BSI-DSZ-CC-1000-2023
for
Secure Smart Grid Hub (SGH-S) V1.00
from
EFR GmbH
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V5.47
BSI-DSZ-CC-1000-2023 (*)
Smart Meter Gateway
Secure Smart Grid Hub (SGH-S)
V1.00
from EFR GmbH
PP Conformance: Protection Profile for the Gateway of a Smart
Metering System, Version 1.3, 31 March 2014, BSI-
CC-PP-0073-2014
Functionality: PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by AVA_VAN.5 and ALC_FLR.2
valid until: 10 September 2031
The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved
evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM),
Version 3.1 extended by Scheme Interpretations and by advice of the Certification
Body for components beyond EAL 5 for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT
Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1. CC and CEM are also published as ISO/IEC
15408 and ISO/IEC 18045.
(*) This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report and
Notification. For details on the validity see Certification Report part A chapter 5.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the
certification scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and
the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are
consistent with the
evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for
Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is
either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 11 September 2023
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Matthias Intemann L.S.
Head of Section
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
SOGIS
Recognition Agreement
for components up to
EAL 4
Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
recognition for components
up to EAL 2 and ALC_FLR
only
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1000-2023
This page is intentionally left blank.
4 / 26
BSI-DSZ-CC-1000-2023 Certification Report
Contents
A. Certification....................................................................................................................6
1. Preliminary Remarks...................................................................................................6
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure..............................................................6
3. Recognition Agreements.............................................................................................7
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification...............................................................8
5. Validity of the Certification Result................................................................................8
6. Publication..................................................................................................................9
B. Certification Results.....................................................................................................10
1. Executive Summary..................................................................................................11
2. Identification of the TOE............................................................................................12
3. Security Policy..........................................................................................................14
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope....................................................................14
5. Architectural Information...........................................................................................15
6. Documentation..........................................................................................................15
7. IT Product Testing.....................................................................................................15
8. Evaluated Configuration............................................................................................17
9. Results of the Evaluation..........................................................................................17
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE....................................................20
11. Security Target........................................................................................................20
12. Definitions...............................................................................................................20
13. Bibliography............................................................................................................22
C. Excerpts from the Criteria............................................................................................25
D. Annexes.......................................................................................................................26
5 / 26
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1000-2023
A. Certification
1. Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● Act on the Federal Office for Information Security1
● BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance2
● BSI Schedule of Costs 3
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern und für Heimat (Federal
Ministry of the Interior and Community)
● DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) [3]
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility, its
approval and licencing process (CC-Stellen) [3]
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
2
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung - BSIZertV) of 17 December
2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231
3
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 3 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I, p. 519
6 / 26
BSI-DSZ-CC-1000-2023 Certification Report
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.14
[1] also published as
ISO/IEC 15408
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published
as ISO/IEC 18045
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
3. Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
3.1. European Recognition of CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS
Technical Domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL 1 to EAL 4. For "Smartcards and similar devices" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in
place. For "HW Devices with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too.
In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of
the recognition agreement.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on
recognition, and the history of the agreement can be seen on the website at
https://www.sogis.eu.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the related bodies of the signatory nations. A disclaimer
beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of recognition.
This certificate is recognized according to the rules of SOGIS-MRA, i.e. up to and including
CC part 3 EAL 4 components. The evaluation contained the component AVA_VAN.5 that is
not mutually recognised in accordance with the provisions of the SOGIS MRA. For mutual
recognition the EAL 4 components of these assurance families are relevant.
3.2. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC
(Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08
September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP)
(exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or
the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection
Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on
the website: https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the related bodies
4
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern und für Heimat of 12 February 2007 in the
Bundesanzeiger dated 23 February 2007, p. 3730
7 / 26
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1000-2023
of the signatory nations. A disclaimer beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of
recognition.
This certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2014, i. e. up to and including
CC part 3 EAL 2 and ALC_FLR components.
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product Secure Smart Grid Hub (SGH-S), V1.00 has undergone the certification
procedure at BSI.
The evaluation of the product Secure Smart Grid Hub (SGH-S), V1.00 was conducted by
SRC. The evaluation was completed on 6 September 2023. SRC is an evaluation facility
(ITSEF)5
recognised by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the applicant is: EFR GmbH.
The product was developed by: EFR GmbH.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
5. Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report applies only to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance components and assurance levels please refer to CC
itself. Detailed references are listed in part C of this report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-assessment or
re-certification). Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation
and certification procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk
management needs regularly updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-
assessment on a regular e.g. annual basis.
In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved attack methods would
require a re-assessment of the products resistance to state of the art attack methods, the
maximum validity of the certificate has been limited. The certificate issued on 11
September 2023 is valid until 10 September 2031 combined with a regular mandatory re-
assessment after every 2 years. Validity can be re-newed by re-certification.
5
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
8 / 26
BSI-DSZ-CC-1000-2023 Certification Report
The owner of the certificate is obliged:
1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product's certification, to refer to
the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report, the Security
Target and user guidance documentation mentioned herein to any customer of
the product for the application and usage of the certified product,
2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of the
product that have been identified by the developer or any third party after
issuance of the certificate,
3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security
relevant changes in the evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and
production sites or processes, occur, or the confidentiality of documentation and
information related to the Target of Evaluation (TOE) or resulting from the
evaluation and certification procedure where the certification of the product has
assumed this confidentiality being maintained, is not given any longer. In
particular, prior to the dissemination of confidential documentation and
information related to the TOE or resulting from the evaluation and certification
procedure that do not belong to the deliverables according to the Certification
Report part B, or for those where no dissemination rules have been agreed on, to
third parties, the Certification Body at BSI has to be informed.
4. to monitor the resistance of the certified product against new attack methods and
to provide a positive qualified confirmation by applying for a re-certification or re-
assessment process on a regular basis every two years starting from the
issuance of the certificate.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
6. Publication
The product Secure Smart Grid Hub (SGH-S), V1.00 has been included in the BSI list of
certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de
and [5]). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer6
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
6
EFR GmbH
Nymphenburger Straße 20b
80335 München
9 / 26
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1000-2023
B. Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
10 / 26
BSI-DSZ-CC-1000-2023 Certification Report
1. Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the Gateway in a Smart Metering System consisting of
the SMGW Software, Version 1.0 and the SMGW Hardware, Versions SGH-S-AL1-B-100
or SGH-S-AM1-B-100. The TOE is comprised of a hardware board and an application
software. Other hardware such as the hardwired security module (separatly certified, BSI-
DSZ-CC-1003-2018) or the communication modem is not part of the TOE.
It serves as the communication unit between devices of private and commercial
consumers and commodity industry service providers (e.g, electricity, gas, water). It also
collects, processes and stores Meter Data and is responsible for the distribution of this
data to external entities.
Typically, the Gateway will be placed in the household or premises of the consumer of the
commodity and enables access to local Meter(s) (i.e. the unit(s) used for measuring the
consumption or production of electric power, gas, water, heat etc.) and may enable access
to Controllable Local Systems (e.g., power generation plants, controllable loads such as
air condition and intelligent household appliances).
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profile Protection Profile for the Gateway of a Smart Metering System, Version
1.3, 31 March 2014, BSI-CC-PP-0073-2014 [8].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 4
augmented by AVA_VAN.5 and ALC_FLR.2.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6], chapter 6. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and some of
them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionality:
TOE Security
Functionality
Addressed issue
Cryptographic
Functionality
All cryptographic primitives (demanded in BSI TR 03116-3) required by the protocols
as well as other services in the TOE are fully implemented in the TOE, including key
exchange, key transportation, block cipher AES and hash functions.
A security module according to BSI-CC-PP-0077-V2-2015 is used to generate
cryptographic keys and digital signatures.
TLS Handling The TLS protocol ensures the confidentiality and integrity of transmitted user data,
most importantly the meter data and derived consumption information. The
management inter-face is also protected by TLS.
Identification,
Authentication And
Authorization
The TOE contains a firewall and an access control management.
The firewall enforces an information flow control policy based on BSI-CC-PP-0073.
Communication that passes the firewall is handled by the access control
management.
Data access for each user is restricted to data which is explicitly assigned to this user.
The TOE maintains the correct system time, so time-dependent data can be reliably
11 / 26
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1000-2023
TOE Security
Functionality
Addressed issue
time-stamped
Self-Protection The TOE periodically performs a self-test to detect malfunction or manipulation. This
includes a data integrity check (including the TSF itself) using checksums and the
evaluation of logging entries. This test can also be started by a user request. If a
potential security violation is detected, the Gateway Administrator is informed.
The TOE keeps separate system, consumer and calibration logs. The logs are
protected against unauthorized access and deletion.
Security
Management
A security management system is implemented in the TOE in order to preserve the
security functionality in any case.
The security functionalities of the TOE are protected against intentional and
unintentional manipulation by a user. Therefore, all users are assigned to security
roles and provided with security attributes. Following roles are available in the TOE:
- Authorized consumer
- Authorized gateway administrator
- Authorized service technician
- Authorized External Entity (FMT_SMR.1).
The gateway administrator can provide firmware updates to the TOE. These updates
must be cryptographically signed.
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 7.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6], chapter 3.2.
Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of Assumptions,
Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [6],
chapter 3.
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2. Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
Secure Smart Grid Hub (SGH-S), V1.00
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
12 / 26
BSI-DSZ-CC-1000-2023 Certification Report
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
1 HW Secure EFR Smart Grid Hub SGH-S v1.00 As a single device
in a secure
transport box by
service technician
2 SW TOE firmware, including boot-loader,
operating system, root file system and
SMGW application
Bootloader c2e15873
Root File System 9ac7c6ce03
Operating System 93ef40da7c8f
SMGW-App 6.1.1- b955543b4
Included in 1
3 DOC Servicetechniker Handbuch für das
Smart-Meter-Gateway (SMGW)
Secure Smart Grid Hub EFR SGH-S
[11]
V1.19; 15.06.2023
SHA256 checksum
4137c4cdc38fedb9bad1c8b034ff
d47d58a0830287bfb680c8453f0
8396ead97
Download
4 DOC Produkthandbuch GWA für den Smart
Meter Gateway Administrator (GWA)
für das Smart-Meter-Gateway
(SMGW) Secure Smart Grid Hub EFR
SGH-S [12]
V1.22; 05.07.2023
SHA256 checksum
6257d6b87ef1bb50aebe390a80
945f9b14475621dcca61f6ad21d
b22c05e28c4
Download
5 DOC Handbuch für Endnutzer für das
Smart-Meter-Gateway (SMGW)
Secure Smart Grid Hub EFR SGH-S
[13]
v1.07; 31.07.2023
SHA256 checksum
8a7547ac0623bb9b08be6e8c1c
86a8860fcdee3825198b4acbfe1
2223fe5cd79
Download
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
2.1. Delivery items and associated delivery methods
The TOE is delivered and installed by the service technician, who follows a defined,
secured delivery plan:
• After production, the TOE instances are stored in secure transport boxes (pylocx“)
with electronic locks. These boxes can only be opened by authorized persons using
one-time codes.
• For transportation of TOEs, the service technician or other authorized persons also
use secure boxes with one-time codes.
• Transport time of TOEs should be no more than 24 hours. If this cannot be
achieved, the secure boxes with the TOEs must be brought into a secure storage
facility for every stop of more than 60 minutes.
• Each delivery is announced with the following information: Type and serial number
of the secure box; IDs of the delivered TOEs; time and expected duration of the
delivery trip.
• The recipient of a TOE delivery must check the integrity and serial number of the
box on receipt.
• The service technician receives at most 100 TOE devices in one delivery.
• The IDs of delivered TOEs are documented, so the identity of delivered and
installed TOEs can be checked at all stages of the delivery process.
13 / 26
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1000-2023
• In addition to that a personal handover by one employee (5 devices) or two
employees (10 devices) is also possible.
Electronic documents: Download from the developer. The authenticity can be verified by
the SHA256 checksum listed in [ST], sec. 1.2
Firmware: The firmware is pre-installed in the TOE at production. No firmware installation
is necessary or possible on installation by the service technician.
2.2. Identification of the TOE by the User
For the customer and service technician to be able to check the correct delivery visually,
instructions are provided in [11], [12] and [13].
Further checks by the user can be done as following on the installed TOE:
• the labeling of the housing, showing the name, type and serial number
• the consumer client software TRuDi can show the firmware version of the TOE
The electronic guidance documents can be identified by their SHA256 checksum listed in
[6], section 1.2.
3. Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues: Protection of metrological data
stored and transmitted from a non-public environment within the premises of the consumer
providing a basic level of physical protection by implementing logical and additional
physical security functionality
In addition, the TOE implements policies pertaining to the following security functional
classes: Security Audit, Communication, Cryptographic support, User Data Protection,
Identification and Authentication, Security Management, Privacy, Protection of the TSF and
Trusted path/channel.
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are
of relevance:
• Trustworthy authorised and authenticated external entities
• Trustworthy and well-trained gateway administrators and service technicians
• Basic level of physical protection by installation in a non-public environment within
the premises of the consumer
• Processing profiles are obtained from a trustworthy and reliable source only
• Usage of a certified Security Module for specific cryptographic services
• Certification of firmware updates prior to installation in the SMGW
• Reliability and availability of WAN network connections, trustworthiness and
availability of time sources, assumptions on LMN and HAN network connections
• Secure generation of ECC key pair and secure transmission to SMGW by the GWA
14 / 26
BSI-DSZ-CC-1000-2023 Certification Report
Details can be found in the Security Target [6], chapter 4.2.
5. Architectural Information
The TOE is a single device that is part of a smart metering system. It is typically installed
next to one or more meters for a commodity (e.g. electricity, water), to which it has wired or
wireless connections.
The TOE is structured into 45 subsystems that can be reduced into 10 logical units.
Hardware: Includes seals, housing, and the electronic logic board and guarantees passive
physical protection of the TOE.
Operating System: The underlying operating system including encryption and integrity
protection for bootloader, kernel and the SMGW application. Provides network-services,
firewall functionality and user-separated access control.
Administration: Gives access for trusted and authorized users for administration,
management of processing profiles, and access to log-files.
Notification: Sends notifications to trusted users to inform about critical events.
Integrity Protection: Includes all functionality to guarantee the integrity of the TOE,
including constant monitoring of the TOEs filesystem, data-integrity, availability of HW
resources and execution of self-tests.
Cryptography: Provides cryptographic services and implements access to the SMGWs
security module.
LMN: Contains the communication with wired and wireless LMN participants and their
configuration as well as the tariffication according to the processing profiles.
HAN: Allows access for trusted and authorized end-users to access energy consumption
and audit data.
CLS: Implements communication channels for CLS devices
System Services: Provides further services to the SMGW application including NTP and
management of the mobile communication.
6. Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7. IT Product Testing
The developer used mostly automated tests for their functional testing, supplemented by
some manual tests where automation was not feasible. Each test focused on with a
specific part of the TSF, but since the tests are integration tests, the whole TOE was
always the target. A single configuration of the TOE exists and is intended to be covered
by this evaluation.
15 / 26
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1000-2023
The test cases are mapped to the interfaces described in the functional specification. Each
TSFI is tested in at least one test case and therefore the correspondence between the
interfaces in the functional specification and the tests in the test documentation is
complete.
The evaluator added some test cases to complement the developer's test coverage. Those
tests were incorporated in the developer's test suite and were subsequently executed
during each development cycle. All tests were passed by the final TOE.
The evaluator performed penetration testing to assure that the TSF could not be
circumvented. In special focus were vulnerabilities that allowed to bypass the encryption
and authentication on the network ports. No vulnerabilities were found.
7.1. Developer’s Testing
There is only one configuration of the TOE. The use of different communication modules
(LTE, wMBUS) is outside of the scope of this evaluation (see [6], section 1.3).
Developer’s Test Results
The developer manages their test results in TestRail. The evaluator exported the test
results from there in the form of an CSV file. The resulting file is very similar to the test
specifications, but the additional fields "Status" (the test result) and "Tested By" (the
person who performed the test) and "Tested On" (date and time of the test) are included as
evidence that the test has in fact been performed.
Verdict
All tests passed with the expected results.
7.2. Independent Testing
The independent testing was performed using the developer’s testing environment.
During ATE_COV and ATE_DPT, the evaluator had identified several tests to be added or
modified to complete the developer's test coverage. Those tests were added to the
developer's test repository and also repeated during ATE_IND.
Verdict
The overall test result is that no deviations were found between the expected and the
actual test results.
7.3. Penetration Testing
The evaluator searched methodically for vulnerabilities in the TOE. Notably, the evaluators
• looked for evidence for vulnerabilities while preparing the Single Evaluation Reports
for the different evaluation aspects,
• checked for publicly known vulnerabilities in third-party and open source
components of the TOE, and evaluated the developer responses to potentially
exploitable vulnerabilities,
• evaluated the TLS implementation of the TOE for standard conformance and
correctness,
• performed a side channel analysis within the limits of an local attacker,
16 / 26
BSI-DSZ-CC-1000-2023 Certification Report
• performed penetration testing to check if the authentication and access control of
the TOE could be circumvented, and
• tested the TOE resistance against physical tampering.
The evaluators found no exploitable vulnerabilities.
Verdict
The overall test result is that no deviations were found between the expected and the
actual test results; moreover, no attack scenario with the high attack potential was actually
successful.
8. Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE. Only one TOE
configuration exists, consisting of the items listed in table 2. Multiple Communication
Modules for LTE exist, however these are non-TOE components and as such out of scope
for this certification.
9. Results of the Evaluation
9.1. CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL 5
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance
specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 34) and guidance specific for the
technology of the product [4] (AIS 46, AIS 48).
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 4 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
● The components AVA_VAN.5 and ALC_FLR.2 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance: Protection Profile for the Gateway of a Smart Metering System,
Version 1.3, 31 March 2014, BSI-CC-PP-0073-2014 [8]
● for the Functionality: PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by AVA_VAN.5 and ALC_FLR.2
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
17 / 26
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1000-2023
9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment
The following table gives an overview of the cryptographic functionalities inside the TOE to
enforce the security policy and outlines the standard of application where its specific
appropriateness is stated.
Purpose Cryptographic Mechanism Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in
Bits
Standard of
Application
Validity
Period
Key generation TLS-PRF with SHA-256 or
SHA-384
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_
AES_128_CBC_SHA256 or
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_
AES_256_CBC_SHA384 or
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_
AES_128_GCM_SHA256 or
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_
AES_256_GCM_SHA384
RFC 5289
RFC 5246 (AES)
128 bit
256 bit
BSI-TR-
03116-3 [16]
BSI-TR-
03109-3 [15]
2029+
Symmetric
encryption,
Integrity
protection
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_
AES_128_CBC_SHA256 or
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_
AES_256_CBC_SHA384 or
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_
AES_128_GCM_SHA256 or
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_
AES_256_GCM_SHA384
RFC 5289
RFC 5246, FIPS
197 (AES)
NIST SP800-38D
(AES-GCM)
NIST SP800-38A
(AES_CBC)
RFC-2104
(HMAC)
128 or 256
bit
BSI-TR-
03109-3 [15]
2029+
ECKA-EG key
agreement and
Key derivation
ElGamal Key Agreement
(ECKA-EG):
ecka-eg X963KDF-SHA256
ecka-eg X963KDF-SHA384
ecka-eg X963KDF-SHA512
TR-03111, §4.1.3
TR-03111, $4.3.3
by Usage of the
security modules
services
128 bit
192 bit
256 bit
BSI-TR-
03109-3 [15]
2029+
AES Key
wrap /unwrap
Advanced Encryption
Standard (AES) Key Wrap
Algorithm with AES-ECB:
id-aes128-wrap
id-aes192-wrap
id-aes256-wrap
RFC-3394
FIPS 197
128 bit
192 bit
256 bit
BSI-TR-
03109-1-I [14]
2029+
Key generation Generation of symmetric AES
keys
PTG.3 128 bit
192 bit
256 bit
BSI-TR-
03109-3 [15]
BSI-TR-
03109-1-I [14]
2029+
Encryption +
Integrity
protection
AES_GCM FIPS Pub. 197
NIST-SP800-38D
RFC 5084
128 bit
192 bit
256 bit
BSI-TR-
03109-1-I [14]
BSI-TR-
03109-3 [15]
2029+
18 / 26
BSI-DSZ-CC-1000-2023 Certification Report
Purpose Cryptographic Mechanism Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in
Bits
Standard of
Application
Validity
Period
Decryption +
Integrity
protection
AES_GCM, AES_CBC_CMAC FIPS Pub. 197
NIST-SP800-38D
RFC 5652
128 bit
192 bit
256 bit
BSI-TR-
03109-3 [15]
BSI-TR-
03109-1-I [14]
2029+
Key-generation Key-generation of the shared
secret via TRNG of the
security module
Key derivation of MK’ for
symmetrical
encryption/decryption and
integrity protection via AES-
CMAC
Key-generation for the TLS
session according to
FCS_CKM.1.1/TLS
PTG.3 MK’ and keys
for
symmetrical
encryption/
decryption:
128 bit
TLS:
According to
FCS_
CKM.1.1/TL
S
BSI-TR-
03109-3 [15]
BSI-TR-
03116-3
§7.1.1 [16]
2029+
Symmetrical
encryption
/decryption and
integrity
protection
AES-CMAC BSI TR 03116-3
§7.2
RFC 4493
128 bit BSI-TR-
03109-3 [15]
BSI-TR-
03116-3 §7.2
[16]
2029+
Encryption,
Decryption
AES_CBC FIPS-197
ISO/IEC 18033-
2:2006
128 bit BSI-TR-
03109-3 [15]
2029+
Integrity
protection
AES-CMAC FIPS-197
RFC4493
128 bit BSI-TR-
03109-3 [15]
2029+
Key
Destruction
Key overwriting and non-
volatile memory zeroization
- - -
Strong Hash/
Integrity
protection
SHA-256
SHA-384
SHA-512
FIPS-180-4 - BSI-TR-
03109-3[15]
2029+
Encryption,
Decryption
AES_256_XTS IEEE 1619 2 keys each
256 bit
BSI-TR-
02102 [17]
2029+
Table 3: TOE cryptographic functionality
The strength of these cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this
certification procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
According to TR-03116-3 [15] or TR-02102-1 [16], the algorithms are suitable for Smart
Metering Systems.
19 / 26
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1000-2023
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9 has
to be considered by the user and his system risk management process, too.
If available, certified updates of the TOE should be used. If non-certified updates or
patches are available the user of the TOE should request the sponsor to provide a re-
certification. In the meantime a risk management process of the system using the TOE
should investigate and decide on the usage of not yet certified updates and patches or
take additional measures in order to maintain system security.
11. Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report.
12. Definitions
12.1. Acronyms
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CBC Cyber Block Chain
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
CMS Cryptographic Message Syntax
cPP Collaborative Protection Profile
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
EC Elliptic Curve
ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptograph
ECKA ElGamal Key Agreement
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
GCM Galois/Counter Mode
GWA Gateway Administrator
HAN Home Area Network
HMAC Keyed- Hashing for Message Authentication
20 / 26
BSI-DSZ-CC-1000-2023 Certification Report
HTTP Hypertext Transfer Protocol
HTTPS Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure
IP Internet Protocol
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
LMN Local Metrological Network
LTE Long Term Evolution
MAC Message Authentication Code
PP Protection Profile
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SIM Subscriber Identity Module
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SMGW Smart Meter Gateway
SMPF Smart Metering Platform Framework
SSH Secure Shell
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
WAN Wide Area Network
TSF TOE Security Functionality
12.2. Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Package - named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements
Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
21 / 26
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1000-2023
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
13. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 4, September 2012
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 4, September 2012
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 4, September 2012
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012,
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[3] BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) and Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility,
approval and licencing (CC-Stellen), https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE7
https://www.bsi.bund.de/AIS
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
on the BSI Website, https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierungsreporte
[6] Technical Specification Security Target Smart Grid Hub – Secure, BSI-DSZ-CC-
1000-2023, Version 1.22, 06.09.2023, EFR GmbH
[7] Evaluation Technical Report Summary Secure Smart Grid Hub, Certification ID BSI-
DSZ-CC-1000, Version 1.3.2, 06.09.2023, SRC Security Research & Consulting
GmbH (confidential document)
[8] Protection Profile for the Gateway of a Smart Metering System, Version 1.3, 31
March 2014, BSI-CC-PP-0073-2014, 11.12.2014, German Federal Office for
Information Security
[9] Protection Profile for the Security Module of a Smart Meter Gateway (Security
Module PP), Version 1.03, BSI-CC-PP-0077-V2-2015, German Federal Office for
Information Security
7
specifically
• AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
• AIS 34, Version 3, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL 5+ (CCv2.3 &
CCv3.1) and EAL 6 (CCv3.1)
• AIS 46, Version 3, Informationen zur Evaluierung von kryptographischen Algorithmen und
ergänzende Hinweise für die Evaluierung von Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 48, Version 1.0, Anforderungen an die Prüfung von Sicherheitsetiketten
22 / 26
BSI-DSZ-CC-1000-2023 Certification Report
[10] CC Assurance Komponenten ALC_CMS “Konfigurations-Management-Scope Kon-
figurationsliste”, v1.13, 30.08.2023, EFR GmbH (confidential document)
[11] Servicetechniker Handbuch für das Smart-Meter-Gateway (SMGW) Secure Smart
Grid Hub EFR SGH-S, V1.19, 15.06..2023, EFR GmbH
[12] Produkthandbuch GWA für den Smart Meter Gateway Administrator (GWA) für das
Smart-Meter-Gateway (SMGW) Secure Smart Grid Hub EFR SGH-S, V1.22,
05.07.2023, EFR GmbH
[13] Handbuch für Endnutzer für das Smart-Meter-Gateway (SMGW) Secure Smart Grid
Hub EFR SGH-S, v1.07, 31.07.2023, EFR GmbH
[14] Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-03109-1-I Anforderungen an die Interoperabilität der
Kommunikationseinheit eines intelligenten Messsystems, Version 1.1, 17.
September 2021, German Federal Office for Information Security
[15] TR-03109-3 Kryptographische Vorgaben für die Infrastruktur von intelligenten
Messsystemen; Version 1.1; 17.04.2014, German Federal Office for Information
Security
[16] Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-03116 Kryptographische Vorgaben für Projekte der
Bundesregierung, Teil 3: Intelligente Messsysteme, Stand 2023, 06.12.2022,
German Federal Office for Information Security
[17] Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102-1 Kryptographische Verfahren: Empfehlungen
und Schlüssellängen, Version 2020-01, 04.03.2020, German Federal Office for
Information Security
[18] Standard of Implementation:
BSI TR-03111, Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC), Version 2.10, 2018, German
Federal Office for Information Security
[FIPS 180-4] NIST FIPS PUB 180-4: Secure Hash Standard (SHS). NIST, 2015.
[FIPS 197] NIST FIPS PUB 197: Announcing the ADVANCED ENCRYPTION
STANDARD (AES). NIST, 2001.
[NIST SP800-38A] NIST SP800-38A: Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation: Methods and Techniques. NIST, 2001
[NIST SP800-38D] NIST SP800-38D: Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC. NIST, 2007.
[RFC 2104] Network Working Group RFC 2104, H. Krawczyk et al.: HMAC: Keyed-
Hashing for Message Authentication. Network Working Group, Feb. 1997
[RFC 3394] IETF RFC 3394, J. Schaad, R. Housley: Advanced Encryption
Standard(AES) Key Wrap Algorithm. IETF, 2002.
[RFC 4493] IETF RFC 4493, J. H. Song, J. Lee, T. Iwata: The AES-CMAC-
Algorithm. IETF, 2006
[RFC 5084] IETF RFC 5084, R. Housley: Using AES-CCM and AES-GCM
Authenticated Encryption in the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS). IETF, 2007.
[RFC5246] RFC 5246 - The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol, Version 1.2,
Dierks & Rescorla - Standard Track, August 2008
[RFC 5289] IETF RFC 5289, E. Rescorla: TLS Elliptic Curve Cipher Suites with
SHA-256/384 and AES Galois Counter Mode (GCM). IETF, 2008.
23 / 26
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1000-2023
[RFC 5652] IETF RFC 5652, R. Housley, Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS),
2009
[ISO/ IEC 18033-2:2006] Information technology - Security techniques - Encryption
algorithms - Part 2:Asymmetric ciphers, 2006
[IEEE 1619] IEEE 1619-2018, IEEE Standard for Cryptographic Protection of Data
on Block-Oriented Storage Devices, 2018
24 / 26
BSI-DSZ-CC-1000-2023 Certification Report
C. Excerpts from the Criteria
For the meaning of the assurance components and levels the following references to the
Common Criteria can be followed:
• On conformance claim definitions and descriptions refer to CC part 1 chapter 10.4
• On the concept of assurance classes, families and components refer to CC Part 3
chapter 7.1
• On the concept and definition of pre-defined assurance packages (EAL) refer to CC
Part 3 chapters 7.2 and 8
• On the assurance class ASE for Security Target evaluation refer to CC Part 3
chapter 11
• On the detailed definitions of the assurance components for the TOE evaluation
refer to CC Part 3 chapters 12 to 16
• The table in CC part 3 , Annex E summarizes the relationship between the
evaluation assurance levels (EAL) and the assurance classes, families and
components.
The CC are published at https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/cc/
25 / 26
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1000-2023
D. Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
Note: End of report
26 / 26