BSI-DSZ-CC-0459-2008
for
IBM z/OS
Version 1, Release 9
from
IBM Corporation
Certification Report V1.0 ZS-01-01-F-326 V4.1
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 9582-111
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 9582-111
BSI-DSZ-CC-0459-2008
IBM z/OS
Version 1, Release 9
from IBM Corporation
PP Conformance: Labeled Security Protection Profile (LSPP), Issue 1.b,
08.10.1999 and
Controlled Access Protection Profile (CAPP), Issue
1.d, 08.10.1999
Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by ALC_FLR.3
Common Criteria
Arrangement
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an accredited and licensed/ approved
evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3 for conformance
to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.3 (ISO/IEC 15408:2005).
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration
and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme of the
German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the
evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any
other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the
Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 29 February 2008
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Bernd Kowalski L.S.
Head of Department
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0459-2008
IV
This page is intentionally left blank.
BSI-DSZ-CC-0459-2008 Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the
task of issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a
distributor, hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product
according to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised
security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the
BSI or by BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This
report contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the
detailed Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security
functionality of the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and
weaknesses) and instructions for the user.
1
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of
17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
V
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0459-2008
VI
Contents
Part A: Certification
Part B: Certification Results
Part C: Excerpts from the Criteria
BSI-DSZ-CC-0459-2008 Certification Report
A Certification
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down
in the following:
• BSIG2
• BSI Certification Ordinance3
• BSI Schedule of Costs4
• Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal
Ministry of the Interior)
• DIN EN 45011 standard
• BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
• Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.3 (ISO/IEC
15408:2005)5
• Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3
• BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS)
• Advice from the Certification Body on methodology for assurance
components above EAL4 (AIS 34)
2 Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries
a mutual recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are
based on ITSEC or CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of
17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 07 July 1992,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik (BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 10 May 2006 in the Bundesanzeiger
dated 19 May 2006, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0459-2008
2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC - Certificates
The SOGIS-Agreement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on
ITSEC became effective on 3 March 1998.
This agreement was signed by the national bodies of Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland and the United Kingdom. This agreement on the mutual recognition
of IT security certificates was extended to include certificates based on the CC
for all evaluation levels (EAL 1 – EAL 7). The German Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) recognises certificates issued by the national
certification bodies of France and the United Kingdom within the terms of this
Agreement.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised
under the terms of this agreement.
2.2 International Recognition of CC - Certificates
An arrangement (Common Criteria Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC evaluation assurance levels up to and including
EAL 4 has been signed in May 2000 (CC-MRA). It includes also the recognition
of Protection Profiles based on the CC.
As of February 2008 the arrangement has been signed by the national bodies
of: Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea,
Malaysia, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Republic of Singapore,
Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States of America. The current
list of signatory nations resp. approved certification schemes can be seen on
the web site: http:\\www.commoncriteriaportal.org
The Common Criteria Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates that
this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement.
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform
procedure, a uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product IBM z/OS, Version 1 Release 9 has undergone the certification
procedure at BSI. This is a re-certification based on BSI-DSZ-CC-0377-2007.
Specific results from the evaluation process based on BSI-DSZ-CC-0377-2007
were re-used.
The evaluation of the product IBM z/OS, Version 1 Release 9 was conducted by
atsec information security GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 26.
February 2008. atsec information security GmbH is an evaluation facility
(ITSEF)6
recognised by the certification body of BSI.
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0459-2008 Certification Report
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: IBM Corporation
The product was developed by: IBM Corporation
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of
this Certification Report. This work was completed by BSI.
4 Validity of the certification result
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated.
The confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
• all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in
the following report, are observed,
• the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in the
following report and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance levels and the confirmed strength of
functions, please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at the end of the
Certification Report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the
Security Target at the date of certification. As attack methods may evolve over
time, the resistance of the certified version of the product against new attack
methods can be re-assessed if required and the sponsor applies for the certified
product being monitored within the assurance continuity program of the BSI
Certification Scheme. It is recommended to perform a re-assessment on a
regular basis.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be
extended to the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for
assurance continuity (i.e. re-certification or maintenance) of the modified
product, in accordance with the procedural requirements, and the evaluation
does not reveal any security deficiencies.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0459-2008
A-4
5 Publication
The following Certification Results contain pages B-1 to B-32.
The product IBM z/OS, Version 1 Release 9 has been included in the BSI list of
the certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet: http://
www.bsi.bund.de). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49
228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer7
of the product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form
at the internet address stated above.
7
IBM Corporation
Walter Farrell, M/S P388
2455 South Road
Poughkeepsie NY 12601, USA
BSI-DSZ-CC-0459-2008 Certification Report
B Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
• the security target of the sponsor for the target of evaluation,
• the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
• complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0459-2008
Contents of the certification results
1 Executive Summary 3
2 Identification of the TOE 7
3 Security Policy 9
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 10
5 Architectural Information 10
6 Documentation 21
7 IT Product Testing 22
8 Evaluated Configuration 24
9 Results of the Evaluation 28
9.1 CC specific results 28
9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment 29
10 Obligations and notes for the usage of the TOE 29
11 Security Target 29
12 Definitions 30
12.1 Acronyms 30
12.2 Glossary 30
13 Bibliography 32
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0459-2008 Certification Report
1 Executive Summary
The Target of evaluation (TOE) is IBM z/OS, Version 1 Release 9.
z/OS is a general-purpose, multi-user, multi-tasking operating system for
enterprise computing systems. Multiple users can use z/OS simultaneously to
perform a variety of functions that require controlled, shared access to the
information stored on the system.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the
certified Protection Profile ”Labeled Security Protection Profile (LSPP), Issue
1.b, 08.10.1999”,[8] and ”Controlled Access Protection Profile (CAPP), Issue
1.d, 08.10.1999”,[9].
The TOE security assurance requirements are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], part 3
for details). The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation
Assurance Level EAL 4 augmented by ALC_FLR.3.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are
outlined in the Security Target [6], chapter 5.1. They are selected from
Common Criteria Part 2 and some of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is
CC part 2 extended.
The Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the IT Environment of
the TOE are outlined in the Security Target [6], chapter 5.3.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following
TOE Security Functions:
TOE Security Function Addressed issue
IA Identification and authentication:
z/OS provides identification and authentication of users by the
means of:
• an alphanumeric RACF user ID and a system-encrypted
password.
• an alphanumeric RACF user ID and a PassTicket, which is
a cryptographically-generated password substitute en-
compassing the user ID, the requested application name,
and the current date/time.
• an x.509v3 digital certificate presented to a server
application that uses System SSL or TCP/IP Application
Transparent TLS (AT-TLS) to provide TLS- or SSLv3-based
client authentication, and then “mapped” (using TOE
functions) by that server application or by AT-TLS to a
RACF user ID.
• a KerberosTM
v5 ticket presented to a server application that
supports the Kerberos mechanism, and then mapped by
that application through the TOE-provided GSS-API
programming services or alternate functions that are also
provided by the TOE (specifically the R_ticketServ, and
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0459-2008
TOE Security Function Addressed issue
R_GenSec services).
• an LDAP bind DN, which is mapped to a RACF user ID by
information in the LDAP directory, together with a
password.
For the circumstances in which the different authentication
means are used, please refer to the Security Target, chapter 6.
AC Access control:
Discretionary Access Control
z/OS supports access controls that are capable of enforcing
access limitations on individual users and data objects.
Discretionary access control (DAC) allows individual users to
specify how such resources as direct access storage devices
(DASDs), DASD and tape data sets, and tape volumes that are
under their control are to be shared.
RACF makes access control decisions based on the user’s
identity, security attributes, group authorities, and the access
authority specified with respect to the resource profile.
z/OS provides three DAC mechanisms:
• The z/OS standard DAC mechanism is used for most
traditional (non-UNIX) protected objects.
• The z/OS UNIX DAC mechanism is used for z/OS UNIX
objects (files, directories, etc.)
• The z/OS LDAP LDBM DAC mechanism is used to protect
LDAP objects in the LDAP LDBM back-end data store.
Mandatory Access Control
In addition to DAC, z/OS provides mandatory access control
(MAC) functions that are required for LSPP mode, which
impose additional access restrictions on information flow on
security classification. Users and resources can have a security
label specified in their profile. Security labels contain a
hierarchical classification (security level), which specify the
sensitivity (for example: public, internal use, or secret), and zero
or more non-hierarchical security categories (for example:
PROJECTA or PROJECTB).
The access control enforced by the TOE ensures that users can
only read labeled information if their security labels dominate
the information’s label, and that they can only write to labeled
information containers if the container’s label dominates the
subject’s, thus implementing the Bell-LaPadula model of
information flow control.
Note that security label checking will also occur in CAPP mode,
if the administrator has configured security labels and if
resources and users have labels assigned to them.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0459-2008 Certification Report
TOE Security Function Addressed issue
CS Communication security:
z/OS provides means of secure communication between
systems sharing the same security policy. In LSPP mode,
communication within TOE parts coupled into a sysplex can be
multilevel, whereas other communication channels are assigned
a single security label. In CAPP mode, labels need not to be
assigned and evaluated for any communication channel.
z/OS TCP/IP provides the means for associating labels with all
IP addresses in the network. In LSPP mode, communication is
permitted between any two addresses that have equivalent
labels. In LSPP mode, communication between two multilevel
addresses requires the explicit labeling of each packet with the
sending user's label and is only permitted over XCF links within
the sysplex.
z/OS TCP/IP provides the means to define Virtual IP addresses
(VIPAs) with specific labels on a multilevel system. z/OS
TCP/IP considers the user's label when choosing a source
address for communications. z/OS UNIX System Services also
provides the means to run up to eight instances of the z/OS
TCP/IP stack which can each be restricted to a single label.
Either of these approaches can be used to ensure that most
communications between multilevel systems do not use a
multilevel address on both ends and thereby avoid the need for
explicit labelling.
Means implemented in z/OS for securing the communication:
• SSL/TLS optionally with x509-based client authentication
• IPSEC with IKE key exchange method
• KerberosTM
version 5 networking protocols
• IBM Ported Tools (SSH v2 implementation)
• Access controlled TCP/IP stacks
SM Security management:
z/OS provides a set of commands and options to adequately
manage the TOE’s security functions. Additionally, the TOE
provides the capability of managing users and groups of users
via the z/OS LDAP server, which can accept LDAP-format
requests from a remote administrator and transform them into
RACF administrative commands via its SDBM backend
processing. The TOE also provides a Java class that allows
Java programs to issue commands to manage users and
groups. Both the LDAP SDBM and the Java class ultimately
create a RACF command and pass it to RACF using a
programming interface, and then RACF runs the command
using the identity associated with the SDBM session or the Java
program. This behaves just the same as when a local
administrator issues the command, including all the same
security checking and auditing.
The TOE recognises several authorities that are able to perform
the different management tasks related to the TOE’s security:
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0459-2008
TOE Security Function Addressed issue
• General security options are managed by security
administrators.
• In LSPP mode: management of MAC attributes is
performed by security administrators.
• Management of users and their security attributes is
performed by security administrators.
• Management of groups (and to some extent users) can be
delegated to group security administrators.
• Users can change their own passwords, their default
groups, and their user names (but not their user IDs).
• In LSPP mode: users can choose their security labels at
login, for some login methods.
• Auditors manage the parameters of the audit system (a list
of audited events, for example) and can analyse the audit
trail.
• Security administrators can define what audit records are
captured by the system.
• Discretionary access rights to protected resources are
managed by the owners of the applicable profiles (or UNIX
objects) or by security administrators.
AU Auditing:
The TOE provides an auditing capability that allows generating
audit records for security-critical events. RACF provides a
number of logging and reporting functions that allow resource
owners and auditors to identify users who attempt to access
resources. Audit records are collected by the System
Management Facilities (SMF) into an audit trail, which is
protected from unauthorized modification or deletion by the
DAC and (in LSPP mode) MAC mechanisms. This audit trail
can reside directly in MVS data sets, or in an MVS log stream
(which can be automatically off-loaded into MVS data sets), as
configured by the administrator.
OR Object reuse:
The TOE ensures the re-usability of protected objects and
storage before making it accessible to further use.
SP TOE self-protection:
TSF protection is based on several protection mechanisms that
are supported by the underlying abstract machine the TOE is
executed upon.
Table 1: TOE Security Functions
The TOE is one instance of z/OS running on an abstract machine as the sole
operating system and exercising full control over this abstract machine. This
abstract machine can be provided by one of the following:
• a logical partition provided by PR/SM on an IBM System z™ processor
(z890, z990, z9™ 109, z9™ BC, z9™ EC or z10™ EC).
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0459-2008 Certification Report
• a certified version of z/VM®
executing on one of the above-listed System z™
processors.
Multiple instances of the TOE may be connected in a basic sysplex or in a
parallel sysplex with the instances sharing their RACF database.
The individual TOEs can be run alone or within a network as a set of
cooperating hosts, operating under and implementing the same set of security
policies.
For more details concerning the software version defining the TOE, the abstract
machine the TOE runs on and the user guidance documentation delivered with
the TOE please refer to the remainder of this report.
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 6.1 to 6.8.
The claimed TOE’s strength of functions ‘medium’ (SOF-medium) for specific
functions as indicated in the Security Target [6], chapter 8.3.4 is confirmed. The
rating of the strength of functions does not include the crypto-algorithms
suitable for encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2).
For details see chapter 9 of this report.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6],
chapter 3. Based on these assets the security environment is defined in terms
of assumptions, threats and policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [6],
chapter 3.
For the configuration of the TOE covered by this certification please refer to
chapter 8 of this report or the Security Target [6], chapter 2.3.
The Certification Results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the
Certificate and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in
this Certification Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product
by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation
that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT
product by BSI or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2 Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
IBM z/OS, Version 1 Release 9
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of
Delivery
z/OS Version 1 Release 9 Common Criteria Evaluated Base:
z/OS Version 1 Release 9 (z/OS V1R9, program number 5694-A01)
1 SW z/OS V1R9 Common Criteria Evaluated Base
(IBM program number 5694-A01)
V1R9 Tape
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0459-2008
No Type Identifier Release Form of
Delivery
2 DOC z/OS V1R9 Program Directory GI10-0670-09 Hardcopy
3 DOC z/OS V1.9 Collection SK3T-4269-19 CD-ROM
4 DOC z/OS Hot Topics Newsletter GA22-7501-13 Hardcopy
5 DOC ServerPac: IYO (Installing Your Order) n/a Hardcopy
6 DOC Memo to Customers of z/OS V1.9 Common
Criteria Configuration
n/a Hardcopy
7 DOC z/OS V1.9 Planning for Multilevel Security and
the Common Criteria
GA22-7509-07 Hardcopy
PSF V4 Base for z/OS V4.1.0 (Program number 5655-M32)
8 SW IBM Print Services Facility™ Version 4 for
z/OS (PSF V4R1, program number 5655-
M32)
V4R1 Tape
9 DOC PSF 4.1 CDROM Kit BOOK SK3T-9927-00 CD-ROM
10 DOC PSF 4.1 CDROM Kit PDF SK3T-9928-00 CD-ROM
11 DOC PSF for OS/390 Program Directory GI10-0281-00 Hardcopy
12 DOC PSF Tiers - IBM AFP Printer Z125-4564-18 Hardcopy
OGL/370 V1.1.0 (Program number 5688-191)
13 SW Overlay Generation Language Version 1
(OGL V1R1, program number 5688-191)
V1R1 Tape
14 DOC Overlay Generation Language/370: User's
Guide and Reference
S544370203 Hardcopy
15 DOC OGL/370 V1R1.0: Getting Started G544369100 Hardcopy
16 DOC OGL/370 V1R1.0: LPS G544369700 Hardcopy
17 DOC OGL: Command Summary and Quick
Reference
S544370301 Hardcopy
18 DOC Program Directory OGL/370 GI10021201 Hardcopy
IBM Ported Tools for z/OS V1.1.2 FMID HOS1110 (Program number 5655-M23, optional)
19 SW IBM Ported Tools for z/OS V1.1.2 (Program
number 5655-M23, optional)
V1.1.2 Tape
20 DOC Prog Dir IBM Ported Tools for z/OS V1.1.2 GI10-0769-01 Hardcopy
21 DOC IBM Ported Tools for z/OS License
Information
GA22-7986-02 Hardcopy
Additional Media
22 SW APAR OA22518 (PTF UA37426) and APAR
PK57688 (PTF UK32719) obtained
electronically from ShopzSeries
(https://www.ibm.com/software/shopzseries)
n/a Electronic
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0459-2008 Certification Report
Please note that:
• The same software elements are used in the LSPP and CAPP mode of
operation, except as otherwise noted. The mode of operation is defined by
the configuration of the labeling-related options in RACF. Details are
described in [10].
• Only the most important CC guidance documentation is listed above. More
information on guidance documents (which are also shipped together with
the TOE) and which have to be followed can be found in chapter 6 of this
report.
3 Security Policy
The security policy is expressed by the set of security functional requirements
and implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues:
The TOE implements several policies which are specified in the Security Target
by the TOE security functional requirements. Those policies are:
• An Identification & Authentication Policy that is defined by the SFRs:
FIA_ATD.1, FMT_MTD.1(3)8
, FMT_REV.1(1), FMT_MTD.1(4),
FMT_MTD.1(5), FMT_MTD.1(6), FMT_MTD.1(8), FIA_UAU.1, FIA_UAU.5,
FIA_UAU.7, FIA_SOS.1, FIA_UID.1, FIA_USB.1
• Access Control Policies:
• A Mandatory Access Control Policy defined by the SFRs:
FDP_IFC.1, FDP_IFF.2, FDP_ETC.1, Note 1, FDP_ITC.1, FDP_ITC.2,
FIA_ATD.1, FIA_USB.1, FMT_MSA.1(2), FMT_MSA.3(2),
FMT_REV.1(2), FPT_TDC.1
• A Discretionary Access Control Policy that is defined by the SFRs:
FDP_ACC.1, FDP_ACF.1(1), FDP_ACF.1(2), FDP_ACF.1(3),
FIA_ATD.1, FIA_USB.1, FMT_MSA.1(1), FMT_MSA.3(1),
FMT_REV.1(2)
• An Audit Policy defined by the SFRs:
FAU_GEN.1, FAU_GEN.2, FAU_SEL.1, FAU_SAR.1, FAU_SAR.2,
FAU_SAR.3, FAU_STG.1, FAU_STG.3, FAU_STG.4, FIA_USB.1,
FMT_MTD.1(1), FMT_MTD.1(2), FPT_STM.1
• A Trusted Channel Policy defined by the SFRs:
FDP_UCT.1, FDP_UIT.1, FMT_MTD.1(6), FTP_ITC.1
In addition to the Security Target the Security Policy of the TOE has been
described in a separate Informal TOE security policy model as required by the
CC assurance component ADV_SPM.1.
8
The number in brackets denotes the nth
iteration of the SFR
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0459-2008
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of threats
and organisational security policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These
aspects lead to specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-
Environment. The following topics are of relevance: OE.INSTALL,
OE.PHYSICAL, OE.CREDEN, OE.HW_SEP, OE.HW_CRYPTO and
OE.CLASSIFICATION (LSPP mode only). Details can be found in the Security
Target [6], chapter 4.2.
5 Architectural Information
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the z/OS operating system with the software
components as listed in chapter 2 of this report. z/OS is a general-purpose,
multi-user, multi-tasking operating system for enterprise computing systems.
Multiple users can use z/OS simultaneously to perform a variety of functions
that require controlled, shared access to the information stored on the system.
For purposes of evaluation, the TOE is seen as one instance of z/OS running
on an abstract machine as the sole operating system and exercising full control
over this abstract machine. This abstract machine can be provided by one of
the following:
• a logical partition provided by PR/SM on an IBM System z™ processor
(z890, z990, z9 109, z9 BC, z9 EC or z10 EC)
• a certified version of z/VM®
executing on one of the above-listed System z™
processors.
The abstract machine itself is not part of the TOE, rather, it belongs to the TOE
environment. Nevertheless the correctness of separation and memory
protection mechanisms implemented in the abstract machine is analyzed as
part of the evaluation since those functions are crucial for the security of the
TOE.
The TOE environment, as part of the System z processor, also includes specific
hardware functions that provide support for the cryptographic operations
involved in communications security and for the digital signature operations
involved with X.509v3 digital certificates.
Multiple instances of the TOE may be connected in a basic sysplex or in a
parallel sysplex with the instances sharing their RACF® database.
The platforms selected for the evaluation consist of IBM products that are
available when the evaluation has been completed and will remain available for
a substantial period of time afterward.
The individual TOEs can be run alone or within a network as a set of
cooperating hosts, operating under and implementing the same set of security
policies.
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Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) network services,
connections and communication that occur outside of a sysplex are restricted to
one security label; that is, each system regards its peers as single-label hosts.
Other network communication is disallowed, with the exception of the Job Entry
System 2 (JES2) Network Job Entry (NJE) protocol.
Most of the TOE security functions (TSF) are provided by the z/OS operating
system Base Control Program (BCP) and the Resource Access Control Facility
(RACF), a z/OS component that is used by different services as the central
instance for identification and authentication and for access control decisions.
z/OS comes with management functions that allow configuring of the TOE
security functions to tailor them to the customer’s needs. Some elements have
been included in the TOE that do not provide security functions. These
elements run in authorized mode, so they could compromise the TOE if they do
not behave properly. Because these elements are essential for the operation of
many customer environments, the inclusion of these elements subjects them to
the process of scrutiny during the evaluation and ensures that they may be
used by customers without affecting the TOE’s security status.
In its evaluated configuration, the TOE allows two modes of operation: LSPP-
compliant and CAPP-compliant. In both modes, the same software elements
are used. The two modes have different RACF settings with respect to the use
of security labels. All other configuration parameters are identical in the two
modes.
Intended Method of Use
z/OS provides a general computing environment that allows users to gain
controlled access to its resources in different ways:
• online interaction with users through Time Sharing Option Extensions
(TSO/E) or z/OS UNIX System Services
• batch processing (JES2)
• services provided by started procedures or tasks
• daemons and servers utilizing z/OS UNIX System Services that provide
similar functions as started procedures or tasks but based on UNIX
interfaces
These services can be accessed by users local to the computer systems or
accessing the systems via network services supported by the evaluated
configuration.
All users of the TOE are assigned a unique user identifier (user ID). This user
ID, which is used as the basis for access control decisions and for
accountability, associates the user with a set of security attributes. In most
cases the TOE authenticates the claimed identity of a user before allowing this
user to perform any further security-relevant actions. Exceptions to this
authentication policy include:
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1. Pre-specified identities:
a. The authorized administrator can specify an identity to be used by server
or daemon processes or system address spaces, which may be started
either automatically or via system operator commands;
b. The authorized administrator may configure a trusted HTTP server to
access selected data under a specified identity, rather than the identity of
the end user making the request. The HTTP server may optionally
authenticate the user in this case, or may serve the data to anyone asking
for it, if the administrator has determined that such anonymous access is
appropriate.
2. Users are allowed to execute programs that accept network connections on
ports the user has access to. In this case the untrusted program has no
knowledge about the external "user" and cannot perform authentication. The
program executes with the rights of the z/OS user that started it, and any
data access occurs using this user’s authenticated identity.
The TOE provides mechanisms for both mandatory and discretionary access
control. The Security Target describes two modes of operation: one with
discretionary access control only (compliant to the requirements of the
"Controlled Access Protection Profile (CAPP), Issue 1.d, 08.10.1999" [9]) and
one with both discretionary and mandatory access control where the mandatory
access control is fully enabled for all subjects and objects (compliant to the
requirements of the "Labeled Security Protection Profile (LSPP), Issue 1.b,
08.10.1999" [8]). In commercial environments it is often useful to activate only
part of the mandatory access control functions required in the Security Target
for full compliance to LSPP. While such a mode may be useful for specific
environments and the functions used have been evaluated, the claims about
information flow control made in the Security Target for the LSPP mode may not
hold completely when only part of the mandatory access control functions are
configured.
All TOE resources are under the control of the TOE. The TOE mediates the
access of subjects to TOE-protected objects. Subjects in the TOE are called
tasks. Tasks are the active entities that can act on the user’s behalf. Data is
stored in named objects. The TOE can associate a set of security attributes with
each named resource, which includes the description of the access rights to
that object and (in LSPP mode) a security label.
Objects are owned by users, who are assumed to be capable of assigning
discretionary access rights to their objects in accordance with the organizational
security policies. Ownership of named objects can be transferred under the
control of the access control policy. In LSPP mode, security labels are assigned
by the TOE, either automatically upon creation of the object or by the trusted
system administrator. The security attributes of users, data objects, and objects
through which the information is passed are used to determine if information
may flow through the system as requested by a user.
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Apart from normal users, z/OS recognizes administrative users with special
authorizations. These users are trusted to perform system administration and
maintenance tasks, which includes configuration of the security policy enforced
by the z/OS system and attributes related to it. Authorizations can be delegated
to other administrative users by updating their security attributes. The TOE also
recognizes the role of an auditor, who uses the auditing system provided by
z/OS to monitor the system usage according to the organizational security
policies.
The TOE is intended to operate in a networked environment with other
instantiations of the TOE as well as other well-behaved client systems operating
within the same management domain. All of those systems need to be
configured in accordance with a defined common security policy.
Summary of Security Features
The primary security features of the product are:
• identification and authentication
• discretionary access control
• in LSPP mode: mandatory access control and support for security labels
• auditing
• object re-use
• security management
• communications security
• TSF protection
These primary security features are supported by domain separation and
reference mediation, which ensure that the features are always invoked and
cannot be bypassed.
Identification and authentication
z/OS provides identification and authentication of users by the means of
• an alphanumeric RACF user ID and a system-encrypted password.
• an alphanumeric RACF user ID and a PassTicket, which is a
cryptographically-generated password substitute encompassing the user ID,
the requested application name, and the current date/time.
• an x.509v3 digital certificate presented to a server application that uses
System SSL or TCP/IP Application Transparent TLS (AT-TLS) to provide
TLS- or SSLv3-based client authentication, and then “mapped” (using TOE
functions) by that server application or by AT-TLS to a RACF user ID.
• a Kerberos v5 ticket presented to a server application that supports the
Kerberos mechanism, and then mapped by that application through the
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TOE-provided GSS-API programming services or alternate functions that
are also provided by the TOE (specifically the R_ticketServ, and R_GenSec
services). These functions enable the application server to validate the
Kerberos ticket, and thus the authentication of the principal. The application
server then translates (or maps) the Kerberos principal (using the TOE
provided function of R_userMap) to a RACF user ID.
• an LDAP bind DN, which is mapped to a RACF user ID by information in the
LDAP directory, together with a password. The LDAP server then passes
the derived RACF user ID, and the password, to RACF to complete the
authentication process.
In the evaluated configuration, all human users are assigned a unique user ID.
This user ID supports individual accountability. The TOE security functions
authenticate the claimed identity of the user by verifying the password (or other
mechanism, as listed above) before allowing the user to perform any actions
that require TSF mediation, other than actions that aid an authorized user in
gaining access to the TOE.
In some cases of external access to the system, such as the HTTP server, FTP
server, or LDAP server, an installation may decide to define a user ID that is
used for access checking of selected resources for users that have not been
authenticated. This allows an installation to define resources unauthenticated
users may access using that server via an appropriate client program. Users
may still authenticate to the server using their user ID and password (or other
authentication mechanism as above) to access additional resources they have
been assigned access to.
The required password quality can be tailored to the installation’s policies using
various parameters. When creating users, administrators are required to choose
an initial password that must usually be changed by the user during initial logon.
Discretionary access control
z/OS supports access controls that are capable of enforcing access limitations
on individual users and data objects. Discretionary access control (DAC) allows
individual users to specify how such resources as direct access storage devices
(DASDs), DASD and tape data sets, and tape volumes that are under their
control are to be shared.
RACF makes access control decisions based on the user’s identity, security
attributes, group authorities, and the access authority specified with respect to
the resource profile.
z/OS provides three DAC mechanisms.
1. The z/OS standard DAC mechanism is used for most traditional (non- UNIX)
protected objects.
2. The z/OS UNIX DAC mechanism is used for z/OS UNIX objects (files,
directories, etc.)
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3. The z/OS LDAP LDBM DAC mechanism is used to protect LDAP objects in
the LDAP LDBM back-end data store.
z/OS standard DAC mechanism
Access types that can be granted are NONE, EXECUTE, READ, UPDATE,
CONTROL, and ALTER, which form a hierarchical set of increasing access
authorities.
Access authorities to resources are stored in profiles. Discrete profiles are valid
for a single, named resource and generic profiles are applicable to a group of
resources, typically with similar names. For access permission checks, RACF
always chooses the most specific profile for a resource. Profiles can have an
access control list associated with them that contains a potentially large number
of entries for different groups and users, thus allowing the modeling of complex,
fine-grained access controls.
Profiles are assigned to a number of resources within z/OS. This Security
Target defines the resource types analyzed during the evaluation. RACF
profiles are also used to manage and control privileges in z/OS and resources
of subsystems that are not part of the evaluated configuration (e. g. DB2, CICS,
JES3).
Access rights for subjects to resources can be set by the profile owner and by
the security administrator.
z/OS UNIX DAC mechanism
z/OS implements POSIX-conformant access control for such named objects in
the UNIX realm as UNIX file system objects and UNIX inter-process
communication (IPC) objects. Access types for UNIX file system objects are
read, write, and execute/search, and read and write for UNIX IPC objects. z/OS
file system objects provide either access control based on the permission bits
associated with a file, or based on access control lists, which are upward-
compatible with the permission bits algorithm and implement the
recommendations from Portable Operating System Interface for UNIX (POSIX)
1003.1e draft 17.
z/OS LDAP DAC mechanism
The z/OS LDAP server supports several back-end data stores, two of which
(LDBM, SDBM) can be used in the evaluated configuration. The SDBM
backend allows RACF administration by remote administrators for systems
configured in CAPP mode. The LDBM back-end allows storage of customer
data in either CAPP or LSPP mode, and this back-end supports a standard
LDAP access control mechanism to control which authenticated users can
access which data. It also supports the possibility of “public” data, accessed by
unauthenticated users, when the administrator has configured this kind of data
and access.
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Mandatory access control and support for security labels in LSPP mode
In addition to DAC, z/OS provides mandatory access control (MAC) functions
that are required for LSPP mode, which impose additional access restrictions
on information flow on security classification. Users and resources can have a
security label specified in their profile. Security labels contain a hierarchical
classification (security level), which specify the sensitivity (for example: public,
internal use, or secret), and zero or more non-hierarchical security categories
(for example: PROJECTA or PROJECTB).
The access control enforced by the TOE ensures that users can only read
labeled information if their security labels dominate the information’s label, and
that they can only write to labeled information containers if the container’s label
dominates the subject’s, thus implementing the Bell-LaPadula model of
information flow control. The system can also be configured to allow write-down
for certain authorized users.
MAC checks are performed before DAC checks.
Note that security label checking will also occur in CAPP mode, if the
administrator has configured security labels and if resources and users have
labels assigned to them. The exact effects (e.g., whether write-down can occur)
depend on several RACF options, and so the behavior may differ from that
imposed by an LSPP configuration, which mandates the setting of certain
options.
Users with clearance for multiple security classifications can choose their label
at login time in TSO and for batch jobs submitted to JES, with appropriate
defaults assigned if no labels are chosen. The choice may be restricted by the
label assigned to the point of access (the logical or physical device the user has
used to authenticate, e. g. the ID of the terminal, the IP address, or the ID of the
job entry station).
TCP/IP applications that process user login requests must either be restricted to
a single label or must restrict the user label by the label assigned to the point of
access.
The z/OS LDAP server has no mechanisms in the LDBM back-end to perform
MAC checking. Instead, each z/OS LDAP server must run with a single security
label, matching the classification of the data in the LDBM database. TCP/IP
processing will then ensure that only users running with that security label will
have access to the LDAP data, thus fulfilling the required MAC checking. As
needed, customers may configure multiple z/OS LDAP servers, each running
with a single security label, and users must connect to the appropriate server
that matches their own security label when they want to access the data.
Auditing
The TOE provides an auditing capability that allows generating audit records for
security-critical events. RACF provides a number of logging and reporting
functions that allow resource owners and auditors to identify users who attempt
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to access resources. Audit records are collected by the System Management
Facilities (SMF) into an audit trail, which is protected from unauthorized
modification or deletion by the DAC and (in LSPP mode) MAC mechanisms.
The system can be configured to halt on exhaustion of audit trail space to
prevent audit data loss. Operators are warned when audit trail space
consumption reaches a predefined threshold.
RACF always generates audit records for such events as unauthorized attempts
to access the system or changes to the status of the RACF database. The
security administrator, auditors, and other users with appropriate authorization
can configure which additional optional security events are to be logged. In
addition to writing records to the audit trail, messages can be sent to the
security console to immediately alert operators of detected policy violations.
RACF provides SMF records for all RACF-protected resources (either
“traditional” or z/OS UNIX-based) as well as for LDAP-based resources.
Auditors can unload selected parts of the SMF database for further analysis into
human-readable formats or for upload to a query or reporting package, such as
DFSORT™.
Object re-use functionality
Reuse of protected objects and of storage is handled by various hardware and
software controls, and by administrative practices.
All memory content of non-shared page frames is cleared before making it
accessible to other address spaces or data spaces. DASD data sets can be
purged during deletion with the RACF ERASE option and tape volumes can be
erased on return to the scratch pool. All resources allocated to UNIX objects are
cleared before reuse. Other data pools are under strict TOE control and cannot
be accessed directly by normal users.
Security management
z/OS provides a set of commands and options to adequately manage the TOE’s
security functions. Additionally, the TOE provides the capability of managing
users and groups of users via the z/OS LDAP server, which can accept LDAP-
format requests from a remote administrator and transform them into RACF
administrative commands via its SDBM backend processing. The TOE
recognizes several authorities that are able to perform the different
management tasks related to the TOE’s security:
• General security options are managed by security administrators.
• In LSPP mode: management of MAC attributes is performed by security
administrators.
• Management of users and their security attributes is performed by security
administrators. Management of groups (and to some extent users) can be
delegated to group security administrators.
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• Users can change their own passwords, their default groups, and their user
names (but not their user IDs).
• In LSPP mode: users can choose their security labels at login, for some
login methods. (Note: this also applies in CAPP mode if the administrator
chooses to activate security label processing.)
• Auditors manage the parameters of the audit system (a list of audited
events, for example) and can analyze the audit trail.
• Security administrators can define what audit records are captured by the
system.
• Discretionary access rights to protected resources are managed by the
owners of the applicable profiles (or UNIX objects) or by security
administrators.
Communications Security
z/OS provides means of secure communication between systems sharing the
same security policy. In LSPP mode, communication within TOE parts coupled
into a sysplex can be multilevel, whereas other communication channels are
assigned a single security label. In CAPP mode, labels need not to be assigned
and evaluated for any communication channel.
z/OS TCP/IP provides the means for associating labels with all IP addresses in
the network. In LSPP mode, communication is permitted between any two
addresses that have equivalent labels. In LSPP mode, communication between
two multilevel addresses requires the explicit labeling of each packet with the
sending user's label and is only permitted over XCF links within the sysplex.
z/OS TCP/IP provides the means to define Virtual IP addresses (VIPAs) with
specific labels on a multilevel system. z/OS TCP/IP considers the user's label
when choosing a source address for communications. z/OS UNIX System
Services also provides the means to run up to eight instances of the z/OS
TCP/IP stack which can each be restricted to a single label. Either of these
approaches can be used to ensure that most communications between
multilevel systems do not use a multilevel address on both ends and thereby
avoid the need for explicit labelling.
In its evaluated configuration, z/OS supports trusted communication channels
for TCP/IP connections. The confidentiality and integrity of network connections
are assured by Secure Sockets Layer / Transport Layer Security (SSL/TLS)
encrypted communication for TCP/IP connections, which can be used explicitly
by applications or applied transparently to their communications without
changing the applications using it (assuming the applications that do not make
use of the SSL/TLS capabilities that allow clients to authenticate to the system
using a client-supplied X.509 digital certificate. If applications accept client
certificates then they do need to have specific SSL/TLS-related processing
within the applications.).
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In addition to the SSL/TLS connection, z/OS also supports the IP Security
(IPSec) protocol with Internet Key Exchange (IKE) as the key exchange
method. This is an additional way to set up a trusted channel to another trusted
IT product for IP-based connections.
z/OS also supports KerberosTM
version 5 networking protocols, via the
Integrated Security Services Network Authentication Service component (z/OS
Network Authentication Service) These protocols enable both the client and the
server to mutually authenticate. This authentication mechanism can be utilized
with the GSS-API services provided by the z/OS Network Authentication
Service to provide security services to applications. These services enable
encrypted communications channels between clients and servers that may
reside on the same or on different systems.
z/OS also supports, via the optional add-on product IBM Ported Tools for z/OS,
the SSH v2 protocol and the ssh-daemon provided services of ssh (secure
shell), scp (secure copy), and sftp (secure ftp) TCP/IP-based communication
can be further controlled by the access control function for TCP/IP connections,
which allows controlling of the connection establishment based on access to the
TCP/IP stack in general, individual network address and individual ports on a
per-application or per-user basis.
z/OS provides also a variety of network services, all of which use RACF for
identification, authentication, and access control. In the evaluated configuration,
terminal services are provided by TN3270, telnet, rlogin, rsh, and rexec. File
transfer services are provided by the File Transfer Protocol (FTP), sftp and scp,
Web serving functions are provided by the z/OS HTTP Server.
TSF protection
TSF protection is based on several protection mechanisms that are provided by
the underlying abstract machine:
• Privileged processor instructions are only available to programs running in
the processor’s supervisor state
• Semi-privileged instructions are only available to programs running in an
execution environment that is established and authorized by the TSF
• While in operation, all address spaces, as well as the data and tasks
contained therein, are protected by the memory protection mechanisms of
the underlying abstract machine
The TOE’s address space management ensures that programs running in
problem state cannot access protected memory or resources that belong to
other address spaces.
Access to system services – through supervisor call (SVC) or program call (PC)
instructions, for example – is controlled by the system, which requires that
subjects who want to perform security-relevant tasks be authorized
appropriately.
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The hardware and firmware components that provide the abstract machine for
the TOE are required to be physically protected from unauthorized access. The
z/OS Base Control Program mediates all access to the TOE’s hardware
resources themselves, other than program-visible CPU instruction functions.
Tools are provided in the TOE environment to allow authorized administrators to
check the correct operation of the underlying abstract machine.
In addition to the protection mechanism of the underlying abstract machine, the
TOE also uses software mechanisms like the authorized program facility (APF)
or specific privileges for programs in the UNIX system services environment to
protect the TSF.
High-level Design
The subsystems considered in the high-level design of the TOE are the
following:
1. Base Control Program (BCP)
2. System Management Facilities (SMF)
3. System REXX
4. Security Server (Resource Access Control Facility RACF)
5. System Operations
6. Communication Server (IP and SNA)
7. DFSMS – System Managed Storage
8. Job Entry Subsystem 2 - JES2
9. TSO/E
10.z/OS UNIX System Services
11.Print Services Facility (PSF)
12.Parallel Sysplex
13.Cryptographic Services
14.Hardware Configuration Definition (HCD) and Hardware Configuration
Manager (HCM)
15.Resource Management Facility - RMF
16.SDSF
17.System SSL
18.Network File System
19.HTTP Server
20.IBM Health Checker
21.IBM Tivoli Directory Server for z/OS (LDAP)
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22.Network Authentication Service (Kerberos)
23.PKI Services
24.OpenSSH
25.Common Information Model (CIM) Server
26.EIM ICTX - LDAP backend for remote authorization and remote auditing
6 Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the
product to the customer. This documentation together with the Security Target
itself is the most important documentation to securely use the TOE in the
evaluated configuration.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in
chapter 10 of this report have to be followed.
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7 IT Product Testing
Test Configuration
The Security Target requires the software packages comprising the TOE to be
run on an abstract machine implementing the z/Architecture machine interface
as defined in the "z/Architecture Principles of Operation". The hardware
platforms implementing this abstract machine are:
• IBM zSeries model z890, optionally with CryptoExpress2 card or PCIXCC
and PCICA crypto cards
• IBM zSeries model z990, optionally with CryptoExpress2 card or PCIXCC
and PCICA crypto cards
• IBM System z9 109, z9 BC, or z9 EC, optionally with CryptoExpress2 card.
• IBM System z10 EC, optionally with CryptoExpress2 card.
The TOE may be running on those machines within a logical partition provided
by a certified version of PR/SM. In addition, the TOE may run on a virtual
machine provided by a certified version of z/VM.
For the peripherals that can be used with the TOE, please refer to the Security
Target, chapter 2.3.2.
IBM has tested the platforms (hardware and combinations of hardware with
PR/SM and/or z/VM) for z/OS individually for their compliance to the
z/Architecture using the Systems Assurance Kernel (SAK) suite of tests. These
tests ensure that every platform provides the abstract machine interface that
z/OS requires.
The test systems were running z/OS Version 1 Release 9 in the evaluated
configuration. Due to the massive amount of tests, testing was performed
throughout the development of the TOE. To ensure proper testing of all security
relevant behaviour of the TOE, the evaluators verified that all tests that might
have been affected by any security-relevant change introduced late in the
development cycle had been run on the evaluated configuration.
Depth/Coverage of Testing
The developer has done substantial functional testing of all externally visible
interfaces (TSFI). Internal interfaces of the high-level design have been covered
by direct and indirect testing. The evaluators repeated a subset of the developer
tests and conducted additional independent tests and penetration tests.
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Summary of Developer Testing
Test configuration:
The sponsor/developer has performed the tests on the platforms defined above.
The software was installed and configured as required in the guidance
documents (refer to chapter 6) and the Security Target.
Testing approach:
The sponsor/developer conducts extensive testing for every release of z/OS.
Functional Verification Testing (FVT) and System Verification Testing (SVT) are
performed by independent test teams with testers being independent from
developers. A special collection of tests was compiled to explicitly deal with the
security functionality as claimed in the Security Target.
For components providing cryptographic functions, testing was performed with
and without hardware cryptographic support in order to test the correct usage of
the hardware cryptographic functions, if present, and the correct implementation
of the software implementation within the TOE.
Testing results:
All actual test results were consistent with the expected test results.
Summary of Evaluator Testing Effort
Test configuration:
The evaluator used the same test environment as the developer. The
configuration of the TOE was conformant to the Security Target requirements
and have been set up according to the guidance documents.
Testing approach:
The evaluation facility decided to re-run a subset of the developer tests focusing
on functionality newly introduced since the previous evaluation. In addition
evaluator tests were defined and executed by the evaluation facility.
Testing results:
All actual test results were consistent with the expected test results.
Evaluator penetration testing:
The evaluator has devised penetration tests based on the developer
vulnerability analysis as well as on his own independent vulnerability analysis.
The evaluator has used the information contained in the evalution evidence to
derive penetration tests. This time the evaluator deliberately selected very
different penetration test areas compared to the previous evaluation.
The evaluator penetration tests can be classified into the following categories:
• Network vulnerability testing
• Fuzzy testing of interfaces
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• Resource exhaustion test
• Penetration test to get indirect access to read protected storage
The penetration testing showed no vulnerabilities which are exploitable with the
attack potential assumed for EAL4 in the intended operating environment.
8 Evaluated Configuration
The Target of Evaluation is IBM z/OS, Version 1 Release 9. The TOE is
software only. The items listed in chapter 2 of this report represent the TOE.
This following configuration of the TOE is covered by this certification:
The z/OS V1R9 Common Criteria Evaluated Base package, and (if used) IBM
Ported Tools for z/OS) must be installed according to the directions delivered
with the media and configured according to the instructions in [10].
Installations may choose not to use any of the elements delivered within the
ServerPac, but are required to install, configure, and use at least the RACF
component of the z/OS Security Server element.
In addition, any software outside the TOE may be added without affecting the
security characteristics of the system, if it cannot run:
• in supervisor state
• as APF-authorized
• with keys 0 through 7
• with UID(0),
• with authority to FACILITY resources BPX.DAEMON, BPX.SERVER, or
BPX.SUPERUSER
• with authority to UNIXPRIV resources
This explicitly excludes replacement of any element in the ServerPac providing
security functions relevant to this evaluation by other third-party products.
Note: The evaluated software configuration is not invalidated by installing and
operating other appropriately certified components that possibly run authorised.
However the evaluation of those components must show that the component
and the security policies implemented by the component do not undermine the
security policies described in this document.
The IBM Tivoli Directory Server for z/OS (FMID HRSL380) component may be
used as the LDAP server, but:
• client authentication via digital certificates has not been evaluated for LDAP
and cannot be used in the evaluated configuration;
• client authentication using the Kerberos mechanism has not been evaluated
for LDAP and cannot be used in the evaluated configuration.
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• authentication via passwords stored in LDAP cannot be used. Authentication
must occur using RACF passwords. Note that for LDBM an LDAP bind DN is
specified when binding to the server, but the password specified must be for
the RACF user ID associated with that LDAP bind DN by the LDAP
administrator;
• only the LDBM and ICTX backends may be used in LSPP mode. In CAPP
mode either LDBM, SDBM, or ICTX backends may be used. Other LDAP
backend configurations have not been evaluated and must not be used.
• (LSPP only) Each running instance of the LDAP server must run with a
single, non-SYSMULTI, non-SYSNONE, security label. Multiple server
instances may run at the same time, with the same or different security
labels.
Note: z/OS also ships an older LDAP Server component as part of the
Integrated Security Services element of z/OS. That server was not part of this
evaluation, and must not be used in the evaluated configuration.
Each running instance of the HTTP server must run with a security label that is
neither SYSMULTI nor SYSNONE.
SSHD (from IBM Ported Tools for z/OS), may be used, but if used:
• must be configured to use protocol version 2 and either 3DES or one of the
AES-based encryption suites,
• must be configured in privilege separation mode, and
• must be configured to allow only password-based authentication of users.
Rhost-based and public-key based user authentication may not be used in
the evaluated configuration. In LSPP mode SSHD should be configured with
the SYSMULTI security label.
The Network Authentication Service component (FMID HSWK360) of the
Integrated Security Services component, if used, and applications exploiting it,
must satisfy the following constraints:
• The Network Authentication Service must use the SAF (RACF) registry. The
NDBM registry is not a valid configuration for this evaluation.
• Cross Realm Trust relationships with foreign Kerberos realms is allowed, but
the foreign KDC must be capable of supporting the same cipher as does the
z/OS KDC.
• In order to ensure strong cryptographic protection of Kerberos tickets, DES3
or AES should be utilized by the z/OS KDC and any KDC participating in a
cross-realm trust relationship with the z/OS KDC. DES should only be used
in network environments where the threat of cryptographic attacks against
the tickets and Kerberos-protected sessions is deemed low enough to justify
the use of these weaker encryption protocols.
• Applications supporting Kerberos may use a combination of application
specific protocols and the GSSAPI functions or the equivalent native
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platform callable services (the SAF R_TicketServ and R_GenSec callable
services) to authenticate clients, and in client-server authentication. Only the
Kerberos mechanism may be used by applications that utilise GSS-API or
the equivalent native platform functions. The GSS-API and R_GenSec
services also enable the encryption of sensitive application messages
passed via application specific protocols. These services enable the secure
communication between client and server applications. The GSSAPI
services include the message integrity and privacy functions that validate the
authenticity and secure the communications between clients and servers.
The Network File System (NFS) Server (FMID HDZ11US) may be used, but
only in CAPP configurations. NFS must not be used in LSPP configurations.
Kerberos-based authentication must be used. The server must be configured
with the SAF or SAFEXPORT option, to ensure that all file and directory access
(except possibly directory mounting) has appropriate RACF security checks
made.
SSL (Secure Sockets Layer) processing, if used, must use SSLv3 protocols.
SSL and TLS (Transport Layer Security), if used, must use use either triple DES
(168-bit keys), AES (128- or 256-bit keys), or RC4 (128-bit keys) encryption.
Any application performing client authentication using client digital certificates
over SSL or TLS must be configured to use RACF profiles in the RACDCERT or
DIGTRING classes or PKCS#11 tokens in ICSF to store the keyrings that
contain the application private key and the allowed Certificate Authority (CA)
certificates that may be used to provide the client certificates that the application
will support. The use of gskkyman for this purpose is not part of the evaluated
configuration.
Any client that is delivered with the product that executes with the user's
privileges must be used with care, since the TSF can not protect those clients
from potentially hostile programs. Passwords a user enters into those client
programs that those clients use to pass to the corresponding server to
authenticate the user may potentially be spoofed by hostile programs running in
the user's address space. This includes client programs for telnet, TN3270, ftp,
r-commands, ssh, all ldap utilities and Kerberos administration utilities that
require the user to enter his password. When using those client programs the
user should take care that no untrusted potentially hostile program has been
called during his session.
The following elements and element components cannot be used in an
evaluated system, either because they violate the security policies stated in this
Security Target or because they have been removed from the evaluated
configuration due to time and resource constraints of the evaluation. As they are
part of the base system, either they must be not configured for use or they must
be deactivated, as described in [10], chapter 7:
• All Bulk Data Transfer (BDT) elements: BDT, BDT File-to-File , and BDT
Systems Network Architecture (SNA) NJE Connection Manager
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• The Distributed Computing Environment (DCE) component (FMID
HRSS190) of the Integrated Security Services element
• DCE Base Services (FMID HMB3190)
• The DFS™ Server Message Block (SMB) and DFS DCE-DFS (FMID
H0H2390) components of the Distributed File Service element
• The Enterprise Identity Mapping component of the Integrated Security
Services element
• Infoprint®
Server
• JES3
• The Advanced Program-to-Program Communication/ Multiple Virtual
Storage (APPC/MVS) component of the BCP
• Process Manager component from the UNIX System Services Element
• The z/OS LDAP Server component of the Integrated Security Services
element (FMID JRSL38A). For LDAP functionality in the evaluated
configuration use the IBM Tivoli Directory Server for z/OS (FMID HRSL380)
component of z/OS instead.
The use of TCP/IP communication for JES2 NJE has not been part of the
evaluation and must not be used in the evaluated configuration.
The JES2 Execution Batch Monitor (XBM) facility has not been part of the
evaluation and must not be used in the evaluated configuration.
The RACF Remote Sharing Facility has not been part of the evaluation and
must not be used in the evaluated configuration.
The Data Facility Storage Management Subsystem (DFSMS) Object Access
Method for content management type applications must not be used.
For the Communications Server:
• The z/OS FTP server and client, and the z/OS TN3270 server, support both
manually-configured SSL/TLS, or AT-TLS. This evaluation has considered
only AT-TLS configurations, and as a result manual configuration of those
components to use SSL or TLS is not allowed for evaluated configurations.
• The z/OS FTP server and client can support either the protocols from the
draft standard for securing FTP with TLS/SSL, or the protocols from the
formal RFC 4217 level of Security FTP with TLS/SSL. This evaluation has
considered only the formal RFC 4217 level of support, and as a result that
option must be used in the evaluated configuration.
• The following applications must not be used in LSPP configurations, as
noted in the Communications Server IP Configuration Guide: BINL, DHCP
PXE, HOMETEST command, IUCV, LPD, LPQ command, LPR command,
LPRM command, LPRSET command, NCPROUTE, NPF, Portmapper
RPCBIND, SMTP, SNMP NetView client, TELNET client command,
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TESTSITE command, TNF, VMCF, z/OS UNIX DNS name server (BIND 4),
z/OS UNIX Network SLAPM2 subagent, z/OS UNIX OMPROUTE SNMP
subagent, z/OS UNIX popper, z/OS UNIX RSVP agent, z/OS UNIX SNMP
client command, z/OS UNIX SNMP server and agent, z/OS UNIX Trap
Forwarder Daemon.
9 Results of the Evaluation
9.1 CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR), [7] was provided by the ITSEF
according to the Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of
the Scheme [3] and all interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as
relevant for the TOE.
The evaluation methodology CEM [2] was used for all assurance requirements
claimed for the TOE.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following
assurance components:
• All components of the class ASE
• All components of the EAL 4 package as defined in the CC (see also part C
of this report)
• The components ALC_FLR.3 – Systematic flaw remediation augmented for
this TOE evaluation.
As the evaluation work performed for this certification procedure was carried out
as a re-evaluation based on the certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-0377-2007, re-use of
specific evaluation tasks was possible. The focus of this re-evaluation was on
newly added security functionality like:
• System Logger audit services,
• Network Policy Agent,
• Network Security Services,
• RACF handling of digital certificates (RACDCERT),
• Web Express Logon services and
• anonymous FTP
The evaluation has confirmed:
• for PP Conformance Labeled Security Protection Profile (LSPP), Issue
1.b, 08.10.1999 and Controlled Access Protection
Profile (CAPP), Issue 1.d, 08.10.1999 ([8] and [9])
• for the functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
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• for the assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by ALC_FLR.3
• The TOE Security Function User Authentication based on passwords fulfils
the claimed Strength of Function medium.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in
chapter 2 and the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment
The rating of the strength of functions does not include the crypto-algorithms
suitable for encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2).
This holds for:
• The TOE Security Functions “RACF Passtickets”, “Authentication via Client
Digital Certificates”, “Authentication via Kerberos” and “Communication
Security” and
• for other usage of encryption and decryption within the TOE.
10 Obligations and notes for the usage of the TOE
The operational documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information
about the usage of the TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered.
11 Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the security target [6] of the target of evaluation
(TOE) is provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report.
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12 Definitions
12.1 Acronyms
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal
Office for Information Security, Bonn, Germany
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
DAC Discretionary access control
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
LDAP Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
MAC Mandatory access control
PKI Public Key Infrastructure
PP Protection Profile
PR/SM™ Processor Resource/Systems Manager™
RACF Resource Access Control Facility
SF Security Function
SFP Security Function Policy
SMF System Management Facility
SOF Strength of Function
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSC TSF Scope of Control
TSF TOE Security Functions
TSP TOE Security Policy
12.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more assurance component(s) from CC
Part 3 to an EAL or assurance package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not
contained in part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the
CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics
based on well-established mathematical concepts.
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Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - An entity within the TSC that contains or receives information and
upon which subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent set of security require-
ments for a category of TOEs that meet specific consumer needs.
Security Function - A part or parts of the TOE that have to be relied upon for
enforcing a closely related subset of the rules from the TSP.
Security Target - A set of security requirements and specifications to be used
as the basis for evaluation of an identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined
semantics.
Strength of Function - A qualification of a TOE security function expressing
the minimum efforts assumed necessary to defeat its expected security
behaviour by directly attacking its underlying security mechanisms.
SOF-basic - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against casual breach of TOE
security by attackers possessing a low attack potential.
SOF-medium - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows
that the function provides adequate protection against straightforward or
intentional breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a moderate attack
potential.
SOF-high - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against deliberately planned or
organised breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a high attack
potential.
Subject - An entity within the TSC that causes operations to be performed.
Target of Evaluation - An IT product or system and its associated
administrator and user guidance documentation that is the subject of an
evaluation.
TOE Security Functions - A set consisting of all hardware, software, and
firmware of the TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the
TSP.
TOE Security Policy - A set of rules that regulate how assets are managed,
protected and distributed within a TOE.
TSF Scope of Control - The set of interactions that can occur with or within a
TOE and are subject to the rules of the TSP.
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13 Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 2.3, August 2005
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
(CEM), Evaluation Methodology, Version 2.3, August 2005
[3] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for
the TOE specifically.
- AIS 14, Version 4, 2 April 2007, Anforderungen an Aufbau und
Inhalt der ETR-Teile (Evaluation Technical Report) für
Evaluationen nach CC (Common Criteria)
- AIS 19, Version 3, 2 April 2007, Anforderungen an Aufbau und
Inhalt der Zusammenfassung des ETR (Evaluation Technical
Report) für Evaluationen nach CC (Common Criteria) und ITSEC
- AIS 23, Version 1.0, 7 November 2000, Zusammentragen von
Nachweisen der Entwickler (Collection of Developer Evidence)
- AIS 32, Version 1, 02 July 2001, Übernahme international
abgestimmter CC-Interpretationen ins deutsche Zertifizierungs-
schema.
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148, BSI 7149), periodically
updated list published also on the BSI Web-site
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-0459-2008, Version 4.10, 2008-02-15, Security
Target for IBM z/OS Version 1 Release 9, IBM Corporation
[7] Evaluation Technical Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0459, Version 1.1,
26.02.2008, atsec information security GmbH (confidential document)
[8] Labeled Security Protection Profile (LSPP), Issue 1.b, 08.10.1999
[9] Controlled Access Protection Profile (CAPP), Issue 1.d, 08.10.1999
[10] z/OS V1R9.0 Planning for Multilevel Security and the Common Criteria,
Eighth Edition, March, 2008, GA22-7509-07
BSI-DSZ-CC-0459-2008 Certification Report
C Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part1:
Conformance results (chapter 7.4)
„The conformance result indicates the source of the collection of requirements
that is met by a TOE or PP that passes its evaluation. This conformance result
is presented with respect to CC Part 2 (functional requirements), CC Part 3
(assurance requirements) and, if applicable, to a pre-defined set of
requirements (e.g., EAL, Protection Profile).
The conformance result consists of one of the following:
• CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 conformant if the
functional requirements are based only upon functional components in CC
Part 2.
• CC Part 2 extended - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 extended if the functional
requirements include functional components not in CC Part 2.
plus one of the following:
• CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 conformant if the
assurance requirements are based only upon assurance components in CC
Part 3.
• CC Part 3 extended - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 extended if the assurance
requirements include assurance requirements not in CC Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance result may include a statement made with respect
to sets of defined requirements, in which case it consists of one of the following:
• Package name Conformant - A PP or TOE is conformant to a pre-defined
named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements
(functions or assurance) include all components in the packages listed as
part of the conformance result.
• Package name Augmented - A PP or TOE is an augmentation of a pre-
defined named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the
requirements (functions or assurance) are a proper superset of all
components in the packages listed as part of the conformance result.
Finally, the conformance result may also include a statement made with respect
to Protection Profiles, in which case it includes the following:
• PP Conformant - A TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of
the conformance result.“
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CC Part 3:
Protection Profile criteria overview (chapter 8.2)
“The goal of a PP evaluation is to demonstrate that the PP is complete,
consistent, technically sound, and hence suitable for use as a statement of
requirements for one or more evaluatable TOEs. Such a PP may be eligible for
inclusion within a PP registry.”
“Assurance Class Assurance Family
TOE description (APE_DES)
Security environment (APE_ENV)
Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation PP introduction (APE_INT)
Security objectives (APE_OBJ)
IT security requirements (APE_REQ)
Explicitly stated IT security requirements
(APE_SRE)
Table 3 - Protection Profile families - CC extended requirements ”
Security Target criteria overview (Chapter 8.3)
“The goal of an ST evaluation is to demonstrate that the ST is complete,
consistent, technically sound, and hence suitable for use as the basis for the
corresponding TOE evaluation.”
“Assurance Class Assurance Family
TOE description (ASE_DES)
Security environment (ASE_ENV)
ST introduction (ASE_INT)
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation Security objectives (ASE_OBJ)
PP claims (ASE_PPC)
IT security requirements (ASE_REQ)
Explicitly stated IT security requirements (ASE_SRE)
TOE summary specification (ASE_TSS)
Table 5 - Security Target families - CC extended requirements ”
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Assurance categorisation (chapter 7.5)
“The assurance classes, families, and the abbreviation for each family are
shown in Table 1.
Assurance Class Assurance Family
CM automation (ACM_AUT)
ACM: Configuration management CM capabilities (ACM_CAP)
CM scope (ACM_SCP)
ADO: Delivery and operation Delivery (ADO_DEL)
Installation, generation and start-up (ADO_IGS)
Functional specification (ADV_FSP)
High-level design (ADV_HLD)
Implementation representation (ADV_IMP)
ADV: Development TSF internals (ADV_INT)
Low-level design (ADV_LLD)
Representation correspondence (ADV_RCR)
Security policy modeling (ADV_SPM)
AGD: Guidance documents Administrator guidance (AGD_ADM)
User guidance (AGD_USR)
Development security (ALC_DVS)
ALC: Life cycle support Flaw remediation (ALC_FLR)
Life cycle definition (ALC_LCD)
Tools and techniques (ALC_TAT)
Coverage (ATE_COV)
ATE: Tests Depth (ATE_DPT)
Functional tests (ATE_FUN)
Independent testing (ATE_IND)
Covert channel analysis (AVA_CCA)
AVA: Vulnerability assessment Misuse (AVA_MSU)
Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF)
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA)
Table 1: Assurance family breakdown and mapping”
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Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 11)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that
balances the level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of
acquiring that degree of assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate
concepts of assurance in a TOE at the end of the evaluation, and of
maintenance of that assurance during the operational use of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are
included in the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful
and desirable assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and
components will be considered for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and
STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 11.1)
“Table 6 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a
hierarchically ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families.
Each number in the resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component
where applicable.
As outlined in the next section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation
assurance levels are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance.
They are hierarchically ordered inasmuch as each EAL represents more
assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in assurance from EAL to EAL is
accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher assurance component
from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope, and/or depth)
and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance families
(i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as
described in chapter 7 of this Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no
more than one component of each assurance family and all assurance
dependencies of every component are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other
combinations of assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the
addition of assurance components (from assurance families not already
included in the EAL) or the substitution of assurance components (with another
hierarchically higher assurance component in the same assurance family) to an
EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only EALs may be
augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance component”
is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with it
the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of
the added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be extended
with explicitly stated assurance requirements.
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Assurance Class Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1 EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6 EAL7
Configuration
management
ACM_AUT 1 1 2 2
ACM_CAP 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ACM_SCP 1 2 3 3 3
Delivery and
operation
ADO_DEL 1 1 2 2 2 3
ADO_IGS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Development ADV_FSP 1 1 1 2 3 3 4
ADV_HLD 1 2 2 3 4 5
ADV_IMP 1 2 3 3
ADV_INT 1 2 3
ADV_LLD 1 1 2 2
ADV_RCR 1 1 1 1 2 2 3
ADV_SPM 1 3 3 3
Guidance
documents
AGD_ADM 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_USR 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
support
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 2 2 3
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 2 2 3
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_CCA 1 2 2
AVA_MSU 1 2 2 3 3
AVA_SOF 1 1 1 1 1 1
AVA_VLA 1 1 2 3 4 4
Table 6: Evaluation assurance level summary”
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Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 11.3)
“Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but
the threats to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where
independent assurance is required to support the contention that due care has
been exercised with respect to the protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer,
including independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the
guidance documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could
be successfully conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE,
and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a
manner consistent with its documentation, and that it provides useful protection
against identified threats.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 11.4)
“Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of
design information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the
part of the developer than is consistent with good commercial practice. As such
it should not require a substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a low to moderate level of independently assured security in the
absence of ready availability of the complete development record. Such a
situation may arise when securing legacy systems, or where access to the
developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked
(chapter 11.5)
“Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from
positive security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of
existing sound development practices.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate level of independently assured security, and require a thorough
investigation of the TOE and its development without substantial re-
engineering.”
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Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and
reviewed (chapter 11.6)
“Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security
engineering based on good commercial development practices which, though
rigorous, do not require substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other
resources. EAL4 is the highest level at which it is likely to be economically
feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a moderate to high level of independently assured security in
conventional commodity TOEs and are prepared to incur additional security-
specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested
(chapter 11.7)
“Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security
engineering based upon rigorous commercial development practices supported
by moderate application of specialist security engineering techniques. Such a
TOE will probably be designed and developed with the intent of achieving EAL5
assurance. It is likely that the additional costs attributable to the EAL5
requirements, relative to rigorous development without the application of
specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a high level of independently assured security in a planned development
and require a rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable
costs attributable to specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and
tested (chapter 11.8)
“Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security
engineering techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to
produce a premium TOE for protecting high value assets against significant
risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for
application in high risk situations where the value of the protected assets
justifies the additional costs.”
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Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 11.9)
“Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in
extremely high risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies
the higher costs. Practical application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with
tightly focused security functionality that is amenable to extensive formal
analysis.“
Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF) (chapter 19.3)
“Objectives
Even if a TOE security function cannot be bypassed, deactivated, or corrupted,
it may still be possible to defeat it because there is a vulnerability in the concept
of its underlying security mechanisms. For those functions a qualification of their
security behaviour can be made using the results of a quantitative or statistical
analysis of the security behaviour of these mechanisms and the effort required
to overcome them. The qualification is made in the form of a strength of TOE
security function claim.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA) (chapter 19.4)
"Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the construction and anticipated operation of
the TOE or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses), could allow users to
violate the TSP.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that a user will be able to discover
flaws that will allow unauthorised access to resources (e.g. data), allow the
ability to interfere with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised
capabilities of other users.”
"Application notes
A vulnerability analysis is performed by the developer in order to ascertain the
presence of security vulnerabilities, and should consider at least the contents of
all the TOE deliverables including the ST for the targeted evaluation assurance
level. The developer is required to document the disposition of identified
vulnerabilities to allow the evaluator to make use of that information if it is found
useful as a support for the evaluator's independent vulnerability analysis.”
“Independent vulnerability analysis goes beyond the vulnerabilities identified by
the developer. The main intent of the evaluator analysis is to determine that the
TOE is resistant to penetration attacks performed by an attacker possessing a
low (for AVA_VLA.2 Independent vulnerability analysis), moderate (for
AVA_VLA.3 Moderately resistant) or high (for AVA_VLA.4 Highly resistant)
attack potential.”