BSI-DSZ-CC-1217-2024
for
TCOS eEnergy Security Module Version 2.0
Release 1/P71
from
Deutsche Telekom Security GmbH
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V5.47
BSI-DSZ-CC-1217-2024 (*)
TCOS eEnergy Security Module Version 2.0 Release 1/P71
from Deutsche Telekom Security GmbH
PP Conformance: Protection Profile for the Security Module of a Smart
Meter Gateway (Security Module PP), Version 1.03,
11 December 2014, BSI-CC-PP-0077-V2-2015
Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by ALC_DVS.2, ATE_DPT.2 and
AVA_VAN.5
valid until: 28 February 2034
The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation
facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1
extended by Scheme Interpretations and by advice of the Certification Body for
components beyond EAL 5 and CC Supporting Documents as listed in the Certification
Report for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version
3.1. CC and CEM are also published as ISO/IEC 15408 and ISO/IEC 18045.
(*) This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report and
Notification. For details on the validity see Certification Report part A chapter 5.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification
scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions
of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for
Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is
either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 29 February 2024
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Sandro Amendola L.S.
Director-General
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
SOGIS
Recognition Agreement
Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
recognition for components
up to EAL 2 only
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1217-2024
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1217-2024 Certification Report
Contents
A. Certification....................................................................................................................6
1. Preliminary Remarks...................................................................................................6
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure..............................................................6
3. Recognition Agreements.............................................................................................7
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification...............................................................8
5. Validity of the Certification Result................................................................................8
6. Publication..................................................................................................................9
B. Certification Results.....................................................................................................10
1. Executive Summary..................................................................................................11
2. Identification of the TOE............................................................................................13
3. Security Policy..........................................................................................................15
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope....................................................................16
5. Architectural Information...........................................................................................16
6. Documentation..........................................................................................................17
7. IT Product Testing.....................................................................................................17
8. Evaluated Configuration............................................................................................17
9. Results of the Evaluation..........................................................................................18
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE....................................................21
11. Security Target........................................................................................................22
12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES).............................................................22
13. Definitions...............................................................................................................22
14. Bibliography............................................................................................................25
C. Excerpts from the Criteria............................................................................................27
D. Annexes.......................................................................................................................28
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1217-2024
A. Certification
1. Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● Act on the Federal Office for Information Security1
● BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance2
● BMI Regulations on Ex-parte Costs 3
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern und für Heimat
(Federal Ministry of the Interior and Community)
● DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) [3]
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility,
its approval and licencing process (CC-Stellen) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.14
[1] also published as
ISO/IEC 15408
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
2
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung - BSIZertV) of 17 December
2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231
3
BMI Regulations on Ex-parte Costs - Besondere Gebührenverordnung des BMI für individuell
zurechenbare öffentliche Leistungen in dessen Zuständigkeitsbereich (BMIBGebV), Abschnitt 7 (BSI-
Gesetz) - dated 2 September 2019, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1365
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1217-2024 Certification Report
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also
published as ISO/IEC 18045
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
3. Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
3.1. European Recognition of CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS
Technical Domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL 1 to EAL 4. For "Smartcards and similar devices" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in
place. For "HW Devices with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too.
In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of
the recognition agreement.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on
recognition, and the history of the agreement can be seen on the website at
https://www.sogis.eu.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the related bodies of the signatory nations. A disclaimer
beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of recognition.
This certificate is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected.
3.2. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC
(Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08
September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP)
(exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or
the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection
Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on
the website: https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the related bodies
of the signatory nations. A disclaimer beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of
recognition.
This certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2014, i. e. up to and including
CC part 3 EAL 2 and ALC_FLR components.
4
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern und für Heimat of 12 February 2007 in the
Bundesanzeiger dated 23 February 2007, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1217-2024
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product TCOS eEnergy Security Module Version 2.0 Release 1/P71 has undergone
the certification procedure at BSI.
The evaluation of the product TCOS eEnergy Security Module Version 2.0 Release 1/P71
was conducted by SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH. The evaluation was
completed on 16 February 2024. SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH is an
evaluation facility (ITSEF)5
recognised by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: Deutsche Telekom Security
GmbH.
The product was developed by: Deutsche Telekom Security GmbH.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
5. Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report applies only to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following
report and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance components and assurance levels please refer to CC
itself. Detailed references are listed in part C of this report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-assessment or
re-certification). Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation
and certification procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk
management needs regularly updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-
assessment on a regular e.g. annual basis.
In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved attack methods would
require a re-assessment of the products resistance to state of the art attack methods, the
maximum validity of the certificate has been limited. The certificate issued on 29 February
2024 is valid until 28 February 2034. Validity can be re-newed by re-certification.
The owner of the certificate is obliged:
1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product's certification, to refer to
the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report, the Security
Target and user guidance documentation mentioned herein to any customer of the
product for the application and usage of the certified product,
5
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1217-2024 Certification Report
2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of the
product that have been identified by the developer or any third party after issuance
of the certificate,
3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security relevant
changes in the evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and production sites
or processes, occur, or the confidentiality of documentation and information related
to the Target of Evaluation (TOE) or resulting from the evaluation and certification
procedure where the certification of the product has assumed this confidentiality
being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of
confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the
evaluation and certification procedure that do not belong to the deliverables
according to the Certification Report part B, or for those where no dissemination
rules have been agreed on, to third parties, the Certification Body at BSI has to be
informed.
4. to provide latest at of half of the certificate's validity period unsolicitedly and at his
own expense current qualified evidence to the Certification Body at BSI that
demonstrates that the requirements as outlined in the Security Target are up-to-date
and remain valid in view of the respective status of technology. In general, this
evidence is provided in the form of a re-assessment report according to the rules of
the BSI Certification Scheme.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
6. Publication
The product TCOS eEnergy Security Module Version 2.0 Release 1/P71 has been
included in the BSI list of certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet:
https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline
+49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer6
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
6
Deutsche Telekom Security GmbH
Untere Industriestraße 20
57250 Netphen
Germany
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1217-2024
B. Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1217-2024 Certification Report
1. Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the product TCOS eEnergy Security Module Version 2.0
Release 1/P71 developed by Deutsche Telekom Security GmbH. The TOE is a Smart
Meter Security Module according to the Technical Guideline BSI TR-03109-2 [15] intended
to be used by a Smart Meter Gateway in a Smart Metering System. The TOE serves as
cryptographic service provider for the Smart Meter Gateway and supports the Smart Meter
Gateway for its specific cryptographic needs. These cryptographic services that are
invoked by the Smart Meter Gateway for its operation in a Smart Metering System cover
the following issues:
● Digital Signature Generation,
● Digital Signature Verification,
● Key Agreement for TLS,
● Key Agreement for Content Data Encryption,
● Key Pair Generation,
● Random Number Generation,
● Component Authentication via the PACE Protocol with Negotiation of Session Keys,
● Secure Messaging, and
● Secure Storage of Key Material and further data relevant for the Gateway.
The TOE comprises
● the circuitry of the contact-based chip including all IC Dedicated Software being
active in the Integration Phase and Operational Phase of the TOE (the integrated
circuit, IC),
● the IC Embedded Software (operating system),
● the IC Application Software (file system including the Smart Meter application), and
● the associated guidance documentation.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified PP
Protection Profile for the Security Module of a Smart Meter Gateway (Security Module PP),
Version 1.03, 11 December 2014, BSI-CC-PP-0077-V2-2015 [7].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 4
augmented by ALC_DVS.2, ATE_DPT.2 and AVA_VAN.5.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6], chapter 6.1. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and some
of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionality:
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
Digital Signature Generation The TOE (Smart Meter Security Module) serves as a
cryptographic service provider for the Smart Meter Gateway. It
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1217-2024
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
generates digital signatures based on elliptic curve
cryptography for different purposes (commands PSO
COMPUTE DIGITAL SIGNATURE, INTERNAL
AUTHENTICATE).
Digital Signature Verification The TOE (Smart Meter Security Module) serves as a
cryptographic service provider for the Smart Meter Gateway. It
verifies digital signatures based on elliptic curve cryptography
for different purposes (commands PSO VERIFY DIGITAL
SIGNATURE, EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE, PSO VERIFY
CERTIFICATE).
Key Agreement for TLS The TOE (Smart Meter Security Module) serves as a
cryptographic service provider for the Smart Meter Gateway. It
supports the cryptographic protocol ECKA-DH up to the
generation of the shared secret value (command GENERAL
AUTHENTICATE / variant ECKA-DH).
Hint: The key derivation function is not part of the TOE's
functionality and has to be realised by the external world (here:
Smart Meter Gateway). The session keys derived from the
shared secret value by the key derivation function are used in
the framework of the so-called TLS handshake.
Key Agreement for Content Data
Encryption
The TOE (Smart Meter Security Module) serves as a
cryptographic service provider for the Smart Meter Gateway. It
supports the cryptographic protocol ECKA-EG up to the
generation of the shared secret value (command GENERAL
AUTHENTICATE / variant ECKA-EG).
Hint: The key derivation function is not part of the TOE's
functionality and has to be realised by the external world (here:
Smart Meter Gateway). The session keys derived from the
shared secret value by the key derivation function are used in
the framework of content data encryption.
Key Pair Generation The TOE (Smart Meter Security Module) serves as a
cryptographic service provider for the Smart Meter Gateway. It
generates asymmetric key pairs based on elliptic curve
cryptography for different purposes (keys for signature, TLS,
content data encryption).
Random Number Generation The TOE (Smart Meter Security Module) serves as a
cryptographic service provider for the Smart Meter Gateway. It
generates random numbers by providing an hybrid physical
random number generator of class PTG.3 (command GET
CHALLENGE). Furthermore, the TOE generates random
values for internal purpose and the purpose of key generation.
Component Authentication via the PACE
Protocol with Negotiation of Session
Keys
The TOE (Smart Meter Security Module) implements the PACE
protocol (command GENERAL AUTHENTICATE / variant
PACE). The protocol provides component authentication
between the TOE (Smart Meter Security Module) and the
external world (here: Smart Meter Gateway) and includes the
negotiation of session keys that will be used afterwards for
Secure Messaging between these two components.
Secure Messaging The TOE (Smart Meter Security Module) provides Secure
Messaging according to ISO 7816-4 based on AES for securing
the data transfer between the TOE (Smart Meter Security
Module) and the external world (here: Smart Meter Gateway)
for confidentiality and integrity.
Hint: The session keys used for Secure Messaging are
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1217-2024 Certification Report
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
negotiated in the framework of the PACE protocol between the
TOE (Smart Meter Security Module) and the external world
(here: Smart Meter Gateway).
Secure Storage of Key Material and
further data relevant for the Gateway
The TOE (Smart Meter Security Module) serves as device for
secure storage of keys and further data relevant for the external
world (here: Smart Meter Gateway).
The TOE (Smart Meter Security Module) provides mechanisms
for the access control to User Data stored in and processed by
the TOE. Furthermore, the TOE (Smart Meter Security Module)
provides mechanisms for the management and access to the
TSF and TSF Data.
The TOE (Smart Meter Security Module) provides security
mechanisms serving for the accuracy and reliability of the TOE
security functionality. This includes in particular self-protection,
secure failure status and resistance against side channel and
fault injection attacks.
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 6.1 and 7.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6], chapter 3.1.
Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of Assumptions,
Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [6],
chapter 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4.
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2. Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
TCOS eEnergy Security Module Version 2.0 Release 1/P71
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
1 HW/SW NXP Secure Smart Card
Controller P71D600 (N7122)
including its IC Dedicated
Software
(refer to the Certification Report
BSI-DSZ-CC-1149-V3-2023 [11])
Hardware platform:
P71D600 (N7122)
Wafer-Image (ChipExe):
WaferImageTCOS-
ESM20_HW04_MB6D6
M01000000.out.chipexe
Hard macro instantiated
within a wafer, module
and/or package, e.g.
HVQFN
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1217-2024
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
2 SW IC Embedded Software (TCOS
operating system)
TCOS eEnergy Security
Module Version 2.0
Release 1/P71
OS Version: '01 C1'
Completion Code
Version: '01'
(refer to Table 3)
Implemented in Flash
memory/EEPROM of the
IC
3 SW IC Application Software (file
system including the Smart Meter
application)
FSV01
File System Version: '01'
(refer to Table 3)
Implemented in Flash
memory/EEPROM of the
IC
4 DOC Operational Guidance for users
and administrators, Guidance
Documentation of TCOS eEnergy
Security Module 2.0 Release 1
[10]
Version 1.0.0 Document in electronic
form (encrypted and
signed)
5 DATA Activation command APDUs (for
opening personalization and
integration processes of the
TOE's life cycle model)
--- Text file in electronic
form (encrypted and
signed)
6 DATA Authentication Key (customer-
specific)
--- Text file in electronic
form (encrypted and
signed)
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
The customer-specific Wafer-Image (ChipExe) for the TOE is labelled and identified by
NXP Semiconductors GmbH as TCOS eEnergy 2.0 R1, sample.
The name of the Wafer-Image file transferred from Deutsche Telekom Security GmbH to
NXP Semiconductors GmbH is WaferImageTCOS-ESM20_HW04_MB6D6M01000000_-
submission_2.zip.gpg.
The identification of the TOE by NXP Semiconductors GmbH is defined by the project
name SE042.
The wafer initialisation of the TOE based on the hardware platform P71D600 (N7122) is
part of the NXP IC manufacturing and takes place by using the aforementioned Wafer-
Image from Deutsche Telekom Security GmbH that includes all TOE parts.
According to the Security Target [6], chapter 1.4.4 the life-cycle model of the TOE consists
of the following 6 phases: Phase 1: Security Module Embedded Software Development /
Phase 2: IC Development / Phase 3: IC Manufacturing, Packaging and Testing / Phase 4:
Security Module Product Finishing Process / Phase 5: Security Module Integration
(Integration Phase) / Phase 6: Security Module End-Usage (Operational Phase).
The TOE delivery takes place after Phase 4 so that the evaluation process is limited to
Phases 1 to 4. The TOE is delivered from NXP Semiconductors GmbH to the Integrator
who is responsible for the integration of the TOE (Smart Meter Security Module) and the
Smart Meter Gateway and loading of initial key and certificate material into the TOE in the
framework of the integration of the TOE in Phase 5. The TOE is as well delivered to the
developers of Smart Meter Gateways in order to support their implementation activities. To
ensure that the evaluated TOE version is received, the procedures to start the
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1217-2024 Certification Report
personalization and integration processes as described in the user guidance document
[10] have to be followed.
In order to verify that the user uses a certified TOE, the TOE can be identified using the
means described in the user guidance [10], chapters 8.3.29 and 8.4.1.1. The TOE can be
identified by using the command FORMAT (only till Phase 5 of the TOE's life-cycle model)
respective the command GET CARD INFO (in Phase 6 of the TOE's life-cycle model). Via
the command FORMAT (P1 P2 = '00 00' for option ‘Reading of chip information’)
respective the command GET CARD INFO (P1 P2 = '06 00') the user can read out the
chip information and identify the underlying chip as well as the TCOS operating system
and initialised file system installed in the chip. To open the personalization and integration
phase (Phase 5 of the TOE's life-cycle model) a mutual authentication via the command
FORMAT as described in the user guidance [10], chapter 8.4.1.3 is necessary, therefore
the authenticity of the TOE is verified before further usage of the TOE.
The following identification data can be retrieved within a 16 byte string responded by the
commands FORMAT respective GET CARD INFO:
Byte Product information Value
1 Indicator of the chip manufacturer according to ISO 7816-6: NXP
Semiconductors GmbH
'04'
2 Chip type (type ID of the chip manufacturer) '20'
3 - 8 Unique identification number for the chip -
9 Card type: TCOS eESM '10'
10 -11 Operating system version (ROM mask version) '01 C1'
12 Version of the completion code for finalizing the operating system '01'
13 File system version '01'
14 '00' (RFU) '00'
15 '00' (RFU) '00'
16 Authentication key version '11'
Table 3: TOE identification data
3. Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues: The Security Policy of the TOE as
a Smart Meter Security Module consisting of an underlying contact-based IC and an
operating system and (initial) file system according to TR-03109-2 [15] and to the TOE
user guidance [10] is to provide secure cryptographic functionalities and related key
management functions for usage by the Smart Meter Gateway and its Gateway
Administrator. The TOE serves as a cryptographic service provider for the Smart Meter
Gateway with provisioning of overall system security in view of Smart Meter Gateway
needs.
The TOE implements physical and logical security functionality in order to protect user
data stored and operated on the module when used as part of the Smart Meter Gateway in
a hostile environment. Hence the TOE maintains integrity and confidentiality of code and
data stored in its memories and the different CPU modes with the related capabilities for
configuration and memory access and for integrity, the correct operation and the
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1217-2024
confidentiality of security functionality provided by the TOE. Therefore the TOE's overall
policy is to protect against malfunction, leakage, physical manipulation and probing.
Besides, the TOE's life-cycle is supported as well as the user Identification whereas the
abuse of functionality is prevented. Furthermore, specific cryptographic services including
random number generation and key management functionality are being provided to be
securely used by the TOE embedded software.
Specific details concerning the above mentioned security policies can be found in the
Security Target [6], chapter 6.
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are
of relevance:
● OE.Integration: Integration phase of the Gateway and TOE
● OE.OperationalPhase: Operational phase of the integrated Gateway
● OE.Administration: Administration of the TOE
● OE.TrustedAdmin: Trustworthiness of the Gateway Administrator
● OE.PhysicalProtection: Physical protection of the TOE
● OE.KeyAgreementDH: DH key agreement
● OE.KeyAgreementEG: ElGamal key agreement
● OE.PACE: PACE
● OE.TrustedChannel: Trusted channel
Details can be found in the Security Target [6], chapter 4.2 and in the PP [7], chapter 4.2,
respectively.
5. Architectural Information
The TOE is set up as a composite product. It is composed from the Integrated Circuit (IC)
P71D600 (N7122) from NXP Semiconductors GmbH, the IC Embedded Software
consisting of the TCOS operating system and the IC Application Software comprising a
specific file system developed by Deutsche Telekom Security GmbH.
For details concerning the CC evaluation of the underlying IC see the evaluation
documentation under the Certification ID BSI-DSZ-CC-1149-V3-2023 [11].
According to the TOE design the Security Functions of the TOE as listed in chapter 1 are
enforced and implemented by the following subsystems:
● Hardware (COMP_CH): Hardware Platform
● Kernel (COMP_KL): implements security relevant base functions in system mode of
the Hardware Platform
● TCOS eESM Application (COMP_APP): implements TCOS commands into system
calls for the Kernel, processes APDUs after getting process control from the Kernel
and requests resources of the Kernel
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6. Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target [6].
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7. IT Product Testing
The developer tested all TOE Security Functions either on real modules or with simulator
tests. For all commands and functionality tests, test cases are specified in order to
demonstrate its expected behaviour including error cases. Hereby, a representative
sample including all boundary values of the parameter set, e.g. all command APDUs with
valid and invalid inputs were tested and all functions were tested with valid and invalid
inputs. Repetition of developer tests were performed during the independent evaluator
tests.
Since many Security Functions can be tested by APDU command sequences, the
evaluators performed these tests with real samples. This is considered to be a reasonable
approach because the developer tests include a full coverage of all security functionality.
Furthermore, penetration tests were chosen by the evaluators for those Security Functions
where internal secrets of the module could maybe be modified or observed during testing.
During their independent testing, the evaluators covered
● testing APDU commands related to Key Management and Crypto Functions,
● testing APDU commands related to NVM Management and File System,
● testing APDU commands related to Security Management,
● testing APDU commands related to Secure Messaging,
● penetration testing related to the verification of the Reliability of the TOE,
● source code analysis performed by the evaluators,
● side channel analysis for ECC (including ECC key generation) and hash calculation,
● fault injection attacks (laser attacks),
● testing APDU commands for the Integration Phase and Operational Phase (including
personalisation and end-usage of the TOE),
● testing APDU commands for the commands using cryptographic mechanisms,
● fuzzy testing on APDU processing.
The evaluators have tested the TOE systematically against high attack potential during
their penetration testing.
The achieved test results correspond to the expected test results.
8. Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE as outlined in the Security
Target [6]:
TCOS eEnergy Security Module Version 2.0 Release 1/P71
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There is only one configuration of the TOE.
The TOE is installed on a contact-based chip of type P71D600 (N7122) from NXP
Semiconductors GmbH. The underlying IC is certified under the Certification ID BSI-DSZ-
CC-1149-V3-2023 (refer to [11]).
The TOE does not use the cryptographic software libraries of the hardware platform, but
provides its cryptographic services by the crypto library developed by Deutsche Telekom
Security GmbH.
The TOE is delivered as already initialised component (in type of wafer, module and/or
package, e.g. HVQFN), i.e. the chip contains the complete IC Embedded Software (TCOS
operating system) and IC Application Software (file system including the Smart Meter
application).
The user can identify the certified TOE by the TOE response to specific APDU commands,
more detailed by using the command FORMAT (only till Phase 5 of the TOE's life-cycle
model) respective the command GET CARD INFO (in Phase 6 of the TOE's life-cycle
model) according to the user guidance [10], chapters 8.3.29 and 8.4.1.1. See chapter 2 for
details.
9. Results of the Evaluation
9.1. CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL 5
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance
specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 34).
The following guidance specific for the technology was used:
(i) Composite product evaluation for Smart Cards and similar devices according to AIS
36 (see [4]). On base of this concept the relevant guidance documents of the
underlying IC platform (refer to [11]) and the document ETR for composite
evaluation from the IC’s evaluation (refer to [13] and [11]) have been applied in the
TOE evaluation. Related to AIS 36 the updated version of the JIL document
‘Composite product evaluation for Smart Cards and similar devices’, Version 1.5.1,
May 2018 was taken into account.
(ii) Guidance for Smartcard Evaluation (AIS 37, see [4]).
(iii) Attack Methods for Smartcards and Similar Devices (AIS 26, see [4]).
(iv) Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards (AIS 26, see [4]).
(v) Application of CC to Integrated Circuits (AIS 25, see [4]).
(vi) Security Architecture requirements (ADV_ARC) for smart cards and similar devices
(AIS 25, see [4]).
(vii) Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL5+ and EAL6 (AIS 34,
see [4]).
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(viii) Functionality classes and evaluation methodology of physical and deterministic
random number generators (AIS 20 and AIS 31, see [4]).
(ix) Informationen zur Evaluierung von kryptographischen Algorithmen (AIS 46, see
[4]).
For smart card specific methodology the scheme interpretations AIS 25, AIS 26, AIS 34,
AIS 36, AIS 37 and AIS 46 (see [4]) were used. For RNG assessment the scheme
interpretations AIS 20 and AIS 31 were applied (see [4]).
The assurance refinements outlined in the Security Target were followed in the course of
the evaluation of the TOE.
A document ETR for composite evaluation according to AIS 36 has not been provided in
the course of this certification procedure. It could be provided by the ITSEF and submitted
to the Certification Body for approval subsequently.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 4 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC
(see also part C of this report)
● The components ALC_DVS.2, ATE_DPT.2 and AVA_VAN.5 augmented for this TOE
evaluation.
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance: Protection Profile for the Security Module of a Smart Meter
Gateway (Security Module PP), Version 1.03, 11 December
2014, BSI-CC-PP-0077-V2-2015 [7]
● for the Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by ALC_DVS.2, ATE_DPT.2 and AVA_VAN.5
Additionally, the requirements of the Technical Guideline TR-03109-2 [15] are met. This is
part of the qualification of the TCOS eEnergy Security Module Version 2.0 Release 1/P71
intended to be used by Smart Meter Gateways in the Smart Metering System.
For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see
annex B in part D of this report.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
The evaluation was performed as a composite evaluation according to AIS 36 (see [4]) and
therefore relies on the platform certification of the used IC. Refer to certification ID BSI-
DSZ-CC-1149-V3 ([11], [12]). The TOE’s cryptographic functionality (except for the IC’s
symmetric and asymmetric co-processors) is implemented by Deutsche Telekom Security
GmbH and assessed in the framework of the composite evaluation.
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9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment
The following table gives an overview of the cryptographic functionalities inside the TOE to
enforce the security policy and outlines the standard of application where its specific
appropriateness is stated.7
# Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in Bits Standard of
Application
Comments
1 Authenticity ECDSA-signature
verification using
SHA-{256, 384,
512}
ANSI X9.63
(ECDSA),
FIPS 180-4
(SHA),
TR-03111, chap.
4.2
Key sizes
corresponding to
the used elliptic
curve:
BrainpoolP{256,
384, 512}r1 acc.
to RFC 5639
NIST curves P-
{256, 384}
(secp{256, 384}r1)
acc. to FIPS 186
TR-03116-3,
chap. 2.2
FCS_COP.1/
IMP
import of keys
2 Authentication ECDSA-signature
verification using
SHA-{256, 384,
512}
ANSI X9.63
(ECDSA),
FIPS 180-4
(SHA),
TR-03111, chap.
4.2
Key sizes
corresponding to
the used elliptic
curve:
BrainpoolP{256,
384, 512}r1 acc.
to RFC 5639
NIST curves P-
{256, 384}
(secp{256, 384}r1)
acc. to FIPS 186
TR-03116-3,
chap. 2.2
FCS_COP.1/
AUTH
external
authentication
(Gateway
Administrator)
3 Authenticated
Key
Agreement
PACE-KA with
SHA-{1, 224,
256}
TR-03110-2,
chap. 3.2
(PACEv2)
|Nonce| = 128 bit TR-03110-2,
TR-03116-2,
chap. 3.2,
4.2
FCS_CKM.1/
PACE
FIA_UID.1
FIA_UAU.1/G
WA,
FIA_UAU.4,
FIA_UAU.5
4 Confidentiality AES in CBC
mode
FIPS 197 (AES),
SP800-38A
(CBC)
|k| = 128, 192,
256,
|challenge|=64
TR-03116-3,
chap. 2.1
FCS_COP.1/
PACE-ENC
FCS_CKM.1/
PACE
5 Integrity AES in CMAC
mode
FIPS 197 (AES),
SP800-38B
(CMAC)
|k| = 128, 192, 256 TR-03116-3,
chap. 2.1
FCS_COP.1/
PACE-MAC
6 Trusted
Channel
Secure
messaging in
ENC_MAC mode
(established
during PACEv2)
ISO 7816-4
TR-03110-2,
chap. 3.2
(PACEv2)
TR-03110-2,
TR-03116-2,
chap. 3.2,
4.2
FTP_ITC.1
trusted
channel
between the
TOE and the
Smart Meter
Gateway
7 Cryptographic
Primitive
ECDSA signature
verification /
generation
TR-03111, chap.
4.2
Key sizes
corresponding to
the used elliptic
TR-03116-3,
chap. 2.2
FCS_COP.1/
VER-
ECDSA
7
For references to crypto standards please refer to TR-03109-3 [16] or TR-03116-3 [17] respectively.
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# Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in Bits Standard of
Application
Comments
without Hash curve:
BrainpoolP{256,
384, 512}r1 acc.
to RFC 5639
NIST curves P-
{256, 384}
(secp{256, 384}r1)
acc. to FIPS 186
FCS_COP.1/
SIG-
ECDSA
Hybrid physical
RNG PTG.3
AIS 20/31 n.a. TR-03116-3,
chap. 1.3.3,
8.3, 8.4
FCS_RNG.1
ECKA-DH TR-03111 (EC
Diffie-Hellman)
Key sizes
corresponding to
the used elliptic
curve:
BrainpoolP{256,
384, 512}r1 acc.
to RFC 5639
NIST curves P-
{256, 384}
(secp{256, 384}r1)
acc. to FIPS 186
TR-03116-3,
chap. 2.2
FCS_CKM.1/
ECKA-DH
used by the
Smart Meter
Gateway for
TLS
handshake
ECKA-EG TR-03111 (EC
ElGamal)
Key sizes
corresponding to
the used elliptic
curve:
BrainpoolP{256,
384, 512}r1 acc.
to RFC 5639
NIST curves P-
{256, 384}
(secp{256, 384}r1)
acc. to FIPS 186
TR-03116-3,
chap. 2.2
FCS_CKM.1/
ECKA-EG
used by the
Smart Meter
Gateway for
content data
encryption
Table 4: TOE cryptographic functionality
All cryptographic algorithms listed in table 4 are implemented by the TOE on the base of
the Technical Guidelines TR-03109-2 [15], TR-03109-3 [16] and TR-03116-3 [17]. For that
reason an explicit validity period is not given.
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this evaluation
(see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2). According to the Technical Guidelines TR-03109-
3 [16] and TR-03116-3 [17], the algorithms are suitable for securing integrity, authenticity
and confidentiality of the data stored in and processed by the TOE as a Smart Meter
Security Module that is intended to be used by the Smart Meter Gateway in the Smart
Metering System. For the validity period of each algorithm refer to the Technical Guideline
TR-03116-3 [17].
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
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In particular, the following aspects, requirements and recommendations need to be
considered when using the TOE and its security functionality (including cryptographic
functionality): Refer to the user guidance [10], chapters 9.1 to 9.9.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9 has
to be considered by the user and his system risk management process, too.
11. Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report.
12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)
None.
13. Definitions
13.1. Acronyms
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
APDU Application Protocol Data Unit
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CBC Cipher Block Chaining
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
CMAC Cipher-based MAC
cPP Collaborative Protection Profile
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography
ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
ECKA Elliptic Curve Key Agreement
ECKA-DH Elliptic Curve Key Agreement - Diffie-Hellman
ECKA-EG Elliptic Curve Key Agreement - ElGamal
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
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HVQFN Quad Flat No Leads Package
ID Identifier
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
KA Key Agreement
MAC Message Authentication Code
NVM Non Volatile Memory
PACE Password Authenticated Connection Establishment
PP Protection Profile
RFU Reserved for Future Use
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
ST Security Target
TLS Transport Layer Security
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
13.2. Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Package - Named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements.
Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
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Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
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14. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 5, April 2017
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[3] BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) and Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility,
approval and licencing (CC-Stellen)
https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE8
https://www.bsi.bund.de/AIS
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
on the BSI Website
https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierungsreporte
8
specifically
• AIS 1, Version 14, Durchführung der Ortsbesichtigung in der Entwicklungsumgebung des Herstellers
• AIS 14, Version 7, Anforderungen an Aufbau und Inhalt der ETR-Teile (Evaluation Technical Report)
für Evaluationen nach CC (Common Criteria)
• AIS 19, Version 9, Anforderungen an Aufbau und Inhalt der Zusammenfassung des ETR (Evaluation
Technical Report) für Evaluationen nach CC (Common Criteria)
• AIS 20, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für deterministische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 25, Version 9, Anwendung der CC auf Integrierte Schaltungen including JIL Document and CC
Supporting Document
• AIS 26, Version 10, Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware integrierte Schaltungen including JIL
Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 31, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
• AIS 34, Version 3, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL 5+ (CCv2.3 &
CCv3.1) and EAL 6 (CCv3.1)
• AIS 35, Version 2, Öffentliche Fassung des Security Targets (ST-Lite) including JIL Document and
CC Supporting Document and CCRA policies
• AIS 36, Version 5, Kompositionsevaluierung including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document
(but with usage of updated JIL document ‘Composite product evaluation for Smart Cards and similar
devices’, Version 1.5.1, May 2018)
• AIS 37, Version 3, Terminologie und Vorbereitung von Smartcard-Evaluierungen
• AIS 38, Version 2, Reuse of evaluation results
• AIS 46, Version 3, Informationen zur Evaluierung von kryptographischen Algorithmen und
ergänzende Hinweise für die Evaluierung von Zufallszahlengeneratoren
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[6] Security Target for BSI-DSZ-CC-1217-2024, Specification of the Security Target
TCOS eEnergy Security Module 2.0 Release 1, Version 2.0.1, 1 February 2024,
Deutsche Telekom Security GmbH
[7] Protection Profile for the Security Module of a Smart Meter Gateway (Security
Module PP) - Schutzprofil für das Sicherheitsmodul der Kommunikationseinheit
eines intelligenten Messsystems für Stoff- und Energiemengen, Version 1.03,
11 December 2014, BSI-CC-PP-0077-V2-2015, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informatiostechnik (BSI)
[8] Evaluation Technical Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1217, TCOS eEnergy Security Module
Version 2.0 Release 1/P71, Version 1.1, 16 February 2024, SRC Security Research
& Consulting GmbH (confidential document)
[9] Configuration List BSI-DSZ-CC-1217, Konfigurationsliste von TCOS eESM Version
2.0 Release 1/NXP P71D600, Version 1.0, 13 February 2024, Deutsche Telekom
Security GmbH (confidential document)
[10] Guidance Documentation BSI-DSZ-CC-1217, Operational Guidance for users and
administrators, Guidance Documentation of TCOS eEnergy Security Module 2.0
Release 1, Version 1.0.0, 4 February 2024, Deutsche Telekom Security GmbH
[11] Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1149-V3-2023 for NXP Secure Smart Card
Controller N7122 with IC Dedicated Software and Crypto Library (R1/R2/R3) from
NXP Semiconductors GmbH, 13 December 2023, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik (BSI)
[12] Security Target Lite BSI-DSZ-CC-1149-V3-2023, NXP Secure Smart Card Controller
N7122 with IC Dedicated Software and Crypto Library (R1/R2R3), Version 1.8,
1 December 2023, NXP Semiconductors GmbH (sanitised public document)
[13] ETR for composite evaluation according to AIS 36, NXP Secure Smart Card
Controller N7122 with IC Dedicated Software and Crypto Library (R1/R2R3), BSI-
DSZ-CC-1149-V3-2023, Version 2, 1 December 2023, TÜV Informationstechnik
GmbH (confidential document)
[14] Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-03109-1: Smart Meter Gateway - Anforderungen an
die Interoperabilität der Kommunikationseinheit eines intelligenten Messsystems,
Version 1.1, 2021, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI)
[15] Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-03109-2: Smart Meter Gateway - Anforderungen an
die Funktionalität und Interoperabilität des Sicherheitsmoduls, Version 1.1, 2014,
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI)
[16] Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-03109-3: Kryptographische Vorgaben für die
Infrastruktur von intelligenten Messsystemen, Version 1.1, 2014, Bundesamt für
Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI)
[17] Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-03116-3: Kryptographische Vorgaben für Projekte der
Bundesregierung – Teil 3: Intelligente Messsysteme, 2022 (Stand 2023), Bundesamt
für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI)
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C. Excerpts from the Criteria
For the meaning of the assurance components and levels the following references to the
Common Criteria can be followed:
• On conformance claim definitions and descriptions refer to CC Part 1 chapter 10.5.
• On the concept of assurance classes, families and components refer to CC Part 3
chapter 7.1.
• On the concept and definition of pre-defined assurance packages (EAL) refer to CC
Part 3 chapters 7.2 and 8.
• On the assurance class ASE for Security Target evaluation refer to CC Part 3
chapter 12.
• On the detailed definitions of the assurance components for the TOE evaluation
refer to CC Part 3 chapters 13 to 17.
• The table in CC Part 3, Annex E summarizes the relationship between the
evaluation assurance levels (EAL) and the assurance classes, families and
components.
The CC are published at https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/cc/.
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D. Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
Annex B: Evaluation results regarding development and production environment.
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Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1217-2024
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product TCOS eEnergy Security Module Version 2.0 Release 1/P71 (Target of
Evaluation, TOE) has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the Common
Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by Scheme
Interpretations by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and CC
Supporting Documents for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
(CC), Version 3.1.
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 29 February 2024, the following results
regarding the development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria
assurance requirements ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_CMC.4, ALC_CMS.4,
ALC_DEL.1, ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.1)
are fulfilled for the development and production sites of the TOE listed below:
a) Deutsche Telekom Security GmbH, Untere Industriestraße 20, 57250 Netphen,
Germany (development and test).
b) For development and production sites regarding the platform and wafer
initialisation please refer to the Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1149-V3-2023
([11]).
For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance
with the Security Target [6]. The evaluators verified, that the threats, security objectives
and requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the Security
Target [6]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.
Note: End of report
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