1
This document and the information it contains is the property of IDEMIA. It may not be used, reproduced or transmitted to a third
party without prior written approval.
CombICAO Applet v3 on
ID-One Cosmo X (EAC
with PACE for French ID
Configuration) Public
Security Target
Reference: FQR 550 0286 Ed 3 - ST
2
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party without prior written approval.
About IDEMIA
OT-Morpho is now IDEMIA, the global leader in trusted identities for an
increasingly digital world, with the ambition to empower citizens and consumers
alike to interact, pay, connect, travel and vote in ways that are now possible in a
connected environment.
Securing our identity has become mission critical in the world we live in today. By
standing for Augmented Identity, we reinvent the way we think, produce, use
and protect this asset, whether for individuals or for objects. We ensure privacy
and trust as well as guarantee secure, authenticated and verifiable transactions
for international clients from Financial, Telecom, Identity, Security and IoT
sectors.
With close to €3bn in revenues, IDEMIA is the result of the merger between OT
(Oberthur Technologies) and Safran Identity & Security (Morpho). This new
company counts 14,000 employees of more than 80 nationalities and serves
clients in 180 countries.
| For more information, visit www.idemia.com / Follow @IdemiaGroup on Twitter
3
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party without prior written approval.
APPROVAL
COMPANY NAME FUNCTION
Established by: IDEMIA
Rozenn
TRUBERT
Certification Project Manager
Reviewed by: IDEMIA
Abraham YAP R&D Embedded Manager
Jerome
BOUDINEAU
Marketing Product Owner
Authorized by: IDEMIA Sarra MESTIRI IDEMIA Certification Team Manager
4
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party without prior written approval.
DOCUMENT EVOLUTION
Date Version Name Revision
29/11/2021 Ed 1 Prem KUMAR Sanitized version created for Public Issue.
01/02/2022 Ed 2 Prem KUMAR
Sanitized version created for Public Issue
after incorporating ANSSI feedbacks.
16/01/2023 Ed 3 Rozenn TRUBERT
Update [AGD_PRE], [AGD_OPE],
[ST_PTF] and [PTF_CERT] references
5
This document and the information it contains is the property of IDEMIA. It may not be used, reproduced or transmitted to a third
party without prior written approval.
Table of contents
1 SECURITY TARGET INTRODUCTION ...................................................... 10
1.1 ST IDENTIFICATION ..........................................................................................10
1.2 TOE REFERENCE ..............................................................................................10
2 TECHNICAL TERMS, ABBREVIATIONS AND ASSOCIATED REFERENCES 11
2.1 TECHNICAL TERMS............................................................................................11
2.2 ABBREVIATIONS ...............................................................................................23
2.3 REFERENCES....................................................................................................25
3 TOE OVERVIEW AND DESCRIPTION ...................................................... 29
3.1 TOE OVERVIEW ...............................................................................................29
3.2 TOE DESCRIPTION ...........................................................................................31
3.2.1 Physical scope of the TOE ........................................................................32
3.2.2 Logical scope of the TOE..........................................................................32
3.3 REQUIRED NON-TOE HARDWARE/SOFTWARE/FIRMWARE ............................................34
3.4 TOE USAGE AND MAJOR SECURITY FEATURES OF THE TOE..........................................35
3.4.1 Active Authentication (AA)........................................................................36
3.4.2 Basic Access Control (BAC).......................................................................36
3.4.3 Chip Authentication Protocol (v1)..............................................................37
3.4.4 Terminal Authentication Protocol (v1)........................................................37
3.4.5 Password Authenticated Connection Establishment (PACE)..........................37
4 LIFE CYCLE............................................................................................. 39
4.1 DEVELOPMENT ENVIRONMENT..............................................................................40
4.2 PRODUCTION ENVIRONMENT ...............................................................................40
4.3 PREPARATION ENVIRONMENT...............................................................................52
4.4 OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT ..............................................................................52
5 CONFORMANCE CLAIMS ........................................................................ 53
5.1 COMMON CRITERIA CONFORMANCE CLAIM ..............................................................53
5.2 PROTECTION PROFILE CONFORMANCE CLAIM ...........................................................53
5.3 PACKAGE CLAIM ...............................................................................................54
5.4 PP CONFORMANCE RATIONALE.............................................................................54
5.4.1 Main aspects...........................................................................................54
5.4.2 Overview of differences between the PP and the ST ...................................54
5.4.3 Subjects .................................................................................................55
5.4.4 Threats...................................................................................................55
5.4.5 Security Objectives ..................................................................................55
5.5 CC CONFORMANCE AND USAGE IN REAL LIFE ............................................................55
6 SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION ......................................................... 57
6.1 ASSETS ..........................................................................................................57
6.1.1 Primary Assets ........................................................................................57
6.1.2 Secondary Assets ....................................................................................58
6.1.3 Additional Assets identified as per ADDENDUM...........................................60
6.2 SUBJECTS AND EXTERNAL ENTIITIES ......................................................................60
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party without prior written approval.
6.2.1 Subjects .................................................................................................61
6.2.2 Additional Subjects identified as per ADDENDUM........................................63
6.2.3 Additional Subjects Identified ...................................................................65
6.3 THREATS ........................................................................................................65
6.3.1 Threats...................................................................................................65
6.3.2 Additional Threats as per ADDENDUM .......................................................69
6.3.3 Additional Threats Identified.....................................................................69
6.4 ORGANISATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES ...................................................................70
6.5 ASSUMPTIONS..................................................................................................72
7 SECURITY OBJECTIVES.......................................................................... 74
7.1 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE TOE.....................................................................74
7.1.1 Security Objectives from the PP ................................................................74
7.1.2 Additional Objectives as per ADDENDUM ...................................................77
7.1.3 Additional Objectives for Active Authentication...........................................77
7.1.4 Additional Security Objectives Identified ....................................................77
7.2 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT......................................78
7.2.1 eDigitalIdentity document Issuer and CVCA: eDigitalIdentity document's PKI
(issuing) branch...................................................................................................78
7.2.2 Issuing State or Organisation....................................................................79
7.2.3 Receiving State or Organisation ................................................................80
7.2.4 eDigitalIdentity document Issuer as the general responsible........................81
7.2.5 Terminal operator: Terminal's receiving branch..........................................81
7.2.6 eDigitalIdentity document holder Obligations .............................................82
7.3 SECURITY OBJECTIVES RATIONALE........................................................................82
7.3.1 Threats...................................................................................................82
7.3.2 Organisational Security Policies.................................................................85
7.3.3 Assumptions ...........................................................................................88
7.3.4 SPD and Security Objectives.....................................................................88
8 EXTENDED REQUIREMENTS................................................................... 93
8.1 EXTENDED FAMILIES..........................................................................................93
8.1.1 Extended Family FPT_EMS - TOE Emanation..............................................93
8.1.2 Extended Family FMT_LIM - Limited capabilities.........................................94
8.1.3 Extended Family FIA_API - Authentication Proof of Identity.........................96
8.1.4 Extended Family FAU_SAS - Audit data storage..........................................97
8.1.5 Extended Family FCS_RND - Generation of random numbers.......................98
9 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS.................................................................. 100
9.1 SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS................................................................ 100
9.1.1 Class FAU Security Audit ........................................................................ 100
9.1.2 Class FCS Cryptographic Support ............................................................ 100
9.1.3 Additional FCS SFR's Identified ............................................................... 103
9.1.4 Class FDP User Data Protection............................................................... 106
9.1.5 Additional FDP SFR's Identified ............................................................... 108
9.1.6 Class FIA Identification and Authentication .............................................. 109
9.1.7 Additional FIA SFRs identified as per ADDENDUM..................................... 113
9.1.8 Additional FIA SFR's Identified................................................................ 113
9.1.9 Class FMT Security Management............................................................. 114
9.1.10 Additional FMT SFRs identified as per ADDENDUM................................. 118
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party without prior written approval.
9.1.11 Additional FMT SFR's Identified............................................................ 118
9.1.12 Class FPT Protection of the Security Functions ...................................... 120
9.1.13 Class FTP Trusted Path/Channels......................................................... 122
9.1.14 Additional FTP SFR's Identified ............................................................ 122
9.2 SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS................................................................. 123
9.2.1 ADV Development ................................................................................. 123
9.2.2 AGD Guidance documents ...................................................................... 128
9.2.3 ALC Life-cycle support............................................................................ 130
9.2.4 ASE Security Target evaluation ............................................................... 134
9.2.5 ATE Tests ............................................................................................. 140
9.2.6 AVA Vulnerability assessment ................................................................. 143
9.3 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS RATIONALE ................................................................. 144
9.3.1 Objectives............................................................................................. 144
9.3.2 Rationale tables of Security Objectives and SFRs...................................... 152
9.3.3 Dependencies........................................................................................ 159
9.3.4 Rationale for the Security Assurance Requirements .................................. 165
9.3.5 AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis............................. 165
9.3.6 ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures ............................................ 166
10 TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION .......................................................... 167
10.1 TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION .......................................................................... 167
10.2 THIS SECURITY FUNCTIONALITY ENSURES THAT THE TOE, WHEN DELIVERED TO THE
ADMINISTRATION AGENT, PROVIDES AND REQUIRES AUTHENTICATION FOR DATA EXCHANGE. SFRS
AND TSS............................................................................................................... 172
10.2.1 SFRs and TSS - Rationale.................................................................... 172
10.2.2 Association tables of SFRs and TSS ...................................................... 178
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party without prior written approval.
Table of figures
Figure 1 TOE’s logical architecture .................................................................................33
Figure 2 Life cycle Overview..........................................................................................39
Figure 3 Remote Inspection Procedure...........................................................................64
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party without prior written approval.
Table of tables
Table 1 Different evaluated configurations of the CombICAO application...........................31
Table 2 BAC Configuration ............................................................................................37
Table 3 : Development R&D Sites ..................................................................................40
Table 4 : Audited Production Sites .................................................................................41
Table 5 Option 1: Both Platform and Applet packages are loaded at IC Manufacturer Site...41
Table 6 Option 2: Both Platform and Applet packages are loaded at CC Audited IDEMIA Sites
or Non-Audited IDEMIA Sites or External Sites ..........................................................42
Table 7 Option 3(a): Platform package is loaded at IC Manufacturer Site and Applet package
is loaded at Audited IDEMIA Sites or Non-Audited IDEMIA Sites or External Sites through
GP Mechanism .......................................................................................................43
Table 8 Platform package is loaded at IC Manufacturer Site and Applet package is loaded
through resident application using LSK format or DUMP Package in Ciphered format is
loaded...................................................................................................................45
Table 9 Option 3(c): Platform package is loaded at IC Manufacturer Site and Applet package
in plain format is loaded at Audited IDEMIA Sites only...............................................46
Table 10 Option 4(a): Platform package is loaded at Audited IDEMIA Sites or Non-Audited
IDEMIA Sites or External Sites and Applet package is loaded at Audited IDEMIA Sites or
Non-Audited IDEMIA Sites or External Sites through GP Mechanism............................48
Table 11 Platform package is loaded at Audited IDEMIA Sites or Non-Audited IDEMIA Sites or
External Sites and Options and Applet package is loaded through Resident application
using LSK format or DUMP Package in Ciphered format is loaded ...............................50
Table 12 Option 4(c): Platform package is loaded at IC Manufacturer Site and Applet
package in plain format is loaded at CC Audited IDEMIA Sites only.............................51
Table 13 Common Criteria conformance claim.................................................................53
Table 14 Threats and Security Objectives - Coverage .....................................................89
Table 15 Security Objectives and Threats - Coverage .....................................................90
Table 16 OSPs and Security Objectives - Coverage.........................................................90
Table 17 Security Objectives and OSPs - Coverage.........................................................92
Table 18 Assumptions and Security Objectives for the Operational Environment - Coverage
............................................................................................................................92
Table 19 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment and Assumptions - Coverage
............................................................................................................................92
Table 20 Security Objectives and SFRs - Coverage ....................................................... 155
Table 21 SFRs and Security Objectives........................................................................ 159
Table 22 SFRs Dependencies...................................................................................... 163
Table 23 SARs Dependencies ..................................................................................... 165
Table 24 SFRs and TSS - Coverage ............................................................................. 182
Table 25 TSS and SFRs - Coverage ............................................................................. 183
10
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party without prior written approval.
1 Security Target Introduction
1.1 ST Identification
Title CombICAO Applet v3 on ID-One Cosmo X (EAC with PACE for
French ID Configuration) Public Security Target
ST Identification FQR 550 0286 Ed 3
CC Version 3.1 revision 5
Assurance Level EAL5 augmented with ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5
ITSEF CEA-LETI
Certification Body ANSSI
Compliant to
Protection Profile
[PP_EACwPACE] and [ADDENDUM]
1.2 TOE Reference
TOE Commercial
Name
CombICAO Applet v3 in EAC with PACE configuration for French
ID on ID-One Cosmo X
Applet Code Versions
(SAAAAR Code)
‘20 37 42 FF’
Applet Internal
Version
’00 00 02 0D’
Platform Name ID-One Cosmo X
Platform Certificate [PTF_CERT]
Guidance Documents [AGD_PRE], [AGD_OPE].
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party without prior written approval.
2 Technical Terms, Abbreviations and Associated
References
2.1 Technical Terms
Term Definition
Accurate Terminal
Certificate
A Terminal Certificate is accurate, if the issuing Document Verifier is
trusted by the eDigitalIdentity document’s chip to produce Terminal
Certificates with the correct certificate effective date, see [TR-03110-
3].
Advanced
Inspection
Procedure (with
PACE)
A specific order of authentication steps between a eDigitalIdentity
document and a terminal as required by [TR-03110-3], namely (i)
PACE, (ii) Chip Authentication v1, (iii) Passive Authentication with SOD
and (iv) Terminal Authentication v1. AIP can generally be used by EIS-
AIP-PACE.
Agreement This term is used in the current ST in order to reflect an appropriate
relationship between the parties involved, but not as a legal notion.
Application note Optional informative part of the PP containing sensitive supporting
information that is considered relevant or useful for the construction,
evaluation, or use of the TOE (cf. CC part 1, section B.2.7).
Audit records Write-only-once non-volatile memory area of the eDigitalIdentity
document’s chip to store the Initialisation Data and Pre-personalisation
Data.
Authenticity Ability to confirm the eDigitalIdentity document and its data elements
on the eDigitalIdentity document’s chip were created by the issuing
State or Organization
Basic Access
Control
Security mechanism defined in [ICAO_9303] by which means the
eDigitalIdentity document’s chip proves and the inspection system
protect their communication by means of secure messaging with Basic
Access Keys (see there).
Basic Inspection
System (BIS)
A technical system being used by an inspecting authority and operated
by a governmental organisation (i.e. an Official Domestic or Foreign
Document Verifier) and verifying the eDigitalIdentity document
presenter as the eDigitalIdentity document holder (for ePassport: by
comparing the real biometric data (face) of the eDigitalIdentity
document presenter with the stored biometric data (DG2) of the
eDigitalIdentity document holder).
The Basic Inspection System with PACE is a PACE Terminal additionally
supporting/applying the Passive Authentication protocol and is
authorised by the eDigitalIdentity document Issuer through the
Document Verifier of receiving state to read a subset of data stored on
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party without prior written approval.
Term Definition
the eDigitalIdentity document.
Biographical data
(bio data).
The personalised details of the bearer of the eDigitalIdentity document
appearing as text in the visual and machine readable zones on the
biographical data page of a eDigitalIdentity document [ICAO_9303].
Biometric
reference data
Data stored for biometric authentication of the eDigitalIdentity
document holder in the eDigitalIdentity document’s chip as (i) digital
portrait and (ii) optional biometric reference data.
Card Access
Number (CAN)
Password derived from a short number printed on the front side of the
data-page.
Certificate chain A sequence defining a hierarchy certificates. The Inspection System
Certificate is the lowest level, Document Verifier Certificate in between,
and Country Verifying Certification Authority Certificates are on the
highest level. A certificate of a lower level is signed with the private key
corresponding to the public key in the certificate of the next higher
level.
Counterfeit An unauthorized copy or reproduction of a genuine security document
made by whatever means.
Country Signing CA
Certificate (CCSCA)
Self-signed certificate of the Country Signing CA Public Key
(KPu CSCA) issued by CSCA stored in the inspection system.
Country Signing
Certification
Authority (CSCA)
An organisation enforcing the policy of the eDigitalIdentity document
Issuer with respect to confirming correctness of user and TSF data
stored in the eDigitalIdentity document. The CSCA represents the
country specific root of the PKI for the eDigitalIdentity documents and
creates the Document Signer Certificates within this PKI.
The CSCA also issues the self-signed CSCA Certificate (CCSCA) having
to be distributed by strictly secure diplomatic means, see.
[ICAO_9303], 5.5.1.
The Country Signing Certification Authority issuing certificates for
Document Signers (cf. [6]) and the domestic CVCA may be integrated
into a single entity, e.g. a Country Certification Authority. However,
even in this case, separate key pairs must be used for different roles,
see [TR-03110-3].
Country Verifying
Certification
Authority (CVCA)
An organisation enforcing the privacy policy of the eDigitalIdentity
document Issuer with respect to protection of user data stored in the
eDigitalIdentity document (at a trial of a terminal to get an access to
these data). The CVCA represents the country specific root of the PKI
for the terminals using it and creates the Document Verifier Certificates
within this PKI. Updates of the public key of the CVCA are distributed in
form of CVCA Link-Certificates, see [TR-03110-3].
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party without prior written approval.
Term Definition
Since the Standard Inspection Procedure does not imply any certificate-
based terminal authentication, the current TOE cannot recognise a
CVCS as a subject; hence, it merely represents an organizational entity
within this ST.
The Country Signing Certification Authority (CSCA) issuing certificates
for Document Signers (cf. [ICAO_9303]) and the domestic CVCA may
be integrated into a single entity, e.g. a Country Certification Authority.
However, even in this case, separate key pairs must be used for
different roles, see [TR-03110-3].
Current date The maximum of the effective dates of valid CVCA, DV and domestic
Inspection System certificates known to the TOE. It is used the validate
card verifiable certificates.
CV Certificate Certificate of the new public key of the Country Verifying Certification
Authority signed with the old public key of the Country Verifying
Certification Authority where the certificate effective date for the new
key is before the certificate expiration date of the certificate for the old
key.
CVCA link
Certificate
Certificate of the new public key of the Country Verifying Certification
Authority signed with the old public key of the Country Verifying
Certification Authority where the certificate effective date for the new
key is before the certificate expiration date of the certificate for the old
key.
Document Basic
Access Key
Derivation
Algorithm
The [ICAO_9303] describes the Document Basic Access Key Derivation
Algorithm on how terminals may derive the Document Basic Access
Keys from the second line of the printed MRZ data.
Document Details
Data
Data printed on and electronically stored in the eDigitalIdentity
document representing the document details like document type,
issuing state, document number, date of issue, date of expiry, issuing
authority. The document details data are less-sensitive data.
Document Basic
Access Keys
Pair of symmetric Triple-DES keys used for secure messaging with
encryption (key KENC) and message authentication (key KMAC) of data
transmitted between the eDigitalIdentity document’s chip and the
inspection system [ICAO_9303]. It is drawn from the printed MRZ of
the passport book to authenticate an entity able to read the printed
MRZ of the passport book.
Document Security
Object (SOD)
A RFC3369 CMS Signed Data Structure, signed by the Document Signer
(DS). Carries the hash values of the LDS Data Groups. It is stored in
the eDigitalIdentity document’s chip. It may carry the Document Signer
Certificate (CDS). [ICAO_9303]
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party without prior written approval.
Term Definition
Document Signer
(DS)
An organisation enforcing the policy of the CSCA and signing the
Document Security Object stored on the eDigitalIdentity document for
passive authentication.
A Document Signer is authorised by the national CSCA issuing the
Document Signer Certificate (CDS), see [ICAO_9303].
This role is usually delegated to a Personalisation Agent.
Document Verifier
(DV)
An organisation enforcing the policies of the CVCA and of a Service
Provider (here: of a governmental organisation / inspection authority)
and managing terminals belonging together (e.g. terminals operated by
a State’s border police), by – inter alia – issuing Terminal Certificates. A
Document Verifier is therefore a Certification Authority, authorised by
at least the national CVCA to issue certificates for national terminals,
see [TR-03110-3].
Since the Standard Inspection Procedure does not imply any certificate-
based terminal authentication, the current TOE cannot recognise a DV
as a subject; hence, it merely represents an organisational entity within
this ST.
There can be Domestic and Foreign DV: A domestic DV is acting under
the policy of the domestic CVCA being run by the eDigitalIdentity
document Issuer; a foreign DV is acting under a policy of the
respective foreign CVCA (in this case there shall be an appropriate
agreement between the eDigitalIdentity document Issuer und a foreign
CVCA ensuring enforcing the eDigitalIdentity document Issuer’s privacy
policy) 1 2
Eavesdropper A threat agent with low attack potential reading the communication
between the eDigitalIdentity document’s chip and the inspection
system to gain the data on the eDigitalIdentity document’s chip.
Enrolment The process of collecting biometric samples from a person and the
subsequent preparation and storage of biometric reference templates
representing that person's identity. [ICAO_9303]
eDigitalIdentity
document
(electronic)
The contact based or contactless smart card integrated into the plastic
or paper, optical readable cover and providing the following
application: ePassport.
1
The form of such an agreement may be of formal and informal nature; the term ‘agreement’ is used in the
current ST in order to reflect an appropriate relationship between the parties involved.
2
Existing of such an agreement may be technically reflected by means of issuing a CCVCA-F for the Public Key of
the foreign CVCA signed by the domestic CVCA.
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party without prior written approval.
Term Definition
ePassport
application
[PACE-PP] definition
A part of the TOE containing the non-executable, related user data
(incl. biometric) as well as the data needed for authentication (incl.
MRZ); this application is intended to be used by authorities, amongst
other as a machine readable eDigitalIdentity document (MRTD).
See [TR-03110-1].
[PP-EAC] definition
Non-executable data defining the functionality of the operating system
on the IC as the eDigitalIdentity document’s chip. It includes
the file structure implementing the LDS [ICAO_9303],
the definition of the User Data, but does not include the User Data
itself (i.e. content of EF.DG1 to EF.DG13, EF.DG16, EF.COM and
EF.SOD) and
the TSF Data including the definition the authentication data but except
the authentication data itself.
Extended Access
Control
Security mechanism identified in [ICAO_9303] by which means the
eDigitalIdentity document’s chip (i) verifies the authentication of the
inspection systems authorized to read the optional biometric reference
data, (ii) controls the access to the optional biometric reference data
and (iii) protects the confidentiality and integrity of the optional
biometric reference data during their transmission to the inspection
system by secure messaging. The Personalisation Agent may use the
same mechanism to authenticate themselves with Personalisation
Agent Authentication Private Key and to get write and read access to
the logical eDigitalIdentity document and TSF data.
Extended
Inspection System
(EIS)
A role of a terminal as part of an inspection system which is in addition
to Basic Inspection System authorized by the issuing State or
Organization to read the optional biometric reference data and
supports the terminals part of the Extended Access Control
Authentication Mechanism.
Forgery Fraudulent alteration of any part of the genuine document, e.g.
changes to the biographical data or the portrait.
Global
Interoperability
The capability of inspection systems (either manual or automated) in
different States throughout the world to exchange data, to process
data received from systems in other States, and to utilize that data in
inspection operations in their respective States. Global interoperability
is a major objective of the standardized specifications for placement of
both eye-readable and machine readable data in all eDigitalIdentity
document’s. [ICAO_9303]
IC Dedicated
Software
Software developed and injected into the chip hardware by the IC
manufacturer. Such software might support special functionality of the
IC hardware and be used, amongst other, for implementing delivery
procedures between different players. The usage of parts of the IC
Dedicated Software might be restricted to certain life phases.
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party without prior written approval.
Term Definition
IC Dedicated
Support Software
That part of the IC Dedicated Software (refer to above) which provides
functions after TOE Delivery. The usage of parts of the IC Dedicated
Software might be restricted to certain phases.
IC Dedicated Test
Software
That part of the IC Dedicated Software (refer to above) which is used
to test the TOE before TOE Delivery but which does not provide any
functionality thereafter.
IC Embedded
Software
Software embedded in an IC and not being designed by the IC
developer. The IC Embedded Software is designed in the design life
phase and embedded into the IC in the manufacturing life phase of the
TOE.
IC Identification
Data
The IC manufacturer writes a unique IC identifier to the chip to control
the IC as eDigitalIdentity document material during the IC
manufacturing and the delivery process to the eDigitalIdentity
document manufacturer.
Impostor A person who applies for and obtains a document by assuming a false
name and identity, or a person who alters his or her physical
appearance to represent himself or herself as another person for the
purpose of using that person’s document.
Improperly
documented
person
A person who travels, or attempts to travel with: (a) an expired
eDigitalIdentity document or an invalid visa; (b) a counterfeit, forged
or altered eDigitalIdentity document or visa; (c) someone else’s travel
document or visa; or (d) no travel document or visa, if required.
[ICAO_9303]
Initialisation Process of writing Initialisation Data (see below) to the TOE (TOE life-
cycle, Phase 2 Manufacturing, Step 3).
Initialisation Data Any data defined by the TOE Manufacturer and injected into the non-
volatile memory by the Integrated Circuits manufacturer (Phase 2).
These data are for instance used for traceability and for IC
identification as eDigitalIdentity document material (IC identification
data).
Inspection The act of a State examining an eDigitalIdentity document presented
to it by a traveller (the eDigitalIdentity document’s holder) and
verifying its authenticity. [ICAO_9303]
Inspection system
(IS)
A technical system used by the border control officer of the receiving
State (i) examining an eDigitalIdentity document presented by the
traveller and verifying its authenticity and (ii) verifying the traveller as
eDigitalIdentity document holder.
Integrated circuit
(IC)
Electronic component(s) designed to perform processing and/or
memory functions. The eDigitalIdentity document’s chip is an
integrated circuit.
Integrity Ability to confirm the eDigitalIdentity document and its data elements
on the eDigitalIdentity document’s chip have not been altered from
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party without prior written approval.
Term Definition
that created by the issuing State or Organization
Issuing
Organization
Organization authorized to issue an official eDigitalIdentity document
(e.g. the United Nations Organization, issuer of the Laissez-passer).
[ICAO_9303]]
Issuing State The Country issuing the eDigitalIdentity document. [ICAO_9303]
Logical Data
Structure (LDS)
The collection of groupings of Data Elements stored in the optional
capacity expansion technology [ICAO_9303]. The capacity expansion
technology used is the eDigitalIdentity document’s chip.
Logical Data
Structure 2 (LDS2)
The file structures required to support the ICAO LDS2 [9303-10_LDS2]
consisting of LDS file structure with three additional and optional
applications:
• Travel records (stamps);
• Visa records; and
• Additional biometrics.
Logical
eDigitalIdentity
document
Data of the eDigitalIdentity document holder stored according to the
Logical Data Structure [ICAO_9303] as specified by ICAO on the
contact based/contactless integrated circuit. It presents contact
based/contactless readable data including (but not limited to)
personal data of the eDigitalIdentity document holder
the digital Machine Readable Zone Data (digital MRZ data, EF.DG1),
the digitized portraits (EF.DG2),
the biometric reference data of finger(s) (EF.DG3) or iris image(s)
(EF.DG4) or both and
the other data according to LDS (EF.DG5 to EF.DG16).
EF.COM and EF.SOD
Machine Readable
Travel Document
(MRTD)
Official document issued by a State or Organization which is used by
the holder for international travel (e.g. passport, visa, official document
of identity) and which contains mandatory visual (eye readable) data
and a separate mandatory data summary, intended for global use,
reflecting essential data elements capable of being machine read.
[ICAO_9303]
Machine Readable
Zone (MRZ)
Fixed dimensional area located on the front of the eDigitalIdentity
document or MRP Data Page or, in the case of the TD1, the back of the
eDigitalIdentity document, containing mandatory and optional data for
machine reading using OCR methods. [ICAO_9303]
The MRZ-Password is a restricted-revealable secret that is derived from
the machine readable zone and may be used for PACE.
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This document and the information it contains is the property of IDEMIA. It may not be used, reproduced or transmitted to a third
party without prior written approval.
Term Definition
Machine-verifiable
biometrics feature
A unique physical personal identification feature (e.g. an iris pattern,
fingerprint or facial characteristics) stored on a eDigitalIdentity
document in a form that can be read and verified by machine.
[ICAO_9303]
Manufacturer Generic term for the IC Manufacturer producing integrated circuit and
the eDigitalIdentity document Manufacturer completing the IC to the
eDigitalIdentity document. The Manufacturer is the default user of the
TOE during the manufacturing life phase. The TOE itself does not
distinguish between the IC Manufacturer and eDigitalIdentity document
Manufacturer using this role Manufacturer.
Metadata of a CV
Certificate
Data within the certificate body (excepting Public Key) as described in
[TR-03110-3].
The metadata of a CV certificate comprise the following elements:
- Certificate Profile Identifier,
- Certificate Authority Reference,
- Certificate Holder Reference,
- Certificate Holder Authorisation Template,
- Certificate Effective Date,
- Certificate Expiration Date.
Optional biometric
reference data
Data stored for biometric authentication of the eDigitalIdentity
document holder in the eDigitalIdentity document’s chip as (i) encoded
finger image(s) (DG3) or (ii) encoded iris image(s) (DG4) or (iii) both.
Note that the European commission decided to use only finger print
and not to use iris images as optional biometric reference data.
Password
Authenticated
Connection
Establishment
(PACE)
A communication establishment protocol defined in [ICAO_9303] part
11. The PACE Protocol is a password authenticated Diffie-Hellman key
agreement protocol providing implicit password-based authentication of
the communication partners (e.g. smart card and the terminal
connected): i.e. PACE provides a verification, whether the
communication partners share the same value of a password π). Based
on this authentication, PACE also provides a secure communication,
whereby confidentiality and authenticity of data transferred within this
communication channel are maintained.
PACE passwords Passwords used as input for PACE. This may either be the CAN or the
SHA-1-value of the concatenation of Serial Number, Date of Birth and
Date of Expiry as read from the MRZ, see [ICAO_9303] part 11 or a
user PIN or PUK as specified in [TR-03110-3]
Passive
authentication
(i) verification of the digital signature of the Document Security Object
and (ii) comparing the hash values of the read LDS data fields with the
hash values contained in the Document Security Object.
Personalisation The process by which the Personalisation Data are stored in and
unambiguously, inseparably associated with the eDigitalIdentity
document. This may also include the optional biometric data collected
during the “Enrolment” (cf. paragraph 1.7.4.3, TOE life-cycle, Phase 3,
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This document and the information it contains is the property of IDEMIA. It may not be used, reproduced or transmitted to a third
party without prior written approval.
Term Definition
Step 6).
Personalisation
Agent
An organisation acting on behalf of the eDigitalIdentity document
Issuer to personalise the eDigitalIdentity document for the
eDigitalIdentity document holder by some or all of the following
activities:
ICAO eDigitalIdentity document
(i) establishing the identity of the eDigitalIdentity document
holder for the biographic data in the eDigitalIdentity
document,
(ii) enrolling the biometric reference data of the
eDigitalIdentity document holder,
(iii) writing a subset of these data on the physical
eDigitalIdentity document (optical personalisation) and
storing them in the eDigitalIdentity document (electronic
personalisation) for the eDigitalIdentity document holder
as defined in [TR-03110-1],
(iv) writing the document details data,
(v) writing the initial TSF data,
(vi) signing the Document Security Object defined in
[ICAO_9303] (in the role of DS).
Please note that the role ‘Personalisation Agent’ may be distributed
among several institutions according to the operational policy of the
eDigitalIdentity document Issuer.
Generating signature key pair(s) is not in the scope of the tasks of this
role.
Personalisation
Data
A set of data incl.
individual-related data (biographic and biometric data) of the
eDigitalIdentity document holder,
dedicated document details data and
dedicated initial TSF data (incl. the Document Security Object).
Personalisation data are gathered and then written into the non-volatile
memory of the TOE by the Personalisation Agent in the life-cycle phase
card issuing.
Personalisation
Agent
Authentication
Information
TSF data used for authentication proof and verification of the
Personalisation Agent.
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This document and the information it contains is the property of IDEMIA. It may not be used, reproduced or transmitted to a third
party without prior written approval.
Term Definition
Personalisation
Agent Key
Symmetric cryptographic key or key set (MAC, ENC) used
by the Personalisation Agent to prove his identity and get access to the
logical eDigitalIdentity document and
by the eDigitalIdentity document’s chip to verify the authentication
attempt of a terminal as Personalisation Agent according to the SFR
FIA_UAU.1/PACE, FIA_UAU.4/PACE, FIA_UAU.5/PACE
(FIA_UAU.1/PACE_CAM, FIA_UAU.4/PACE_CAM, FIA_UAU.5/PACE_CAM
for PACE CAM).
Physical part of the
eDigitalIdentity
document
eDigitalIdentity document in form of paper, plastic and chip using
secure printing to present data including (but not limited to)
biographical data,
data of the machine-readable zone,
photographic image and
other data.
Pre-personalisation Process of writing Pre-Personalisation Data (see below) to the TOE
including the creation of the eDigitalIdentity document Application
(TOE life-cycle, Phase 2, Step 5)
Pre-personalisation
Data
Any data that is injected into the non-volatile memory of the TOE by
the eDigitalIdentity document Manufacturer (Phase 2) for traceability of
non-personalised eDigitalIdentity document’s and/or to secure
shipment within or between life cycle phases 2 and 3. It contains (but
is not limited to) the Personalisation Agent Key Pair and Chip Life-Cycle
Production data (CPLC data).
Pre-personalised
eDigitalIdentity
document’s chip
eDigitalIdentity document’s chip equipped with a unique identifier.
Receiving State The Country to which the eDigitalIdentity document holder is applying
for entry. [ICAO_9303]
Reference data Data enrolled for a known identity and used by the verifier to check the
verification data provided by an entity to prove this identity in an
authentication attempt.
RF-terminal A device being able to establish communication with an RF-chip
according to ISO/IEC 14443 [ISO14443].
Secondary image A repeat image of the holder’s portrait reproduced elsewhere in the
document by whatever means [ICAO_9303].
Secure messaging
in encrypted
/combined mode
Secure messaging using encryption and message authentication code
according to ISO/IEC 7816-4 [ISO7816]
Service Provider An official organisation (inspection authority) providing inspection
service which can be used by the eDigitalIdentity document holder.
Service Provider uses terminals (BIS-PACE) managed by a DV.
Skimming Imitation of the inspection system to read the logical eDigitalIdentity
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party without prior written approval.
Term Definition
document or parts of it via the contactless communication channel of
the TOE without knowledge of the printed MRZ data.
Standard
Inspection
Procedure
A specific order of authentication steps between an eDigitalIdentity
document and a terminal as required by [ICAO_9303] and [TR-03110-
1], namely
PACE or BAC and
Passive Authentication with SOD.
SIP can generally be used by BIS-PACE and BIS-BAC.
Inspection
Procedure for
multi-application
eDigitalIdentity
document’s
This section describes an inspection procedure designed for
eDigitalIdentity document’s containing one or more applications
besides the eDigitalIdentity document’s application (“LDS2-
documents”): [LDS2_TR] Annex A2.
Terminal A terminal is any technical system communicating with the TOE either
through the contact based or contactless interface. A technical system
verifying correspondence between the password stored in the
eDigitalIdentity document and the related value presented to the
terminal by the eDigitalIdentity document presenter.
In this ST the role ‘Terminal’ corresponds to any terminal being
authenticated by the TOE.
Terminal may implement the terminal’s part of the PACE protocol and
thus authenticate itself to the eDigitalIdentity document using a shared
password (CAN or MRZ).
Terminal
Authorization
Intersection of the Certificate Holder Authorizations of the Inspection
System Certificate, the Document Verifier Certificate and Country
Verifier Certification Authority which shall be valid for the Current Date.
Terminal
Authorisation Level
Intersection of the Certificate Holder Authorisations defined by the
Terminal Certificate, the Document Verifier Certificate and Country
Verifying Certification Authority which shall be all valid for the Current
Date.
TOE tracing data Technical information about the current and previous locations of the
eDigitalIdentity document gathered by inconspicuous (for the
eDigitalIdentity document holder) recognising the eDigitalIdentity
document.
eDigitalIdentity
document
Official document issued by a state or organisation which is used by
the holder for international travel (e.g. passport, visa, official document
of identity) and which contains mandatory visual (eye readable) data
and a separate mandatory data summary, intended for global use,
reflecting essential data elements capable of being machine read; see
[ICAO_9303] (there “Machine readable eDigitalIdentity document”).
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This document and the information it contains is the property of IDEMIA. It may not be used, reproduced or transmitted to a third
party without prior written approval.
Term Definition
eDigitalIdentity
document
(electronic)
The contact based or contactless smart card integrated into the plastic
or paper, optical readable cover and providing the following
application: ePassport.
eDigitalIdentity
document Holder
The rightful holder of the eDigitalIdentity document for whom the
issuing State or Organisation personalised the eDigitalIdentity
document.
eDigitalIdentity
document’s Chip
A contact based / contactless integrated circuit chip complying with
ISO/IEC 14443 [15] and programmed according to the Logical Data
Structure as specified by ICAO, [ICAO_9303], sec III.
Traveller Person presenting the eDigitalIdentity document to the inspection
system and claiming the identity of the eDigitalIdentity document
holder.
TSF data Data created by and for the TOE, that might affect the operation of the
TOE (CC part 1 [CC1]).
Unpersonalised
eDigitalIdentity
document
The eDigitalIdentity document that contains the eDigitalIdentity
document chip holding only Initialisation Data and Pre-personalisation
Data as delivered to the Personalisation Agent from the Manufacturer.
User data All data (being not authentication data)
stored in the context of the ePassport application of the eDigitalIdentity
document as defined in [5] and
being allowed to be read out solely by an authenticated terminal acting
as Basic Inspection System with PACE.
CC give the following generic definitions for user data:
Data created by and for the user that does not affect the operation of
the TSF (CC part 1 [CC1]). Information stored in TOE resources that
can be operated upon by users in accordance with the SFRs and upon
which the TSF places no special meaning (CC part 2 [CC2]).
Verification The process of comparing a submitted biometric sample against the
biometric reference template of a single enrollee whose identity is
being claimed, to determine whether it matches the enrollee’s
template. [ICAO_9303]
Verification data Data provided by an entity in an authentication attempt to prove their
identity to the verifier. The verifier checks whether the verification data
match the reference data known for the claimed identity.
23
This document and the information it contains is the property of IDEMIA. It may not be used, reproduced or transmitted to a third
party without prior written approval.
2.2 Abbreviations
Acronym Definition
BAC Basic Access Control
BIS Basic Inspection System
BIS-PACE Basic Inspection System with PACE
CA Chip Authentication
CAN Card Access Number
CC Common Criteria
CLFDB Ciphered Load File Data Block
DER Distinguished Encoding Rules
DES Data Encryption Standard
DF Dedicated File
DH Diffie Hellman
DSK Dump Secret Key
EAC Extended Access Control
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
EF Elementary File
FID File identifier
GP Global Platform
IC Integrated Chip
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization
ICC Integrated Chip card
ICCSN Integrated Circuit Card Serial Number.
IFD Interface Device
IS Inspection System
LSK Load Secure Key
MAC Message Authentication code
MF Master File
MRTD Machine Readable Travel Document
MRZ Machine readable zone
OE Security Objectives for the Operational Environment
OSP Organisational security policy
OT Security Objectives for the TOE
PACE Password Authenticated Connection Establishment
PCD Proximity Coupling Device
PICC Proximity Integrated Circuit Chip
PIN Personal Identification Number
PKI Public Key Infrastructure
PP Protection Profile
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party without prior written approval.
PS Personalisation System
PT Personalisation Terminal
RF Radio Frequency
ROM Read Only Memory
RSA Rivest Shamir Adleman
RSA CRT Rivest Shamir Adleman – Chinese Remainder Theorem
SAI Scanning Area Identifier
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SCP Secure Channel Procotol
SFR Security functional requirement
SHA Secure Hashing Algorithm
SIP Standard Inspection Procedure
ST Security Target
TA Terminal Authentication
TOE Target Of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functions
25
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party without prior written approval.
2.3 References
Reference Description
[ADDENDUM] 20190821-Module-PP0056 - v1.1
[AGD_OPE]
FQR 220 1641 - CombICAO Applet V3 on ID-One Cosmo X
- AGD_OPE
[AGD_PRE]
FQR 220 1640 - CombICAO Applet V3 on ID-One Cosmo X
- AGD_PRE
[CC1]
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Part 1: Introduction and general model.
Version 3.1. Revision 5. April 2017. CCMB-2017-04-001.
[CC2]
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Part 2: Security functional requirements.
Version 3.1. Revision 5. April 2017. CCMB-2017-04-002.
[CC3]
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Part 3: Security assurance requirements.
Version 3.1. Revision 5. April 2017. CCMB-2017-04-003.
[CEM]
Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Evaluation Methodology. Version 3.1. Revision
5. April 2017. CCMB-2017-04-004.
[FIPS_180_4]
FIPS 180-4, Federal Information Processing Standards
Publication (FIPS PUB) 180-4, Secure Hash Standard,
August 2015
[FIPS_186_3]
FIPS 186-3, Federal Information Processing Standards
Publication (FIPS PUB) 186-3, Digital Signature Standard
(DSS), June 2009
[FIPS_197]
FIPS 197, Federal Information Processing Standards
Publication (FIPS PUB 197), Advanced Encryption Standard
(AES)
[FIPS_46_3]
FIPS 46-3, Federal Information Processing Standards
Publication (FIPS PUB) 46-3, Data Encryption Standard
(DES), 1999 October 25
[GPC_SPE_014]
GlobalPlatform Card Technology - Secure Channel Protocol
'03', Card Specification v2.3 – Amendment D” Version
1.1.2 - Public Release March 2019
[GPC_SPE_034]
“GlobalPlatform Card Specification“ Version 2.3.1 Public
Release - March 2018
26
This document and the information it contains is the property of IDEMIA. It may not be used, reproduced or transmitted to a third
party without prior written approval.
[ICAO_9303]
International Civil Aviation Organization, ICAO Doc 9303,
Machine Readable Travel Documents – 7th
and 8th
edition.
[ISO_15946]
ISO/IEC 15946: Information technology — Security
techniques — Cryptographic techniques based on elliptic
curves — Part 3: Key establishment, 2002
[ISO_9796-2]
ISO/IEC 9796-2:2002 - Information technology - Security
techniques - Digital signature schemes giving message
recovery - Part 2: Mechanisms using a hash-function
[ISO_9797_1]
ISO/IEC 9797-1 Information technology – Security
techniques – Message Authentication codes (MACs) – part
1: Mechanisms using a block cipher, Second edition 2011-
03-01
[ISO11770-2]
ISO/IEC 11770-2. Information Technology – Security
techniques – Key management – part 2: Mechanisms using
symmetric techniques, 1996
[ISO11770-3]
ISO/IEC 11770-3. Information Technology – Security
techniques – Key management – part 3: Mechanisms using
asymmetric techniques, 2015
[ISO14443]
ISO/IEC 14443 Identification cards -- Contactless
integrated circuit cards -- Proximity cards, 2016
[ISO7816]
ISO/IEC 7816: Identification cards — Integrated circuit
cards.
[NIST_800_38A]
NIST Special Publication 800-38A: 2001, Recommendation
for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods and
Techniques, December 2001
[NIST_800_38B]
NIST Special Publication 800-38B: 2005, Recommendation
for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The CMAC Mode for
Authentication, May 2005
[PKCS#3]
PKCS #3: Diffie-Hellman Key-Agreement Standard, An RSA
Laboratories Technical Note, Version 1.4 Revised
November 1, 1993
[PP_BAC]
Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable
Travel Document with "ICAO Application", Basic Access
Control, BSI-CC-PP-0055-2009, Version 1.10, 25th March
2009
[PP_EAC]
EAC- Machine readable travel documents with “ICAO
Application”, Extended Access control – BSI-PP-0056 v1.10
25th march 2009
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This document and the information it contains is the property of IDEMIA. It may not be used, reproduced or transmitted to a third
party without prior written approval.
[PP_EACwPACE]
Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable
Travel Document with “ICAO Application”, Extended
Access Control with PACE (EAC PP), BSI-CC-PP0056-V2-
2012-MA-02, version 1.3.2, 5th December 2012
[PP_IC]
Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation
Packages Version 1.0, Registered and Certified by
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI)
under the reference BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014.
[PP_PACE]
Machine Readable Travel Document using Standard
Inspection Procedure with PACE, BSI-CC-PP-0068-V2-
2011-MA-01, Version 1.01, 22 July 2014
[PP-SSCD2]
Protection profiles for secure signature creation device —
Part 2: Device with key Generation, EN 419211-2:2013,
CEN/TC 224, BSI-CC-PP-0059-2009-MA-02, Version 2.0.1,
June 30 2016
[PP-SSCD3]
Protection profiles for secure signature creation device –
Part3: Device with key import, EN 419211-3:2013, CEN/TC
224, BSI-CC-PP-0075-2012-MA-01, Version 1.0.2, June 30
2016
[PP-SSCD4]
Protection profiles for secure signature creation device —
Part 4: Extension for device with key generation and
trusted communication with certificate generation
application, EN 419211-4:2013, CEN/TC 224, BSI-CC-PP-
0071-2012-MA-01, Version 1.0.1, June 30 2016
[PP-SSCD5]
Protection profiles for secure signature creation device —
Part 5: Extension for device with key generation and
trusted communication with signature creation application,
EN 419211-5:2013, CEN/TC 224, BSI-CC-PP-0072-2012-
MA-01, Version 1.0.1, June 30 2016
[PP-SSCD6]
Protection profiles for secure signature creation device –
Part6: Extension for device with key import and trusted
communication with signature-creation application, EN
419211-6:2013, CEN/TC 224, BSI-CC-PP-0076-2013-MA-
01, Version 1.0.4, June 30 2016
[PTF_CERT] ANSSI-CC-2021/29-S01-V2 - ID-One COSMO X
[QR_Guide] FQR 220 1646 Ed 1 - CombICAO Applet V3 -
Recommendations for Compatibility with QR
[RGS2_B1]
GUIDE DES MÉCANISMES CRYPTOGRAPHIQUES RÈGLES
ET RECOMMANDATIONS CONCERNANT LE CHOIX ET LE
DIMENSIONNEMENT DES MÉCANISMES
CRYPTOGRAPHIQUES, Version 2.04 du 01 Janvier 2020
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This document and the information it contains is the property of IDEMIA. It may not be used, reproduced or transmitted to a third
party without prior written approval.
[ST_PTF] Security Target Lite ID-ONE Cosmo X, FQR 110 9730
[TR-03110-1]
Technical Guideline TR-03110-1, Advanced Security
Mechanisms for Machine Readable Travel Documents –Part
1 – eMRTDs with BAC/PACEv2 and EACv1, Version 2.20,
26.02.2015 by BSI
[TR-03110-2]
Technical Guideline TR-03110-2, Advanced Security
Mechanisms for Machine Readable Travel Documents –Part
2 – Extended Access Control Version 2 (EACv2),Password
Authenticated Connection Establishment (PACE),and
Restricted Identification (RI), Version 2.21, 21.12.2016 by
BSI
[TR-03110-3]
TR-03110-3 Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine
Readable Travel Documents – Part 3: Common
Specifications, version 2.21, 21-12-2016 by BSI
[TR-03111]
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI),
Technical Guideline TR-03111 Elliptic Curve Cryptography,
TR-03111, Version 1.11, 17.04.2009
[X9.62]
AMERICAN NATIONAL STANDARD X9.62-1998: Public Key
Cryptography For The Financial Services Industry (rDSA), 9
september 1998
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party without prior written approval.
3 TOE Overview and Description
3.1 TOE Overview
The TOE is a composite product that consist of an IDEMIA applet named CombICAO v3
loaded on ID-One Cosmo X Global Platform and Java Card Operating system. The product is
contact and/or contactless smart card security controller in EAC with PACE configuration
for French ID Products.
This Security Target addresses the protection of the logical eDigitalIdentity document
(i) in integrity by write-only-once access control and by physical means, and
(ii) in confidentiality with the Extended Access Control Mechanism.
TOE implements the Extended Access Control as defined in [TR-03110-1] and [TR-03110-3].
The Extended Access Control consists of two parts
(i) Chip Authentication Protocol Version 1 (v1), and
(ii) Terminal Authentication Protocol Version 1 (v1).
Chip Authentication acts as an alternative to the Active Authentication stated in
[ICAO_9303].
The Chip Authentication Protocol v1
(i) authenticates the eDigitalIdentity document’s chip to the inspection system and
(ii) establishes secure messaging which will be used by Terminal Authentication v1 to
protect the confidentiality and integrity of the sensitive biometric reference data
during their transmission from the TOE to the Extended Inspection System.
Therefore Terminal Authentication v1 can only be performed if Chip
Authentication v1 has been successfully executed.
The Terminal Authentication Protocol v1 consists of
(i) the authentication of the Extended Inspection System as entity authorized by the
receiving State or Organisation through the issuing State, and
(ii) an access control by the TOE to allow reading the sensitive biometric reference data
only to successfully authenticated authorized inspection systems. The issuing
State or Organisation authorizes the receiving State by means of certification the
authentication public keys of Document Verifiers who create Inspection System
Certificates.
The confidentiality by Password Authenticated Connection Establishment (PACE) is a
mandatory security feature of the TOE. The eDigitalIdentity document shall strictly conform
to ([PP_PACE]) as it considers high attack potential.
For the PACE protocol according to [ICAO_9303], the following steps shall be performed:
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party without prior written approval.
(i) The eDigitalIdentity document’s chip encrypts a nonce with the shared
password, derived from the MRZ resp. CAN data and transmits the encrypted
nonce together with the domain parameters to the terminal.
(ii) The terminal recovers the nonce using the shared password, by (physically)
reading the MRZ resp. CAN data.
(iii) The eDigitalIdentity document’s chip and terminal computer perform a Diffie-
Hellmann key agreement together with the ephemeral domain parameters to
create a shared secret. Both parties derive the session keys KMAC and KENC
from the shared secret.
(iv) Each party generates an authentication token, sends it to the other party and
verifies the received token.
After successful key negotiation the terminal and the eDigitalIdentity document’s chip
provide private communication (secure messaging) [TR-03110-3], [ICAO_9303].
The CombICAO Applet v3 is also evaluated in other configurations as mentioned in the
Table below.
This ST considers the CombICAO Applet v3 in the EAC with PACE configuration for
French ID Configuration.
Configuration PP Conformity Extensions to the PP
BAC and CA [PP_BAC]
- Active Authentication (AA)
- Chip Authentication Protocol (v1)
- Restart secure messaging in AES128,
AES192 or AES256 secure messaging (in
addition to 3DES) after Chip Authentication
Protocol (v1)
EAC in
combination with
BAC
[PP_EAC] - Active Authentication (AA)
EAC with PACE
[PP_PACE]
- Active Authentication (AA)
[PP_EACwPACE]
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party without prior written approval.
EAC with PACE
for French ID
[PP_PACE]
- [ADDENDUM]
- Active Authentication (AA)
[PP_EACwPACE]
SSCD
[PP-SSCD2],
[PP-SSCD3],
[PP-SSCD4],
[PP-SSCD5], and
[PP-SSCD6]
- ADMIN role
- Integrity token
Table 1 Different evaluated configurations of the CombICAO application
3.2 TOE Description
The TOE in the PACE with EAC for French ID configuration encompasses the following
features:
 In Personalisation phase:
 authentication protocol for personalisation agent authentication;
 3DES, AES128, AES192 and AES256 Global Platform secure messaging;
 access control;
 Creation and configuration of application instances and their logical data
structure;
 Secure data loading;
 life-cycle phase switching to operational phase;
 In operational phase:
 PACE mapping types Generic Mapping (GM), Integrated Mapping (IM) and Chip
Authentication Mapping (CAM)*;
Note*: The availability of PACE-CAM depends on platform configuration and is an
optional feature;
 PACE passwords: MRZ, CAN, PIN and PUK;
 PACE PIN/PUK suspend/resume mechanism according to [TR-03110-2];
 PIN/PUK verify and PIN reset;
 EAC: Chip Authentication v1 (CAv1) and Terminal Authentication v1 (TAv1);
 Active Authentication (AA);
 After CAv1: restart ICAO secure messaging in 3DES, AES128, AES192 or AES256
cipher mode;
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This document and the information it contains is the property of IDEMIA. It may not be used, reproduced or transmitted to a third
party without prior written approval.
 After PACE start ICAO secure messaging in 3DES, AES128, AES192 or AES256
cipher mode;
 After EAC: access control to DG3 and DG4 based on the effective authorization
established during TAv1;
3.2.1 Physical scope of the TOE
The TOE is physically made up of several components hardware and software.
Once constructed, the TOE is a bare microchip with its external interfaces for
communication.
The TOE may be used on several physical medium like wafer, inlay, eCover, eDatapage,
eMRTD booklet or in a smart card.
The physical medium on which the microchip is mounted is not part of the target of
evaluation as it does not alter nor modify any security functions of the TOE. Also, the inlay
production including the application of the antenna is not part of the TOE
3.2.2 Logical scope of the TOE
The TOE is a smartcard, composed of:
 IC,
 Java Card Open Platform (OS) and
 CombICAO Applet v3 (data storage file structure)
The prepersonalisation and personalisation are performed by the Manufacturer and the
Personalisation Agent, which controls the TOE. All along this phase, the TOE is self-
protected, as it requires the authentication of the Manufacturer and the Personalisation
Agent prior to any operation.
By being authenticated, the Personalisation Agent gets the rights (access control) for
(1) reading and writing data,
(2) instantiating the application, and
(3) writing of personalisation data. The Personalisation Agent can so create the file structure
(MF / ADF) required for this configuration.
33
This document and the information it contains is the property of IDEMIA. It may not be used, reproduced or transmitted to a third
party without prior written approval.
A schematic overview of the TOE’s logical architecture is shown in below figure:
Figure 1 TOE’s logical architecture
The TOE is composed of:
 Circuitry of the MRTD’s chip (the IC) :
 IC Dedicated Software with the parts IC Dedicated Test Software and IC Dedicated
Support Software
 ID-One Cosmo X Platform: see [ST_PTF] and [PTF_CERT]
 CombICAO Applet v3
 Associated guidance documentation (delivered in electronic version).
34
This document and the information it contains is the property of IDEMIA. It may not be used, reproduced or transmitted to a third
party without prior written approval.
The following guidance documents will be provided with the TOE:
Guidance Audience Form Factor of Delivery
[AGD_PRE] Personalising Agent
Electronic Version
[AGD_OPE] End user of the TOE
The following guide is provided only in case compliancy with QR scheme is required:
Guidance Purpose Form Factor of Delivery
[QR_Guide]
Recommendations for
QR Electronic Version
This ST Lite version of this Security Target will also be provided along with above-mentioned
documents.
Platform related guidance documents are mentioned in [ST_PTF].
“Life Cycle” section in this ST provides more details about the TOE delivery for the different
options.
3.3 Required non-TOE hardware/Software/firmware
There is no explicit non-TOE hardware, software or firmware required by the TOE to perform
its claimed security features. The TOE is defined to comprise the chip and the complete
operating system and application. Note, the inlay holding the chip as well as the antenna and
the booklet (holding the printed MRZ) are needed to represent a complete MRTD,
nevertheless these parts are not inevitable for the secure operation of the TOE.
Note: In particular, the TOE may be used in contact mode, without any inlay or antenna.
35
This document and the information it contains is the property of IDEMIA. It may not be used, reproduced or transmitted to a third
party without prior written approval.
3.4 TOE Usage and major security features of the TOE
A State or Organization issues MRTDs to be used by the holder for international travel. The
eDigitalIdentity document presenter presents a MRTD to the inspection system to prove his
or her identity. The MRTD in context of this Security Target contains (i) visual (eye readable)
biographical data and portrait of the holder, (ii) a separate data summary (MRZ data) for
visual and machine reading using OCR methods in the Machine readable zone (MRZ) and (iii)
data elements on the MRTD’s chip according to LDS for contactless machine reading. The
authentication of the eDigitalIdentity document presenter is based on (i) the possession of a
valid MRTD personalised for a holder with the claimed identity as given on the biographical
data page and (ii) optional biometrics using the reference data stored in the MRTD. The
issuing State or Organization ensures the authenticity of the data of genuine MRTD’s. The
receiving State trusts a genuine MRTD of an issuing State or Organization.
The MRTD is viewed as unit of
(a) the physical MRTD as eDigitalIdentity document in form of paper, plastic
and chip. It presents visual readable data including (but not limited to)
personal data of the MRTD holder
(1) the biographical data on the biographical data page of the passport
book,
(2) the printed data in the Machine-Readable Zone (MRZ) and
(3) the printed portrait.
(b) the logical MRTD as data of the MRTD holder stored according to the
Logical Data Structure [ICAO_9303] as specified by ICAO on the contactless
integrated circuit. It presents contactless readable data including (but not
limited to) personal data of the MRTD holder
(1) the digital Machine Readable Zone Data (digital MRZ data, EF.DG1),
(2) the digitized portraits (EF.DG2),
(3) the optional biometric reference data of finger(s) (EF.DG3) or iris
image(s) (EF.DG4) or both
(4) the other data according to LDS (EF.DG5 to EF.DG16) and
(5) the Document security object.
The issuing State or Organization implements security features of the MRTD to maintain the
authenticity and integrity of the MRTD and their data. The MRTD as the passport book and
the MRTD’s chip is uniquely identified by the Document Number.
The physical MRTD is protected by physical security measures (e.g. watermark on paper,
security printing), logical (e.g. authentication keys of the MRTD’s chip) and organizational
security measures (e.g. control of materials, personalisation procedures) [ICAO_9303].
These security measures include the binding of the MRTD’s chip to the passport book.
36
This document and the information it contains is the property of IDEMIA. It may not be used, reproduced or transmitted to a third
party without prior written approval.
The logical MRTD is protected in authenticity and integrity by a digital signature created by
the document signer acting for the issuing State or Organization and the security features of
the MRTD’s chip.
The ICAO defines the baseline security methods Passive Authentication and the optional
advanced security methods Basic Access Control to the logical MRTD, Extended Access
Control to and the Data Encryption of additional sensitive biometrics as optional security
measure in the ‘ICAO Doc 9303’ [ICAO_9303]. The Passive Authentication Mechanism and
the Data Encryption are performed completely and independently on the TOE by the TOE
environment.
3.4.1 Active Authentication (AA)
Active Authentication is an authentication mechanism ensuring the chip is genuine. It uses a
challenge-response protocol between the IS and the chip.
Active Authentication is realised with the INTERNAL AUTHENTICATE command. The
key and algorithms supported are the following:
RSA ISO/IEC 9796-2 with a key length of 1024, 1536, 2048, 3072 and 4096 bits and hashing
algorithm of SHA1 or SHA2 (i.e. SHA256, SHA384 and SHA512).
ECDSA over prime field curves with hashing algorithm of SHA1 or SHA2 (i.e. SHA256,
SHA384 and SHA512) and the key sizes 192 to 521.
3.4.2 Basic Access Control (BAC)
The protocol for Basic Access Control is specified by [ICAO_9303]. Basic Access Control
checks that the terminal has physical access to the MRTD’s data page. This is enforced by
requiring the terminal to derive an authentication key from the optically read MRZ of the
MRTD. The protocol for Basic Access Control is based on [ISO11770-2] key establishment
mechanism 6. This protocol is also used to generate session keys that are used to protect
the confidentiality (and integrity) of the transmitted data.
The Basic Access Control (BAC) is a security feature that is supported by the TOE. The
inspection system reads the printed data on the document (MRZ), authenticates itself as
inspection system by means of keys derived from MRZ data. After successful 3DES based
authentication, the TOE provides read access to data requiring BAC rights by means of a
private communication (secure messaging) with the inspection system.
The purpose of this mechanism is to ensure that the holder gives access to the IS to the
logical MRTD (data stored in the chip); It is achieved by a mutual authentication.
Once the mutual authentication is performed, a secure messaging is available to protect the
communication between the chip and the IS.
37
This document and the information it contains is the property of IDEMIA. It may not be used, reproduced or transmitted to a third
party without prior written approval.
This table lists the supported configurations for BAC protocol:
Configuration Key Algo Key Length Hash Algo MAC Algo
BAC 3DES 2Key 16-bytes SHA-1 Retail MAC
Table 2 BAC Configuration
3.4.3 Chip Authentication Protocol (v1)
The Chip Authentication Protocol is an ephemeral-static Diffie-Hellman key agreement
protocol that provides secure communication and unilateral authentication of the MRTD chip.
The protocol establishes Secure Messaging between an MRTD chip and a terminal based on
a static key pair stored on the MRTD chip. Chip Authentication is an alternative to the
optional ICAO Active Authentication, i.e. it enables the terminal to verify that the MRTD chip
is genuine but has two advantages over the original protocol:
 Challenge Semantics are prevented because the transcripts produced by this protocol
are non-transferable.
 Besides authentication of the MRTD chip this protocol also provides strong session
keys.
CAv1 provides implicit authentication of both the MRTD chip itself and the stored data by
performing Secure Messaging using the new session keys.
3.4.4 Terminal Authentication Protocol (v1)
The Terminal Authentication Protocol is a two-move challenge-response protocol that
provides explicit unilateral authentication of the terminal.
This protocol enables the MRTD chip to verify that the terminal is entitled to access sensitive
data. As the terminal may access sensitive data afterwards, all further communication MUST
be protected appropriately. Terminal Authentication therefore also authenticates an
ephemeral public key chosen by the terminal that was used to set up Secure Messaging with
Chip Authentication. The MRTD chip MUST bind the terminal’s access rights to Secure
Messaging established by the authenticated ephemeral public key of the terminal.
3.4.5 Password Authenticated Connection Establishment (PACE)
PACE is an access control mechanism that is supplemental to BAC. It is a cryptographically
stronger access control mechanism than BAC since it uses asymmetric cryptography
compared to BAC’s symmetric cryptography.
PACE is realized through five commands:
1. MSE SET – AT command
2. GENERAL AUTHENTICATE command – Encrypted Nonce
3. GENERAL AUTHENTICATE command – Map Nonce
4. GENERAL AUTHENTICATE command – Perform Key Agreement
5. GENERAL AUTHENTICATE command – Mutual Authentication
38
This document and the information it contains is the property of IDEMIA. It may not be used, reproduced or transmitted to a third
party without prior written approval.
Once the mutual authentication is performed, a secure messaging is available to protect the
communication between the chip and the IS.
39
This document and the information it contains is the property of IDEMIA. It may not be used, reproduced or transmitted to a third
party without prior written approval.
4 Life Cycle
The TOE life cycle in the following figure distinguishes stages for development, production,
preparation and operational use in accordance with the standard smart card life cycle
[PP_IC].
Figure 2 Life cycle Overview
40
This document and the information it contains is the property of IDEMIA. It may not be used, reproduced or transmitted to a third
party without prior written approval.
4.1 Development Environment
In this environment, the following two phases take place:
 Phase 1: IC Embedded Software Development (Java Card Open Platform components
and CombICAO Applet v3)
 Phase 2: IC Development
The IC Embedded Software Developer is in charge of the specification, development and
validation of the software (Java Card Open Platform and CombICAO Applet v3).
The IC Developer designs the IC, develops the IC dedicated software and provides
information, software or tools to the IC embedded software developer.
Roles, actors, sites and coverage for this environment of the product life-cycle are listed in
the table below:
Role Actor Site Covered by
CombICAO Applet v3
Developer
IDEMIA MANILA, JAKARTA,
COURBEVOIE and PESSAC
R&D sites
ALC
Embedded Software
Developer (Java Card Open
Platform)
IDEMIA Platform Developer
Refer to [ST_PTF]
ALC
Redaction and Review of
Documents
IDEMIA NOIDA, COURBEVOIE and
PESSAC R&D sites
ALC
IC Developer INFINEON IC Manufacturer
Refer to [ST_PTF]
ALC
Table 3 : Development R&D Sites
4.2 Production Environment
In this environment, the following two phases take place:
 Phase 3: IC Manufacturing
 Phase 4: ID-One Cosmo X Platform loading and CombICAO Applet v3 loading
The CombICAO Applet v3 run time code is integrated in the FLASH memory of the chip.
Depending on the intention, the following different loading options are supported. Details on
delivery methods for each option are provided in the [AGD_PRE].
41
This document and the information it contains is the property of IDEMIA. It may not be used, reproduced or transmitted to a third
party without prior written approval.
IDEMIA CC Audited Production Sites are listed below:
IDEMIA CC Audited Production
Sites/Plants
Country
Haarlem Netherlands
Noida India
Ostrava Czech Republic
Shenzhen China
Vitré France
Table 4 : Audited Production Sites
(Option 1) Image Loading audited IC Manufacturer site
FLASH image containing both the “ID-One Cosmo X” Java Card Platform OS along with the
CombICAO Applet v3 is securely delivered directly from the software developer (IDEMIA R&D
Audited Site) to the IC Manufacturer (Infineon CC Audited Site) to be loaded into FLASH
memory. The FLASH image is always encrypted.
TOE Delivery point (i.e. point in time where the TOE starts to exist):
 The TOE delivery point occurs in Phase 4, as soon as the loading of the
image with ID-One Cosmo X Platform + CombICAO Applet v3 by the IC
Manufacturer has been completed.
Package Actor
for FLASH image
loading
Site
For FLASH image
loading
Covered by
CC
FLASH image containing
ID-One Cosmo X Platform
+ CombICAO Applet v3
IC Manufacturer
IC Manufacturer CC
Audited Production Plants
specified in
[ST_PTF]
ALC
Table 5 Option 1: Both Platform and Applet packages are loaded at IC
Manufacturer Site
(Option 2) Image loading at IDEMIA and External sites
FLASH image containing both ID-One Cosmo X Platform along with CombICAO Applet v3 is
securely delivered directly from the software developer (IDEMIA R&D Audited Site) for
loading to CC Audited IDEMIA Production Sites (Refer Audited Production Sites Table)
or Non-Audited IDEMIA Sites or External Sites.
TOE Delivery point:
42
This document and the information it contains is the property of IDEMIA. It may not be used, reproduced or transmitted to a third
party without prior written approval.
 If loading of ID-One Cosmo X Platform + CombICAO Applet v3 is
performed in Audited IDEMIA Production Sites, then TOE delivery is
considered at the end of Phase 4.
 If loading of ID-One Cosmo X Platform + CombICAO Applet v3 is
performed in Non-Audited IDEMIA Production Sites or External Sites, then
TOE delivery is considered after Phase 4.
Package Actor for FLASH
image loading
Site for FLASH image
loading
Covered by
CC
FLASH image containing
the ID-One Cosmo X
Platform + CombICAO
Applet v3
IDEMIA Authorized
Entity
Refer Audited Production
Sites Table
ALC
External Authorized
Agent
Non-Audited IDEMIA
Sites
or
External Sites
AGD
Table 6 Option 2: Both Platform and Applet packages are loaded at CC Audited
IDEMIA Sites or Non-Audited IDEMIA Sites or External Sites
(Option 3) Platform loaded by IC Manufacturer, Applet loaded by IDEMIA or 3rd
party
Only the ID-One Cosmo X Platform is delivered to the IC Manufacturer (Infineon Audited
Sites) to be loaded.
With the ID-One Cosmo X Platform already loaded (i.e. present) on the chip, the following
options (3a or 3b (i) or 3b (ii) or 3c) can be chosen for loading the CombICAO Applet v3.
(Option 3a) Applet loading using GP CLFDB mechanism.
The CombICAO Applet v3 along with the TOE’s guidance documentation is securely
delivered directly from the Software Developer (IDEMIA R&D Audited Site) to
Audited IDEMIA Production Sites (Refer Audited Production Sites Table) or Non-
Audited IDEMIA Sites or External Sites.
Loading of the CombICAO Applet v3 on top of the already present ID-One Cosmo X
Platform GP Java Card OS in any of these sites is accomplished by using a GP CLFDB
decryption Key.
TOE Delivery points:
 If loading of the CombICAO Applet v3 on top of already loaded ID-One
Cosmo X Platform (as described below) is done in a CC Audited IDEMIA
Production Sites then, TOE delivery is considered at the end of Phase 4.
43
This document and the information it contains is the property of IDEMIA. It may not be used, reproduced or transmitted to a third
party without prior written approval.
 If loading of the CombICAO Applet v3 on top of already loaded ID-One
Cosmo X Platform (as described below) is done in Non-Audited IDEMIA
Production Sites or External Sites then, TOE delivery is considered after phase
4.
Package Actor Site Covered by
Image containing only ID-
One Cosmo X Platform
IC Manufacturer
IC Manufacturer
Production Plants
Refer to [PTF-CERT]
ALC
CombICAO Applet v3 loaded
through GP mechanism using
CLFDB Key
IDEMIA Authorized
Entity
Refer Audited Production
Sites Table
ALC
External
Authorized Agent
Non-Audited IDEMIA
Sites
or
External Sites
AGD
Table 7 Option 3(a): Platform package is loaded at IC Manufacturer Site and
Applet package is loaded at Audited IDEMIA Sites or Non-Audited IDEMIA Sites
or External Sites through GP Mechanism
44
This document and the information it contains is the property of IDEMIA. It may not be used, reproduced or transmitted to a third
party without prior written approval.
(Option 3b) Applet loading using the IDEMIA Resident Application
(i) CombICAO Applet v3 along with the guidance documentation is securely
delivered directly from the Software Developer (IDEMIA R&D Audited Site) to
Audited IDEMIA Production Sites (Refer Audited Production Sites Table)
or Non-Audited IDEMIA Sites or External Sites.
CombICAO Applet v3 package is securely loaded via LSK on top of the
present ID-One Cosmo X Platform Java Card OS in any of these sites. This
loading is accomplished by using the IDEMIA “Resident Application” of the ID-
One Cosmo X Platform.
(ii) The DUMP package (including CombICAO Applet v3) with the guidance
documentation is securely delivered directly from the Software Developer
(IDEMIA R&D Audited Site) to Audited IDEMIA Production Sites (Refer
Audited Production Sites Table) or Non-Audited IDEMIA Sites or External
Sites.
Loading of DUMP PACKAGES in any of these sites is done through Resident
Application using DSK secret production key on top of the platform already
loaded by IC Manufacturer (Infineon).
TOE Delivery points:
 If loading of Applet package /DUMP Package on top of already loaded ID-One
Cosmo X Platform (as described below) is done in Audited IDEMIA Production
Sites then, TOE delivery is considered at the end of Phase 4.
 If loading of Applet package /DUMP Package on top of already loaded ID-One
Cosmo X Platform (as described below) is done in Non-Audited IDEMIA
Production Sites or External Sites then, TOE delivery after Phase 4.
45
This document and the information it contains is the property of IDEMIA. It may not be used, reproduced or transmitted to a third
party without prior written approval.
Package Actor Site Covered by
Image containing only ID-One
Cosmo X Platform
IC Manufacturer
IC Manufacturer
Production Plants
Refer to [PTF-CERT]
ALC
3b (i)
CombICAO Applet v3 loaded
through Resident Application
using LSK format
IDEMIA
Authorized Entity
Refer Audited Production
Sites Table
ALC
External
Authorized
Agent
Non-Audited IDEMIA
Sites
or
External Sites
AGD
3b (ii)
DUMP PACKAGE Ciphered
format [DSK Secret Live Key]
IDEMIA
Authorized Entity
Refer Audited Production
Sites Table ALC
External
Authorized
Agent
Non-Audited IDEMIA
Sites
or
External Sites
AGD
Table 8 Platform package is loaded at IC Manufacturer Site and Applet package is
loaded through resident application using LSK format or DUMP Package in
Ciphered format is loaded
46
This document and the information it contains is the property of IDEMIA. It may not be used, reproduced or transmitted to a third
party without prior written approval.
(Option 3c) Applet loading in plain (unprotected) format using GP
CombICAO Applet v3 along with the guidance documentation is securely delivered
directly from the Software Developer (IDEMIA R&D Audited Site) to CC Audited
IDEMIA Production Sites (Refer Audited Production Sites Table).
Here, there is a provision for loading the applet in plain format in Common Criteria
Audited IDEMIA Sites only, on top of the platform already loaded by IC
Manufacturer (Infineon). This applet loading in plain format is not allowed in Non-
Audited IDEMIA Sites or External Sites.
TOE Delivery points:
 The loading of CombICAO Applet v3 on top of already loaded ID-One Cosmo
X Platform is done in plain (unprotected) format in Common Criteria Audited
IDEMIA Production Sites. The TOE delivery is considered at the end of Phase
4.
Package Actor Site Covered by
Image containing only ID-
One Cosmo X Platform
IC Manufacturer
IC Manufacturer
Production Plants
Refer to [PTF-CERT]
ALC
CombICAO Applet v3 in
Plain Format
IDEMIA Authorized
Entity Refer Audited Production
Sites Table
ALC
Table 9 Option 3(c): Platform package is loaded at IC Manufacturer Site and
Applet package in plain format is loaded at Audited IDEMIA Sites only
47
This document and the information it contains is the property of IDEMIA. It may not be used, reproduced or transmitted to a third
party without prior written approval.
(Option 4) Platform and Applet loaded by IDEMIA or 3rd
party
Only ID-One Cosmo X Platform is securely delivered directly from the software developer
(IDEMIA R&D Audited Site) for loading to CC Audited IDEMIA Production Sites (Refer
Audited Production Sites Table) or Non-Audited IDEMIA Sites or External Sites.
Note: Here, when the ID-One Cosmo X Platform package is loaded in Non-Audited IDEMIA
Sites or External Sites, then the Platform is in self-protected mode by its secure functions
The following options (4a or 4b (i) or 4b (ii) or 4c) can be chosen for loading applets on
top of the already loaded platform.
(Option 4a) Applet loading using GP CLFDB mechanism
CombICAO Applet v3 along with the guidance documentation is securely delivered
directly from the Software Developer (IDEMIA R&D Audited Site) to Audited
IDEMIA Production Sites (Refer Audited Production Sites Table) or Non-Audited
IDEMIA Sites or External Sites.
Loading of Applet in any of these sites is done through GP mechanism using CLFDB
Key on top of the platform already loaded by CC Audited IDEMIA Production
Sites or Non-Audited IDEMIA Sites or External Sites.
TOE Delivery points:
 If loading of the CombICAO Applet v3 on top of already loaded ID-One
Cosmo X Platform (as described below) is done in CC Audited IDEMIA
Production Sites then, TOE delivery is considered at the end of Phase 4.
 If loading of the CombICAO Applet v3 onto the already loaded ID-One Cosmo
X Platform (as described below) is done in Non-Audited IDEMIA Production
Sites or External Sites then, TOE delivery is considered after Phase 4.
48
This document and the information it contains is the property of IDEMIA. It may not be used, reproduced or transmitted to a third
party without prior written approval.
Package Actor Site Covered by
Image containing
only ID-One
Cosmo X
Platform
IDEMIA Authorized
Entity
Refer Audited Production Sites
Table
ALC
External Authorized
Agent
Non-Audited IDEMIA Sites
or
External Sites
AGD
CombICAO
Applet v3 loaded
through GP
mechanism using
CLFDB Key
IDEMIA Authorized
Entity
Refer Audited Production Sites
Table
ALC
External Authorized
Agent
Non-Audited IDEMIA Sites
or
External Sites
AGD
Table 10 Option 4(a): Platform package is loaded at Audited IDEMIA Sites or Non-
Audited IDEMIA Sites or External Sites and Applet package is loaded at Audited
IDEMIA Sites or Non-Audited IDEMIA Sites or External Sites through GP
Mechanism
49
This document and the information it contains is the property of IDEMIA. It may not be used, reproduced or transmitted to a third
party without prior written approval.
(Option 4b) Applet loading using the IDEMIA Resident Application
(i) CombICAO Applet v3 along with the guidance documentation is securely
delivered directly from the Software Developer (IDEMIA R&D Audited Site) to
Audited IDEMIA Production Sites (Refer Audited Production Sites Table)
or Non-Audited IDEMIA Sites or External Sites.
Secure loading of CombICAO Applet v3 is done via LSK on top of the present
Cosmo X Java Card OS (already loaded by Audited IDEMIA Production
Sites or Non-Audited IDEMIA Sites or External Sites) in any of these
sites. This loading is accomplished by using the IDEMIA “Resident Application”
of the ID-One Cosmo X Platform OS
(ii) DUMP package (including the CombICAO Applet v3) with the guidance
documentation is securely delivered directly from the Software Developer
(IDEMIA R&D Audited Site) to Audited IDEMIA Production Sites (Refer
Audited Production Sites Table) or Non-Audited IDEMIA Sites or External
Sites.
Loading of DUMP PACKAGES in any of these sites is done through Resident
Application using DSK secret production key on top of the platform already
loaded by Audited IDEMIA Production Sites or Non-Audited IDEMIA
Sites or External Sites.
TOE Delivery points:
 If loading of Applet package /DUMP Package on top of already loaded ID-One
Cosmo X Platform (as described below) is done in Audited IDEMIA Production
Sites then, TOE delivery is considered at the end of Phase 4.
 If loading of Applet package /DUMP Package on top of already loaded ID-One
Cosmo X Platform (as described below) is done in Non-Audited IDEMIA
Production Sites or External Sites then, TOE delivery is considered after Phase
4.
50
This document and the information it contains is the property of IDEMIA. It may not be used, reproduced or transmitted to a third
party without prior written approval.
Package Actor Site
Covered
by
Image containing only ID-One
Cosmo X Platform
IDEMIA
Authorized Entity
Refer Audited Production
Sites Table
ALC
External
Authorized Agent
Non-Audited IDEMIA Sites
or
External Sites
AGD
4b (i)
CombICAO Applet v3
package loaded through
Resident Application using
LSK format
IDEMIA
Authorized Entity
Refer Audited Production
Sites Table
ALC
External
Authorized Agent
Non-Audited IDEMIA Sites
or
External Sites
AGD
4b (ii)
DUMP PACKAGE Ciphered
format [DSK Secret Live Key]
IDEMIA
Authorized Entity
Refer Audited Production
Sites Table ALC
External
Authorized Agent
Non-Audited IDEMIA Sites
or
External Sites
AGD
Table 11 Platform package is loaded at Audited IDEMIA Sites or Non-Audited
IDEMIA Sites or External Sites and Options and Applet package is loaded through
Resident application using LSK format or DUMP Package in Ciphered format is
loaded
(Option 4c) Applet loading in plain (unprotected) format using GP
CombICAO Applet v3 along with the guidance documentation is securely delivered
directly from the Software Developer (IDEMIA R&D Audited Site) to Audited
IDEMIA Production Sites (Refer Audited Production Sites Table).
Here, there is a provision of loading the applet in plain format in Audited IDEMIA
Sites only, on top of the platform already loaded by Audited IDEMIA Production Sites
or Non-Audited IDEMIA Sites or External Sites. This applet loading in plain format is
not allowed in Non-Audited IDEMIA Sites or External Sites.
TOE Delivery points:
51
This document and the information it contains is the property of IDEMIA. It may not be used, reproduced or transmitted to a third
party without prior written approval.
 Here, since the loading of Applet package on top of already loaded ID-One
Cosmo X Platform (as described below) is done in Plain format in CC Audited
IDEMIA Production Sites, so TOE delivery is considered at the end of Phase 4.
Package Actor Site Covered by
Image containing only ID-
One Cosmo X Platform
IDEMIA
Authorized Entity
Refer Audited Production
Sites Table
ALC
External
Authorized Agent
Non-Audited IDEMIA
Sites
or
External Sites
AGD
CombICAO Applet v3 in
Plain Format
IDEMIA
Authorized Entity
Refer Audited Production
Sites Table
ALC
Table 12 Option 4(c): Platform package is loaded at IC Manufacturer Site and
Applet package in plain format is loaded at CC Audited IDEMIA Sites only
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party without prior written approval.
4.3 Preparation Environment
In this environment, the following two phases take place:
 Phase 5: Pre-personalisation of the applet
 Phase 6: Personalisation
The preparation environment may not necessarily take place in a manufacturing site, but
may be performed anywhere. All along these two phases, the TOE is self-protected as it
requires the authentication of the pre-personalisation agent or personalisation agent prior to
any operation.
The CombICAO Applet v3 is pre-personalised and personalised according to [AGD_PRE].
These two phases are covered by [AGD_PRE] tasks of the TOE and Guidance tasks of
[ST_PTF].
4.4 Operational Environment
Phase 7: Use Phase
The TOE is used as a travel document's chip by the traveller and the inspection systems in
the “Operational Use” phase. The user data can be read according to the security policy of
the issuing State or Organisation and can be used according to the security policy of the
issuing State but they can never be modified for eMRTD application.
Note that applications can be loaded onto the ID-One Cosmo X platform during this phase.
During this phase, the TOE may be used as described in [AGD_OPE] of the TOE.
This phase is covered by [AGD_OPE] tasks of the TOE and Guidance tasks of [ST_PTF].
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party without prior written approval.
5 Conformance claims
5.1 Common Criteria Conformance Claim
This security target claims conformance to the Common Criteria version 3.1, revision 5 [CC2]
and [CC3].
The conformance to the CC is claimed as follows:
CC Conformance rationale
Part 2
Conformance with the extended3
part:
 FAU_SAS.1 “Audit Storage”
 FCS_RND.1 “Quality metric for random numbers”
 FMT_LIM.1 “Limited capabilities”
 FMT_LIM.2 “Limited availability”
 FPT_EMS.1 “TOE Emanation”
 FIA_API.1 “Authentication Proof of Identity”
Part 3
Conformance to EAL 5, augmented with
 AVA_VAN.5: “Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis”
 ALC_DVS.2: “Sufficiency of security measures”
Table 13 Common Criteria conformance claim
The Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation [CEM] has been
taken into account.
5.2 Protection Profile Conformance Claim
This security target (ST) claims strict conformance to:
 [PP_EACwPACE] : Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel
Document with “ICAO Application”, Extended Access Control with PACE (EAC PP),
BSI-CC-PP0056-V2-2012, version 1.3.2, 5th December 2012.
The [PP_EACwPACE] claims strict conformance to the PACE Protection Profile Machine
Readable Travel Document using Standard Inspection Procedure with PACE, BSI-CC-PP-
0068-V2-2011-MA-01, Version 1.01, 22 July 2014, BSI.
Even though the ST claims conformance to [PP_EACwPACE], certain terminology has been
updated in the ST and Assets, Threats, Objectives and SFRs added according to the
[ADDENDUM].
3
The rationale for SFR addition is described in the relative PP
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party without prior written approval.
The extensions do not contradict any of the threats, assumptions, organisational policies,
objectives or SFRs stated in the [PP_EACwPACE] that covers the advanced security methods
PACE and EAC in operational use phase.
5.3 Package Claim
This ST is conforming to assurance package EAL5 augmented with ALC_DVS.2 and
AVA_VAN.5 defined in CC part 3 [CC3].
5.4 PP Conformance Rationale
This ST [PACE/EACPP]
eDigitalIdentity document travel document
eDigitalIdentity document holder travel document holder
eDigitalIdentity document presenter traveler
Identification user data user data
PACE terminal BIS-PACE
5.4.1 Main aspects
- The TOE description is based on the TOE definition and TOE usage of [PP_EACwPACE]
and [ADDENDUM]. It was enhanced by product specific details.
- All definitions of the security problem definition in [PP_EACwPACE] and [ADDENDUM]
have been taken exactly from the protection profile in the same wording.
- All security objectives have been taken exactly from [PP_EACwPACE] and [ADDENDUM]
in the same wording.
- The part of extended components definition has been taken originally from
[PP_EACwPACE] and [ADDENDUM].
- All SFRs for the TOE have been taken originally from the [PP_EACwPACE] and
[ADDENDUM] added by according iterations, selections and assignments.
- The security assurance requirements (SARs) have been taken originally from the
[PP_EACwPACE]. The requirements are shifted to those of EAL 5+.
5.4.2 Overview of differences between the PP and the ST
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party without prior written approval.
The following parts list additional Subject, Threats and Objectives for this TOE which are not
in [PP_EACwPACE] and [ADDENDUM].
These additions do not contradict with any other Subjects, Threats and Objectives of the
TOE of the original PP nor mitigate a threat (or part of a threat) , meant to be addressed by
security objectives for the TOE in the PP.
5.4.3 Subjects
The following additional Subjects are identified for this TOE:
 eDigitalIdentity document packaging responsible
 Embedded software loading responsible
 Pre-personalisation Agent
 Administrator
5.4.4 Threats
The following additional Threats are identified for this TOE:
 T.Configuration
 T. Forgery_Supplemental_Data
 T.ADMIN_Configuration
 T.Key_Access
5.4.5 Security Objectives
The following additional Security Objectives of the TOE are identified for this TOE:
 OT.AA_Proof
 OT.Data_Int_AA
 OT.Configuration
 OT.Update_File
 OT.AC_SM_Level
 OT.Chip_Auth_Proof_PACE_CAM
 OT.ADMIN_Configuration
 OT.Key_Usage_Counter
5.5 CC Conformance and usage in real life
In the real life, for interoperability purposes, the MRTD will most likely support BAC, PACE
and EAC.
 If the terminal reads MRTD data by performing only BAC, the security of the MRTD
will be covered by the security evaluation of the TOE described in the ST claiming
compliance to the [PP_BAC] only.
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 If the terminal reads the content of the MRTD by performing BAC then EAC, the
security of the MRTD will be covered by the security evaluation of (1) the TOE
described by the ST claiming compliance to [PP_BAC] and (2) the TOE described by
the ST claiming compliance to [PP_EAC], assuming PACE is not supported by the
terminal (as not used for the inspection procedure)
 If the terminal reads the content of the MRTD by performing PACE then EAC, the
security of the MRTD will be covered by the security evaluation of the TOE described
by the ST claiming compliance to [PP_EACwPACE], assuming PACE is supported by
the terminal (as not used for the inspection procedure).
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party without prior written approval.
6 Security Problem Definition
6.1 Assets
Overview
The following table presents the assets of the TOE and their corresponding phase(s)
according to TOE life cycle:
Asset Step 5 Step 6 Step 7
Biometric Data No Yes Yes
Personal Data No Yes Yes
EF.COM No Yes Yes
CA_SK No Yes Yes
Session_K Yes Yes Yes
PACE_Kmac No No Yes
PACE_Kenc No No Yes
ephem-Skpicc-PACE No No Yes
PACE_PWD No Yes Yes
Perso_K No Yes No
LCS Yes Yes Yes
Updatable data No Yes Yes
The assets to be protected by the TOE include the Sensitive Identification User Data on the
eDigitalIdentity document’s chip, Sensitive Identification user data transferred between the
TOE and the terminal, and eDigitalIdentity document tracing data.
6.1.1 Primary Assets
Logical MRTD Sensitive User Data
Sensitive biometric reference data (EF.DG3, EF.DG4)
Application Note:
(5 in [PP_EACwPACE]): Due to interoperability reasons the [ICAO_9303] requires that
Basic Inspection Systems may have access to logical eDigitalIdentity document data DG1,
DG2, DG5 to DG16. The TOE is not in certified mode, if it is accessed using BAC
[ICAO_9303]. Note that the BAC mechanism cannot resist attacks with high attack
potential (cf. [PP_BAC]). If supported, it is therefore recommended to use PACE instead
of BAC. If nevertheless BAC has to be used, it is recommended to perform Chip
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Authentication v1 before getting access to data (except DG14), as this mechanism is
resistant to high potential attacks.
Authenticity of the MRTD's chip
The authenticity of the MRTD’s chip personalised by the issuing State or Organisation for
the MRTD holder is used by the eDigitalIdentity document presenter to prove his
possession of a genuine MRTD.
User data stored on the TOE
All data (being not authentication data) stored in the context of the ePassport application
of the MRTD as defined in [ICAO_9303] and being allowed to be read out solely by an
authenticated terminal acting as Basic Inspection System with PACE (in the sense of
[ICAO_9303]).
This asset covers ‘User Data on the MRTD’s chip’, ‘Logical MRTD Data’ and ‘Sensitive User
Data’ in [PP_BAC].
It includes:
Personal Data
The Personal Data are the logical MRTD standard Identification User Data of the MRTD
holder (EF.DG1, EF.DG2, EF.DG5 to EF.DG13, EF.DG16).
EF.COM
The EF.COM is an elementary file containing the list of the existing elementary files (EF)
with the Identification user data.
User data transferred between the TOE and the terminal connected
All data (being not authentication data) being transferred in the context of the ePassport
application of the MRTD as defined in [ICAO_9303] between the TOE and an
authenticated terminal acting as Basic Inspection System with PACE (in the sense of
[ICAO_9303]).
User data can be received and sent (exchange receive, send).
MRTD tracing data
Technical information about the current and previous locations of the MRTD gathered
unnoticeable by the MRTD holder recognising the TOE not knowing any PACE password.
TOE tracing data can be provided / gathered.
6.1.2 Secondary Assets
Accessibility to the TOE functions and data only for authorised subjects
Property of the TOE to restrict access to TSF and TSF-data stored in the TOE to
authorised subjects only.
Genuineness of the TOE
Property of the TOE to be authentic in order to provide claimed security functionality in a
proper way.
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party without prior written approval.
This asset also covers ‘Authenticity of the MRTD’s chip in [PP_BAC].
TOE internal secret cryptographic keys
Permanently or temporarily stored secret cryptographic material used by the TOE in order
to enforce its security functionality.
It includes:
Chip Authentication Private Key (CA_SK)
The Chip Authentication Private Key is used by the application to process Chip
Authentication.
Secure Messaging session keys (Session_K
Session keys are used to secure communication in confidentiality and authenticity.
PACE session keys (PACE-Kmac, PACE-Kenc)
PACE session keys are secure messaging keys for message authentication and for
message encryption agreed between the TOE and a terminal as result of the PACE
Protocol.
Ephemeral private key PACE (ephem-Skpicc-PACE) The ephemeral PACE
Authentication Key Pair is used for Key Agreement Protocol.
TOE internal non-secret cryptographic material
Permanently or temporarily stored non-secret cryptographic (public) keys and other non-
secret material (Document Security Object SOD containing digital signature) used by the
TOE in order to enforce its security functionality.
MRTD communication establishment authorisation data
Restricted-revealable authorisation information for a human user being used for
verification of the authorisation attempts as authorised user (PACE password). These data
are stored in the TOE and are not to be send to it.
It includes:
PACE password (PACE_PWD)
Password needed for PACE authentication.
Personalisation Agent keys (Perso_K)
This key set used for mutual authentication between the Personalisation agent and the
chip, and secure communication establishment.
TOE Life Cycle State (LCS)
This is the Life Cycle State of the TOE.
Updatable Data
Data other than Personal Data, Biometric Data, EF.COM, EF.SOD, CA_PK, CA_SK, Pre-
Perso_K, Perso_K, Session_K, LCS and Configuration Data which can be modified in
Operational Use phase.
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party without prior written approval.
6.1.3 Additional Assets identified as per ADDENDUM
6.1.3.1 Primary Assets
Sensitive ID User Data
Person identification data, which have been classified as sensitive data by the
eDigitalIdentity document issuer. Sensitive identification user data are a subset of all user
data.
Generic security property to be maintained by the current security policy: Confidentiality,
Integrity, Authenticity
6.1.3.2 Secondary Assets identified as per ADDENDUM
eDigitalIdentity document Communication Establishment Authorization Data
Restricted-revealable authorization information for a human user being used for
verification of the authorization attempts as an authorized user (PACE PIN & PUK). These
data are stored in the TOE, and are not send to it.
Generic security property to be maintained by the current security policy: Confidentiality,
Integrity
Secret eDigitalIdentity document Holder Authentication Data
Secret authentication information for the eDigitalIdentity document holder being used for
verification of the authentication attempts as authorized eDigitalIdentity document holder
(sent PACE passwords, e.g. PIN or PUK).
Generic security property to be maintained by the current security policy: Confidentiality,
Integrity
6.2 Subjects and external entiities
Overview
The following table presents the assets of the TOE and their corresponding phase(s)
according to life cycle defined in this ST.
Subject Step 3 Step 4 Step 5 Step 6 Step 7
MRTD Holder No No No No Yes
eDigitalIdentity document presenter No No No No Yes
Basic Inspection System with PACE No No No No Yes
Document Signer No No No Yes No
Country Signing Certification Authority No No No Yes No
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Personalisation Agent No No No Yes No
Administrator No No No No Yes
IC manufacturer (Manufacturer role) Yes No No No No
eDigitalIdentity document packaging
responsible (Manufacturer role)
No Yes No No No
Embedded software loading responsible
(Manufacturer role)
No Yes No No No
Pre-personalisation Agent (Manufacturer
role)
No No Yes No No
Country Verifying Certification Authority No No No No Yes
Document Verifier No No No No Yes
Terminal No No Yes Yes Yes
Inspection System No No No No Yes
Attacker Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
6.2.1 Subjects
MRTD holder
MRTD holder is the eDigitalIdentity document holder defined in [PP_PACE]:
A person for whom the eDigitalIdentity document Issuer has personalised the
eDigitalIdentity document. This entity is commensurate with ‘MRTD Holder’ in [PP_BAC].
Please note that a eDigitalIdentity document holder can also be an attacker.
eDigitalIdentity document presenter
A person presenting the eDigitalIdentity document to a terminal and claiming the identity
of the eDigitalIdentity document holder. This external entity is commensurate with
‘eDigitalIdentity document presenter’ in [PP_BAC]. Please note that a eDigitalIdentity
document presenter can also be an attacker.
Terminal
A terminal is any technical system communicating with the TOE through the contactless
interface.
Note: as the TOE may also be used in contact mode, the terminal may also communicate
using the contact interface.
Basic Inspection System with PACE (BIS-PACE terminal)
A technical system being used by an inspecting authority and verifying the eDigitalIdentity
document presenter as the eDigitalIdentity document holder (for ePassport: by comparing
the real biometric data (face) of the eDigitalIdentity document presenter with the stored
biometric data (DG2) of the eDigitalIdentity document holder).
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party without prior written approval.
PACE terminal implements the terminal’s part of the PACE protocol and authenticates
itself to the eDigitalIdentity document using a shared password (PACE password) and
supports Passive Authentication.
See also par. 1.2.5 in [PP_PACE].
Document Signer (DS)
An organisation enforcing the policy of the CSCA and signing the Document Security
Object stored on the eDigitalIdentity document for passive authentication. A Document
Signer is authorised by the national CSCA issuing the Document Signer Certificate, see
[ICAO_9303]. This role is usually delegated to a Personalisation Agent.
Country Signing Certification Authority (CSCA)
An organisation enforcing the policy of the eDigitalIdentity document Issuer with respect
to confirming correctness of user and TSF data stored in the eDigitalIdentity document.
The CSCA represents the country specific root of the PKI for the eDigitalIdentity
document and creates the Document Signer Certificates within this PKI. The CSCA also
issues the self-signed CSCA Certificate having to be distributed by strictly secure
diplomatic means, see [ICAO_9303], 5.5.1.
Personalisation Agent
An organisation acting on behalf of the eDigitalIdentity document Issuer to personalise
the eDigitalIdentity document for the eDigitalIdentity document holder by some or all of
the following activities: (i) establishing the identity of the eDigitalIdentity document
holder for the biographic data in the eDigitalIdentity document, (ii) enrolling the biometric
reference data of the eDigitalIdentity document holder, (iii) writing a subset of these data
on the physical eDigitalIdentity document (optical personalisation) and storing them in the
eDigitalIdentity document (electronic personalisation) for the eDigitalIdentity document
holder as defined in [ICAO_9303], (iv) writing the document details data, (v) writing the
initial TSF data, (vi) signing the Document Security Object defined in [ICAO_9303] (in the
role of DS). Please note that the role ‘Personalisation Agent’ may be distributed among
several institutions according to the operational policy of the eDigitalIdentity document
Issuer. This entity is commensurate with ‘Personalisation agent’ in [PP_BAC].
IC Manufacturer
This additional subject is a refinement of the role Manufacturer as described in
[PP_PACE]. It is the manufacturer of the IC.
If scheme 1 is applied (cf. § 1.3.6), this subject is responsible for the embedded software
downloading in the IC. This subject does not use Flash loader, even if it is embedded in
the IC
Attacker
Additionally to the definition from [PP_PACE], chap 3.1 the definition of an attacker is
refined as followed: A threat agent trying (i) to manipulate the logical eDigitalIdentity
document without authorization, (ii) to read sensitive biometric reference data (i.e.
EF.DG3, EF.DG4), (iii) to forge a genuine eDigitalIdentity document, or (iv) to trace a
eDigitalIdentity document.
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party without prior written approval.
Application Note:
(7 in [PP_EACwPACE]): An impostor is attacking the inspection system as TOE IT
environment independent on using a genuine, counterfeit or forged eDigitalIdentity
document. Therefore the impostor may use results of successful attacks against the TOE
but the attack itself is not relevant for the TOE.
Country Verifying Certification Authority (CVCA)
The Country Verifying Certification Authority (CVCA) enforces the privacy policy of the
issuing State or Organisation with respect to the protection of sensitive biometric
reference data stored in the eDigitalIdentity document. The CVCA represents the country
specific root of the PKI of Inspection Systems and creates the Document Verifier
Certificates within this PKI. The updates of the public key of the CVCA are distributed in
the form of Country Verifying CA Link-Certificates.
Document Verifier (DV)
The Document Verifier (DV) enforces the privacy policy of the receiving State with respect
to the protection of sensitive biometric reference data to be handled by the Extended
Inspection Systems. The Document Verifier manages the authorization of the Extended
Inspection Systems for the sensitive data of the eDigitalIdentity document in the limits
provided by the issuing States or Organisations in the form of the Document Verifier
Certificates.
Inspection system (IS)
A technical system used by the border control officer of the receiving State (i) examining
an eDigitalIdentity document presented by the eDigitalIdentity document presenter and
verifying its authenticity and (ii) verifying the eDigitalIdentity document presenter as
eDigitalIdentity document holder.
The Extended Inspection System (EIS) performs the Advanced Inspection Procedure
(figure1) and therefore (i) contains a terminal for the communication with the
eDigitalIdentity document’s chip, (ii) implements the terminals part of PACE and/or BAC;
(iii) gets the authorization to read the logical eDigitalIdentity document either under PACE
or BAC by optical reading the eDigitalIdentity document providing this information, (iv)
implements the Terminal Authentication and Chip Authentication Protocols both Version 1
according to [TR-03110-1] and [TR-03110-3] and (v) is authorized by the issuing State or
Organisation through the Document Verifier of the receiving State to read the sensitive
biometric reference data. Security attributes of the EIS are defined by means of the
Inspection System Certificates. BAC may only be used if supported by the TOE. If both
PACE and BAC are supported by the TOE and the BIS, PACE must be used.
6.2.2 Additional Subjects identified as per ADDENDUM
PACE Terminal
A technical system verifying correspondence between the password stored in the
eDigitalIdentity document and the related value presented to the terminal by the
eDigitalIdentity document presenter.
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party without prior written approval.
A PACE terminal performs the Remote Inspection Procedure (figure 2) and therefore (i)
contains a terminal for the communication with the eDigitalIdentity document’s chip, (ii)
implements the terminal part of the PACE protocol, (iii) authenticates the eDigitalIdentity
holder to the eDigitalIdentity document using a shared password (PIN, PUK or CAN) and
(iv) implements the Chip Authentication Protocols Version 1 according to [ICAO9303].
The remote terminal authentication, the decryption of sensitive user data and the passive
authentication are performed outside of the TOE.
Figure 3 Remote Inspection Procedure
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party without prior written approval.
6.2.3 Additional Subjects Identified
eDigitalIdentity document packaging responsible
This additional subject is a refinement of the role Manufacturer as described in
[PP_PACE]. This subject is responsible for the combination of the IC with hardware for the
contactless and/or contact interface.
Embedded software loading responsible
This additional subject is a refinement of the role Manufacturer as described in
[PP_PACE]. This subject is responsible for the embedded software loading when scheme 2
is applied (cf. § 1.3.6). This subject does not exist if scheme 1 is applied (cf. § 1.3.6).
This subject used the Flash loader embedded in the IC.
Pre-personalisation Agent
This additional subject is a refinement of the role Manufacturer as described in
[PP_PACE]. This subject is responsible for the preparation of the card, i.e. creation of the
MF and MRTD ADF. He also sets Personalisation Agent keys, Administrator keys and
Configuration data.
Administrator
The role ADMIN is an Administrator in use phase who can act on the TOE configuration.
The administrative actions are dedicated to:
o Manage symmetric authentication using Administration Agent keys,
o Configure the size or value of the Chip Authentication key to be modified in USE
phase,
o Change the key parameters during the key generation process,
o Invalidate one of the Chip Authentication key in USE phase and to set the
secondary key as being the primary key.
6.3 Threats
6.3.1 Threats
T.Read_Sensitive_Data
Adverse action: An attacker tries to gain the sensitive biometric reference data through
the communication interface of the eDigitalIdentity document’s chip. The attack
T.Read_Sensitive_Data is similar to the threat T.Skimming (cf. [PP_BAC]) in respect of the
attack path (communication interface) and the motivation (to get data stored on the
eDigitalIdentity document’s chip) but differs from those in the asset under the attack
(sensitive biometric reference data vs. digital MRZ, digitized portrait and other data), the
opportunity (i.e. knowing the PACE Password) and therefore the possible attack methods.
Note, that the sensitive biometric reference data are stored only on the eDigitalIdentity
document’s chip as private sensitive personal data whereas the MRZ data and the portrait
are visually readable on the physical part of the eDigitalIdentity document as well.
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party without prior written approval.
Threat agent: having high attack potential, knowing the PACE Password, being in
possession of a legitimate eDigitalIdentity document.
Asset: confidentiality of logical eDigitalIdentity document sensitive user data (i.e.
biometric reference.
T.Forgery
Adverse action: An attacker fraudulently alters the User Data or/and TSF-data stored on
the eDigitalIdentity document or/and exchanged between the TOE and the terminal
connected in order to outsmart the PACE authenticated PACE terminal by means of
changed eDigitalIdentity document holder’s related reference data (like biographic or
biometric data). The attacker does it in such a way that the terminal connected perceives
these modified data as authentic one.
Threat agent: having high attack potential.
Asset: integrity of the eDigitalIdentity document.
T.Counterfeit
Adverse action: An attacker with high attack potential produces an unauthorized copy or
reproduction of a genuine eDigitalIdentity document’s chip to be used as part of a
counterfeit eDigitalIdentity document. This violates the authenticity of the eDigitalIdentity
document’s chip used for authentication of a eDigitalIdentity document presenter by
possession of a eDigitalIdentity document. The attacker may generate a new data set or
extract completely or partially the data from a genuine eDigitalIdentity document’s chip
and copy them to another appropriate chip to imitate this genuine eDigitalIdentity
document’s chip.
Threat agent: having high attack potential, being in possession of one or more legitimate
eDigitalIdentity documents
Asset: authenticity of user data stored on the TOE
T.Abuse-Func
Adverse action: An attacker may use functions of the TOE which shall not be used in TOE
operational phase in order (i) to manipulate or to disclose the User Data stored in the
TOE, (ii) to manipulate or to disclose the TSF-data stored in the TOE or (iii) to manipulate
(bypass, deactivate or modify) soft-coded security functionality of the TOE. This threat
addresses the misuse of the functions for the initialisation and personalisation in the
operational phase after delivery to the eDigitalIdentity document holder.
Threat agent: having high attack potential, being in possession of one or more legitimate
eDigitalIdentity documents integrity and authenticity of the eDigitalIdentity document,
availability of the functionality of the eDigitalIdentity document
Asset: integrity and authenticity of the eDigitalIdentity document, availability of the
functionality of the eDigitalIdentity document.
Application Note:
Application Note (16 in [PP_PACE]): Details of the relevant attack scenarios depend, for
instance, on the capabilities of the test features provided by the IC Dedicated Test
Software being not specified here.
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T.Information_Leakage
Adverse action: An attacker may exploit information leaking from the TOE during its
usage in order to disclose confidential User Data or/and TSF-data stored on the
eDigitalIdentity document or/and exchanged between the TOE and the terminal
connected. The information leakage may be inherent in the normal operation or caused
by the attacker.
Threat agent: having high attack potential.
Asset: confidentiality of User Data and TSF-data of the eDigitalIdentity document.
Application Note:
Application Note (17 in [PP_PACE]): Leakage may occur through emanations, variations in
power consumption, I/O characteristics, clock frequency, or by changes in processing time
requirements. This leakage may be interpreted as a covert channel transmission, but is
more closely related to measurement of operating parameters which may be derived
either from measurements of the contactless interface (emanation) or direct
measurements (by contact to the chip still available even for a contactless chip) and can
then be related to the specific operation being performed. Examples are Differential
Electromagnetic Analysis (DEMA) and Differential Power Analysis (DPA). Moreover the
attacker may try actively to enforce information leakage by fault injection (e.g. Differential
Fault Analysis).
T.Phys-Tamper
Adverse action: An attacker may perform physical probing of the eDigitalIdentity
document in order (i) to disclose the TSF-data, or (ii) to disclose/reconstruct the TOE’s
Embedded Software. An attacker may physically modify the eDigitalIdentity document in
order to alter (I) its security functionality (hardware and software part, as well), (ii) the
User Data or the TSF-data stored on the eDigitalIdentity document.
Threat agent: having high attack potential, being in possession of one or more legitimate
eDigitalIdentity documents
Asset: integrity and authenticity of the eDigitalIdentity document, availability of the
functionality of the eDigitalIdentity document, confidentiality of User Data and TSF-data
of the eDigitalIdentity document.
Application Note:
Application Note (18 in [PP_PACE]): Physical tampering may be focused directly on the
disclosure or manipulation of the user data (e.g. the biometric reference data for the
inspection system) or the TSF data (e.g. authentication key of the eDigitalIdentity
document) or indirectly by preparation of the TOE to following attack methods by
modification of security features (e.g. to enable information leakage through power
analysis). Physical tampering requires a direct interaction with the eDigitalIdentity
document’s internals. Techniques commonly employed in IC failure analysis and IC
reverse engineering efforts may be used. Before that, hardware security mechanisms and
layout characteristics need to be identified. Determination of software design including
treatment of the user data and the TSF data may also be a pre-requisite. The modification
may result in the deactivation of a security function. Changes of circuitry or data can be
permanent or temporary.
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party without prior written approval.
T.Malfunction
Adverse action: An attacker may cause a malfunction the eDigitalIdentity document’s
hardware and Embedded Software by applying environmental stress in order to (i)
deactivate or modify security features or functionality of the TOE’ hardware or to (ii)
circumvent, deactivate or modify security functions of the TOE’s Embedded Software. This
may be achieved e.g. by operating the eDigitalIdentity document outside the normal
operating conditions, exploiting errors in the eDigitalIdentity document’s Embedded
Software or misusing administrative functions. To exploit these vulnerabilities an attacker
needs information about the functional operation having information about the functional
operation.
Threat agent: having high attack potential, being in possession of one or more legitimate
eDigitalIdentity documents, having information about the functional operation
Asset: integrity and authenticity of the eDigitalIdentity document, availability of the
functionality of the eDigitalIdentity document, confidentiality of User Data and TSF-data
of the eDigitalIdentity document
Application Note:
Application note (19 in [PP_PACE]): A malfunction of the TOE may also be caused using a
direct interaction with elements on the chip surface. This is considered as being a
manipulation (refer to the threat T.Phys-Tamper) assuming a detailed knowledge about
TOE’s internals
T.Skimming
Adverse action: An attacker imitates an inspection system in order to get access to the
user data stored on or transferred between the TOE and the inspecting authority
connected via the contactless/contact interface of the TOE..
Threat agent: having high attack potential, cannot read and does not know the correct
value of the shared password (PACE password) in advance
Asset: confidentiality of logical eDigitalIdentity document data
Application Note:
Application Note (10 in [PP_PACE]): A product using BIS-BAC cannot avert this threat in
the context of the security policy defined in [PP_PACE].
Application Note (11 in [PP_PACE]): MRZ is printed and CAN is printed or stuck on the
eDigitalIdentity document. Please note that neither CAN nor MRZ effectively represent
secrets, but are restricted-revealable, cf. OE.Travel_Document_Holder.
T.Eavesdropping
Adverse action: An attacker is listening to the communication between the eDigitalIdentity
document and the PACE authenticated PACE terminal in order to gain the user data
transferred between the TOE and the terminal connected.
Threat agent: having high attack potential, cannot read and does not know the correct
value of the shared password (PACE password) in advance.
Asset: confidentiality of logical eDigitalIdentity document data.
Application Note:
Application Note (12 in [PP_PACE]): A product using BIS-BAC cannot avert this threat in
the context of the security policy defined in [PP_PACE]
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party without prior written approval.
T.Tracing
Adverse action: An attacker tries to gather TOE tracing data (i.e. to trace the movement
of the eDigitalIdentity document) unambiguously identifying it remotely by establishing or
listening to a communication via the contactless/contact interface of the TOE.
Threat agent: having high attack potential, cannot read and does not know the correct
value of the shared password (PACE password) in advance.
Asset: privacy of the eDigitalIdentity document holder.
Application Note:
Application Note (13 in [PP_PACE]): This Threat completely covers and extends “T.Chip-
ID” from [PP_BAC].
Application Note (14 in [PP_PACE]): A product using BAC (whatever the type of the
inspection system is: BIS-BAC) cannot avert this threat in the context of the security
policy defined in [PP_PACE], see also the par. 1.2.5 in [PP_PACE].
Application Note (15 in [PP_PACE]): Since the Standard Inspection Procedure does not
support any unique-secret-based authentication of the eDigitalIdentity document’s chip
(no Chip Authentication), a threat like T.Counterfeit (counterfeiting eDigitalIdentity
document) cannot be averted by the current TOE.
Application Note: As our TOE supports Chip Authentication in addition to Standard
Inspection Procedure, the previous application note extracted from PP does not apply.
6.3.2 Additional Threats as per ADDENDUM
T.Sentitive_ID_User_Data
Adverse action: An attacker tries to gain access to identification user data through the
communication interface of the eDigitalIdentity document’s chip. The threat
T.Sentitive_ID_User_Data is similar to the threat T.Skimming from [PACE/EACPP] w.r.t.
the attack path (communication interface) and the motivation (to get data stored on the
eDigitalIdentity document’s chip) but differs from those in the asset under the attack
(identification user data vs. CAN, PIN, PUK and other data), the opportunity (i.e. knowing
the PACE Password) and therefore the possible attack methods.
Threat agent: having high attack potential, knowing the PACE passwords, being in
possession of one or more legitimate eDigitalIdentity document
Asset: confidentiality of identification user data stored on the TOE
6.3.3 Additional Threats Identified
T.Configuration
Adverse action: An attacker may access to the TOE at Manufacturing and Personalisation
phases (steps 5 and 6) to try to (i) deactivate or modify security features or functions of
the TOE or (ii) circumvent, deactivate or modify security functions of the MRTD’s chip
Embedded Software.
Threat agent: having high attack potential, being in possession of one or more MRTD in
Pre-personalisation or Personalisation phases.
Asset: authenticity of logical MRTD data.
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party without prior written approval.
T. Forgery_Supplemental_Data
Adverse action: An attacker alters fraudulently the data stored in files other than EF.DG1
to EF.DG16, EF.COM and EF document security object. This may lead the extended
inspection system (EIS) using these data to be deceived
Threat agent: having high attack potential, being in possession of one or more legitimate
MRTDs.
Asset: authenticity of data stored in files other than EF.DG1 to EF.DG16, EF.COM and EF
document security object
T.ADMIN_Configuration
Adverse action: An attacker may access to the TOE at user phase (phase 7) to try to (i)
deactivate or modify security features or functions of the TOE or (ii) circumvent,
deactivate or modify security functions of the eDigitalIdentity document’s embedded
software.
Threat agent: having high attack potential, being in possession of one or more legitimate
eDigitalIdentity document in Operational use phase.
Asset: authenticity of logical eDigitalIdentity document data.
T.Key_Access
Adverse action: An attacker may access to the internal secret cryptographic keys of the
TOE.
Threat agent: having high attack potential, knowing the key values, being in possession of
a legitimate eDigitalIdentity document.
Asset: TOE internal secret cryptographic keys
6.4 Organisational Security Policies
P.Sensitive_Data
The biometric reference data of finger(s) (EF.DG3) and iris image(s) (EF.DG4) are
sensitive private personal data of the eDigitalIdentity document holder. The sensitive
biometric reference data can be used only by inspection systems which are authorized for
this access at the time the eDigitalIdentity document is presented to the inspection
system (Extended Inspection Systems). The issuing State or Organisation authorizes the
Document Verifiers of the receiving States to manage the authorization of inspection
systems within the limits defined by the Document Verifier Certificate. The eDigitalIdentity
document’s chip shall protect the confidentiality and integrity of the sensitive private
personal data even during transmission to the Extended Inspection System after Chip
Authentication Version 1.
P.Manufact
The Initialization Data are written by the IC Manufacturer to identify the IC uniquely. The
eDigitalIdentity document Manufacturer writes the Pre-personalisation Data which
contains at least the Personalisation Agent Key.
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P.Personalisation
The issuing State or Organisation guarantees the correctness of the biographical data, the
printed portrait and the digitized portrait, the biometric reference data and other data of
the logical eDigitalIdentity document with respect to the eDigitalIdentity document holder.
The personalisation of the eDigitalIdentity document for the holder is performed by an
agent authorized by the issuing State or Organisation only.
P.Pre-Operational
1) The eDigitalIdentity document Issuer issues the eDigitalIdentity document and
approves it using the terminals complying with all applicable laws and regulations.
2) The eDigitalIdentity document Issuer guarantees correctness of the user data
(amongst other of those, concerning the eDigitalIdentity document holder) and of the
TSF-data permanently stored in the TOE.
3) The eDigitalIdentity document Issuer uses only such TOE’s technical components (IC)
which enable traceability of the eDigitalIdentity documents in their manufacturing and
issuing life cycle phases, i.e. before they are in the operational phase, cf. sec. 1.2.3 in
[PP_PACE].
4) If the eDigitalIdentity document Issuer authorises a Personalisation Agent to
personalise the eDigitalIdentity document for eDigitalIdentity document holders, the
eDigitalIdentity document Issuer has to ensure that the Personalisation Agent acts in
accordance with the eDigitalIdentity document Issuer’s policy.
P.Card_PKI
1) The eDigitalIdentity document Issuer shall establish a public key infrastructure for the
passive authentication, i.e. for digital signature creation and verification for the
eDigitalIdentity document. For this aim, he runs a Country Signing Certification Authority
(CSCA). The eDigitalIdentity document Issuer shall publish the CSCA Certificate (CCSCA).
2) The CSCA shall securely generate, store and use the CSCA key pair. The CSCA shall
keep the CSCA Private Key secret and issue a self-signed CSCA Certificate (CCSCA) having
to be made available to the eDigitalIdentity document Issuer by strictly secure means, see
[ICAO_9303], 5.5.1. The CSCA shall create the Document Signer Certificates for the
Document Signer Public Keys (CDS) and make them available to the eDigitalIdentity
document Issuer, see [ICAO_9303], 5.5.1.
3) A Document Signer shall (i) generate the Document Signer Key Pair, (ii) hand over the
Document Signer Public Key to the CSCA for certification, (iii) keep the Document Signer
Private Key secret and (iv) securely use the Document Signer Private Key for signing the
Document Security Objects of eDigitalIdentity documents.
Application Note:
The description below states the responsibilities of involved parties and represents the
logical, but not the physical structure of the PKI. Physical distribution ways shall be
implemented by the involved parties in such a way that all certificates belonging to the
PKI are securely distributed / made available to their final destination, e.g. by using
directory services.
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P.Trustworthy_PKI
The CSCA shall ensure that it issues its certificates exclusively to the rightful organisations
(DS) and DSs shall ensure that they sign exclusively correct Document Security Objects to
be stored on the eDigitalIdentity document.
P.Terminal
The Basic Inspection Systems with PACE (PACE terminal) shall operate their terminals as
follows:
1) The related terminals (basic inspection system, cf. above) shall be used by terminal
operators and by eDigitalIdentity document holders as defined in [ICAO_9303].
2) They shall implement the terminal parts of the PACE protocol [ICAO_9303], of the
Passive Authentication [ICAO_9303] and use them in this order28. The PACE terminal
shall use randomly and (almost) uniformly selected nonces, if required by the protocols
(for generating ephemeral keys for Diffie-Hellmann).
3) The related terminals need not to use any own credentials.
4) They shall also store the Country Signing Public Key and the Document Signer Public
Key (in form of CCSCA and CDS) in order to enable and to perform Passive Authentication
(determination of the authenticity of data groups stored in the eDigitalIdentity document,
[ICAO_9303]).
5) The related terminals and their environment shall ensure confidentiality and integrity of
respective data handled by them (e.g. confidentiality of PACE passwords, integrity of PKI
certificates, etc.), where it is necessary for a secure operation of the TOE according to
[PP_PACE].
6.5 Assumptions
A.Insp_Sys
The Extended Inspection System (EIS) for global interoperability (i) includes the Country
Signing CA Public Key and (ii) implements the terminal part of PACE [ICAO_9303] and/or
BAC [PP_BAC]. BAC may only be used if supported by the TOE. If both PACE and BAC are
supported by the TOE and the IS, PACE must be used. The EIS reads the logical
eDigitalIdentity document under PACE or BAC and performs the Chip Authentication v1 to
verify the logical eDigitalIdentity document and establishes secure messaging. EIS
supports the Terminal Authentication Protocol v1 in order to ensure access control and is
authorized by the issuing State or Organisation through the Document Verifier of the
receiving State to read the sensitive biometric reference data.
Justification: The assumption A.Insp_Sys does not confine the security objectives of the
[PP_PACE] as it repeats the requirements of P.Terminal and adds only assumptions for
the Inspection Systems for handling the EAC functionality of the TOE.
A.Auth_PKI
The issuing and receiving States or Organisations establish a public key infrastructure for
card verifiable certificates of the Extended Access Control. The Country Verifying
Certification Authorities, the Document Verifier and Extended Inspection Systems hold
authentication key pairs and certificates for their public keys encoding the access control
rights. The Country Verifying Certification Authorities of the issuing States or
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party without prior written approval.
Organisations are signing the certificates of the Document Verifier and the Document
Verifiers are signing the certificates of the Extended Inspection Systems of the receiving
States or Organisations. The issuing States or Organisations distribute the public keys of
their Country Verifying Certification Authority to their eDigitalIdentity document’s chip.
Justification: This assumption only concerns the EAC part of the TOE. The issuing and use
of card verifiable certificates of the Extended Access Control is neither relevant for the
PACE part of the TOE nor will the security objectives of the [PP_PACE] be restricted by
this assumption. For the EAC functionality of the TOE the assumption is necessary
because it covers the pre-requisite for performing the Terminal Authentication Protocol
Version 1.
A.Passive_Auth
The issuing and receiving States or Organisations establish a public key infrastructure for
passive authentication i.e. digital signature creation and verification for the logical
eDigitalIdentity document. The issuing State or Organisation runs a Certification Authority
(CA) which securely generates, stores and uses the Country Signing CA Key pair. The CA
keeps the Country Signing CA Private Key secret and is recommended to distribute the
Country Signing CA Public Key to ICAO, all receiving States maintaining its integrity. The
Document Signer (i) generates the Document Signer Key Pair, (ii) hands over the
Document Signer Public Key to the CA for certification, (iii) keeps the Document Signer
Private Key secret and (iv) uses securely the Document Signer Private Key for signing the
Document Security Objects of the eDigitalIdentity documents. The CA creates the
Document Signer Certificates for the Document Signer Public Keys that are distributed to
the receiving States and Organisations. It is assumed that the Personalisation Agent
ensures that the Document Security Object contains only the hash values of genuine user
data according to [ICAO_9303].
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7 Security Objectives
7.1 Security Objectives for the TOE
7.1.1 Security Objectives from the PP
OT.AC_Pers
Personalisation of the Electronic Document
The TOE must ensure that the logical eDigitalIdentity document data in EF.DG1 to
EF.DG16, the Document Security Object according to LDS [ICAO_9303] and the TSF data
can be written by authorized Personalisation Agents only. The logical eDigitalIdentity
document data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 and the TSF data may be written only during and
cannot be changed after personalisation of the document.
Application Note:
The OT.AC_Pers implies that the data of the LDS groups written during personalisation for
eDigitalIdentity document holder (at least EF.DG1 and EF.DG2) can not be changed using
write access after personalisation.
OT.Data_Integrity
Integrity of Data
The TOE must ensure integrity of the User Data and the TSF-data stored on it by
protecting these data against unauthorised modification (physical manipulation and
unauthorised modifying).The TOE must ensure integrity of the User Data and the TSF-
data during their exchange between the TOE and the terminal connected (and
represented by PACE authenticated PACE terminal) after the PACE Authentication.
OT.Sens_Data_Conf
The TOE must ensure the confidentiality of the sensitive biometric reference data (EF.DG3
and EF.DG4) by granting read access only to authorized Extended Inspection Systems.
The authorization of the inspection system is drawn from the Inspection System
Certificate used for the successful authentication and shall be a non-strict subset of the
authorization defined in the Document Verifier Certificate in the certificate chain to the
Country Verifier Certification Authority of the issuing State or Organisation. The TOE must
ensure the confidentiality of the logical eDigitalIdentity document data during their
transmission to the Extended Inspection System. The confidentiality of the sensitive
biometric reference data shall be protected against attacks with high attack potential.
OT.Identification
IIdentification of the TOE
The TOE must provide means to store Initialisation and Pre-Personalisation Data in its
non-volatile memory. The Initialisation Data must provide a unique identification of the IC
during the manufacturing and the card issuing life cycle phases of the eDigitalIdentity
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party without prior written approval.
document. The storage of the Pre-Personalisation data includes writing of the
Personalisation Agent Key(s).
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof
The TOE must support the Inspection Systems to verify the identity and authenticity of
the eDigitalIdentity document’s chip as issued by the identified issuing State or
Organisation by means of the Chip Authentication Version 1 as defined in [TR-03110-1]
and [TR-03110-3]. The authenticity proof provided by eDigitalIdentity document’s chip
shall be protected against attacks with high attack potential.
Application Note:
The OT.Chip_Auth_Proof implies the eDigitalIdentity document’s chip to have (i) a unique
identity as given by the eDigitalIdentity document’s Document Number, (ii) a secret to
prove its identity by knowledge i.e. a private authentication key as TSF data. The TOE
shall protect this TSF data to prevent their misuse. The terminal shall have the reference
data to verify the authentication attempt of eDigitalIdentity document’s chip i.e. a
certificate for the Chip Authentication Public Key that matches the Chip Authentication
Private Key of the eDigitalIdentity document’s chip. This certificate is provided by (i) the
Chip Authentication Public Key (EF.DG14) in the LDS defined in [6] and (ii) the hash value
of DG14 in the Document Security Object signed by the Document Signer
The OT.Chip_Auth_Proof implies the eDigitalIdentity document’s chip to have (i) a unique
identity as given by the eDigitalIdentity document’s number, (ii) a secret to prove its
identity by knowledge i.e. a private authentication key as TSF data. The TOE shall protect
this TSF data to prevent their misuse. The terminal shall have the reference data to verify
the authentication attempt of eDigitalIdentity document’s chip i.e. a certificate for the
Chip Authentication Public Key that matches the Chip Authentication Private Key of the
eDigitalIdentity document’s chip. This certificate is provided by (i) the Chip Authentication
Public Key (EF.DG14) in the LDS defined in [ICAO_9303] and (ii) the hash value of DG14
in the Document Security Object signed by the Document Signer.
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
Protection against Abuse of Functionality
The TOE must prevent that functions of the TOE, which may not be used in TOE
operational phase, can be abused in order (i) to manipulate or to disclose the User Data
stored in the TOE, (ii) to manipulate or to disclose the TSF-data stored in the TOE, (iii) to
manipulate (bypass, deactivate or modify) soft-coded security functionality of the TOE.
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
Protection against Information Leakage
The TOE must provide protection against disclosure of confidential User Data or/and TSF-
data stored and/or processed by the eDigitalIdentity document
o by measurement and analysis of the shape and amplitude of signals or the time
between events found by measuring signals on the electromagnetic field, power
consumption, clock, or I/O lines,
o by forcing a malfunction of the TOE and/or
o by a physical manipulation of the TOE.
Application Note:
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party without prior written approval.
This objective pertains to measurements with subsequent complex signal processing due
to normal operation of the TOE or operations enforced by an attacker.
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
Protection against Physical Tampering
The TOE must provide protection of confidentiality and integrity of the User Data, the
TSF-data and the eDigitalIdentity document’s Embedded Software by means of
o measuring through galvanic contacts representing a direct physical probing on the
chip’s surface except on pads being bonded (using standard tools for measuring
voltage and current) or
o measuring not using galvanic contacts, but other types of physical interaction
between electrical charges (using tools used in solid-state physics research and IC
failure analysis),
o manipulation of the hardware and its security functionality, as well as
o controlled manipulation of memory contents (User Data, TSF-data) with a prior
o reverse-engineering to understand the design and its properties and functionality.
OT.Prot_Malfunction
Protection against Malfunctions
The TOE must ensure its correct operation. The TOE must prevent its operation outside
the normal operating conditions where reliability and secure operation have not been
proven or tested. This is to prevent functional errors in the TOE. The environmental
conditions may include external energy (esp. electromagnetic) fields, voltage (on any
contacts), clock frequency or temperature. The following TOE security objectives address
the aspects of identified threats to be countered involving TOE’s environment.
OT.Data_Authenticity
Authenticity of Data The TOE must ensure authenticity of the User Data and the TSF-
data stored on it by enabling verification of their authenticity at the terminal-side.The TOE
must ensure authenticity of the User Data and the TSF-data during their exchange
between the TOE and the terminal connected (and represented by PACE authenticated
PACE terminal) after the PACE Authentication. It shall happen by enabling such a
verification at the terminal-side (at receiving by the terminal) and by an active verification
by the TOE itself (at receiving by the TOE).
OT.Data_Confidentiality
Confidentiality of Data
The TOE must ensure confidentiality of the User Data and the TSF-data by granting read
access only to the PACE authenticated PACE terminal connected. The TOE must ensure
confidentiality of the User Data and the TSF-data during their exchange between the TOE
and the terminal connected (and represented by PACE authenticated PACE terminal) after
the PACE Authentication.
OT.Tracing
Tracing eDigitalIdentity document
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party without prior written approval.
The TOE must prevent gathering TOE tracing data by means of unambiguous identifying
the eDigitalIdentity document remotely through establishing or listening to a
communication via the contactless/contact interface of the TOE without knowledge of the
correct values of shared passwords (PACE passwords) in advance.
Application Note:
Since the Standard Inspection Procedure does not support any unique-secret-based
authentication of the eDigitalIdentity document’s chip (no Chip Authentication), a security
objective like OT.Chip_Auth_Proof (proof of eDigitalIdentity document authenticity)
cannot be achieved by the current TOE.
As our TOE supports Chip Authentication in addition to Standard Inspection Procedure,
the previous application note extracted from PP does not apply.
7.1.2 Additional Objectives as per ADDENDUM
OT.Sens_Ident_User_Data_Conf
Confidentiality of sensitive identification user data
The TOE must ensure the confidentiality of sensitive identification user data by granting
read access only to authorized Inspection Systems. The authorization of the inspection
system is drawn by the eDigitalIdentity document holder by consciously entering his
secret PIN. The identification user data may be decrypted to authorized Inspection
Systems by the eDigitalIdentity document issuer State or Organisation. The TOE must
ensure the confidentiality of the identification user data during their transmission to the
Inspection System. The confidentiality of the identification user data shall be protected
against attacks with high attack potential.
7.1.3 Additional Objectives for Active Authentication
OT.AA_Proof
The TOE must support the Inspection Systems to verify the identity and authenticity of
MRTD’s chip as issued by the identified issuing State or Organization by means of the
Active Authentication as defined in [ICAO_9303]. The authenticity proof through AA
provided by MRTD’s chip shall be protected against attacks with high attack potential.
OT.Data_Int_AA
The TOE must ensure the integrity of the logical MRTD stored on the MRTD's chip against
physical manipulation and unauthorized writing. The TOE must ensure the integrity of the
logical MRTD data during their transmission to the General Inspection System after Active
Authentication.
7.1.4 Additional Security Objectives Identified
OT.Configuration
Protection of the TOE preparation
During Pre-personalisation and Personalisation phases, the TOE must control the access
to its sensitive information and its functions and must provide the means to secure
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party without prior written approval.
exchanges using cryptographic functions. It must also ensure secure erasing of useless
keys.
OT.Update_File
Modification of file in Operational Use Phase
During Operational Use phase, the TOE must allow the modification of Updatable Data if
the write access to these objects is fulfilled by the Terminal.
OT.AC_SM_Level
Access control to sensitive biometric reference data according to SM level
The TOE must protect the Access control to sensitive biometric reference data according
to SM level defined.
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof_PACE_CAM
Verification of the identity and authenticity of the electronic document’s chip
The TOE must support the terminals to verify the identity and authenticity of the
electronic document’s chip as issued by the identified issuing State or Organization by
means of the PACE-Chip Authentication Mapping (PACE-CAM) as defined in [ICAO_9303].
The authenticity proof provided by electronic document’s chip shall be protected against
attacks with high attack potential.
OT.ADMIN_Configuration
Protection of the TOE administration
In user phase, the TOE must ensure the administration actions are only authorized for
Administrator. The TOE must control the access to its sensitive information and its
functions and must provide the means to secure exchanges using cryptographic functions.
OT.Key_Usage_Counter
Configuration of Key Usage Counter
The TOE must protect the key usage through OT.Key_Usage_Counter that support a Key
Usage Counter which should be decremented by one each time the key is used. Once the
counter is depleted, the key should become unusable.
7.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment
7.2.1 eDigitalIdentity document Issuer and CVCA: eDigitalIdentity document's
PKI (issuing) branch
The eDigitalIdentity document Issuer and the related CSCA will implement the following
security objectives for the TOE environment:
OE.Passive_Auth_Sign
Authentication of eDigitalIdentity document by Signature
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party without prior written approval.
The eDigitalIdentity document Issuer has to establish the necessary public key
infrastructure as follows: the CSCA acting on behalf and according to the policy of the
eDigitalIdentity document Issuer must (i) generate a cryptographically secure CSCA Key
Pair, (ii) ensure the secrecy of the CSCA Private Key and sign Document Signer
Certificates in a secure operational environment, and (iii) publish the Certificate of the
CSCA Public Key (CCSCA). Hereby authenticity and integrity of these certificates are being
maintained. A Document Signer acting in accordance with the CSCA policy must (i)
generate a cryptographically secure Document Signing Key Pair, (ii) ensure the secrecy of
the Document Signer Private Key, (iii) hand over the Document Signer Public Key to the
CSCA for certification, (iv) sign Document Security Objects of genuine eDigitalIdentity
documents in a secure operational environment only. The digital signature in the
Document Security Object relates to all hash values for each data group in use according
to [ICAO_9303]. The Personalisation Agent has to ensure that the Document Security
Object contains only the hash values of genuine user data according to [ICAO_9303]. The
CSCA must issue its certificates exclusively to the rightful organisations (DS) and DSs
must sign exclusively correct Document Security Objects to be stored on eDigitalIdentity
document.
OE.Personalisation
Personalisation of eDigitalIdentity document
The eDigitalIdentity document Issuer must ensure that the Personalisation Agents acting
on his behalf (i) establish the correct identity of the eDigitalIdentity document holder and
create the biographical data for the eDigitalIdentity document, (ii) enrol the biometric
reference data of the eDigitalIdentity document holder, (iii) write a subset of these data
on the physical Passport (optical personalisation) and store them in the eDigitalIdentity
document (electronic personalisation) for the eDigitalIdentity document holder as defined
in [ICAO_9303], (iv) write the document details data, (v) write the initial TSF data, (vi)
sign the Document Security Object defined in [ICAO_9303] (in the role of a DS).
7.2.2 Issuing State or Organisation
The issuing State or Organisation will implement the following security objectives of the TOE
environment.
OE.Auth_Key_Travel_Document
eDigitalIdentity document Authentication Key
The issuing State or Organisation has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure
in order to (i) generate the eDigitalIdentity document’s Chip Authentication Key Pair, (ii)
sign and store the Chip Authentication Public Key in the Chip Authentication Public Key
data in EF.DG14 and (iii) support inspection systems of receiving States or Organisations
to verify the authenticity of the eDigitalIdentity document’s chip used for genuine
eDigitalIdentity document by certification of the Chip Authentication Public Key by means
of the Document Security Object.
Justification: This security objective for the operational environment is needed
additionally to those from [PP_PACE] in order to counter the Threat T.Counterfeit as it
specifies the pre-requisite for the Chip Authentication Protocol Version 1 which is one of
the additional features of the TOE described only in this Protection Profile and not in
[PP_PACE].
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party without prior written approval.
OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data
Authorization for Use of Sensitive Biometric Reference Data
The issuing State or Organisation has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure
in order to limit the access to sensitive biometric reference data of eDigitalIdentity
document holders to authorized receiving States or Organisations. The Country Verifying
Certification Authority of the issuing State or Organisation generates card verifiable
Document Verifier Certificates for the authorized Document Verifier only.
Justification: This security objective for the operational environment is needed
additionally to those from [PP_PACE] in order to handle the Threat
T.Read_Sensitive_Data, the Organisational Security Policy P.Sensitive_Data and the
Assumption A.Auth_PKI as it specifies the pre-requisite for the Terminal Authentication
Protocol v1 as it concerns the need of an PKI for this protocol and the responsibilities of
its root instance. The Terminal Authentication Protocol v1 is one of the additional features
of the TOE described only in this Protection Profile and not in [PP_PACE].
7.2.3 Receiving State or Organisation
The receiving State or Organisation will implement the following security objectives of the
TOE environment.
OE.Exam_Travel_Document
Examination of the physical part of the eDigitalIdentity document
The inspection system of the receiving State or Organisation must examine the
eDigitalIdentity document presented by the eDigitalIdentity document presenter to verify
its authenticity by means of the physical security measures and to detect any
manipulation of the physical part of the eDigitalIdentity document. The Basic Inspection
System for global interoperability (i) includes the Country Signing CA Public Key and the
Document Signer Public Key of each issuing State or Organisation, and (ii) implements the
terminal part of PACE [ICAO_9303] and/or the Basic Access Control [ICAO_9303].
Extended Inspection Systems perform additionally to these points the Chip Authentication
Protocol Version 1 to verify the Authenticity of the presented eDigitalIdentity document’s
chip.
Justification: This security objective for the operational environment is needed
additionally to those from [PP_PACE] in order to handle the Threat T.Counterfeit and the
Assumption A.Insp_Sys by demanding the Inspection System to perform the Chip
Authentication protocol v1. OE.Exam_Travel_Document also repeats partly the
requirements from OE.Terminal in [PP_PACE] and therefore also counters T.Forgery and
A.Passive_Auth from [PP_PACE]. This is done because a new type of Inspection System is
introduced in [PP_EACwPACE] as the Extended Inspection System is needed to handle the
additional features of a eDigitalIdentity document with Extended Access Control.
OE.Prot_Logical_Travel_Document
Protection of data from the logical eDigitalIdentity document
The inspection system of the receiving State or Organisation ensures the confidentiality
and integrity of the data read from the logical eDigitalIdentity document. The inspection
system will prevent eavesdropping to their communication with the TOE before secure
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party without prior written approval.
messaging is successfully established based on the Chip Authentication Protocol Version
1.
Justification: This security objective for the operational environment is needed
additionally to those from [PP_PACE] in order to handle the Assumption A.Insp_Sys by
requiring the Inspection System to perform secure messaging based on the Chip
Authentication Protocol v1.
OE.Ext_Insp_Systems
Authorization of Extended Inspection Systems
The Document Verifier of receiving States or Organisations authorizes Extended
Inspection Systems by creation of Inspection System Certificates for access to sensitive
biometric reference data of the logical eDigitalIdentity document. The Extended
Inspection System authenticates themselves to the eDigitalIdentity document’s chip for
access to the sensitive biometric reference data with its private Terminal Authentication
Key and its Inspection System Certificate.
Justification: This security objective for the operational environment is needed
additionally to those from [PP_PACE] in order to handle the Threat
T.Read_Sensitive_Data, the Organisational Security Policy P.Sensitive_Data and the
Assumption A.Auth_PKI as it specifies the pre-requisite for the Terminal Authentication
Protocol v1 as it concerns the responsibilities of the Document Verifier instance and the
Inspection Systems.
7.2.4 eDigitalIdentity document Issuer as the general responsible
The eDigitalIdentity document Issuer as the general responsible for the global security policy
related will implement the following security objectives for the TOE environment:
OE.Legislative_Compliance
Issuing of the eDigitalIdentity document
The eDigitalIdentity document Issuer must issue the eDigitalIdentity document and
approve it using the terminals complying with all applicable laws and regulations.
7.2.5 Terminal operator: Terminal's receiving branch
OE.Terminal
Terminal operating
The terminal operators must operate their terminals as follows:
1) The related terminals (basic inspection systems, cf. above) are used by terminal
operators and by eDigitalIdentity document holders as defined in [ICAO_9303]. 2) The
related terminals implement the terminal parts of the PACE protocol [ICAO_9303], of the
Passive Authentication [ICAO_9303] (by verification of the signature of the Document
Security Object) and use them in this order. The PACE terminal uses randomly and
(almost) uniformly selected nonces, if required by the protocols (for generating ephemeral
keys for Diffie-Hellmann). 3) The related terminals need not to use any own credentials.
4) The related terminals securely store the Country Signing Public Key and the Document
Signer Public Key (in form of C_CSCA and C_DS) in order to enable and to perform
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Passive Authentication of the eDigitalIdentity document (determination of the authenticity
of data groups stored in the eDigitalIdentity document, [ICAO_9303]) 5) The related
terminals and their environment must ensure confidentiality and integrity of respective
data handled by them (e.g. confidentiality of the PACE passwords, integrity of PKI
certificates, etc.), where it is necessary for a secure operation of the TOE according to the
[PP_PACE].
Application Note:
OE.Terminal completely covers and extends “OE.Exam_MRTD”, “OE.Passive_Auth_Verif“
and “OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD” from [PP_BAC].
7.2.6 eDigitalIdentity document holder Obligations
OE.Travel_Document_Holder
eDigitalIdentity document holder Obligations
The eDigitalIdentity document holder may reveal, if necessary, his or her verification
values of the PACE password to an authorized person or device who definitely act
according to respective regulations and are trustworthy.
7.3 Security Objectives Rationale
7.3.1 Threats
7.3.1.1 Threats
T.Read_Sensitive_Data The OSP P.Sensitive_Data “Privacy of sensitive biometric
reference data”is fulfilled and the threat T.Read_Sensitive_Data “Read the sensitive
biometric reference data” is countered by the TOE-objective OT.Sens_Data_Conf
“Confidentiality of sensitive biometric reference data” requiring that read access to
EF.DG3 and EF.DG4 (containing the sensitive biometric reference data) is only granted to
authorized inspection systems. Furthermore it is required that the transmission of these
data ensures the data’s confidentiality. The authorization bases on Document Verifier
certificates issued by the issuing State or Organisation as required by
OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data “Authorization for Use of Sensitive Biometric Reference Data”.
The Document Verifier of the receiving State has to authorize Extended Inspection
Systems by creating appropriate Inspection System certificates for access to the sensitive
biometric reference data as demanded by OE.Ext_Insp_Systems “Authorization of
Extended Inspection Systems”.
This threat is also covered by OT.AC_SM_Level “Access control to sensitive biometric
reference data according to SM level” that enhences this protection by allowing the
issuing State or Organization to require the usage of a secure messaging with a minimum
security level for accessing the sensitive biometric reference data. The strength of the
secure messaging is tightly bound to the underlying block Cipher involved (3DES, AES-
128/192/256). This objective allows an issuing State or Organization to set a secure
messaging level it considers as sufficient to ensure a long term confidentiality of the
sensitive biometric data of its citizen when being read.
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party without prior written approval.
T.Forgery The threat T.Forgery “Forgery of Data” addresses the fraudulent, complete or
partial alteration of the User Data or/and TSF-data stored on the TOE or/and exchanged
between the TOE and the terminal. The security objective OT.AC_Pers “Access Control for
Personalisation of logical MRTD” requires the TOE to limit the write access for the
eDigitalIdentity document to the trustworthy Personalisation Agent (cf.
OE.Personalisation). The TOE will protect the integrity and authenticity of the stored and
exchanged User Data or/and TSF-data as aimed by the security objectives
OT.Data_Integrity “Integrity of Data” and OT.Data_Authenticity “Authenticity of Data”,
respectively. The objectives OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper “Protection against Physical
Tampering” and OT.Prot_Abuse-Func “Protection against Abuse of Functionality”
contribute to protecting integrity of the User Data or/and TSF-data stored on the TOE. A
terminal operator operating his terminals according to OE.Terminal “Terminal operating”
and performing the Passive Authentication using the Document Security Object as aimed
by OE.Passive_Auth_Sign “Authentication of eDigitalIdentity document by Signature” will
be able to effectively verify integrity and authenticity of the data received from the TOE.
Additionally to the security objectives from [PP_PACE] (see above) which counter this
threat, the examination of the presented MRTD passport book according to
OE.Exam_Travel_Document “Examination of the physical part of the eDigitalIdentity
document” shall ensure its authenticity by means of the physical security measures and
detect any manipulation of the physical part of the eDigitalIdentity document.
T.Counterfeit The threat T.Counterfeit “Counterfeit of eDigitalIdentity document chip
data”addresses the attack of unauthorized copy or reproduction of the genuine
eDigitalIdentity document's chip. This attack is thwarted by chip an identification and
authenticity proof required by OT.Chip_Auth_Proof “Proof of the eDigitalIdentity
document’s chip authenticity”using an authentication key pair to be generated by the
issuing State or Organisation. The Public Chip Authentication Key has to be written into
EF.DG14 and signed by means of Documents Security Objects as demanded by
OE.Auth_Key_Travel_Document “eDigitalIdentity document Authentication Key”.
According to OE.Exam_Travel_Document “Examination of the physical part of the
eDigitalIdentity document” the General Inspection system has to perform the Chip
Authentication Protocol Version 1 to verify the authenticity of the eDigitalIdentity
document’s chip. OT.Chip_Auth_Proof_PACE_CAM ensures that the chip in addition to CA
also supports the PACE-Chip Authentication Mapping (PACE-CAM) protocol, which
supports the same security functionality as CA does. PACE-CAM enables much faster
authentication of the of the chip than running PACE with general mapping followed by CA.
This threat is also covered by OE.Auth_Key_Travel_Document “eDigitalIdentity document
Authentication Key”using a authentication key pair to be generated by the issuing State or
Organization. This attack is also thwarted by Active Authentication proving the
authenticity of the chip as required by OT.AA_Proof and OT.Data_Int_AA using a
authentication key pair to be generated by the issuing State or Organization.
OE.Activ_Auth_Verif and OE.Activ_Auth_Sign covers also this threat enabling the
possibility of performing an Active Authentication which reinforce the security associated
to the communication.
T.Abuse-Func The threat T.Abuse-Func “Abuse of Functionality” addresses attacks of
misusing TOE’s functionality to manipulate or to disclosure the stored User- or TSF-data
as well as to disable or to bypass the soft-coded security functionality. The security
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objective OT.Prot_Abuse-Func “Protection against Abuse of Functionality” ensures that
the usage of functions having not to be used in the operational phase is effectively
prevented.
T.Information_Leakage The threat T.Information_Leakage is typical for integrated circuits
like smart cards under direct attack with high attack potential. The protection of the TOE
against this threat is obviously addressed by the directly related security objective
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
T.Phys-Tamper The threat T.Phys-Tamper is typical for integrated circuits like smart cards
under direct attack with high attack potential. The protection of the TOE against this
threat is obviously addressed by the directly related security objective OT.Prot_Phys-
Tamper
T.Malfunction The threat T.Malfunction is typical for integrated circuits like smart cards
under direct attack with high attack potential. The protection of the TOE against this
threat is obviously addressed by the directly related security objective
OT.Prot_Malfunction
T.Skimming The threat T.Skimming “Skimming eDigitalIdentity document / Capturing Card-
Terminal Communication” addresses accessing the User Data (stored on the TOE or
transferred between the TOE and the terminal) using the TOE’s contactless/contact
interface. This threat is countered by the security objectives OT.Data_Integrity “Integrity
of Data”, OT.Data_Authenticity “Authenticity of Data” and OT.Data_Confidentiality
“Confidentiality of Data” through the PACE authentication. The objective
OE.Travel_Document_Holder “eDigitalIdentity document holder Obligations” ensures that
a PACE session can only be established either by the eDigitalIdentity document holder
itself or by an authorised person or device, and, hence, cannot be captured by an
attacker.
Additionally, the threat is also addressed by OT.Sens_Ident_User_Data_Conf that
demands a trusted channel based on Chip Authentication, and requires that read access
to sensitive identification user data is only granted to authorized Inspection Systems.
T.Eavesdropping The threat T.Eavesdropping “Eavesdropping on the communication
between the TOE and the PACE terminal” addresses listening to the communication
between the TOE and a rightful terminal in order to gain the User Data transferred there.
This threat is countered by the security objective OT.Data_Confidentiality “Confidentiality
of Data” through a trusted channel based on the PACE authentication.
Additionally, the threat is also addressed by OT.Sens_Ident_User_Data_Conf that
demands a trusted channel based on Chip Authentication.
T.Tracing The threat T.Tracing “Tracing eDigitalIdentity document” addresses gathering
TOE tracing data identifying it remotely by establishing or listening to a communication
via the contactless/contact interface of the TOE, whereby the attacker does not a priori
know the correct values of the PACE password. This threat is directly countered by
security objectives OT.Tracing “Tracing eDigitalIdentity document” (no gathering TOE
tracing data) and OE.Travel_Document_Holder “eDigitalIdentity document holder
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party without prior written approval.
Obligations” (the attacker does not a priori know the correct values of the shared
passwords).
7.3.1.2 Additional Threats as per ADDENDUM
T.Sentitive_ID_User_Data The threat T.Sentitive_ID_User_Data is countered by the TOE-
Objective OT.Sens_Ident_User_Data_Conf that requires that read access to sensitive user
data is only granted to authorized Inspection Systems. Furthermore, it is required that the
confidentiality of the data is ensured during transmission.
7.3.1.3 Additional Threats Identified
T.Configuration The threat T.Configuration “Tampering attempt of the TOE during
preparation” addresses attacks in Pre-personalisation and Personalisation phases. The
attacker trying to access to unauthorized TOE functions, trying to access or to modify
sensitive information exchanged between the TOE and the Personalisation system.
Protection of the TOE during these two phases is directly addressed by OT.Configuration
“Protection of the TOE preparation”.
T. Forgery_Supplemental_Data The threat T. Forgery_Supplemental_Data “Forgery of
supplemental data stored in the TOE” addresses the fraudulent alteration of Updatable
Data. The TOE protects the update of these data thanks to OT.Update_File “Modification
of file in Operational Use Phase” that ensures inspection system are authenticated and
data to be updated are sent through a secure channel ensuring integrity, authenticity and
confidentiality.
T.ADMIN_Configuration The threat T.ADMIN_Configuration “Tampering attempt of the
TOE during administration” addresses attacks in Operational use phase. The attacker
trying to access to unauthorized TOE functions, trying to access or to modify sensitive
information exchanged between the TOE and the Administartion system. Protection of the
TOE during this phases is directly addressed by OT.ADMIN_Configuration “Protection of
the TOE administration”.
T.Key_Access The threat T.Key_Access addresses the threat of access to the internal
secret cryptographic keys of the TOE. The TOE protects the key usage through
OT.Key_Usage_Counter “Configuration of Key Usage Counter” that support a Key Usage
Counter that is decremented by one each time the key is used. Once the counter is
depleted, the key becomes unusable. In the case of CA key, the Key Usage Counter will
be reset to the maximum usage if the CA key is re-generated in USE phase.
7.3.2 Organisational Security Policies
P.Sensitive_Data The OSP P.Sensitive_Data “Privacy of sensitive biometric reference
data”is fulfilled and the threat T.Read_Sensitive_Data “Read the sensitive biometric
reference data” is countered by the TOE-objective OT.Sens_Data_Conf “Confidentiality of
sensitive biometric reference data” requiring that read access to EF.DG3 and EF.DG4
(containing the sensitive biometric reference data) is only granted to authorized
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party without prior written approval.
inspection systems. Furthermore it is required that the transmission of these data ensures
the data’s confidentiality. The authorization bases on Document Verifier certificates issued
by the issuing State or Organisation as required by OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data “Authorization
for Use of Sensitive Biometric Reference Data”. The Document Verifier of the receiving
State has to authorize Extended Inspection Systems by creating appropriate Inspection
System certificates for access to the sensitive biometric reference data as demanded by
OE.Ext_Insp_Systems “Authorization of Extended Inspection Systems”.
This threat is also covered by OT.AC_SM_Level “Access control to sensitive biometric
reference data according to SM level” that enhences this protection by allowing the
issuing State or Organization to require the usage of a secure messaging with a minimum
security level for accessing the sensitive biometric reference data. The strength of the
secure messaging is tightly bound to the underlying block Cipher involved (3DES, AES-
128/192/256). This objective allows an issuing State or Organization to set a secure
messaging level it considers as sufficient to ensure a long term confidentiality of the
sensitive biometric data of its citizen when being read
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party without prior written approval.
P.Manufact The OSP P.Manufact “Manufacturing of the eDigitalIdentity document’s chip”
requires a unique identification of the IC by means of the Initialization Data and the
writing of the Pre-personalisation Data as being fulfilled by OT.Identification
“Identification of the TOE”.
P.Personalisation The OSP P.Personalisation “Personalisation of the eDigitalIdentity
document by issuing State or Organisation only” addresses the (i) the enrolment of the
logical eDigitalIdentity document by the Personalisation Agent as described in the security
objective for the TOE environment OE.Personalisation “Personalisation of eDigitalIdentity
document”, and (ii) the access control for the user data and TSF data as described by the
security objective OT.AC_Pers “Access Control for Personalisation of logical MRTD” Note
the manufacturer equips the TOE with the Personalisation Agent Key(s) according to
OT.Identification “Identification of the TOE”. The security objective OT.AC_Pers “Access
Control for Personalisation of logical MRTD” limits the management of TSF data and the
management of TSF to the Personalisation Agent.
P.Pre-Operational The OSP P.Pre-Operational “Pre-operational handling of the
eDigitalIdentity document” is enforced by the following security objectives:
OT.Identification “Identification of the TOE” is affine to the OSP’s property ‘traceability
before the operational phase’; OT.AC_Pers “Access Control for Personalisation of logical
MRTD” and OE.Personalisation “Personalisation of eDigitalIdentity document” together
enforce the OSP’s properties ‘correctness of the User- and the TSF-data stored’ and
‘authorisation of Personalisation Agents’; OE.Legislative_Compliance “Issuing of the
eDigitalIdentity document” is affine to the OSP’s property ‘compliance with laws and
regulations’.
P.Card_PKI The OSP P.Card_PKI “PKI for Passive Authentication (issuing branch)” is
enforced by establishing the issuing PKI branch as aimed by the objectives
OE.Passive_Auth_Sign “Authentication of eDigitalIdentity document by Signature” (for the
Document Security Object).
P.Trustworthy_PKI The OSP P.Trustworthy_PKI “Trustworthiness of PKI” is enforced by
OE.Passive_Auth_Sign “Authentication of eDigitalIdentity document by Signature” (for
CSCA, issuing PKI branch).
P.Terminal The OSP P.Terminal “Abilities and trustworthiness of terminals” is obviously
enforced by the objective OE.Terminal “Terminal operating”, whereby the one-to-one
mapping between the related properties is applicable.
The OSP P.Terminal “Abilities and trustworthiness of terminals” is countered by the
security objective OE.Exam_Travel_Document “Examination of the physical part of the
eDigitalIdentity document” additionally to the security objectives from [PP_PACE] (see
above). OE.Exam_Travel_Document “Examination of the physical part of the
eDigitalIdentity document” enforces the terminals to perform the terminal part of the
PACE protocol.
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7.3.3 Assumptions
A.Insp_Sys The examination of the eDigitalIdentity document addressed by the assumption
A.Insp_Sys “Inspection Systems for global interoperability” is covered by the security
objectives for the TOE environment OE.Exam_Travel_Document “Examination of the
physical part of the eDigitalIdentity document”which requires the inspection system to
examine physically the eDigitalIdentity document, the Basic Inspection System to
implement the Basic Access Control, and the Extended Inspection Systems to implement
and to perform the Chip Authentication Protocol Version 1 to verify the Authenticity of the
presented eDigitalIdentity document’s chip. The security objectives for the TOE
environment OE.Prot_Logical_Travel_Document “Protection of data from the logical
eDigitalIdentity document” require the Inspection System to protect the logical
eDigitalIdentity document data during the transmission and the internal handling.
A.Auth_PKI The assumption A.Auth_PKI “PKI for Inspection Systems” is covered by the
security objective for the TOE environment OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data “Authorization for Use
of Sensitive Biometric Reference Data” requires the CVCA to limit the read access to
sensitive biometrics by issuing Document Verifier certificates for authorized receiving
States or Organisations only. The Document Verifier of the receiving State is required by
OE.Ext_Insp_Systems “Authorization of Extended Inspection Systems” to authorize
Extended Inspection Systems by creating Inspection System Certificates. Therefore, the
receiving issuing State or Organisation has to establish the necessary public key
infrastructure
A.Passive_Auth The assumption A.Passive_Auth “PKI for Passive Authentication” is directly
covered by the security objective for the TOE environment OE.Passive_Auth_Sign
“Authentication of eDigitalIdentity document by Signature” from [PP_PACE] covering the
necessary procedures for the Country Signing CA Key Pair and the Document Signer Key
Pairs. The implementation of the signature verification procedures is covered by
OE.Exam_Travel_Document “Examination of the physical part of the eDigitalIdentity
document”.
7.3.4 SPD and Security Objectives
Threats Security Objectives Rationale
T.Read_Sensitive_Data OT.Sens_Data_Conf,
OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data,
OE.Ext_Insp_Systems, OT.AC_SM_Level
Section 7.3.1
T.Forgery OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Authenticity,
OT.Data_Integrity, OT.Prot_Abuse-Func,
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper, OE.Personalisation,
OE.Passive_Auth_Sign, OE.Terminal,
OE.Exam_Travel_Document
Section 7.3.1
T.Counterfeit OT.Chip_Auth_Proof,
OE.Auth_Key_Travel_Document,
OE.Exam_Travel_Document,
Section 7.3.1
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OT.Chip_Auth_Proof_PACE_CAM,
OT.AA_Proof, OT.Data_Int_AA
T.Abuse-Func OT.Prot_Abuse-Func Section 7.3.1
T.Information_Leakage OT.Prot_Inf_Leak Section 7.3.1
T.Phys-Tamper OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper Section 7.3.1
T.Malfunction OT.Prot_Malfunction Section 7.3.1
T.Skimming OT.Data_Integrity, OT.Data_Authenticity,
OT.Data_Confidentiality,
OE.Travel_Document_Holder,
OT.Sens_Ident_User_Data_Conf
Section 7.3.1
T.Eavesdropping OT.Data_Confidentiality,
OT.Sens_Ident_User_Data_Conf
Section 7.3.1
T.Tracing OT.Tracing, OE.Travel_Document_Holder Section 7.3.1
T.Sentitive_ID_User_Data OT.Sens_Ident_User_Data_Conf Section 7.3.1
T.Configuration OT.Configuration Section 7.3.1
T.
Forgery_Supplemental_Data
OT.Update_File Section 7.3.1
T.ADMIN_Configuration OT.ADMIN_Configuration Section 7.3.1
T.Key_Access OT.Key_Usage_Counter Section 7.3.1
Table 14 Threats and Security Objectives - Coverage
Security Objectives Threats
OT.AC_Pers T.Forgery
OT.Data_Integrity T.Forgery, T.Skimming
OT.Sens_Data_Conf T.Read_Sensitive_Data
OT.Identification
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof T.Counterfeit
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func T.Forgery, T.Abuse-Func
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak T.Information_Leakage
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper T.Forgery, T.Phys-Tamper
OT.Prot_Malfunction T.Malfunction
OT.Data_Authenticity T.Forgery, T.Skimming
OT.Data_Confidentiality T.Skimming, T.Eavesdropping
OT.Tracing T.Tracing
OT.Sens_Ident_User_Data_Conf T.Skimming, T.Eavesdropping,
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T.Sentitive_ID_User_Data
OT.AA_Proof T.Counterfeit
OT.Data_Int_AA T.Counterfeit
OT.Configuration T.Configuration
OT.Update_File T. Forgery_Supplemental_Data
OT.AC_SM_Level T.Read_Sensitive_Data
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof_PACE_CAM T.Counterfeit
OT.ADMIN_Configuration T.ADMIN_Configuration
OT.Key_Usage_Counter T.Key_Access
OE.Passive_Auth_Sign T.Forgery
OE.Personalisation T.Forgery
OE.Auth_Key_Travel_Document T.Counterfeit
OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data T.Read_Sensitive_Data
OE.Exam_Travel_Document T.Forgery, T.Counterfeit
OE.Prot_Logical_Travel_Document
OE.Ext_Insp_Systems T.Read_Sensitive_Data
OE.Legislative_Compliance
OE.Terminal T.Forgery
OE.Travel_Document_Holder T.Skimming, T.Tracing
Table 15 Security Objectives and Threats - Coverage
Organisational
Security Policies
Security Objectives Rationale
P.Sensitive_Data OT.Sens_Data_Conf, OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data,
OE.Ext_Insp_Systems, OT.AC_SM_Level
Section 7.3.2
P.Manufact OT.Identification Section 7.3.2
P.Personalisation OT.AC_Pers, OT.Identification, OE.Personalisation Section 7.3.2
P.Pre-Operational OT.Identification, OT.AC_Pers, OE.Personalisation,
OE.Legislative_Compliance
Section 7.3.2
P.Card_PKI OE.Passive_Auth_Sign Section 7.3.2
P.Trustworthy_PKI OE.Passive_Auth_Sign Section 7.3.2
P.Terminal OE.Terminal, OE.Exam_Travel_Document Section 7.3.2
Table 16 OSPs and Security Objectives - Coverage
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Security Objectives Organisational Security Policies
OT.AC_Pers P.Personalisation, P.Pre-Operational
OT.Data_Integrity
OT.Sens_Data_Conf P.Sensitive_Data
OT.Identification P.Manufact, P.Personalisation, P.Pre-
Operational
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
OT.Prot_Malfunction
OT.Data_Authenticity
OT.Data_Confidentiality
OT.Tracing
OT.Sens_Ident_User_Data_Conf
OT.AA_Proof
OT.Data_Int_AA
OT.Configuration
OT.Update_File
OT.AC_SM_Level P.Sensitive_Data
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof_PACE_CAM
OT.ADMIN_Configuration
OT.Key_Usage_Counter
OE.Passive_Auth_Sign P.Card_PKI, P.Trustworthy_PKI
OE.Personalisation P.Personalisation, P.Pre-Operational
OE.Auth_Key_Travel_Document
OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data P.Sensitive_Data
OE.Exam_Travel_Document P.Terminal
OE.Prot_Logical_Travel_Document
OE.Ext_Insp_Systems P.Sensitive_Data
OE.Legislative_Compliance P.Pre-Operational
OE.Terminal P.Terminal
OE.Travel_Document_Holder
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Table 17 Security Objectives and OSPs - Coverage
Assumptions Security Objectives for the Operational Environment Rationale
A.Insp_Sys OE.Exam_Travel_Document,
OE.Prot_Logical_Travel_Document
Section 7.3.3
A.Auth_PKI OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data, OE.Ext_Insp_Systems Section 7.3.3
A.Passive_Auth OE.Passive_Auth_Sign, OE.Exam_Travel_Document Section 7.3.3
Table 18 Assumptions and Security Objectives for the Operational Environment -
Coverage
Security Objectives for the Operational Environment Assumptions Rationale
OE.Passive_Auth_Sign A.Passive_Auth
OE.Personalisation
OE.Auth_Key_Travel_Document
OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data A.Auth_PKI
OE.Exam_Travel_Document A.Insp_Sys,
A.Passive_Auth
OE.Prot_Logical_Travel_Document A.Insp_Sys
OE.Ext_Insp_Systems A.Auth_PKI
OE.Legislative_Compliance
OE.Terminal
OE.Travel_Document_Holder
Table 19 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment and Assumptions -
Coverage
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1
FPT_EMS TOE Emanation
8 Extended Requirements
8.1 Extended Families
8.1.1 Extended Family FPT_EMS - TOE Emanation
8.1.1.1 Description
The additional family FPT_EMS (TOE Emanation) of the Class FPT (Protection of the TSF) is
defined here to describe the IT security functional requirements of the TOE. The TOE shall
prevent attacks against the TOE and other secret data where the attack is based on external
observable physical phenomena of the TOE. Examples of such attacks are evaluation of
TOE’s electromagnetic radiation, simple power analysis (SPA), differential power analysis
(DPA), timing attacks, radio emanation etc. This family describes the functional requirements
for the limitation of intelligible emanations. The family FPT_EMS belongs to the Class FPT
because it is the class for TSF protection. Other families within the Class FPT do not cover
the TOE emanation.
8.1.1.2 Extended Components
Extended Component FPT_EMS.1
Family behavior:
This family defines requirements to mitigate intelligible emanations.
Component levelling:
FPT_EMS.1 TOE Emanation has two constituents:
 FPT_EMS.1.1 Limit of Emissions requires to not emit intelligible emissions enabling
access to TSF data or user data.
 FPT_EMS.1.2 Interface Emanation requires to not emit interface emanation enabling
access to TSF data or user data.
Management: FPT_EMS.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FPT_EMS.1
There are no actions identified that shall be auditable if FAU_GEN
(Security audit data generation ) isincluded in a PP or ST using
FPT_EMS.1.
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Definition
FPT_EMS.1 TOE Emanation
FPT_EMS.1.1 The TOE shall not emit [assignment: types of emissions] in excess of
[assignment: specified limits] enabling access to [assignment: list of types of TSF data]
and [assignment: list of types of user data].
FPT_EMS.1.2 The TSF shall ensure [assignment: type of users] are unable to use the
following interface [assignment: type of connection] to gain access to [assignment: list of
types of TSF data] and [assignment: list of types of user data].
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
8.1.2 Extended Family FMT_LIM - Limited capabilities
8.1.2.1 Description
The family FMT_LIM describes the functional requirements for the test features of the TOE.
The new functional requirements were defined in the class FMT because this class addresses
the management of functions of the TSF. The examples of the technical mechanism used in
the TOE show that no other class is appropriate to address the specific issues of preventing
abuse of functions by limiting the capabilities of the functions and by limiting their
availability.
8.1.2.2 Extended Components
Extended Component FMT_LIM.1
Family behavior:
This family defines requirements that limit the capabilities and availability of
functions in a combined manner. Note, that FDP_ACF restricts access to
functions whereas the Limited capability of this family requires the functions
themselves to be designed in a specific manner.
Component levelling:
1
2
FMT_LIM Limited capabilities and availability
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FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities requires that the TSF is built to provide only the
capabilities (perform action, gather information) necessary for its
genuinepurpose.
FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability requires that the TSF restrict the use of functions
(refer to Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)). This can be achieved, for
instance, by removing or by disabling functions in a specific phase of
the TOE’s life-cycle.
Management: FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
Definition
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FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities
FMT_LIM.1.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so that in
conjunction with ‘Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)’ the following policy is enforced
[assignment: Limited capability and availability policy]
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability.
Extended Component FMT_LIM.2
Definition
FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability
FMT_LIM.2.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so that in
conjunction with ‘Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)’ the following policy is enforced
[assignment: Limited capability and availability policy]
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: FMT_LIM.1 Limited availability.
8.1.3 Extended Family FIA_API - Authentication Proof of Identity
8.1.3.1 Description
To describe the IT security functional requirements of the TOE a sensitive family (FIA_API)
of the Class FIA (Identification and authentication) is defined here. This family describes the
functional requirements for the proof of the claimed identity for the authentication
verification by an external entity where the other families of the class FIA address the
verification of the identity of an external entity.
Application note 10: The other families of the Class FIA describe only the authentication
verification of users' identity performed by the TOE and do not describe the functionality of
the user to prove their identity. The following paragraph defines the family FIA_API in the
style of the Common Criteria part 2 (cf. [3], chapter 'Explicitly stated IT security
requirements (APE_SRE)') from a TOE point of view.
8.1.3.2 Extended Components
Extended Component FIA_API.1
Family behavior:
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1
FAU_SAS Audit data storage
This family defines functions provided by the TOE to prove its identity and to
be verified by an externalentity in the TOE IT environment.
Component levelling:
Management FIA_API.1
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in
FMT: Management of authentication information used to prove the claimed
identity.
Audit: FIA_API.1
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
Definition
FIA_API.1 Authentication Proof of Identity
FIA_API.1.1 The TSF shall provide a [assignment: authentication mechanism ] to prove the
identity of the [assignment: authorized user or role ].
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: No dependencies.
8.1.4 Extended Family FAU_SAS - Audit data storage
8.1.4.1 Description
To describe the security functional requirements of the TOE, the family FAU_SAS of the class
FAU (Security audit) is defined here. This family describes the functional requirements for
the storage of audit data. It has a more general approach than FAU_GEN, because it does
not necessarily require the data to be generated by the TOE itself and because it does not
give specific details of the content of the audit records.
The family ‘Audit data storage (FAU_SAS)’ is specified as follows:
FAU_SAS Audit data storage
Family behavior
This family defines functional requirements for the storage of audit data.
Component levelling
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FAU_SAS.1 Requires the TOE to provide the possibility to store audit data.
Management: FAU_SAS.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FAU_SAS.1
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage
FAU_SAS.1.1: The TSF shall provide [assignment: authorised users] with the capability to
store [assignment: list of audit information] in the audit records.
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: No Depenedencies
8.1.5 Extended Family FCS_RND - Generation of random numbers
8.1.5.1 Description
This family defines quality requirements for the generation of random numbers intended to
be used for cryptographic purposes.
8.1.5.2 Extended Components
Extended Component FCS_RND.1
Family behavior:
This family defines requirements for the generation random number where
the random numbers are intended to be used for cryptographic purposes.
Component levelling:
Management: FCS_RND.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FCS_RND.1
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There are no actions defined to be auditable.
Definition
FCS_RND.1 Quality metric for random numbers
FCS_RND.1.1 The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate random numbers that meet
[assignment: a defined quality metric ].
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
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9 Security Requirements
9.1 Security Functional Requirements
This section describes the requirements imposed on the TOE in order to achieve the security
objectives laid down in the previous chapter.
9.1.1 Class FAU Security Audit
FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage
FAU_SAS.1.1 The TSF shall provide the Manufacturer with the capability to store the
Initialisation and Pre-Personalisation Data in the audit records.
9.1.2 Class FCS Cryptographic Support
FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE Cryptographic key generation
FCS_CKM.1.1/DH_PACE The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key generation algorithm ECDH compliant to [TR-03111] and
specified cryptographic key sizes 192 to 521 bit that meet the following:
[ICAO_9303].
FCS_CKM.1/CA Cryptographic key generation
FCS_CKM.1.1/CA The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key generation algorithm see table below and specified cryptographic key
sizes see table below that meet the following: see table below:
Key Generation Algorithm Key Sizes Standard
based on ECDH compliant to
[ISO11770-3]
192 to 512 bit [TR-03111]
based on DH 1024, 1536 and
2048
[TR-03110-3] and
PKCS#3
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FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.4.1 The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key destruction method zeroisation that meets the following: none.
FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/PACE_ENC The TSF shall perform refer to table below in accordance
with a specified cryptographic algorithm refer to table below and cryptographic key
sizes refer to table below that meet the following: refer to table below
Cryptographic Operations Algorithms Key sizes Norms
secure messaging-encryption
and decryption
AES in CBC
mode
128, 192 and
256 bits
[ICAO_9303]
secure messaging-encryption
and decryption
TDES in CBC
mode
112 bits [ICAO_9303]
FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/PACE_MAC The TSF shall perform refer table below in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm refer table below and cryptographic key sizes refer
table below that meet the following: refer table below
Cryptographic Operations Algorithms Key sizes Norms
secure messaging - message
authentication code
AES CMAC 128, 192 and
256 bits
[ICAO_9303]
secure messaging - message
authentication code
Retail MAC 112 bits [ICAO_9303]
FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/CA_ENC The TSF shall perform refer to table below in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm refer to table below and cryptographic key sizes
refer to table below that meet the following: refer to table below
Cryptographic Operations Algorithms Key sizes Norms
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secure messaging-encryption and
decryption
AES in CBC
mode
128, 192 and
256 bits
[TR-03110-
3]
secure messaging-encryption and
decryption
TDES in CBC
mode
112 bits [TR-03110-
3]
FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/SIG_VER The TSF shall perform see table below in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm see table below and cryptographic key sizes see
table below that meet the following: see table below
Cryptographic
Operation
Algorithm Key Sizes
digital signature
verification
ECDSA with SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256,
SHA-384 and SHA-512 as defined in
[FIPS_186_3]
192 to 512
digital signature
verification
RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 with SHA-1, SHA-256
and SHA-512
1024, 1536,
2048, 3072 and
4096
digital signature
verification
RSA PKCS#1-PSS with SHA-1, SHA-256
and SHA-512
1024, 1536,
2048, 3072 and
4096
FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/CA_MAC The TSF shall perform refer table below in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm refer table below and cryptographic key sizes refer
table below that meet the following: refer table below
Cryptographic Operations Algorithms Key sizes Norms
secure messaging - message
authentication code
AES CMAC 128, 192 and
256 bits
[TR-03110-
3]
secure messaging - message
authentication code
Retail MAC 112 bits [TR-03110-
3]
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party without prior written approval.
FCS_RND.1 Quality metric for random numbers
FCS_RND.1.1 The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate random numbers that meet
the average Shannon entropy per internal random bit exceeds 0.994.
9.1.3 Additional FCS SFR's Identified
FCS_CKM.1/CAM Cryptographic key generation
FCS_CKM.1.1/CAM The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key generation algorithm based on ECDH compliant to
[ISO11770-3] and specified cryptographic key sizes 192 to 521 bit that meet the
following: [TR-03110-3].
FCS_CKM.1/CA_DATA_GEN Cryptographic key generation
FCS_CKM.1.1/CA_DATA_GEN The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance
with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm see table below and specified
cryptographic key sizes see table below that meet the following: see table below
Algorithm Key Size Standard
Chip Authentication Data Generation using DH
keys compliant to PKCS#3
1024 to 2048 bits in
steps of 512 bits
PKCS#3
Chip authentication data generation using
ECDH keys compliant to [ISO_15946]
192 to 512 bits [TR-
03111]
FCS_CKM.1/GP Cryptographic key generation
FCS_CKM.1.1/GP The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key generation algorithm see table below and specified
cryptographic key sizes see table below that meet the following: see table below:
Key Generation Algorithm Key Sizes Standard
Triple-DES in CBC mode 112 bit [GPC_SPE_034]
AES in CBC mode 128, 192 and 256 [GPC_SPE_014]
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FCS_COP.1/CAM Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/CAM The TSF shall perform the PACE-CAM protocol in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm PACE-CAM and cryptographic key sizes 192 to 521
bits that meet the following: [ICAO_9303].
FCS_COP.1/GP_ENC Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/GP_ENC The TSF shall perform see table below in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm see table below and cryptographic key sizes see
table below that meet the following: see table below:
Cryptographic Operation Algorithm Key Sizes Standard
secure messaging (GP) –
encryption and decryption
Triple-DES in
CBC mode
112 bit [FIPS_46_3]
secure messaging (GP) –
encryption and decryption
AES in CBC
mode
128, 192
and 256 bits
[NIST_800_38A]
FCS_COP.1/GP_MAC Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/GP_MAC The TSF shall perform see table below in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm see table below and cryptographic key sizes see
table below that meet the following: see table below:
Cryptographic Operation Algorithm Key Sizes Standard
secure messaging – message
authentication code
Retail MAC 112 bit [ISO_9797_1]
secure messaging – message
authentication code
AES CMAC 128, 192 and
256 bits
[NIST_800_38B]
FCS_COP.1/GP_AUTH Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/GP_AUTH The TSF shall perform see table below in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm see table below and cryptographic key sizes see
table below that meet the following: see table below:
Cryptographic Operation Algorithm Key Sizes Standard
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symmetric authentication –
message authentication code
Full 3DES
MAC
112 bit [ISO_9797_1]
symmetric authentication –
message authentication code
AES CMAC 128, 192
and 256 bits
[NIST_800_38B]
Application Note:
The Authentication Mechanisms based on Triple-DES and AES is the authentication process
performed in phases 5 and 6
FCS_COP.1/GP_KEY_DEC Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/GP_KEY_DEC The TSF shall perform see table below in accordance with
a specified cryptographic algorithm see table below and cryptographic key sizes see
table below that meet the following: see table below:
Cryptographic
Operation
Algorithm Key Sizes Standard
key decryption Triple-DES in ECB
mode
112 bit [FIPS_46_3]
key decryption AES in CBC mode 128, 192 and 256
bits
[FIPS_197]
FCS_COP.1/AA Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/AA The TSF shall perform see table below in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm see table below and cryptographic key sizes see table below
that meet the following: see table below:
Cryptographic
Operation
Cryptographic
Algorithm
Cryptographic Key
Sizes(bits)
Standard
Digital Signature
Creation
ECDSA with SHA1,
256, 384, 512
192 to 521 over
prime field curves
[ISO_9796-2],
[PKCS#3],
[FIPS_180_4] and
[X.92]
Digital Signature
Creation
RSA signature (CRT)
with SHA1, 256,
384, 512
1024, 1536, 2048,
3072 and 4096
[ISO_9796-2]
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9.1.4 Class FDP User Data Protection
FDP_ACC.1/TRM Subset access control
FDP_ACC.1.1/TRM The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP on terminals
gaining access to user data and data stored in EF.SOD of the logical
eDigitalIdentity document.
FDP_ACF.1/TRM Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACF.1.1/TRM The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP to objects based on
the following:
o 1) Subjects:
a) Terminal,
b) PACE terminal,
c) Extended Inspection System
o 2) Objects:
a) data in EF.DG1, EF.DG2 and EF.DG5 to EF.DG16,EF.SOD and
EF.COM of the logical eDigitalIdentity document,
b) data in EF.DG3 of the logical eDigitalIdentity document,
c) data in EF.DG4 of the logical eDigitalIdentity document,
d) all TOE intrinsic secret cryptographic keys stored in the
eDigitalIdentity document
o 3) Security attributes:
a) PACE Authentication
b) Chip Authentication v1
c) Terminal Authentication v1
d) Authorisation of the Terminal.
FDP_ACF.1.2/TRM The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation
among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:
o A PACE terminal is allowed to read data objects from FDP_ACF.1/TRM
according to [ICAO_9303] after at least a successful PACE
authentication as required by FIA_UAU.1/PACE
o A PACE Terminal is allowed to read data objects 2a) of
FDP_ACF.1.1/TRM according to [ICAO_9303] only after a successful
PACE authentication followed by Chip Authentication v1 as required by
FIA_UAU.1/PACE. Data object 2a) may also require terminal
authentication v1. This rule is not applicable for EF.DG14.
o A PACE Terminal is allowed to read data objects 2b) and 2c) of
FDP_ACF.1.1/TRM according to [ICAO_9303] only after a successful
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PACE authentication followed by Chip Authentication v1 and Terminal
Authentication v1 as required by FIA_UAU.1/PACE.
Refinement:
The TOE can be configured to restrict access to data in EF.DG1, EF.DG2 and EF.DG5 to
EF.DG16, EF.SOD and EF.COM of the logical eDigitalIdentity document to a successful
PACE Authentication followed by a successful Chip Authentication.
FDP_ACF.1.3/TRM The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based
on the following additional rules: none.
FDP_ACF.1.4/TRM The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the
following additional rules:
1) Any terminal being not authenticated at least as PACE authenticated
PACE terminal is not allowed to read, to write, to modify, to use any
User Data stored on the eDigitalIdentity document.
2) Terminals not using secure messaging are not allowed to read, to
write, to modify, to use any data stored on the eDigitalIdentity
document.
3) Any terminal being not successfully authenticated as Extended
Inspection System with the Read access to DG 3 granted by the relative
certificate holder authorization encoding is not allowed to read the data
objects 2b) of FDP_ACF.1.1/TRM.
4) Any terminal being not successfully authenticated as Extended
Inspection System with the Read access to DG 4 granted by the relative
certificate holder authorization encoding is not allowed to read the data
objects 2c) of FDP_ACF.1.1/TRM.
5) Nobody is allowed to read the data objects 2d) of FDP_ACF.1.1/TRM.
6)Terminals authenticated as CVCA or as DV are not allowed to read
data in the EF.DG3 and EF.DG4.
7) Moreover, the Extended Inspection System shall communicate with
at least the minimum secure messaging level identified at the creation
of the DG3 and DG4, to be able to read these DGs.
FDP_RIP.1 Subset residual information protection
FDP_RIP.1.1 The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content of a resource is
made unavailable upon the deallocation of the resource from the following objects:
o Session Keys (immediately after closing related communication
session),
o the ephemeral private key ephem-SK picc -PACE (by having generated a
DH shared secret K)
o PIN and PUK.
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FDP_UCT.1/TRM Basic data exchange confidentiality
FDP_UCT.1.1/TRM The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP to receive and
transmit user data in a manner protected from unauthorised disclosure.
FDP_UIT.1/TRM Data exchange integrity
FDP_UIT.1.1/TRM The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP to transmit and
receive user data in a manner protected from modification, deletion, insertion and
replay errors.
FDP_UIT.1.2/TRM The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data, whether
modification, deletion, insertion and replay has occurred.
9.1.5 Additional FDP SFR's Identified
FDP_ACC.1/UPD_FILE Subset access control
FDP_ACC.1.1/UPD_FILE The TSF shall enforce the UPD_FILE Access Control SFP on
terminals gaining write, read and modification access to data in the file(s)
other than EF.COM, EF.SOD, and EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD.
FDP_ACF.1/UPD_FILE Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACF.1.1/UPD_FILE The TSF shall enforce the UPD_FILE Access Control SFP to
objects based on the following:
o Subjects:
 Personalisation Agent,
 Extended Inspection System
 Terminal,
o Objects:
 data in the file(s)EF.COM, EF.SOD, and EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the
logical MRTD
o Security attributes
 authentication status of terminals,.
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FDP_ACF.1.2/UPD_FILE The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an
operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:
o the Personalisation Agent is allowed to write, read and modify the data
in the file(s) other than EF.COM, EF.SOD, and EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the
logical MRTD,
o the successfully authenticated Extended Inspection System following
FMT_MTD.1.1/UPD_FILE is allowed to modify the data in the file(s)
other than EF.COM, EF.SOD, and EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD.
FDP_ACF.1.3/UPD_FILE The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects
based on the following additional rules: none.
FDP_ACF.1.4/UPD_FILE The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based
on the following additional rules: Any Terminal is not allowed to modify the data in
the file(s) EF.COM, EF.SOD, and EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD.
FDP_DAU.1/AA Basic Data Authentication
FDP_DAU.1.1/AA The TSF shall provide a capability to generate evidence that can be used
as a guarantee of the validity of the TOE itself.
FDP_DAU.1.2/AA The TSF shall provide any users with the ability to verify evidence of
the validity of the indicated information.
FDP_ITC.1/AA Import of user data without security attributes
FDP_ITC.1.1/AA The TSF shall enforce the Active Authentication Access Control SFP
when importing user data, controlled under the SFP, from outside of the TOE.
FDP_ITC.1.2/AA The TSF shall ignore any security attributes associated with the user data
when imported from outside the TOE.
FDP_ITC.1.3/AA The TSF shall enforce the following rules when importing user data
controlled under the SFP from outside the TOE: None.
9.1.6 Class FIA Identification and Authentication
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party without prior written approval.
FIA_UID.1/PACE Timing of identification
FIA_UID.1.1/PACE The TSF shall allow
o To establish a communication channel,
o Carrying out the PACE protocol according to [ICAO_9303],
o To read the Initialization Data if it is not disabled by TSF according to
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS
o To carry out the Chip Authentication Mapping (PACE-CAM) according to
[TR-03110-3]
o To carry out the Chip Authentication Protocol v1 according to [TR-
03110-1] and [TR-03110-3]
o To carry out the Terminal Authentication Protocol v1 according to [TR-
03110-1] and [TR-03110-3]
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified.
FIA_UID.1.2/PACE The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before
allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
FIA_UAU.1/PACE Timing of authentication
FIA_UAU.1.1/PACE The TSF shall allow
o to establish the communication channel,
o carrying out the PACE Protocol according to [ICAO_9303]
o to read the Initialization Data if it is not disable by TSF according to
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS,
o to identify themselves by selection of the authentication key
o to carry out the Chip Authentication Protocol v1 according to [TR-
03110-1] and [TR-03110-3]
o To carry out the Terminal Authentication Protocol v1 according to [TR-
03110-1] and [TR-03110-3]
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated.
FIA_UAU.1.2/PACE The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated
before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
FIA_UAU.4/PACE Single-use authentication mechanisms
FIA_UAU.4.1/PACE The TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to
o PACE Protocol according to [ICAO_9303],
o Authentication Mechanisms based on Triple-DES and AES
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party without prior written approval.
o Terminal Authentication Protocol v1 according to [TR-03110-1] and
[TR-03110-3].
Application Note:
The authentication mechanisms based on Triple-DES and AES is the authentication process
performed in phases 5 and 6
FIA_UAU.5/PACE Multiple authentication mechanisms
FIA_UAU.5.1/PACE The TSF shall provide
o PACE Protocol according to [ICAO_9303] and PACE-CAM Protocol
according to [ICAO_9303],
o Passive Authentication according to [ICAO_9303],
o Secure messaging in MAC-ENC mode according to [ICAO_9303]
o Symmetric Authentication Mechanism based on Triple-DES and AES
o Terminal Authentication Protocol v1 according to [TR-03110-1] and
[TR-03110-3]
to support user authentication.
FIA_UAU.5.2/PACE The TSF shall authenticate any user's claimed identity according to the
following rules:
o Having successfully run the PACE protocol the TOE accepts only received
commands with correct message authentication code sent by means of
secure messaging with the key agreed with the terminal by means of
the PACE protocol.
o The TOE accepts the authentication attempt as Personalisation Agent by
the Authentication Mechanism with Personalisation Agent Key(s).
o After run of the Chip Authentication Protocol v1 the TOE accepts only
received commands with correct message authentication code sent by
means of secure messaging with key agreed with the terminal by means
of the Chip Authentication Mechanism v1.
o The TOE accepts the authentication attempt by means of the Terminal
Authentication Protocol v1 only if the terminal uses the public key
presented during the Chip Authentication Mechanism v1 or the terminal
uses the public key presented during PACE-CAM and the secure
messaging established during PACE.
o The TOE accepts the authentication attempt as Administrator by the
Authentication Mechanism with Administrator Key(s).
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FIA_UAU.6/EAC Re-authenticating
FIA_UAU.6.1/EAC The TSF shall re-authenticate the user under the conditions each
command sent to the TOE after successful run of the Chip Authentication
Protocol v1 shall be verified as being sent by the Inspection System.
FIA_UAU.6/PACE Re-authenticating
FIA_UAU.6.1/PACE The TSF shall re-authenticate the user under the conditions each
command sent to the TOE after successful run of the PACE protocol shall be
verified as being sent by the PACE terminal.
FIA_AFL.1/PACE Authentication failure handling
FIA_AFL.1.1/PACE The TSF shall detect when [Number] unsuccessful authentication
attempts occur related to [Authentication events].
FIA_AFL.1.2/PACE When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has
been met, the TSF shall [Actions]
Number Authentication events Actions
Positive integer
number set to 0x0A
Authentication attempt
involving CAN or MRZ as
shared password for PACE
Wait for an increasing time
between receiving of the
terminal challenge and
sending of the TSF response
during the PACE
authentication attempts
An administrator
configurable positive
integer linked to the
PIN or PUK
(respectively)
Consecutive failed
authentication attempts
using the PIN or PUK as the
shared password for PACE
leaving a single
authentication attempt
Suspend the PIN or the PUK
’1’ On suspend mode, a bad or
incorrect value presentation
attempts using the PIN or
PUK as the shared password
for PACE
Suspend the PIN or the PUK
’1’ On suspend mode, After a
PACE_CAN authentication, a
bad PIN/PUK value
presentation attempt.
Block the PIN or the PUK
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9.1.7 Additional FIA SFRs identified as per ADDENDUM
FIA_API.1/TOE Authentication Proof of Identity
FIA_API.1.1/TOE The TSF shall provide a an authentication mechanism to prove the
identity of the the eDigitalIdentity document holder.
Application Note:
The TOE acts as a substitute for the eDigitalIdentity document holder, to authenticate
digitally on its behalf. The authentication mechanism is triggered by the eDigitalIdentity
Document holder itself by presenting its PIN to the TOE.
9.1.8 Additional FIA SFR's Identified
FIA_AFL.1/MP Authentication failure handling
FIA_AFL.1.1/MP The TSF shall detect when 1 unsuccessful authentication attempts occur
related to authentication of the Manufacturer and the Personalisation Agent.
FIA_AFL.1.2/MP When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has
been met, the TSF shall slow down exponentially the next authentication.
FIA_API.1/CA Authentication Proof of Identity
FIA_API.1.1/CA The TSF shall provide a Chip Authentication Protocol v1 according
to [TR-03110-1] and [TR-03110-3] to prove the identity of the TOE.
FIA_API.1/CAM Authentication Proof of Identity
FIA_API.1.1/CAM The TSF shall provide a PACE-CAM according to [ICAO_9303] to
prove the identity of the TOE.
FIA_UAU.6/MP Re-authenticating
FIA_UAU.6.1/MP The TSF shall re-authenticate the user under the conditions each
command sent to the TOE after successful authentication of the terminal with
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party without prior written approval.
the Symmetric Authentication Mechanism shall be verified as being sent by the
authenticated terminal.
9.1.9 Class FMT Security Management
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions:
o Initialization,
o Pre-personalisation,
o Personalisation,
o Configuration,
o Administration,
o Basic Access Control expiration,
o Resume and Unblock the PIN and PUK.
Application Note:
This SFR is an extension of the SFR 'FMT_SMF.1' defined in [PP_PACE]. It is here refined by
including mechanisms for PIN management (Resume and unblock the PIN and PUK). This
extension does not conflict with the strict conformance to [PP_PACE] and [PP_EACwPACE].
FMT_SMR.1/PACE Security roles
FMT_SMR.1.1/PACE The TSF shall maintain the roles
o Manufacturer,
o Personalisation Agent,
o Terminal,
o PACE authenticated PACE terminal
o Country Verifying Certificate Authority,
o Document Verifier,
o Domestic Extended Inspection System,
o Foreign Extended Inspection System,
o Administrator
FMT_SMR.1.2/PACE The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
Application Note:
This SFR also applies to the refinement of the role Manufacturer and to the additional role
Administrator.
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FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities
FMT_LIM.1.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so that in
conjunction with ‘Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)’ the following policy is enforced
Deploying test features after TOE delivery do not allow
o User Data to be manipulated and disclosed,
o TSF data to be manipulated or disclosed,
o software to be reconstructed,
o substantial information about construction of TSF to be gathered which
may enable other attacks,
o sensitive User Data (EF.DG3 and EF.DG4) to be disclosed
FMT_LIM.2 Limited capabilities
FMT_LIM.2.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so that in
conjunction with ‘Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)’ the following policy is enforced
Deploying test features after TOE delivery do not allow
o User Data to be manipulated and disclosed,
o TSF data to be manipulated or disclosed,
o software to be reconstructed,
o substantial information about construction of TSF to be gathered which
may enable other attacks,
o sensitive User Data (EF.DG3 and EF.DG4) to be disclosed
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/INI_ENA The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the Initialisation
Data and the Pre-personalisation Data to the Manufacturer.
Application Note:
Please refer to F.ACW for details of the data written by the manufacturer.
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/INI_DIS The TSF shall restrict the ability to read out the Initialisation
Data and the Pre-personalisation Data to the Personalisation Agent.
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party without prior written approval.
FMT_MTD.1/PA Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/PA The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the document Security
Object (SO D) to the Personalisation Agent.
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/CVCA_INI The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the
o initial Country Verifying Certification Authority Public Key,
o initial Country Verifying Certification Authority Certificate,
o Initial Current Date
o none
to the Personalisation Agent.
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/CVCA_UPD The TSF shall restrict the ability to update the
o Country Verifying Certification Authority Public Key,
o Country Verifying Certification Authority Certificate
to Country Verifying Certification Authority.
FMT_MTD.1/DATE Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/DATE The TSF shall restrict the ability to modify the Current Date to
o Country Verifying Certification Authority
o Document Verifier
o Domestic Extended Inspection System.
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/CAPK The TSF shall restrict the ability to [Operation] the [TSF Data] to
[Role]
Operation TSF Data Role
load or
create
Chip Authentication private
key
the personalisation agent (in phase
6)
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party without prior written approval.
create Chip Authentication private
key
admin or admin + signatory (in
phase 7)
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/KEY_READ The TSF shall restrict the ability to read the
o PACE passwords,
o Manufacturer Keys
o Pre-personalisation Agent Keys,
o Personalisation Agent Keys,
o Chip Authentication Private Key
o Administrator Keys
to none.
FMT_MTD.3 Secure TSF data
FMT_MTD.3.1 [Editorially Refined] The TSF shall ensure that only secure values of the
certificate chain are accepted for TSF data of the Terminal Authentication Protocol
v1 and the Access Control.
Refinement:
The certificate chain is valid if and only if
 the digital signature of the Inspection System Certificate can be verified as correct with
the public key of the Document Verifier Certificate and the expiration date of the
Inspection System Certificate is not before the Current Date of the TOE,
 the digital signature of the Document Verifier Certificate can be verified as correct with
the public key in the Certificate of the Country Verifying Certification Authority and the
expiration date of the Certificate of the Country Verifying Certification Authority is not
before the Current Date of the TOE and the expiration date of the Document Verifier
Certificate is not before the Current Date of the TOE,
 the digital signature of the Certificate of the Country Verifying Certification Authority
can be verified as correct with the public key of the Country Verifying Certification
Authority known to the TOE.
The Inspection System Public Key contained in the Inspection System Certificate in a valid
certificate chain is a secure value for the authentication reference data of the Extended
Inspection System.
The intersection of the Certificate Holder Authorizations contained in the certificates of a
valid certificate chain is a secure value for Terminal Authorization of a successful
authenticated Extended Inspection System.
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party without prior written approval.
9.1.10 Additional FMT SFRs identified as per ADDENDUM
FMT_MTD.1/Initialize_PIN Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/Initialize_PIN The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the PIN and
PUK to the Personalisation Agent.
FMT_MTD.1/Resume_PIN Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/Resume_PIN The TSF shall restrict the ability to resume the suspended
PIN or the PUK to the eDigitalIdentity document holder.
FMT_MTD.1/Change_PIN Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/Change_PIN The TSF shall restrict the ability to change the PIN to
eDigitalIdentity document holder.
FMT_MTD.1/Unblock_PIN Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/Unblock_PIN The TSF shall restrict the ability to unblock the blocked
PIN to the eDigitalIdentity document holder (using the PUK for unblocking).
9.1.11 Additional FMT SFR's Identified
FMT_MTD.1/PACE_PWD Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/PACE_PWD The TSF shall restrict the ability to load the PACE Password
to Personalisation Agent.
FMT_MTD.1/LCS_PERS Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/LCS_PERS The TSF shall restrict the ability to switch the LCS from
phase 6 to phase 7 to the Personalisation Agent.
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party without prior written approval.
FMT_MTD.1/UPD_FILE Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/UPD_FILE The TSF shall restrict the ability to set the identifiers of files
that can be modified in phase 7 (different from EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1 to
EF.DG16) to the Personalisation Agent.
FMT_MTD.1/SM_LVL_DG3_DG4 Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/SM_LVL_DG3_DG4 The TSF shall restrict the ability to set the minimum
Secure Messaging level required to access DG3 and DG4 to Personalisation
Agent.
Application Note:
Possible secure messaging levels are: 3DES, AES 128, AES 192 or AES 256
FMT_MTD.1/SM_LVL Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/SM_LVL The TSF shall restrict the ability to set the allowed Secure
Messaging level when performing PACE and Chip Authentication to
Personalisation Agent.
Application Note:
Possible secure messaging levels are: 3DES, AES 128, AES 192 or AES 256
FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_READ Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/AA_KEY_READ The TSF shall restrict the ability to read the AAK to
none.
FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_WRITE Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/AA_KEY_WRITE The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the AAK to
Personalisation Agent.
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FMT_MTD.1/ADMIN Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/ADMIN The TSF shall restrict the ability to see table below the see
table below to Admin
Operation TSF Data
Modify The Chip Authentication key parameters to be used during key
generation in USE phase
Invalidate Invalidate one of the Chip Authentication key in USE phase or set
the secondary key as being the primary key
FMT_MTD.1/Key_Usage_Counter Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/Key_Usage_Counter The TSF shall restrict the ability to configure the
Key Usage Counter to Personalization Agent.
FMT_MOF.1/GP Management of security functions behaviour
FMT_MOF.1.1/GP The TSF shall restrict the ability to enable the functions
o transmission of user data in a manner protected from unauthorized
disclosure,
o reception of user data in a manner protected from unauthorized
disclosure,
o transmission of user data in a manner protected from modification,
deletion, insertion and replay errors,
o reception of user data in a manner protected from modification,
deletion, insertion and replay errors,
to the Manufacturer, Administrator and Personalisation agent.
FMT_MOF.1/AA Management of security functions behaviour
FMT_MOF.1.1/AA The TSF shall restrict the ability to enable and disable the functions
TSF Active Authentication to Personalisation Agent.
9.1.12 Class FPT Protection of the Security Functions
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FPT_EMS.1 TOE Emanation
FPT_EMS.1.1 The TOE shall not emit power variations, timing variations during
command execution in excess of non useful information enabling access to
o Chip Authentication Session Keys,
o PACE session keys (PACE-K mac, PACE-K enc),
o The ephemeral private key ephem SK picc -PACE,
o The ephemeral private key SK Map,PICC -PACE-CAM,
o Personalisation Agent Key(s),
o Chip Authentication Private Key,
o Active Authentication Private Key (AAK).
o Administrator authentication Key(s).
FPT_EMS.1.2 The TSF shall ensure users are unable to use the following interface smart
card circuit contacts to gain access to
o Chip Authentication Session Keys,
o PACE session keys (PACE-K mac, PACE-K enc),
o The ephemeral private key ephem SK picc -PACE,
o Personalisation Agent Key(s),
o Chip Authentication Private Key,
o Active Authentication Private Key (AAK).
o Administrator authentication Key(s).
FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state
FPT_FLS.1.1 The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of failures
occur:
o Exposure to operating conditions causing a TOE malfunction,
o Failure detected by TSF according to FPT_TST.1,
o none.
FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack
FPT_PHP.3.1 The TSF shall resist physical manipulation and physical probing to the
TSF by responding automatically such that the SFRs are always enforced.
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FPT_TST.1 TSF testing
FPT_TST.1.1 The TSF shall run a suite of self tests at the conditions
o At reset to demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF.
FPT_TST.1.2 The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the
integrity of TSF data.
FPT_TST.1.3 The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the
integrity of stored TSF executable code.
9.1.13 Class FTP Trusted Path/Channels
FTP_ITC.1/PACE Inter-TSF trusted channel
FTP_ITC.1.1/PACE The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and
another trusted IT product that is logically distinct from other communication channels
and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data
from modification or disclosure.
FTP_ITC.1.2/PACE The TSF shall permit another trusted IT product to initiate
communication via the trusted channel.
FTP_ITC.1.3/PACE [Editorially Refined] The TSF shall enforce communication via the
trusted channel for any data exchange between the TOE and the Terminal.
9.1.14 Additional FTP SFR's Identified
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FTP_ITC.1/MP Inter-TSF trusted channel
FTP_ITC.1.1/MP The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and
another trusted IT product that is logically distinct from other communication channels
and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data
from modification or disclosure.
FTP_ITC.1.2/MP The TSF shall permit another trusted IT product to initiate
communication via the trusted channel.
FTP_ITC.1.3/MP The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for loading
sensitive data (Pre-Perso_K, Perso_K, PACE_PWD, CA_SK) shall be encrypted.
9.2 Security Assurance Requirements
The Evaluation Assurance Level is EAL5 augmented with AVA_VAN.5 and ALC_DVS.2.
9.2.1 ADV Development
9.2.1.1 ADV_ARC Security Architecture
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party without prior written approval.
ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_ARC.1.1D The developer shall design and implement the TOE so that the security
features of the TSF cannot be bypassed.
ADV_ARC.1.2D The developer shall design and implement the TSF so that it is able to
protect itself from tampering by untrusted active entities.
ADV_ARC.1.3D The developer shall provide a security architecture description of the TSF.
ADV_ARC.1.1C The security architecture description shall be at a level of detail
commensurate with the description of the SFR-enforcing abstractions described in the
TOE design document.
ADV_ARC.1.2C The security architecture description shall describe the security domains
maintained by the TSF consistently with the SFRs.
ADV_ARC.1.3C The security architecture description shall describe how the TSF
initialisation process is secure.
ADV_ARC.1.4C The security architecture description shall demonstrate that the TSF
protects itself from tampering.
ADV_ARC.1.5C The security architecture description shall demonstrate that the TSF
prevents bypass of the SFR-enforcing functionality.
ADV_ARC.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
9.2.1.2 ADV_FSP Functional specification
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ADV_FSP.5 Complete semi-formal functional specification with additional error
information
ADV_FSP.5.1D The developer shall provide a functional specification.
ADV_FSP.5.2D The developer shall provide a tracing from the functional specification to
the SFRs.
ADV_FSP.5.1C The functional specification shall completely represent the TSF.
ADV_FSP.5.2C The functional specification shall describe the TSFI using a semi-formal
style.
ADV_FSP.5.3C The functional specification shall describe the purpose and method of use
for all TSFI.
ADV_FSP.5.4C The functional specification shall identify and describe all parameters
associated with each TSFI.
ADV_FSP.5.5C The functional specification shall describe all actions associated with each
TSFI.
ADV_FSP.5.6C The functional specification shall describe all direct error messages that may
result from an invocation of each TSFI.
ADV_FSP.5.7C The functional specification shall describe all error messages that do not
result from an invocation of a TSFI.
ADV_FSP.5.8C The functional specification shall provide a rationale for each error message
contained in the TSF implementation yet does not result from an invocation of a TSFI.
ADV_FSP.5.9C The tracing shall demonstrate that the SFRs trace to TSFIs in the functional
specification.
ADV_FSP.5.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
ADV_FSP.5.2E The evaluator shall determine that the functional specification is an accurate
and complete instantiation of the SFRs.
9.2.1.3 ADV_IMP Implementation representation
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party without prior written approval.
ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF
ADV_IMP.1.1D The developer shall make available the implementation representation for
the entire TSF.
ADV_IMP.1.2D The developer shall provide a mapping between the TOE design description
and the sample of the implementation representation.
ADV_IMP.1.1C The implementation representation shall define the TSF to a level of detail
such that the TSF can be generated without further design decisions.
ADV_IMP.1.2C The implementation representation shall be in the form used by the
development personnel.
ADV_IMP.1.3C The mapping between the TOE design description and the sample of the
implementation representation shall demonstrate their correspondence.
ADV_IMP.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that, for the selected sample of the
implementation representation, the information provided meets all requirements for
content and presentation of evidence.
9.2.1.4 ADV_TDS TOE design
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ADV_TDS.4 Semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.4.1D The developer shall provide the design of the TOE.
ADV_TDS.4.2D The developer shall provide a mapping from the TSFI of the functional
specification to the lowest level of decomposition available in the TOE design.
ADV_TDS.4.1C The design shall describe the structure of the TOE in terms of subsystems.
ADV_TDS.4.2C The design shall describe the TSF in terms of modules, designating each
module as SFR-enforcing, SFR-supporting, or SFR-non-interfering.
ADV_TDS.4.3C The design shall identify all subsystems of the TSF.
ADV_TDS.4.4C The design shall provide a semiformal description of each subsystem of the
TSF, supported by informal, explanatory text where appropriate.
ADV_TDS.4.5C The design shall provide a description of the interactions among all
subsystems of the TSF.
ADV_TDS.4.6C The design shall provide a mapping from the subsystems of the TSF to the
modules of the TSF.
ADV_TDS.4.7C The design shall describe each SFR-enforcing and SFR-supporting module
in terms of its purpose and relationship with other modules.
ADV_TDS.4.8C The design shall describe each SFR-enforcing and SFR-supporting module
in terms of its SFR-related interfaces, return values from those interfaces, interaction with
other modules and called SFR-related interfaces to other SFR-enforcing or SFR-supporting
modules.
ADV_TDS.4.9C The design shall describe each SFR-non-interfering module in terms of its
purpose and interaction with other modules.
ADV_TDS.4.10C The mapping shall demonstrate that all TSFIs trace to the behaviour
described in the TOE design that they invoke.
ADV_TDS.4.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
ADV_TDS.4.2E The evaluator shall determine that the design is an accurate and complete
instantiation of all security functional requirements.
9.2.1.5 ADV_INT TSF internals
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ADV_INT.2 Well-structured internals
ADV_INT.2.1D The developer shall design and implement the entire TSF such that it has
well-structured internals.
ADV_INT.2.2D The developer shall provide an internals description and justification.
ADV_INT.2.1C The justification shall describe the characteristics used to judge the
meaning of ``well-structured''.
ADV_INT.2.2C The TSF internals description shall demonstrate that the entire TSF is well-
structured.
ADV_INT.2.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
ADV_INT.2.2E The evaluator shall perform an internals analysis on the TSF.
9.2.2 AGD Guidance documents
9.2.2.1 AGD_OPE Operational user guidance
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AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_OPE.1.1D The developer shall provide operational user guidance.
AGD_OPE.1.1C The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role, the user-
accessible functions and privileges that should be controlled in a secure processing
environment, including appropriate warnings.
AGD_OPE.1.2C The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role, how to
use the available interfaces provided by the TOE in a secure manner.
AGD_OPE.1.3C The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role, the
available functions and interfaces, in particular all security parameters under the control
of the user, indicating secure values as appropriate.
AGD_OPE.1.4C The operational user guidance shall, for each user role, clearly present
each type of security-relevant event relative to the user-accessible functions that need to
be performed, including changing the security characteristics of entities under the control
of the TSF.
AGD_OPE.1.5C The operational user guidance shall identify all possible modes of operation
of the TOE (including operation following failure or operational error), their consequences
and implications for maintaining secure operation.
AGD_OPE.1.6C The operational user guidance shall, for each user role, describe the
security measures to be followed in order to fulfil the security objectives for the
operational environment as described in the ST.
AGD_OPE.1.7C The operational user guidance shall be clear and reasonable.
AGD_OPE.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
9.2.2.2 AGD_PRE Preparative procedures
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party without prior written approval.
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
AGD_PRE.1.1D The developer shall provide the TOE including its preparative procedures.
AGD_PRE.1.1C The preparative procedures shall describe all the steps necessary for secure
acceptance of the delivered TOE in accordance with the developer's delivery procedures.
AGD_PRE.1.2C The preparative procedures shall describe all the steps necessary for secure
installation of the TOE and for the secure preparation of the operational environment in
accordance with the security objectives for the operational environment as described in
the ST.
AGD_PRE.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
AGD_PRE.1.2E The evaluator shall apply the preparative procedures to confirm that the
TOE can be prepared securely for operation.
9.2.3 ALC Life-cycle support
9.2.3.1 ALC_CMC CM capabilities
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party without prior written approval.
ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures and automation
ALC_CMC.4.1D The developer shall provide the TOE and a reference for the TOE.
ALC_CMC.4.2D The developer shall provide the CM documentation.
ALC_CMC.4.3D The developer shall use a CM system.
ALC_CMC.4.1C The TOE shall be labelled with its unique reference.
ALC_CMC.4.2C The CM documentation shall describe the method used to uniquely identify
the configuration items.
ALC_CMC.4.3C The CM system shall uniquely identify all configuration items.
ALC_CMC.4.4C The CM system shall provide automated measures such that only
authorised changes are made to the configuration items.
ALC_CMC.4.5C The CM system shall support the production of the TOE by automated
means.
ALC_CMC.4.6C The CM documentation shall include a CM plan.
ALC_CMC.4.7C The CM plan shall describe how the CM system is used for the development
of the TOE.
ALC_CMC.4.8C The CM plan shall describe the procedures used to accept modified or
newly created configuration items as part of the TOE.
ALC_CMC.4.9C The evidence shall demonstrate that all configuration items are being
maintained under the CM system.
ALC_CMC.4.10C The evidence shall demonstrate that the CM system is being operated in
accordance with the CM plan.
ALC_CMC.4.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
9.2.3.2 ALC_CMS CM scope
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ALC_CMS.5 Development tools CM coverage
ALC_CMS.5.1D The developer shall provide a configuration list for the TOE.
ALC_CMS.5.1C The configuration list shall include the following: the TOE itself; the
evaluation evidence required by the SARs; the parts that comprise the TOE; the
implementation representation; security flaw reports and resolution status; and
development tools and related information.
ALC_CMS.5.2C The configuration list shall uniquely identify the configuration items.
ALC_CMS.5.3C For each TSF relevant configuration item, the configuration list shall
indicate the developer of the item.
ALC_CMS.5.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
9.2.3.3 ALC_DEL Delivery
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC_DEL.1.1D The developer shall document and provide procedures for delivery of the
TOE or parts of it to the consumer.
ALC_DEL.1.2D The developer shall use the delivery procedures.
ALC_DEL.1.1C The delivery documentation shall describe all procedures that are necessary
to maintain security when distributing versions of the TOE to the consumer.
ALC_DEL.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
9.2.3.4 ALC_DVS Development security
ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
ALC_DVS.2.1D The developer shall produce and provide development security
documentation.
ALC_DVS.2.1C The development security documentation shall describe all the physical,
procedural, personnel, and other security measures that are necessary to protect the
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party without prior written approval.
confidentiality and integrity of the TOE design and implementation in its development
environment.
ALC_DVS.2.2C The development security documentation shall justify that the security
measures provide the necessary level of protection to maintain the confidentiality and
integrity of the TOE.
ALC_DVS.2.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
ALC_DVS.2.2E The evaluator shall confirm that the security measures are being applied.
9.2.3.5 ALC_LCD Life-cycle definition
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
ALC_LCD.1.1D The developer shall establish a life-cycle model to be used in the
development and maintenance of the TOE.
ALC_LCD.1.2D The developer shall provide life-cycle definition documentation.
ALC_LCD.1.1C The life-cycle definition documentation shall describe the model used to
develop and maintain the TOE.
ALC_LCD.1.2C The life-cycle model shall provide for the necessary control over the
development and maintenance of the TOE.
ALC_LCD.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
9.2.3.6 ALC_TAT Tools and techniques
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party without prior written approval.
ALC_TAT.2 Compliance with implementation standards
ALC_TAT.2.1D The developer shall provide the documentation identifying each
development tool being used for the TOE.
ALC_TAT.2.2D The developer shall document and provide the selected implementation-
dependent options of each development tool.
ALC_TAT.2.3D The developer shall describe and provide the implementation standards that
are being applied by the developer.
ALC_TAT.2.1C Each development tool used for implementation shall be well-defined.
ALC_TAT.2.2C The documentation of each development tool shall unambiguously define
the meaning of all statements as well as all conventions and directives used in the
implementation.
ALC_TAT.2.3C The documentation of each development tool shall unambiguously define
the meaning of all implementation-dependent options.
ALC_TAT.2.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
ALC_TAT.2.2E The evaluator shall confirm that the implementation standards have been
applied.
9.2.4 ASE Security Target evaluation
9.2.4.1 ASE_CCL Conformance claims
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party without prior written approval.
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_CCL.1.1D The developer shall provide a conformance claim.
ASE_CCL.1.2D The developer shall provide a conformance claim rationale.
ASE_CCL.1.1C The conformance claim shall contain a CC conformance claim that identifies
the version of the CC to which the ST and the TOE claim conformance.
ASE_CCL.1.2C The CC conformance claim shall describe the conformance of the ST to CC
Part 2 as either CC Part 2 conformant or CC Part 2 extended.
ASE_CCL.1.3C The CC conformance claim shall describe the conformance of the ST to CC
Part 3 as either CC Part 3 conformant or CC Part 3 extended.
ASE_CCL.1.4C The CC conformance claim shall be consistent with the extended
components definition.
ASE_CCL.1.5C The conformance claim shall identify all PPs and security requirement
packages to which the ST claims conformance.
ASE_CCL.1.6C The conformance claim shall describe any conformance of the ST to a
package as either package-conformant or package-augmented.
ASE_CCL.1.7C The conformance claim rationale shall demonstrate that the TOE type is
consistent with the TOE type in the PPs for which conformance is being claimed.
ASE_CCL.1.8C The conformance claim rationale shall demonstrate that the statement of
the security problem definition is consistent with the statement of the security problem
definition in the PPs for which conformance is being claimed.
ASE_CCL.1.9C The conformance claim rationale shall demonstrate that the statement of
security objectives is consistent with the statement of security objectives in the PPs for
which conformance is being claimed.
ASE_CCL.1.10C The conformance claim rationale shall demonstrate that the statement of
security requirements is consistent with the statement of security requirements in the PPs
for which conformance is being claimed.
ASE_CCL.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
9.2.4.2 ASE_ECD Extended components definition
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ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_ECD.1.1D The developer shall provide a statement of security requirements.
ASE_ECD.1.2D The developer shall provide an extended components definition.
ASE_ECD.1.1C The statement of security requirements shall identify all extended security
requirements.
ASE_ECD.1.2C The extended components definition shall define an extended component
for each extended security requirement.
ASE_ECD.1.3C The extended components definition shall describe how each extended
component is related to the existing CC components, families, and classes.
ASE_ECD.1.4C The extended components definition shall use the existing CC components,
families, classes, and methodology as a model for presentation.
ASE_ECD.1.5C The extended components shall consist of measurable and objective
elements such that conformance or nonconformance to these elements can be
demonstrated.
ASE_ECD.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
ASE_ECD.1.2E The evaluator shall confirm that no extended component can be clearly
expressed using existing components.
9.2.4.3 ASE_INT ST introduction
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party without prior written approval.
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_INT.1.1D The developer shall provide an ST introduction.
ASE_INT.1.1C The ST introduction shall contain an ST reference, a TOE reference, a TOE
overview and a TOE description.
ASE_INT.1.2C The ST reference shall uniquely identify the ST.
ASE_INT.1.3C The TOE reference shall identify the TOE.
ASE_INT.1.4C The TOE overview shall summarise the usage and major security features of
the TOE.
ASE_INT.1.5C The TOE overview shall identify the TOE type.
ASE_INT.1.6C The TOE overview shall identify any non-TOE hardware/software/firmware
required by the TOE.
ASE_INT.1.7C The TOE description shall describe the physical scope of the TOE.
ASE_INT.1.8C The TOE description shall describe the logical scope of the TOE.
ASE_INT.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
ASE_INT.1.2E The evaluator shall confirm that the TOE reference, the TOE overview, and
the TOE description are consistent with each other.
9.2.4.4 ASE_OBJ Security objectives
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ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_OBJ.2.1D The developer shall provide a statement of security objectives.
ASE_OBJ.2.2D The developer shall provide a security objectives rationale.
ASE_OBJ.2.1C The statement of security objectives shall describe the security objectives
for the TOE and the security objectives for the operational environment.
ASE_OBJ.2.2C The security objectives rationale shall trace each security objective for the
TOE back to threats countered by that security objective and OSPs enforced by that
security objective.
ASE_OBJ.2.3C The security objectives rationale shall trace each security objective for the
operational environment back to threats countered by that security objective, OSPs
enforced by that security objective, and assumptions upheld by that security objective.
ASE_OBJ.2.4C The security objectives rationale shall demonstrate that the security
objectives counter all threats.
ASE_OBJ.2.5C The security objectives rationale shall demonstrate that the security
objectives enforce all OSPs.
ASE_OBJ.2.6C The security objectives rationale shall demonstrate that the security
objectives for the operational environment uphold all assumptions.
ASE_OBJ.2.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
9.2.4.5 ASE_REQ Security requirements
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party without prior written approval.
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_REQ.2.1D The developer shall provide a statement of security requirements.
ASE_REQ.2.2D The developer shall provide a security requirements rationale.
ASE_REQ.2.1C The statement of security requirements shall describe the SFRs and the
SARs.
ASE_REQ.2.2C All subjects, objects, operations, security attributes, external entities and
other terms that are used in the SFRs and the SARs shall be defined.
ASE_REQ.2.3C The statement of security requirements shall identify all operations on the
security requirements.
ASE_REQ.2.4C All operations shall be performed correctly.
ASE_REQ.2.5C Each dependency of the security requirements shall either be satisfied, or
the security requirements rationale shall justify the dependency not being satisfied.
ASE_REQ.2.6C The security requirements rationale shall trace each SFR back to the
security objectives for the TOE.
ASE_REQ.2.7C The security requirements rationale shall demonstrate that the SFRs meet
all security objectives for the TOE.
ASE_REQ.2.8C The security requirements rationale shall explain why the SARs were
chosen.
ASE_REQ.2.9C The statement of security requirements shall be internally consistent.
ASE_REQ.2.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
9.2.4.6 ASE_SPD Security problem definition
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party without prior written approval.
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
ASE_APD.1.1D The developer shall provide a security problem definition.
ASE_SPD.1.1C The security problem definition shall describe the threats.
ASE_SPD.1.2C All threats shall be described in terms of a threat agent, an asset, and an
adverse action.
ASE_SPD.1.3C The security problem definition shall describe the OSPs.
ASE_SPD.1.4C The security problem definition shall describe the assumptions about the
operational environment of the TOE.
ASE_SPD.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
9.2.4.7 ASE_TSS TOE summary specification
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ASE_TSS.1.1D The developer shall provide a TOE summary specification.
ASE_TSS.1.1C The TOE summary specification shall describe how the TOE meets each
SFR.
ASE_TSS.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
ASE_TSS.1.2E The evaluator shall confirm that the TOE summary specification is consistent
with the TOE overview and the TOE description.
9.2.5 ATE Tests
9.2.5.1 ATE_COV Coverage
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ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
ATE_COV.2.1D The developer shall provide an analysis of the test coverage.
ATE_COV.2.1C The analysis of the test coverage shall demonstrate the correspondence
between the tests in the test documentation and the TSFIs in the functional specification.
ATE_COV.2.2C The analysis of the test coverage shall demonstrate that all TSFIs in the
functional specification have been tested.
ATE_COV.2.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
9.2.5.2 ATE_DPT Depth
ATE_DPT.3 Testing: modular design
ATE_DPT.3.1D The developer shall provide the analysis of the depth of testing.
ATE_DPT.3.1C The analysis of the depth of testing shall demonstrate the correspondence
between the tests in the test documentation and the TSF subsystems and modules in the
TOE design.
ATE_DPT.3.2C The analysis of the depth of testing shall demonstrate that all TSF
subsystems in the TOE design have been tested.
ATE_DPT.3.3C The analysis of the depth of testing shall demonstrate that all TSF modules
in the TOE design have been tested.
ATE_DPT.3.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
9.2.5.3 ATE_FUN Functional tests
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ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_FUN.1.1D The developer shall test the TSF and document the results.
ATE_FUN.1.2D The developer shall provide test documentation.
ATE_FUN.1.1C The test documentation shall consist of test plans, expected test results and
actual test results.
ATE_FUN.1.2C The test plans shall identify the tests to be performed and describe the
scenarios for performing each test. These scenarios shall include any ordering
dependencies on the results of other tests.
ATE_FUN.1.3C The expected test results shall show the anticipated outputs from a
successful execution of the tests.
ATE_FUN.1.4C The actual test results shall be consistent with the expected test results.
ATE_FUN.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
9.2.5.4 ATE_IND Independent testing
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ATE_IND.2 Independent testing - sample
ATE_IND.2.1D The developer shall provide the TOE for testing.
ATE_IND.2.1C The TOE shall be suitable for testing.
ATE_IND.2.2C The developer shall provide an equivalent set of resources to those that
were used in the developer's functional testing of the TSF.
ATE_IND.2.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
ATE_IND.2.2E The evaluator shall execute a sample of tests in the test documentation to
verify the developer test results.
ATE_IND.2.3E The evaluator shall test a subset of the TSF to confirm that the TSF
operates as specified.
9.2.6 AVA Vulnerability assessment
9.2.6.1 AVA_VAN Vulnerability analysis
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party without prior written approval.
AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.5.1D The developer shall provide the TOE for testing.
AVA_VAN.5.1C The TOE shall be suitable for testing.
AVA_VAN.5.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
AVA_VAN.5.2E The evaluator shall perform a search of public domain sources to identify
potential vulnerabilities in the TOE.
AVA_VAN.5.3E The evaluator shall perform an independent, methodical vulnerability
analysis of the TOE using the guidance documentation, functional specification, TOE
design, security architecture description and implementation representation to identify
potential vulnerabilities in the TOE.
AVA_VAN.5.4E The evaluator shall conduct penetration testing based on the identified
potential vulnerabilities to determine that the TOE is resistant to attacks performed by an
attacker possessing High attack potential.
9.3 Security Requirements Rationale
9.3.1 Objectives
9.3.1.1 Security Objectives for the TOE
Security Objectives from the PP
OT.AC_Pers The security objective OT.AC_Pers “Access Control for Personalisation of logical
eDigitalIdentity document” addresses the access control of the writing the logical
eDigitalIdentity document. The justification for the SFRs FAU_SAS.1,
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA and FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS arises from the justification for
OT.Identification above with respect to the Pre-personalisation Data. The write access to
the logical eDigitalIdentity document data are defined by the SFR FIA_UID.1/PACE,
FIA_UAU.1/PACE, FDP_ACC.1/TRM and FDP_ACF.1/TRM in the same way: only the
successfully authenticated Personalisation Agent is allowed to write the data of the groups
EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical eDigitalIdentity document only once. FMT_MTD.1/PA
covers the related property of OT.AC_Pers (writing SOD and, in generally, personalisation
data). The SFR FMT_SMR.1/PACE lists the roles (including Personalisation Agent) and the
SFR FMT_SMF.1 lists the TSF management functions (including Personalisation). The SFRs
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ and FPT_EMS.1 restrict the access to the Personalisation Agent
Keys and the Chip Authentication Private Key.
The authentication of the terminal as Personalisation Agent shall be performed by TSF
according to SFR FIA_UAU.4/PACE and FIA_UAU.5/PACE. If the Personalisation Terminal
want to authenticate itself to the TOE by means of the Terminal Authentication Protocol
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v1 (after Chip Authentication v1) with the Personalisation Agent Keys the TOE will use
TSF according to the FCS_RND.1 (for the generation of the challenge), FCS_CKM.1/CA
(for the derivation of the new session keys after Chip Authentication v1),
FCS_CKM.1/CA_DATA_GEN for generation of CA Data in phase 6, and
FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC and FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC (for the ENC_MAC_Mode secure
messaging), FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER (as part of the Terminal Authentication Protocol v1)
and FIA_UAU.6/EAC (for the re-authentication). If the Personalisation Terminal wants to
authenticate itself to the TOE by means of the Authentication Mechanism with
Personalisation Agent Key the TOE will use TSF according to the FCS_RND.1 (for the
generation of the challenge) and FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC (to verify the authentication
attempt). The session keys are destroyed according to FCS_CKM.4 after use.
The Personalisation Agent can load the PACE password according to
FMT_MTD.1/PACE_PWD.
FMT_MTD.1/LCS_PERS ensures only personalisation agent can transfer the TOE from life
cycle phase 6 to phase 7.
FIA_UAU.6/MP ensures all commands in personalisation phase are sent via secure
messaging. FIA_AFL.1/MP helps block the Authentication in Phase 6 if too many failed
authentication attempts occur to prevent attacks.
FDP_ACC.1/UPD_FILE and FDP_ACF.1/UPD_FILE restrict write access to files to
personalisation agent.
Additionally to the SFRs from [PACE/EACPP] which cover this objective, the security
objective OT.AC_Pers is achieved by terminal identification/authentication using and
managing the PIN/PUK as required by the SFRs FIA_AFL.1/PACE. The SFR FMT_SMF.1
support the related functions. The SFR FDP_RIP.1 requires erasing the temporal values
PIN and PUK.
OT.Data_Integrity The security objective OT.Data_Integrity “Integrity of personal data”
requires the TOE to protect the integrity of the logical eDigitalIdentity document stored on
the eDigitalIdentity document’s chip against physical manipulation and unauthorized
writing. Physical manipulation is addressed by FPT_PHP.3. Logical manipulation of stored
user data is addressed by (FDP_ACC.1/TRM, FDP_ACF.1/TRM): only the Personalisation
Agent is allowed to write the data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical eDigitalIdentity
document (FDP_ACF.1.2/TRM, rule 1) and terminals are not allowed to modify any of the
data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical eDigitalIdentity document (cf.
FDP_ACF.1.4/TRM). FMT_MTD.1/PA requires that SOD containing signature over the User
Data stored on the TOE and used for the Passive Authentication is allowed to be written
by the Personalisation Agent only and, hence, is to be considered as trustworthy. The
Personalisation Agent must identify and authenticate themselves according to
FIA_UID.1/PACE and FIA_UAU.1/PACE before accessing these data. FIA_UAU.4/PACE,
FIA_UAU.5/PACE and FCS_CKM.4 represent some required specific properties of the
protocols used. The SFR FMT_SMR.1/PACE lists the roles and the SFR FMT_SMF.1 lists the
TSF management functions.
Unauthorised modifying of the exchanged data is addressed, in the first line, by
FTP_ITC.1/PACE using FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC. For PACE secured data exchange, a
prerequisite for establishing this trusted channel is a successful PACE Authentication
(FIA_UID.1/PACE, FIA_UAU.1/PACE) using FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE and possessing the
special properties FIA_UAU.5/PACE, FIA_UAU.6/PACE resp. FIA_UAU.6/EAC. The trusted
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channel is established using PACE, Chip Authentication v1, and Terminal Authentication
v1. FDP_RIP.1 requires erasing the values of session keys (here: for KMAC).
The TOE supports the inspection system detect any modification of the transmitted logical
eDigitalIdentity document data after Chip Authentication v1. The SFR FIA_UAU.6/EAC and
FDP_UIT.1/TRM requires the integrity protection of the transmitted data after Chip
Authentication v1 by means of secure messaging implemented by the cryptographic
functions according to FCS_CKM.1/CA and FCS_CKM.1/CAM(for the generation of shared
secret andfor the derivation of the new session keys), and FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC and
FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC for the ENC_MAC_Mode secure messaging. The session keys are
destroyed according to FCS_CKM.4 after use.
The SFR FMT_MTD.1/CAPK and FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ requires that the Chip
Authentication Key cannot be written unauthorized or read afterwards. The SFR
FCS_RND.1 represents a general support for cryptographic operations needed.
The SFRs FDP_ACC.1/UPD_FILE and FDP_ACF.1/UPD_FILE ensure that no terminal is
allowed to modify the user data.
FIA_UAU.6/MP and FMT_MOF.1/GP makes sure that the data is transmitted via secure
messaging to maintain integrity.
Additionally to the SFRs from [PACE/EACPP] which cover these objectives, these security
objectives are achieved by establishing a trusted channel via a successful Chip
Authentication thanks to the SFRs FIA_API.1/TOE. Since PACE can use the PIN as the
shared secret, using and management of PIN, the SFRs FIA_AFL.1/PACE,
FMT_MTD.1/Initialize_PIN, FMT_MTD.1/Resume_PIN, FMT_MTD.1/Change_PIN,
FMT_MTD.1/Unblock_PIN support alos the achievement of these objectives. The SFR
FMT_SMF.1 support the related functions. The SFR FDP_RIP.1 requires erasing the
temporal values PIN and PUK.
OT.Sens_Data_Conf The security objective OT.Sense_Data_Conf “Confidentiality of
sensitive biometric reference data” is enforced by the Access Control SFP defined in
FDP_ACC.1/TRM and FDP_ACF.1/TRM allowing the data of EF.DG3 and EF.DG4 only to be
read by successfully authenticated Extended Inspection System being authorized by a
valid certificate according FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER. The SFRs FIA_UID.1/PACE and
FIA_UAU.1/PACE require the identification and authentication of the inspection systems.
The SFR FIA_UAU.5/PACE requires the successful Chip Authentication (CA) v1 before any
authentication attempt as Extended Inspection System. During the protected
communication following the CA v1 the reuse of authentication data is prevented by
FIA_UAU.4/PACE. The SFR FIA_UAU.6/EAC and FDP_UCT.1/TRM requires the
confidentiality protection of the transmitted data after Chip Authentication v1 by means of
secure messaging implemented by the cryptographic functions according to FCS_RND.1
(for the generation of the terminal authentication challenge), FCS_CKM.1/CA (for the
generation of shared secret and for the derivation of the new session keys),
FCS_CKM.1/CA_DATA_GEN for generation of Chip Authentication Data in personalisation
phase, and FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC and FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC for the ENC_MAC_Mode secure
messaging. The session keys are destroyed according to FCS_CKM.4 after use. The SFR
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK and FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ requires that the Chip Authentication Key
cannot be written unauthorized or read afterwards. FIA_UAU.6/MP requires that the
sensitive data is sent via Secure Messaging during personalisation phase. To allow a
verification of the certificate chain as in FMT_MTD.3 the CVCA’s public key and certificate
as well as the current date are written or update by authorized identified role as of
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party without prior written approval.
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI, FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD and FMT_MTD.1/DATE. FMT_MOF.1/GP
ensures all data is transmitted and received via secure messaging to ensure confidentiality
OT.Identification The security objective OT.Identification “Identification of the TOE”
addresses the storage of Initialisation and Pre-Personalisation Data in its non-volatile
memory, whereby they also include the IC Identification Data uniquely identifying the
TOE’s chip. This will be ensured by TSF according to SFR FAU_SAS.1. The SFR
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA allows only the Manufacturer to write Initialisation and Pre-
personalisation Data (including the Personalisation Agent key). The SFR
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS requires the Personalisation Agent to disable access to Initialisation
and Pre-personalisation Data in the life cycle phase ‘operational use’. The SFRs
FMT_SMF.1 and FMT_SMR.1/PACE support the functions and roles related.
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof The security objective OT.Chip_Auth_Proof “Proof of eDigitalIdentity
document’s chip authenticity” is ensured by the Chip Authentication Protocol v1 provided
by FIA_API.1/CA proving the identity of the TOE. The Chip Authentication Protocol v1
defined by FCS_CKM.1/CA is performed using a TOE internally stored confidential private
key as required by FMT_MTD.1/CAPK and FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ. The Chip
Authentication Data is generated by using FCS_CKM.1/CA_DATA_GEN. The Chip
Authentication Protocol v1 [TR-03110-1] and [TR-03110-3] requires additional TSF
according to FCS_CKM.1/CA (for the derivation of the session keys), FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC
and FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC (for the ENC_MAC_Mode secure messaging).The SFRs
FMT_SMF.1 and FMT_SMR.1/PACE support the functions and roles related.
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func The security objective OT.Prot_Abuse-Func “Protection against
Abuse of Functionality” is ensured by the SFR FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2 which prevent
misuse of test functionality of the TOE or other features which may not be used after TOE
Delivery.
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak The security objective OT.Prot_Inf_Leak “Protection against Information
Leakage” requires the TOE to protect confidential TSF data stored and/or processed in the
eDigitalIdentity document’s chip against disclosure
o by measurement and analysis of the shape and amplitude of signals or the time
between events found by measuring signals on the electromagnetic field, power
consumption, clock, or I/O lines which is addressed by the SFR FPT_EMS.1,
o by forcing a malfunction of the TOE which is addressed by the SFR FPT_FLS.1 and
FPT_TST.1, and/or
o by a physical manipulation of the TOE which is addressed by the SFR FPT_PHP.3.
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party without prior written approval.
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper The security objective OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper “Protection against
Physical Tampering” is covered by the SFR FPT_PHP.3.
OT.Prot_Malfunction The security objective OT.Prot_Malfunction “Protection against
Malfunctions” is covered by (i) the SFR FPT_TST.1 which requires self tests to
demonstrate the correct operation and tests of authorized users to verify the integrity of
TSF data and TSF code, and (ii) the SFR FPT_FLS.1 which requires a secure state in case
of detected failure or operating conditions possibly causing a malfunction.
OT.Data_Authenticity The security objective OT.Data_Authenticity aims ensuring
authenticity of the User- and TSF data (after the PACE Authentication) by enabling its
verification at the terminal-side and by an active verification by the TOE itself.This
objective is mainly achieved by FTP_ITC.1/PACE using FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC. A
prerequisite for establishing this trusted channel is a successful PACE or Chip and
Terminal Authentication v1 (FIA_UID.1/PACE, FIA_UAU.1/PACE) using
FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE resp. FCS_CKM.1/CA or FCS_CKM.1/CAM and possessing the
special properties FIA_UAU.5/PACE, FIA_UAU.6/PACE resp. FIA_UAU.6/EAC.
FIA_UAU.6/MP ensures the data that is reaching the TOE is coming from the
personalisation agent by maintaining secure messaging for all commands. FDP_RIP.1
requires erasing the values of session keys (here: for KMAC). FIA_UAU.4/PACE,
FIA_UAU.5/PACE and FCS_CKM.4 represent some required specific properties of the
protocols used. The SFR FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ restricts the access to the PACE
passwords and the Chip Authentication Private Key. FMT_MTD.1/PA requires that SOD
containing signature over the User Data stored on the TOE and used for the Passive
Authentication is allowed to be written by the Personalisation Agent only and, hence, is to
be considered as trustworthy.The SFR FCS_RND.1 represents a general support for
cryptographic operations needed.The SFRs FMT_SMF.1 and FMT_SMR.1/PACE support the
functions and roles related.
Additionally to the SFRs from [PACE/EACPP] which cover these objectives, these security
objectives are achieved by establishing a trusted channel via a successful Chip
Authentication thanks to the SFR FIA_API.1/TOE. Since PACE can use the PIN as the
shared secret, using and management of PIN, the SFRs FIA_AFL.1/PACE,
FMT_MTD.1/Initialize_PIN, FMT_MTD.1/Resume_PIN, FMT_MTD.1/Change_PIN,
FMT_MTD.1/Unblock_PIN support alos the achievement of these objectives. The SFR
FMT_SMF.1 support the related functions. The SFR FDP_RIP.1 requires erasing the
temporal values PIN and PUK.
OT.Data_Confidentiality The security objective OT.Data_Confidentiality aims that the TOE
always ensures confidentiality of the User- and TSF-data stored and, after the PACE
Authentication resp. Chip Authentication, of these data exchanged.This objective for the
data stored is mainly achieved by (FDP_ACC.1/TRM, FDP_ACF.1/TRM). FIA_UAU.4/PACE,
FIA_UAU.5/PACE and FCS_CKM.4 represent some required specific properties of the
protocols used. This objective for the data exchanged is mainly achieved by
FDP_UCT.1/TRM, FDP_UIT.1/TRM, FTP_ITC.1/PACE using FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC resp.
FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC. A prerequisite for establishing this trusted channel is a successful
PACE or Chip and Terminal Authentication v1 (FIA_UID.1/PACE, FIA_UAU.1/PACE) using
FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE resp. FCS_CKM.1/CA or FCS_CKM.1/CAM and possessing the
special properties FIA_UAU.5/PACE, FIA_UAU.6/PACE resp. FIA_UAU.6/EAC and
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party without prior written approval.
FIA_UAU.6/MP for Manufacture and Personalisation Agent authentication. FDP_RIP.1
requires erasing the values of session keys (here: for Kenc). The SFR
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ restricts the access to the PACE passwords and the Chip
Authentication Private Key. FMT_MTD.1/PA requires that SOD containing signature over
the User Data stored on the TOE and used for the Passive Authentication is allowed to be
written by the Personalisation Agent only and, hence, is to be considered trustworthy.The
SFR FCS_RND.1 represents the general support for cryptographic operations needed.The
SFRs FMT_SMF.1 and FMT_SMR.1/PACE support the functions and roles related.
Additionally to the SFRs from [PACE/EACPP] which cover these objectives, these security
objectives are achieved by establishing a trusted channel via a successful Chip
Authentication thanks to the SFR FIA_API.1/TOE. Since PACE can use the PIN as the
shared secret, using and management of PIN, the SFRs FIA_AFL.1/PACE,
FMT_MTD.1/Initialize_PIN, FMT_MTD.1/Resume_PIN, FMT_MTD.1/Change_PIN,
FMT_MTD.1/Unblock_PIN support alos the achievement of these objectives. The SFR
FMT_SMF.1 support the related functions. The SFR FDP_RIP.1 requires erasing the
temporal values PIN and PUK.
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OT.Tracing The security objective OT.Tracing aims that the TOE prevents gathering TOE
tracing data by means of unambiguous identifying the eDigitalIdentity document remotely
through establishing or listening to a communication via the contactless interface of the
TOE without a priori knowledge of the correct values of shared passwords (CAN,
MRZ).This objective is achieved as follows:(i) while establishing PACE communication with
PIN, PUK, CAN or MRZ (non-blocking authorisation data) – by FIA_AFL.1/PACE;(ii) for
listening to PACE communication (is of importance for the current PP, since SOD is card-
individual) – FTP_ITC.1/PACE.
Additional Objectives as per ADDENDUM
OT.Sens_Ident_User_Data_Conf The security objective of
OT.Sens_Ident_User_Data_Conf aims to explicitly protect sensitive identification user and
TSF-Data during their exchange. It is enforcing by the Access Control SFP defined in
FDP_ACC.1/TRM and FDP_ACF.1/TRM allowing the data of EF.DG3 and EF.DG4 only to be
read by successfully authenticated Extended Inspection System being authorized by a
valid certificate according FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER. A prerequisite for establishing a trusted
channel is a successful Chip Authentication thanks to the SFRs FIA_API.1/TOE. Since
PACE can use the PIN as the shared secret, the SFRs FIA_AFL.1/PACE,
FMT_MTD.1/Initialize_PIN, FMT_MTD.1/Resume_PIN, FMT_MTD.1/Change_PIN,
FMT_MTD.1/Unblock_PIN support the achievement of this objective. The SFR FMT_SMF.1
support the related functions. The SFR FDP_RIP.1 requires erasing the temporal values
PIN and PUK.
Additional Objectives for Active Authentication
OT.AA_Proof The security objective OT.AA_Proof is ensured by the Active Authentication
Protocol activated by FMT_MOF.1/AA and provided by FDP_DAU.1/AA, FDP_ITC.1/AA
proving the identity and authenticity of the TOE. The Active Authentication relies on
FCS_COP.1/AA and FCS_RND.1. It is performed using a TOE internally stored confidential
private key as required by FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_WRITE and FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_READ.
OT.Data_Int_AA The security objective OT.AA_Proof is ensured by the Active
Authentication Protocol activated by FMT_MOF.1/AA and provided by FDP_DAU.1/AA and
FDP_ITC.1/AA proving the identity and authenticity of the TOE.
Additional Security Objectives Identified
OT.Configuration The security objective OT.Configuration “Protection of the TOE
preparation” addresses management of the Data Configuration, Pre-personalisation Agent
keys, Personalisation Agent keys and the Life Cycle State of the TOE.
The Manufacturer can be authenticated by using the symmetric authentication mechanism
(FCS_COP.1/GP_AUTH) with the Pre-personalisation key. FIA_UAU.6/MP describes the re-
authentication. In case of failed authentication attempts FIA_AFL.1/MP enforces additional
waiting time prolonging the necessary amount of time for facilitating a brute force attack.
The SFR FTP_ITC.1/MP allows the Manufacturer to communicate with the OS.
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party without prior written approval.
Once step 4 is done, the eDigitalIdentity document packaging responsible is allowed to
set the Pre-personalisation Agent keys according to the SFR FCS_COP.1/GP_KEY_DEC.
The read access to the Pre-personalisation keys is prevented by SFRs FPT_EMS.1,
FPT_FLS.1 and FPT_PHP.3 the confidentially of these keys.
The Manufacturer shall be authenticated by using the symmetric authentication
mechanism (FCS_COP.1/GP_AUTH).
In case of failed authentication attempts FIA_AFL.1/MP enforces additional waiting time
prolonging the necessary amount of time for facilitating a brute force attack
The SFR FIA_UAU.6/MP describes the re-authentication and FDP_UCT.1/MP the protection
of the transmitted data by means of secure messaging implemented by the cryptographic
functions according to FCS_CKM.1/GP, FCS_RND.1 (for key generation), and
FCS_COP.1/GP_ENC as well as FCS_COP.1/GP_MAC for the ENC_MAC_Mode. The SFR
FCS_CKM.4 enforces the destruction of Secure Messaging session keys.
The Manufacturer and the Personalisation Agent can select the protection mode of user
data following FMT_MOF.1.1/GP.
The SFR FCS_CKM.4, FPT_EMS.1, FPT_FLS.1 and FPT_PHP.3 the confidentially of
Personalisation Agent keys.
OT.Update_File The security objective OT.Update_File “Modification of file in Operational
Use Phase” addresses the modification of Updatable Data as defined in
FDP_ACC.1/UPD_FILE. The SFR FDP_ACF.1/UPD_FILE clarifies what can be done by
which subject: after a correct authentication the Personalisation Agent is allowed to write,
read and modify these Updatable Data during Pre-Personalisation and Personalisation
phases. Any Terminal is not allowed to modify them during Operational phase. Only a
successfully authenticated Extended Inspection System is allowed to modify Updatable
Data, only if with the name corresponding to the one (or beginning of the one) set
following FMT_MTD.1/UPD_FILE by the Personalisation Agent during Pre-Personalisation
and Personalisation phases.
OT.AC_SM_Level The security objective OT.AC_SM_Level “Access control to sensitive
biometric reference data according to SM level” is covered by
FMT_MTD.1/SM_LVL_DG3_DG4 and FMT_MTD.1/SM_LVL.
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof_PACE_CAM OT.Chip_Auth_Proof_PACE_CAM aims to ensure the
authenticity of the electronic document's chip by the PACE-CAM protocol. This is
supported by FCS_CKM.1/CAM for cryptographic key-generation, and FIA_API.1/CAM and
FCS_COP.1/CAM for the implementation itself, as well as FIA_UID.1/PACE and
FIA_UAU.5/PACE, the latter supporting the PACE protocol.
OT.ADMIN_Configuration The security objective OT.ADMIN_Configuration “Protection of
the TOE administration” addresses management of the Data Configuration with key size
management for the Chip Authentication of the TOE. The authentication of the terminal
as Administrator is performed by TSF according to FIA_UAU.5/PACE. The Administrator
can be authenticated by using the symmetric authentication mechanism
(FCS_COP.1/GP_AUTH) with the Administartor key. ADMIN keys are created during pre-
personalization. FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ restricts the ability to read the Administrator Keys
to none. The Administartor can select the protection mode of user data following
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party without prior written approval.
FMT_MOF.1/GP. FPT_EMS.1 protects the confidentially of Administrator Agent keys. The
SFRs FMT_SMF.1 and FMT_SMR.1/PACE support the functions and roles related. The
administration TSF data manipulation are supported by FMT_MTD.1/ADMIN. It is now
allowed to modify the Chip Authentication key parameters to be used during key
generation in USE phase. The minimum key size that the user can generate in USE phase
is controlled by the “ADMIN” role. It is also possible to change the key parameters during
the key generation process. For example changing the domain parameters of an elliptic
curve key. It is also possible to invalidate one of the Chip Authentication key in USE phase
and to set the secondary key as being the primary key. Note: after such process, the
“freed” CA key set is available for a future CA key generation.
OT.Key_Usage_Counter The security objective OT.Key_Usage_Counter is covered by
FMT_MTD.1/Key_Usage_Counter.
9.3.2 Rationale tables of Security Objectives and SFRs
Security Objectives Security Functional Requirements Rationale
OT.AC_Pers FMT_MTD.1/PA, FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ,
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA,
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS, FAU_SAS.1,
FIA_UAU.5/PACE, FMT_SMF.1,
FMT_SMR.1/PACE, FIA_UAU.6/MP,
FIA_AFL.1/MP, FDP_ACC.1/UPD_FILE,
FDP_ACF.1/UPD_FILE,
FMT_MTD.1/LCS_PERS, FCS_CKM.1/CA,
FCS_CKM.4, FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC,
FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER, FCS_RND.1,
FIA_UID.1/PACE, FIA_UAU.1/PACE,
FIA_UAU.4/PACE, FIA_UAU.6/EAC,
FDP_ACC.1/TRM, FDP_ACF.1/TRM,
FMT_MTD.1/PACE_PWD, FPT_EMS.1,
FCS_CKM.1/CA_DATA_GEN,
FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC, FIA_AFL.1/PACE,
FDP_RIP.1
Section 9.3.1
OT.Data_Integrity FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE,
FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC,
FIA_UAU.1/PACE, FIA_UAU.5/PACE,
FIA_UAU.6/EAC, FIA_UID.1/PACE,
FIA_UAU.4/PACE, FIA_UAU.6/PACE,
FDP_ACF.1/TRM, FDP_ACC.1/TRM,
FDP_UIT.1/TRM, FTP_ITC.1/PACE,
FMT_MTD.1/PA, FMT_MTD.1/CAPK,
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ,
FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC, FCS_CKM.1/CA,
FCS_CKM.4, FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC,
FDP_RIP.1, FMT_SMF.1,
FMT_SMR.1/PACE, FPT_PHP.3,
FIA_UAU.6/MP, FDP_ACC.1/UPD_FILE,
Section 9.3.1
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party without prior written approval.
FDP_ACF.1/UPD_FILE, FCS_RND.1,
FMT_MOF.1/GP, FCS_CKM.1/CAM,
FIA_AFL.1/PACE, FIA_API.1/TOE,
FMT_MTD.1/Initialize_PIN,
FMT_MTD.1/Resume_PIN,
FMT_MTD.1/Change_PIN,
FMT_MTD.1/Unblock_PIN
OT.Sens_Data_Conf FCS_CKM.1/CA, FCS_CKM.4,
FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC,
FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER,
FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC, FCS_RND.1,
FIA_UID.1/PACE, FIA_UAU.1/PACE,
FIA_UAU.4/PACE, FIA_UAU.5/PACE,
FIA_UAU.6/EAC, FIA_UAU.6/MP,
FDP_ACC.1/TRM, FDP_ACF.1/TRM,
FDP_UCT.1/TRM, FMT_MOF.1/GP,
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI,
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD,
FMT_MTD.1/DATE, FMT_MTD.1/CAPK,
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ, FMT_MTD.3,
FCS_CKM.1/CA_DATA_GEN
Section 9.3.1
OT.Identification FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA,
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS, FAU_SAS.1,
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1/PACE
Section 9.3.1
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof FCS_CKM.1/CA, FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC,
FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC, FIA_API.1/CA,
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1/PACE,
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ,
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK,
FCS_CKM.1/CA_DATA_GEN
Section 9.3.1
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2 Section 9.3.1
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak FPT_FLS.1, FPT_PHP.3, FPT_TST.1,
FPT_EMS.1
Section 9.3.1
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper FPT_PHP.3 Section 9.3.1
OT.Prot_Malfunction FPT_FLS.1, FPT_TST.1 Section 9.3.1
OT.Data_Authenticity FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE,
FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC,
FIA_UAU.1/PACE, FIA_UAU.5/PACE,
FIA_UAU.6/EAC, FIA_UID.1/PACE,
FIA_UAU.4/PACE, FIA_UAU.6/PACE,
FTP_ITC.1/PACE, FMT_MTD.1/PA,
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ, FCS_CKM.1/CA,
FCS_CKM.4, FDP_RIP.1, FMT_SMF.1,
FMT_SMR.1/PACE, FIA_UAU.6/MP,
FCS_RND.1, FCS_CKM.1/CAM,
Section 9.3.1
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party without prior written approval.
FIA_AFL.1/PACE, FIA_API.1/TOE,
FMT_MTD.1/Initialize_PIN,
FMT_MTD.1/Resume_PIN,
FMT_MTD.1/Change_PIN,
FMT_MTD.1/Unblock_PIN
OT.Data_Confidentiality FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE,
FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC,
FIA_UAU.1/PACE, FIA_UAU.5/PACE,
FIA_UAU.6/EAC, FIA_UID.1/PACE,
FIA_UAU.4/PACE, FIA_UAU.6/PACE,
FDP_ACF.1/TRM, FDP_ACC.1/TRM,
FDP_UCT.1/TRM, FDP_UIT.1/TRM,
FTP_ITC.1/PACE, FMT_MTD.1/PA,
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ, FCS_CKM.1/CA,
FCS_CKM.4, FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC,
FDP_RIP.1, FMT_SMF.1,
FMT_SMR.1/PACE, FIA_UAU.6/MP,
FCS_RND.1, FCS_CKM.1/CAM,
FIA_AFL.1/PACE, FIA_API.1/TOE,
FMT_MTD.1/Initialize_PIN,
FMT_MTD.1/Resume_PIN,
FMT_MTD.1/Change_PIN,
FMT_MTD.1/Unblock_PIN
Section 9.3.1
OT.Tracing FTP_ITC.1/PACE, FIA_AFL.1/PACE Section 9.3.1
OT.Sens_Ident_User_Data_Conf FIA_AFL.1/PACE, FIA_API.1/TOE,
FMT_MTD.1/Initialize_PIN,
FMT_MTD.1/Resume_PIN,
FMT_MTD.1/Change_PIN,
FMT_MTD.1/Unblock_PIN, FMT_SMF.1,
FDP_RIP.1, FDP_ACC.1/TRM,
FDP_ACF.1/TRM, FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER
Section 9.3.1
OT.AA_Proof FCS_COP.1/AA, FCS_RND.1,
FDP_ITC.1/AA, FDP_DAU.1/AA,
FMT_MOF.1/AA,
FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_READ,
FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_WRITE
Section 9.3.1
OT.Data_Int_AA FDP_DAU.1/AA, FDP_ITC.1/AA,
FMT_MOF.1/AA
Section 9.3.1
OT.Configuration FCS_CKM.1/GP, FCS_COP.1/GP_ENC,
FCS_COP.1/GP_MAC,
FCS_COP.1/GP_AUTH,
FCS_COP.1/GP_KEY_DEC,
FTP_ITC.1/MP, FIA_AFL.1/MP,
FIA_UAU.6/MP, FCS_CKM.4, FCS_RND.1,
FPT_EMS.1, FPT_FLS.1, FPT_PHP.3
Section 9.3.1
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party without prior written approval.
OT.Update_File FDP_ACC.1/UPD_FILE,
FDP_ACF.1/UPD_FILE,
FMT_MTD.1/UPD_FILE
Section 9.3.1
OT.AC_SM_Level FMT_MTD.1/SM_LVL_DG3_DG4,
FMT_MTD.1/SM_LVL
Section 9.3.1
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof_PACE_CAM FCS_COP.1/CAM, FIA_UAU.5/PACE,
FIA_API.1/CAM, FIA_UID.1/PACE,
FCS_CKM.1/CAM
Section 9.3.1
OT.ADMIN_Configuration FIA_UAU.5/PACE, FCS_COP.1/GP_AUTH,
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ, FMT_MOF.1/GP,
FPT_EMS.1, FMT_SMF.1,
FMT_SMR.1/PACE, FMT_MTD.1/ADMIN
Section 9.3.1
OT.Key_Usage_Counter FMT_MTD.1/Key_Usage_Counter Section 9.3.1
Table 20 Security Objectives and SFRs - Coverage
Security Functional Requirements Security Objectives
FAU_SAS.1 OT.AC_Pers, OT.Identification
FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE OT.Data_Integrity, OT.Data_Authenticity,
OT.Data_Confidentiality
FCS_CKM.1/CA OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Integrity,
OT.Sens_Data_Conf, OT.Chip_Auth_Proof,
OT.Data_Authenticity,
OT.Data_Confidentiality
FCS_CKM.4 OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Integrity,
OT.Sens_Data_Conf,
OT.Data_Authenticity,
OT.Data_Confidentiality, OT.Configuration
FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC OT.Data_Confidentiality
FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC OT.Data_Integrity, OT.Data_Authenticity
FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Integrity,
OT.Sens_Data_Conf, OT.Chip_Auth_Proof,
OT.Data_Confidentiality
FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER OT.AC_Pers, OT.Sens_Data_Conf,
OT.Sens_Ident_User_Data_Conf
FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Integrity,
OT.Sens_Data_Conf, OT.Chip_Auth_Proof
FCS_RND.1 OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Integrity,
OT.Sens_Data_Conf,
OT.Data_Authenticity,
OT.Data_Confidentiality, OT.AA_Proof,
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OT.Configuration
FCS_CKM.1/CAM OT.Data_Integrity, OT.Data_Authenticity,
OT.Data_Confidentiality,
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof_PACE_CAM
FCS_CKM.1/CA_DATA_GEN OT.AC_Pers, OT.Sens_Data_Conf,
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof
FCS_CKM.1/GP OT.Configuration
FCS_COP.1/CAM OT.Chip_Auth_Proof_PACE_CAM
FCS_COP.1/GP_ENC OT.Configuration
FCS_COP.1/GP_MAC OT.Configuration
FCS_COP.1/GP_AUTH OT.Configuration,
OT.ADMIN_Configuration
FCS_COP.1/GP_KEY_DEC OT.Configuration
FCS_COP.1/AA OT.AA_Proof
FDP_ACC.1/TRM OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Integrity,
OT.Sens_Data_Conf,
OT.Data_Confidentiality,
OT.Sens_Ident_User_Data_Conf
FDP_ACF.1/TRM OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Integrity,
OT.Sens_Data_Conf,
OT.Data_Confidentiality,
OT.Sens_Ident_User_Data_Conf
FDP_RIP.1 OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Integrity,
OT.Data_Authenticity,
OT.Data_Confidentiality,
OT.Sens_Ident_User_Data_Conf
FDP_UCT.1/TRM OT.Sens_Data_Conf,
OT.Data_Confidentiality
FDP_UIT.1/TRM OT.Data_Integrity,
OT.Data_Confidentiality
FDP_ACC.1/UPD_FILE OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Integrity,
OT.Update_File
FDP_ACF.1/UPD_FILE OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Integrity,
OT.Update_File
FDP_DAU.1/AA OT.AA_Proof, OT.Data_Int_AA
FDP_ITC.1/AA OT.AA_Proof, OT.Data_Int_AA
FIA_UID.1/PACE OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Integrity,
OT.Sens_Data_Conf,
OT.Data_Authenticity,
OT.Data_Confidentiality,
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OT.Chip_Auth_Proof_PACE_CAM
FIA_UAU.1/PACE OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Integrity,
OT.Sens_Data_Conf,
OT.Data_Authenticity,
OT.Data_Confidentiality
FIA_UAU.4/PACE OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Integrity,
OT.Sens_Data_Conf,
OT.Data_Authenticity,
OT.Data_Confidentiality
FIA_UAU.5/PACE OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Integrity,
OT.Sens_Data_Conf,
OT.Data_Authenticity,
OT.Data_Confidentiality,
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof_PACE_CAM,
OT.ADMIN_Configuration
FIA_UAU.6/EAC OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Integrity,
OT.Sens_Data_Conf,
OT.Data_Authenticity,
OT.Data_Confidentiality
FIA_UAU.6/PACE OT.Data_Integrity, OT.Data_Authenticity,
OT.Data_Confidentiality
FIA_AFL.1/PACE OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Integrity,
OT.Data_Authenticity,
OT.Data_Confidentiality, OT.Tracing,
OT.Sens_Ident_User_Data_Conf
FIA_API.1/TOE OT.Data_Integrity, OT.Data_Authenticity,
OT.Data_Confidentiality,
OT.Sens_Ident_User_Data_Conf
FIA_AFL.1/MP OT.AC_Pers, OT.Configuration
FIA_API.1/CA OT.Chip_Auth_Proof
FIA_API.1/CAM OT.Chip_Auth_Proof_PACE_CAM
FIA_UAU.6/MP OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Integrity,
OT.Sens_Data_Conf,
OT.Data_Authenticity,
OT.Data_Confidentiality, OT.Configuration
FMT_SMF.1 OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Integrity,
OT.Identification, OT.Chip_Auth_Proof,
OT.Data_Authenticity,
OT.Data_Confidentiality,
OT.Sens_Ident_User_Data_Conf,
OT.ADMIN_Configuration
FMT_SMR.1/PACE OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Integrity,
OT.Identification, OT.Chip_Auth_Proof,
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OT.Data_Authenticity,
OT.Data_Confidentiality,
OT.ADMIN_Configuration
FMT_LIM.1 OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
FMT_LIM.2 OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA OT.AC_Pers, OT.Identification
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS OT.AC_Pers, OT.Identification
FMT_MTD.1/PA OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Integrity,
OT.Data_Authenticity,
OT.Data_Confidentiality
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI OT.Sens_Data_Conf
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD OT.Sens_Data_Conf
FMT_MTD.1/DATE OT.Sens_Data_Conf
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK OT.Data_Integrity, OT.Sens_Data_Conf,
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Integrity,
OT.Sens_Data_Conf, OT.Chip_Auth_Proof,
OT.Data_Authenticity,
OT.Data_Confidentiality,
OT.ADMIN_Configuration
FMT_MTD.3 OT.Sens_Data_Conf
FMT_MTD.1/Initialize_PIN OT.Data_Integrity, OT.Data_Authenticity,
OT.Data_Confidentiality,
OT.Sens_Ident_User_Data_Conf
FMT_MTD.1/Resume_PIN OT.Data_Integrity, OT.Data_Authenticity,
OT.Data_Confidentiality,
OT.Sens_Ident_User_Data_Conf
FMT_MTD.1/Change_PIN OT.Data_Integrity, OT.Data_Authenticity,
OT.Data_Confidentiality,
OT.Sens_Ident_User_Data_Conf
FMT_MTD.1/Unblock_PIN OT.Data_Integrity, OT.Data_Authenticity,
OT.Data_Confidentiality,
OT.Sens_Ident_User_Data_Conf
FMT_MTD.1/PACE_PWD OT.AC_Pers
FMT_MTD.1/LCS_PERS OT.AC_Pers
FMT_MTD.1/UPD_FILE OT.Update_File
FMT_MTD.1/SM_LVL_DG3_DG4 OT.AC_SM_Level
FMT_MTD.1/SM_LVL OT.AC_SM_Level
FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_READ OT.AA_Proof
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FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_WRITE OT.AA_Proof
FMT_MTD.1/ADMIN OT.ADMIN_Configuration
FMT_MTD.1/Key_Usage_Counter OT.Key_Usage_Counter
FMT_MOF.1/GP OT.Data_Integrity, OT.Sens_Data_Conf,
OT.ADMIN_Configuration
FMT_MOF.1/AA OT.AA_Proof, OT.Data_Int_AA
FPT_EMS.1 OT.AC_Pers, OT.Prot_Inf_Leak,
OT.Configuration,
OT.ADMIN_Configuration
FPT_FLS.1 OT.Prot_Inf_Leak, OT.Prot_Malfunction,
OT.Configuration
FPT_PHP.3 OT.Data_Integrity, OT.Prot_Inf_Leak,
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper, OT.Configuration
FPT_TST.1 OT.Prot_Inf_Leak, OT.Prot_Malfunction
FTP_ITC.1/PACE OT.Data_Integrity, OT.Data_Authenticity,
OT.Data_Confidentiality, OT.Tracing
FTP_ITC.1/MP OT.Configuration
Table 21 SFRs and Security Objectives
9.3.3 Dependencies
9.3.3.1 SFRs Dependencies
Requirements CC
Dependencies
Satisfied Dependencies
FAU_SAS.1 No Dependencies
FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE (FCS_CKM.2 or
FCS_COP.1) and
(FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_CKM.4,
FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC,
FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC
FCS_CKM.1/CA (FCS_CKM.2 or
FCS_COP.1) and
(FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_CKM.4, FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC,
FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC
FCS_CKM.4 (FCS_CKM.1 or
FDP_ITC.1 or
FDP_ITC.2)
FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE,
FCS_CKM.1/CA,
FCS_CKM.1/CA_DATA_GEN,
FCS_CKM.1/GP
FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC (FCS_CKM.1 or
FDP_ITC.1 or
FDP_ITC.2) and
(FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE, FCS_CKM.4
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FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC (FCS_CKM.1 or
FDP_ITC.1 or
FDP_ITC.2) and
(FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE, FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC (FCS_CKM.1 or
FDP_ITC.1 or
FDP_ITC.2) and
(FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_CKM.1/CA, FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER (FCS_CKM.1 or
FDP_ITC.1 or
FDP_ITC.2) and
(FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_CKM.1/CA, FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC (FCS_CKM.1 or
FDP_ITC.1 or
FDP_ITC.2) and
(FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_CKM.1/CA, FCS_CKM.4
FCS_RND.1 No Dependencies
FCS_CKM.1/CAM (FCS_CKM.2 or
FCS_COP.1) and
(FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_CKM.4, FCS_COP.1/CAM
FCS_CKM.1/CA_DATA_GEN (FCS_CKM.2 or
FCS_COP.1) and
(FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_CKM.4, FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER
FCS_CKM.1/GP (FCS_CKM.2 or
FCS_COP.1) and
(FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_CKM.4, FCS_COP.1/GP_ENC,
FCS_COP.1/GP_MAC
FCS_COP.1/CAM (FCS_CKM.1 or
FDP_ITC.1 or
FDP_ITC.2) and
(FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_CKM.4, FCS_CKM.1/CAM
FCS_COP.1/GP_ENC (FCS_CKM.1 or
FDP_ITC.1 or
FDP_ITC.2) and
(FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_CKM.4, FCS_CKM.1/GP
FCS_COP.1/GP_MAC (FCS_CKM.1 or
FDP_ITC.1 or
FDP_ITC.2) and
(FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_CKM.4, FCS_CKM.1/GP
FCS_COP.1/GP_AUTH (FCS_CKM.1 or
FDP_ITC.1 or
FDP_ITC.2) and
(FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_CKM.4, FCS_CKM.1/GP
FCS_COP.1/GP_KEY_DEC (FCS_CKM.1 or FCS_CKM.4, FCS_CKM.1/GP
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FDP_ITC.1 or
FDP_ITC.2) and
(FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_COP.1/AA (FCS_CKM.1 or
FDP_ITC.1 or
FDP_ITC.2) and
(FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_CKM.4, FDP_ITC.1/AA
FDP_ACC.1/TRM (FDP_ACF.1) FDP_ACF.1/TRM
FDP_ACF.1/TRM (FDP_ACC.1) and
(FMT_MSA.3)
FDP_ACC.1/TRM
FDP_RIP.1 No Dependencies
FDP_UCT.1/TRM (FDP_ACC.1 or
FDP_IFC.1) and
(FTP_ITC.1 or
FTP_TRP.1)
FDP_ACC.1/TRM, FTP_ITC.1/PACE
FDP_UIT.1/TRM (FDP_ACC.1 or
FDP_IFC.1) and
(FTP_ITC.1 or
FTP_TRP.1)
FDP_ACC.1/TRM, FTP_ITC.1/PACE
FDP_ACC.1/UPD_FILE (FDP_ACF.1) FDP_ACF.1/UPD_FILE
FDP_ACF.1/UPD_FILE (FDP_ACC.1) and
(FMT_MSA.3)
FDP_ACC.1/UPD_FILE
FDP_DAU.1/AA No Dependencies
FDP_ITC.1/AA (FDP_ACC.1 or
FDP_IFC.1) and
(FMT_MSA.3)
FDP_ACC.1/TRM
FIA_UID.1/PACE No Dependencies
FIA_UAU.1/PACE (FIA_UID.1) FIA_UID.1/PACE
FIA_UAU.4/PACE No Dependencies
FIA_UAU.5/PACE No Dependencies
FIA_UAU.6/EAC No Dependencies
FIA_UAU.6/PACE No Dependencies
FIA_AFL.1/PACE (FIA_UAU.1) FIA_UAU.1/PACE
FIA_API.1/TOE No Dependencies
FIA_AFL.1/MP (FIA_UAU.1) FIA_UAU.1/PACE
FIA_API.1/CA No Dependencies
FIA_API.1/CAM No Dependencies
FIA_UAU.6/MP No Dependencies
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FMT_SMF.1 No Dependencies
FMT_SMR.1/PACE (FIA_UID.1) FIA_UID.1/PACE
FMT_LIM.1 No Dependencies
FMT_LIM.2 No Dependencies
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA (FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1/PACE
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS (FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1/PACE
FMT_MTD.1/PA (FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1/PACE
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI (FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1/PACE
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD (FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1/PACE
FMT_MTD.1/DATE (FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1/PACE
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK (FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1/PACE
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ (FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1/PACE
FMT_MTD.3 (FMT_MTD.1) FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI,
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD
FMT_MTD.1/Initialize_PIN (FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1/PACE
FMT_MTD.1/Resume_PIN (FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1/PACE
FMT_MTD.1/Change_PIN (FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1/PACE
FMT_MTD.1/Unblock_PIN (FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1/PACE
FMT_MTD.1/PACE_PWD (FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1/PACE
FMT_MTD.1/LCS_PERS (FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1/PACE
FMT_MTD.1/UPD_FILE (FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1/PACE
FMT_MTD.1/SM_LVL_DG3_DG4 (FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1/PACE
FMT_MTD.1/SM_LVL (FMT_SMF.1) and FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1/PACE
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(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_READ (FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1/PACE
FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_WRITE (FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1/PACE
FMT_MTD.1/ADMIN (FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1/PACE
FMT_MTD.1/Key_Usage_Counter (FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1/PACE
FMT_MOF.1/GP (FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1/PACE
FMT_MOF.1/AA (FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1/PACE
FPT_EMS.1 No Dependencies
FPT_FLS.1 No Dependencies
FPT_PHP.3 No Dependencies
FPT_TST.1 No Dependencies
FTP_ITC.1/PACE No Dependencies
FTP_ITC.1/MP No Dependencies
Table 22 SFRs Dependencies
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Rationale for the exclusion of Dependencies
The dependency FMT_MSA.3 of FDP_ACF.1/TRM is discarded. The access control
TSF according to FDP_ACF.1/TRM uses security attributes that have been defined during
personalisation, and that are fixed over the whole life time of the TOE. No management
of these security attributes (i.e. SFR FMT_MSA.1 and FMT_MSA.3) is necessary.
The dependency FMT_MSA.3 of FDP_ACF.1/UPD_FILE is discarded. The access
control TSF according to FDP_ACF.1/UPD_FILE uses security attributes which are defined
during the personalisation and are fixed over the whole life time of the TOE. No
management of these security attribute (i.e. SFR FMT_MSA.1 and FMT_MSA.3) is
necessary here.
The dependency FMT_MSA.3 of FDP_ITC.1/AA is discarded. The access control TSF
according to FDP_ACF.1/TRM uses security attributes which are defined during the
personalisation and are fixed over the whole life time of the TOE. No management of
these security attribute (i.e. SFR FMT_MSA.1 and FMT_MSA.3) is necessary here.
9.3.3.2 SARs Dependencies
Requirements CC Dependencies Satisfied Dependencies
ADV_ARC.1 (ADV_FSP.1) and (ADV_TDS.1) ADV_FSP.5, ADV_TDS.4
ADV_FSP.5 (ADV_IMP.1) and (ADV_TDS.1) ADV_IMP.1, ADV_TDS.4
ADV_IMP.1 (ADV_TDS.3) and (ALC_TAT.1) ADV_TDS.4, ALC_TAT.2
ADV_TDS.4 (ADV_FSP.5) ADV_FSP.5
ADV_INT.2 (ADV_IMP.1) and (ADV_TDS.3) and
(ALC_TAT.1)
ADV_IMP.1, ADV_TDS.4,
ALC_TAT.2
AGD_OPE.1 (ADV_FSP.1) ADV_FSP.5
AGD_PRE.1 No Dependencies
ALC_CMC.4 (ALC_CMS.1) and (ALC_DVS.1) and
(ALC_LCD.1)
ALC_CMS.5, ALC_DVS.2,
ALC_LCD.1
ALC_CMS.5 No Dependencies
ALC_DEL.1 No Dependencies
ALC_DVS.2 No Dependencies
ALC_LCD.1 No Dependencies
ALC_TAT.2 (ADV_IMP.1) ADV_IMP.1
ASE_CCL.1 (ASE_ECD.1) and (ASE_INT.1) and
(ASE_REQ.1)
ASE_ECD.1, ASE_INT.1,
ASE_REQ.2
ASE_ECD.1 No Dependencies
ASE_INT.1 No Dependencies
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ASE_OBJ.2 (ASE_SPD.1) ASE_SPD.1
ASE_REQ.2 (ASE_ECD.1) and (ASE_OBJ.2) ASE_ECD.1, ASE_OBJ.2
ASE_SPD.1 No Dependencies
ASE_TSS.1 (ADV_FSP.1) and (ASE_INT.1) and
(ASE_REQ.1)
ADV_FSP.5, ASE_INT.1,
ASE_REQ.2
ATE_COV.2 (ADV_FSP.2) and (ATE_FUN.1) ADV_FSP.5, ATE_FUN.1
ATE_DPT.3 (ADV_ARC.1) and (ADV_TDS.4) and
(ATE_FUN.1)
ADV_ARC.1, ADV_TDS.4,
ATE_FUN.1
ATE_FUN.1 (ATE_COV.1) ATE_COV.2
ATE_IND.2 (ADV_FSP.2) and (AGD_OPE.1) and
(AGD_PRE.1) and (ATE_COV.1) and
(ATE_FUN.1)
ADV_FSP.5, AGD_OPE.1,
AGD_PRE.1, ATE_COV.2,
ATE_FUN.1
AVA_VAN.5 (ADV_ARC.1) and (ADV_FSP.4) and
(ADV_IMP.1) and (ADV_TDS.3) and
(AGD_OPE.1) and (AGD_PRE.1) and
(ATE_DPT.1)
ADV_ARC.1, ADV_FSP.5,
ADV_IMP.1, ADV_TDS.4,
AGD_OPE.1, AGD_PRE.1,
ATE_DPT.3
Table 23 SARs Dependencies
9.3.4 Rationale for the Security Assurance Requirements
The EAL5 was chosen to permit a developer to gain maximum assurance from security
engineering based upon rigorous commercial development practices supported by moderate
application of specialist security engineering techniques.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a high
level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a rigorous
development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to specialist security
engineering techniques.
9.3.5 AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis
The selection of the component AVA_VAN.5 provides a higher assurance of the security by
vulnerability analysis to assess the resistance to penetration attacks performed by an
attacker possessing a high attack potential. This vulnerability analysis is necessary to fulfill
the security objectives OT.Chip_Auth_Proof.
The component AVA_VAN.5 has the following dependencies:
 ADV_ARC.1 “Security architecture description”
 ADV_FSP.4 “Security-enforcing functional specification”
 ADV_TDS.3 “Basic modular design”
 ADV_IMP.1 “Implementation representation of the TSF”
 AGD_OPE.1 “Operational user guidance”
 AGD_PRE.1 “Preparative procedures”
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 ATE_DPT.1 “Testing: basic design”
All of these are met or exceeded in the EAL5 assurance package
9.3.6 ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
The selection of the component ALC_DVS.2 provides a higher assurance of the security of
the MRTD’s development and manufacturing especially for the secure handling of the
MRTD’s material.
The component ALC_DVS.2 augmented to EAL5 has no dependencies to other security
requirements.
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10 TOE Summary Specification
10.1 TOE Summary Specification
The TOE provides the following Security Functions (TSF):
F.ACR - Access Control in Reading
This function controls access to read functions and enforces the security policy for data
retrieval. Prior to any data retrieval, it authenticates the actor trying to access the data,
and checks the access conditions are fulfilled as well as the life cycle state. It ensures that
at any time, the following keys are never readable:
o Manufacturer Keys,
o Pre-personalisation Agent keys,
o Personalisation Agent keys,
o CA private key,
o PACE passwords,
o Active Authentication Keys.
It controls access to the Initialization and Pre-Personalisation data by allowing read access
without authentication prior to delivery. After delivery, only the personalisation agent after
authentication has read access to it.
Regarding the file structure:
In the Operational Use phase:
o The terminal can read user data, the Document Security Object, (EF.COM,
EF.SOD, EF.DG1 to EF.DG16) only after PACE or EAC authentication and through a
valid secure channel.
In the Production and preparation stage:
The Manufacturer can read the Initialization Data in Stage 2 “Production”. The pre-
personalisation agent and the Personalisation Agent can read only the random identifier in
Stage 3 “Preparation” stored in the TOE. Other data-elements can only be read after they
are authenticated by the TOE (using their authentication keys).
It ensures as well that no other part of the memory can be accessed at anytime.
F.ACW - Access Control in Writing
This function controls access to write functions (in NVM) and enforces the security policy
for data writing. Prior to any data update, it authenticates the actor, and checks the
access conditions are fulfilled as well as the life cycle state.
Regarding the file structure:
In the Operational Use phase:
It is not possible to create any files (system or data files). Furthermore, it is not possible
to update any files (system or data files), except for the current date, the CVCA public key
and the CVCA certificate which can be updated if the access conditions is verified by the
subjects defined in FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD and FMT_MTD.1/DATE.
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In the Production and preparation stage:
The Manufacturer can write all the Initialization and data for the Pre-personalisation. The
Personalisation Agent can write through a valid secure channel all the data, PACE
passwords, Chip Authentication Private Key, Active Authentication Keys and Country
Verifying Certification Authority Public Key after it is authenticated by the TOE (using its
authentication keys).
The Pre-Personalisation Agent can write through a valid secure channel data to be used
by the personalisation agent (after it is authenticated by the TOE using its authentication
keys). The Pre-personalisation agent is only active after delivery. The key that is written
in the TOE for authentication purposes during manufacturing in meant for the pre-
personalisation agent. the Pre-personalisation agent (which is seen as a sub-role of thep
Personalisation agent) will refresh this key.
F.CLR_INFO - Clear Residual Information
This security function ensures clearing of sensitive information
o Authentication state is securely cleared in case an error is detected or a new
authentication is attempted
o Authentication data related to GP authentication, PACE authentication and EAC is
securely cleared to prevent reuse
o Session keys is securely erased in case an error is detected or the secure
communication session is closed
o ephem-SK picc -PACE is securely erased
o PIN and PUK
F.CRYPTO - Cryptographic Support
This Security Function provides the following cryptographic features:
o Key Generation based on ECDH with key sizes 192 to 521 bits.
o Key generation based on DH with key sizes 1024, 1536 and 2048.
o Key generation for Triple-DES in CBC mode for 112 bits.
o Key generation for AES in CBC mode with key sizes 128, 192 and 256 bits.
o Secure messaging (encryption and decryption) using:
 Triple DES in CBC mode (key size 112 bits).
 AES in CBC mode (key sizes 128,192,256 bits).
o Secure messaging (message authentication code) using:
 Retail MAC with key size 112 bits.
 AES CMAC with key sizes 128,192 and 256 bits.
o GP Secure Messaging (encryption and decryption) using:
 Triple-DES in CBC mode with key size 112 bits as defined in [FIPS_46_3].
 AES with key sizes 128, 192 and 256 bits as defined in [NIST_800_38A].
o Digital signature creation using:
 ECDSA with SHA-1, 224, 256, 384 and 512 with key sizes 192 to 512 bits over
prime field curves
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 RSA signature (CRT) with SHA-1, 224, 256, 384 and 512 with key sizes 1024,
1536, 2048, 3072 and 4096.
o Digital signature verification using:
 ECDSA with SHA-1, SHA-224 and SHA-256 with key sizes 192 to 512 bits.
 RSA PKCS#1v1.5 with SHA-1, SHA-256 and SHA-512 with key sizes 1024, 1536,
2048, 3072 and 4096.
 RSA PKCS#1-PSS with SHA-1, SHA-256 and SHA-512 with key sizes 1024,
1536, 2048, 3072 and 4096.
o GP Secure Messaging (message authentication code) using:
 Retail MAC with key size 112 bits as defined in [ISO_9797_1].
 AES CMAC with key sizes 128, 192 and 256 bits as defined in [NIST_800_38B].
o Random number generation that meets the requirement the average Shannon
entropy per internal random bit exceeds 0.994.
o Symmetric Authentication - encryption and decryption using:
 Full 3DES MAC with key size 112 bits as defined in [ISO_9797_1].
 AES CMAC with key sizes 128, 192 and 256 bits as defined in [NIST_800_38B].
o Key decryption using:
 Triple-DES in ECB mode with key size 112 bits as defined in [FIPS_46_3].
 AES in CBC mode with key sizes 128, 192 and 256 bits as defined in
[FIPS_197].
o Chip Authentication Data Generation using DH, with key sizes 1024 to 2048 bits in
steps of 512 bits.
o Chip Authentication Data Generation using ECDH, with key sizes 192 to 512 bits.
o PACE-CAM as defined in [ICAO_9303] with key sizes 192 to 521 bits.
F.EAC - Extended Access Control
This TSF provides the Extended Access Control, authentication and session keys
generation to be used by F.SM, as described in [TR-03110-3]. It also provides the
following management functions:
o Maintain the roles: Document Verifier, CVCA, Domestic EIS, Foreign EIS
o Limit the ability to update the CVCA Public key and CVCA Certificate to the Country
Verifying Certification Authority
o Limit the ability to update the date to CVCA, Document Verifier and Domestic
Extended Inspection System.
F.PACE - Authentication using PACE
This TSF provides the Password Authenticated Connection Establishment Authentication
(all mappings) and session keys generation to be used by F.SM, as described in
[ICAO_9303].
In case the number of consecutive failed authentication attempts crosses the
administrator defined number defined in FIA_AFL.1/PACE the TSF will slow down further
authentication attempts.
Only the eDigitalIdentity document holder after successful authentication can
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o resume the suspended PIN or PUK,
o change the PIN,
o unblock the blocked PIN using the PUK.
F.PERS - MRTD Personalisation
This security functionality ensures that the TOE, when delivered to the Personalisation
Agent, provides and requires authentication for data exchange. This authentication is
based on a Triple DES and AES authentication mechanism. This security function is also
responsible for management operations during personalisation phase. This function allows
to:
o Manage symmetric authentication using Personalisation Agent keys,
o Configuration of the TOE
o Compute session keys to be used by F.SM,
o Load user data,
o Configure SM level for biometrical data access,
o Load Chip Authentication keys in encrypted form,
o Chip Authnetication Key Generation,
o Write Active Authentication Keys,
o Enable and disable TSF Active Authentication,
o Load of key data PACE in encrypted form,
o Configure BAC deactivation mechanism,
o Set TOE life cycle to Operational Use phase,
o Write the PIN and PUK,
o set the files that are allowed to be modified in phase 7,
o Write the Document Security Object (SO d),
o Write the initial CVCA Public Key, CVCA Certificate and Current Date.
In case the number of consecutive failed authentication attempts crosses 1 the TSF will
slow down further authentication attempts.
F.PHY - Physical Protection
This Security Function protects the TOE against physical attacks, so that the integrity and
confidentiality of the TOE is ensured, including keys, user data, configuration data and
TOE life cycle. It detects physical tampering, responds automatically, and also controls the
emanations sent out by the TOE.
This Security Function also limits any physical emanations from the TOE so as to prevent
any information leakge via these emanations that might reveal or provide access to
sensitive data.
Furthermore, it prevents deploying test features after TOE delivery.
F.PREP - MRTD Pre-personalisation
This security functionality ensures that the TOE, when delivered to the Manufacturer,
provides and requires an authentication mechanism for data exchange. This
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authentication is based on Triple DES and AES symmetric authentication mechanism. This
function allows to:
o Manage symmetric authentication using Pre-personalisation Agent keys,
o Compute session keys to be used by F.SM,
o Initialization of the TOE,
o Load Personalisation Agent keys in encrypted form,
o Store the Initialization and Pre-Personalisation data in audit records.
In case the number of consecutive failed authentication attempts crosses 1 the TSF will
slow down further authentication attempts.
F.SM - Secure Messaging
This security functionality ensures the confidentiality, authenticity and integrity of the
communication between the TOE and the interface device. In the operational phase, after
a successful Authentication Procedure (i.e. PACE or CA), a secure channel is established.
This security functionality also provides a Secure Messaging (SCP02 and SCP03) for the
transmission of user data in Pre-personalisation and Personalisation phases. The protocols
can be configured to protect the exchanges integrity and/or confidentiality. If an error
occurs in the secure messaging layer or if the session is closed, the session keys are
destroyed. This ensures protection against replay attacks as session keys are never
reused. The level of security of the allowed secure messaging can now be restricted
during perso for the USE phase according to the following increasing level:
o 3DES Secure messaging and above accepted
o AES 128 Secure messaging and above accepted
o AES 192 Secure messaging and above accepted
o AES 256 Secure messaging and above accepted
F.SS - Safe State Management
This security functionality ensures that the TOE gets back to a secure state when:
o a tearing occurs (during a copy of data in NVM).
o an error due to self test as defined in FPT_TST.1.
o any physical tampering is detected.
This security functionality ensures that if such a case occurs, the TOE either is switched in
the state "kill card" or becomes mute.
F.STST - Self Test
This security function implements self test features through platform functionalities at
reset as defined in FPT_TST.1 to ensure the integrity of the TSF and TSF data.
F.AA - Active Authentication
This security functionality ensures the Active Authentication is performed as described in
[ICAO_9303] (if it is activated by the personaliser).
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F.ADMIN - MRTD Administration
10.2 This security functionality ensures that the TOE, when
delivered to the Administration Agent, provides and requires
authentication for data exchange. SFRs and TSS
10.2.1 SFRs and TSS - Rationale
Class FAU Security Audit
FAU_SAS.1 is met by F.PREP - MRTD Pre-personalisation.
Class FCS Cryptographic Support
FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE is met by F.PACE - Authentication using PACE that generates keys
after a successful authentication using F.CRYPTO - Cryptographic Support.
FCS_CKM.1/CA is met by F.EAC - Extended Access Control and F.PACE - Authentication
using PACE that generates keys after a successful authentication using F.CRYPTO -
Cryptographic Support.
FCS_CKM.4 is met by F.CLR_INFO - Clear Residual Information and F.SM - Secure
Messaging that destroys the session keys upon closure of a secure messaging session.
FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC is met by F.SM - Secure Messaging that uses F.CRYPTO -
Cryptographic Support to maintain a secure messaging session as defined in the
requirement.
FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC is met by F.SM - Secure Messaging that uses F.CRYPTO -
Cryptographic Support to maintain a secure messaging session as defined in the
requirement.
FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC is met by F.SM - Secure Messaging that uses F.CRYPTO -
Cryptographic Support to maintain a secure messaging session as defined in the
requirement.
FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER is met by F.EAC - Extended Access Control that uses F.CRYPTO -
Cryptographic Support to provide digital signature verification.
FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC is met by F.SM - Secure Messaging that uses F.CRYPTO -
Cryptographic Support to maintain a secure messaging session as defined in the
requirement.
FCS_RND.1 is met by F.CRYPTO - Cryptographic Support.
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Additional FCS SFR's Identified
FCS_CKM.1/CAM is met by F.PACE - Authentication using PACE that generates keys after a
successful authentication using F.CRYPTO - Cryptographic Support.
FCS_CKM.1/CA_DATA_GEN is met by F.PERS - MRTD Personalisation that generates keys
after a successful authentication using F.CRYPTO - Cryptographic Support.
FCS_CKM.1/GP is met by F.PERS - MRTD Personalisation and F.PREP - MRTD Pre-
personalisation that generates keys after a successful authentication using F.CRYPTO -
Cryptographic Support.
FCS_COP.1/CAM is met by F.PACE - Authentication using PACE that uses F.CRYPTO -
Cryptographic Support to provide PACE-CAM functionality.
FCS_COP.1/GP_ENC is met by F.SM - Secure Messaging that uses F.CRYPTO -
Cryptographic Support maintain a secure messaging session as defined in the
requirement.
FCS_COP.1/GP_MAC is met by F.SM - Secure Messaging that uses F.CRYPTO -
Cryptographic Support maintain a secure messaging session as defined in the
requirement.
FCS_COP.1/GP_AUTH is met by F.PREP - MRTD Pre-personalisation and F.PERS - MRTD
Personalisation that use F.CRYPTO - Cryptographic Supportto perform Symmetric
Authentication.
FCS_COP.1/GP_KEY_DEC is met by F.PREP - MRTD Pre-personalisation and F.PERS -
MRTD Personalisation that use F.CRYPTO - Cryptographic Support to perform key
decryption.
FCS_COP.1/AA is covered by F.AA - Active Authentication in association with F.CRYPTO -
Cryptographic Support.
Class FDP User Data Protection
FDP_ACC.1/TRM is met by F.ACW - Access Control in Writing and F.ACR - Access Control
in Reading that control read and write access to the data based on the current
authentication state using authentication mechanism provided by F.PACE - Authentication
using PACE.
FDP_ACF.1/TRM is met by F.ACW - Access Control in Writing and F.ACR - Access Control
in Reading that control read and write access to the data based on the current
authentication state using authentication mechanism provided by F.PACE - Authentication
using PACE.
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FDP_RIP.1 is met by F.CLR_INFO - Clear Residual Information that ensures keys are
erased securely.
FDP_UCT.1/TRM is met by F.SM - Secure Messaging that ensures all user data is
transmitted and received via a secure communication channel.
FDP_UIT.1/TRM is met by F.SM - Secure Messaging that ensures all user data is
transmitted and received via a secure communication channel.
Additional FDP SFR's Identified
FDP_ACC.1/UPD_FILE is met by F.ACW - Access Control in Writing and F.ACR - Access
Control in Reading that control read and write access to the data based on the current
authentication state using authentication mechanisms provided by F.EAC - Extended
Access Control and F.PACE - Authentication using PACE using PACE and F.PERS - MRTD
Personalisation.
FDP_ACF.1/UPD_FILE is met by F.ACW - Access Control in Writing and F.ACR - Access
Control in Reading that control read and write access to the data based on the current
authentication state using authentication mechanisms provided by F.PACE -
Authentication and F.EAC - Extended Access Control using PACE and F.PERS - MRTD
Personalisation.
FDP_DAU.1/AA is met by F.AA - Active Authentication.
FDP_ITC.1/AA is met by F.ACW - Access Control in Writing that verifies the write access
based on authentication provided by F.AA - Active Authentication.
Class FIA Identification and Authentication
FIA_UID.1/PACE is met by F.ACR - Access Control in Reading that manages access to data
based on the current authentication state. It is also met by F.PACE - Authentication using
PACE and F.EAC - Extended Access Control that provide PACE and Chip Authentication. It
is met by F.PERS - MRTD Personalisation and F.PREP - MRTD Pre-personalisation for
manufacturer and peronalization agent authentication. It is also met by F.SM - Secure
Messaging that provides a secure messaging channel.
FIA_UAU.1/PACE is met by F.ACR - Access Control in Reading that manages access to
data based on the current authentication state. It is also met by F.PACE - Authentication
using PACE and F.EAC - Extended Access Control that provide PACE and Extended Access
Control. It is met by F.PERS - MRTD Personalisation and F.PREP - MRTD Pre-
personalisation for manufacturer and peronalization agent authentication. It is also met by
F.SM - Secure Messaging that provides a secure messaging channel.
FIA_UAU.4/PACE is met by F.CLR_INFO - Clear Residual Information that ensures all
authentication data is securely erased to prevent reuse.
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FIA_UAU.5/PACE is met by F.PACE - Authentication using PACE that provides PACE
Authentication. It is also met by F.EAC - Extended Access Control that provides Chip
Authentication and Terminal Authentication as part of Extended Access Control. It is also
met by F.PERS - MRTD Personalisation and F.PREP - MRTD Pre-personalisation that
provides symmetric authentication.
FIA_UAU.6/EAC is met by F.SM - Secure Messaging that ensures all messages are sent
through secure messaging after chip and terminal authentication.
FIA_UAU.6/PACE is met by F.SM - Secure Messaging that ensures all messages are sent
through secure messaging after PACE authentication.
FIA_AFL.1/PACE is met by F.PACE - Authentication using PACEthat handles the
consecutive failed authentication attempts related to PACE.
Additional FIA SFRs identified as per ADDENDUM
FIA_API.1/TOE is met by F.PACE - Authentication using PACE that provides a means to
identify the document holder via PACE Authentication.
Additional FIA SFR's Identified
FIA_AFL.1/MP is met by F.PERS - MRTD Personalisation and F.PREP - MRTD Pre-
personalisation that ensures that after 3 unsuccessful symmetric authentication attempts
the TOE increases the time taken to respond to a terminal challenge.
FIA_API.1/CA is met by F.EAC - Extended Access Control that provides Chip
Authentication.
FIA_API.1/CAM is met by F.PACE - Authentication using PACE that provides PACE-CAM
functionality to prove authenticity of the chip.
FIA_UAU.6/MP is met by F.SM - Secure Messaging that ensures all messages are sent
through secure messaging after symmetric authentication.
Class FMT Security Management
FMT_SMF.1 is met by F.EAC - Extended Access Control and F.PACE - Authentication using
PACE, F.PERS - MRTD Personalisation and F.PREP - MRTD Pre-personalisation that
provide the required management functions and F.SM - Secure Messaging that ensures
protection of incoming and outgoing user data via secure communication.
FMT_SMR.1/PACE is met by F.PACE - Authentication using PACE, F.EAC - Extended Access
Control, F.PERS - MRTD Personalisation and F.PREP - MRTD Pre-personalisation. These
roles are maintained by means of the authentication states during the authentication
mechanisms provided by the 3 security functions.
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FMT_LIM.1 is met by F.PHY - Physical Protection and F.SS - Safe State Management that
ensure that no data can be manipulated or revealed and the TSF assumes a safe state in
case any illegal attempts to do so are detected.
FMT_LIM.2 is met by F.PHY - Physical Protection and F.SS - Safe State Management that
ensure that no data can be manipulated or revealed and the TSF assumes a safe state in
case any illegal attempts to do so are detected.
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA is met by F.ACW - Access Control in Writing that ensures access
conditions are met by way of authentication through F.PREP - MRTD Pre-personalisation.
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS is met by F.ACR - Access Control in Reading that ensures access
conditions are met by way of authentication through F.PREP - MRTD Pre-personalisation.
FMT_MTD.1/PA is met by F.PERS - MRTD Personalisation.
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI is met by F.ACW - Access Control in Writing that controls write
access based on authentication provided by F.PERS - MRTD Personalisation.
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD is met by F.ACW - Access Control in Writing that controls write
access based on authentication provided by F.EAC - Extended Access Control.
FMT_MTD.1/DATE is met by F.ACW - Access Control in Writing that controls write access
based on authentication provided by F.EAC - Extended Access Control.
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK is met by F.ACW - Access Control in Writing that ensures access
conditions are met by way of authentication through F.PERS - MRTD Personalisation.
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ is met by F.ACR - Access Control in Reading that ensures the
secret keys are never readable.
FMT_MTD.3 is met by F.EAC - Extended Access Control that implements terminal
authentication.
Additional FMT SFRs identified as per ADDENDUM
FMT_MTD.1/Initialize_PIN is met by F.PERS - MRTD Personalisation.
FMT_MTD.1/Resume_PIN is met by F.PACE - Authentication using PACE.
FMT_MTD.1/Change_PIN is met by F.PACE - Authentication using PACE.
FMT_MTD.1/Unblock_PIN is met by F.PACE - Authentication using PACE.
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Additional FMT SFR's Identified
FMT_MTD.1/PACE_PWD is met by F.PERS - MRTD Personalisation.
FMT_MTD.1/LCS_PERS is met by F.PERS - MRTD Personalisation that allows the
personalisation agent after successful authentication to switch the lifecycle state from
phase 6 to phase 7.
FMT_MTD.1/UPD_FILE is met by F.PERS - MRTD Personalisation that controls access
conditions in F.ACW - Access Control in Writing to allow only the name set by the
personalisation agent to be able to edit files in operational phase.
FMT_MTD.1/SM_LVL_DG3_DG4 is met by F.PERS - MRTD Personalisation that allows the
personalisation agent to provide configure the secure messaging level required to access
DG.3 and DG.4
FMT_MTD.1/SM_LVL is met by F.PERS - MRTD Personalisation in which the level of
security of the allowed secure messaging can now be restricted during perso for the USE
phase.
FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_READ is met by F.ACR - Access Control in Reading that ensures the
secret keys are never readable
FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_WRITE is met by F.ACW - Access Control in Writing that controls
write access for Active Authentication based on authentication provided by F.PERS -
MRTD Personalisation.
FMT_MTD.1/ADMIN is met by F.ADMIN - MRTD Administration, that ensures that the
TOE, when delivered to the Administration Agent, provides and requires authentication for
data exchange. This function allows during Use phase to:
o Manage symmetric authentication using Administration Agent keys,
o Modify the Chip Authentication key parameters to be used during key generation
in USE phase,
o Change the key parameters during the key generation process,
o Invalidate one of the Chip Authentication key in USE phase and to set the
secondary key as being the primary key.
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FMT_MTD.1/Key_Usage_Counter is met by F.PERS - MRTD Personalisation
FMT_MOF.1/GP is met by F.SM - Secure Messaging that provides secure messaging after
authentication through F.PERS - MRTD Personalisation and F.PREP - MRTD Pre-
personalisation.
FMT_MOF.1/AA is met by F.PERS - MRTD Personalisation.
Class FPT Protection of the Security Functions
FPT_EMS.1 is met by F.PHY - Physical Protection that prevents emanations beyond
permissible limits to prevent any accidental revelation of data.
FPT_FLS.1 is met by F.SS - Safe State Management that ensures a safe state is maintained.
FPT_PHP.3 is met by F.PHY - Physical Protection that protects the TOE against any phycial
probing or tampering by using F.SS - Safe State Management in case any physical
manipulation is detected.
FPT_TST.1 is met by F.STST - Self Test that performs self tests to ensure integrity of the
TSF
Class FTP Trusted Path/Channels
FTP_ITC.1/PACE is met by F.SM - Secure Messaging that establishes a secure channel for
communication as defined in F.EAC - Extended Access Control and F.PACE -
Authentication using PACE.
Additional FTP SFR's Identified
FTP_ITC.1/MP is met by F.SM - Secure Messaging that establishes a secure channel for
communication for loading of keys as defined in F.PERS - MRTD Personalisation and
F.PREP - MRTD Pre-personalisation.
10.2.2 Association tables of SFRs and TSS
Security Functional
Requirements
TOE Summary Specification
FAU_SAS.1 F.PREP - MRTD Pre-personalisation
FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE F.PACE - Authentication using PACE, F.CRYPTO -
Cryptographic Support
FCS_CKM.1/CA F.EAC - Extended Access Control, F.CRYPTO -
Cryptographic Support, F.PACE - Authentication using
PACE
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FCS_CKM.4 F.SM - Secure Messaging, F.CLR_INFO - Clear Residual
Information
FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC F.SM - Secure Messaging, F.CRYPTO - Cryptographic
Support
FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC F.SM - Secure Messaging, F.CRYPTO - Cryptographic
Support
FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC F.SM - Secure Messaging, F.CRYPTO - Cryptographic
Support
FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER F.EAC - Extended Access Control, F.CRYPTO -
Cryptographic Support
FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC F.SM - Secure Messaging, F.CRYPTO - Cryptographic
Support
FCS_RND.1 F.CRYPTO - Cryptographic Support
FCS_CKM.1/CAM F.CRYPTO - Cryptographic Support, F.PACE -
Authentication using PACE
FCS_CKM.1/CA_DATA_GEN F.PERS - MRTD Personalisation, F.CRYPTO -
Cryptographic Support
FCS_CKM.1/GP F.PERS - MRTD Personalisation, F.PREP - MRTD Pre-
personalisation, F.CRYPTO - Cryptographic Support
FCS_COP.1/CAM F.CRYPTO - Cryptographic Support, F.PACE -
Authentication using PACE
FCS_COP.1/GP_ENC F.SM - Secure Messaging, F.CRYPTO - Cryptographic
Support
FCS_COP.1/GP_MAC F.SM - Secure Messaging, F.CRYPTO - Cryptographic
Support
FCS_COP.1/GP_AUTH F.PERS - MRTD Personalisation, F.PREP - MRTD Pre-
personalisation, F.CRYPTO - Cryptographic Support
FCS_COP.1/GP_KEY_DEC F.PERS - MRTD Personalisation, F.CRYPTO -
Cryptographic Support, F.PREP - MRTD Pre-
personalisation
FCS_COP.1/AA F.CRYPTO - Cryptographic Support, F.AA - Active
Authentication
FDP_ACC.1/TRM F.ACR - Access Control in Reading, F.ACW - Access
Control in Writing, F.PACE - Authentication using PACE
FDP_ACF.1/TRM F.ACR - Access Control in Reading, F.ACW - Access
Control in Writing, F.PACE - Authentication using PACE
FDP_RIP.1 F.CLR_INFO - Clear Residual Information
FDP_UCT.1/TRM F.SM - Secure Messaging
FDP_UIT.1/TRM F.SM - Secure Messaging
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This document and the information it contains is the property of IDEMIA. It may not be used, reproduced or transmitted to a third
party without prior written approval.
FDP_ACC.1/UPD_FILE F.ACR - Access Control in Reading, F.ACW - Access
Control in Writing, F.PERS - MRTD Personalisation,
F.EAC - Extended Access Control, F.PACE -
Authentication using PACE
FDP_ACF.1/UPD_FILE F.ACR - Access Control in Reading, F.ACW - Access
Control in Writing, F.PERS - MRTD Personalisation,
F.EAC - Extended Access Control, F.PACE -
Authentication using PACE
FDP_DAU.1/AA F.AA - Active Authentication
FDP_ITC.1/AA F.ACW - Access Control in Writing, F.AA - Active
Authentication
FIA_UID.1/PACE F.EAC - Extended Access Control, F.PACE -
Authentication using PACE, F.SM - Secure Messaging,
F.PERS - MRTD Personalisation, F.PREP - MRTD Pre-
personalisation, F.ACR - Access Control in Reading
FIA_UAU.1/PACE F.ACR - Access Control in Reading, F.SM - Secure
Messaging, F.EAC - Extended Access Control, F.PACE -
Authentication using PACE, F.PERS - MRTD
Personalisation, F.PREP - MRTD Pre-personalisation
FIA_UAU.4/PACE F.CLR_INFO - Clear Residual Information
FIA_UAU.5/PACE F.EAC - Extended Access Control, F.PACE -
Authentication using PACE, F.PERS - MRTD
Personalisation, F.PREP - MRTD Pre-personalisation
FIA_UAU.6/EAC F.SM - Secure Messaging
FIA_UAU.6/PACE F.SM - Secure Messaging
FIA_AFL.1/PACE F.PACE - Authentication using PACE
FIA_API.1/TOE F.PACE - Authentication using PACE
FIA_AFL.1/MP F.PERS - MRTD Personalisation, F.PREP - MRTD Pre-
personalisation
FIA_API.1/CA F.EAC - Extended Access Control
FIA_API.1/CAM F.PACE - Authentication using PACE
FIA_UAU.6/MP F.SM - Secure Messaging
FMT_SMF.1 F.PERS - MRTD Personalisation, F.PREP - MRTD Pre-
personalisation, F.EAC - Extended Access Control, F.SM
- Secure Messaging, F.PACE - Authentication using
PACE
FMT_SMR.1/PACE F.PACE - Authentication using PACE, F.PERS - MRTD
Personalisation, F.PREP - MRTD Pre-personalisation,
F.EAC - Extended Access Control
FMT_LIM.1 F.PHY - Physical Protection, F.SS - Safe State
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party without prior written approval.
Management
FMT_LIM.2 F.PHY - Physical Protection, F.SS - Safe State
Management
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA F.ACW - Access Control in Writing, F.PREP - MRTD Pre-
personalisation
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS F.ACR - Access Control in Reading, F.PREP - MRTD Pre-
personalisation
FMT_MTD.1/PA F.PERS - MRTD Personalisation
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI F.ACW - Access Control in Writing, F.PERS - MRTD
Personalisation
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD F.EAC - Extended Access Control, F.ACW - Access
Control in Writing
FMT_MTD.1/DATE F.EAC - Extended Access Control, F.ACW - Access
Control in Writing
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK F.PERS - MRTD Personalisation, F.ACW - Access
Control in Writing
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ F.ACR - Access Control in Reading
FMT_MTD.3 F.EAC - Extended Access Control
FMT_MTD.1/Initialize_PIN F.PERS - MRTD Personalisation
FMT_MTD.1/Resume_PIN F.PACE - Authentication using PACE
FMT_MTD.1/Change_PIN F.PACE - Authentication using PACE
FMT_MTD.1/Unblock_PIN F.PACE - Authentication using PACE
FMT_MTD.1/PACE_PWD F.PERS - MRTD Personalisation
FMT_MTD.1/LCS_PERS F.PERS - MRTD Personalisation
FMT_MTD.1/UPD_FILE F.ACW - Access Control in Writing, F.PERS - MRTD
Personalisation
FMT_MTD.1/SM_LVL_DG3_DG4 F.PERS - MRTD Personalisation
FMT_MTD.1/SM_LVL F.PERS - MRTD Personalisation
FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_READ F.ACR - Access Control in Reading
FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_WRITE F.ACW - Access Control in Writing, F.PERS - MRTD
Personalisation
FMT_MTD.1/ADMIN F.ADMIN - MRTD Administration
FMT_MTD.1/Key_Usage_Counter F.PERS - MRTD Personalisation
FMT_MOF.1/GP F.SM - Secure Messaging, F.PERS - MRTD
Personalisation, F.PREP - MRTD Pre-personalisation
FMT_MOF.1/AA F.PERS - MRTD Personalisation
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This document and the information it contains is the property of IDEMIA. It may not be used, reproduced or transmitted to a third
party without prior written approval.
FPT_EMS.1 F.PHY - Physical Protection
FPT_FLS.1 F.SS - Safe State Management
FPT_PHP.3 F.PHY - Physical Protection, F.SS - Safe State
Management
FPT_TST.1 F.STST - Self Test
FTP_ITC.1/PACE F.SM - Secure Messaging, F.PACE - Authentication
using PACE, F.EAC - Extended Access Control
FTP_ITC.1/MP F.PERS - MRTD Personalisation, F.PREP - MRTD Pre-
personalisation, F.SM - Secure Messaging
Table 24 SFRs and TSS - Coverage
TOE Summary
Specification
Security Functional Requirements
F.ACR - Access
Control in Reading
FDP_ACC.1/TRM, FDP_ACF.1/TRM, FDP_ACC.1/UPD_FILE,
FDP_ACF.1/UPD_FILE, FIA_UID.1/PACE, FIA_UAU.1/PACE,
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS, FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ,
FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_READ
F.ACW - Access
Control in Writing
FDP_ACC.1/TRM, FDP_ACF.1/TRM, FDP_ACC.1/UPD_FILE,
FDP_ACF.1/UPD_FILE, FDP_ITC.1/AA, FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA,
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI, FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD, FMT_MTD.1/DATE,
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK, FMT_MTD.1/UPD_FILE,
FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_WRITE
F.CLR_INFO -
Clear Residual
Information
FCS_CKM.4, FDP_RIP.1, FIA_UAU.4/PACE
F.CRYPTO -
Cryptographic
Support
FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE, FCS_CKM.1/CA, FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC,
FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC, FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC, FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER,
FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC, FCS_RND.1, FCS_CKM.1/CAM,
FCS_CKM.1/CA_DATA_GEN, FCS_CKM.1/GP, FCS_COP.1/CAM,
FCS_COP.1/GP_ENC, FCS_COP.1/GP_MAC, FCS_COP.1/GP_AUTH,
FCS_COP.1/GP_KEY_DEC, FCS_COP.1/AA
F.EAC - Extended
Access Control
FCS_CKM.1/CA, FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER, FDP_ACC.1/UPD_FILE,
FDP_ACF.1/UPD_FILE, FIA_UID.1/PACE, FIA_UAU.1/PACE,
FIA_UAU.5/PACE, FIA_API.1/CA, FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1/PACE,
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD, FMT_MTD.1/DATE, FMT_MTD.3,
FTP_ITC.1/PACE
F.PACE -
Authentication
using PACE
FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE, FCS_CKM.1/CA, FCS_CKM.1/CAM,
FCS_COP.1/CAM, FDP_ACC.1/TRM, FDP_ACF.1/TRM,
FDP_ACC.1/UPD_FILE, FDP_ACF.1/UPD_FILE, FIA_UID.1/PACE,
FIA_UAU.1/PACE, FIA_UAU.5/PACE, FIA_AFL.1/PACE, FIA_API.1/TOE,
FIA_API.1/CAM, FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1/PACE,
FMT_MTD.1/Resume_PIN, FMT_MTD.1/Change_PIN,
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party without prior written approval.
FMT_MTD.1/Unblock_PIN, FTP_ITC.1/PACE
F.PERS - MRTD
Personalisation
FCS_CKM.1/CA_DATA_GEN, FCS_CKM.1/GP, FCS_COP.1/GP_AUTH,
FCS_COP.1/GP_KEY_DEC, FDP_ACC.1/UPD_FILE,
FDP_ACF.1/UPD_FILE, FIA_UID.1/PACE, FIA_UAU.1/PACE,
FIA_UAU.5/PACE, FIA_AFL.1/MP, FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1/PACE,
FMT_MTD.1/PA, FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI, FMT_MTD.1/CAPK,
FMT_MTD.1/Initialize_PIN, FMT_MOF.1/GP, FMT_MTD.1/PACE_PWD,
FMT_MTD.1/LCS_PERS, FMT_MTD.1/UPD_FILE,
FMT_MTD.1/SM_LVL_DG3_DG4, FMT_MTD.1/SM_LVL,
FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_WRITE, FMT_MTD.1/Key_Usage_Counter,
FMT_MOF.1/AA, FTP_ITC.1/MP
F.PHY - Physical
Protection
FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2, FPT_EMS.1, FPT_PHP.3
F.PREP - MRTD
Pre-personalisation
FAU_SAS.1, FCS_CKM.1/GP, FCS_COP.1/GP_AUTH,
FCS_COP.1/GP_KEY_DEC, FIA_UID.1/PACE, FIA_UAU.1/PACE,
FIA_UAU.5/PACE, FIA_AFL.1/MP, FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1/PACE,
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA, FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS, FMT_MOF.1/GP,
FTP_ITC.1/MP
F.SM - Secure
Messaging
FCS_CKM.4, FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC, FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC,
FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC, FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC, FCS_COP.1/GP_ENC,
FCS_COP.1/GP_MAC, FDP_UCT.1/TRM, FDP_UIT.1/TRM,
FIA_UID.1/PACE, FIA_UAU.1/PACE, FIA_UAU.6/EAC, FIA_UAU.6/PACE,
FIA_UAU.6/MP, FMT_SMF.1, FMT_MOF.1/GP, FTP_ITC.1/PACE,
FTP_ITC.1/MP
F.SS - Safe State
Management
FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2, FPT_FLS.1, FPT_PHP.3
F.STST - Self Test FPT_TST.1
F.AA - Active
Authentication
FCS_COP.1/AA, FDP_DAU.1/AA, FDP_ITC.1/AA
F.ADMIN - MRTD
Administration
FMT_MTD.1/ADMIN
Table 25 TSS and SFRs - Coverage