National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
for the
Vertiv CYBEX™ SCUSBHIDFILTER Firmware Version
40404-0E7 and Vertiv CYBEX™ SCKM140PP4 KM Switch
Firmware Version 40404-0E7
Peripheral Sharing Devices
Version 1.0
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-VID11254-2022
Dated: 01/31/2022
Version: 1.0
National Institute of Standards and Technology Department of Defense
Information Technology Laboratory ATTN: NIAP, Suite: 6982
100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Fort Meade, MD 20755-6982
®
TM
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Validation Team
Daniel Faigin: Senior Validator
Chris Thorpe: Lead Validator
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
Ken Lasoski
Joshua Gola
Acumen Security, LLC
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Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary............................................................................................................... 5
2 Identification.......................................................................................................................... 7
3 Architectural Information .................................................................................................... 9
4 Security Policy...................................................................................................................... 10
4.1 Security Policy for The SCKM140PP4 KM Switch...................................................................................10
4.1.1 User Data Protection ..................................................................................................................................10
4.1.2 Protection of the TSF .................................................................................................................................10
4.1.3 TOE Access................................................................................................................................................10
4.2 Security Policy for The SCUSBHIDFILTER.............................................................................................10
4.2.1 User Data Protection ..................................................................................................................................10
4.2.2 Protection of the TSF .................................................................................................................................10
5 Assumptions, Threats & Clarification of Scope ............................................................... 11
5.1 Assumptions..................................................................................................................................................11
5.2 Threats...........................................................................................................................................................12
5.3 Clarification of Scope...................................................................................................................................13
6 Documentation..................................................................................................................... 14
7 TOE Evaluated Configuration ........................................................................................... 15
7.1 Evaluated Configuration..............................................................................................................................15
7.2 Excluded Functionality ................................................................................................................................16
8 IT Product Testing............................................................................................................... 17
8.1 Developer Testing .........................................................................................................................................17
8.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing.......................................................................................................17
9 Results of the Evaluation .................................................................................................... 18
9.1 Evaluation of Security Target .....................................................................................................................18
9.2 Evaluation of Development Documentation...............................................................................................18
9.3 Evaluation of Guidance Documents............................................................................................................19
9.4 Evaluation of Life Cycle Support Activities...............................................................................................19
9.5 Evaluation of Test Documentation and the Test Activity .........................................................................19
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity ..............................................................................................................19
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results..................................................................................................................20
10 Validator Comments & Recommendations ...................................................................... 21
11 Annexes................................................................................................................................. 22
12 Security Target .................................................................................................................... 23
13 Glossary................................................................................................................................ 24
14 Bibliography......................................................................................................................... 25
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1 Executive Summary
This Validation Report (VR) is intended to assist the end user of this product and any security
certification Agent for that end user in determining the suitability of this Information Technology
(IT) product for their environment. End users should review the Security Target (ST), which is
where specific security claims are made, in conjunction with this VR, which describes how those
security claims were tested and evaluated and any restrictions on the evaluated configuration.
Prospective users should carefully read the Assumptions and Clarification of Scope in Section 5
and the Validator Comments in Section 10, where any restrictions on the evaluated configuration
are highlighted.
This report documents the National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP) assessment of the
evaluation of the Vertiv CYBEX™ SCKM140PP4 KM Switch and SCUSBHIDFILTER
Firmware Version 40404-0E7 Peripheral Sharing Devices Target of Evaluation (TOE). It
presents the evaluation results, their justifications, and the conformance results. This VR is not
an endorsement of the TOE by any agency of the U.S. Government and no warranty of the TOE
is either expressed or implied. This VR applies only to the specific version and configuration of
the product as evaluated and documented in the ST.
The evaluation was completed by Acumen Security in January 2022. The information in this
report is largely derived from the Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) and associated test report,
all written by Acumen Security. The evaluation determined that the product is both Common
Criteria Part 2 Extended and Part 3 Conformant, and meets the assurance requirements defined in
the National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP) PP‐Configuration for Peripheral Sharing
Device and Keyboard/Mouse Devices [CFG_PSD-KM_V1.0], which references the Protection
Profile for Peripheral Sharing Device Version 4.0 [PP_PSD_V4.0] and the PP‐Module for
Keyboard/Mouse Devices, Version 1.0.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) identified in this Validation Report has been evaluated at a
NIAP approved Common Criteria Testing Laboratory using the Common Methodology for IT
Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev. 5) for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT
Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev. 5), as interpreted by the Assurance Activities contained in
the PP‐Configuration for Peripheral Sharing Device and Keyboard/Mouse Devices which
references the Protection Profile for Peripheral Sharing Device Version 4.0 [PP_PSD_V4.0] and
the PP‐Module for Keyboard/Mouse Devices, Version 1.0. This Validation Report applies only
to the specific version of the TOE as evaluated. The evaluation has been conducted in
accordance with the provisions of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
and the conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are consistent with
the evidence provided.
The validation team provided guidance on technical issues and evaluation processes and
reviewed the individual work units documented in the ETR and the Assurance Activities Report
(AAR). The validation team found that the evaluation showed that the product satisfies all of the
functional requirements and assurance requirements stated in the Security Target (ST). Based on
these findings, the validation team concludes that the testing laboratory's findings are accurate,
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the conclusions justified, and the conformance results are correct. The conclusions of the testing
laboratory in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence produced.
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2 Identification
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product
evaluations. Under this program, security evaluations are conducted by commercial testing
laboratories called Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs). CCTLs evaluate products
against Protection Profile containing Assurance Activities, which are interpretations of CEM
work units specific to the technology described by the PP.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality
and consistency across evaluations. Developers of information technology products
desiring a security evaluation contract with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product's
evaluation. Upon successful completion of the evaluation, the product is added to NIAP's
Product Compliance List.
Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:
• The Target of Evaluation (TOE): the fully qualified identifier of the product as
evaluated.
• The Security Target (ST), describing the security features, claims, and assurances
of the product.
• The conformance result of the evaluation.
• The Protection Profile(s) to which the product is conformant.
• The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation.
Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers
Item Identifier
Evaluation Scheme United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
TOE Vertiv CYBEX™ SCKM140PP4 KM Switch and SCUSBHIDFILTER Firmware
Version 40404-0E7 Peripheral Sharing Devices
Protection Profile PP‐Configuration for Peripheral Sharing Device and Keyboard/Mouse Devices, which
references the Protection Profile for Peripheral Sharing Device Version 4.0
[PP_PSD_V4.0] and the PP‐Module for Keyboard/Mouse Devices, Version 1.0
Security Target Vertiv CYBEX™ SCKM140PP4 KM Switch Firmware Version 40404-0E7 Security
Target, Version: 1.18, January 13, 2021
Vertiv CYBEX™ SCUSBHIDFILTER Firmware Version 40404-0E7 Security Target,
Version: 1.15, January 5, 2021
Evaluation Technical
Report
Evaluation Technical Report for Vertiv CYBEX™ SCKM140PP4 KM Switch and
Vertiv CYBEX™ SCUSBHIDFILTER Firmware Version 40404-0E7 Peripheral
Sharing Devices, Version 1.1
CC Version Version 3.1, Revision 5
Conformance Result CC Part 2 Extended and CC Part 3 Conformant
Sponsor Vertiv IT Systems
Developer Vertiv IT Systems
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Common Criteria
Testing Lab (CCTL)
Acumen Security
2400 Research Blvd, Rockville MD 20850
CCEVS Validators Da Daniel Faigin, Chris Thorpe
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3 Architectural Information
The SCKM140PP4 Keyboard, Mouse (KM) switch allows users to share keyboard and mouse
peripherals amongst four connected computers.
The Vertiv Secure Universal Serial Bus (USB) Human Interface Device (HID) Filter/Isolator is
connected between a computer and a USB keyboard/mouse. It ensures unidirectional flow of
data between keyboard and mouse peripheral devices and a secure connected computer.
The evaluated features of the TOE are described further in Section 4.
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4 Security Policy
4.1 Security Policy for The SCKM140PP4 KM Switch
The TOE is comprised of several security features. Each of the security features consists of
several security functionalities, as identified below:
• User Data Protection
• Protection of the TSF
• TOE Access
These features are described in more detail in the subsections below.
4.1.1 User Data Protection
The TOE enforces unidirectional data flow for keyboard and mouse. The TOE ensures that only
authorized peripheral devices may be used. The TOE provides secure switching capabilities for
keyboard and mouse.
4.1.2 Protection of the TSF
The TOE ensures a secure state in the case of failure, provides only restricted access, and
performs self-testing. The TOE provides both passive detection of physical attack, and active
resistance to attack.
4.1.3 TOE Access
The TOE provides a continuous indication of which computer is currently selected.
4.2 Security Policy for the SCUSBHIDFILTER
The TOE is comprised of several security features. Each of the security features consists of
several security functionalities, as identified below:
• User Data Protection
• Protection of the TSF
These features are described in more detail in the subsections below.
4.2.1 User Data Protection
The TOE enforces unidirectional data flow for keyboard and mouse. The TOE ensures that only
authorized peripheral devices may be used.
4.2.2 Protection of the TSF
The TOE ensures a secure state in the case of failure, provides only restricted access, and
performs self-testing. The TOE provides passive detection of physical attack.
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5 Assumptions, Threats & Clarification of Scope
5.1 Assumptions
The specific conditions listed in the following subsections are assumed to exist in the TOE’s
environment. These assumptions include both practical realities in the development of the TOE
security requirements and the essential environmental conditions on the use of the TOE.
Table 1 TOE Assumptions
Assumption Assumption Definition
A.NO_TEMPEST
Computers and peripheral devices connected
to the PSD are not TEMPEST approved.
The TSF may or may not isolate the ground
of the keyboard and mouse computer
interfaces (the USB ground). The Operational
Environment is assumed not to support
TEMPEST red‐black ground isolation.
A.PHYSICAL The environment provides physical security
commensurate with the value of the TOE and
the data it processes and contains.
A.NO_WIRELESS_DEVICES The environment includes no wireless
peripheral devices.
A.TRUSTED_ADMIN PSD Administrators and users are trusted to
follow and apply all guidance in a trusted
manner.
A.TRUSTED_CONFIG Personnel configuring the PSD and its
operational environment follow the applicable
security configuration guidance.
A.USER_ALLOWED_ACCESS All PSD users are allowed to interact with all
connected computers. It is not the role of the
PSD to prevent or otherwise control user
access to connected computers. Computers or
their connected network shall have the
required means to authenticate the user and to
control access to their various resources.
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5.2 Threats
The following table lists the threats addressed by the TOE and the IT Environment. The
assumed level of expertise of the attacker for all the threats identified below is Enhanced-Basic.
Table 2 TOE Threats
Threat Threat Definition
T.DATA_LEAK A connection via the PSD2 between one or
more computers may allow unauthorized data
flow through the PSD or its connected
peripherals.
T.SIGNAL_LEAK A connection via the PSD between one or
more computers may allow unauthorized data
flow through bit‐by‐bit signaling.
T.RESIDUAL_LEAK A PSD may leak (partial, residual, or echo)
user data between the intended connected
computer and another unintended connected
computer.
T.UNINTENDED_USE A PSD may connect the user to a computer
other than the one to which the user intended
to connect.
T.UNAUTHORIZED_DEVICES The use of an unauthorized peripheral device
with a specific PSD peripheral port may allow
unauthorized data flows between connected
devices or enable an attack on the PSD or its
connected computers.
T.LOGICAL_TAMPER An attached device (computer or peripheral)
with malware, or otherwise under the control
of a malicious user, could modify or
overwrite code or data stored in the PSD’s
volatile or non‐volatile memory to allow
unauthorized information flows.
T.PHYSICAL_TAMPER A malicious user or human agent could
physically modify the PSD to allow
unauthorized information flows.
T.REPLACEMENT A malicious human agent could replace the
PSD during shipping, storage, or use with an
alternate device that does not enforce the PSD
security policies.
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Threat Threat Definition
T.FAILED Detectable failure of a PSD may cause an
unauthorized information flow or weakening
of PSD security functions.
5.3 Clarification of Scope
All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that need
clarifying. This text covers some of the more important limitations and clarifications of this
evaluation. Note that:
• As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated configuration meets
the security claims made, with a certain level of assurance. The level of assurance for this
evaluation is defined within the PP‐Configuration for Peripheral Sharing Device and
Keyboard/Mouse Devices, which references the Protection Profile for Peripheral Sharing
Device Version 4.0 [PP_PSD_V4.0] and the PP‐Module for Keyboard/Mouse Devices,
Version 1.0.
• Consistent with the expectations of the Protection Profile, this evaluation did not
specifically search for, nor seriously attempt to counter, vulnerabilities that were not
“obvious” or vulnerabilities to objectives not claimed in the ST. The CEM defines an
“obvious” vulnerability as one that is easily exploited with a minimum of understanding
of the TOE, technical sophistication and resources.
• The evaluation of security functionality of the product was limited to the functionality
specified in the claimed PPs. Any additional security related functional capabilities
included in the product were not covered by this evaluation.
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6 Documentation
The following documents were provided by the vendor with the TOE for evaluation:
• Vertiv CYBEX™ SCKM140PP4 KM Switch Firmware Version 40404-0E7 Security
Target, Version: 1.18, January 13, 2021
• Vertiv CYBEX™ SCUSBHIDFILTER Firmware Version 40404-0E7 Security Target,
Version: 1.15, January 5, 2021
• CYBEX™ SC Series Secure Switches SC800/900DPH, SC800/900DVI, and
SCKM100PP4 Quick Installation Guide, 590-2282-501B
• Vertiv CYBEX™ SCKM140PP4 KM Switch Firmware Version 40404-0E7 Common
Criteria Guidance Supplement, Version 1.8, November 23, 2021
• CYBEX™ SECURE USB FILTERS, 590-2297-501 Rev. A
• Vertiv CYBEX™ SCUSBHIDFILTER Firmware Version 40404-0E7 Common Criteria
Guidance Supplement, Version 1.8, January 19, 2021
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7 TOE Evaluated Configuration
7.1 Evaluated Configuration
Figure 1 shows a basic evaluated configuration for the SCKM140PP4 KM.
The TOE is used with a remote control.
Figure 1 – KM Switch Evaluated Configuration
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Figure 2 – USB Filter Evaluated Configuration
7.2 Excluded Functionality
The ST does not describe excluded functionality.
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8 IT Product Testing
This section describes the testing efforts of the developer and the evaluation team. It is derived
from information contained in Test Report for Vertiv CYBEX™ SCKM140PP4 KM Switch
Firmware Version 40404-0E7 Peripheral Sharing Device and Test Report for Vertiv CYBEX™
SCUSBHIDFILTER Firmware Version 40404-0E7 Peripheral Sharing Device, which are not
publicly available. The Assurance Activities Report provides an overview of testing and the
prescribed assurance activities.
8.1 Developer Testing
No evidence of developer testing is required in the Assurance Activities for this product.
8.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing
The evaluation team verified the product according to the vendor-provided guidance
documentation and ran the tests specified in the Protection Profile for Peripheral Sharing Device
Version 4.0 and the PP‐Module for Keyboard/Mouse Devices Version 1.0. The Independent
Testing activity is documented in the Assurance Activities Report, which is publicly available,
and is not duplicated here.
All testing was carried out on-site in Ottawa, Ontario by Acumen Security personnel. Initial
receipt and inspection of the TOE occurred in March 2020. The general timeline for testing
spanned from March 2020 to October 2021, with periods of inactivity in-between. Much of the
testing for the TOE was achieved during the October and November 2020 timeframes as well as
October of 2021. For the entire duration of the testing, the TOE was in a physically protected,
access controlled, designated test lab with no unattended entry/exit ways. Only individuals
authorized by Acumen Security were allowed access to the rooms where the devices were kept
stored. At the start of each day, the test bed was verified to ensure that it was not compromised.
This was achieved by inspecting the tamper seals, enclosures, and cabling for signs of tampering.
All evaluation documentation was always kept with the evaluator. In addition, all the necessary
precautions and safety protocols were followed.
For the Isolator, testing was performed on the SCUSBHIDFILTER product. As this device has a
feature where the USB connection is permanently “locked” to connected computers, some
testing was performed with a modified plug that did not permanently lock.
For the Switch, testing was performed on the SCKM140PP4 switch with the SCAFP0004 remote
unit. An equivalency argument was provided on peripheral port testing.
Details of the supporting test equipment used are proprietary and are specified in the Test
Reports for the Switch and Isolator devices.
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9 Results of the Evaluation
The results of the assurance requirements are generally described in this section and are
presented in detail in the proprietary documents: the Detailed Test Report (DTR) and the
Evaluation Technical Report (ETR). The reader of this document can assume that activities and
work units received a passing verdict.
A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to the
corresponding evaluator action elements. The evaluation was conducted based upon CC version
3.1 rev 5 and CEM version 3.1 rev 5. The evaluation determined the Vertiv CYBEX™
SCKM140PP4 KM Switch and SCUSBHIDFILTER Firmware Version 40404-0E7 Peripheral
Sharing Devices to be Part 2 extended, and meets the SARs contained in the PP. Additionally the
evaluator performed the Assurance Activities specified in the Protection Profile and claimed
modules.
9.1 Evaluation of Security Target
The evaluation team applied each EAL 1 ASE CEM work unit. The ST evaluation ensured the
ST contains a description of the environment in terms of policies and assumptions, a statement of
security requirements claimed to be met by the Vertiv CYBEX™ SCKM140PP4 KM Switch
and SCUSBHIDFILTER Firmware Version 40404-0E7 Peripheral Sharing Devices that are
consistent with the Common Criteria, and product security function descriptions that support the
requirements. Additionally, the evaluator performed an assessment of the Assurance Activities
specified in the Protection Profile for Peripheral Sharing Device Version 4.0 and PP‐Module for
Keyboard/Mouse Devices, Version 1.0.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in
accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation
team was justified.
9.2 Evaluation of Development Documentation
The evaluation team applied each EAL 1 ADV CEM work unit. The evaluation team assessed
the design documentation and found it adequate to aid in understanding how the TSF provides
the security functions. The design documentation consists of a functional specification contained
in the Security Target's TOE Summary Specification. Additionally, the evaluator performed the
Assurance Activities specified in the Protection Profile for Peripheral Sharing Device Version
4.0 and PP‐Module for Keyboard/Mouse Devices, Version 1.0 related to the examination of the
information contained in the TOE Summary Specification.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted
in accordance with the Assurance Activities, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation
team was justified.
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9.3 Evaluation of Guidance Documents
The evaluation team applied each EAL 1 AGD CEM work unit. The evaluation team ensured the
adequacy of the user guidance in describing how to use the operational TOE. Additionally, the
evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the administrator guidance in describing how to
securely administer the TOE. The guides were assessed during the design and testing phases of
the evaluation to ensure they were complete. Additionally, the evaluator performed the
Assurance Activities specified in the Protection Profile for Peripheral Sharing Device Version
4.0 and PP‐Module for Keyboard/Mouse Devices, Version 1.0 related to the examination of the
information contained in the operational guidance documents.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the Assurance Activities, and that the conclusion reached by
the evaluation team was justified.
9.4 Evaluation of Life Cycle Support Activities
The evaluation team applied each EAL 1 ALC CEM work unit. The evaluation team found
that the TOE was identified.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in
accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation
team was justified.
9.5 Evaluation of Test Documentation and the Test Activity
The evaluation team applied each EAL 1 ATE CEM work unit. The evaluation team ran the set
of tests specified by the Assurance Activities in the Protection Profile for Peripheral Sharing
Device Version 4.0 and PP‐Module for Keyboard/Mouse Devices, Version 1.0 and recorded the
results in a Test Report, summarized in the Evaluation Technical Report and Assurance
Activities Report.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence was
provided by the evaluation team to show that the evaluation activities addressed the test activities
in the Protection Profile for Peripheral Sharing Device Version 4.0 and PP‐Module for
Keyboard/Mouse Devices, Version 1.0, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team
was justified.
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity
The evaluation team applied each EAL 1 AVA CEM work unit. The evaluation team performed
a public search for vulnerabilities, performed vulnerability testing and did not discover any
issues with the TOE.
The evaluator searched the Internet for potential vulnerabilities in the TOE using the web sites
listed below. The sources of the publicly available information are provided below.
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• National Vulnerability Database: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/search
• Vertiv Support: https://www.vertiv.com/en-ca/support/
• Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures: https://google.com
The evaluator performed the public domain vulnerability searches using the following key
words: (The search was performed on January 12, 2021.)
• Vertiv
• Vertiv KM
• Vertiv Firmware
• Vertiv Peripheral Sharing Device
• SCKM140PP4
• SCUSBHIDFILTER
• AFP0004
• Firmware Version 40404-0E7
• Cybex
• NAK Transaction
• USB HID Traffic
• STMicroelectronics 32-bit
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation addressed the
vulnerability analysis Assurance Activities in the Protection Profile for Peripheral Sharing
Device Version 4.0 and PP‐Module for Keyboard/Mouse Devices, Version 1.0, and that the
conclusion reached by the evaluation team was justified.
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results
The evaluation team's assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims in
the ST are met. Additionally, the evaluation team's test activities also demonstrated the
accuracy of the claims in the ST.
The validation team's assessment of the evidence provided by the evaluation team is that it
demonstrates that the evaluation team performed the Assurance Activities in the Protection
Profile for Peripheral Sharing Device Version 4.0 and PP‐Module for Keyboard/Mouse Devices,
Version 1.0, and correctly verified that the product meets the claims in the ST.
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10 Validator Comments & Recommendations
The validation team notes that the evaluated configuration is dependent upon the TOE being
configured per the instructions in the Vertiv CYBEX™ SCUSBHIDFILTER Firmware Version
40404-0E7 Common Criteria Guidance Supplement, v1.8, January 19, 2022 and Vertiv
CYBEX™ SCKM140PP4 KM Switch Firmware Version 40404-0E7 Common Criteria
Guidance Supplement, v1.8, November 23, 2021 documents.
Note that the SCUSBHIDFILTER isolator device is designed to lock into the USB port and
cannot be removed (a special non-locking version was used for some tests). Users of the product
should be aware of this specialized characteristic.
No versions of the TOE and software, either earlier or later were evaluated. Please note that the
functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the security functional requirements specified in
the Security Target for the Isolator and Switch TOEs. Other functionality included in the product
was not assessed as part of this evaluation.
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11 Annexes
Not applicable.
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12 Security Target
Vertiv CYBEX™ SCUSBHIDFILTER Firmware Version 40404-0E7 Security Target Version:
1.15, January 5, 2022
Vertiv CYBEX™ SCKM140PP4 KM Switch Firmware Version 40404-0E7 Security Target,
Version: 1.18, January 13, 2022
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13 Glossary
The following definitions are used throughout this document:
• Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL). An IT security evaluation facility
accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and
approved by the CCEVS Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based
evaluations.
• Conformance. The ability to demonstrate in an unambiguous way that a given
implementation is correct with respect to the formal model.
• Evaluation. The assessment of an IT product against the Common Criteria using the
Common Criteria Evaluation Methodology to determine whether or not the claims made
are justified; or the assessment of a protection profile against the Common Criteria using
the Common Evaluation Methodology to determine if the Profile is complete, consistent,
technically sound and hence suitable for use as a statement of requirements for one or
more TOEs that may be evaluated.
• Evaluation Evidence. Any tangible resource (information) required from the sponsor or
developer by the evaluator to perform one or more evaluation activities.
• Feature. Part of a product that is either included with the product or can be ordered
separately.
• Target of Evaluation (TOE). A group of IT products configured as an IT system, or an
IT product, and associated documentation that is the subject of a security evaluation
under the CC.
• Validation. The process carried out by the CCEVS Validation Body leading to the issue
of a Common Criteria certificate.
• Validation Body. A governmental organization responsible for carrying out validation
and for overseeing the day-to-day operation of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation
and Validation Scheme.
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14 Bibliography
The Validation Team used the following documents to produce this Validation Report:
1. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part 1: Introduction
and general model, Version 3.1 Revision 5.
2. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part 2: Security
functional requirements, Version 3.1 Revision 5.
3. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part 3: Security
assurance requirements, Version 3.1 Revision 5.
4. Common Evaluation Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1 Revision 5.
5. Vertiv CYBEX™ SCUSBHIDFILTER Firmware Version 40404-0E7 Security Target
Version: 1.15, January 5, 2022
6. Vertiv CYBEX™ SCKM140PP4 KM Switch Firmware Version 40404-0E7 Security
Target, Version: 1.18, January 13, 2022
7. Assurance Activity Report for Vertiv CYBEX™ SCUSBHIDFILTER Firmware Version
40404-0E7 and Vertiv CYBEX™ SCKM140PP4 KM Switch Firmware Version 40404-
0E7 Peripheral Sharing Devices [AAR], Version 1.2, January 28, 2022
8. Evaluation Technical Report for Vertiv CYBEX™ SCUSBHIDFILTER Firmware
Version 40404-0E7 and Vertiv CYBEX™ SCKM140PP4 KM [ETR], Version 1.2
January 28, 2022
9. Vertiv CYBEX™ SCUSBHIDFILTER Firmware Version 40404-0E7 Common Criteria
Guidance Supplement, v1.8, January 19, 2022
10. Vertiv CYBEX™ SCKM140PP4 KM Switch Firmware Version 40404-0E7 Common
Criteria Guidance Supplement, v1.8, November 23, 2021
11. CYBEX™ SC Series Secure Switches SC800/900DPH, SC800/900DVI, and
SCKM100PP4 Quick Installation Guide, 590-2282-501B
12. CYBEX™ SECURE USB FILTERS, 590-2297-501A