BSI-DSZ-CC-1170-2023
for
cryptovision SMAERS, Version 2.0
from
cv cryptovision GmbH
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V5.41
BSI-DSZ-CC-1170-2023 (*)
cryptovision SMAERS, Version 2.0
from cv cryptovision GmbH
PP Conformance: Common Criteria Protection Profile Security Module
Application for Electronic Record-keeping Systems
(SMAERS) Version 1.0, 15 July 2020, BSI-CC-PP-
0105-V2-2020
Functionality: PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 conformant
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 2 augmented by ALC_LCD.1 and ALC_CMS.3
The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation
facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1
extended by Scheme Interpretations and CC Supporting Documents as listed in the
Certification Report for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
(CC), Version 3.1. CC and CEM are also published as ISO/IEC 15408 and ISO/IEC
18045.
(*) This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report and
Notification. For details on the validity see Certification Report part A chapter 5.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification
scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions
of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for
Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is
either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 27 April 2023
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Sandro Amendola L.S.
Head of Division
SOGIS
Recognition Agreement
Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangemen
up to EAL 2 and ALC_FLR
onlyt
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1170-2023
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1170-2023 Certification Report
Contents
A. Certification......................................................................................................................6
1. Preliminary Remarks....................................................................................................6
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure...............................................................6
3. Recognition Agreements..............................................................................................7
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification................................................................8
5. Validity of the Certification Result.................................................................................8
6. Publication....................................................................................................................9
B. Certification Results.......................................................................................................10
1. Executive Summary....................................................................................................11
2. Identification of the TOE.............................................................................................12
3. Security Policy............................................................................................................13
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.....................................................................13
5. Architectural Information.............................................................................................14
6. Documentation...........................................................................................................14
7. IT Product Testing.......................................................................................................14
8. Evaluated Configuration.............................................................................................15
9. Results of the Evaluation............................................................................................15
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.....................................................16
11. Security Target..........................................................................................................18
12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)..............................................................18
13. Definitions.................................................................................................................18
14. Bibliography..............................................................................................................19
C. Excerpts from the Criteria..............................................................................................22
D. Annexes.........................................................................................................................23
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1170-2023
A. Certification
1. Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● Act on the Federal Office for Information Security1
● BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance2
● BMI Regulations on Ex-parte Costs 3
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) [3]
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility, its
approval and licencing process (CC-Stellen) [3]
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
2
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung - BSIZertV) of 17 December
2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231
3
BMI Regulations on Ex-parte Costs - Besondere Gebührenverordnung des BMI für individuell
zurechenbare öffentliche Leistungen in dessen Zuständigkeitsbereich (BMIBGebV), Abschnitt 7 (BSI-
Gesetz) - dated 2 September 2019, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1365
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1170-2023 Certification Report
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.14
[1] also published as
ISO/IEC 15408.
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published
as ISO/IEC 18045
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
3. Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
3.1. European Recognition of CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS
Technical Domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL 1 to EAL 4. For "Smartcards and similar devices" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in
place. For "HW Devices with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too.
In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of
the recognition agreement.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on
recognition, and the history of the agreement can be seen on the website at
https://www.sogis.eu.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the related bodies of the signatory nations. A disclaimer
beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of recognition.
This certificate is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected.
3.2. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC
(Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08
September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP)
(exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or
the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection
Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on
the website: https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the related bodies
of the signatory nations. A disclaimer beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of
recognition.
4
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1170-2023
This certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2014, i. e. up to and including
CC part 3 EAL 2.
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product cryptovision SMAERS, Version 2.0 has undergone the certification procedure
at BSI.
The evaluation of the product cryptovision SMAERS, Version 2.0 was conducted by TÜV
Informationstechnik GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 30 March 2023. TÜV
Informationstechnik GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)5
recognised by the certification
body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: cv cryptovision GmbH.
The product was developed by: cv cryptovision GmbH.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
5. Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report applies only to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance components and assurance levels please refer to CC
itself. Detailed references are listed in part C of this report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-assessment or
re-certification). Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation
and certification procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk
management needs regularly updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-
assessment on a regular e.g. annual basis.
In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved attack methods would
require a re-assessment of the products resistance to state of the art attack methods, the
maximum validity of the certificate has been limited. The certificate issued on 27 April 2023
is valid until 26 April 2031. Validity can be re-newed by re-certification.
The owner of the certificate is obliged:
5
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1170-2023 Certification Report
1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product's certification, to refer to
the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report, the Security
Target and user guidance documentation mentioned herein to any customer of the
product for the application and usage of the certified product,
2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of the
product that have been identified by the developer or any third party after issuance
of the certificate,
3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security relevant
changes in the evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and production sites
or processes, occur, or the confidentiality of documentation and information related
to the Target of Evaluation (TOE) or resulting from the evaluation and certification
procedure where the certification of the product has assumed this confidentiality
being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of
confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the
evaluation and certification procedure that do not belong to the deliverables
according to the Certification Report part B, or for those where no dissemination
rules have been agreed on, to third parties, the Certification Body at BSI has to be
informed.
4. to conduct a re-assessment or re-certification after 5 years (i.e. the re-assessment
must be finalized before 26 April 2028 in order to assess the robustness of the
product against new state-of-the-art attack methods. This has to be done on the
developer‘s own initiative and at his own expense. As evidence a report regarding a
re-assessment or a re-certification according to the regulations of the BSI
certification scheme shall be provided.
5. to use the CSP module identified in BSI-DSZ-CC-1119-2023 as underlying CSP for
the present SMAERS TOE.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
6. Publication
The product cryptovision SMAERS, Version 2.0 has been included in the BSI list of
certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de
and [5]). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer6
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
6
cv cryptovision GmbH
Munscheidstr. 14
45886 Gelsenkirchen
Deutschland
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1170-2023
B. Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1170-2023 Certification Report
1. Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is named cryptovision SMAERS – Java Card applet
providing Security Module Application for Electronic Record-keeping Systems and was
evaluated in version 2.0. It is a security module application implemented as software
running on the cryptovision CSP (cryptographic service provider). The TOE is a part of the
security module of a certified technical security system (CTSS) for electronic record-
keeping systems (ERS).
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profile Common Criteria Protection Profile Security Module Application for
Electronic Record-keeping Systems (SMAERS) Version 1.0, 15 July 2020, BSI-CC-PP-
0105-V2-2020 [8].
The ST also lists TSF_CSP, however this Security Functionality is not part of the TOE as it
is provided solely by the underlying CSP platform (BSI-DSZ-CC-1119-2022). The Security
Target [6] has identified solely one configuration of the TOE under evaluation.
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 2
augmented by ALC_LCD.1 and ALC_CMS.3.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6], chapter 6. They are all selected from Common Criteria Part 2. Thus the
TOE is CC Part 2 conformant.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionality:
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
TSF_Management Management of the security functionality
TSF_Log Handling of log data and signature functionality
TSF_Auth Authentication protocols
TSF_Update Update functionality
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 6.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6], chapter 3.
Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of Assumptions,
Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [6],
chapter 3.
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1170-2023
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2. Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
cryptovision SMAERS, Version 2.0.
The following TOE deliverables are provided from the application developer to NXP or a
third party:
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
1 SW cryptovision SMAERS 2.0 Encrypted and signed e-mail
from cryptovision to NXP or a
third party.
2 DOC cryptovision SMAERS v2.0
– Java Card applet
configuration providing a
Security Module Application
for Electronic Record-
keeping Systems
(SMAERS) - Operational
Guidance (AGD_OPE)
1.0.12
3 DOC cryptovision SMAERS v2.0
– Java Card applet
configuration providing a
Security Module Application
for Electronic Record-
keeping Systems
(SMAERS) - Preparative
Guidance (AGD_PRE)
1.0.22
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
The following TOE deliverables are provided from the application developer to the
customer:
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
1 HW +
SW
cryptovision SMAERS on
the platform cryptovision
CSP v2.0
2.0 The delivery process is included
in the evaluation of the
underlying Java Card OS which
is the platform of the
cryptovision CSP. The TOE is
already protected by the Java
Card OS.
2 DOC cryptovision SMAERS v2.0
– Java Card applet
configuration providing a
Security Module Application
for Electronic Record-
keeping Systems
(SMAERS) - Operational
Guidance (AGD_OPE)
1.0.12 PGP encrypted and signed e-
mail from cryptovision to
customer.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1170-2023 Certification Report
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
3 DOC cryptovision SMAERS v2.0
– Java Card applet
configuration providing a
Security Module Application
for Electronic Record-
keeping Systems
(SMAERS) - Preparative
Guidance (AGD_PRE)
1.0.22 PGP encrypted and signed e-
mail from cryptovision to
customer.
Table 3: Deliverables of the TOE
Regarding delivery:
The TOE cryptovision SMAERS consists of two Java Card Applets, the SMAERSD and the
SMAERSI. First, the TOE is delivered by encrypted e-mail from cryptovision to NXP or a
third party. There the applications are integrated on the certified cryptovision CSP. In
addition, the guidance documentation [11] and [12] is delivered by encrypted e-mail from
cryptovision to NXP or a third party. This is the delivery in sense of Common Criteria.
Afterwards the product is delivered integrated on the certified cryptovision CSP to the
customer. The Security Target [6] outlines the delivery procedure.
In addition, cryptovision delivers the guidance documents [11] and [12] directly, via signed
and encrypted e-mail, to the customer.
Regarding identification:
The documents [11] and [12] contain the identification procedure for the TOE.
3. Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues:
• User Data Protection,
• Identification and Authentication,
• Security Management,
• Security Audit,
• Protection of the TSF and
• Code Update Package import.
Specific details concerning the above mentioned security policies can be found in the
Security Target [6] chapter 6.1.
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are
of relevance:
• OE.ERS Trustworthy electronic record-keeping system,
• OE.CSP Cryptographic service provider component,
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1170-2023
• OE.CSPPlatform CSP as secure platform of the TOE,
• OE.SMAERSPlatform as Secure platform storage,
• OE.Transaction Verification of Transaction,
• OE.SecOEnv Secure operational environment,
• OE.SecCommCSP Secure communication between TOE and CSP and
• OE.SUCP Signed Update Code Packages, and
• OE.SecUCP.
Details can be found in the Security Target [6], chapter 4.2.
5. Architectural Information
The TOE cryptovision SMAERS consists of two Java Card application, the SMAERSD and
SMAERSI. It runs on the to be certified cryptovision CSP and comprises the following
subsystems:
• Command Processor: Provides the main interface to the TOE and takes the
decision which command will be executed by the appropriate subsystem, or that the
APDU is rejected due to an unavailable instruction code.
• Configuration Manager: Provides services for application creation in terms of applet
instantiation.
• User Manager: Initially creates the configured users like Admin and TimeAdmin as
well as the roles CTSS and CSP for creation of transaction and system logs.
Furthermore, it handles user authentication and changing reference data by using
CSP functions, and returns status information on request.
• Transaction Manager: Provides services for signing transaction logs using CSP
functions.
• System Log Manager: Uses CSP functions to create logs for system events such as
user authentication or setting of system time.
• Data Container: Stores configuration data and is used to persist data generated
during runtime.
6. Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7. IT Product Testing
Developer’s testing approach:
The developer considered the following aspects when designing his test approach:
● Tests to cover all TSFI defined in developer documents,
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1170-2023 Certification Report
● Good case and bad case tests for each interface defined in the respective develoepr
document and executable on the TOE,
● Tests covering all TSF subsystems in the TOE design.
Verdict for the activity:
All test cases in each test suite were run successfully on this TOE version.
The developer’s testing results demonstrate that the TOE operates as expected.
Evaluator tests (ATE_IND):
Independent testing according to ATE_IND was conducted.
The TOE was tested in the one configuration in scope of the certification.
The test results have not shown any deviations between the expected test results and the
actual test results.
Evaluator tests (AVA):
Penetration testing according to AVA was also conducted.
The overall test result is that no deviations were found between the expected and the
actual test results. No attack scenario with the attack potential ‘Basic’ was actually
successful in the TOE’s operational environment as defined in [6] provided that all
measures required by the developer are applied.
The test results have not shown any deviations between the expected test results and the
actual test results.
8. Evaluated Configuration
The evaluated TOE configuration is identical with the one described in table 2, which in
turn is the delivered product. There is only one configuration of the TOE. For all tests the
TOE is configured and parameterized, if necessary, according to the guidance documents.
The cryptovision SMAERS TOE configuration is loaded and installed on the underlying
CSP platform. The cryptovision SMAERS TOE needs to be installed and personalised
according to the guidelines given in [11] and [12].
9. Results of the Evaluation
9.1. CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used.
The following guidance specific for the technology was considered (while not being
mandatory during the CC certification and not being evaluated according to):
(i.) TR_03151 Technical Guideline BSI TR-03151 Secure Element API (SE API), BSI,
Version 1.0.1, 20. December 2018,
(ii.)TR_03153 Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-03153 Technische Sicherheitseinrichtung
für elektronische Aufzeichnungssysteme, BSI, Version 1.0.1, 20. Dezember 2018.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1170-2023
The assurance refinements outlined in the Security Target were followed in the course of
the evaluation of the TOE.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 2 package (augmented by ALC_LCD.1 and ALC_CMS.3)
including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see also part C of this report)
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance: Common Criteria Protection Profile Security Module Application
for Electronic Record-keeping Systems (SMAERS) Version 1.0,
15 July 2020, BSI-CC-PP-0105-V2-2020 [8]
● for the Functionality: PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 conformant
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant EAL 2 (augmented by
ALC_LCD.1 and ALC_CMS.3).
For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see
annex B in part D of this report.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment
The TOE does not include cryptographic mechanisms as a service. The only cryptographic
mechanism used are implemented in the CSP platform or the Java Card platform and not
part of this evaluation. Thus, no such mechanisms were part of the assessment.
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
As the TOE relies on security functionality provided by the underlying CSP, it must be
operated in conjunction with the CSP of the evaluated configuration. For details
concerning the CSP and its certification refer to the certification procedure BSI-DSZ-CC-
1119-2022 and the dedicated BSI Report [21].
In regard of the further operational environment, it is to be noted that the certification and
evaluation were conducted under the condition, that the objective for the operational
environment “OE.SecOEnv: Secure operational environment” (Security Target [6]) is in
place. In detail, the objective states:
OE.SecOEnv: Secure operational environment:
The operational environment shall protect the electronic record-keeping system and
the certified technical security system including the TOE against manipulation,
perturbation and misuse. It protects the integrity of the communication between the
electronic record-keeping system and the TOE.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1170-2023 Certification Report
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms needs to be considered for
the intended TOE usage, it has to be considered by the user and his system risk
management process.
Also note that the UCP (Update Code Package) mechanism itself is certified according to
this certificate’s evaluation assurance level and the respective Security Target’s Security
Functional Requirements. However, installation and usage of other TOE configuration
items than specified in the Security Target ([6]) (and thus evaluated during the course of
this certification) are not included in this certificate. Recertifications are required in order to
maintain a valid certification status in cases where such TOE changes are to be applied.
As a consequence, only certified updates of the TOE should be used via a respective
UCP deployment procedure. If non-certified Update Code Packages are available, TOE
user discretion is advised on whether the sponsor should provide a re-certification. In the
meantime a risk management process of the system using the TOE should investigate and
decide on the usage of not yet certified updates and patches or take additional measures
in order to maintain system security.
Regarding Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) it is to be noted, that neither the Protection
Profile [8] nor the Security Target ([6]) address (security-assurance- or security-functional)
requirements concerning a PKI. Therefore, no PKI aspects were CC evaluated by the
ITSEF or the BSI CC certification Section in the course of the underlying CC evaluation.
Hence the CC certification scope does not cover the Public Key Infrastructure. However,
the developer cv cryptovision GmbH provided a (confidential) PKI concept document [17],
outlining relevant PKI structures, definitions and processes. The document was examined
by a dedicated BSI Section and deemed suitable.
Similar as for the PKI concept document, the Protection Profile requires additional
documentation, which also were not evaluated by the ITSEF or the BSI CC certification
Section during the CC evaluation and the CC certification procedure but were examined by
a dedicated BSI Section and deemed suitable:
• The provisioning of the CSP within the life cycle of the CTSS describing the initial
personalization and subsequent renewal of keying material used in the context of
the TOE, the assignment and separation of users and roles contained in the CSP,
and the audit configuration of the CSP,
• The update procedures to allow for recovery from security incidents including the
procedures for creating, distributing, and enforcing installation of update code
packages for the TOE and the CSP.
• The “Umgebungsschutzkonzept SMAERS v2” [20].
For all respective documents see [17], [18], [19] and [20].
The TOE includes guidance documentation (see table 2) which contains obligations and
guidelines for the user and/or developer of the product layer on top on how to securely use
this certified TOE and which measures have to be taken in order to fulfil the overall
security requirements of the Security Target of the TOE.
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If the TOE is subject to an evaluation in a composite product or system, it must be
examined if the required measures have been correctly and effectively implemented by the
product layer on top.
At the point in time when evaluation and certification results are reused, there might be an
updated documentation available. Therefore, the certified products list on the BSI website
has to be checked for latest information on reassessments, recertifications or maintenance
result available for the product.
11. Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report.
12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)
None.
13. Definitions
13.1. Acronyms
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
cPP Collaborative Protection Profile
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
PP Protection Profile
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
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13.2. Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Package - named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements
Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
14. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 5, April 2017
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 5, April 2017,
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[3] BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) and Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility,
approval and licencing (CC-Stellen), https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE7
https://www.bsi.bund.de/AIS
7
specifically
• AIS 14 Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 14, Anforderungen an
Aufbau und Inhalt der ETR-Teile (Evaluation Technical Report) für Evaluationen nach CC (Common
Criteria), Version 7, 2010-08-03, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik.
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[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
on the BSI Website, https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierungsreporte
[6] Security Target Lite BSI-DSZ-CC-1170-2022, Version 2.6, 2023-03-21, “cryptovision
SMAERS - Java Card applet providing Security Module Application for Electronic
Record-keeping Systems Security Target Lite”, cv cryptovision GmbH
[7] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 3, 2023-03-23, EVALUATION TECHNICAL
REPORT SUMMARY (ETR SUMMARY), TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH,
(confidential document)
[8] Common Criteria Protection Profile Security Module Application for Electronic
Record-keeping Systems (SMAERS) Version 1.0, 15 July 2020, BSI-CC-PP-0105-
V2-2020
[9] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-1170-2023, Version 2.6, 2023-03-21, “cryptovision
SMAERS - Java Card applet providing Security Module Application for Electronic
Record-keeping Systems Security Target”, cv cryptovision GmbH (confidential
document)
[10] ALC, Version 2.7, 2022-09-27, cryptovision CSP - cryptovision SMAERS Life - cycle
definition, configuration management and development security at cv cryptovision
(Document class ALC), cv cryptovision GmbH
[11] AGD_OPE, 1.0.11, 2022-10-07, cryptovision SMAERS v2.0 – Java Card applet
configuration providing a Security Module Application for Electronic Record-keeping
Systems (SMAERS) - Operational Guidance (AGD_OPE), cv cryptovision GmbH
[12] AGD_PRE, Version 1.0.22, 2022-10-19, cryptovision SMAERS v2.0 – Java Card
applet configuration providing a Security Module Application for Electronic Record-
keeping Systems (SMAERS) - Preparative Guidance (AGD_PRE), cv cryptovision
GmbH
[13] Configuration List, “Configuration List (2023-03-23_conflist-JCOP4_SMAERS.xlsx)”,
2022-03-23, cv cryptovision GmbH (confidential)
[14] Platform ST, JCOP 4.7 SE051 Security Target Lite, Revision 2.1, 2022-06-09,
NSCIB-CC-0095534-2MA, NXP Semiconductors
[15] TR-03151, Version 1.0.1, 20.12.2018, Technical Guideline BSI TR-03151, Secure
Element API (SE API), BSI
[16] TR-03153, Version 1.0.1, 20.12.2018, Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-03153,
Technische Sicherheitseinrichtung für elektronische Aufzeichnungssysteme, BSI
• AIS 19 Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 19, Anforderungen an
Aufbau und Inhalt der Zusammenfassung des ETR (Evaluation Technical Report) für Evaluationen
nach CC (Common Criteria), Version 9, 2014-11-03, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik.
• AIS 32, Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 32, CC-Interpretationen
im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema, Version 7, 2011-06-08, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik.
• AIS 35 Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 35, Öffentliche Fassung
eines Security Target (ST-lite), Version 2, 2007-11-12, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik.
• AIS 38 Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) – AIS 38, Reuse of evaluation
results, Version 2, 2007-09-28, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik.
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[17] PKI-Konzept, Version 18.0, 2023-03-20, PKI-Konzept cryptovision TSE v2, cv
cryptovision (confidential)
[18] “Lebenszyklus von SMAERS, CSP und TSE sowie User/Rollen bei SMAERS und
CSP”, v1.6, 2022-09-02 (confidential)
[19] Key Responsibility Concept, v1.4, 2022-09-30, cv cryptovision GmbH (confidential)
[20] Umgebungsschutzkonzept SMAERS v2, v1.2, 2022-09-27, cv cryptovision GmbH
(confidential)
[21] Certification Report for “BSI-DSZ-CC-1119-2023 - cryptovision CSP – Java Card
applet providing Cryptographic Service Provider version 2.0”, Version 2.0, 2023-01-
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C. Excerpts from the Criteria
For the meaning of the assurance components and levels the following references to the
Common Criteria can be followed:
• On conformance claim definitions and descriptions refer to CC part 1 chapter 10.5
• On the concept of assurance classes, families and components refer to CC Part 3
chapter 7.1
• On the concept and definition of pre-defined assurance packages (EAL) refer to CC
Part 3 chapters 7.2 and 8
• On the assurance class ASE for Security Target evaluation refer to CC Part 3
chapter 12
• On the detailed definitions of the assurance components for the TOE evaluation
refer to CC Part 3 chapters 13 to 17
• The table in CC part 3 , Annex E summarizes the relationship between the
evaluation assurance levels (EAL) and the assurance classes, families and
components.
The CC are published at https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/cc/ .
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D. Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
Annex B: Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment
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Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1170-2023
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product cryptovision SMAERS, Version 2.0, (Target of Evaluation, TOE) has been
evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT
Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by Scheme Interpretations and CC
Supporting Documents for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
(CC), Version 3.1.
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 27 April 2023, the following results regarding the
development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria assurance
requirements ALC – Life cycle support (ALC_CMC.2, ALC_CMS.2, ALC_DEL.1)
are fulfilled for the development site of the TOE listed below:
a) cv cryptovision GmbH
Munscheiderstr. 14
45886 Gelsenkirchen
Germany
Note: End of report
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