BSI-DSZ-CC-1216-2024
for
secunet eID PKI Suite Certified CA Kernel SC
Version 3.0.0
from
secunet Security Networks AG
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V5.47
BSI-DSZ-CC-1216-2024 (*)
Certificate Issuing and Management Component
secunet eID PKI Suite Certified CA Kernel SC
Version 3.0.0
from secunet Security Networks AG
PP Conformance: None
Functionality: Product specific Security Target
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by ALC_FLR.2
valid until: 07 March 2029
The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation
facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1
extended by Scheme Interpretations for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT
Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1. CC and CEM are also published as ISO/IEC 15408
and ISO/IEC 18045.
(*) This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report and
Notification. For details on the validity see Certification Report part A chapter 5.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification
scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions
of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for
Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is
either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 8 March 2024
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Sandro Amendola L.S.
Director-General
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 87 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
SOGIS
Recognition Agreement
Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
recognition for components
up to EAL 2 and ALC_FLR
only
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1216-2024
This page is intentionally left blank.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1216-2024 Certification Report
Contents
A. Certification....................................................................................................................6
1. Preliminary Remarks...................................................................................................6
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure..............................................................6
3. Recognition Agreements.............................................................................................7
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification...............................................................8
5. Validity of the Certification Result................................................................................8
6. Publication..................................................................................................................9
B. Certification Results.....................................................................................................10
1. Executive Summary..................................................................................................11
2. Identification of the TOE............................................................................................14
3. Security Policy..........................................................................................................17
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope....................................................................17
5. Architectural Information...........................................................................................19
6. Documentation..........................................................................................................20
7. IT Product Testing.....................................................................................................20
8. Evaluated Configuration............................................................................................24
9. Results of the Evaluation..........................................................................................25
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE....................................................29
11. Security Target........................................................................................................29
12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES).............................................................29
13. Definitions...............................................................................................................29
14. Bibliography............................................................................................................31
C. Excerpts from the Criteria............................................................................................33
D. Annexes.......................................................................................................................34
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1216-2024
A. Certification
1. Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● Act on the Federal Office for Information Security1
● BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance2
● BMI Regulations on Ex-parte Costs3
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern und für Heimat (Federal
Ministry of the Interior and Community)
● DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) [3]
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility, its
approval and licencing process (CC-Stellen) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.14
[1] also published as
ISO/IEC 15408
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
2
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung - BSIZertV) of 17 December
2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231
3
BMI Regulations on Ex-parte Costs - Besondere Gebührenverordnung des BMI für individuell
zurechenbare öffentliche Leistungen in dessen Zuständigkeitsbereich (BMIBGebV), Abschnitt 7 (BSI-
Gesetz) - dated 2 September 2019, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1365
6 / 34
BSI-DSZ-CC-1216-2024 Certification Report
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published
as ISO/IEC 18045
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
3. Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
3.1. European Recognition of CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS
Technical Domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL 1 to EAL 4. For "Smartcards and similar devices" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in
place. For "HW Devices with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too.
In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of
the recognition agreement.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on
recognition, and the history of the agreement can be seen on the website at
https://www.sogis.eu.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the related bodies of the signatory nations. A disclaimer
beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of recognition.
This certificate is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected.
3.2. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC
(Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08
September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP)
(exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or
the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection
Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on
the website: https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the related bodies
of the signatory nations. A disclaimer beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of
recognition.
This certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2014, i. e. up to and including
CC part 3 EAL 2 and ALC_FLR components.
4
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern und für Heimat of 12 February 2007 in the
Bundesanzeiger dated 23 February 2007, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1216-2024
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product secunet eID PKI Suite Certified CA Kernel SC, Version 3.0.0 has undergone
the certification procedure at BSI.
The evaluation of the product secunet eID PKI Suite Certified CA Kernel SC, Version 3.0.0
was conducted by SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH. The evaluation was
completed on 7 March 2024. SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH is an evaluation
facility (ITSEF)5
recognised by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: secunet Security Networks
AG.
The product was developed by: secunet Security Networks AG.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
5. Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report applies only to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance components and assurance levels please refer to CC
itself. Detailed references are listed in part C of this report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-assessment or
re-certification). Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation
and certification procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk
management needs regularly updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-
assessment on a regular e.g. annual basis.
In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved attack methods would
require a re-assessment of the products resistance to state of the art attack methods, the
maximum validity of the certificate has been limited. The certificate issued on 8 March
2024 is valid until 07 March 2029. Validity can be re-newed by re-certification.
The owner of the certificate is obliged:
1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product's certification, to refer to
the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report, the Security
Target and user guidance documentation mentioned herein to any customer of the
product for the application and usage of the certified product,
5
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1216-2024 Certification Report
2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of the
product that have been identified by the developer or any third party after issuance
of the certificate,
3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security relevant
changes in the evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and production sites
or processes, occur, or the confidentiality of documentation and information related
to the Target of Evaluation (TOE) or resulting from the evaluation and certification
procedure where the certification of the product has assumed this confidentiality
being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of
confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the
evaluation and certification procedure that do not belong to the deliverables
according to the Certification Report part B, or for those where no dissemination
rules have been agreed on, to third parties, the Certification Body at BSI has to be
informed.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
6. Publication
The product secunet eID PKI Suite Certified CA Kernel SC, Version 3.0.0 has been
included in the BSI list of certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet:
https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline
+49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer6
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
6
secunet Security Networks AG
Kurfürstenstraße 58
45138 Essen
Deutschland
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1216-2024
B. Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1216-2024 Certification Report
1. Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the product secunet eID PKI Suite Certified CA Kernel
SC Version 3.0.0 provided by secunet Security Networks AG. The TOE is a CA
(Certification Authority) Kernel that provides request, issuance, revocation, and overall
management of certificates and certificate status information.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is not based on a certified
Protection Profile7
.
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 4
augmented by ALC_FLR.2.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6], chapter 7. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and some of
them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionality:
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
SF1.1 Audit message
generation
The Audit (also called Audit system or Audit unit) logs the security-relevant
events that were performed by the TOE.
These events are either triggered internally or by external
components/users via Java methods. That is the CA-Core logs amongst
others every event and the appropriate event state, in the case that this
event triggers a process of the CA-Core.
The CA-Core generates audit messages for the following auditable events:
● Startup and shutdown of the audit functions and
● further security-relevant events
These audit messages are sent to the Audit.
If the audit trail is full the TOE shutdowns.
SF1.2 Audit trail protection After audit message generation the Audit unit of the TOE generates
uniquely identifiable audit messages, so called audit records.
The Audit is able to associate each auditable event with the identity of the
user that caused the event as the identity (UserIdentity) is contained in the
audit record.
The Audit is able to select the set of events to be audited from the set of all
auditable events based on the following attributes contained in the audit
record (see Section 12.2 of [6]: object identity (Module), user identity
(UserIdentity) and event type (EventType).
The TOE triggers that a set of these chronological ordered audit records
(called audit trail) are periodically signed by means of a digital signature by
the Hardware Security Module, resulting in a so called protected audit trail
(see Sections 12.3 and 12.4 of [6]. This period is configurable. In order to
protect audit messages against modification or deletion the Audit uses
timestamps (OE.Time stamps) and sequence numbers.
7
Even though it doesn’t claim conformance to it, this ST is heavily based on the PP “Certificate Issuing and
Management Component” [8]
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1216-2024
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
The Audit also triggers further cryptographic operations with HSM to protect
the audit messages. The Audit needs three different cryptographic keys to
protect the audit trails. It needs two asymmetric key pairs, one signature
key pair (ASK) and one encryption key (AEK) and also one current
symmetric trail record key (TRK). All these keys are generated within and
stored on the HSM. The asymmetric keys are generated during the
bootstrap process of the TOE (see Section 2.7 of [6]). Audit records and
audit trails are stored via Java-API in the Adapter.
‍
SF2 Management of the TSF At the first startup the CA-Core has no configuration. Thus, the CA-Core
must first be configured via the Java-API. The Administrator shall specify
the acceptable set of certificate extensions.
The CA-Core performs the same checks for Java configuration method as
described in SF3.2. That is certificate validation, signature verification,
challenge/identity check and role check. If all checks succeed, the Audit
generates an audit log (see SF1.1) and the CA-Core triggers the generation
of a new symmetric key within HSM (see SF6). Then the CA-Core triggers
HMAC (RFC2104) protection (see SF6) of the configuration within HSM.
Finally the CA-Core stores the HMAC protected configuration via Java-API
to the Adapter.
In order to prevent replay every change of a configuration requires that the
CA-Core triggers the generation of a new symmetric key (see SF6) and the
deletion of the formerly used symmetric key within HSM.
If a configuration is needed during processing the CA-Core loads all
information via Java-API from the Adapter.
Then the CA-Core verifies the HMAC (see SF6). If HMAC verification fails
the Audit generates an audit log record (see SF1.1) and the CA-Core does
not further continue processing. If HMAC verification succeeds the CA-Core
Job processing is continued.
‍
SF3.1 Challenge Request
and Response
In order to prevent replay the CA-Core triggers a challenge-response
algorithm. In a first step the external component must request a challenge
via Adapter from the CA-Core. The CA-Core then triggers generation of a
challenge (10 Byte). The Environment’s Deterministic Random Number
Generator (DRNG) of the CA Card is used to generate the challenge. The
CA-Core then stores the challenge with the user identification given in the
request (it is possible to have more than one challenge per user at any
given time) and sends the challenge back to the external component via
Adapter. Now the external component may request Job processing via
Adapter in a second step. A Job must contain amongst others the requested
challenge and must be signed with the user’s private key.
‍
SF3.2 Remote Data entry
Verification, Authorization
and Challenge Verification
Before CA-Core starts a particular process it performs the following checks
to ensure the integrity of the consigned Java method data: The CA-Core
● performs user certificate validation and the appropriate certificate chain
validation,
● performs the signature verification with all consigned data,
● checks whether the given challenge and the signature identity matches a
stored challenge/identity, and
● checks whether the role of the signature identity has the right to perform
the requested process (for example creating a new certificate or a new
certification revocation list). The security attribute role belongs to
individual users. The allowed roles are: Administrator, Auditor and Officer.
The right to modify configuration files and profiles and to modify the
security attribute role is limited to Administrators.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1216-2024 Certification Report
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
If all checks succeed, the Audit generates an audit log record (see SF1.1)
and starts request processing. If a check fails, the Audit generates an audit
log record (see SF1.1) and the CA-Core does not start request processing.
‍
SF4 Certificate and
Certificate Status
management
The TOE triggers generation of X.509 certificates and CRLs according to
the standards X.509v3 and RFC 5280.
In addition to this, the TOE also generates CVC for EAC e-Passport
infrastructure according to the BSI TR-03110 standard.
The TOE maintains via Adapter all issued certificates and their current state
in a database, in order to serve status information. Status information of
certificates is made available through CRLs and delta CRLs (RFC 5280).
‍
SF4.1 Certificate Generation In case of a certificate request the CA-Core
● validates the certificate request against the loaded CAProfile,
● triggers signature verification of the certificate request within HSM,
● transforms the CAProfile and merge it with the certificate request into a
certification template,
● triggers signing of certificate template to generate a certificate within
HSM (see SF6) and
● returns the new certificate via Java-API to the Adapter.
‍
SF4.2 Certificate Revocation In case of a certificate revocation list request the CA-Core
● merges the CRLProfile and the list of revoked certificates into the
certificate revocation list template,
● triggers singing of the certificate revocation list template within the
environment (CA Card) (see SF6) and
● returns the new certificate revocation list via Java-API to the Adapter.
‍
SF4.3 Certificate Status Ex-
port
Issued CRLs are stored via Java-API in the Adapter.
‍
SF5 Access Control The TOE enforces the CIMC TOE Access Control Policy specified in
Section 10.1 in [6]. The access to resources in the TOE is controlled using
access control lists, based on:
● access rule – accept or decline access to a resource,
● resource – a resource to which access is controlled,
● user – an entity that have access rights to a resource,
● role – a role that a user is allowed to take on. Since access rules are
defined on a role, so for a user to have access rights he must be
assigned roles.
When a controlled resource is accessed, the CA-Core verifies that the caller
meets the appropriate access rules for the resource and, if not, denies
access and generates an error. If there are no access rules associated to
the resource, access is denied. The TOE access control system maps
authentication information to a user entity. The entity is then associated to a
role in order to acquire privileges.
‍
SF6 Cryptographic Key
Management
For cryptographic operations the TOE partly relies on its environment. An
external key storage is used to generate key material, to store these keys
and to execute cryptographic operations with them. In addition, the TOE
implements some cryptographic primitives by itself. All in all, three entities
are involved in the cryptographic implementation of the TOE:
The CA Card (environment)
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1216-2024
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
The CA Card generates, stores and allows the use of EC keys for a CA.
The CA Card supports the algorithms as defined in Table 1 in [6].
The CA Card also holds an AES key that is used for encryption/decryption
of audit trails, the data store in the environment and the
encryption/decryption of the core configuration. Please note however that
the CA Card is only used to generate these keys while the actual encryption
and decryption is performed by the TOE.
The TOE
The TOE itself implements the cryptographic primitives as defined in Table
2 in [6] and securely deletes cryptographic keys if not longer used.
The TOE also provides a hash base deterministic random number
generator. It should be noted that [8] contains stipulations about the
implementation of cryptographic primitives in the environment. These
requirements are not met by the description in this Security Target. This is
the main reason that this Security Target does not claim conformance to [8].
The integrity and authenticity of keys stored by the TOE in the environment
is protected by the usage of a digital signature, namely of the digital
certificate structure in which it has been included. Every time a public key
(which is stored in form of a certificate) needs to be used to perform any
cryptographic operation, its protective digital signature will be verified and,
in case of failure, an audit log entry (see SF1.1) will be generated and the
key will be marked as tampered with, becoming unusable for all types of
operations.
The TOE triggers or performs zeroizing private keys in the environment and
within the TOE, if required.
The TOE may trigger the cryptographic operations within its environment
which includes amongst others all cryptographic operations required.
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 11.1.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6], chapter 4.1.
Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of Assumptions,
Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [6],
chapter 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5.
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2. Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1216-2024 Certification Report
secunet eID PKI Suite Certified CA Kernel SC, Version 3.0.0
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
1 SW Certified CA Kernel SC (zip file)
Secunet_eID_PKI_Suite_Certified-CAKernel-
3_0_0.zip that contains the items from no. 2 – 9:
3.0.0 Delivered as download
via secunet Download-
Portal
2 SW JAR archive with the Certified CA Kernel SC
functionality,
CertifiedCAKernel.jar
SHA256 sum:
49be126b2c17bcba5cbae860f9a55bef5b52c429f30
b723b2ed3575fd6a695a3
3.0.0 Contained within no. 1
3 SW JAR archive with the SinacardHandler functionality,
HSMHandlerSinacard.jar
SHA256 sum:
4baf577b06be37889f72a66dba0f4207359fe2e69f6f
1886b7c8b12f4ec0038f
3.0.0 Contained within no. 1
4 SW Batch file with bootstrapping functionality for
Windows,
bootstrap.bat
SHA256 sum:
5429697a7e211e9fc9ce54df0525813f360f18363c71
0a8b3172be72fe31b8d1
3.0.0 Contained within no. 1
‍
5 SW Shell file with bootstrapping functionality for Linux,
bootstrap.sh
SHA256 sum:
6cbb191551c066606e951c4e598d152e51e2079a0
a85dd5bb4b37b303b0312d3
3.0.0 Contained within no. 1
‍
6 SW Public key for signature verification:
Can be used for verification of the signature of the
zip file (after verification of its fingerprint, see
section 2.2),
PublicSignatureKey.pem
SHA256 sum:
4f3e5d2e1a733eb6ff12f8a0663e6e904b4c8e5cf8a7
805eb773db7875643cbe
- Contained within no. 1
‍
7 DOC Manual including API documentation Manual
Certified CA Kernel.pdf [10],
SHA256 sum:
e3fcc7fac60ab1ba789a98e15588ea2197d00eb420
94ed06c52f6d8a9da73e34
javadoc-cc.zip [11],
SHA256 sum:
53f1ea14696ceb209dfb009a1e603b21cade7d72d3
b4cde1c83ccb1e82d50cd2
3.6.6 Contained within no. 1
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1216-2024
‍
8 DOC Release Notes [12] (information about TOE
changes, Bugfixes etc.),
ReleaseNotes.pdf
SHA256 sum:
7ff5434cbf1d6eee2331e6c100a34fec13579e17521
08e5b1f1be57cad8e2918
3.0.0 Contained within no. 1
‍
9 DOC Security Target [6] secunet eID PKI Suite Certified
CA Kernel SC Security Target,
Security Target Certified CA KernelSC.pdf
SHA256 sum:
fe25bba6300b16124c2bd89b77676cba331aeb9000
7a5249162c251f5fc85f2e
3.3.4 Contained within no. 1
‍
10 DOC Signature over ZIP file containing all previous items
SHA256 sum:
7f851b4a1541a5b732e9b8e31939672870b06ffdde3
f40b10f66ebfc694d71e0
- The signature is not part
of the zip file but
delivered separately
with the TOE download.
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
2.1. TOE Delivery
The eID PKI Certified CA Kernel SC is delivered in binary form as a signed zip file via
download from the secunet download portal. The software used by the download portal is
TS FileX version 1.2. The download portal enforces https with server authentication with a
X.509 server certificate. The web server supports TLS 1.2.
The download file is uploaded onto the download server by the product manager, which is
not possible without their authentication via their username and download server
password. After successful upload the product manager gets an e-mail which contains the
one-time customer password and the URL for the download portal which the customer
uses to download the TOE. The ID for the download URL is automatically generated. One-
time customer password, download URL and information about the TOE version are
forwarded to the customer via e-mail. After the customer has downloaded the TOE, the
download portal generates a notification e-mail and sends it to the product manager so
they can retrace the download.
2.2. Identification of the TOE by the User
In section 11.3 of [10] it is explained in detail how to check the authenticity and integrity of
the delivered items. For a first step, the signature of the zip-file must be checked. For this
purpose, the user has to verify the signature with help of the delivered public key and the
accompanying correct fingerprint.
The fingerprint of the key that can be used for verification of the integrity and authenticity
of the delivered items is:
SHA-256: 5040af99068e11769776f4ed5b47394f6836b6f7796f34edd1668d55a206a4e5
The fingerprint can also be found in the Security Target [6]. If the fingerprint is not correct,
the delivery procedure must be repeated in accordance with section 11.2 of [10]. In case
the verification of the signature fails, the customer is not allowed to use the downloaded
file and the delivery procedure must be repeated in accordance with 11.2 of [10].
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The Version of the CertifiedCAKernelSC library can be obtained by opening the JAR-File
with any archive tool. The version is printed in the file MANIFEST.MF (see [10], section
11.3).
3. Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues: The TOE implements logical
security functionality in order to provide Registration Authority (RA) functionality to verify
the information in the public key certificates and determine the certificate status and CA
functionality to generate certificates and certificate status information as well as audit data
generation according example CIMC-3 (single component) of CIMC PP [8]8
. Specific
details concerning the above mentioned security functionalities can be found in sec. 7 of
[6].
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are
of relevance:
● OE.Administrators, Officers and Auditors guidance documentation:
Deter Administrator, Officer or Auditor errors by providing adequate documentation on
securely configuring and operating the CIMC.
● OE.Auditors Review Audit Logs:
Identify and monitor security-relevant events by requiring auditors to review audit logs on
a frequency sufficient to address level of risk.
● OE.Authentication Data Management:
Ensure that users change their authentication data at appropriate intervals and to
appropriate values (e.g., proper lengths, histories, variations, etc.) through enforced
authentication data management (Note: this objective is not applicable to biometric
authentication data.)
● OE.Communications Protection:
Protect the system against a physical attack on the communications capability by
providing adequate physical security.
● OE.Competent Administrators, Officers and Auditors:
Provide capable management of the TOE by assigning competent Administrators,
Officers and Auditors to manage the TOE and the security of the information it contains.
Only non-hostile people are entrusted with administrative tasks.
● OE.Cooperative Users:
Ensure that users are cooperative so that they can accomplish some task or group of
tasks that require a secure IT environment and information managed by the TOE.
● OE.CPS:
All Administrators, Officers and Auditors shall be familiar with the certificate policy (CP)
and the certification practices statement (CPS) under which the TOE is operated.
8
Even though it does not claim conformance to it, this ST is heavily based on the PP “Certificate Issuing and
Management Component” [8]
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● OE.Detect modifications of firmware, software, and backup data:
Provide integrity protection to detect modifications to firmware, software, and backup
data.
● OE.Disposal of Authentication Data:
Provide proper disposal of authentication data and associated privileges after access
has been removed (e.g., Job termination, change in responsibility).
● OE.HSM9
:
The smart card in the environment (CA Card) that is used by the TOE shall only be used
exclusively by the TOE. That is no other IT component is allowed to use the smart card.
● OE.Installation:
Those responsible for the TOE must ensure that the TOE is delivered, installed,
managed, and operated in a manner which maintains IT security.
● OE.Lifecycle security:
Provide tools and techniques used during the development phase to ensure security is
designed into the CIMC. Detect and resolve flaws during the operational phase.
● OE.Malicious Code Not Signed:
Protect the TOE from malicious code by ensuring all code is signed by a trusted entity
prior to loading it into the system.
● OE.Notify Authorities of Security Issues:
Notify proper authorities of any security issues that impact their systems to minimize the
potential for the loss or compromise of data.
● OE.Object and data recovery free from malicious code:
Recover to a viable state after malicious code is introduced and damage occurs. That
state must be free from the original malicious code.
● OE.Operating System:
The operating system used is validated to provide adequate security, including domain
separation and non-bypassability, in accordance with security requirements
recommended by the National Institute of Standards and Technology.
● OE.Periodically check integrity:
Provide periodic integrity checks on both system and software.
● OE.Physical Protection:
Those responsible for the TOE must ensure that the security-relevant components of the
TOE and non-TOE are protected from physical attack that might compromise IT security.
● OE.Preservation/trusted recovery of secure state:
Preserve the secure state of the system in the event of a secure component failure
and/or recover to a secure state.
● OE.Procedures for preventing malicious code:
Incorporate malicious code prevention procedures and mechanisms.
● OE.Repair identified security flaws:
The vendor repairs security flaws that have been identified by a user.
● OE.Require inspection for downloads:
Require inspection of downloads/transfers.
9
Even though the CA Kernel SC does not use a HSM, the name of the OE was kept out of convenience.
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● OE.Security-relevant configuration management:
Manage and update system security policy data and enforcement functions, and other
security-relevant configuration data, to ensure they are consistent with organizational
security policies.
● OE.Social Engineering Training:
Provide training for general users, Administrators, Officers and Auditors in techniques to
thwart social engineering attacks.
● OE.Sufficient backup storage and effective restoration:
Provide sufficient backup storage and effective restoration to ensure that the system can
be recreated.
● OE.Time stamps:
Provide time stamps to ensure that the sequencing of events can be verified.
● OE.Trusted Path:
Provide a trusted path between the user and the system. Provide a trusted path to
security-relevant (TSF) data in which both end points have assured identities.
● OE.Validation of security function:
Ensure that security-relevant software, hardware, and firmware are correctly functioning
through features and procedures.
● OE.Cryptographic functions:
Provide algorithms for authentication and signature generation/verification; key
generation techniques. Please refer to chapter 1.2.1.1 of [6] for more details on the
required algorithms.
Details can be found in the Security Target [6], chapter 5.2.
5. Architectural Information
The TOE is a CA (Certification Authority) Kernel that provides request, issuance,
revocation, and overall management of certificates and certificate status information. The
secunet eID PKI Suite Certified CA Kernel SC supports Extended Access Control
Certification Authorities (EAC CAs,) according Technical Guideline BSI TR-03110 and
International Civil Aviation Organization CAs (ICAO CAs), which are X.509 CAs according
ITU-T X.509. For cryptographic operations the secunet CA Kernel SC relies on a
smartcard in the environment as well as cryptographic functionality implemented by the
TOE itself.
The Certified CA Kernel SC provides Registration Authority (RA) functionality as well as
CA functionality according the CIMC PP [8].
The security functions of the TOE are:
● SF1 Security Audit
• SF1.1 Audit message generation
• SF1.2 Audit trail protection
● SF2 Management of the TSF
● SF3 Data Authenticity and Authorization
• SF3.1 Challenge Request and Response
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• SF3.2 Remote Data entry Verification, Authorization and Challenge Verification
● SF4 Certificate and Certificate Status management
• SF4.1 Certificate Generation
• SF4.2 Certificate Revocation
• SF4.3 Certificate Status Export
● SF5 Access Control
● SF6 Cryptographic Key Management
According to the TOE design specification these security functions are enforced by the
following subsystems:
● System (supports the TSF SF1, SF2, SF3, SF4, SF5, SF6)
• The subsystem System provides methods for the subsystems Audit, CACore and
supports Bootstrap for the secure initialization.
● Audit (supports the TSF SF1)
• Audit interacts with the subsystem system and provides message generation and
protect Audit trails
● CA-Core (supports the TSFs SF2 and SF4)
• The subsystem CA-Core interacts with the subsystem System and provides the main
functionalities of the TOE
● Bootstrapping
• The subsystem bootstrapping interacts with subsystem System and CA-Core, to
ensure a secure initialization and boot process on the first initialization of the TOE.
6. Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7. IT Product Testing
7.1. Test Summary
The developer tested all TOE security functions. For all commands and functionality tests,
test cases were specified in order to demonstrate its expected behaviour including error
cases. Hereby a representative sample including all boundary values of the parameter set
were tested and all functions were tested with valid and invalid inputs. Repetition of
developer tests were performed during the independent evaluator tests.
During their testing, the evaluators covered
● Testing of all developer tests and
● additional evaluator tests
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● Vulnerability analysis
The evaluators have tested the TOE systematically against enhanced basic attack
potential during their testing.
The achieved test results correspond to the expected test results.
7.2. Developer Testing
TOE test configuration
The TOE was tested in the secunet testing environment in two ways: In the lab
environment the TOE was installed on a standard PC fulfilling the requirements from
chapter 1.2.3 of [6]. It was connected to multiple card readers which contained the CA
Cards. The CA Cards used for developer testing were the Javacard and the STARCOS 3.5
card in the testing scenario with real cards and the STARCOS 3.5 card in the testing
scenario with virtual cards. This environment was tested using the operating system
RedHat Enterprise 7. In the virtual environment the TOE was run on a virtual machine
(VirtualBox) with virtual smartcards and a key file as a PIN pad substitute. These tests
were conducted using all four operating systems (RedHat 7, RedHat 8, Windows Server
2016, Windows Server 2019). Besides the requirements described in chapter 1.2.3 of [6]
the test environment also needed to fulfil the security objectives for the environment. The
TOE environment and the related test equipment for the tests were consistent with the
described ones in [6] and [10].
The developer test configuration for the virtual environment and the test protocols were
provided to the evaluator.
Testing approach
The developer specified and implemented test cases for each defined subsystem. The test
cases are divided into tests of the CA-Core, Audit, System, Bootstrapping and
Miscellaneous. Thus all subsystems are covered by several test cases.
For the tests of the TOE the developer used the JUnit testing framework. In this framework
test cases are implemented in Java. Each test is implemented as a Java method. The
tests can be run and the frameworks shows whether the test was successful. To create
extensive log files as required for the evaluation the developer changed the default
behaviour of the testing framework, so additional information about the testing is logged.
Testing Results
The results of the TOE tests suggest a correct implementation. All test cases were
executed successfully and ended up with the expected result.
7.3. Independent Evaluator Tests
Overview
The independent testing was performed using the developer’s test software environment.
The configuration of the TOE being intended to be covered by the current evaluation was
tested.
The overall test result was that no deviations were found between the expected and the
actual test results.
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Since the evaluator used the test environment of the developer, there was no deviation
between the developer test configuration and the evaluator test configuration.
The description of the required non-TOE hardware, software and firmware is described in
section 1.2.3 of [6]. Note that the developer conducted testing on all four supported
operating systems (RedHat 7, RedHat 8, Windows Server 2016, Windows Server 2019).
The evaluators repeated as a test sample all developer tests in the virtual test environment
with the simulated STARCOS 3.5 CA card on the operating system RedHat 8.
The entire developer test configuration and the test protocols were provided to the
evaluator.
Test Configuration
The evaluator used the same TOE test configuration as the developer, so the statement
from “TOE test configuration” above applies.
The description of the required non-TOE hardware, software and firmware is described in
chapter 1.2.3 of [6]. The following configuration was the configuration of the virtual
machine test setup:
● Smartcard Emulator: STARCOS 3.5
● RedHat 8 Operating System
For the tests of the TOE which were carried out at the evaluator’s site this configuration
was used.
The virtual test network used by the evaluators was only implemented with the VirtualBox
with RedHat Enterprise Version 8. One of the key features of Java is the abstraction of the
execution of the TOE from the operating system platform via the Java Virtual Machine, so
the direct execution environment is the JVM with its interface to the operating system.
Therefore the Java application behaves exactly the same, if no operating system specific
parameters libraries or frameworks are used, which is not the case for the TOE. Another
way to force a different behaviour on different operating system is by using the functions
provided by the System java class. To query the OS on which the JVM runs, the query
System.getProperty("os.name") can be added to the source code of a product that is not
tailored to a specific operating system platform. The query System.getProperty("*") is used
only twice in the delivered source code:
● In the Test Suite (AbstractHSMSettings and TestUser), but the Test Suite is not part of
the TOE.
● In file BootstrapHandler: During bootstrapping, the user directory of the current user is
determined via the query System.getProperty("user.dir"). Access to the user directory is
executed via the JVM and therefore platform-independent.
The evaluators checked the source code for these queries and found only the two
instances mentioned above. Therefore they came to the conclusion that the TOE is
platform-independent and therefore virtual testing of the TOE on only one platform is
sufficient.
The TOE was tested by the evaluators using the virtual secunet testing environment with
the specifications mentioned above, on a virtual machine image with RedHat Enterprise
Linux 8 and a STARCOS 3.5 Smartcard Simulator.
The developer provided the log files of his testing with the real smartcards, therefore the
evaluators could verify that their test environment acts as the TOE environment.
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Subset size chosen
As a chosen test subset the evaluators repeated all developer tests in the virtual test
environment with the simulated STARCOS 3.5 CA Card on the operating system RedHat
8.
Independent test subset chosen incl. a short justification:
The independent test subset consisted of seven individual tests. Each SFR-enforcing TSFI
was tested at least once. The following tests were conducted:
● The method changeCertificateStateAndDelete() is called on a Certificate with a
signature signed for another Certificate.
● The TOE must not allow commands other than getState in its secure state AuditError.
● The TOE does not create a new CA.
● After a manipulation of a trail the TOE goes into AuditError state. The audit logs can only
restored by an administrator, not by the role officer.
● The TOE must not start with an incorrect system configuration.
● Two consecutive trails are being corrupted (which is not possible under normal
operation). The method fixTrailStorage() is called first without the flag “forceInitialisation”
and then with the flag.
● The TOE creates two certificates and performs various changes on the states of the two
certificates.
For all evaluator tests the actual result matched the expected result and thus the tests
were executed successfully.
Developer’s test subset repeated incl. a short justification:
All developer tests were repeated by the evaluators. In all test cases the expected result
was met.
Verdict for the sub-activity:
The overall test result is that no deviations were found between the expected and the
actual test results.
Vulnerability analysis
The evaluator applied a methodical analysis to create a list of potential vulnerabilities. The
evaluators have conducted their search and have taken the following information into
account: All evaluation deliverables, in particular the ST and the deliverables for classes
ADV, AGD, ALC and ATE.
First, the evaluator created a list of potential vulnerabilities based on the results gained
while performing the vulnerability analysis. This list merely considered the current TOE
type / TOE specific technology / TOE specific implementation, but not its intended
operational environment. No further vulnerabilities were identified.
Secondly, the evaluator reconstructed the formal assumptions about the TOE operational
environment. In order to do this he referred to [6], section 5.1 and 5.2. The operational
environment does neither restrict nor extend vulnerabilities.
Having performed the analysis above, the evaluator found no remaining potential
vulnerabilities that may be exploitable in the intended TOE environment with the attack
potential enhanced basic.
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During the vulnerability analysis of the evaluator all potential attack methods and
vulnerabilities were discussed in a systematic way in accordance to the attack potential
enhanced basic.
According to the CEM [2] there must be a penetration test analysis for identified potential
vulnerabilities. Due to the fact that there are no potential vulnerabilities identified that are
not analysed in AVA there was no further penetration testing done by the evaluator.
The evaluators took the following approach to perform the vulnerability assessment of the
TOE. First the evaluators verified that the TOE configuration matches the one described in
the ST [6]. After that, the evaluators verified that the TOE is in a known state.
The evaluators examined publicly available information to find hints for potential
vulnerabilities in the TOE. This included gathering information about the TOE type and
common attacks against it as well as collect CVEs of the libraries used in the TOE and the
environment. Then the evaluators conducted a focused search of ST, guidance and all
other developer deliverables for the various evaluation aspects, to find potential
vulnerabilities. The evaluators searched for common implementation flaws for Java-based
applications. The advices in the OWASP TOP 10 for Java EE Guide and the CWE
Weaknesses Guide have been considered when reviewing the source code of the TOE.
Additionally the source code was verified using a static code analysis tool to detect
common errors.
None of these activities led to the need of additional penetration tests. Therefore, the
evaluators have performed no penetration tests.
The test results fulfil the requirements of AVA_VAN.3.
8. Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the following evaluated configuration, defined by the notation:
● secunet eID PKI Suite Certified CA Kernel SC
● The documents:
• Handbuch [10]
• Release Notes [12]
• Security Target [6]
To identify the TOE as outlined in chapter 2.1 of the ST [6], the Guidance [10] is providing
sufficient information in chapter 12.
The description of the required non-TOE hardware, software and firmware is described in
chapter 1.2.3 of [6]. The requirements for the non-TOE hardware, software and firmware
are the following:
CA-Server
● 4096 MB RAM
● 2.4 GHz CPU (64 bit)
● 64 GB storage
The hardware must be compatible with the JVM (see [6], section 1.2.3.2). The physical
connections are:
● Network Card
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● Power Supply
● PS/2- or USB-attached keyboard
● VGA graphics adapter
● Card reader
JVM
The Certified CA Kernel SC is implemented in Java. Thus, it interacts with the interfaces of
the Java Virtual Machine instead of directly interacting with the underlying operating
system. The Certified CA Kernel SC requires the following JVM being present in its
environment:
● Oracle JVM 17
Operating System
While the use of the JVM as a universal interface allows the Certified CA Kernel SC to
operate under all operating systems that allow the operation of the aforementioned JVMs,
it is recommended to utilize an operating system that provides adequate security
measures and is actively maintained. Specifically, the Certified CA Kernel SC is tested for
operation under the following OS:
● Windows Server 2016 and 2019,
● Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 and 8 or Rocky Linux 8 (which is equivalent to RHEL 8)
The CA Card used as part of the crypto module shall fulfil the following requirements:
1) Provide the required functionality as needed for the use case and as identified in table 1
of the ST [6]
2) Provide sufficient trust into the implementation. This can e.g. be shown by using a
certified card (on at least the assurance level from this certification).
As an example, the Giesecke und Devrient STARCOS 3.5 on Infineon SLE78CLX1280P
(M7820A11) could be used.
The systems used by the evaluators during the testing fulfils these requirements.
9. Results of the Evaluation
9.1. CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 4 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
● The components ALC_FLR.2 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
The evaluation has confirmed:
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● PP Conformance: None.
● for the Functionality: Product specific Security Target
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by ALC_FLR.2
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification
procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). But cryptographic functionalities with a
security level of lower than 100 bits can no longer be regarded as secure without
considering the application context. Therefore, for these functionalities it shall be checked
whether the related crypto operations are appropriate for the intended system. Some
further hints and guidelines can be derived from the 'Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102'
(https://www.bsi.bund.de).
The following table gives an overview of the cryptographic functionalities inside the TOE to
enforce the security policy and outlines its rating from cryptographic point of view. Any
Cryptographic Functionality that is marked in column 'Security Level above 100 Bits' of the
following table with 'no' achieves a security level of lower than 100 Bits (in general context)
only.
No. Purpose Cryptographic Mechanism Standard of
Implementa
tion
Key Size in Bits Security
Level
above
100 Bits
Comments
1 Audit Trail
security
RSA key generation PKCS#1/
FIPS 186-5
[13]
2048, 3072 yes
2 Audit Trail
security
RSA encryption/decryption
RSAES-OAEP
PKCS#1/
FIPS 186-5
[13]
2048, 3072 yes
3 Audit Trail
security
Certificates
RSA signature creation
● RSA_SHA256_PKCS1
● RSA_SHA384_PKCS1
● RSA_SHA512_PKCS1
● RSA_SHA256_PSS
● RSA_SHA384_PSS
● RSA_SHA512_PSS
PKCS#1/
FIPS 186-5
[13]
2048, 3072 yes
4 Audit Trail
security
Certificates
RSA signature verification
● RSA_SHA256_PKCS1
● RSA_SHA384_PKCS1
● RSA_SHA512_PKCS1
● RSA_SHA256_PSS
PKCS#1/
FIPS 186-5
[13]
2048, 3072 yes
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No. Purpose Cryptographic Mechanism Standard of
Implementa
tion
Key Size in Bits Security
Level
above
100 Bits
Comments
● RSA_SHA384_PSS
● RSA_SHA512_PSS
5 Verification
of
signatures
ECDSA signature verification BSI TR-
03111 [14]
supported elliptic
curves:
● NIST-P224/
secp224r1
● NIST-P384/
secp384r1
● NIST-P512/
secp512r1
● NIST-P256/
secp256r1
● NIST-K233/
sect233k1
● NIST-B233/
sect233k1
● NIST-K283/
sect283k1
● NIST-B283/
sect283r1
● NIST-K409/
sect409k1
● NIST-B409/
sect409r1
● NIST-K571/
sect571k1
● NIST-B571/
sect571r1
● brainpoolP256r1
● brainpoolP256t1
● brainpoolP320r1
● brainpoolP320t1
● brainpoolP384r1
● brainpoolP384t1
● brainpoolP512r1
● brainpoolP512t1
yes
6 Verification
of
signatures
ECGDSA signature
verification
BSI TR-
03111 [14]
supported elliptic
curves:
● NIST-P224/
secp224r1
● NIST-P384/
yes
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No. Purpose Cryptographic Mechanism Standard of
Implementa
tion
Key Size in Bits Security
Level
above
100 Bits
Comments
secp384r1
● NIST-P512/
secp512r1
● NIST-P256/
secp256r1
● NIST-K233/
sect233k1
● NIST-B233/
sect233k1
● NIST-K283/
sect283k1
● NIST-B283/
sect283r1
● NIST-K409/
sect409k1
● NIST-B409/
sect409r1
● NIST-K571/
sect571k1
● NIST-B571/
sect571r1
● brainpoolP256r1
● brainpoolP256t1
● brainpoolP320r1
● brainpoolP320t1
● brainpoolP384r1
● brainpoolP384t1
● brainpoolP512r1
● brainpoolP512t1
7 Encryption
and
decryption
of secrets
AES key generation FIPS197
[15]
128, 256 yes
8 Audit Trail
Security
AES HMAC_SHA256
RFC2104
SP 800-38B
[17]
128, 256 yes
9 Encryption
and
decryption
of secrets
AES encryption/decryption
with CBC and PKCS5
Padding
SP 800-38A
[17]
128, 256 yes
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No. Purpose Cryptographic Mechanism Standard of
Implementa
tion
Key Size in Bits Security
Level
above
100 Bits
Comments
10 Hashing for
various
functions
SHA-256
SHA-110
FIPS180-2
[16]
256, 384, 512 SHA-1:
no,
SHA-
256: yes
Table 3: TOE cryptographic functionality
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9 has
to be considered by the user and his system risk management process, too.
If available, certified updates of the TOE should be used. If non-certified updates or
patches are available the user of the TOE should request the sponsor to provide a re-
certification. In the meantime a risk management process of the system using the TOE
should investigate and decide on the usage of not yet certified updates and patches or
take additional measures in order to maintain system security.
11. Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report.
12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)
None
13. Definitions
13.1. Acronyms
AEK Asymmetric Encryption Key
ASK Asymmetric Signature Key Pair
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
10
It is important to mention that the SHA-1 is only used to derive a fingerprint and to support legacy PKI
systems that have been set up using SHA-1.
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BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CA Certification Authority
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
CIMC Certificate Issuing and Management Component
CP Certificate Policy
CPS Certification Practices Statement
cPP Collaborative Protection Profile
CRL Certificate Revocation List
CVC Card Validation Code
CVE Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures
EC Elliptic Curve
EAC Extended Access Control
DRNG Deterministic Random Number Generator
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
HMAC Hashing for Message Authentication
HSM Hardware Secure Module
ICAO CA International Civil Aviation Organization Certification Authority
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
ITU-T ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector
JAR Java Archive
PKI Public Key Infrastructure
PP Protection Profile
RA Registration Authority
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TRK Symmetric Trail Record Key
TSF TOE Security Functionality
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13.2. Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Package - named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements
Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
14. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 5, April 2017
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 5, April 2017,
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[3] BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) and Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility,
approval and licencing (CC-Stellen), https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE11
https://www.bsi.bund.de/AIS
11
specifically
• AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
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[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
on the BSI Website, https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierungsreporte
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-1216-2024, Version 3.3.4, 20.02.2024, secunet eID
PKI Suite Certified CA Kernel SC Security Target, secunet Security Networks AG
[7] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 1.3, 07.03.2024, Evaluation Technical Report
(ETR) – Summary, SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH, (confidential
document)
[8] Certificate Issuing and Management Components Protection Profile Version 1.5, 11
August, 2011, Communications Security Establishment Canada, Document number:
383-6-3-CR
[9] Configuration list for the TOE, Version 1.3.9, 07.03.2024, Konfigurationsliste
ALC_CMS.4, cms_secunet+eID+PKI+Suite_V.1.3.9.pdf, secunet Security Networks
AG (confidential document)
[10] Guidance documentation for the TOE, Version 3.6.6, 20.02.2024, Handbuch
(AGD_PRE.1 und AGD_OPE.1), agd_secunet+eID+PKI+Suite_v3.6.6.pdf, secunet
Security Networks AG
[11] API Documentation (JavaDoc), Version 3.6.6, 20.02.2024, javadoc-cc.zip, secunet
Security Networks AG
[12] Release Notes, Version 3.0, 15.01.2024, ReleaseNotes.pdf, secunet Security
Networks AG
[13] FIPS PUB 186-5: Digital Signature Standard (DSS) / National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST), February 2023
[14] TR-03111 Technical Guideline TR-03111 – Elliptic Curve Cryptography,; Version
1.11, April 2009 / Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI)
[15] Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), FIPS 197, November 26, 2001
[16] Secure Hash Standard (SHS), 8/04/2015
[17] NIST Special Publication 800-38A, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation: Methods and Techniques; and NIST Special Publication 800-38B,
Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: the CMAC Mode for
Authentication
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C. Excerpts from the Criteria
For the meaning of the assurance components and levels the following references to the
Common Criteria can be followed:
• On conformance claim definitions and descriptions refer to CC part 1 chapter 10.5
• On the concept of assurance classes, families and components refer to CC Part 3
chapter 7.1
• On the concept and definition of pre-defined assurance packages (EAL) refer to CC
Part 3 chapters 7.2 and 8
• On the assurance class ASE for Security Target evaluation refer to CC Part 3
chapter 12
• On the detailed definitions of the assurance components for the TOE evaluation
refer to CC Part 3 chapters 13 to 17
• The table in CC part 3 , Annex E summarizes the relationship between the
evaluation assurance levels (EAL) and the assurance classes, families and
components.
The CC are published at https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/cc/
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D. Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
Note: End of report
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