National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
Cisco Adaptive Security Appliances (ASA) 9.12 running
on Firepower 2100 Series Appliances
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-11090-2020
Dated: December 9, 2020
Version: 0.2
National Institute of Standards and Technology National Security Agency
Information Technology Laboratory Information Assurance Directorate
100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road STE 6940
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6940
®
TM
Cisco ASA 9.12 on Firepower 2100 Series Appliances Validation Report Version 0.2, December 9, 2020
ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Validation Team
Harry Beddo
Marybeth Panock
Kenneth Stutterheim
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
Kevin Cummins
Chris Keenan
Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc.
Columbia, MD
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Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary.................................................................................................... 1
2 Identification............................................................................................................... 1
3 Architectural Information ........................................................................................... 3
3.1 TOE Evaluated Platforms ................................................................................... 3
3.2 TOE Architecture................................................................................................ 3
3.3 Physical Boundaries............................................................................................ 4
4 Security Policy............................................................................................................ 5
4.1 Security audit ...................................................................................................... 6
4.2 Cryptographic support ........................................................................................ 6
4.3 Full Residual Protection...................................................................................... 6
4.4 Identification and authentication......................................................................... 6
4.5 Security management.......................................................................................... 7
4.6 Packet Filtering................................................................................................... 7
4.7 Protection of the TSF.......................................................................................... 8
4.8 TOE access.......................................................................................................... 8
4.9 Trusted path/channels ......................................................................................... 8
5 Assumptions................................................................................................................ 8
6 Clarification of Scope ................................................................................................. 9
7 Documentation............................................................................................................ 9
8 IT Product Testing .................................................................................................... 10
8.1 Developer Testing............................................................................................. 10
8.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing ............................................................. 10
9 Evaluated Configuration ........................................................................................... 10
10 Results of the Evaluation .......................................................................................... 11
10.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE).......................................................... 12
10.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV)............................................................ 12
10.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD) ............................................... 12
10.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC) ................................... 12
10.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE) ............... 13
10.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)....................................................... 13
10.7 Summary of Evaluation Results........................................................................ 14
11 Validator Comments/Recommendations .................................................................. 14
12 Annexes..................................................................................................................... 14
13 Security Target.......................................................................................................... 14
14 Glossary .................................................................................................................... 14
15 Bibliography ............................................................................................................. 15
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1 Executive Summary
This report documents the assessment of the National Information Assurance Partnership
(NIAP) validation team of the evaluation of Cisco Adaptive Security Appliances (ASA)
on Firepower 2100 Series Appliances solution provided by Cisco Systems, Inc. It
presents the evaluation results, their justifications, and the conformance results. This
Validation Report is not an endorsement of the Target of Evaluation by any agency of the
U.S. government, and no warranty is either expressed or implied.
The evaluation was performed by the Gossamer Security Solutions (Gossamer) Common
Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL) in Columbia, MD, United States of America, and was
completed in December 2020. The information in this report is largely derived from the
Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) and associated test reports, all written by Gossamer
Security Solutions. The evaluation determined that the product is both Common Criteria
Part 2 Extended and Part 3 Conformant, and meets the assurance requirements of EAL 1.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the Cisco Adaptive Security Appliances (ASA) 9.12
running on Firepower 2100 Series Appliances.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) identified in this Validation Report has been evaluated at
a NIAP approved Common Criteria Testing Laboratory using the Common Methodology
for IT Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 5) for conformance to the Common Criteria
for IT Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 5). This Validation Report applies only to the
specific version of the TOE as evaluated. The evaluation has been conducted in accordance
with the provisions of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme and
the conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are consistent
with the evidence provided.
The validation team monitored the activities of the evaluation team, provided guidance on
technical issues and evaluation processes, and reviewed the individual work units and
successive versions of the ETR. The validation team found that the evaluation showed that
the product satisfies all of the functional requirements and assurance requirements stated
in the Security Target (ST). Therefore the validation team concludes that the testing
laboratory’s findings are accurate, the conclusions justified, and the conformance results
are correct. The conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are
consistent with the evidence produced.
The technical information included in this report was obtained from the Cisco Adaptive
Security Appliances (ASA) 9.12 on FP2100 Security Target, Version 0.11, December 7,
2020 and analysis performed by the Validation Team.
2 Identification
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product
evaluations. Under this program, security evaluations are conducted by commercial testing
laboratories called Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs) using the Common
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Evaluation Methodology (CEM) for Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL) 1 through 4 in
accordance with National Voluntary Laboratory Assessment Program (NVLAP)
accreditation.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality and
consistency across evaluations. Developers of information technology products desiring a
security evaluation contract with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product’s evaluation.
Upon successful completion of the evaluation, the product is added to NIAP’s Validated
Products List.
Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:
 The Target of Evaluation (TOE): the fully qualified identifier of the product as
evaluated.
 The Security Target (ST), describing the security features, claims, and assurances
of the product.
 The conformance result of the evaluation.
 The Protection Profile to which the product is conformant.
 The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation.
Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers
Item Identifier
Evaluation Scheme United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
TOE Cisco Adaptive Security Appliances (ASA) 9.12 running on Firepower 2100
Series Appliances
Protection Profile (Specific models identified in Section 3.1)
PP-Configuration for Network Devices, Stateful Traffic Filter Firewalls, and
Virtual Private Network (VPN) Gateways, Version 1.0, 6 March 2020
 The PP-Configuration includes the following components:
 collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.1, 24
September 2018 (CPP_ND_V2.1)
 PP-Module for Virtual Private Network (VPN) Gateways, Version 1.0,
019-09-17 (CFG_NDCPP_VPNGW_V1.0)
 PP-Module for Stateful Traffic Filter Firewalls, Version 1.1, 23 October
2019 (MOD_CPP_FW_1.3)
ST Cisco Adaptive Security Appliances (ASA) 9.12 on FP2100 Security
Target, Version 0.11, December 7, 2020
Evaluation Technical
Report
Evaluation Technical Report for Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA) on
FP2100, Version 0.3, December 7, 2020
CC Version Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
rev 5
Conformance Result CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 conformant
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Item Identifier
Sponsor Cisco Systems, Inc.
Developer Cisco Systems, Inc.
Common Criteria
Testing Lab (CCTL)
Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc.
CCEVS Validators Harry Beddo, Marybeth Panock, Kenneth Stutterheim
3 Architectural Information
Note: The following architectural description is based on the description presented in the
Security Target.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the Cisco Adaptive Security Appliances (ASA) 9.12
running on Firepower 2100 Series Appliances as noted in section 3.1. The TOE is
comprised of both software and hardware. The model series is comprised of the following:
FP2110, FP2120, FP2130, and FP2140. The software is comprised of the Adaptive
Security Appliance software image Release 9.12 and FXOS 2.6. The ASA software
provides all the firewall and VPN functionality and the FXOS (Firepower eXtensible
Operating System) is the underlying OS that is used to load ASA and to load/update
software images.
3.1 TOE Evaluated Platforms
The evaluated configuration consists of the following models:
TOE Configuration Hardware Configurations Software Version
FP2110
FP2120
FP2130
FP2140
The Cisco ASA Adaptive Security
Appliance on Firepower 2100 Series
Appliances provides high-performance
firewall and VPN services and 4-12 Gigabit
Ethernet interfaces, and support for up to
10,000 VPNs.
ASA release 9.12
FXOS release 2.6
3.2 TOE Architecture
The TOE consists of hardware and software that provides connectivity and security
services onto a single device.
The ASA on Firepower 2100 Series Appliances provides application-aware stateful packet
filtering firewalls. A stateful packet filtering firewall controls the flow of IP traffic by
matching information contained in the headers of connection-oriented or connection-less
IP packets against a set of rules specified by the authorized administrators. Depending upon
the rule and the results of the match, the firewall either passes or drops the packet. The
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stateful firewall remembers the state of the connection from information gleaned from prior
packets flowing on the connection and uses that information to regulate current packets.
The packet will be denied if the security policy is violated.
The TOE mediates information flows on the basis of other information, such as the
direction (incoming or outgoing) of the packet on a firewall network interface. For
connection-oriented transport services, the firewall either permits connections and
subsequent packets for that connection or denies the connection and subsequent packets
associated with the connection.
The application-inspection capabilities treat traffic according to detailed policies based not
only on port, state, and addressing information, but also on application information within
the packet header. By comparing packet inspection information with corporate policies, the
firewall will allow or block certain traffic.
The TOE also provides IPsec connection capabilities. All references within this document
to “VPN” connectivity refer to the use of IPsec tunnels to secure connectivity to and/or
from the TOE, for example, gateway-to-gateway VPN or remote access VPN such as for
transmissions from the TOE to remote audit/syslog servers, or AAA servers, or for an
additional layer of security for remote administration connections to the TOE, such as SSH
or TLS connections tunneled in IPsec.
The TOE can operate in a number of modes but was evaluated as a single standalone
device.
3.3 Physical Boundaries
The physical boundary of the TOE is the hardware appliance. The TOE supports (in some
cases optionally) the following hardware, software, and firmware in its environment when
the TOE is configured in its evaluated configuration:
Table 1: IT Environment Components
Component Required Usage/Purpose Description for TOE performance
Management
Workstation with
SSH Client
Yes This includes any IT Environment Management workstation with
SSH client installed that is used by the TOE administrator to support
TOE administration through SSHv2 protected channels. Any SSH
client that supports SSHv2 may be used.
Local Console Yes The Console that is directly connected to the TOE via the Serial
Console Port and is used by the TOE administrator to support TOE
administration.
ASDM
Management
Platform
Yes The ASDM operates from any of the following operating systems:
 Microsoft Windows 7, 8, 10, Server 2008, Server 2012, and
Server 2012 R2
 Apple OS X 10.4 and later
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Component Required Usage/Purpose Description for TOE performance
Note that that ASDM software is downloaded from the ASA TOE,
and runs on the management platform but is not installed to the
management platform, nor is ASDM installed to the TOE. ASDM
runs on the management platform is used to connect to the TOE over
TLS. The only software installed on the management platform is a
Cisco ASDM Launcher.
Web browser Yes The following web browsers are supported for access to the ASDM;
 Internet Explorer
 Firefox
 Safari
 Chrome
Note: Using the latest supported web browser version is
recommended.
Audit (syslog)
Server
Yes This includes any syslog server to which the TOE would transmit
syslog messages. Connections to remote audit servers must be
tunneled in IPsec or TLS.
AAA Server No This includes any IT environment AAA server that provides single-
use authentication mechanisms. This can be any AAA server that
provides single-use authentication. The TOE correctly leverages the
services provided by this AAA server to provide single-use
authentication to administrators. Connections to remote AAA servers
must be tunneled in IPsec.
Certification
Authority
Yes This includes any IT Environment Certification Authority on the TOE
network. This can be used to provide the TOE with a valid certificate
during certificate enrollment.
Remote Tunnel
Endpoint
Yes This includes any peer with which the TOE participates in tunneled
communications. Remote tunnel endpoints may be any device or
software client (e.g., Cisco AnyConnect, Cisco VPN client) that
supports IPsec tunneling. Both VPN clients and VPN gateways can
be considered to be remote tunnel endpoints.
4 Security Policy
This section summaries the security functionality of the TOE:
1. Security audit
2. Cryptographic support
3. Full Residual Protection
4. Identification and authentication
5. Security management
6. Packet Filtering
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7. Protection of the TSF
8. TOE access
9. Trusted path/channels
4.1 Security audit
The TOE provides auditing capabilities. The TOE can audit events related to cryptographic
functionality, identification and authentication, and administrative actions. The TOE
generates an audit record for each auditable event. The administrator configures auditable
events, performs back-up operations, and manages audit data storage. The TOE provides
the administrator with a circular audit trail or a configurable audit trail threshold to track
the storage capacity of the audit trail. Audit logs are backed up over an encrypted channel
to an external audit server, if so configured.
4.2 Cryptographic support
The TOE provides cryptography in support of other TOE security functionality. The TOE
provides cryptography in support of secure connections using IPsec and TLS, and remote
administrative management via SSHv2, and TLS/HTTPS. The cryptographic random bit
generators (RBGs) are seeded by an entropy noise source.
4.3 Full Residual Protection
The TOE ensures that all information flows from the TOE do not contain residual
information from previous traffic by padding packets with zeros. Residual data is never
transmitted from the TOE.
4.4 Identification and authentication
The TOE performs two types of authentication: device-level authentication of the remote
device (VPN peers) and user authentication for the authorized administrator of the TOE.
Device-level authentication allows the TOE to establish a secure channel with a trusted
peer. The secure channel is established only after each device authenticates the other.
Device-level authentication is performed via IKE/IPsec X509v3 certificate-based
authentication or pre-shared key methods.
The TOE provides authentication services for administrative users wishing to connect to
the TOEs secure CLI and GUI administrator interfaces. The TOE requires authorized
administrators to authenticate prior to being granted access to any of the management
functionality. The TOE can be configured to require a minimum password length of 15
characters (8-127 for ASA, and 8-80 for FXOS). The TOE implements a lockout
mechanism if the threshold of unsuccessful attempts has been exceeded.
The TOE provides administrator authentication against a local user database. Password-
based authentication can be performed on the serial console, SSHv2, and HTTPS
interfaces. The TOE optionally supports the use of AAA server including RADIUS and
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TACACS+ (part of the IT Environment) for authentication of administrative users
attempting to connect to the TOE.
4.5 Security management
The TOE provides secure administrative services for management of general TOE
configuration and the security functionality provided by the TOE. All TOE administration
occurs either through a secure SSHv2 or TLS/HTTPS session or via a local console
connection. The TOE provides the ability to securely manage all TOE administrative
users; all identification and authentication; all audit functionality of the TOE; all TOE
cryptographic functionality; the timestamps maintained by the TOE and the information
flow control policies enforced by the TOE including encryption/decryption of information
flows for VPNs. The TOE supports an “authorized administrator” role, which equates to
any account authenticated to an administrative interface (CLI or GUI, but not VPN), and
possessing sufficient privileges to perform security-relevant administrative actions.
When a secure session is initially established, the TOE displays an administrator-
configurable warning banner. This is used to provide any information deemed necessary
by the administrator prior to logging in. After a configurable period of inactivity,
administrative sessions will be terminated, requiring administrators to re-authenticate.
4.6 Packet Filtering
The TOE provides stateful traffic firewall functionality including IP address-based filtering
(for IPv4 and IPv6) to address the issues associated with unauthorized disclosure of
information, inappropriate access to services, misuse of services, disruption or denial of
services, and network-based reconnaissance. Address filtering can be configured to restrict
the flow of network traffic between protected networks and other attached networks based
on source and/or destination IP addresses. Port filtering can be configured to restrict the
flow of network traffic between protected networks and other attached networks based on
the originating (source) and/or receiving (destination) port (service). Stateful packet
inspection is used to ensure that packets are only forwarded when they’re part of a properly
established session. The TOE supports protocols that can spawn additional sessions in
accordance with the protocol RFCs where a new connection will be implicitly permitted
when properly initiated by an explicitly permitted session. System monitoring functionality
includes the ability to generate audit messages for any explicitly defined (permitted or
denied) traffic flow. TOE administrators have the ability to configure permitted and denied
traffic flows, including adjusting the sequence in which flow control rules will be applied,
and to apply rules to any network interface of the TOE.
The TOE also provides packet filtering and secure IPsec tunneling. The tunnels can be
established between two trusted VPN peers as well as between remote VPN clients and the
TOE. More accurately, these tunnels are sets of security associations (SAs). The SAs define
the protocols and algorithms to be applied to sensitive packets and specify the keying
material to be used. SAs are unidirectional and are established per the ESP security
protocol. An authorized administrator can define the traffic that needs to be protected via
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IPsec by configuring access lists (permit, deny, log) and applying these access lists to
interfaces using crypto map set.
4.7 Protection of the TSF
The TOE protects against interference and tampering by untrusted subjects by
implementing identification, authentication, and administrator roles to limit configuration
to authorized administrators. The TOE prevents reading of cryptographic keys and
passwords.
Additionally, the TOE is not a general-purpose operating system and access to the TOE
memory space is restricted to only TOE functions.
The TOE internally maintains the date and time. This date and time are used as the
timestamp that is applied to audit records generated by the TOE. Administrators can update
the TOE’s clock manually. As well, the TOE performs testing to verify correct operation
of the appliance itself and that of the cryptographic module. Whenever any system failures
occur within the TOE the TOE will cease operation.
4.8 TOE access
When an administrative session is initially established, the TOE displays an administrator-
configurable warning banner. This is used to provide any information deemed necessary
by the administrator. After a configurable period of inactivity, administrator and VPN
client sessions will be terminated, and require re-authentication. The TOE supports direct
connections from VPN clients and protects against threats related to those client
connections. The TOE can disconnect sessions based on idle times, can be configured to
deny sessions based on IP, time, and day, and to perform Network Address Translation
(NAT) of the external IPs of connecting VPN clients to internal network addresses.
4.9 Trusted path/channels
The TOE supports establishing trusted paths between itself and remote administrators using
SSHv2 for CLI access, and TLS/HTTPS for GUI/ASDM access. The TOE supports use
of TLS and/or IPsec for connections with remote syslog servers. The TOE can use IPsec
to encrypt connections with remote authentication servers (e.g. RADIUS, TACACS+).
The TOE can establish trusted paths of peer-to-peer VPN tunnels using IPsec, and VPN
client tunnels using IPsec or TLS. Note that the VPN client is in the operational
environment.
5 Assumptions
The Security Problem Definition, including the assumptions, may be found in the following
documents:
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 PP-Configuration for Network Devices, Stateful Traffic Filter Firewalls, and
Virtual Private Network (VPN) Gateways, Version 1.0, 6 March 2020
o The PP-Configuration includes the following components:
 collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.1,
24 September 2018 (CPP_ND_V2.1)
 PP-Module for Virtual Private Network (VPN) Gateways, Version
1.0, 2019-09-17 (CFG_NDCPP_VPNGW_V1.0)
 PP-Module for Stateful Traffic Filter Firewalls, Version 1.1, 23
October 2019 (MOD_CPP_FW_1.3)
The Assumptions and Security Problem definition information has not been reproduced
here and the CPP_ND_V2.1/CFG_NDCPP_VPNGW_V1.0 should be consulted if there is
interest in that material.
6 Clarification of Scope
All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that
could benefit from additional clarification. This text covers some of the more important
limitations and clarifications of this evaluation. Note that:
 This evaluation covers only the specific device models and software as identified
in this document, and not any earlier or later versions released or in process.
 As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated configuration
meets the security claims made, with a certain level of assurance. The level of
assurance for this evaluation is defined within the relevant protection profiles.
 This evaluation did not specifically search for, nor attempt to exploit, vulnerabilities
that were not “obvious” or vulnerabilities to objectives not claimed in the ST. The
CEM defines an “obvious” vulnerability as one that is easily exploited with a
minimum of understanding of the TOE, technical sophistication and resources.
 The scope of this evaluation was limited to the functionality and assurances covered
in the CPP_ND_V2.1/CFG_NDCPP_VPNGW_V1.0 and MOD_CPP_FW_1.3 and
applicable Technical Decisions as described for this TOE in the Security Target.
Other functionality included in the product was not assessed as part of this
evaluation. All other functionality provided by the devices needs to be assessed
separately, and no further conclusions can be drawn about their effectiveness.
7 Documentation
The following documents were available with the TOE for evaluation:
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 Cisco Adaptive Security Appliances (ASA) 9.12 on Firepower 2100 Series
Preparative Procedures & Operational User Guide for the Common Criteria
Certified Configuration, Version 0.4, December 7, 2020
 Cisco FXOS 2.6 on Firepower 2100 Series Preparative Procedures & Operational
User Guide for the Common Criteria Certified Configuration, Version 0.4,
December 7, 2020
The documentation listed above is the only documentation that should be trusted to install,
administer, or use the TOE in its evaluated configuration. Any additional customer
documentation provided with the product, or that may be available online, was not included
in the scope of the evaluation and therefore should not to be relied upon when configuring
or operating the product platforms as evaluated. Consumers are encouraged to download
the configuration documentation from the NIAP website to ensure that the TOE platforms
are configured as evaluated.
8 IT Product Testing
This section describes the testing efforts of the developer and the Evaluation Team. It is
derived from information contained in the proprietary Detailed Test Report for Cisco
Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA) on FP2100, Version 0.3, December 7, 2020 (DTR).
8.1 Developer Testing
No evidence of developer testing is required in the assurance activities for this product.
8.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing
The evaluation team verified the product according a Common Criteria Certification
document and ran the tests specified in the CPP_ND_V2.1/CFG_NDCPP_VPNGW_V1.0
and MOD_CPP_FW_1.3 including any tests associated with optional requirements. The
testing was performed at the Gossamer Security Solutions Common Criteria Testing
Laboratory located in Catonsville, Maryland.
9 Evaluated Configuration
The evaluated configuration consists of the following models:
TOE Configuration Hardware Configurations Software Version
FP2110
FP2120
FP2130
FP2140
The Cisco ASA Adaptive Security
Appliance on Firepower 2100 Series
Appliances provides high-performance
firewall and VPN services and 4-12 Gigabit
Ethernet interfaces, and support for up to
10,000 VPNs.
ASA release 9.12
FXOS release 2.6
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Example TOE deployment:
To use the product in the evaluated configuration, the product must be configured as
specified in the following documents.
 Cisco Adaptive Security Appliances (ASA) 9.12 on Firepower 2100 Series
Preparative Procedures & Operational User Guide for the Common Criteria
Certified Configuration, Version 0.4, December 7, 2020
 Cisco FXOS 2.6 on Firepower 2100 Series Preparative Procedures & Operational
User Guide for the Common Criteria Certified Configuration, Version 0.4,
December 7, 2020
10 Results of the Evaluation
The results of the assurance requirements are generally described in this section and are
presented in detail in the proprietary ETR.
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A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to
the corresponding evaluator action elements. The evaluation was conducted based upon
CC version 3.1 rev 5 and CEM version 3.1 rev 5.
10.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE)
The evaluation team applied each ASE CEM work unit. The ST evaluation ensured the ST
contains a description of the environment in terms of policies and assumptions, a statement
of security requirements claimed to be met by the Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance
(ASA) on Firepower 2100 Series Appliances products that are consistent with the
Common Criteria, and product security function descriptions that support the requirements.
The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion
reached by the evaluation team was justified.
10.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV)
The evaluation team assessed the design documentation and found it adequate to aid in
understanding how the TSF provides the security functions. The design documentation
consists of a functional specification contained in the Security target and Guidance
documents. In addition, the evaluator performed the assurance activities specified in the
CPP_ND_V2.1/CFG_NDCPP_VPNGW_V1.0 related to the examination of the
information contained in the TSS.
The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion
reached by the evaluation team was justified.
10.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD)
The evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the user guidance in describing how to use
the operational TOE. Additionally, the evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the
administrator guidance in describing how to securely administer the TOE. All of the guides
were assessed during the design and testing phases of the evaluation to ensure they were
complete.
The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion
reached by the evaluation team was justified.
10.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)
The evaluation team found that the TOE was identified.
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The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion
reached by the evaluation team was justified.
10.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE)
The evaluation team ran the set of tests specified by the assurance activities in the
CPP_ND_V2.1/CFG_NDCPP_VPNGW_V1.0 and recorded the results in a Test Report,
as summarized in the AAR.
The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion
reached by the evaluation team was justified.
10.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)
The evaluation team performed a public search for vulnerabilities on November 5, 2020 at
the following security related sites and did not discover any public issues with the TOE.
The evaluator searched the following sources for vulnerabilities:
 National Vulnerability Database (https://web.nvd.nist.gov/vuln/search),
 Vulnerability Notes Database (http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/),
 Rapid7 Vulnerability Database (https://www.rapid7.com/db/vulnerabilities),
 Tipping Point Zero Day Initiative (http://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories ),
 Exploit / Vulnerability Search Engin (http://www.exploitsearch.net),
 SecurITeam Exploit Search (http://www.securiteam.com),
 Tenable Network Security (http://nessus.org/plugins/index.php?view=search),
 Offensive Security Exploit Database (https://www.exploit-db.com/)
The terms used for the search were as follows:
 Cisco
 FXOS
 ASA
 Firepower 2100
 Radius
 TACACS+
 SSH
 TLS
 IKE
 IPsec
 Firewall
 VPN Gateway
 Router
 TCP
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In addition, the evaluation team performed testing against the TOE with fuzzed, mutated,
invalid and undefined packets and noticed no ill effects exhibited by the TOE as a result.
The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion
reached by the evaluation team was justified.
10.7 Summary of Evaluation Results
The evaluation team’s assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims
in the ST are met. Additionally, the evaluation team’s testing demonstrated the accuracy
of the claims in the ST.
The validation team’s assessment of the evidence provided by the evaluation team is that
it demonstrates that the evaluation team followed the procedures defined in the CEM, and
correctly verified that the product meets the claims in the ST.
11 Validator Comments/Recommendations
None
12 Annexes
Not applicable
14 Glossary
The following definitions are used throughout this document:
 Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL). An IT security evaluation facility
accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and
approved by the CCEVS Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based
evaluations.
 Conformance. The ability to demonstrate in an unambiguous way that a given
implementation is correct with respect to the formal model.
 Evaluation. The assessment of an IT product against the Common Criteria using the
Common Criteria Evaluation Methodology to determine whether or not the claims
made are justified; or the assessment of a protection profile against the Common
Criteria using the Common Evaluation Methodology to determine if the Profile is
13 Security Target
Cisco Adaptive Appliances (ASA) 9.12 on FP2100 Security Target, Version 0.11,
December 7, 2020.
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complete, consistent, technically sound and hence suitable for use as a statement of
requirements for one or more TOEs that may be evaluated.
 Evaluation Evidence. Any tangible resource (information) required from the sponsor
or developer by the evaluator to perform one or more evaluation activities.
 Feature. Part of a product that is either included with the product or can be ordered
separately.
 Target of Evaluation (TOE). A group of IT products configured as an IT system, or
an IT product, and associated documentation that is the subject of a security evaluation
under the CC.
 Validation. The process carried out by the CCEVS Validation Body leading to the
issue of a Common Criteria certificate.
 Validation Body. A governmental organization responsible for carrying out validation
and for overseeing the day-to-day operation of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation
and Validation Scheme.
15 Bibliography
The Validation Team used the following documents to produce this Validation Report:
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation: Part 1:
Introduction and General Model, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
[2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security
functional components, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
[3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security
assurance components, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.
[4] collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.1, 24 September
2018 (CPP_ND_V2.1),
[5] PP-Module for Virtual Private Network (VPN) Gateways, Version 1.0, 17
September 2019 (CFG_NDCPP_VPNGW_V1.0)
[6] Cisco Adaptive Security Appliances (ASA) 9.12 on FP2100 Security
Target, Version 0.11, December 7, 2020 (ST)
[7] Assurance Activity Report for Cisco Adaptive Security Appliances (ASA)
on FP2100, Version 0.3, December 7, 2020 (AAR)
[8] Detailed Report for Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA) on FP2100, Version
0.3, December 7, 2020 (DTR)
[9] Evaluation Technical Report for Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA) on
FP2100, ETR, Version 0.3, December 7, 2020 (ETR)