Certification Report Page 1
KECS-CR-20-12
Samsung SDS Database Encryption v1.0
Certification Report
Certification No.: KECS-CISS-0998-2020
2020. 3. 3.
IT Security Certification Center
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History of Creation and Revision
No. Date
Revised
Pages
Description
00 2020.3.3. -
Certification report for Samsung SDS Database Encryption v1.0
- First documentation
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This document is the certification report for Samsung SDS Database Encryption v1.0 of
Samsung SDS Co., Ltd
The Certification Body
IT Security Certification Center
The Evaluation Facility
Korea System Assurance (KOSYAS)
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Table of Contents
1. Executive Summary ................................................................................................... 5
2. Identification............................................................................................................... 9
3. Security Policy.......................................................................................................... 10
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope ................................................................ 10
5. Architectural Information..........................................................................................11
6. Documentation ..........................................................................................................11
7. TOE Testing................................................................................................................11
8. Evaluated Configuration .......................................................................................... 12
9. Results of the Evaluation......................................................................................... 12
9.1 Security Target Evaluation (ASE) .................................................................. 13
9.2 Life Cycle Support Evaluation (ALC)............................................................. 13
9.3 Guidance Documents Evaluation (AGD) ....................................................... 14
9.4 Development Evaluation (ADV)..................................................................... 14
9.5 Test Evaluation (ATE).................................................................................... 14
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment (AVA) .................................................................... 14
9.7 Evaluation Result Summary.......................................................................... 15
10. Recommendations ................................................................................................... 15
11. Security Target.......................................................................................................... 16
12. Acronyms and Glossary .......................................................................................... 17
13. Bibliography ............................................................................................................. 18
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1. Executive Summary
This report describes the certification result drawn by the certification body on the
results of the Samsung SDS Database Encryption v1.0 developed by Samsung SDS
Co., Ltd with reference to the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation (“CC” hereinafter) [1]. It describes the evaluation result and its soundness
and conformity.
The Target of Evaluation (“TOE” hereinafter) is database encryption software. The TOE
provides a variety of security features: security audit, cryptographic operation using
cryptographic module (MagicJCrypto V2.0.0.0) validated under the Korea Cryptographic
Module Validation Program (KCMVP), identification and authentication including mutual
authentication between TOE components, security management, the TOE access session
management, and the TSF protection function.
The evaluation of the TOE has been carried out by Korea System Assurance
(KOSYAS) and completed on February 18, 2020. This report grounds on the
Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [6] KOSYAS had submitted and the Security Target
(ST) [7].
The ST claims strict conformance to the Korean National Protection Profile for
Database Encryption V1.1 [5]. All Security Assurance Requirements (SARs) in the ST
are based only upon assurance component in CC Part 3. The ST and the resulting TOE
is CC Part 3 conformant. The Security Functional Requirements (SFRs) are based upon
both functional components in CC Part 2 and a newly defined component in the
Extended Component Definition chapter of the PP, therefor the ST, and the TOE
satisfies the SFRs in the ST. Therefore, the ST and the resulting TOE is CC Part 2
extended.
The TOE type is classified into the 'API type' depending on the TOE operation type and
TOE consists of Samsung SDS Database Encryption Server v1.0.2 (hereinafter
‘Management Server’) and Samsung SDS Database Encryption Client v1.0.2 (hereinafter
‘Client Module’).
[Figure 1] shows the operating environment of 'API Module, Separate Management
Server separate type'.
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[Figure 1] API-type operational environment (API module, management server separate type)
'API Module, Separate Management Server separate type' means that the client module
is installed in the application server and the management server is physically separated.
[Figure 2] shows the operating environment of 'API module, management server
integrated type'.
[Figure 2] API-type operational environment (API module, management server integrated type)
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'API module, management server integrated type' installs client module and
management server together in Application Server.
The communication among the TOE components shall be based on the encrypted
communication using the approved cryptographic algorithm of the validated
cryptographic module. Even though the TOE is operated as an integrated type, the TSF
data shared among the TOE components through the encrypted communication using
the validated cryptographic module. The external IT entity needed to operate the TOE
includes email server to notify the authorized administrator in case of audit data loss.
The minimum requirements for hardware, software to install and operate the TOE are shown
in [Table 1] below:
Component Minimum requirements
Management
Server
H/W
CPU Intel Core i7-4710HQ 2.5 GHz or higher
RAM 8 GB Memory or higher
HDD Space required for TOE Installation is 20 GB or higher
NIC 10/100/1000 Mbps NIC * 1 EA or higher
S/W
OS
Microsoft Windows Server 2016 Standard 64 bit
CentOS 6.10 64bit (Kernel 2.6)
CentOS 7.7 64bit (Kernel 3.10)
Applications
JRE 8
PostgreSQL 10.10
Tomcat 8.5.49
Client Module
H/W
CPU Intel Core i7-4710HQ 2.5 GHz or higher
RAM 8 GB Memory or higher
HDD Space required for TOE Installation is 10 GB or higher
NIC 10/100/1000 Mbps NIC * 1 EA or higher
S/W
OS
Microsoft Windows Server 2016 Standard 64 bit
CentOS 6.10 64bit (Kernel 2.6)
CentOS 7.7 64bit (Kernel 3.10)
Applications JRE 7, JRE 8
[Table 1] TOE Hardware and Software
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The minimum specifications for hardware and software required for authorized administrator's
PC are as follows.
Component Minimum requirements
Administrator
PC
H/W
CPU Intel Core i7-4710HQ 2.5 GHz or higher
RAM 4 GB Memory or higher
HDD Space required is 10 GB or higher
NIC 10/100/1000 Mbps NIC * 1 EA or higher
S/W
OS Microsoft Windows 10 Enterprise 64 bit
Browser
Internet Explorer 11
Chrome 79
Firefox 72
External IT entities required for the operation of the TOE are as follows.
Classification Description
Mail Server
Server for sending mail to authorized administrators when a potential
security breach is detected.
Certification Validity: The certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by
the government of Republic of Korea or by any other organization that recognizes or
gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the
government of Republic of Korea or by any other organization recognizes or gives
effect to the certificate, is either expressed or implied.
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2. Identification
The TOE reference is identified as follows.
TOE Samsung SDS Database Encryption v1.0
Version v1.0.2
TOE
Components
Samsung SDS Database Encryption Server v1.0.2
Samsung SDS Database Encryption Client v1.0.2
Guidance
Documents
Samsung SDS Database Encryption PRE v1.3
Samsung SDS Database Encryption OPE v1.1
[Table 2] TOE identification
[Table 3] summarizes additional information for scheme, developer, sponsor,
evaluation facility, certification body, etc.
Scheme
Korea Evaluation and Certification Guidelines for IT Security
(August 24, 2017)
Korea Evaluation and Certification Regulation for IT Security
(September 12, 2017)
TOE Samsung SDS Database Encryption v1.0
Common Criteria
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-001 ~
CCMB-2017-04-003, April 2017
Protection Profile
Korean National Protection Profile for Database Encryption
V1.1, KECS-PP-0820a-2017
Developer Samsung SDS Co., Ltd
Sponsor Samsung SDS Co., Ltd
Evaluation Facility Korea System Assurance (KOSYAS)
Completion Date of
Evaluation
February 18, 2020
Certification Body IT Security Certification Center
[Table 3] Additional identification information
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3. Security Policy
The TOE complies security policies defined in the ST [7] by security requirements.
Thus the TOE provides following security features. For more details refer to the ST [7].
TSF Explanation
Security Audit The TOE generates audit records of security relevant events.
Cryptographic
Support
The TOE performs cryptographic operation such as
encryption/decryption, and cryptographic key management such as
key generation/distribution/destruction using cryptographic
modules(MagicJCrypto V2.0.0.0) validated under the KCMVP.
User Data
Protection
The TOE performs encryption/decryption in user database and
removes the origin data.
Identification
and
Authentication
The TOE identifies and authenticates the administrators using
ID/password, mutually authenticates TOE components.
Security
Management
Only the authorized administrator who can access the management
interface provided by TOE can performs security management of the
TOE.
Protection of
the TSF
The TOE provides secure communications amongst TOE
components to protect confidentiality and integrity of the transmitted
data between them.
TOE Access
The TOE manages the authorized administrator’s access to itself by
terminating interactive sessions after defined time interval of their
inactivity.
[Table 4] The TOE Security Functions
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
There are no explicit security problem definition chapter, Therefore, no assumptions
section, in the low assurance ST. Some Security aspects of the operational
environment are added to those of the PP in which the TOE will be used or is intended
to be used (For the detailed and precise definition of the security objectives of the
operational environment, refer to the ST, chapter 3)
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5. Architectural Information
The physical scope of the TOE consists of the Management Server, Client Module,
and guidance. The following security functions are provided by the TOE Logical scope
and boundary of TOE is shown in [Figure 3]
[Figure 3] TOE Logical scope
6. Documentation
The following documentation is evaluated and provided with the TOE by the developer
to the customer.
Identifier Version Date
Samsung SDS Database Encryption PRE v1.3 January 23, 2020
Samsung SDS Database Encryption OPE v1.1 November 26, 2019
[Table 5] Documentation
7. TOE Testing
The developer took a testing approach based on the security services provided by
each TOE component based on the operational environment of the TOE. Each test
case includes the following information:
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 Test no. and conductor: Identifier of each test case and its conductor
 Test Purpose: Includes the security functions and modules to be tested
 Test Configuration: Details about the test configuration
 Test Procedure detail: Detailed procedures for testing each security function
 Expected result: Result expected from testing
 Actual result: Result obtained by performing testing
 Test result compared to the expected result: Comparison between the expected
and actual result
The developer correctly performed and documented the tests according to the
assurance component ATE_FUN.1.
The evaluator has installed the product using the same evaluation configuration and
tools as the developer’s test and performed all tests provided by the developer. The
evaluator has confirmed that, for all tests, the expected results had been consistent
with the actual results. In addition, the evaluator conducted penetration testing based
upon test cases devised by the evaluator resulting from the independent search for
potential vulnerabilities. The evaluator testing effort, the testing approach,
configuration, depth, and results are summarized in the ETR [6].
8. Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is software consisting of the following components:
TOE: Samsung SDS Database Encryption v1.0 (v1.0.2)
- Samsung SDS Database Encryption Server v1.0.2
- Samsung SDS Database Encryption Client v1.0.2
The Administrator can identify the complete TOE reference after installation using the
product’s Info check menu. And the guidance documents listed in this report chapter 6,
[Table 5] were evaluated with the TOE
9. Results of the Evaluation
The evaluation facility provided the evaluation result in the ETR [6] which references
Single Evaluation Reports for each assurance requirement and Observation Reports.
The evaluation result was based on the CC [1] and CEM [2].
As a result of the evaluation, the verdict PASS is assigned to all assurance
components
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9.1 Security Target Evaluation (ASE)
The ST Introduction correctly identifies the ST and the TOE, and describes the TOE in
a narrative way at three levels of abstraction (TOE reference, TOE overview and TOE
description), and these three descriptions are consistent with each other. Therefore,
the verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_INT.1.
The Conformance Claim properly describes how the ST and the TOE conform to the
CC and how the ST conforms to PPs and packages. Therefore, the verdict PASS is
assigned to ASE_CCL.1.
The Security Objectives for the operational environment are clearly defined. Therefore,
the verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_OBJ.1.
The Extended Components Definition has been clearly and unambiguously defined,
and it is necessary. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_ECD.1.
The Security Requirements is defined clearly and unambiguously, and they are
internally consistent. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_REQ.1.
The TOE Summary Specification addresses all SFRs, and it is consistent with other
narrative descriptions of the TOE. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to
ASE_TSS.1.
Thus, the ST is sound and internally consistent, and suitable to be used as the basis
for the TOE evaluation.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ASE.
9.2 Life Cycle Support Evaluation (ALC)
The developer has clearly identified the TOE. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned
to ALC_CMC.1.
The configuration management document verifies that the configuration list includes
the TOE and the evaluation evidence. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to
ALC_CMS.1.
Also the evaluator confirmed that the correct version of the software is installed in
device.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ALC.
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9.3 Guidance Documents Evaluation (AGD)
The procedures and steps for the secure preparation of the TOE have been
documented and result in a secure configuration. Therefore, the verdict PASS is
assigned to AGD_PRE.1.
The operational user guidance describes for each user role the security functionality
and interfaces provided by the TSF, provides instructions and guidelines for the
secure use of the TOE, addresses secure procedures for all modes of operation,
facilitates prevention and detection of insecure TOE states, or it is misleading or
unreasonable. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to AGD_OPE.1.
Thus, the guidance documents are adequately describing the user can handle the
TOE in a secure manner. The guidance documents take into account the various
types of users (e.g. those who accept, install, administrate or operate the TOE) whose
incorrect actions could adversely affect the security of the TOE or of their own data.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class AGD.
9.4 Development Evaluation (ADV)
The functional specifications specify a high-level description of the SFR-enforcing and
SFR-supporting TSFIs, in terms of descriptions of their parameters. Therefore, the
verdict PASS is assigned to ADV_FSP.1.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ADV.
9.5 Test Evaluation (ATE)
The developer correctly performed and documented the tests in the test
documentation. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to ATE_FUN.1.
By independently testing a subset of the TSFI, the evaluator confirmed that the TOE
behaves as specified in the functional specification and guidance documentation.
Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to ATE_IND.1.
Thus, the TOE behaves as described in the ST and as specified in the evaluation
evidence (described in the ADV class).
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ATE.
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment (AVA)
By penetrating testing, the evaluator confirmed that there are no exploitable
vulnerabilities by attackers possessing basic attack potential in the operational
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environment of the TOE. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to AVA_VAN.1.
Thus, potential vulnerabilities identified, during the evaluation of the development and
anticipated operation of the TOE or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses), don’t
allow attackers possessing basic attack potential to violate the SFRs.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class AVA.
9.7 Evaluation Result Summary
Assurance
Class
Assurance
Component
Evaluator Action
Elements
Verdict
Evaluator
Action
Elements
Assurance
Component
Assurance
Class
ASE
ASE_INT.1
ASE_INT.1.1E PASS
PASS
PASS
ASE_INT.1.2E PASS
ASE_CCL.1 ASE_CCL.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_OBJ.1 ASE_OBJ.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_ECD.1
ASE_ECD.1.1E PASS
PASS
ASE_ECD.1.2E PASS
ASE_REQ.1 ASE_REQ.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_TSS.1
ASE_TSS.1.1E PASS
PASS
ASE_TSS.1.2E PASS
ALC
ALC_CMS.1 ALC_CMS.1.1E PASS PASS
PASS
ALC_CMC.1 ALC_CMC.1.1E PASS PASS
AGD
AGD_PRE.1
AGD_PRE.1.1E PASS PASS
PASS
AGD_PRE.1.2E PASS PASS
AGD_OPE.1 AGD_OPE.1.1E PASS PASS
ADV ADV_FSP.1
ADV_FSP.1.1E PASS PASS
PASS
ADV_FSP.1.2E PASS PASS
ATE
ATE_FUN.1 ATE_FUN.1.1E PASS PASS
PASS
ATE_IND.1
ATE_IND.1.1E PASS
PASS
ATE_IND.1.2E PASS
AVA AVA_VAN.1
AVA_VAN.1.1E PASS
PASS PASS
AVA_VAN.1.2E PASS
AVA_VAN.1.3E PASS
[Table 6] Evaluation Result Summary
10. Recommendations
The TOE security functionality can be ensured only in the evaluated TOE operational
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environment with the evaluated TOE configuration, thus the TOE shall be operated by
complying with the followings:
 The TOE must be installed and operated in a physically secure environment
accessible only by authorized administrators and should not allow remote
management from outside.
 The administrator shall maintain a safe state such as application of the latest
security patches, eliminating unnecessary service, change of the default
ID/password, etc., of the operating system and DBMS in the TOE operation.
 The administrator should periodically check a spare space of audit data
storage in case of the audit data loss, and carries out the audit data backup to
prevent audit data loss.
 The developer who uses the TOE to interoperate with the user identification
and authentication function in the operational environment of the business
system shall ensure that the security functions of the TOE are securely applied
in accordance with the requirements of the manual provided with the TOE.
11. Security Target
Samsung SDS Database Encryption v1.0 Security Target v1.3 is included in this report
for reference
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12. Acronyms and Glossary
CC Common Criteria
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
PP Protection Profile
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
TSFI TSF Interface
Database A set of data that is compiled according to a certain
structure in order to receive, save, and provide data
in response to the demand of multiple users to
support multiple application duties at the same time.
Korea Cryptographic
Module Validation
Program(KCMVP)
A system to validate the security and implementation
conformance of cryptographic modules used for
protection of important but not classified information
among the data communicated through the
information and communication network of the
government and public institutions
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13. Bibliography
The certification body has used following documents to produce this report.
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1
Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-001 ~ CCMB-2017-04-003, April, 2017
Part 1: Introduction and general model
Part 2: Security functional components
Part 3: Security assurance components
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version
3.1 Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-004, April, 2017
[3] Korea Evaluation and Certification Guidelines for IT Security (August 24, 2017)
[4] Korea Evaluation and Certification Scheme for IT Security (September 12,
2017)
[5] Korean National Protection Profile for Database Encryption V1.1, December 11,
2019
[6] Samsung SDS Database Encryption v1.0 Evaluation Technical Report Lite
V2.00, February 18, 2020
[7] Samsung SDS Database Encryption v1.0 Security Target v1.3, February 18,
2020