BSI-DSZ-CC-1193-2024
for
SDoT Software Data Diode, SDoT SDD 1.3i
from
INFODAS GmbH
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V5.48
BSI-DSZ-CC-1193-2024 (*)
Netzwerk- und Kommunikationsprodukte
SDoT Software Data Diode, SDoT SDD
1.3i
from INFODAS GmbH
Functionality: Product specific Security Target
Common Criteria Part 2 Extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 5 augmented by ALC_FLR.2, AVA_VAN.5
valid until: 05 December 2029
The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation
facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1
extended by Scheme Interpretations for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT
Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1. CC and CEM are also published as ISO/IEC 15408
and ISO/IEC 18045.
(*) This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report and
Notification. For details on the validity see Certification Report part A chapter 5.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification
scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions
of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for
Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is
either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 5 December 2024
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Sandro Amendola L.S.
Director-General
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 87- D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
SOGIS
Recognition Agreement
for components up to
EAL 4
Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
recognition for components
up to EAL 2 and ALC_FLR
only
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1193-2024
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1193-2024 Certification Report
Contents
A. Certification.....................................................................................................................6
1. Preliminary Remarks....................................................................................................6
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure...............................................................6
3. Recognition Agreements..............................................................................................7
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification................................................................8
5. Validity of the Certification Result.................................................................................8
6. Publication...................................................................................................................9
B. Certification Results......................................................................................................10
1. Executive Summary...................................................................................................11
2. Identification of the TOE............................................................................................12
3. Security Policy...........................................................................................................13
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.....................................................................13
5. Architectural Information............................................................................................14
6. Documentation...........................................................................................................14
7. IT Product Testing......................................................................................................14
8. Evaluated Configuration.............................................................................................16
9. Results of the Evaluation...........................................................................................16
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.....................................................18
11. Security Target.........................................................................................................18
12. Definitions................................................................................................................18
13. Bibliography.............................................................................................................20
C. Excerpts from the Criteria.............................................................................................22
D. Annexes........................................................................................................................ 23
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1193-2024
A. Certification
1. Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● Act on the Federal Office for Information Security1
● BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance2
● BMI Regulations on Ex-parte Costs 3
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern und für Heimat (Federal
Ministry of the Interior and Community)
● DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) [3]
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility, its
approval and licencing process (CC-Stellen) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.14
[1] also published as
ISO/IEC 15408
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
2
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung - BSIZertV) of 17 December
2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231
3
BMI Regulations on Ex-parte Costs - Besondere Gebührenverordnung des BMI für individuell
zurechenbare öffentliche Leistungen in dessen Zuständigkeitsbereich (BMIBGebV), Abschnitt 7 (BSI-
Gesetz) - dated 2 September 2019, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1365
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1193-2024 Certification Report
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published
as ISO/IEC 18045
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
3. Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
3.1. European Recognition of CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS
Technical Domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL 1 to EAL 4. For "Smartcards and similar devices" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in
place. For "HW Devices with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too.
In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of
the recognition agreement.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on
recognition, and the history of the agreement can be seen on the website at
https://www.sogis.eu.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the related bodies of the signatory nations. A disclaimer
beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of recognition.
This certificate is recognized according to the rules of SOGIS-MRA, i.e. up to and including
CC part 3 EAL 4 components. The evaluation contained the component AVA_VAN.5 that is
not mutually recognised in accordance with the provisions of the SOGIS MRA. For mutual
recognition the EAL 4 components of these assurance families are relevant.
3.2. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC
(Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08
September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP)
(exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or
the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection
Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on
the website: https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the related bodies
of the signatory nations. A disclaimer beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of
recognition.
4
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern und für Heimat of 12 February 2007 in the
Bundesanzeiger dated 23 February 2007, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1193-2024
This certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2014, i. e. up to and including
CC part 3 EAL 2 and ALC_FLR components.
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product SDoT Software Data Diode, SDoT SDD, 1.3i has undergone the certification
procedure at BSI.
The evaluation of the product SDoT Software Data Diode, SDoT SDD, 1.3i was conducted
by atsec information security GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 25 November
2024. atsec information security GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)5
recognised by the
certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the applicant is: INFODAS GmbH.
The product was developed by: INFODAS GmbH.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
5. Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report applies only to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance components and assurance levels please refer to CC
itself. Detailed references are listed in part C of this report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-assessment or
re-certification). Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation
and certification procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk
management needs regularly updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-
assessment on a regular e.g. annual basis.
In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved attack methods would
require a re-assessment of the products resistance to state of the art attack methods, the
maximum validity of the certificate has been limited. The certificate issued on 5 December
2024 is valid until 04 December 2029. Validity can be renewed by re-certification.
The owner of the certificate is obliged:
5
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1193-2024 Certification Report
1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product's certification, to refer to
the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report, the Security
Target and user guidance documentation mentioned herein to any customer of the
product for the application and usage of the certified product,
2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of the
product that have been identified by the developer or any third party after issuance
of the certificate,
3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security relevant
changes in the evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and production sites
or processes, occur, or the confidentiality of documentation and information related
to the Target of Evaluation (TOE) or resulting from the evaluation and certification
procedure where the certification of the product has assumed this confidentiality
being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of
confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the
evaluation and certification procedure that do not belong to the deliverables
according to the Certification Report part B, or for those where no dissemination
rules have been agreed on, to third parties, the Certification Body at BSI has to be
informed.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
6. Publication
The product SDoT Software Data Diode, SDoT SDD, 1.3i has been included in the BSI list
of certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet:
https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline
+49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer6
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
6
INFODAS GmbH
INFODAS Gesellschaft für Systementwicklung und Informationsverarbeitung mbH
Rhonestraße 2
50765 Köln
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1193-2024
B. Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1193-2024 Certification Report
1. Executive Summary
The TOE (SDoT SDD SW) is the software for the product SDoT Software Data Diode
(hardware and software) of INFODAS GmbH. The TOE version is 1.3i.
The SDoT SDD serves as boundary protection device between IP Networks with different
demands on the level of protection needed. These two IP networks are identified as
Source (SRC) and Destination (DST), and SDoT SDD ensures that there is no data
leakage from DST to SRC but data from SRC to DST can always pass the TOE.
The TOE is an application delivered together with a set of software and hardware
components, which are considered part of the TOE environment.
The TOE implements the following major security features:
• Limitation of message flow from SRC to DST i.e., messages coming from DST are
not accepted and blocked by the TOE;
• Analysis and sanitization of necessary protocol-specific responses;
• Accepting of connections on configured ports, only. For each port, only correct
communication according to the configured protocol is allowed;
• Provision of secure auditing mechanisms of logs and secure administration
capabilities;
• Provision of authentication mechanisms;
• Preservation of a secure state in case of compromising events being detected;
• Implementation of regular checks for integrity of TOE binary and configuration files.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is not based on a certified
Protection Profile.
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 5
augmented by ALC_FLR.2, AVA_VAN.5.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 7. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and
some of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionality:
TOE Security
Functionality
Addressed issue
SF_PR:
Protocol Response
The TOE provides unidirectional protocol transfer from SRC- to DST network and
protocol status responding mechanisms to SRC network which is the main security
functionality of the TOE.
SF_CP:
Channel Protection
The TOE enforces HTTP response SFP, ICAP header SFP, ICAP response SFP
and NTP synchronize SFP on all protocol data units which are sent from DST- to
SRC network. The TOE sanitises any protocol responses sent in direction of SRC
network. A sanitised response only contains a known status code and a pre-
configured corresponding string which shortly describes the status code.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1193-2024
TOE Security
Functionality
Addressed issue
SF_DP:
Data Protection
The TOE protects TSF data from modification with periodic integrity checks. These
are general configuration data, audit parameters, and public certificates. These
parameters are integrity protected with a fingerprint value, for cross-checking with
known answer stored on the server smartcard. The parameter values are
transferred encrypted between the SDoT Adminstation and the TOE via a
dedicated admin network over a mutually authenticated TLS connection. However,
the secure TLS connection itself is not within the scope of the TOE. The Crypto
Unit provides the cryptographic support for signature generation.
SF_AA:
Authentication and
Authorisation
The TOE includes security functionalities to provide authentication and
authorisation mechanisms which addresses the related SFRs. The TOE supports a
secure channel initiated by the SDoT Adminstation within a dedicated admin
network. Based on Admin TLS connection establishment, the authentication and
authorisation can be performed.
SF_AT:
Audit Trail
Upon detection of a potential security violation the TOE takes the following actions:
a) The TOE sends an e-mail to a configurable list of addresses
b) Generates an audit entry into the audit trail
c) Indicates the potential security violation on the audit GUI
For each auditable event resulting from an action of the authenticated human user,
the TOE associates the audit record unambiguously with the user role who
performed any auditable action.
SF_SP:
Self Protection
The TOE includes several functionalities to provide self-protection mechanisms.
The TOE enforces the policy dual control admin SFP on all users attempting to
change the general TOE configuration The TOE enforces that two different users of
role administrator are required to be able to change (modify, insert, delete) the
general TOE configuration.
The TOE ensures that no message flow from SRC- to DST network is possible in
maintenance mode
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 8.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6] and [9],
chapter 3.2. Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of
Assumptions, Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security
Target [6] and [9], chapter 3.
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2. Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1193-2024 Certification Report
SDoT Software Data Diode, SDoT SDD, 1.3i
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
1 SW Installation ISO for installation of the TOE on the SDot SDD 1.3i DVD
2 DOC Manual for SDoT SDD: SDoT SDD-1.3-I-UM-DE/EN-1.6 1.3i Provided digitally
via E-Mail in
Portable Document
Format
3 DOC Product information sheet: SDoT SDD-1.3-I-PI-DE-0.11 1.3i
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
The TOE is delivered to the customer on an installation DVD (see item #1 in table 2
above), which contains a minimal buildroot system, the signed UEFI-Bootlader and the
signed TOE and L4-microkernel components. The DVD is burnt using respective signed
ISO9660-images available for various target system architectures. As all components are
signed with a GPG key and cannot be modified once burnt to DVD, the integrity of the TOE
is guaranteed during delivery. Confidentiality is of no concern, so no additional measures
are implemented.
Guidance documentation is provided as password-protected PDF to the customer via
encrypted email or via the Infodas Download portal, where the files can be placed
encrypted for the respective customer for download using TLS version 1.2 or 1.3. In
addition to the integrity protection provided by TLS during download, the password
protection of the PDF files ensures that the files cannot be edited.
3. Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues: The security policy enforced is
defined by the selected set of Security Functional Requirements and implemented by the
TOE. The TOE implements two role-based access control policy to control access to the
system for administrators and auditors, respectively. Regarding the modification of the
TOE configuration, the TOE implements a dual-control policy requiring two separate
administrators to activate such a configuration modification.
Data may only pass the TOE from the configured SRC network to the configured DST
network as covered by a respective security policy. Due to standard communication
protocols used, respective protocol-specific responses must be returned to the configured
SRC network. The TOE implements response sanitation policies that ensure that no
sensitive information is contained in those responses.
In order to enable time synchronization between the servers in the configured DST
network and the servers in the configured SRC network, the TOE implements an NTP
synchronization policy allowing for such synchronization without those servers needing to
directly interact with each other.
Specific details concerning the above-mentioned security policies can be found in chapter
5 of the Security Target [6]. and [9]
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1193-2024
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are
of relevance:
OE.DIFF_NET, OE.TRUSTW_ONLY, OE.ACCESS, OE.TRUSTW_STAFF,
OE.CRYPTO_UNIT, OE.CRYPTO_UNIT_USER, OE.PKI, OE.NTP_SERVER,
OE.L4_PLATTFORM, OE.DEDICATED_ADMIN_NET, OE.HIGH_AVAILABILITY,
OE.BOOT
Details can be found in the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 4.2.
5. Architectural Information
The Target of Evaluation is the software application SDoT SDD SW at version 1.3i, which
is integral part of the INFODAS product SDoT SDD. The TOE is software only and is
accompanied by guidance documentation.
The TOE can be installed on dedicated hardware and firmware provided by INFODAS for
that purpose and as part of the overall SDoT SDD product- The hardware, firmware and
the operating system are not part of the TOE but together form the underlying platform for
TOE operation.
The TOE and its configuration is managed by a separate, administrative component, i.e.
the SDoT Adminstation, consisting of hardware and software components and also being
part of the operational environment of the TOE.
6. Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7. IT Product Testing
7.1. DeveloperTesting
Test Approach
The developer performed all tests against the user-visible interfaces of the TOE. In some
cases, data is analysed or manipulated outside the TOE:
• verify the contents of the audit harddisk after detaching it from the TOE
• manipulate the contents of the audit harddisk after detaching it from the TOE
Test Configuration
The evaluated configuration was performed according to the ST. and the guide that details
the CC-related requirements. The only exception is, no other SDoT SDD was installed in
the ITSEF lab and therefore high availability (HA) testing is not possible.
Component Version
SDoT SDD (TOE) 1.3.1360.33832 P3 (which is equivalent to 1.3.3.1360.33832)
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1193-2024 Certification Report
Component Version
SDoT Adminstation 1.6 P4
Test client HIGH/LOW Rockylinux 9.2
Smartcard Smartcard with CardOS 5.3 QES and Middleware v5.4 from ATOS
Table 3: Test Configuration
Results
All developer tests showed the expected results.
7.2. Evaluator Testing
Test Approach
As for the developer tests, the evaluator used the user-visible external interfaces of the
TOE for the tests.
The following is a list of tested TOE functions (i.e. the affected SFRs) covered by the
independent evaluator tests:
• Input sanitization of GUI (FMT_MTD.3)
• Secure values test for MTD.3 (FMT_MTD.3)
• Allowed HTTP methods (FDP_IFC.2/HTTP, FDP_IFF.1/HTTP)
• Multiple NTP server (FDP_IFF.1/NTP)
• TLS support on Admin interface (no longer in scope after [ST]. update)
• HTTP parsing (FDP_IFC.2/HTTP, FDP_IFF.1/HTTP)
• TLS support on HA interface (no longer scope after [ST]. update)
• Mail from DST to SRC (FDP_IFC.2)
• TOE binary hash calculation (FPT_INC.1)
The tests were mainly defined to exercise TSFI specifications, but also to verify claims
made in the architecture/design documentation.
The evaluated configuration was performed according to the ST and the guide that details
the CC-related requirements. The TOE and environment configuration was equivalent to
the developer test setup.
Test results
All tests were successfully executed without relevant deviations.
7.3. Penetration Testing
Test Approach
The evaluator used the MITRE CVE portal and general Google searches to find publicly
documented vulnerabilities against the TOE or its involved components. In addition the
evaluator examined the ST, guidance, design and testing information which lead to
different types of tests:
• rather simple tool runs like testssl or nmap
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1193-2024
• tests using the normal TOE functions and interfaces manually
• source code reviews for usage of insecure functions
Tests have been performed for the following potential vulnerable scenarios:
• Data leakage through back channels
• Data exfiltration from DST to SRC (NTP)
• Undocumented network interfaces/services
• Potential software weaknesses in C/C++ implementation
• HTTP vulnerabilities within HTTP request or responses
• SMTP header parsing
• Information gathering through system/service fingerprinting
• TLS vulnerabilities
• Improper data handling during startup
• Proper enforcement of connection limits
• Certificate validation
Test results
All tests run successfully against the current TOE. The tests showed at most minor
deviations from the expected results. The evaluator did not find any exploitable
vulnerability through testing.
8. Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE: The Target of Evaluation
is the software application SDoT SDD SW at version 1.3i, which is integral part of the
INFODAS product SDoT SDD. The TOE is software only and is accompanied by guidance
documentation. The items listed in table 2 above represent the TOE.
9. Results of the Evaluation
9.1. CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL 5
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance
specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 34).
The following guidance specific for the technology was used:
(i) Joint Interpretation Library: Collection of Developer Evidence, version 1.5 as of
January 2012.
(ii) AIS see [4].
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1193-2024 Certification Report
● All components of the EAL 5 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
● The components ALC_FLR.2, AVA_VAN.5 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
The evaluation has confirmed:
● for the Functionality: Product specific Security Target
Common Criteria Part 2 Extended
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 5 augmented by ALC_FLR.2, AVA_VAN.5
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification
procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). But cryptographic functionalities with a
security level of lower than 120 bits can no longer be regarded as secure without
considering the application context. Therefore, for these functionalities it shall be checked
whether the related crypto operations are appropriate for the intended system. Some
further hints and guidelines can be derived from the 'Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102'
(https://www.bsi.bund.de).
The following table gives an overview of the cryptographic functionalities inside the TOE to
enforce the security policy and outlines its rating from cryptographic point of view. Any
Cryptographic Functionality that is marked in column 'Security Level above 120 Bits' of the
following table with 'no' achieves a security level of lower than 120 Bits (in general context)
only. Note that the column “Security Level” refers to the pure cryptographic (mathematical)
strength only, and does not take into account whatever exploitable weaknesses induced by
side-channel leakage, physical attacks, or implementation flaws of any kind.
No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in Bits Security
Level
above
120 Bits
Comments
1 Role
Identification
X.509 certificates [RFC5246]
(TLS1.2)
[RFC5758]
N/A N/A Certificates are
generated
externally and
imported into the
TOE by a
competent
administrator.
2 Role
Identification
ECDSA signature
verification using
SHA-2
ANSI X9.62
[FIPS180-4]
(SHA)
secp384r1
brainpoolP384r1
brainpoolP512r1
yes Signature
verification: TOE
Hashing: TOE
3 Audit data
encryption
AES in GCM mode [FIPS197],
[SP800-38D]
Key length: 256 yes The smart card
provides the AES
key used by the
TOE.
4 HMAC HMAC-SHA-384 HMAC-SHA-384 Key length: 384 yes Private key is
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No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in Bits Security
Level
above
120 Bits
Comments
computation
for audit
records
stored on the
smart card.
5 HMAC
computation
for audit
records
SHA-2
SHA-384
[FIPS180-4] N/A yes
6 Hash
computation
for integrity
check
SHA-2
SHA-384
[FIPS180-4] N/A yes
Table 4: TOE cryptographic functionality
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9 has
to be considered by the user and his system risk management process, too.
If available, certified updates of the TOE should be used. If non-certified updates or
patches are available the user of the TOE should request the sponsor to provide a re-
certification. In the meantime a risk management process of the system using the TOE
should investigate and decide on the usage of not yet certified updates and patches or
take additional measures in order to maintain system security.
11. Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [9] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report. It is a sanitised version of
the complete Security Target [6] used for the evaluation performed. Sanitisation was
performed according to the rules as outlined in the relevant CCRA policy (see AIS 35 [4]).
12. Definitions
12.1. Acronyms
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
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BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CA Certification Authority
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
cPP Collaborative Protection Profile
DVD Digital Versatile Disc
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
FSD Field Structured Data
FW Firmware
GUI Graphical User Interface
HMAC Hash Message Authentication Code
HTTP / S Hypertext Transfer Protocol / Secure
HW Hardware
ICAP Internet Content Adaptation Protocol
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
L2H Low-to-high
L4 Implementation of microkernel L4
NTP Network Time Protocol
PP Protection Profile
RNG Random Number Generator
RTF Rich Text Format
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SdoT Security Inter-Domain Transition
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SMTP Simple Mail Transfer Protocol
ST Security Target
TCP Transmission Control Protocol
TLS Transport Layer Security
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
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UDP User Datagram Protocol
UEFI Unified Extensible Firmware Interface
12.2. Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Package - named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements
Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
13. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 5, April 2017
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 5, April 2017,
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[3] BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) and Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility,
approval and licencing (CC-Stellen), https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung
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[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE7
https://www.bsi.bund.de/AIS
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
on the BSI Website, https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierungsreporte
[6] SDoT SDD Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-1193-2024, Version 2.2 14.10.2024,
Infodas GmbH (confidential document)
[7] Final Evaluation Technical Report, Version 2, 21.11.2024, atsec information security
GmbH, (confidential document)
[8] Configuration List SDoT Software Data Diode 1.3.3i, Version 0.4, 2024-08-07,
Infodas GmbH (confidential document)
[9] SDoT SDD Security Target Lite, BSI-DSZ-CC-1193-2024, Version 1.1, 06.11.2024,
INFODAS GmbH (sanitised public document)
[10] Manual for SDoT SDD (SDoT Software Data Diode - Handbuch), Version SDoT
SDD-1.3-I-UM-DE/EN-1.6, July 2024, Infodas GmbH
[11] Product information sheet (SDoT Software Data Diode - Produktinformation),
Version SDoT SDD-1.3-I-PI-DE-0.11,Oktober 2024, Infodas GmbH
[12] Joint Interpretation Library: Collection of Developer Evidence, version 1.5 as of
January 2012.
7
specifically
• AIS 1, Version 14, Durchführung der Ortsbesichtigung in der Entwicklungsumgebung des Herstellers
• AIS 20, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für deterministische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 23, Version 4, Zusammentragen von Nachweisen der Entwickler (Collection of Developer
Evidence)
• AIS31, Version 3.0, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
• AIS 34, Version 3, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL 5+ (CCv2.3 &
CCv3.1) and EAL 6 (CCv3.1)
• AIS 35, Version 2, Öffentliche Fassung des Security Targets (ST-Lite) including JIL Document and
CC Supporting Document and CCRA policies
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C. Excerpts from the Criteria
For the meaning of the assurance components and levels the following references to the
Common Criteria can be followed:
• On conformance claim definitions and descriptions refer to CC part 1 chapter 10.5
• On the concept of assurance classes, families and components refer to CC Part 3
chapter 7.1
• On the concept and definition of pre-defined assurance packages (EAL) refer to CC
Part 3 chapters 7.2 and 8
• On the assurance class ASE for Security Target evaluation refer to CC Part 3
chapter 12
• On the detailed definitions of the assurance components for the TOE evaluation
refer to CC Part 3 chapters 13 to 17
• The table in CC part 3, Annex E summarizes the relationship between the
evaluation assurance levels (EAL) and the assurance classes, families and
components.
The CC are published at https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/cc/
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D. Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
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