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Reference: 2018-54-INF-3132-v1
Target: Público
Date: 11.06.2020
Created by: CERT10
Revised by: CALIDAD
Approved by: TECNICO
CERTIFICATION REPORT
Dossier # 2018-54
TOE TZ v2.4
Applicant B82193210 - Tecnobit S.L.U.
References
[EXT-4404] Certification request
[EXT-5898] Evaluation Technical Report vM0
Certification report of the product TZ v2.4, as requested in [EXT-4404] dated 20/11/2018, and
evaluated by Applus Laboratories, as detailed in the Evaluation Technical Report [EXT-5898]
received on 24/04/2020.
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CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY...........................................................................................................................3
TOE SUMMARY ......................................................................................................................................4
SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS ............................................................................................4
SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS...........................................................................................5
IDENTIFICATION.....................................................................................................................................6
SECURITY POLICIES.................................................................................................................................6
ASSUMPTIONS AND OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT .........................................................................6
CLARIFICATIONS ON NON-COVERED THREATS..................................................................................7
OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT FUNCTIONALITY ...............................................................................7
ARCHITECTURE.......................................................................................................................................7
LOGICAL ARCHITECTURE ....................................................................................................................7
PHYSICAL ARCHITECTURE...................................................................................................................7
DOCUMENTS..........................................................................................................................................8
PRODUCT TESTING.................................................................................................................................9
PENETRATION TESTING..........................................................................................................................9
EVALUATED CONFIGURATION ...............................................................................................................9
EVALUATION RESULTS ...........................................................................................................................9
COMMENTS & RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE EVALUATION TEAM...............................................10
CERTIFIER RECOMMENDATIONS .........................................................................................................10
GLOSSARY.............................................................................................................................................10
BIBLIOGRAPHY .....................................................................................................................................10
SECURITY TARGET / SECURITY TARGET LITE (IF APPLICABLE)..............................................................11
RECOGNITION AGREEMENTS...............................................................................................................12
European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)......................................................12
International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA).....................................................................12
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This document constitutes the Certification Report for the certification file of the product TZ v2.4.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is a cryptographic module that secures communications between
different deployed units for a mission and it implements endorsed cryptographic security functions
to protect the confidentiality of user data according to a security policy of an IT system.
The TOE uses, manages and protects the cryptographic keys and missions for these endorsed
cryptographic security functions.
Developer/manufacturer: Tecnobit S.L.U.
Sponsor: Tecnobit S.L.U..
Certification Body: Centro Criptológico Nacional (CCN) del Centro Nacional de Inteligencia (CNI).
ITSEF: Applus Laboratories
Security Target: TZ Security Target, Version 008, February 28, 2020.
Protection Profile: None.
Evaluation Level: Common Criteria v3.1 R5 EAL2+ (ALC_FLR.1)
Evaluation end date: 25/05/2020
Expiration Date1: 12/06/2025
All the assurance components required by the evaluation level EAL2+ (ALC_FLR.1) have been
assigned a “PASS” verdict. Consequently, the laboratory Applus Laboratories assigns the “PASS”
VERDICT to the whole evaluation due all the evaluator actions are satisfied for the EAL2+
(ALC_FLR.1), as defined by the Common Criteria v3.1 R5 and the CEM v3.1 R5.
Considering the obtained evidences during the instruction of the certification request of the
product TZ v2.4, a positive resolution is proposed.
1
This date refers to the expiration date of the certificate recognition within the scope of the mutual recognition
arrangements signed by this Certification Body.
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TOE SUMMARY
TZ is a portable, light and very small size cryptographic module for protecting data communications.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is a cryptographic module that secures communications between
different deployed units for a mission and it also implements endorsed cryptographic security
functions to protect the confidentiality of user data according to a security policy of an IT system.
The TOE uses, manages and protects the cryptographic keys and missions for these endorsed
cryptographic security functions.
A mission consists in a set of TOE devices, configured within a data transmission mode and how
that transmission is cryptographically protected.
Cryptographic keys involved in TOE communication provide integrity and confidentiality protection
during data transmission.
TOE protects communication data as follows:
 Data: Information is secured following the IPSec protocol according to [RFC4301]. Both,
transport and tunnel IPSec modes are able to be configured.
TOE is composed by two physical isolated zones: the red one encrypts and decrypts data sent or to
be received by the end user; and the black one manages the delivery of these protected data to one
or several endpoints through communication channel.
Devices used by the end user such as computers, which create and process clear data, are
connected to the red zone of the TOE.
The media devices that transmit the protected data, such us Tactical IP radios (HARRIS 7800, PR4G,
Spearnet, etc.) or network devices such as switches, are connected to the black zone of the TOE.
TOE has two working configurations managed by the role that the user using TOE owns. These roles
can be: operator (S.OPERATOR) or management role (S.MANAGEMENT). When the user using the
TOE is an operator role, TOE is able to transmit data in several modes for protecting data
information:
 Unicast: one target communication
 Multicast: several targets communication
Management role is capable of getting audit files and to update software, cryptographic keys and
missions.
SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS
The product was evaluated with all the evidence required to fulfil the evaluation level EAL2 and the
evidences required by the additional component ALC_FLR.1, according to Common Criteria v3.1 R5.
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ASSURANCE CLASS ASSURANCE COMPONENT
ASE: Security Target Evaluation ASE_INT.1. ST Introduction
ASE.CCL.1. Conformance claims
ASE_SPD.1. Security problem definition
ASE_OBJ.2. Security objectives
ASE_ECD.1. Extended component definition
ASE_REQ.2. Derived security requirements
ASE_TSS.1. TOE summary specification
ADV: Development ADV_ARC.1. Security architecture
ADV_FSP.2. Functional specification
ADV_TDS.1. TOE design
AGD: Guidance documents AGD_OPE.1. Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1. Preparative procedures
ALC: Life cycle support ALC_CMC.2. CM capabilities
ALC_CMS.2. CM Scope
ALC_DEL.1. Delivery
ALC_FLR.1. Flaw remediation
ATE: Tests ATE_COV.1. Coverage
ATE_FUN.1. Functional tests
ATE_IND.2. Independent testing
AVA: Vulnerability assessment AVA_VAN.2. Vulnerability analysis
SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS
The product security functionality satisfies the following functional requirements, according to the
Common Criteria v3.1 R5:
SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS
FAU_GEN.1 FMT_MOF.1/TrustedUpdate
FAU_SAR.1 FMT_MSA.1/CONFIG
FAU_STG.2 FMT_MSA.1/RED-BLACK
FAU_STG.4 FMT_MSA.1/SERVICES
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FCS_CKM.2 FMT_MSA.3/CONFIG
FCS_CKM.4 FMT_MSA.3/RED-BLACK
FCS_COP.1 FMT_MSA.3/SERVICES
FDP_ACC.2/CONFIG FMT_MTD.1
FDP_ACC.2/SERVICES FMT_SMF.1
FDP_ACF.1/CONFIG FMT_SMR.1
FDP_ACF.1/SERVICES FPT_FLS.1
FDP_IFC.2 FPT_PHP.1
FDP_IFF.1 FPT_PHP.3
FDP_ITC.1 FPT_PHP.4
FDP_ITC.2 FPT_STM.1
FDP_UCT.1 FPT_TDC.1
FDP_UIT.1 FPT_TOS.1
FIA_509.1 FPT_TST.2
FIA_509.2 FTP_ITC.1
FIA_AFL.1 FTP_ITC.2
FIA_UAU.1 FTP_TRP.1
FMT_MOF.1/AdminAct
IDENTIFICATION
Product: TZ v2.4
Security Target: TZ Security Target, Version 008, February 28, 2020.
Protection Profile: None.
Evaluation Level: Common Criteria v3.1 R5 EAL2+ (ALC_FLR.1).
SECURITY POLICIES
The use of the product TZ v2.4 shall implement a set of security policies assuring the fulfilment of
different standards and security demands.
The detail of these policies is documented in [ST], chapter 3.4 (Organizational Security Policies).
ASSUMPTIONS AND OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
The assumptions detailed in [ST], chapter 3.5 (Assumptions) are constraints to the conditions used
to assure the security properties and functionalities compiled by the security target. These
assumptions have been applied during the evaluation in order to determine if the identified
vulnerabilities can be exploited.
In order to assure the secure use of the TOE, it is necessary to start from these assumptions for its
operational environment. If this is not possible and any of them could not be assumed, it would not
be possible to assure the secure operation of the TOE.
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CLARIFICATIONS ON NON-COVERED THREATS
The threats detailed in [ST], chapter 3.3 (Threats) do not suppose a risk for the product TZ v2.4,
although the agents implementing attacks have the attack potential according to the basic attack
potential of EAL2 and always fulfilling the usage assumptions and the proper security policies
satisfaction.
For any other threat not included in the [ST], the evaluation results of the product security
properties and the associated certificate, do not guarantee any resistance.
OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT FUNCTIONALITY
The product requires the cooperation from its operational environment to fulfil some of the
objectives of the defined security problem.
The security objectives declared for the TOE operational environment are detailed in [ST], chapter
4.2 (Security Objectives for the Operational Environment).
The details of the product operational environment (assumptions, threats and organisational
security policies) and the TOE security requirements are included in the associated security target.
ARCHITECTURE
LOGICAL ARCHITECTURE
The security functions provided by this TOE are:
 Security audit
 Cryptographic support
 User data protection
 Identification and authentication
 Security management
 Protection of the TSF
 Trusted path/channels
PHYSICAL ARCHITECTURE
The physical boundary of the TOE is the TZ device.
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Figure 1. TZ device
DOCUMENTS
The product includes the following documents that shall be distributed and made available
together to the users of the evaluated version.
DOCUMENT FORMAT
T0074000ILS008-MT-507
Manual de Empleo y Mantenimiento de 1er Escalón
Version 008
PDF
T90421000CFG008
Configuración del TZ
Version 008
PDF
T90421000ERR001
Mensajes de Error
Date 06/06/2019
XLS
T90421000PRE009
Manual de configuración del entorno operacional
Version 008
PDF
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PRODUCT TESTING
The developer has executed test for all the security functions, prioritizing the functionality of the
security measures of the TOE that have a great impact in the overall security of the TSF. All the tests
have been performed by the developer in its premises, with a satisfactory result.
In addition, to verify the results of the developer tests and to gain more assurance of the proper
implementation of the TOE, the evaluator has also repeated all the developer functional tests in the
developer premises, verifying that the obtained results are consistent with the results obtained by
the developer.
PENETRATION TESTING
Based on the list of potential vulnerabilities applicable to the TOE in its operational environment,
the evaluation team has devised attack scenarios for penetration tests.
The overall test result is that no deviations were found between the expected and the actual test
results. No attack scenario with the attack potential Basic has been successful in the TOE’s
operational environment as defined in the security target when all measures required by the
developer are applied.
EVALUATED CONFIGURATION
The TOE is defined as a set of hardware, software and firmware contained within a secured
boundary. The boundary provides physical countermeasures to protect stored data from
information disclosures or integrity breaches.
The evaluated configuration setup where it has been evaluated comprises of:
 TZ v2.4 devices.
 A Management Centre (CMAP) laptop.
 A switch to interconnect CMAP to the TZ devices.
 A virtualized workstation to capture all the traffic between CMAP and TZ devices.
 Virtualized workstations acting as information providers to TZ devices.
The TOE also includes the documents identified in section “DOCUMENTS” of this certification report
that shall be distributed and made available together to the users of the evaluated version.
EVALUATION RESULTS
The product TZ v2.4 has been evaluated against the Security Target: TZ Security Target, Version
008, February 28, 2020.
All the assurance components required by the evaluation level EAL2+ (ALC_FLR.1) have been
assigned a “PASS” verdict. Consequently, the laboratory Applus Laboratories assigns the “PASS”
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VERDICT to the whole evaluation due all the evaluator actions are satisfied for the evaluation level
EAL2+ (ALC_FLR.1), as defined by the Common Criteria v3.1 release 5 and the Common
Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation version 3.1 release 5..
COMMENTS & RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE EVALUATION TEAM
There is no additional recommendation from the evaluation team in order to use the TOE since
guidance documentation is enough to make a secure usage of the TOE.
CERTIFIER RECOMMENDATIONS
Considering the obtained evidences during the instruction of the certification request of the
product Applus Laboratories, a positive resolution is proposed.
The certifier strongly recommends to the TOE consumer to strictly follow the guidance that can be
found on section DOCUMENTS of this certification report as well as to observe the operational
environment requirements and assumptions defined in the applicable security target.
The certifier remarks the following point that should be observed by potential consumers:
 The two anti-tampering labels leave traces when they are removed so it is very important to
look for any trace of labels manipulation or any evidence of labels removal before to
operate the TOE.
GLOSSARY
CCN Centro Criptológico Nacional
CNI Centro Nacional de Inteligencia
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
IPSec Internet Protocol security
OC Organismo de Certificación
TOE Target Of Evaluation
BIBLIOGRAPHY
The following standards and documents have been used for the evaluation of the product:
[CC_P1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 1: Introduction and
general model, Version 3.1, R5 Final, April 2017.
[CC_P2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security functional
components, Version 3.1, R5 Final, April 2017.
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[CC_P3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security assurance
components, Version 3.1, R5 Final, April 2017.
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation: Version 3.1, R5 Final,
April 2017.
SECURITY TARGET
Along with this certification report, the complete security target of the evaluation is available in the
Certification Body: TZ Security Target, Version 008, February 28, 2020.
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RECOGNITION AGREEMENTS
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or CC - under
certain conditions was agreed.
European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in April 2010. It
defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition level and, in addition, at
higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS Technical Domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels EAL 1 to EAL
4 and ITSEC Evaluation Assurance Levels E1 to E3 (basic). For "Smartcards and similar devices”, a
SOGIS Technical Domain is in place. For "HW Devices with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical
Domains is in place, too. In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common
Criteria are part of the recognition agreement.
The new agreement has been signed by the national bodies of Austria, Finland, France, Germany,
Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. The current list of
signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on recognition, and the history of the
agreement can be seen on the website at https://www.sogis.org.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the terms of this
agreement by the nations listed above.
The certificate of this TOE is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected.
International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC (Common
Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08 September 2014. It covers
CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP) (exact use), CC certificates based on
assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or the assurance family Flaw Remediation
(ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The CCRA-2014 replaces the old CCRA signed in May 2000 (CCRA-2000). Certificates based on CCRA-
2000, issued before 08 September 2014 are still under recognition according to the rules of CCRA-
2000. For on 08 September 2014 ongoing certification procedures and for Assurance Continuity
(maintenance and re-certification)of old certificates a transition period on the recognition of
certificates according to the rules of CCRA-2000 (i.e. assurance components up to and including EAL
4 or the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR)) is defined until 08 September 2017.
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As of September 2014 the signatories of the new CCRA-2014 are government representatives from
the following nations: Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, The Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the
United States.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on the
website: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates that this
certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the nations listed above.
The certificate of this TOE is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected.