, January 20, 2022
[8] One Identity Safeguard for Privileged Sessions 6.9 Common Criteria Evaluated Configuration
Guide (CCECG), Version 1.1, January 26, 2022
[9] One Identity Safeguard for Privileged Sessions 6.9.3 Installation Guide, April 30, 2021
[10] One Identity Safeguard for Privileged Sessions 6.9.3 Packaging Checklist, April 30, 2021
[11] One Identity Safeguard for Privileged Sessions 6.9.3 Upgrade Guide, April 30, 2021
[12] One Identity Safeguard for Privileged Sessions 6.9.3 Administration Guide, April 30, 2021
[13] One Identity Safeguard for Privileged Sessions 6.9.3 REST API Reference Guide, April 30, 2021
[14] Super SC113 Chassis Series User’s Manual, Version 1.0d, October 2, 2013
[15] Supermicro SuperServer 1029U-T Series User’s Manual, Revision 1.0i, September 22, 2020
[16] One Identity Safeguard for Privileged Sessions 6.9.4 Release Notes, January 27, 2022
[17] Supermicro BMC IPMI User’s Guide, Revision 1.1b, August 26, 2020
[18] Evaluation Technical Report for One Identity Safeguard for Privileged Sessions 6.9 (Leidos
Proprietary), Version 1.0, 28 February 2022
[19] Assurance Activities Report for One Identity Safeguard for Privileged Sessions 6.9, Version 1.0, 28
February 2022
[20] One Identity Safeguard for Privileged Sessions 6.9 Common Criteria Test Report and Procedures
(Leidos Proprietary), Version 1.1, February 28, 2022
[21] (Leidos Proprietary) One Identity Safeguard for Privileged Sessions 6.9 Vulnerability Assessment,
Version 1.1, February 22, 2022