Ärendetyp: 6 Diarienummer: 20FMV7325-30:1
Dokument ID CSEC2020024
Enligt säkerhetsskyddslagen (2018:585)
SEKRETESS
Enligt offentlighets- och
Sekretesslagen (2009:400)
2022-06-21
Försvarets materielverk
Swedish Defence Material Administration
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report - F5 BIG-IP including AFM
Version 14.1.4.2
Issue: 2.0, 2022-jun-21
Authorisation: Helén Svensson, Lead Certifier , CSEC
Ärendetyp: 6 Diarienummer: 20FMV7325-30:1
Dokument ID CSEC2020024
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report - F5 BIG-IP including AFM Version 14.1.4.2
20FMV7325-30:1 2.0 2022-06-21
CSEC2020024 2 (22)
Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary 3
2 Identification 5
3 Security Policy 6
3.1 Security Audit 6
3.2 Cryptographic Support 6
3.3 User Data Protection 6
3.4 Identification and Authentication 6
3.5 Security Function Management 7
3.6 Protection of the TSF 7
3.7 TOE Access 7
3.8 Trusted Path / Channels 7
3.9 Firewall 7
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 8
4.1 Assumptions on the Usage and the Assumptions Environment 8
4.2 Clarification of Scope 9
5 Architectural Information 12
6 Documentation 14
7 IT Product Testing 15
7.1 Evaluator Testing 15
7.2 Penetration Testing 15
8 Evaluated Configuration 16
9 Results of the Evaluation 17
10 Evaluator Comments and Recommendations 18
11 Glossary 19
12 Bibliography 20
Appendix A Scheme Versions 21
A.1 Quality Management System 21
A.2 Applicable Scheme Notes 21
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1 Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is a Stateful Traffic Filter Firewall network device.
The TOE is BIG-IP LTM+AFM Version 14.1.4.2 (build BIGIP-14.1.4.2.0.0.5, also
referred to as 14.1.4.2) with Appliance Mode licensed and running in a virtual network
machine on purpose-build VELOS hardware.
The TOE requires the F5OS version 1.1.1 operating system hypervisor installed on the
VELOS BX110 Blade hardware in the operating environment.
The TOE hardware appliances above are delivered via trusted couriers. The TOE soft-
ware is downloaded from the F5 website.
The Security Target [ST] claims exact conformance to the PP-Configuration for Net-
work Device and Stateful Traffic Filter Firewalls, v1.4e [CFG], which combines the
collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, v2.2e [NDcPP], and the
PPModule for Stateful Traffic Filter Firewalls, v1.4e [FWMOD].
A list of the NIT technical decisions considered during the evaluation is available in
the ST.
There are eleven assumptions being made in the ST regarding the secure usage and the
operational environment of the TOE. The TOE relies on these to counter the thirteen
threats and comply with the one organisational security policy (OSP) in the ST.
The assumptions, threats, and the OSP are described in chapter 4 Assumptions and
Clarification of Scope.
The evaluation has been performed by atsec information security AB and was com-
pleted in 2022-01-27 The evaluation was conducted in accordance with the require-
ments of Common Criteria, version 3.1, release 5, and the Common Methodology for
IT Security Evaluation, version 3.1, release 5. The evaluation meets the requirements
of evaluation assurance level EAL 1, augmented by ASE_SPD.1 Security Problem
Definition, and the Evaluation Activities for the Collaborative Protection Profile for
Network Devices [EAPP], and the PP-Module for Stateful Traffic Filter Firewalls
[EAMOD].
atsec information security AB is a licensed evaluation facility for Common Criteria
under the Swedish Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification Scheme. atsec infor-
mation security AB is also accredited by the Swedish accreditation body SWEDAC
according to ISO/IEC 17025 for Common Criteria evaluation.
The certifier monitored the activities of the evaluator by reviewing all successive ver-
sions of the evaluation reports. The certifier determined that the evaluation results
confirm the security claims in the Security Target [ST], and have been reached in
agreement with the requirements of the Common Criteria and the Common Methodol-
ogy for evaluation assurance level:
EAL 1 + ASE_SPD.1 and in accordance with the Evaluation Activities for the Collab-
orative Protection Profile for Network Devices [EAPP], and the PP-Module for State-
ful Traffic Filter Firewalls [EAMOD].
The technical information in this report is based on the Security Target and the Final
Evaluation Report (FER) produced by atsec information security AB.
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The certification report was updated to v2.0 on 2022-06-21 after a few corrections
have been made in the ST. The corrections do not invalidate the original certification
decision, so the original certification date still applies.
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the
certificate, and on the condition that all the stipulations in the Security Target are
met.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by CSEC or any other or-
ganisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the
IT product by CSEC or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate is either expressed or implied.
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2 Identification
Certification Identification
Certification ID CSEC2020024
Name and version of the cer-
tified IT product
F5 BIG-IP 14.1.4.2 including AFM, build BIGIP-
14.1.4.2.0.0.5
Security Target Identification F5 BIG-IP® 14.1.4.2 including AFM Security Tar-
get, F5 Inc., 2022-06-10,
document version 4.V.9
EAL EAL 1 + ASE_SPD.1
Sponsor F5 Inc.
Developer F5 Inc.
ITSEF atsec information security AB
Common Criteria version 3.1 release 5
CEM version 3.1 release 5
QMS version 2.1
Scheme Notes Release 18.0
Recognition Scope CCRA
Certification date 2022-02-03
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3 Security Policy
The TOE provides the following security services:
• Security Audit
• Cryptographic Support
• User Data Protection
• Identification and Authentication
• Security Function Management
• Protection of the TSF
• TOE Access
• Trusted Path/Channels
• Firewall
3.1 Security Audit
BIG-IP implements syslog capabilities to generate audit records for security-relevant
events. In addition, the BIG-IP protects the audit trail from unauthorized modifications
and loss of audit data due to insufficient space.
3.2 Cryptographic Support
In BIG-IP, cryptographic functionality is provided by the OpenSSL cryptographic
module. The BIG-IP provides a secure shell (SSH) to allow administrators to connect
over a dedicated network interface. BIG-IP also implements the TLS protocol to allow
administrators to remotely manage the TOE. BIG-IP implements a TLS client for in-
teractions with other TLS servers. These cryptographic implementations utilize the
cryptographic module which provides random number generation, key generation, key
establishment, key storage, key destruction, hash operations, encryption/decryption
operations, and digital signature operations.
3.3 User Data Protection
BIG-IP implements residual information protection on network packets traversing
through it. In other words, network packets traversing through the BIG-IP do not con-
tain any residual data.
3.4 Identification and Authentication
An internal password-based repository is implemented for authentication of manage-
ment users. BIG-IP enforces a strong password policy and disabling user accounts af-
ter a configured number of failed authentication attempts.
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3.5 Security Function Management
A command line interface (available via the traffic management shell "tmsh"), web-
based GUI ("Configuration utility"), a SOAP-based API ("iControl API"), and a
REST-based API (“iControl REST API”) are offered to administrators for all relevant
configuration of security functionality. The TOE manages configuration objects in a
partition which includes users, server pools, etc. This includes the authentication of
administrators by user name and password, as well as access control based on pre-de-
fined roles and, optionally, groups of objects ("Profiles"). "Profiles" can be defined for
individual servers and classes of servers that the TOE forwards traffic from clients to,
and for traffic that matches certain characteristics, determining the kind of treatment
applicable to that traffic. Management capabilities offered by the TOE include the def-
inition of templates for certain configuration options. The management functionality
also implements roles for separation of duties.
3.6 Protection of the TSF
BIG-IP implements many capabilities to protect the integrity and management of its
own security functionality. These capabilities include the protection of sensitive data,
such as passwords and keys, self-tests, product update verification, and reliable time
stamping.
3.7 TOE Access
Prior to interactive user authentication, the BIG-IP can display an administrative-de-
fined banner. BIG-IP terminates interactive sessions after an administrator-defined pe-
riod of inactivity and allows users to terminate their own authenticated session.
3.8 Trusted Path / Channels
The TOE protects remote connections to its management interfaces with TLS and
SSH. The TOE also protects communication channels with audit servers using TLS.
3.9 Firewall
The TOE offers basic firewall functionality, including stateful packet inspection and
network address translation, and logic to mitigate denial-of-service attacks.
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4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
4.1 Assumptions on the Usage and the Assumptions Envi-
ronment
The Security Target [ST] makes eleven assumptions on the usage and on the opera-
tional environment of the TOE.
A.PHYSICAL_PROTECTION
The Network Device is assumed to be physically protected in its operational environ-
ment and not subject to physical attacks that compromise the security and/or interfere
with the device’s physical interconnections and correct operation. This protection is
assumed to be sufficient to protect the device and the data it contains. As a result, the
cPP will not include any requirements on physical tamper protection or other physical
attack mitigations. The cPP will not expect the product to defend against physical ac-
cess to the device that allows unauthorized entities to extract data, bypass other con-
trols, or otherwise manipulate the device. For vNDs, this assumption applies to the
physical platform on which the VM runs.
A.LIMITED_FUNCTIONALITY
The device is assumed to provide networking functionality as its core function and not
provide functionality/services that could be deemed as general purpose computing.
For example the device should not provide a computing platform for general purpose
applications (unrelated to networking functionality).
In the case of vNDs, the VS is considered part of the TOE with only one vND instance
for each physical hardware platform. The exception being where components of the
distributed TOE run inside more than one virtual machine (VM) on a single VS. There
are no other guest VMs on the physical platform providing non-Network Device func-
tionality.
A.NO_THRU_TRAFFIC_PROTECTION
The standard/generic Network Device does not provide any assurance regarding the
protection of traffic that traverses it. The intent is for the Network Device to protect
data that originates on or is destined to the device itself, to include administrative data
and audit data. Traffic that is traversing the Network Device, destined for another net-
work entity, is not covered by the ND cPP. It is assumed that this protection will be
covered by cPPs and PP-Modules for particular types of Network Devices (e.g., fire-
wall). A.NO_THRU_TRAFFIC_PROTECTION is still operative for FWPPM , but
only for the interfaces in the TOE that are defined by the NDcPP and not the FWPPM.
A.TRUSTED_ADMINISTRATOR
The Security Administrator(s) for the Network Device are assumed to be trusted and
to act in the best interest of security for the organization. This includes being appropri-
ately trained, following policy, and adhering to guidance documentation. Administra-
tors are trusted to ensure passwords/credentials have sufficient strength and entropy
and to lack malicious intent when administering the device. The Network Device is
not expected to be capable of defending against a malicious Administrator that ac-
tively works to bypass or compromise the security of the device.
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For TOEs supporting X.509v3 certificate-based authentication, the Security Adminis-
trator(s) are expected to fully validate (e.g. offline verification) any CA certificate
(root CA certificate or intermediate CA certificate) loaded into the TOE’s trust store
(aka 'root store', ' trusted CA Key Store', or similar) as a trust anchor prior to use (e.g.
offline verification).
A.REGULAR_UPDATES
The Network Device firmware and software is assumed to be updated by an Adminis-
trator on a regular basis in response to the release of product updates due to known
vulnerabilities.
A.ADMIN_CREDENTIALS_SECURE
The Administrator’s credentials (private key) used to access the Network Device are
protected by the platform on which they reside.
A.RESIDUAL_INFORMATION
The Administrator must ensure that there is no unauthorized access possible for sensi-
tive residual information (e.g., cryptographic keys, keying material, PINs, passwords,
etc.) on networking equipment when the equipment is discarded or removed from its
operational environment.
A.VS_TRUSTED_ADMINISTRATOR (applies to vNDs only)
The Security Administrators for the VS are assumed to be trusted and to act in the best
interest of security for the organization. This includes not interfering with the correct
operation of the device. The Network Device is not expected to be capable of defend-
ing against a malicious VS Administrator that actively works to bypass or compromise
the security of the device.
A.VS_REGULAR_UPDATES (applies to vNDs only)
The VS software is assumed to be updated by the VS Administrator on a regular basis
in response to the release of product updates due to known vulnerabilities.
A.VS_ISOLATON (applies to vNDs only)
For vNDs, it is assumed that the VS provides, and is configured to provide sufficient
isolation between software running in VMs on the same physical platform. Further-
more, it is assumed that the VS adequately protects itself from software running inside
VMs on the same physical platform.
A.VS_CORRECT_CONFIGURATION (applies to vNDs only)
For vNDs, it is assumed that the VS and VMs are correctly configured to support ND
functionality implemented in VMs.
4.2 Clarification of Scope
The Security Target contains thirteen threats, which have been considered during the
evaluation.
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T.UNAUTHORIZED_ADMINISTRATOR_ACCESS
Threat agents may attempt to gain Administrator access to the Network Device by ne-
farious means such as masquerading as an Administrator to the device, masquerading
as the device to an Administrator, replaying an administrative session (in its entirety,
or selected portions), or performing man-in-the-middle attacks, which would provide
access to the administrative session, or sessions between Network Devices. Success-
fully gaining Administrator access allows malicious actions that compromise the secu-
rity functionality of the device and the network on which it resides.
T.WEAK_CRYPTOGRAPHY
Threat agents may exploit weak cryptographic algorithms or perform a cryptographic
exhaust against the key space. Poorly chosen encryption algorithms, modes, and key
sizes will allow attackers to compromise the algorithms, or brute force exhaust the key
space and give them unauthorized access allowing them to read, manipulate and/or
control the traffic with minimal effort.
T.UNTRUSTED_COMMUNICATION_CHANNELS
Threat agents may attempt to target Network Devices that do not use standardized se-
cure tunneling protocols to protect the critical network traffic. Attackers may take ad-
vantage of poorly designed protocols or poor key management to successfully perform
man-in-the-middle attacks, replay attacks, etc. Successful attacks will result in loss of
confidentiality and integrity of the critical network traffic, and potentially could lead
to a compromise of the Network Device itself.
T.WEAK_AUTHENTICATION_ENDPOINTS
Threat agents may take advantage of secure protocols that use weak methods to au-
thenticate the endpoints – e.g., shared password that is guessable or transported as
plaintext. The consequences are the same as a poorly designed protocol, the attacker
could masquerade as the Administrator or another device, and the attacker could insert
themselves into the network stream and perform a man-in-the-middle attack. The re-
sult is the critical network traffic is exposed and there could be a loss of confidential-
ity and integrity, and potentially the Network Device itself could be compromised.
T.UPDATE_COMPROMISE
Threat agents may attempt to provide a compromised update of the software or firm-
ware which undermines the security functionality of the device. Non-validated updates
or updates validated using non-secure or weak cryptography leave the update firm-
ware vulnerable to surreptitious alteration.
T.UNDETECTED_ACTIVITY
Threat agents may attempt to access, change, and/or modify the security functionality
of the Network Device without Administrator awareness. This could result in the at-
tacker finding an avenue (e.g., misconfiguration, flaw in the product) to compromise
the device and the Administrator would have no knowledge that the device has been
compromised.
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T.SECURITY_FUNCTIONALITY_COMPROMISE
Threat agents may compromise credentials and device data enabling continued access
to the Network Device and its critical data. The compromise of credentials include re-
placing existing credentials with an attacker’s credentials, modifying existing creden-
tials, or obtaining the Administrator or device credentials for use by the attacker.
T.PASSWORD_CRACKING
Threat agents may be able to take advantage of weak administrative passwords to gain
privileged access to the device. Having privileged access to the device provides the
attacker unfettered access to the network traffic and may allow them to take advantage
of any trust relationships with other Network Devices.
T.SECURITY_FUNCTIONALITY_FAILURE
An external, unauthorized entity could make use of failed or compromised security
functionality and might therefore subsequently use or abuse security functions without
prior authentication to access, change or modify device data, critical network traffic or
security functionality of the device.
T.NETWORK_DISCLOSURE
An attacker may attempt to “map” a subnet to determine the machines that reside on
the network, and obtaining the IP addresses of machines, as well as the services (ports)
those machines are offering. This information could be used to mount attacks to those
machines via the services that are exported.
T.NETWORK_ACCESS
With knowledge of the services that are exported by machines on a subnet, an attacker
may attempt to exploit those services by mounting attacks against those services.
T.NETWORK_MISUSE
An attacker may attempt to use services that are exported by machines in a way that is
unintended by a site’s security policies. For example, an attacker might be able to use
a service to “anonymize” the attacker’s machine as they mount attacks against others.
T. MALICIOUS_TRAFFIC
An attacker may attempt to send malformed packets to a machine in hopes of causing
the network stack or services listening on UDP/TCP ports of the target machine to
crash.
The Security Target contains one Organisational Security Policies (OSPs), which have
been considered during the evaluation.
P.ACCESS_BANNER
The TOE shall display an initial banner describing restrictions of use, legal agree-
ments, or any other appropriate information to which users consent by accessing the
TOE.
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5 Architectural Information
The following diagram shows the basic components that comprise the TOE illustrating
the deployment supported in the evaluated configuration.
Figure 1: Architectural aspects of BIG-IP
The TOE is separated into two (2) distinct planes, the control plane and the data plane.
The control plane validates, stores, and passes configuration data to all necessary sys-
tems. It also provides all administrative access to the TOE. The data plane passes user
traffic through the TOE.
The TOE implements and supports the following network protocols: TLS (client and
server), SSH, HTTPS, FTP. The TOE protects remote connections to its management
interfaces with TLS and SSH. The TOE also protects communication channels with
audit servers using TLS (TLSv1.1 and TLSv1.2). The cryptographic functionality im-
plemented in the TOE is provided by OpenSSL.
Traffic Management Operating System (TMOS), Traffic Management Micro-kernel
(TMM), Local Traffic Manager (LTM), and Advanced Firewall Manager (AFM). F5’s
TMOS is a Linux-based operating system customized for performance. The TMM is
the data plane of the product and all data plane traffic passes through the TMM. The
LTM controls network traffic coming into or exiting the local area network (LAN) and
provides the ability to intercept and redirect incoming network traffic. The AFM im-
plements stateful traffic filtering on Level 3 and Level 4 network traffic packets using
administrator-defined packet-filtering rules that are based on network packet attrib-
utes. The VELOS Hardware and Hypervisor are required components of the operating
environment.
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At the core of BIG-IP is a concept referred to as Traffic Management Microkernel
(TMM), representing the data plane of the product when compared to traditional net-
work device architectures. It is implemented by a daemon running with root privi-
leges, performing its own memory management, and having direct access to the hyper-
visor. TMM implements a number of sequential filters both for the “client-side” and
“server-side” network interfaces served by BIG-IP. The filters implemented in TMM
include a TCP, TLS, compression, and HTTP filter, amongst others. If the hypervisor
provides more than one CPU, TMM runs multi-threaded (one thread per CPU). In this
case, disaggregators in the kernel are responsible for de-multiplexing and multiplexing
network traffic for handling by an individual TMM thread.
Additional plug-in filters can be added to this queue by individual product packages.
These plug-ins typically have a filter component in TMM, with additional and more
complex logic in a counter-part implemented in a Linux-based daemon (module). The
plug-in modules relevant to this evaluation include:
 Local Traffic Manager (LTM): authentication of HTTP (based on Apache) traffic
and advanced traffic forwarding directives
 Advanced Firewall Manager (AFM): network filtering as described in FWPPM.
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6 Documentation
The main guides ot installing the TOE into the evaluated configuration is:
[ECG] BIG-IP® Common Criteria Evaluation Configuration Guide BIG-IP
release 14.1.4.2
The [ST] section 1.6.3.2 provides a full list of the guidance documents that are past of
the TOE.
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7 IT Product Testing
7.1 Evaluator Testing
The evaluator has conducted testing on the BIG-IP running build BIGIP-14.1.4.2-0.0.5
installed on a F5OS version 1.1.1 operating system hypervisor installed on the VELOS
BX110 Blade hardware. The evaluator has performed more than 50 test cases, includ-
ing extensive testing to test cryptographic protocols.
The cryptographic algorithm testing is covered by Cryptographic Algorithm Valida-
tion System (CAVS), and the Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program (CAVP)
certificates..
All evaluator test cases were completed successfully.
7.2 Penetration Testing
All TCP/IP ports were scanned. The results of the port scans found that there were no
open ports as expected on the TOE platform.
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8 Evaluated Configuration
The following configuration specifics apply to the evaluated configuration of the
TOE:
 Appliance mode is licensed. Appliance mode disables root access to the TOE op-
erating system and disables bash shell.
 Certificate validation is performed using CRLs.
 Disabled interfaces:
 All command shells other than tmsh are disabled. For example, bash and other
user-serviceable shells are excluded.
 Management of the TOE via SNMP is disabled.
 SSH client
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9 Results of the Evaluation
The evaluators applied each work unit of the Common Methodology [CEM] within
the scope of the evaluation, and concluded that the TOE meets the security objectives
stated in the Security Target [ST] for an attack potential of Basic.
The certifier reviewed the work of the evaluators and determined that the evaluation
was conducted in accordance with the Common Criteria [CC].
The evaluators' overall verdict is PASS.
The verdicts for the assurance classes and components are summarised in the follow-
ing table:
Assurance Class/Family Short name Verdict
Development ADV PASS
Functional Specification ADV_FSP.1 PASS
Guidance Documents AGD PASS
Operational User Guidance AGD_OPE.1 PASS
Preparative Procedures AGD_PRE.1 PASS
Life-cycle Support ALC PASS
CM Capabilities ALC_CMC.1 PASS
CM Scope ALC_CMS.1 PASS
Security Target Evaluation ASE PASS
ST Introduction ASE_INT.1 PASS
Conformance Claims ASE_CCL.1 PASS
Security Problem Definition ASE_SPD.1 PASS
Security Objectives ASE_OBJ.1 PASS
Extended Components Definition ASE_ECD.1 PASS
Security Requirements ASE_REQ.1 PASS
TOE Summary Specification ASE_TSS.1 PASS
Tests ATE PASS
Independent Testing ATE_IND.1 PASS
Vulnerability Assessment AVA PASS
Vulnerability Analysis AVA_VAN.1 PASS
Evaluation Activities for NDcPP PASS
Evaluation Activities for FWMOD PASS
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10 Evaluator Comments and Recommendations
None.
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11 Glossary
CC Common Criteria
CRL Certificate Revocation List
GUI Graphical User Interface
LTM Local Traffic Manager
OSP Organisational Security Policy
PP Protection Profile
SFP Security Function Policy
SOAP Simple Object Access Protocol
TLS Transport Layer Security
TMM Traffic Management Microkernel
TMOS Traffic Management Operating System
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functions
vCMP Virtual Clustered Multi-Processing
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12 Bibliography
ST F5 BIG-IP® 14.1.4.2 including AFM Security Target, F5 Inc.,
2022-06-10, document version 4.V.9
ECG BIG-IP® Common Criteria Evaluation Configuration Guide BIG-IP®
Release 14.1.4.2, F5 Inc., 2021-09-02,
document version 4.6
CFG PP-Configuration for Network Device and Stateful Traffic Filter
Firewalls, 2020-Jun-25, document version 1.4E
FWMOD PP-Module for Stateful Traffic Filter Firewalls, 2020-Jun-25,
document version 1.4E
EAMOD Evaluation Activities for Stateful Traffic Filter Firewalls PP-Module,
ND iTC, Jun 2020, document version 1.4E
NDcPP Collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, ND iTC,
2020-Mar-23, document version 2.2E
EAPP Evaluation Activities for Network Device cPP, ND iTC,
Dec 2019, document version 2.2
CCpart1 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Part 1, version 3.1 revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-001
CCpart2 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Part 2, version 3.1 revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-002
CCpart3 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Part 3, version 3.1 revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-003
CC CCpart1 + CCpart2 + CCpart3
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, version 3.1 revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-004
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report - F5 BIG-IP including AFM Version 14.1.4.2
20FMV7325-30:1 2.0 2022-06-21
CSEC2020024 21 (22)
Appendix A Scheme Versions
A.1 Quality Management System
During the certification project, the following versions of the quality management sys-
tem (QMS) have been applicable since the certification application was registered.
QMS 1.24 valid from 2020-11-19
QMS 1.24.1 valid from 2020-12-03
QMS 1.25 valid from 2021-06-17
QMS 2.0 valid from 2021-11-24
QMS 2.1 valid from 2022-01-26
In order to ensure consistency in the outcome of the certification, the certifier has ex-
amined the changes introduced in each update of the quality management system.
The changes between consecutive versions are outlined in “Ändringslista CSEC QMS
2.1”.
The certifier concluded that, from QMS 1.24 to the current QMS 2.1, there are no
changes with impact on the result of the certification.
A.2 Applicable Scheme Notes
SN-15 Testing
SN-18 Highlighted requirements on the ST
SN-22 Vulnerability assessment
SN-23 Evaluation reports for NIAP PPs and cPPs
SN-25 CAVP-tests in evaluations