UNCLASSIFIED / NON CLASSIFIÉ
579-LSS
COMMON CRITERIA CERTIFICATION REPORT
TestStream Management Software v5.3.0
on nGenius 3900 Series Switches
17 April 2023
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FOREWORD
This certification report is an UNCLASSIFIED publication, issued under the authority of the Chief, Communications Security
Establishment (CSE).
The Information Technology (IT) product identified in this certification report, and its associated certificate, has been
evaluated at an approved testing laboratory established under the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (a branch of CSE).
This certification report, and its associated certificate, applies only to the identified version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration. The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Canadian Common
Criteria Program, and the conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation report are consistent with the evidence
adduced.
This report, and its associated certificate, are not an endorsement of the IT product by Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, or
any other organization that recognizes or gives effect to this report, and its associated certificate, and no warranty for the IT
product by the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, or any other organization that recognizes or gives effect to this report,
and its associated certificate, is either expressed or implied.
If your organization has identified a requirement for this certification report based on business needs and would like more
detailed information, please contact:
Canadian Centre for Cyber Security
Contact Centre and Information Services
contact@cyber.gc.ca | 1-833-CYBER-88 (1-833-292-3788)
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OVERVIEW
The Canadian Common Criteria Program provides a third-party evaluation service for determining the trustworthiness of
Information Technology (IT) security products. Evaluations are performed by a commercial Common Criteria Testing
Laboratory (CCTL) under the oversight of the Certification Body, which is managed by the Canadian Centre for Cyber
Security.
A CCTL is a commercial facility that has been approved by the Certification Body to perform Common Criteria evaluations; a
significant requirement for such approval is accreditation to the requirements of ISO/IEC 17025, the General Requirements
for the Competence of Testing and Calibration Laboratories.
By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, the Certification Body asserts that the product complies with the security
requirements specified in the associated security target. A security target is a requirements specification document that
defines the scope of the evaluation activities. The consumer of certified IT products should review the security target, in
addition to this certification report, to gain an understanding of any assumptions made during the evaluation, the IT
product's intended environment, the evaluated security functionality, and the testing and analysis conducted by the CCTL.
The certification report, certificate of product evaluation and security target are posted to the Common Criteria portal (the
official website of the International Common Criteria Program).
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .................................................................................................................................... 6
1 Identification of Target of Evaluation ........................................................................................................... 7
1.1 Common Criteria Conformance.......................................................................................................................... 7
1.2 TOE Description................................................................................................................................................. 7
1.3 TOE Architecture ............................................................................................................................................... 8
2 Security Policy......................................................................................................................................... 9
2.1 Cryptographic Functionality ............................................................................................................................... 9
3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope ......................................................................................................10
3.1 Usage and Environmental Assumptions.............................................................................................................10
3.2 Clarification of Scope .......................................................................................................................................11
4 Evaluated Configuration............................................................................................................................12
4.1 Documentation.................................................................................................................................................12
5 Evaluation Analysis Activities....................................................................................................................13
5.1 Development....................................................................................................................................................13
5.2 Guidance Documents........................................................................................................................................13
5.3 Life-Cycle Support ............................................................................................................................................13
6 Testing Activities ....................................................................................................................................14
6.1 Assessment of Developer tests.........................................................................................................................14
6.2 Conduct of Testing...........................................................................................................................................14
6.3 Independent Testing.........................................................................................................................................14
6.3.1 Independent Testing Results .........................................................................................................................14
6.4 Vulnerability Analysis .......................................................................................................................................15
6.4.1 Vulnerability Analysis Results........................................................................................................................15
7 Results of the Evaluation ..........................................................................................................................16
7.1 Recommendations/Comments..........................................................................................................................16
8 Supporting Content..................................................................................................................................17
8.1 List of Abbreviations.........................................................................................................................................17
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8.2 References.......................................................................................................................................................17
LIST OF FIGURES
TOE Architecture..................................................................................................................................................8
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1: TOE Identification ................................................................................................................................................7
Table 2: Cryptographic Implementation(s).........................................................................................................................9
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
TestStream Management Software v5.3.0 on nGenius 3900 Series Switches (hereafter referred to as the Target of
Evaluation, or TOE), from NetScout Systems, Inc. , was the subject of this Common Criteria evaluation. A description of the
TOE can be found in Section 1.2. The results of this evaluation demonstrate that the TOE meets the requirements of the
conformance claim listed in Section 1.1 for the evaluated security functionality.
Lightship Security is the CCTL that conducted the evaluation. This evaluation was completed on 17 April 2023 and was
carried out in accordance with the rules of the Canadian Common Criteria Program.
The scope of the evaluation is defined by the Security Target, which identifies assumptions made during the evaluation, the
intended environment for the TOE, and the security functional/assurance requirements. Consumers are advised to verify
that their operating environment is consistent with that specified in the security target, and to give due consideration to the
comments, observations, and recommendations in this Certification Report.
The Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, as the Certification Body, declares that this evaluation meets all the conditions of
the Arrangement on the Recognition of Common Criteria Certificates and that the product is listed on the Certified Products
list (CPL) for the Canadian Common Criteria Program and the Common Criteria portal (the official website of the
International Common Criteria Program).
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1 IDENTIFICATION OF TARGET OF EVALUATION
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is identified as follows:
Table 1: TOE Identification
TOE Name and Version TestStream Management Software v5.3.0 on nGenius 3900 Series Switches
Developer NetScout Systems, Inc.
1.1 COMMON CRITERIA CONFORMANCE
The evaluation was conducted using the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1
Revision 5, for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5.
The TOE claims the following conformance:
collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices (NDcPP) Version 2.2e, 23-March-2020
1.2 TOE DESCRIPTION
The TOE is a network device that provides management features to modify and monitor the layer 1 fabric with applications in
test labs, customer support labs, and other environments. The TOE is a combination of the NETSCOUT TestStream
Management Software v5.3.0 running on nGenius 3900 Series hardware.
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1.3 TOE ARCHITECTURE
A diagram of the TOE architecture is as follows:
TOE Architecture
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2 SECURITY POLICY
The TOE implements and enforces policies pertaining to the following security functionality:
 Protected Communications
 Secure Administration
 Trusted Update
 System Monitoring
 Self-Test
 Cryptographic Operations
Complete details of the security functional requirements (SFRs) can be found in the Security Target (ST) referenced in
section 8.2.
2.1 CRYPTOGRAPHIC FUNCTIONALITY
The following cryptographic implementations are used by the TOE and have been evaluated by the CAVP/CMVP:
Table 2: Cryptographic Implementation(s)
Cryptographic Module/Algorithm Certificate Number
NETSCOUT FIPS Object Module 1.0 C2144, A1882
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3 ASSUMPTIONS AND CLARIFICATION OF SCOPE
Consumers of the TOE should consider assumptions about usage and environmental settings as requirements for the
product’s installation and its operating environment. This will ensure the proper and secure operation of the TOE.
3.1 USAGE AND ENVIRONMENTAL ASSUMPTIONS
The following assumptions are made regarding the use and deployment of the TOE:
 The Network Device is assumed to be physically protected in its operational environment and not subject to physical
attacks that compromise the security or interfere with the device’s physical interconnections and correct operation.
This protection is assumed to be sufficient to protect the device and the data it contains. As a result, the cPP does
not include any requirements on physical tamper protection or other physical attack mitigations. The cPP does not
expect the product to defend against physical access to the device that allows unauthorize d entities to extract data,
bypass other controls, or otherwise manipulate the device. For vNDs, this assumption applies to the physical
platform on which the VM runs.
 The device is assumed to provide networking functionality as its core function and not provide
functionality/services that could be deemed as general purpose computing. For example, the device should not
provide a computing platform for general purpose applications (unrelated to networking functionality).
If a virtual TOE evaluated as a pND, following Case 2 vNDs as specified in Section 1.2, the VS is considered part of
the TOE with only one vND instance for each physical hardware platform. The exception being where components of
a distributed TOE run inside more than one virtual machine (VM) on a single VS. In Case 2 vND, no non-TOE guest
VMs are allowed on the platform.
 A standard/generic Network Device does not provide any assurance regarding the protection of traffic that traverses
it. The intent is for the Network Device to protect data that originates on or is destined to the device itself, to include
administrative data and audit data. Traffic that is traversing the Network Device, destined for another network entity,
is not covered by the ND cPP. It is assumed that this protection will be covered by cPPs and PP-Modules for
particular types of Network Devices (e.g., firewall).
 The Security Administrator(s) for the Network Device are assumed to be trusted and to act in the best interest of
security for the organization. This includes appropriately trained, following policy, and adhering to guidance
documentation. Administrators are trusted to ensure passwords/credentials have sufficient strength and entropy
and to lack malicious intent when administering the device. The Network Device is not expected to be capable of
defending against a malicious Administrator that actively works to bypass or compromise the security of the device.
For TOEs supporting X.509v3 certificate-based authentication, the Security Administrator(s ) are expected to fully
validate (e.g. offline verification) any CA certificate (root CA certificate or intermediate CA certificate) loaded into
the TOE’s trust store (aka 'root store', ' trusted CA Key Store', or similar) as a trust anchor prior to use (e.g. offline
verification).
 The Network Device firmware and software is assumed to be updated by an Administrator on a regular basis in
response to the release of product updates due to known vulnerabilities.
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 The Administrator’s credentials (private key) used to access the Network Device are protected by the platform on
which they reside.
 The Administrator must ensure that there is no unauthorized access possible for sensitive residual information (e.g.
cryptographic keys, keying material, PINs, passwords etc.) on networking equipment when the equipment is
discarded or removed from its operational environment.
3.2 CLARIFICATION OF SCOPE
Only the security functions covered in the collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices v2.2e are included within the
scope of evaluation. Specifically:
 The management features to modify and monitor the layer 1 fabric were not evaluated.
 Use of NTP protocol was not evaluated.
 Use of Syslog over TLS was not evaluated.
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4 EVALUATED CONFIGURATION
The evaluated configuration for the TOE comprises:
TOE Software/Firmware TestStream Management Software build 5.3.0.54
TOE Hardware nGenius 3900 Series network device includes a switch chassis and blade combination.
The following chassis:
 3901R, 1 blade capacity
 3903, 3 blade capacity
 3912, 12 blade capacity
With the following blades:
 S-Blade Pro, 24 QSFP+ ports
 S-Blade 64, 32 SFP+ and 8 QSFP+ ports
Environmental Support Audit Server (syslog)
4.1 DOCUMENTATION
The following documents are provided to the consumer through the NETSCOUT Mastercare web portal to assist in the
configuration and installation of the TOE:
a) NETSCOUT TestStream Management Software 5.3.0 Administrator Guide 733-1696 Rev. A
b) NETSCOUT TestStream Management Software v5.3.0 on nGenius 3900 Series Switches Common Criteria Guide v1.3
c) NETSCOUT TestStream Management Software v5.3.0 Common Criteria Addendum Rev 4.10
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5 EVALUATION ANALYSIS ACTIVITIES
The evaluation analysis activities involved a structured evaluation of the TOE. Documentation and process dealing with
Development, Guidance Documents, and Life-Cycle Support were evaluated.
5.1 DEVELOPMENT
The evaluators analyzed the documentation provided by the vendor; they determined that the design completely and
accurately describes the TOE security functionality (TSF) interfaces and how the TSF implements the security functional
requirements. The evaluators determined that the initialization process is secure, that the security functions are protected
against tamper and bypass, and that security domains are maintained.
5.2 GUIDANCE DOCUMENTS
The evaluators examined the TOE preparative user guidance and operational user guidance and determined that it
sufficiently and unambiguously describes how to securely transform the TOE into its evaluated configuration and how to use
and administer the product. The evaluators examined and tested the preparative and operational guidance and determined
that they are complete and sufficiently detailed to result in a secure configuration.
Section 4.1 provides details on the guidance documents.
5.3 LIFE-CYCLE SUPPORT
An analysis of the TOE configuration management system and associated documentation was performed. The evaluators
found that the TOE configuration items were clearly marked.
The evaluators examined the delivery documentation and determined that it described all the procedures required to
maintain the integrity of the TOE during distribution to the consumer.
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6 TESTING ACTIVITIES
Testing consists of the following three steps: assessing developer tests, performing independent tests, and performing a
vulnerability analysis.
6.1 ASSESSMENT OF DEVELOPER TESTS
The evaluators verified that the developer has met their testing responsibilities by examining their test evidence, and
reviewing their test results, as documented in the Evaluation Test Report (ETR). The correspondence between the tests
identified in the developer’s test documentation and the functional specification was complete.
6.2 CONDUCT OF TESTING
The TOE was subjected to a comprehensive suite of formally documented, independent functional and penetration tests. The
detailed testing activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected results and observed results are
documented in a separate Test Results document.
6.3 INDEPENDENT TESTING
During this evaluation, the evaluator developed independent functional & penetration tests by examining design and
guidance documentation.
All testing was planned and documented to a sufficient level of detail to allow repeatability of the testing procedures and
results. The following testing activities were performed:
a. PP Assurance Activities: The evaluator performed the assurance activities listed in the claimed PP
b. Cryptographic Implementation Verification: The evaluator verified that the claimed cryptographic implementations
were present in the TOE.
6.3.1 INDEPENDENT TESTING RESULTS
The developer’s tests and the independent tests yielded the expected results, providing assurance that the TOE behaves as
specified in its ST and functional specification.
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6.4 VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS
The vulnerability analysis focused on 4 flaw hypotheses.
 Public Vulnerability based (Type 1)
 Technical community sources (Type 2)
 Evaluation team generated (Type 3)
 Tool Generated (Type 4)
The evaluators conducted an independent review of all evaluation evidence, public domain vulnerability databases and
technical community sources (Type 1 & 2). Additionally, the evaluators used automated vulnerability scanning tools to
discover potential network, platform, and application layer vulnerabilities (Type 4). Based upon this review, the evaluators
formulated flaw hypotheses (Type 3), which they used in their vulnerability analysis.
Type 1 & 2 searches were conducted on 24 October 2022 and included the following search terms:
NXP QorIQ P4081 S-Blade Pro Open SSH
Linux S-Blade 64 Postgresql DB
3901R Switch Netscout fips object module Netscout
3903 Switch Openssl Teststream
3912 Switch Apache 2.4
Vulnerability searches were conducted using the following sources:
NIST National Vulnerabilities Database
https://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/search
US-CERT:
https://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/html/search
Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures:
https://cve.mitre.org/cve/
Canadian Centre for Cyber Security Alerts and advisories:
https://www.cyber.gc.ca/en/alerts-advisories
6.4.1 VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS RESULTS
The vulnerability analysis did not uncover any security relevant residual exploitable vulnerabilities in the intended operating
environment.
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7 RESULTS OF THE EVALUATION
The Information Technology (IT) product identified in this certification report, and its associated certificate, has been
evaluated at an approved testing laboratory established under the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security. This certification
report, and its associated certificate, apply only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated
configuration.
This evaluation has provided the basis for the conformance claim documented in Table 1. The overall verdict for this
evaluation is PASS. These results are supported by evidence in the ETR.
7.1 RECOMMENDATIONS/COMMENTS
It is recommended that all guidance outlined in Section 4.1 be followed to configure the TOE in the evaluated configuration.
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8 SUPPORTING CONTENT
8.1 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
Term Definition
CAVP Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program
CCTL Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
CMVP Cryptographic Module Validation Program
CSE Communications Security Establishment
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
IT Information Technology
PP Protection Profile
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Function
8.2 REFERENCES
Reference
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.
Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, CEM, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.
TestStream Management Software v5.3.0 on nGenius 3900 Series Switches Security Target v1.3, 14 April 2023
TestStream Management Software v5.3.0 on nGenius 3900 Series Switches Evaluation Technical Report Version
1.2, 17 April 2023
TestStream Management Software v5.3.0 on nGenius 3900 Series Switches Assurance Activity Report Version
1.2, 17 April 2023