National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
Alcatel-Lucent Enterprise OmniSwitch series 6360,
6465, 6560, 6860, 6865, 6900, 9900 with AOS 8.9 R11
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-VID11404-2023
Dated: October 21, 2023
Version: 1.0
National Institute of Standards and Technology Department of Defense
Information Technology Laboratory ATTN: NIAP, Suite 6982
100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Fort Meade, MD 20755-6982
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Validation Team
Swapna Katikaneni
Fernando Guzman
Jerome F Myers
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
Cornelius Haley
Dip Pudasaini
Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc.
Columbia, MD
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Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary.................................................................................................... 1
2 Identification............................................................................................................... 1
3 Architectural Information ........................................................................................... 3
3.1 TOE Description................................................................................................. 3
3.2 TOE Evaluated Platforms ................................................................................... 3
3.3 TOE Architecture................................................................................................ 3
3.4 Physical Boundaries............................................................................................ 4
4 Security Policy............................................................................................................ 4
4.1 Security audit ...................................................................................................... 4
4.2 Cryptographic support ........................................................................................ 4
4.3 Identification and authentication......................................................................... 5
4.4 Security management.......................................................................................... 5
4.5 Protection of the TSF.......................................................................................... 5
4.6 TOE access.......................................................................................................... 6
4.7 Trusted path/channels ......................................................................................... 6
5 Assumptions & Clarification of Scope ....................................................................... 6
6 Documentation............................................................................................................ 7
7 IT Product Testing ...................................................................................................... 7
7.1 Developer Testing............................................................................................... 7
7.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing ............................................................... 7
8 Evaluated Configuration ............................................................................................. 7
9 Results of the Evaluation ............................................................................................ 8
9.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE)............................................................ 8
9.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV).............................................................. 8
9.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD) ................................................. 9
9.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)..................................... 9
9.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE) ................. 9
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)......................................................... 9
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results........................................................................ 10
10 Validator Comments/Recommendations .................................................................. 10
11 Annexes..................................................................................................................... 10
12 Security Target.......................................................................................................... 11
13 Glossary .................................................................................................................... 11
14 Bibliography ............................................................................................................. 11
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1 Executive Summary
This report documents the assessment of the National Information Assurance Partnership
(NIAP) validation team of the evaluation of Alcatel-Lucent Enterprise OmniSwitch series
6360, 6465, 6560, 6860, 6865, 6900, 9900 with AOS 8.9 R11solution provided by Alcatel-
Lucent Enterprise. It presents the evaluation results, their justifications, and the conformance
results. This Validation Report is not an endorsement of the Target of Evaluation by any
agency of the U.S. government, and no warranty is either expressed or implied.
The evaluation was performed by the Gossamer Security Solutions (Gossamer) Common
Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL) in Columbia, MD, United States of America, and was
completed in October 2023. The information in this report is largely derived from the
Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) and associated test reports, all written by Gossamer
Security Solutions. The evaluation determined that the product is both Common Criteria Part
2 Extended and Part 3 Conformant, and meets the assurance requirements of the collaborative
Protection Profile for Network Devices, version 2.2e, 23 March 2020.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the Alcatel-Lucent Enterprise OmniSwitch series 6360,
6465, 6560, 6860, 6865, 6900, 9900 with AOS 8.9 R11.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) identified in this Validation Report has been evaluated at a
NIAP approved Common Criteria Testing Laboratory using the Common Methodology for
IT Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 5) for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT
Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 5). This Validation Report applies only to the specific
version of the TOE as evaluated. The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the
provisions of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme and the
conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence provided.
The validation team monitored the activities of the evaluation team, provided guidance on
technical issues and evaluation processes, and reviewed the individual work units and
successive versions of the ETR. The validation team found that the evaluation showed that
the product satisfies all of the functional requirements and assurance requirements stated in
the Security Target (ST). Therefore the validation team concludes that the testing
laboratory’s findings are accurate, the conclusions justified, and the conformance results are
correct. The conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are
consistent with the evidence produced.
The technical information included in this report was obtained from the Alcatel-Lucent
Enterprise OmniSwitch series 6360, 6465, 6560, 6860, 6865, 6900, 9900 with AOS 8.9 R11
Security Target, version 0.7, October 9, 2023 and analysis performed by the Validation
Team.
2 Identification
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product
evaluations. Under this program, security evaluations are conducted by commercial testing
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laboratories called Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs) using the Common
Evaluation Methodology (CEM) in accordance with National Voluntary Laboratory
Assessment Program (NVLAP) accreditation.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality and
consistency across evaluations. Developers of information technology products desiring a
security evaluation contract with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product’s evaluation. Upon
successful completion of the evaluation, the product is added to NIAP’s Validated Products
List.
Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:
• The Target of Evaluation (TOE): the fully qualified identifier of the product as evaluated.
• The Security Target (ST), describing the security features, claims, and assurances of the
product.
• The conformance result of the evaluation.
• The Protection Profile to which the product is conformant.
• The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation.
Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers
Item Identifier
Evaluation Scheme United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
TOE Alcatel-Lucent Enterprise OmniSwitch series 6360, 6465, 6560, 6860, 6865, 6900,
9900 with AOS 8.9 R11
(Specific models identified in Section 8)
Protection Profile collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, version 2.2e, 23 March
2020
ST Alcatel-Lucent Enterprise OmniSwitch series 6360, 6465, 6560, 6860, 6865,
6900, 9900 with AOS 8.9 R11 Security Target, version 0.7, October 9, 2023
Evaluation Technical
Report
Evaluation Technical Report for Alcatel-Lucent Enterprise OmniSwitch series
6360, 6465, 6560, 6860, 6865, 6900, 9900 with AOS 8.9 R11, version 0.2, October
9, 2023
CC Version Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
rev 5
Conformance Result CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 conformant
Sponsor ALE USA Inc
Developer Alcatel-Lucent Enterprise
Common Criteria
Testing Lab (CCTL)
Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc.
Columbia, MD
CCEVS Validators Swapna Katikaneni, Jerome F Myers, Fernando Guzman
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3 Architectural Information
Note: The following architectural description is based on the description presented in the
Security Target.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the Alcatel-Lucent Enterprise OmniSwitch series 6360,
6465, 6560, 6860, 6865, 6900, and 9900 with AOS 8.9 R11. The firmware is named Alcatel-
Lucent Operating System (AOS) which is the single purpose operating system that operates
the management functions of all of the Alcatel-Lucent Enterprise OmniSwitch switches.
3.1 TOE Description
The TOE provides Layer-2 switching, Layer-3 routing, and traffic filtering. Layer-2
switching analyzes incoming frames and makes forwarding decisions based on information
contained in the frames. Layer-3 routing determines the next network point to which a packet
should be forwarded toward its destination. These devices may create or maintain a table of
the available routes and their conditions and use this information along with distance and
cost algorithms to determine the best route for a given packet. Routing protocols include
Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), Routing Information Protocol (RIP) v.2, and Open Shortest
Path First (OSPF). Filtering controls network traffic by controlling whether packets are
forwarded or blocked at the TOE’s interfaces. Each packet is examined to determine whether
to forward or drop the packet, on the basis of the criteria specified within the access lists.
Access list criteria could be the source address of the traffic, the destination address of the
traffic, the upper-layer protocol, or other information.
All series perform the same security functions with respect to this evaluation. The differences
between the models are in speed and physical characteristics.
The intended TOE environment is a secure data center that protects the TOE from
unauthorized physical access. Only security administrators are to have access to connect to
the serial console, or gain physical access to the hardware. Appropriate administrator security
policy and security procedure guidance must be in place to govern operational management
of the TOE within its operational environment.
The TOE is not intended for use as a general purpose computer and only executes the services
needed to perform its intended function.
3.2 TOE Evaluated Platforms
Detail regarding the evaluated configuration is provided in Section 8 below.
3.3 TOE Architecture
Each TOE appliance runs the AOS 8.9 R11 software and has physical network connections
to its environment to facilitate managing and filtering network traffic.
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3.4 Physical Boundaries
The TOE is located between the external and the internal network or within the internal
network of an organization in order to perform Layer-2 switching, Layer-3 routing, and
traffic filtering of flowing IP packets. TOE audit records can be optionally stored in a Syslog
Server. Communication is protected by the TLS protocol.
Administrators log onto the TOE and perform management functions via a Command Line
Interface (CLI). These activities can be performed via a Serial Console connected to the TOE
via a dedicated port, or using an SSHv2 client from a computer connected to the security
management network. Administrators can execute commands from the CLI to connect to
external SSH via the SSHv2 protocol.
4 Security Policy
This section summaries the security functionality of the TOE:
1. Security audit
2. Cryptographic support
3. Identification and authentication
4. Security management
5. Protection of the TSF
6. TOE access
7. Trusted path/channels
4.1 Security audit
The TOE generates audit records. The audit records can be displayed on the serial console
as they are generated in a scrolling format.
The TOE writes audit records to a set of circular files stored in the systems flash memory for
permanent storage. These entries are tagged with the AOS application ID of the TOE
subsystem that triggers the audit records to be generated. The TOE also provides the ability
to send the audit records to an external syslog server using a secure channel.
The TOE provides to security administrators the ability to modify the maximum size allowed
for the audit files. Once the files are full the oldest entries are overwritten.
4.2 Cryptographic support
The TOE requires cryptography for supporting the following functionality.
• Establishment of secure channels using the SSHv2 and TLSv1.2 protocols
• X.509 certificate generation and validation
• Storage of passwords
• Self-tests of the cryptographic algorithms
• Verification of the integrity of the TOE firmware
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The TOE provides cryptographic support using the OpenSSL and OpenSSH software
packages, which are bundled in the TOE.
4.3 Identification and authentication
The TOE requires identification and authentication of administrators of the TOE prior to
access any of the management functionality in all possible scenarios, which are as follows.
• TOE administrators accessing (either locally or remotely) the Command Line
Interface (CLI) via a serial console or a Secure Shell (SSH) session
The TOE displays to the administrator a configurable banner before the administrator
successfully logs onto the TOE (either serial console or SSH). The TOE also provides the
ability to lock the administrator after a configurable number of unsuccessful attempts, and
terminate the logon session after a configurable period of inactivity.
The TOE provides administrator configurable password settings to enforce password
complexity when a password is created or modified.
The TOE provides support for the following Identification and Authentication mechanisms.
• Identification and Authentication made by the TOE using credentials stored in the
local file system
• Communication with SSH clients is protected with the Secure Shell (SSH) protocol.
4.4 Security management
The TOE provides a Command-Line Interface (CLI) for security management. TOE
administrators connect to the TOE via either a serial console or a remote session using Secure
Shell (SSHv2). In either case, administrators are required to identify and authenticate against
the TOE before getting access to the CLI.
4.5 Protection of the TSF
The TOE protects itself by requiring administrators to identify and authenticate themselves
prior to performing any actions and by defining the access allowed by each administrator.
The TOE uses the filesystem access control to protect access to sensitive data like
cryptographic keys and credentials.
The TOE ensures that manual updates of the TOE firmware are done using trusted updates
by verifying the integrity of the new version of the TOE firmware.
The TOE also implements self-tests to ensure the correct operation of cryptographic services.
The TOE also provides a reliable date and time that is used for audit record timestamps,
certificate verification and session timing.
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4.6 TOE access
The TOE can be configured to display a login banner when an administrator establishes an
interactive session and subsequently will enforce an administrator-defined inactivity timeout
value after which the inactive session (local or remote) will be terminated.
4.7 Trusted path/channels
The TOE provides the following secure channels to ensure the integrity and confidentiality
of the information exchanged between the TOE and external IT entities in the operational
environment.
• Transport Layer Security (TLS) versions 1.2 is used to protect communication with
external audit servers (syslog).
• Secure Shell version 2 (SSHv2) is used to protect communication with SSH clients.
5 Assumptions & Clarification of Scope
Assumptions
The Security Problem Definition, including the assumptions, may be found in the following
documents:
• collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, version 2.2e, 23 March 2020
That information has not been reproduced here and the NDcPP22e should be consulted if
there is interest in that material.
The scope of this evaluation was limited to the functionality and assurances covered in the
NDcPP22e as described for this TOE in the Security Target. Other functionality included in
the product was not assessed as part of this evaluation. All other functionality provided by
the devices needs to be assessed separately, and no further conclusions can be drawn about
their effectiveness.
Clarification of scope
All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that
need clarification. This text covers some of the more important limitations and clarifications
of this evaluation. Note that:
• As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated configuration
meets the security claims made with a certain level of assurance (the assurance
activities specified in the collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices and
performed by the evaluation team).
• This evaluation covers only the specific device models and software as identified in
this document, and not any earlier or later versions released or in process.
• Apart from the Admin Guide, additional customer documentation for the specific
Network Device models was not included in the scope of the evaluation and therefore
should not to be relied upon when configuring or operating the device as evaluated.
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• This evaluation did not specifically search for, nor attempt to exploit, vulnerabilities
that were not “obvious” or vulnerabilities to objectives not claimed in the ST. The
CEM defines an “obvious” vulnerability as one that is easily exploited with a
minimum of understanding of the TOE, technical sophistication and resources.
• The functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the security functional
requirements specified in the NDcPP22e and applicable Technical Decisions. Any
additional security related functional capabilities of the TOE were not covered by this
evaluation.
6 Documentation
The following documents were available with the TOE for evaluation:
• Preparation and Operation of Common Criteria Evaluated OmniSwitch Products
(NDcPP), AOS Release 8.9.R11, July 2023
Any additional customer documentation provided with the product, or that is available
online was not included in the scope of the evaluation and therefore should not to be relied
upon when configuring or operating the device as evaluated.
To use the product in the evaluated configuration, the product must be configured as
specified in the Guidance Documentation listed above. Consumers are encouraged to
download the configuration guides from the NIAP website to ensure the device is
configured as evaluated.
7 IT Product Testing
This section describes the testing efforts of the developer and the Evaluation Team. It is
derived from information contained in the proprietary Detailed Test Report for Alcatel-
Lucent Enterprise OmniSwitch series 6360, 6465, 6560, 6860, 6865, 6900, 9900 with AOS
8.9 R11, Version 0.2, October 9, 2023 (DTR), as summarized in the evaluation Assurance
Activity Report (AAR).
7.1 Developer Testing
No evidence of developer testing is required in the assurance activities for this product.
7.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing
The evaluation team verified the product according to a Common Criteria Certification
document and ran the tests specified in the NDcPP22e including the tests associated with
optional requirements. The AAR, in sections 1.1 lists the tested devices and section 3.4
provides a list of test tools, and has diagrams of the test environment.
8 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE hardware consists of the following OminSwitch models when configured in
accordance with the documentation specified in Section 6 of this report :
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Model Processor ID Microarchitecture Network Interface
OmniSwitch 6360 (OS6360) Marvell 98DX236S ARM Cortex-A9 Marvell AlleyCat 3
Marvell 98DX233S ARM Cortex-A9 Marvell AlleyCat 3
OmniSwitch 6465
(OS6465/OS6465T)
Marvell 98DX3233 ARM Cortex-A9 Marvell AlleyCat 3
OmniSwitch 6560 (OS6560) Marvell 88F6820 ARM Cortex-A9 Marvell AlleyCat 3
OmniSwitch 6860 (OS6860E) Broadcom BCM56342 ARM Cortex-A9 Broadcom Helix4
Broadcom BCM56340 ARM Cortex-A9 Broadcom Helix4
OmniSwitch 6860 (OS6860N) Intel Atom C3338 Goldmont Broadcom Trident3
Intel Atom C3558 Goldmont Broadcom Trident3
OmniSwitch 6865 (OS6865) Broadcom BCM56342 ARM Cortex-A9 Broadcom Helix4
OmniSwitch 6900 (OS6900) Intel Atom C3558 Goldmont Broadcom Trident3
Intel Atom C2538 Rangeley Broadcom Tomahawk
Intel Xeon D1518 Broadwell Broadcom Trident3
OmniSwitch 9900 (OS9900) Intel Atom C2518 Rangeley Marvell Prestera DX
9 Results of the Evaluation
The results of the assurance requirements are generally described in this section and are
presented in detail in the proprietary ETR. The reader of this document can assume that all
assurance activities and work units received a passing verdict.
A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to the
corresponding evaluator action elements. The evaluation was conducted based upon CC
version 3.1 rev 5 and CEM version 3.1 rev 5. The evaluation determined the Alcatel-Lucent
Enterprise OmniSwitch series 6360, 6465, 6560, 6860, 6865, 6900, 9900 with AOS 8.9 R11
TOE to be Part 2 extended, and to meet the SARs contained in the NDcPP22e.
9.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE)
The evaluation team applied each ASE CEM work unit. The ST evaluation ensured the ST
contains a description of the environment in terms of policies and assumptions, a statement
of security requirements claimed to be met by the Alcatel-Lucent Enterprise OmniSwitch
series 6360, 6465, 6560, 6860, 6865, 6900, 9900 with AOS 8.9 R11 products that are
consistent with the Common Criteria, and product security function descriptions that support
the requirements.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
9.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV)
The evaluation team applied each ADV CEM work unit. The evaluation team assessed the
design documentation and found it adequate to aid in understanding how the TSF provides
the security functions. The design documentation consists of a functional specification
contained in the Security Target and Guidance documents. Additionally the evaluator
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performed the assurance activities specified in the NDcPP22e related to the examination of
the information contained in the TSS.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
9.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD)
The evaluation team applied each AGD CEM work unit. The evaluation team ensured the
adequacy of the user guidance in describing how to use the operational TOE. Additionally,
the evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the administrator guidance in describing how
to securely administer the TOE. All of the guides were assessed during the design and testing
phases of the evaluation to ensure they were complete.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
9.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)
The evaluation team applied each ALC CEM work unit. The evaluation team found that the
TOE was identified.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
9.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE)
The evaluation team applied each ATE CEM work unit. The evaluation team ran the set of
tests specified by the assurance activities in the NDcPP22e and recorded the results in a Test
Report, summarized in the AAR.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)
The evaluation team applied each AVA CEM work unit. The vulnerability analysis is in the
Detailed Test Report (DTR) prepared by the evaluator. The vulnerability analysis includes
a public search for vulnerabilities. The public search for vulnerabilities did not uncover any
residual vulnerability.
The evaluator searched the following sources:
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• National Vulnerability Database (https://web.nvd.nist.gov/vuln/search),
• Vulnerability Notes Database (http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/),
• Rapid7 Vulnerability Database (https://www.rapid7.com/db/vulnerabilities),
• Tipping Point Zero Day Initiative (http://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories ),
• cve.org CVE Database (https://www.cve.org/),
• SecurITeam Exploit Search (http://www.securiteam.com),
• Tenable Network Security (http://nessus.org/plugins/index.php?view=search),
• Offensive Security Exploit Database (https://www.exploit-db.com/)
The search was performed on October 9, 2023. The search was conducted with the following
search terms: "Alcatel-Lucent", "OminSwitch", "SSH", "TLS", "ARM Cortex A9", "Intel
Atom C3558", "Intel Atom C2338", “OpenSSL 3.0.7”. Intel Atom C2538”, “Intel Xeon
D1518”, “Intel Atom C2518”, “Marvell 98DX236S”, “Marvell 98DX233S”, “Marvell
88F6820”, “Broadcom BCM56342”, “Broadcom BCM56340”.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results
The evaluation team’s assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims in
the ST are met. Additionally, the evaluation team’s testing also demonstrated the accuracy
of the claims in the ST.
The validation team’s assessment of the evidence provided by the evaluation team is that it
demonstrates that the evaluation team followed the procedures defined in the CEM, and
correctly verified that the product meets the claims in the ST.
10 Validator Comments/Recommendations
As stated in section 5, the scope of this evaluation was limited to the functionality and
assurances covered in the collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version
2.2e [CPP_ND_V2.2E]. Other functionality included in the product was not assessed as
part of this evaluation. All other functionality provided by the devices needs to be assessed
separately, and no further conclusions can be drawn about their effectiveness. The
evaluated configuration is dependent upon the TOE being configured per the evaluated
configuration described in section 8 and the instructions in the Administrator Guide
document listed in section 6.
11 Annexes
Not applicable
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12 Security Target
The Security Target is identified as: Alcatel-Lucent Enterprise OmniSwitch series 6360,
6465, 6560, 6860, 6865, 6900, 9900 with AOS 8.9 R11 Security Target, Version 0.7, October
9, 2023.
13 Glossary
The following definitions are used throughout this document:
• Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL). An IT security evaluation facility
accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and
approved by the CCEVS Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based
evaluations.
• Conformance. The ability to demonstrate in an unambiguous way that a given
implementation is correct with respect to the formal model.
• Evaluation. The assessment of an IT product against the Common Criteria using the
Common Criteria Evaluation Methodology to determine whether or not the claims made
are justified; or the assessment of a protection profile against the Common Criteria using
the Common Evaluation Methodology to determine if the Profile is complete, consistent,
technically sound and hence suitable for use as a statement of requirements for one or
more TOEs that may be evaluated.
• Evaluation Evidence. Any tangible resource (information) required from the sponsor or
developer by the evaluator to perform one or more evaluation activities.
• Feature. Part of a product that is either included with the product or can be ordered
separately.
• Target of Evaluation (TOE). A group of IT products configured as an IT system, or an
IT product, and associated documentation that is the subject of a security evaluation
under the CC.
• Validation. The process carried out by the CCEVS Validation Body leading to the issue
of a Common Criteria certificate.
• Validation Body. A governmental organization responsible for carrying out validation
and for overseeing the day-to-day operation of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation
and Validation Scheme.
14 Bibliography
The Validation Team used the following documents to produce this Validation Report:
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation: Part 1:
Introduction and General Model, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
[2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security
functional components, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
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[3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security
assurance components, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.
[4] collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, version 2.2e, 23 March 2020.
[5] Alcatel-Lucent Enterprise OmniSwitch series 6360, 6465, 6560, 6860, 6865, 6900,
9900 with AOS 8.9 R11 Security Target, Version 0.7, October 9, 2023 (ST).
[6] Assurance Activity Report for Alcatel-Lucent Enterprise OmniSwitch series 6360,
6465, 6560, 6860, 6865, 6900, 9900 with AOS 8.9.R11, Version 0.2, October 9, 2023
(AAR).
[7] Detailed Test Report for Alcatel-Lucent Enterprise OmniSwitch series 6360, 6465,
6560, 6860, 6865, 6900, 9900 with AOS 8.9.R11, Version 0.2, October 9, 2023
(DTR).
[8] Evaluation Technical Report for Alcatel-Lucent Enterprise OmniSwitch series
6360, 6465, 6560, 6860, 6865, 6900, 9900 with AOS 8.9.R11, Version 0.2, October
9, 2023 (ETR)