KECS-CR-23-40
D'Amo v5.0
Certification Report
Certification No.: KECS-CISS-1246-2023
2023. 6. 15.
IT Security Certification Center
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History of Creation and Revision
No. Date
Revised
Pages
Description
00 2023.06.15. -
Certification report for D'Amo v5.0
- First documentation
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This document is the certification report for D'Amo v5.0 of Penta Security
Systems Inc.
The Certification Body
IT Security Certification Center
The Evaluation Facility
The Korea Security Evaluation Laboratory (KSEL)
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Table of Contents
Certification Report ....................................................................................................1
1. Executive Summary.............................................................................................5
2. Identification.........................................................................................................9
3. Security Policy ...................................................................................................10
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.......................................................... 11
5. Architectural Information .................................................................................. 11
6. Documentation...................................................................................................12
7. TOE Testing........................................................................................................12
8. Evaluated Configuration....................................................................................13
9. Results of the Evaluation ..................................................................................14
9.1 Security Target Evaluation (ASE)............................................................14
9.2 Life Cycle Support Evaluation (ALC) ......................................................14
9.3 Guidance Documents Evaluation (AGD).................................................15
9.4 Development Evaluation (ADV)..............................................................15
9.5 Test Evaluation (ATE).............................................................................15
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment (AVA)..............................................................16
9.7 Evaluation Result Summary ...................................................................16
10. Recommendations.............................................................................................17
11. Security Target ...................................................................................................18
12. Acronyms and Glossary....................................................................................19
13. Bibliography.......................................................................................................19
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1. Executive Summary
This report describes the certification result drawn by the certification body on the results
of the EAL1+ evaluation of D'Amo v5.0 with reference to the Common Criteria for
Information Technology Security Evaluation (“CC” hereinafter) [1]. It describes the
evaluation result and its soundness and conformity.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is database encryption software to prevent the
unauthorized disclosure of confidential information by encrypting the database.
The TOE consists of D’Amo API Agent, D’Amo Plug-in Agent, D’Amo KMS, and the
related guidance documents. The TOE includes a cryptographic module (CIS-CC V4.0)
validated under the Korea Cryptographic Module Validation Program (KCMVP).
The TOE provides a variety of security features: security audit, cryptographic support,
user data protection, identification and authentication including mutual authentication
between TOE components, security management, protection of the TSF, and TOE
access functions.
The evaluation of the TOE has been carried out by Korea Security Evaluation Laboratory
(KSEL) and completed on May 23, 2023. This report grounds on the evaluation technical
report (ETR) [3] KSEL had submitted and the Security Target (ST) [4].
The ST claims strict conformance to the Korean National Protection Profile for Database
Encryption V1.1 (“PP” hereinafter) [5]. All Security Assurance Requirements (SARs) in
the ST are based only upon assurance component in CC Part 3, and the TOE satisfies
the SARs of Evaluation Assurance Level EAL1 augmented by ATE_FUN.1. Therefore,
the ST and the resulting TOE is CC Part 3 conformant. The Security Functional
Requirements (SFRs) are based upon both functional components in CC Part 2 and
newly defined components in the Extended Component Definition chapter of the PP, and
the TOE satisfies the SFRs in the ST. Therefore, the ST and the resulting TOE is CC Part
2 extended.
The TOE operational environment can be classified into plug-in type and API type.
[Figure 1] shows the operational environment of the plug-in type. The agent installed in
the protected DB server encrypts the user data of the application server before storing it
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in the DB according to the policy configured by the authorized administrator, and decrypts
the encrypted user data before sending to the application server.
[Figure 1] TOE Operational Environment : Plug-in type (D'Amo Plug-in Agent, D'Amo KMS
separate type)
[Figure 2] shows the operational environment of the API type. The application providing
the application service, which is installed in the application server, is developed using
the APIs provided by the D’Amo API Agent in order to use the cryptographic functions of
the TOE. D'Amo API Agent is installed in the application server and performs
encryption/decryption of the user data in accordance with the policies configured by
authorized administrator. The user data entered by the application service user is
encrypted by D'Amo API Agent, then sent to the database server. The encrypted user
data received from the database server is decrypted by D'Amo API Agent, then sent to
the application service user.
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[Figure 2] TOE Operational Environment :API type (D'AmoAPIAgent, D'Amo KMS separate type)
The TOE implements secure communications between the TOE components to protect
the transmitted data using the validated cryptographic module. The mail server that is an
external IT entity of the TOE sends security alert mails to the authorized administrator.
The following tables show the hardware and software requirements necessary for
installation and operation of the TOE.
Component Specification
H/W
CPU Intel-Pentium-Processor-G4600-3M-Cache-3.60 GHz or higher
RAM 8 GB or higher
HDD 50 GB or higher (Space required for TOE installation)
NIC 10/100/1000 Mbps x 1EA or higher
S/W
OS Ubuntu 20.04 64bit (Kernel 5.4.0-135)
Java java 1.8.0
[Table 1] Hardware and Software Requirements for D’Amo API Agent
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Component Specification
H/W
CPU Intel-Pentium-Processor-G4600-3M-Cache-3.60 GHz or higher
RAM 8 GB or higher
HDD 50 GB or higher (Space required for TOE installation)
NIC 10/100/1000 Mbps x 1EA or higher
S/W
OS
Ubuntu 20.04 64bit (Kernel 5.4.0-135)
Oracle Linux 8.4 64bit (Kernel 5.4.17-2102.201.3.el8uek)
Windows Server 2019 64bit
DBMS
Tibero 6 *
CUBRID 10.2 *
Oracle 19.3 **
SQL Server 2019 Enterprise ***
* Tibero and CUBRID are installed in Ubuntu.
** Oracle is installed in Oracle Linux
*** SQL Server is installed in Windows Server
Java java 1.8.0
[Table 2] Hardware and Software Requirements for D’Amo Plug-in Agent
Component Specification
H/W
CPU Intel® Core™ I3-9100 Processor 3.6 GHz or higher
RAM 16 GB or higher
HDD 50 GB or higher (Space required for TOE installation)
NIC 10/100/1000 Mbps x 1EA or higher
S/W
OS Ubuntu 20.04 64bit (Kernel 5.4.0-144)
Java java 1.8.0
DBMS Postgresql 15.1
3rd
Party
S/W
OpenSSL 1.1.1t
Nginx 1.24.0
Node.js 18.12.1
libwrap0 7.6
[Table 3] Hardware and Software Requirements for D’Amo KMS
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Certification Validity: The certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the
government of Republic of Korea or by any other organization that recognizes or gives
effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the government of
Republic of Korea or by any other organization recognizes or gives effect to the
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2. Identification
The TOE consists of D’Amo API Agent, D’Amo Plug-in Agent, D’Amo KMS, and the
related guidance documents.
TOE D'Amo v5.0
Version v5.0
Detail version v5.0.3
TOE
Components
D’Amo API Agent D’Amo API Agent v5.0.2
D’Amo Plug-in Agent D’Amo Plug-in Agent for Tibero v5.0.2
D’Amo Plug-in Agent for CUBRID v5.0.2
D’Amo Plug-in Agent for Oracle v5.0.2
D’Amo Plug-in Agent for MSSQL v5.0.2
D’Amo KMS D’Amo KMS v5.0.3
Guidance
Document
- D’Amo v5.0 Preparation procedure and user operation
v1.1(D’Amo API Agent)
- D’Amo v5.0 Preparation procedure and user operation
v1.1(D'Amo Plug-in Agent)
- D’Amo v5.0 Preparation procedure and user operation
v1.1(D'Amo KMS)
[Table 4] TOE identification
Scheme
Korea Evaluation and Certification Guidelines for IT Security
(MSIT Notice No.2022-61, October 31, 2022)
Korea Evaluation and Certification Regulation for IT Security
(May 17, 2021)
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TOE D'Amo v5.0
Common Criteria
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1 Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-001 ~ CCMB-2017-04-
003, April 2017
EAL EAL1+ (ATE_FUN.1)
Protection Profile Korean National Protection Profile for Database Encryption V1.1
Developer Penta Security System Inc.
Sponsor Penta Security System Inc.
Evaluation Facility Korea Security Evaluation Laboratory (KSEL)
Completion Date
of Evaluation
May 23, 2023
Certification Body IT Security Certification Center
[Table 5] Additional identification information
3. Security Policy
The TOE complies security policies pertaining to the following security functional
requirements defined in the ST [4].
- Security Audit
- Cryptographic Support
- Identification and Authentication
- User Data Protection
- Protection of the TSF
- Security Management
- TOE Access
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4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
There are no Assumptions in the Security Problem Definition in the ST [4]. The scope
of this evaluation is limited to the functionality and assurance covered in the Security
Target.
This evaluation covers only the specific software version identified in this document,
and not any earlier or later versions released or in process. (for the detailed information
of TOE version and TOE Components version refer to the [Table 4]).
5. Architectural Information
TOE consists of the D’Amo API Agent, D’Amo Plug-in Agent, and D’Amo KMS. The
TOE includes cryptographic modules (CIS-CC V4.0) validated under the KCMVP.
[Figure 3] and [Figure 4] show the logical scope of the TOE.
[Figure3]LogicalscopeoftheTOE:Plug-intype(D’AmoPlug-inAgent,D’AmoKMSseparatetype)
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[Figure4]LogicalscopeoftheTOE: APItype(D’Amo API Agent,D’AmoKMSseparatetype)
6. Documentation
The following documentation is evaluated and provided with the TOE by the developer
to the customer.
Identifier Release Date
D’Amo v5.0 Preparation procedure and user
operation v1.1(D’Amo API Agent)
v1.1 May 4, 2023
D’Amo v5.0 Preparation procedure and user
operation v1.1(D'Amo Plug-in Agent)
v1.1 May 4, 2023
D’Amo v5.0 Preparation procedure and user
operation v1.1(D'Amo KMS)
v1.1 May 4, 2023
[Table 6] Documentation
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7. TOE Testing
The developer took a testing approach based on the security services provided by each
TOE component based on the operational environment of the TOE. Each test case
includes the following information:
 Test no.: Identifier of each test case
 Test Purpose: Includes the security functions to be tested
 Test Configuration: Details about the test configuration
 Test Procedure detail: Detailed procedures for testing each security function
 Expected result: Result expected from testing
 Actual result: Result obtained by performing testing
 Test result compared to the expected result: Comparison between the expected
and actual result
The developer correctly performed and documented the tests according to the assurance
component ATE_FUN.1.
The evaluator has installed the product using the same evaluation configuration and tools
as the developer’s test and performed all tests provided by the developer. The evaluator
has confirmed that, for all tests, the expected results had been consistent with the actual
results. In addition, the evaluator conducted penetration testing based upon test cases
devised by the evaluator resulting from the independent search for potential
vulnerabilities. The evaluator testing effort, the testing approach, configuration, depth,
and results are summarized in the ETR [3].
8. Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is D'Amo v5.0 (the version of the TOE is v5.0.3). See [Table 4] for detailed
information on the TOE components. The TOE is installed from the CD-ROM distributed
by Penta Security Systems Inc. The TOE is identified by TOE name and version number
including release number. The TOE identification information is provided via GUI, API
and Report.
And the guidance documents listed in this report chapter 6, [Table 6] were evaluated with
the TOE.
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9. Results of the Evaluation
The evaluation facility provided the evaluation result in the ETR [3] which references
Single Evaluation Reports for each assurance requirement and Observation Reports.
The evaluation result was based on the CC [1] and CEM [2].
As a result of the evaluation, the verdict PASS is assigned to all assurance components
of EAL1+(ATE_FUN.1).
9.1 Security Target Evaluation (ASE)
The ST Introduction correctly identifies the ST and the TOE, and describes the TOE in a
narrative way at three levels of abstraction (TOE reference, TOE overview and TOE
description), and these three descriptions are consistent with each other. Therefore, the
verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_INT.1.
The Conformance Claim properly describes how the ST and the TOE conform to the CC
and how the ST conforms to PPs and packages. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned
to ASE_CCL.1.
The Security Objectives for the operational environment are clearly defined. Therefore,
the verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_OBJ.1.
The Extended Components Definition has been clearly and unambiguously defined, and
it is necessary. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_ECD.1.
The Security Requirements is defined clearly and unambiguously, and they are internally
consistent. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_REQ.1.
The TOE Summary Specification addresses all SFRs, and it is consistent with other
narrative descriptions of the TOE. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_TSS.1.
Thus, the ST is sound and internally consistent, and suitable to be used as the basis for
the TOE evaluation.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ASE.
9.2 Life Cycle Support Evaluation (ALC)
The developer has uniquely identified the TOE. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned
to ALC_CMC.1.
The configuration management document verifies that the configuration list includes the
TOE and the evaluation evidence. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to
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ALC_CMS.1.
Also, the evaluator confirmed that the correct version of the software is installed in device.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ALC.
9.3 Guidance Documents Evaluation (AGD)
The procedures and steps for the secure preparation of the TOE have been documented
and result in a secure configuration. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to
AGD_PRE.1.
The operational user guidance describes for each user role the security functionality and
interfaces provided by the TSF, provides instructions and guidelines for the secure use
of the TOE, addresses secure procedures for all modes of operation, facilitates
prevention and detection of insecure TOE states, or it is misleading or unreasonable.
Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to AGD_OPE.1.
Thus, the guidance documents are adequately describing the user can handle the TOE
in a secure manner. The guidance documents take into account the various types of
users (e.g. those who accept, install, administrate or operate the TOE) whose incorrect
actions could adversely affect the security of the TOE or of their own data.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class AGD.
9.4 Development Evaluation (ADV)
The functional specifications specify a high-level description of the SFR-enforcing and
SFR-supporting TSFIs, in terms of descriptions of their parameters. Therefore, the
verdict PASS is assigned to ADV_FSP.1.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ADV.
9.5 Test Evaluation (ATE)
The developer correctly performed and documented the tests in the test documentation.
Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to ATE_FUN.1.
By independently testing a subset of the TSFI, the evaluator confirmed that the TOE
behaves as specified in the functional specification and guidance documentation.
Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to ATE_IND.1.
Thus, the TOE behaves as described in the ST and as specified in the evaluation
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evidence (described in the ADV class).
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ATE.
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment (AVA)
By penetrating testing, the evaluator confirmed that there are no exploitable
vulnerabilities by attackers possessing basic attack potential in the operational
environment of the TOE. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to AVA_VAN.1.
Thus, potential vulnerabilities identified, during the evaluation of the development and
anticipated operation of the TOE, don’t allow attackers possessing basic attack potential
to violate the SFRs.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class AVA.
9.7 Evaluation Result Summary
Assurance
Class
Assurance
Component
Evaluator
Action
Elements
Verdict
Evaluator Action
Elements
Assurance
Component
Assurance
Class
ASE ASE_INT.1 ASE_INT.1.1E PASS PASS PASS
ASE_INT.1.2E PASS
ASE_CCL.1 ASE_CCL.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_OBJ.1 ASE_OBJ.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_ECD.1 ASE_ECD.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_ECD.1.2E PASS
ASE_REQ.1 ASE_REQ.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_TSS.1 ASE_TSS.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_TSS.1.2E PASS
ALC ALC_CMC.1 ALC_CMC.1.1E PASS PASS PASS
ALC_CMS.1 ALC_CMS.1.1E PASS PASS
AGD AGD_PRE.1 AGD_PRE.1.1E PASS PASS PASS
AGD_PRE.1.2E PASS
AGD_OPE.1 AGD_OPE.1.1E PASS PASS
ADV ADV_FSP.1 ADV_FSP.1.1E PASS PASS PASS
ADV_FSP.1.2E PASS
ATE ATE_FUN.1 ATE_FUN.1.1E PASS PASS PASS
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Assurance
Class
Assurance
Component
Evaluator
Action
Elements
Verdict
Evaluator Action
Elements
Assurance
Component
Assurance
Class
ATE_IND.1 ATE_IND.1.1E PASS PASS
ATE_IND.1.2E PASS
AVA AVA_VAN.1 AVA_VAN.1.1E PASS PASS PASS
AVA_VAN.1.2E PASS
AVA_VAN.1.3E PASS
[Table 7] Evaluation Result Summary
10. Recommendations
The TOE security functionality can be ensured only in the evaluated TOE operational
environment with the evaluated TOE configuration, thus the TOE shall be operated by
complying with the followings:
 The TOE (D'Amo KMS) is implemented to provide a mechanism to prevent
reuse of administrator’s authentication information by using timestamp
information during the administrator login process. Therefore, the
administrator must set the time on the administrator’s PC to match the Time
on the server where D’Amo KMS installed before attempting to log in to D'Amo
KMS for security management, and it should be noted that the login attempt
is rejected if the timestamp value of the authentication information transmitted
from the administrator’s PC to D'Amo KMS is different by more than 3
seconds.
 The TOE is implemented to ignore audit data without saving it if the audit data
storage is saturated. Therefore, when an authorized administrator receives an
e-mail notification due to exceeding or saturation of the audit data storage
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threshold, an audit log backup must be performed immediately to prevent
audit data from being lost.
 The authorized administrator must ensure that the password used to generate
the key encryption key (KEK) is different from the password used for
administrator login, and must not use information that can be easily inferred
by an attacker, such as personal information. To ensure the safety of the KEK,
it is recommended to set and use the KEK at a level equivalent to the security
strength of the administrator's password (set a rule combination of 3 or more
of English letters/numbers/special characters and use 9 or more characters).
 The TOE purchaser can perform encryption/decryption of user data in the
TOE operating environment (Application Server or Database Server) through
additional development or modification using the D'Amo Agent. In this case,
the TOE operating environment must be developed in compliance with the
requirements provided by the TOE.
 SSL communication is implemented to perform secure communication
between D'Amo KMS and mail server to send warning mails for security
violation events. Authorized administrators should note that a public certificate
must be used as the SSL certificate of the mail server that works with D'Amo
KMS to send warning mails normally.
11. Security Target
The D'Amo v5.0 Security Target v1.2, May 4, 2023 [4] is included in this report by
reference.
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12. Acronyms and Glossary
CC Common Criteria
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
KCMVP the Korea Cryptographic Module Validation Program
PP Protection Profile
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
TSFI TSF Interface
Decryption The act that restoring the ciphertext into the plaintext
using the decryption key
Encryption The act that converting the plaintext into the ciphertext
using the cryptographic key
Self-test Pre-operational or conditional test executed by the
cryptographic module
Validated Cryptographic
Module
A cryptographic module that is validated and given a
validation number by validation authority
13. Bibliography
The certification body has used following documents to produce this report.
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1
Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-001 ~ CCMB-2017-04-003, April 2017
Part 1: Introduction and general model
Part 2: Security functional components
Part 3: Security assurance components
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version
3.1 Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-004, April 2017
[3] D'Amo v5.0, Evaluation Technical Report V1.00, May 23, 2023
[4] D'Amo v5.0 Security Target v1.2, May 4, 2023
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[5] Korean National Protection Profile for Database Encryption V1.1, December 11, 2019