Ärendetyp 5.3 Diarienummer: 24FMV2376-77
Dokument ID CSEC2024003
Enligt säkerhetsskyddslagen (2018:585)
SEKRETESS
Enligt offentlighets- och
Sekretesslagen (2009:400)
2025-11-05
Försvarets materielverk
Swedish Defence Material Administration
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report MilDef KSW5101 PSD
Issue: 1.0, 2025-nov-05
Authorisation: Jerry Johansson, Lead Certifier , CSEC
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report MilDef KSW5101 PSD
24FMV2376-77 1.0 2025-11-05
CSEC2024003 2 (22)
Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary 3
2 Identification 5
3 Security Policy 6
3.1 Video Security 6
3.2 Keyboard and Mouse Security 6
3.3 Authentication Device 6
3.4 TOE Access 6
3.5 Assumptions 7
3.6 Clarification of Scope 7
4 Architectural Information 9
4.1 User Data Protection 9
4.2 Protection of the TSF 12
4.3 TOE Access 13
5 Documentation 14
6 IT Product Testing 15
6.1 Developer Testing 15
6.2 Evaluator Testing 15
6.3 Penetration Testing 15
7 Evaluated Configuration 16
8 Results of the Evaluation 17
9 Evaluator Comments and Recommendations 18
10 Glossary 19
11 Bibliography 20
Appendix A Scheme Versions 22
A.1 Scheme/Quality Management System 22
A.2 Scheme Notes 22
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report MilDef KSW5101 PSD
24FMV2376-77 1.0 2025-11-05
CSEC2024003 3 (22)
1 Executive Summary
The TOE is the MilDef KSW5101 Firmware Version 4444-M1D1 Peripheral Sharing
Device.
The TOE allows users to securely share keyboard, video, mouse peripherals, and Uni-
versal Serial Bus (USB) authentication device peripherals between up to 4 connected
computers. Security features ensure isolation between computers and peripherals to
prevent data leakage between connected systems.
The TOE consists of:
• Ruggedized Secure KVM Switch, Model KSW5101, Firmware version 4444-
M1D1
• Remote Control, Model KSW4202
and the following guidance:
• MilDef Quick Installation Guide KSW5101 4 Ports Secure Ruggedized HDMI
KVM Switch, HLT32537 Rev 1.3, 2024-08-29
• MilDef KSW5101 Firmware Version 4444-M1D1 Peripheral Sharing Device
Common Criteria Guidance Supplement, Version 1.2, 2025-07-02
The TOE is the complete product. No part of the product has been excluded from the
scope.
TOE physical devices, together with its corresponding cables are delivered to the cus-
tomer via trusted carrier. The TOE guidance MilDef Quick Installation Guide
KSW5101 4 Ports Secure Ruggedized HDMI KVM Switch, HLT32537 Rev 1.3,
2024-08-29 can be downloaded from MilDefs website
(https://download.mildef.com/se) and MilDef KSW5101 Firmware Version 4444-
M1D1 Peripheral Sharing Device Common Criteria Guidance Supplement, Version
1.2 can be requested by sending an e-mail to service@mildef.com.
ST claims exact conformance with the National Information Assurance Partnership
(NIAP) PP-Configuration for Peripheral Sharing Device, Keyboard/Mouse Devices,
User Authentication Devices, and Video/Display Devices, 2019-07-19
[CFG_PSD‐KM‐UA-VI].
This PP-Configuration includes the following components:
• Base-PP: Protection Profile for Peripheral Sharing Device, Version 4.0 [PP_PSD]
• PP-Module: PP-Module for Keyboard/Mouse Devices, Version 1.0 [MOD_KM]
• PP-Module: PP-Module for Video/Display Devices, Version 1.0 [MOD_VI]
• PP-Module: PP-Module for User Authentication Devices, Version 1.0
[MOD_UA]
There are seven assumptions made in the ST regarding the secure usage and environ-
ment of MilDef KSW5101 Firmware Version 4444-M1D1 Peripheral Sharing Device.
The TOE relies on these being met to counter the nine threats. No organizational secu-
rity policies are specified in the ST. The assumptions and threats are described in ST 3
Security Problem Definition.
The evaluation has been performed by Intertek in their premises in Kista, Sweden. The
evaluation was completed on 2025-09-22. The evaluation was conducted in accord-
ance with the requirements of Common Criteria (CC), version 3.1 release 5.
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report MilDef KSW5101 PSD
24FMV2376-77 1.0 2025-11-05
CSEC2024003 4 (22)
Intertek is a licensed evaluation facility for Common Criteria under the Swedish
Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification Scheme. Intertek is also accredited by
the Swedish accreditation body according to ISO/IEC 17025 for Common Criteria.
The certifier monitored the activities of the evaluator by reviewing all successive ver-
sion of the evaluation reports. The certifier determined that the evaluation results con-
firm the security claims in the Security Target (ST) and the Common Methodology for
evaluation assurance level EAL 1 + ASE_OBJ.2, ASE_REQ.2, ASE_SPD.1, in ac-
cordance with the evaluation activities implied by the Protection Profile for Peripheral
Sharing Device, Version 4.0 [PP_PSD], PP-Module for Keyboard/Mouse Devices
Version 1.0 [MOD_KM], PP-Module for Video/Display Devices Version 1.0
[MOD_VI], PP-Module for User Authentication Devices Version 1.0 [MOD_UA].
The technical information in this report is based on the Security Target (ST) and the
Final Evaluation Report (FER) produced by Intertek.
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the cer-
tificate, and on the condition that all the stipulations in the Security Target are met.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by CSEC or any other organ-
isation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT
product by CSEC or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate is either expressed or implied.
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report MilDef KSW5101 PSD
24FMV2376-77 1.0 2025-11-05
CSEC2024003 5 (22)
2 Identification
Certification Identification
Certification ID CSEC2024003
Name and version of the
certified IT product
MilDef KSW5101 Firmware Version 4444-M1D1
Peripheral Sharing Device
Security Target Identification MilDef KSW5101 Firmware Version 4444-M1D1
Peripheral Sharing Device Security Target, 02 Sep-
tember 2025, version 1.4
Protection Profile
Configuration
PP-Configuration for Peripheral Sharing Device,
Keyboard/Mouse Devices, User Authentication De-
vices, and Video/Display Devices, Version 1.0.
Protection Profile Protection Profile for Peripheral Sharing Device,
Version 4.0,
PP-Module for Keyboard/Mouse Devices, Version
1.0,
PP-Module for Video/Display Devices, Version 1.0
PP-Module for User Authentication Devices, Vers-
ion 1.0
EAL EAL 1+ ASE_OBJ.2, ASE_REQ.2, ASE_SPD.1, in
accordance with Protection Profile and PP-Modules
Sponsor MilDef Group AB
Developer MilDef Group AB
ITSEF Intertek
Common Criteria version 3.1 release 5
CEM version 3.1 release 5
QMS version 2.6.1
Scheme Notes Release 22.0
Recognition Scope CCRA, SOGIS, EA/MLA
Certification date 2025-11-05
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report MilDef KSW5101 PSD
24FMV2376-77 1.0 2025-11-05
CSEC2024003 6 (22)
3 Security Policy
The TOE allows users to securely share keyboard, video, mouse peripherals, and Uni-
versal Serial Bus (USB) authentication device peripherals between up to 4 connected
computers. Security features ensure isolation between computers and peripherals to
prevent data leakage between connected systems.
The following security features are provided by the MilDef Peripheral Sharing De-
vice:
• Video Security
• Keyboard and Mouse Security
• Authentication Device
• Anti-Tampering
• TOE Access
3.1 Video Security
• Computer video input interfaces are isolated through the use of separate electronic
components, power and ground domains
• The display is isolated by dedicated, read-only, Extended Display Identification
Data (EDID) emulation for each computer
• Access to the monitor’s EDID is blocked
• EDID file is transferred to connected hosts via a secure mechanism to assure uni-
directional information flow.
• Access to the Monitor Control Command Set (MCCS commands) is blocked
• Only HDMI Interfaces are supported.
• Bi-directional interfaces of HDMI, for example, HEC, ARC, CEC and more are
not connected.
3.2 Keyboard and Mouse Security
• Keyboard and mouse are isolated by dedicated, USB device emulation for each
computer.
• One-way, peripheral-to-computer data flow is enforced through unidirectional op-
tical data diodes.
• Communication from computer-to-keyboard/mouse is blocked.
• Non-HID (Human Interface Device) data transactions are blocked.
3.3 Authentication Device
• Unauthorized USB devices are blocked
• USB authentication devices are authorized by default; all other devices are
blocked
• Anti-Tampering
• The TOE provides passive detection of physical attack. Tamper evident labels on
the product’s enclosure provide a clear visual indication if the product has been
opened or compromised
3.4 TOE Access
• The TOE provides continuous indication of which computer is currently selected.
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report MilDef KSW5101 PSD
24FMV2376-77 1.0 2025-11-05
CSEC2024003 7 (22)
3.5 Assumptions
The Security Target [ST] makes seven assumptions on the usage of the TOE:
A.NO_TEMPEST
Computers and peripheral devices connected to the PSD are not TEMPEST approved.
The TSF may or may not isolate the ground of the keyboard and mouse computer in-
terfaces (the USB ground). The Operational Environment is assumed not to support
TEMPEST red‐black ground isolation.
A.PHYSICAL
The environment provides physical security commensurate with the value of the TOE
and the data it processes and contains.
A.NO_WIRELESS_DEVICES
The environment includes no wireless peripheral devices.
A.TRUSTED_ADMIN
PSD Administrators and users are trusted to follow and apply all guidance in a trusted
manner.
A.TRUSTED_CONFIG
Personnel configuring the PSD and its operational environment follow the applicable
security configuration guidance.
A.USER_ALLOWED_ACCESS
All PSD users are allowed to interact with all connected computers. It is not the role of
the PSD to prevent or otherwise control user access to connected computers. Comput-
ers or their connected network shall have the required means to authenticate the user
and to control access to their various resources.
A.NO_SPECIAL_ANALOG _CAPABILITIES
The computers connected to the TOE are not equipped with special analog data collec-
tion cards or peripherals such as analog to digital interface, high performance audio in-
terface, digital signal processing function, or analog video capture function.
3.6 Clarification of Scope
The Security Target contains nine threats, which have been considered during the
evaluation.
T.DATA_LEAK
A connection via the PSD2 between one or more computers may allow unauthorized
data flow through the PSD or its connected peripherals.
T.SIGNAL_LEAK
A connection via the PSD between one or more computers may allow unauthorized
data flow through bit‐by‐bit signaling.
T.RESIDUAL_LEAK
A PSD may leak (partial, residual, or echo) user data between the intended connected
computer and another unintended connected computer.
T.UNINTENDED_USE
A PSD may connect the user to a computer other than the one to which the user in-
tended to connect.
T.UNAUTHORIZED_DEVICES
The use of an unauthorized peripheral device with a specific PSD peripheral port may
allow unauthorized data flows between connected devices or enable an attack on the
PSD or its connected computers.
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report MilDef KSW5101 PSD
24FMV2376-77 1.0 2025-11-05
CSEC2024003 8 (22)
T.LOGICAL_TAMPER
An attached device (computer or peripheral) with malware, or otherwise under the
control of a malicious user, could modify or overwrite code or data stored in the
PSD’s volatile or non‐volatile memory to allow unauthorized information flows.
T.PHYSICAL_TAMPER
A malicious user or human agent could physically modify the PSD to allow unauthor-
ized information flows.
T.REPLACEMENT
A malicious human agent could replace the PSD during shipping, storage, or use with
an alternate device that does not enforce the PSD security policies.
T.FAILED
Detectable failure of a PSD may cause an unauthorized information flow or weaken-
ing of PSD security functions.
The Security Target contains no Organisational Security Policies (OSPs), which have
been considered during the evaluation.
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report MilDef KSW5101 PSD
24FMV2376-77 1.0 2025-11-05
CSEC2024003 9 (22)
4 Architectural Information
The TOE is the MilDef KSW5101 Firmware Version 4444-M1D1 Peripheral Sharing
Device which consists of the MilDef Firmware version 4444-M1D1, including remote
control.
The figure below shows a basic evaluated configuration. In the evaluated configura-
tion, the TOE is connected to a keyboard, a mouse, and up to four computers. The
video input is HDMI and a single display is connected. The TOE uses all metallic,
ruggedized pin connectors (MIL-SDT-38999) that support both HDMI and USB 2.0
protocols. The KVM is used with a wired remote control.
The TOE provides the following TOE security functions:
• User Data Protection
• Protection of the TSF
• TOE Access
The TOE does not provide a management function to configure aspects of the TSF.
4.1 User Data Protection
Each device includes a System Controller which is responsible for device manage-
ment, user interaction, system control security functions, and device monitoring. It re-
ceives user input from the switches on the front panel or remote control, and drives the
TOE channel select lines that control switching circuits within the TOE.
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report MilDef KSW5101 PSD
24FMV2376-77 1.0 2025-11-05
CSEC2024003 10 (22)
The System Controller includes a microcontroller with internal non-volatile, Read On-
ly Memory (ROM). The controller function manages the TOE functionality through a
pre-programmed state machine loaded on the ROM as read-only firmware during
product manufacturing.
Following boot up of the TOE, the channel select lines are set to Channel 1 by default.
The channel select lines are also used to link the System Controller channel select
commands to the Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) that supports video pro-
cessing.
The user determines the host computer to be connected to the peripherals by pressing a
button on the TOE front panel or on the wired remote control device. The front panel
button of the selected computer is illuminated. Switching can only be initiated through
express user action and not through automated port scanning, connected computer
control, or keyboard shortcuts.
The TOE ensures that data flows only between the peripherals and the connected
computer selected by the user. The TOE ensures that no electrical signal flows be-
tween the connected computers selected by the user. No data or electrical signal trans-
its the TOE when the TOE is powered off, or when the TOE is in a failure state. A
failure state occurs when the TOE fails a self-test when powering on.
Video data flow is comprised of unidirectional Extended Display Identification Data
(EDID) and video data flow paths. The figure below shows a data flow during the dis-
play EDID read function
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report MilDef KSW5101 PSD
24FMV2376-77 1.0 2025-11-05
CSEC2024003 11 (22)
The next figure illustrates the video controller as it writes the EDID content into the
first channel emulated EDID Electrically Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memory
(EEPROM) chip (shown in gray).
The chip write protect switch opens to enable writing. The video controller uses the
I2C lines to write to the first emulated EDID EEPROM chip. Once the write operation
is complete and verified, the video controller switches the EDID multiplexer to the
next channel and the operation repeats until all chips are programmed. Once the write
operation is complete, the video controller switches to normal operating mode, which
is demonstrated in the figure below.
In EDID write mode, the Emulated EDID EEPROM chips are switched to their re-
spective computers to enable reading of the EDID information. The write protect
switches are switched back to protected mode to prevent any attempt to write to the
EEPROM or to transmit MCCS commands.
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report MilDef KSW5101 PSD
24FMV2376-77 1.0 2025-11-05
CSEC2024003 12 (22)
In normal mode, each computer interface operates independently. The power to each
emulated EDID EEPROM is received from its respective computer through the video
cable. The main video multiplexer is switched to the user selected computer to enable
the proper video display.
During TOE normal operation, any attempt by a connected computer to affect the
EDID channel is blocked by the architecture. Each computer is only able to affect its
own emulated EDID EEPROM.
The TOE supports the use of an external user authentication device with a feature
called Freeze USB (fUSB). The TOE does not support internal user authentication de-
vices. By default, only standard USB smart-card readers or biometric authentication
devices with USB smart-card class interfaces that comply with the USB Organization
standard Chip Card Interface Device (CCID) Revision 1.1 or CCID Revision 1.0 will
be accepted by the TOE on the fUSB port.
4.2 Protection of the TSF
Connected computers do not have access to TOE firmware or memory, with the fol-
lowing exceptions:
• EDID data is accessible to connected computers from the TOE
All the TOE microcontrollers run from internal protected flash memory. Firmware
cannot be updated from an external source.
The TOE provides passive anti-tampering functionality. The TOE enclosure was de-
signed specifically to prevent physical tampering. It features a stainless-steel welded
chassis and panels that prevent external access through bending or brute force.
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report MilDef KSW5101 PSD
24FMV2376-77 1.0 2025-11-05
CSEC2024003 13 (22)
Additionally, the KVM switch fitted with Tampering Evident Labels placed at critical
locations on the TOE enclosure. The remote control also has a Tampering Evident La-
bel placed at a critical location.
The TOE performs a self-test at initial start-up. The self-test runs independently at
each microcontroller. If the self-test fails, the LEDs on the front panel blink and the
device makes a clicking sound to indicate the failure.
4.3 TOE Access
The TOE user switches between computers by pressing the corresponding front panel
button on the device, or on the remote control. The front panel button of the KVM or
the remote control button corresponding to the selected computer will illuminate.
When the button to switch computers is pressed, a signal is sent and the TOE periph-
eral sharing device switches to the indicated channel.
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report MilDef KSW5101 PSD
24FMV2376-77 1.0 2025-11-05
CSEC2024003 14 (22)
5 Documentation
The TOE includes the following guidance documentation:
• MilDef Quick Installation Guide KSW5101 4 Ports Secure Ruggedized HDMI
KVM Switch, HLT32537 Rev 1.3, 2024-08-29
• MilDef KSW5101 Firmware Version 4444-M1D1 Peripheral Sharing Device
Common Criteria Guidance Supplement, Version 1.2, 2025-07-02
The MilDef Quick Installation Guide can be downloaded on the MilDef website:
https://download.mildef.com/se, and MilDef KSW5101 Common Criteria Guidance
Supplement is made available upon request by emailing service@mildef.com.
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report MilDef KSW5101 PSD
24FMV2376-77 1.0 2025-11-05
CSEC2024003 15 (22)
6 IT Product Testing
6.1 Developer Testing
No developer testing was claimed in this certification.
6.2 Evaluator Testing
The evaluator performed the installation and configuration of the TOE into the evalu-
ated configuration. All mandatory test cases specified in the following PP and mod-
ules have been performed:
• Base-PP: Protection Profile for Peripheral Sharing Device, Version 4.0
[PP_PSD_V4.0]
• PP-Module: PP-Module for Keyboard/Mouse Devices, Version 1.0
[MOD_KM_V1.0]
• PP-Module: PP-Module for Video/Display Devices, Version 1.0 [MOD_VI_V1.0]
• PP-Module: PP-Module for User Authentication Devices, Version 1.0
[MOD_UA_V1.0]
In total 33 tests were performed by the evaluator and the evaluator determined that no
additional tests were deemed necessary.
6.3 Penetration Testing
Negative tests were performed as part of functional testing mandated by PP and mod-
ules. No vulnerability scan was performed since TOE lacks network interface. The
public vulnerability search resulted in no findings. Therefore, no additional penetra-
tion test was performed.
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report MilDef KSW5101 PSD
24FMV2376-77 1.0 2025-11-05
CSEC2024003 16 (22)
7 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE shall be installed and configured in accordance with the TOE guidance listed
in this document, chapter 5.
The following components are required for the operation of the TOE in the evaluated
configuration.
Computers and peripheral devices connected to the TOE shall not be TEMPEST ap-
proved.
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report MilDef KSW5101 PSD
24FMV2376-77 1.0 2025-11-05
CSEC2024003 17 (22)
8 Results of the Evaluation
The evaluators applied each work unit of the Common Methodology [CEM] within
the scope of the evaluation, and concluded that the TOE meets the security objectives
stated in the Security Target [ST] for an attack potential of Basic.
The certifier reviewed the work of the evaluators and determined that the evaluation
was conducted in accordance with the Common Criteria [CC].
The evaluators' overall verdict is PASS.
The verdicts for the assurance classes and components are summarised in the follow-
ing table:
Assurance Class Name / Assurance Family
Name
Short name (includ-
ing component iden-
tifier for assurance
families)
Verdict
Development ADV PASS
Functional Specification ADV_FSP.1 PASS
Guidance documents AGD PASS
Operational user guidance AGD_OPE.1 PASS
Preparative procedures AGD_PRE.1 PASS
Life-Cycle Support ALC PASS
CM Capabilities ALC_CMC.1 PASS
CM Scope ALC_CMS.1 PASS
Security Target Evaluation ASE PASS
ST Introduction ASE_INT.1 PASS
Conformance Claims ASE_CCL.1 PASS
Security Problem Definition ASE_SPD.1 PASS
Security Objectives ASE_OBJ.2 PASS
Extended Component Definition ASE_ECD.1 PASS
Security Requirements ASE_REQ,2 PASS
TOE Summary Specification ASE_TSS.1 PASS
Tests ATE PASS
Independent Testing ATE IND.1 PASS
Vulnerability Analysis AVA PASS
Vulnerability Analysis AVA_VAN.1 PASS
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report MilDef KSW5101 PSD
24FMV2376-77 1.0 2025-11-05
CSEC2024003 18 (22)
9 Evaluator Comments and Recommendations
None.
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report MilDef KSW5101 PSD
24FMV2376-77 1.0 2025-11-05
CSEC2024003 19 (22)
10 Glossary
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Securi-
ty, document describing the methodology used in Common
Criteria evaluations
ITSEF IT Security Evaluation Facility, test laboratory licensed to
operate within an evaluation and certification scheme
I2C Inter-Integrated Circuit
KVM Keyboard, Video, Mouse
MCCS Monitor Control Command Set
PP Protection Profile
PSD Peripheral Sharing Device
ROM Read Only Memory
ST Security Target, document containing security requirements
and specifications, used as the basis of a TOE evaluation
TOE Target of Evaluation
USB Universal Serial Bus
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report MilDef KSW5101 PSD
24FMV2376-77 1.0 2025-11-05
CSEC2024003 20 (22)
11 Bibliography
ST MilDef KSW5101 Firmware Version 4444-M1D1 Peripheral
Sharing Device Security Target, MilDef Group AB, 2025-09-
02, document version 1.4, 24FMV2376-55
QIG MilDef Quick Installation Guide KSW5101 4 Ports Secure
Ruggedized HDMI KVM Switch, HLT32537 Rev 1.3, 2024-
08-29
CCGS MilDef KSW5101 Firmware Version 4444-M1D1 Peripheral
Sharing Device Common Criteria Guidance Supplement,
Version 1.2, 2025-07-02
PP_PSD Protection Profile for Peripheral Sharing Device, 2019-07-19,
version 4.0
MOD_KM PP‐Module for Keyboard/Mouse Devices, 2019-07-19, ver-
sion 1.0
MOD_KM-SD Supporting Document Mandatory Technical Document
PP‐Module for Keyboard/Mouse Devices. 2019-07-19, vers-
ion 1.0
MOD_UA PP‐Module for User Authentication Devices. 2019-07-19,
version 1.0
MOD_UA-SD Supporting Document Mandatory Technical Document
PP‐Module for User Authentication Devices. 2019-07-19,
version 1.0
MOD_VI PP‐Module for Video/Display Devices. 2019-07-19, version
1.0
MOD_VI-SD Supporting Document Mandatory Technical Document
PP‐Module for Video/Display Devices. 2019-07-19, version
1.0
CFG_PSD‐KM‐UA-
VI
PP‐Configuration for Peripheral Sharing Device, Key-
board/Mouse Devices, User Authentication Devices, and
Video/Display Devices. 2019-07-19, version 1.0
CCpart1 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Eval-
uation, Part 1, version 3.1, revision 5, April 2017, CCMB-
2017-04-001
CCpart2 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Eval-
uation, Part 2, version 3.1, revision 5, April 2017, CCMB-
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report MilDef KSW5101 PSD
24FMV2376-77 1.0 2025-11-05
CSEC2024003 21 (22)
2017-04-002
CCpart3 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Eval-
uation, Part 3, version 3.1, revision 5, April 2017, CCMB-
2017-04-003
CC CCpart1 + CCPart2 + CCPart3
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, version 3.1, revision 5, April 2017, CCMB-2017-
04-004
EP-002 EP-002 Evaluation and Certification, CSEC, 2025-03-25,
document version 36.0
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report MilDef KSW5101 PSD
24FMV2376-77 1.0 2025-11-05
CSEC2024003 22 (22)
Appendix A Scheme Versions
During the certification the following versions of the Swedish Common Criteria Eval-
uation and Certification scheme have been used.
A.1 Scheme/Quality Management System
Version Introduced Impact of changes
2.6.1 2025-10-16 None.
2.6 2025-04-23 None.
2.5.2 2024-06-14 None.
2.5.1 Application Original version
A.2 Scheme Notes
Scheme
Note
Version Title Applicability
SN-15 5.0 Testing Compliant
SN-18 4.0 Highlighted Requirements on ST Compliant
SN-21 3.0 NIAP-Approved PP Certifications Compliant
SN-22 4.0 Vulnerability Assessment Compliant
SN-23 1.0 Evaluation reports for NIAP PPs and cPPs Compliant
SN-27 1.0 ST requirements at the time of application Compliant
SN-28 2.0 Updated procedures Compliant