Australian Information Security
Evaluation Program
Certification Report
Juniper Junos OS 24.4R2–S3 for SRX380
Version 1.0, 16 July 2026
Document reference: AISEP-CC-CR-2026-EFT-T064-CR-v1.0
(Certification expires five years from certification report date)
AISEP-CC-CR-2026-EFT-T064-CR-v1.0 ii
Table of contents
Executive Summary 1
Introduction 2
Overview 2
Purpose 2
Identification 2
Target of Evaluation 4
Overview 4
Description of the TOE 4
TOE Security Functionality 4
TOE Physical Boundary 4
TOE Architecture 5
Clarification of Scope 7
TOE Security Policy 8
Secure Delivery 8
Version Verification 9
Documentation and Guidance 9
Secure Usage 10
Evaluation 11
Overview 11
Evaluation Procedures 11
Functional Testing 11
Entropy Testing 11
Penetration Testing 11
Certification 13
Overview 13
Assurance 13
Certification Result 13
AISEP-CC-CR-2026-EFT-T064-CR-v1.0 iii
Recommendations 13
Annex – References and Abbreviations 15
References 15
Abbreviations 17
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Executive Summary
This report describes the findings of the IT security evaluation of Juniper Junos OS 24.4R2-S3 for the SRX380 appliance
against Common Criteria approved Protection Profiles (PPs).
This report concludes that the Target of Evaluation (TOE) has complied with the following PPs, PP-modules and
functional package [4.a, 4.b, 4.c, 4.d, 4.e, 4.f]:
 Collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version: 3.0e, Date: 06 December 2023 (CPP_ND_V3.0E)
 PP-Module for VPN Gateways, Version: 1.3, 16 August 2023 (MOD_VPNGW_v1.3)
 PP-Module for Stateful Traffic Filter Firewalls, Version 1.4 + Errata 20200625, 25 June 2020
(MOD_CPP_FW_V1.4E)
 PP-Module for Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS), Version: 1.0, 11 May 2021 (MOD_IPS_V1.0)
 PP-Module for MACsec Ethernet Encryption, Version 1.0, 02 March 2023 (MOD_MACSEC_V1.0)
 Functional Package for Secure Shell (SSH), Version 1.0, 13 May 2021 (PKG_SSH_V1.0).
Additionally, the above PPs are grouped together using a certified PP-Configuration. This evaluation used the
following PP-Configuration [4.g]:
 PP-Configuration for Network Devices, Stateful Traffic Filter Firewalls, MACsec Ethernet Encryption, Intrusion
Prevention Systems, and Virtual Private Network Gateways, Version 1.0, 13 April 2026
(CFG_NDcPP_FW_MACsec_IPS_VPNGW_V1.0).
The evaluation was conducted in accordance with the Common Criteria and the requirements of the Australian
Information Security Evaluation Program (AISEP). The evaluation was performed by Teron Labs with the final
Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) submitted on 12 June 2026.
With regard to the secure operation of the TOE, the Australian Certification Authority recommends that
administrators:
 Potential users of the TOE should review the intended operational environment and ensure that they are
comfortable that the stated security objectives for the operational environment can be suitably addressed.
 The users should make themselves familiar with the guidance provided with the TOE and pay attention to all
security warnings.
 The system auditor should review the audit trail generated and exported by the TOE periodically.
 Security administrators should ensure that an IDP security licence and package is installed and kept up to date to
correctly use and enforce [MOD_IPS_v1.0] requirements of the TOE.
 Security administrators and users of the TOE should be aware that when using the TOE in an IPsec-encrypted
High Availability (HA) environment, that the HA encryption link only supports HMAC-SHA-1 for the IPsec
authentication algorithm.
 Verify the hash of any downloaded software, as present on the https://www.juniper.net website.
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This report includes information about the underlying security policies and architecture of the TOE, and information
regarding the conduct of the evaluation.
It is the responsibility of the user to ensure that the TOE meets their requirements. For this reason, it is recommended
that a prospective user of the TOE refer to the Security Target [8] and read this Certification Report prior to deciding
whether to purchase the product.
Introduction
Overview
This chapter contains information about the purpose of this document and how to identify the TOE.
Purpose
The purpose of this Certification Report is to:
 report the certification of results of the IT security evaluation of the TOE against the requirements of the
Common Criteria [1,2,3] and Protection Profiles [4]
 provide a source of detailed security information about the TOE for any interested parties.
This report should be read in conjunction with the TOE’s Security Target [8] which provides a full description of the
security requirements and specifications that were used as the basis of the evaluation.
Identification
The TOE is Juniper Junos OS 24.4R2-S3 for SRX380.
Description Version
Evaluation scheme Australian Information Security Evaluation Program
TOE Juniper Junos OS 24.4R2-S3 for SRX380
Software version Junos OS 24.4R2-S3
Hardware platforms SRX380
Security Target Security Target, Juniper Junos OS 24.4R2-S3 for SRX380, Version 1.0, 09
June 2026
Evaluation Technical Report Evaluation Technical Report 1.0, Dated 12 June 2026
Document reference EFT-T064-ETR 1.0
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Criteria Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2
Extended and Part 3 Conformant, April 2017, Version 3.1 Rev 5
Methodology Common Methodology for Information Technology Security, April 2017
Version 3.1 Rev 5
Conformance  Collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version:
3.0e, Date: 06 December 2023 (CPP_ND_V3.0E)
 PP-Module for VPN Gateways, Version: 1.3, 16 August 2023
(MOD_VPNGW_v1.3)
 PP-Module for Stateful Traffic Filter Firewalls, Version 1.4 + Errata
20200625, 25 June 2020 (MOD_CPP_FW_V1.4E)
 PP-Module for Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS), Version: 1.0, 11
May 2021 (MOD_IPS_V1.0)
 Functional Package for Secure Shell (SSH), Version 1.0, 13 May
2021 (PKG_SSH_V1.0)
 PP-Module for MACsec Ethernet Encryption, Version 1.0, 02
March 2023 (MOD_MACSEC_V1.0
 PP-Configuration for Network Devices, Stateful Traffic Filter
Firewalls, MACsec Ethernet Encryption, Intrusion Prevention
Systems, and Virtual Private Network Gateways, Version 1.0, 13
April 2026 (CFG_NDcPP_FW_MACsec_IPS_VPNGW_V1.0).
Developer Juniper Networks, Inc.
1133 Innovation Way
Sunnyvale 94089 CA
Evaluation facility Teron Labs
Level 2, 14 Moore St
Canberra ACT 2601
Australia
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Target of Evaluation
Overview
This chapter contains information about the Target of Evaluation (TOE), including a description of functionality
provided, its architectural components, the scope of evaluation, its security policies and its secure usage.
Description of the TOE
The TOE comprises the Juniper Junos Operating System version 24.4R2-S3 executing on the SRX380 network
appliance. The TOE is a non-virtual and non-distributed network device designed to provide secure routing,
firewalling, and advanced network security services. It is an appliance meeting the security requirements stated in
CPP_ND_V3.0E enhanced with an Intrusion Prevention functionality, a VPN Gateway, stateful traffic filtering, MACsec
Ethernet Encryption and Secure Shell (SSH). The TOE operates as a next-generation firewall (NGFW) and secure
Software-Defined Wide Area Network (SD-WAN) platform, enabling organisations to enforce security policies, protect
network infrastructure, and facilitate secure communication across interconnected networks.
TOE Security Functionality
The TOE functionality that was evaluated is described in section 1.3 of the Security Target [8].
TOE Physical Boundary
The physical boundary of the TOE includes all hardware and software parts and the security guidance of the TOE. The
parts of the TOE included in the physical boundary are detailed in Table 1 below:
Part of the TOE Identification Description
TOE Hardware SRX380 The hardware platform and the casing of the TOE.
Includes the processor, the memories, and the
persistent storage.
TOE Software Juniper Junos OS 24.4R2-S3 The Junos OS included in the TOE is Juniper Junos
OS 24.4R2-S3. TOE software is distributed as the
installation package:
 junos-install-srxsme-mips-64-24.4R2-
S3.5.tgz.
Linecards The following PIM interface
models are included in the TOE:
 SRX-MP-1T1E1-R
SRX-MP-1T1E1-R is a T1/E1 Mini-PIM provides the
physical connection to T1 or E1 network media
types.
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 SRX-MP1VDSL2-R
 SRX-MP-LTE-AE (North
America, EU)
 SRX-MP-LTE-AA (Asia,
Australia)
 SRX-MP-WLAN-US (US)
 SRX-MP-WLAN-IL (Israel)
 SRX-MP-WLAN-WW
(worldwide)
 SRX-MP-ANT-EXT
SRX-MP1VDSL2-R is a VDSL2 Mini-PIM, part of the
xDSL family of modem technologies, provides
faster data transmission over a single flat
untwisted or twisted pair of copper wires.
SRX-MP-LTE-AE (North America, EU) and SRX-MP-
LTE-AA (Asia, Australia) are a Mini-PIM providing
wireless WAN support. They contain an integrated
modem and operate over 3G and 4G networks.
SRX-MP-WLAN-US (US), SRX-MP-WLAN-IL (Israel),
and SRX-MP-WLAN-WW (worldwide) are a
wireless access point (Wi-Fi) Mini-PIM.
SRX-MP-ANT-EXT is an antenna extension cable
for WLAN Mini-PIM on SRX Series platforms.
Security Guidance Juniper Junos OS 24.4R2-S3 on
SRX380 Common Criteria
Guidance Supplement v1.0
The Common Criteria Guidance supplement for
the TOE. The security guidance is distributed as a
document in PDF format.
Table 1 - Parts Included in the Physical Scope of the TOE
TOE Architecture
The TOE is a network device with an architecture illustrated in Figure 1. The TOE includes the hardware, i.e., the
chassis of the TOE. The Chassis implements the casing, the physical ports, the memories, the program execution
environment, and the hardware foundation for all those functions of the TOE which require hardware. TOE hardware
also includes the linecards.
The TOE is a bare metal network appliance. The software implements the routing engine and the packet forwarding
engine of the TOE. Together, the two implement all routing plane and management plane functions of the TOE. The
software includes the Juniper Junos operating system.
The TOE is connected to the management console and to a syslog server. The management console may be local or
remote. The TOE is also connected to the networks which it interconnects. Only the routing plane functions are
implemented on the network traffic to and from the interconnected networks. All management plane functions are
implemented on the devices connected to the dedicated management ports of the TOE.
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The TOE implements the following distinct sets of interfaces:
 The operationally required interfaces. These include the power management, and the mechanical interfaces
used for the cooling and ventilation of the TOE as well as the LEDs informing the user of the status of the TOE.
 Network interfaces used for connecting the TOE to the interconnected networks. They are the interfaces for the
ingress and egress network traffic and are physically separate from all other network interfaces. The TOE
implements the networking functionality for the network traffic to traverse through it.
 Management interfaces are used by the administrators to manage the TOE. Management interface is through
dedicated network ports and may be accessed locally from console or remotely over SSH. The management
interface implements a CLI which is the only means of administering the TOE.
The TOE has functionality to operate in High Availability Cluster Mode is illustrated in Figure 2. The two hosts
constituting a chassis cluster must have identical configuration except for one being configured to node 0 and the
other to node 1. The two nodes are connected via two links: the HA control link and the HA fabric link. Critical security
parameter data sent over the control link between the two chassis in Cluster Mode is protected from active and
passive eavesdropping using IPsec. Without knowledge of the IPsec key used to protect the communication between
the two instances of the TOE, the attacker can neither read nor modify without detection the content of the traffic.
The scope of the TOE includes both the cluster mode and the non-cluster mode. The security certificate of the TOE is
valid when the TOE is configured in cluster mode, connected to a secondary or primary node, and when operated in a
single (non-cluster) mode.
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Clarification of Scope
The evaluation was conducted in accordance with the Common Criteria and associated methodologies.
The scope of the evaluation was limited to those claims made in the Security Target [8].
Evaluated Functionality
Functional tests performed during the evaluation were taken from the Protection Profiles [4] and Supporting
Documents [12] and sufficiently demonstrate the security functionality of the TOE. Some of the tests were combined
for ease of execution.
Non-TOE Hardware/Software/Firmware
The TOE is the entire network appliance. Yet, it does require external IT devices to be properly operated. Specifically,
the TOE requires the following items in the network environment:
 Syslog server including a SSHv2 client for connecting to the TOE for the TOE to send audit logs
 An IPsec peer
 A MACsec peer
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 A High Availability peer
 One or more NTP servers for synchronizing the clock of the TOE
 A management station with a SSHv2 client for remote administration of the TOE
 A management station with a serial connection client for local administration of the TOE.
Non-evaluated Functionality and Services
Potential users of the TOE are advised that some functions and services have not been evaluated as part of the
evaluation. Potential users of the TOE should carefully consider their requirements for using functions and services
outside of the evaluated configuration.
Australian Government users should refer to the Australian Government Information Security Manual [5] for policy
relating to using an evaluated product in an unevaluated configuration.
The following components are considered outside of the scope of the TOE:
 use of telnet, since it violates the Trusted Path requirement set
 use of File Transfer Protocol, since it violates the Trusted Path requirement set
 use of Simple Network Management Protocol, since it violates the Trusted Path requirement set
 use of Secure Sockets Layer or TLS, including management of the TOE via J-Web or JUNOScript, Neither is
included in the certification and must not be used.
 No user must be assigned super-user or FreeBSD root account privileges. All administration of the TOE must be
through the CLI.
TOE Security Policy
The TOE Security Policy is a set of rules that defines the required security behaviour of the TOE; how information
within the TOE is managed and protected. The Security Target [8] contains a summary of the functionality that is
evaluated.
Secure Delivery
There are several mechanisms provided in the delivery process to ensure that a customer receives a product that has
not been tampered with. The customer should perform the following checks upon receipt of a device to verify the
integrity of the platform:
 shipping label - Ensure that the shipping label correctly identifies the correct customer name and address as well
as the device
 outside packaging - Inspect the outside shipping box and tape. Ensure that the shipping tape has not been cut or
otherwise compromised. Ensure that the box has not been cut or damaged to allow access to the device
 inside packaging - Inspect the plastic bag and seal. Ensure that the bag is not cut or removed. Ensure that the
seal remains intact.
If the customer identifies a problem during the inspection, they should immediately contact the supplier providing the
order number, tracking number and a description of the identified problem to the supplier.
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Additionally, there are several checks that can be performed to ensure that the customer has received a box sent by
Juniper Networks and not a different company masquerading as Juniper Networks. The customer should perform the
following checks upon receipt of a device to verify the authenticity of the device:
 verify that the device was ordered using a purchase order. Juniper Networks devices are never shipped without
a purchase order
 when a device is shipped, a shipment notification is sent to the e-mail address provided by the customer when
the order is taken. Verify that this e-mail notification was received and contains the following information:
 purchase order number
 Juniper Networks order number used to track the shipment
 carrier tracking number used to track the shipment
 list of items shipped including serial numbers
 address and contacts of both the supplier and the customer
 verify that the shipment was initiated by Juniper Network, performing the following tasks:
 compare the carrier tracking number of the Juniper Networks order number listed in the Juniper Networks
shipping notification with the tracking number on the package received
 log on to the Juniper Networks online customer support portal at
https://www.juniper.net/customers/csc/management to view the order status
 compare the carrier tracking number or the Juniper Networks order number listed in the Juniper Networks
shipment notification with the tracking number on the package received.
Installation of the TOE
The Configuration Guides [6] contains all relevant information for the secure configuration of the TOE.
Version Verification
The verification of the TOE is largely automatic, including the verification using hashes. The TOE cannot load a
modified image. Valid software images can be downloaded from https://www.juniper.net. In addition to the
automated verification, the site includes individual hashes for each image. Security Administrators should verify the
hash of the software before installing it onto the hardware platform. The current version on the TOE can be queried
using the CLI command ‘show version’.
Documentation and Guidance
It is important that the TOE is used in accordance with guidance documentation in order to ensure secure usage. The
following documentation is available to the consumer when the TOE is purchased. The evaluated configuration guide
(System Admin Guide) document for the Juniper Junos OS 24.4R2-S3 for SRX380 is available for download at
https://www.juniper.net/documentation. The title is:
 Juniper Junos OS 24.4R2-S3 on SRX380 Common Criteria Guidance Supplement, Release 24.4R2-S3, 09 June 2026
[6]
All Common Criteria guidance material is available at https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Australian Government Information Security Manual is available at https://www.cyber.gov.au/ism [5].
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Secure Usage
The evaluation of the TOE took into account certain assumptions about its operational environment. These
assumptions must hold in order to ensure the security objectives of the TOE are met.
The network device is assumed to be physically secured within its operational environment, protected from physical
attacks that could compromise its security or interfere with its physical connections and correct operation. This level
of protection is expected to be sufficient to safeguard the device and the sensitive data it handles.
The TOE is expected to provide networking functionality as its primary purpose and should not offer any general-
purpose computing capabilities, such as running compilers or user applications unrelated to its networking functions.
This ensures that the device remains focused solely on its intended security and networking roles.
The network device's administrator(s) are assumed to be trustworthy, acting in the best interests of the organization’s
security. This includes being well-trained, adhering to established policies, and following all guidance documentation.
Administrators are responsible for ensuring that passwords and credentials used within the TOE are strong and
secure. The TOE is not expected to protect against a malicious administrator who deliberately seeks to bypass or
compromise its security features.
For TOEs supporting X.509v3 certificate-based authentication, the Security Administrator(s) are expected to fully
validate (e.g. offline verification) any CA certificate (root CA certificate or intermediate CA certificate) loaded into the
TOE’s trust store (aka 'root store', ' trusted CA Key Store', or similar) as a trust anchor prior to use (e.g. offline
verification).
The TOE’s firmware and software are assumed to be regularly updated by an administrator, particularly in response to
newly discovered vulnerabilities. This ensures that the TOE remains protected against emerging threats.
The credentials (such as private keys) used by administrators to access the TOE must be securely protected on any
platform where they are stored. Administrators must also ensure that sensitive residual information, including
cryptographic keys, keying material, PINs, and passwords, is not accessible to unauthorized individuals when
networking equipment is discarded or removed from service.
The TOE is assumed to be connected to distinct networks in a way that ensures its security policies are enforced on all
relevant network traffic flowing between these networks.
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Evaluation
Overview
This chapter contains information about the procedures used in conducting the evaluation, the testing conducted as
part of the evaluation and the certification result.
Evaluation Procedures
The criteria against which the Target of Evaluation (TOE) has been evaluated are contained in the relevant Protection
Profiles [4] and Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Version 3.1 Revision 5, Parts 2 and 3
[1, 2].
Testing methodology was drawn from Common Methodology for Information Technology Security, April 2017 Version
3.1 Revision 5 [3] and relevant Supporting Documents [12].
The evaluation was carried out in accordance with the operational procedures of the Australian Information Security
Evaluation Program [10].
In addition, the conditions outlined in the Arrangement on the Recognition of Common Criteria Certificates in the field
of Information Technology Security [9] and the document CC and CEM addenda, Exact Conformance, Selection-Based
SFRs, Optional SFRs [13] were also upheld.
Functional Testing
All functional tests performed by the evaluators were taken from the Protection Profiles [4] and Supporting
Documents [12]. The tests were designed to provide the required testing coverage for the security functions claimed
by the TOE.
Entropy Testing
The entropy design description, justification, operation and health tests are assessed and documented in a separate
report [11].
Penetration Testing
The evaluators performed the evaluation activities for vulnerability assessment specified by the NDcPP Supporting
Document [12] that follow a flaw hypothesis methodology. Accordingly, four types of flaw hypotheses have been
considered:
 Type 1 - public vulnerabilities
 Type 2 - ND-iTC (Network international Technical Community) sourced
 Type 3 - evaluation team generated
 Type 4 - tool generated.
The evaluators conducted a review of public vulnerability databases and technical community sources to determine
potential flaw hypotheses using searches that include TOE device name and components, protocols supported by the
TOE and terms relating to the device type of the TOE. These searches were conducted up to the 13 April 2026
coinciding with the conclusion of the evaluation. There was no identifiable Type 2 hypotheses for this evaluation.
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The evaluation team devised one test to check a potential vulnerability within the TOE’s boot process. The evaluation
team also conducted tool-generated vulnerability testing of the TOE as per the Supporting Document [12].
Based on the results of this testing, the evaluators determined that the TOE is resistant to an attacker possessing a
basic attack potential.
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Certification
Overview
This chapter contains information about the result of the certification, an overview of the assurance provided and
recommendations made by the certifiers.
Assurance
This certification is focused on the evaluation of product compliance with Protection Profiles that cover the
technology area of network devices with added security functionality including stateful traffic firewall functions, VPN
gateway functions, intrusion prevention functions and MACsec functions. Organisations can have confidence that the
scope of an evaluation against an ASD-approved Protection Profile covers the necessary security functionality
expected of the evaluated product and known threats will have been addressed.
The analysis is supported by testing as outlined in the PP Supporting Documents [12] and Protection Profile Module
activities, and a vulnerability survey demonstrating resistance to penetration attackers with a basic attack potential.
Compliance also provides assurance through evidence of secure delivery procedures.
The effectiveness and integrity of cryptographic functions are also within the scope of product evaluations performed
in line with the Protection Profiles (PPs) [4]. PPs provide assurance by providing a full Security Target [8], and an
analysis of the Security Functional Requirements in that Security Target, guidance documentation, and a basic
description of the architecture of the TOE.
Certification Result
Teron Labs has determined that the TOE upholds the claims made in the Security Target [8] and has met the
requirements of the Protection Profiles CPP_ND_V3.0E [4.a], MOD_VPNGW_v1.3 [4.b], MOD_CPP_FWv1.4E [4.c],
MOD_IPS_v1.0 [4.d], MOD_MACSEC_V1.0 [4.e] PKG_SSH_V1.0 [4.f] and PP-Configuration for Network Devices, Stateful
Traffic Filter Firewalls, MACsec Ethernet Encryption, Intrusion Prevention Systems, and Virtual Private Network
Gateways [4.g].
After due consideration of the conduct of the evaluation as reported to the certifiers, and of the Evaluation Technical
Report [7], the Australian Certification Authority certifies the evaluation of the Juniper Junos OS 24.4R2-S3 for SRX380
performed by the Australian Information Security Evaluation Facility, Teron Labs.
The Australian Certification Authority certifies that the Security Target [8] have met the requirements of the Network
Device Protection Profiles [4].
Certification is not a guarantee of freedom from security vulnerabilities.
Recommendations
Not all of the evaluated functionality present in the TOE may be suitable for Australian Government users. For further
guidance, Australian Government users should refer to the Australian Government Information Security Manual [5].
In addition to ensuring that the assumptions concerning the operational environment are fulfilled, and the guidance
document is followed, the Australian Certification Authority also recommends that users and administrators:
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 Potential users of the TOE should review the intended operational environment and ensure that they are
comfortable that the stated security objectives for the operational environment can be suitably addressed.
 The users should make themselves familiar with the guidance provided with the TOE and pay attention to all
security warnings.
 The system auditor should review the audit trail generated and exported by the TOE periodically.
 Security administrators should ensure that an IDP security licence and package is installed and kept up to date to
correctly use and enforce [MOD_IPS_v1.0] requirements of the TOE.
 Security administrators and users of the TOE should be aware that when using the TOE in an IPsec-encrypted HA
environment, that the HA encryption link only supports HMAC-SHA-1 for the IPsec authentication algorithm.
 Verify the hash of any downloaded software, as present on the https://www.juniper.net website.
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Annex – References and Abbreviations
References
1. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security functional components April
2017, Version 3.1 Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-001
2. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security assurance components April
2017, Version 3.1 Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-002
3. Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Evaluation Methodology, April 2017,
Version 3.1 Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-003
4. Protection Profiles:
a) Collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version: 3.0e, Date: 06 December 2023
(CPP_ND_V3.0E)
b) PP-Module for VPN Gateways, Version: 1.3, 16 August 2023 (MOD_VPNGW_v1.3)
c) PP-Module for Stateful Traffic Filter Firewalls, Version 1.4 + Errata 20200625, 25 June 2020
(MOD_CPP_FW_V1.4E)
d) PP-Module for Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS), Version: 1.0, 11 May 2021 (MOD_IPS_V1.0)
e) PP-Module for MACsec Ethernet Encryption, Version 1.0, 02 March 2023 (MOD_MACSEC_V1.0)
f) Functional Package for Secure Shell (SSH), Version 1.0, 13 May 2021 (PKG_SSH_V1.0)
g) PP-Configuration for Network Devices, Stateful Traffic Filter Firewalls, MACsec Ethernet Encryption
Intrusion Prevention Systems, and Virtual Private Network Gateways, Version 1.0, 13 April 2026
(CFG_NDcPP-FW-MACsec-IPS-VPNGW_V1.0).
5. Australian Government Information Security Manual: https://www.cyber.gov.au/ism
6. Junos® OS Juniper Junos OS 24.4R2-S3 on SRX380 Common Criteria Guidance Supplement, Release 24.4R2-S3,
Published 09 June 2026.
7. Evaluation Technical Report EFT-T064 (Juniper Junos OS 24.4R2-S3 for SRX380) Version 1.0, dated 12 June
2026 (Document reference EFT-T064-ETR 1.0)
8. Security Target Juniper Junos OS 24.4R2-S3 for SRX380, Version 1.0, 09 June 2026.
9. Arrangement on the Recognition of Common Criteria Certificates in the field of Information Technology
Security, 2 July 2014
10. AISEP Policy Manual (APM): https://www.cyber.gov.au/sites/default/files/2023-
03/2022_AUG_REL_AISEP_Policy_Manual_6.3.pdf
11. Entropy Documentation:
a) Entropy Source Analysis and Validation per SP 800-90B Requirements for Junos OS™ Kernel CPU Time
Jitter RNG Version 3.4.1, Version 1.4, 17 December 2025.
12. Protection Profile Supporting Documents
a) Evaluation Activities for Network Device cPP, Version 3.0e, 6 December 2023
b) Supporting Document, Mandatory Technical Document, PP-Module for Virtual Private Network (VPN)
Gateways, Version 1.3, 16 August 2023
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c) Supporting Document, Mandatory Technical Document, Evaluation Activities for Stateful Traffic Filter
Firewalls PP-Module, Version 1.4e, 25 June 2020
d) Supporting Document, Mandatory Technical Document, PP-Module for Intrusion Prevention Systems
(IPS), Version 1.0, 11 May 2021
e) Supporting Document, Mandatory Technical Document, PP-Module for MACsec Ethernet Encryption,
Version 1.0, 02 March 2023.
13. CC and CEM addenda, Exact Conformance, Selection-Based SFRs, Optional SFRs 30 September 2021, Version 2.0,
CCDB-013-v2.0
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Abbreviations
AISEP Australian Information Security Evaluation Program
ASD Australian Signals Directorate
CA Certificate Authority
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CLI Command Line Interface
Gbps Gigabits per second
HA High Availability
HMAC-SHA-1 Hash-based Message Authentication Code Secure Hash Algorithm version 1.0
IDP Identity Provider
IPsec Internet Protocol Security
IPS Intrusion Prevention Systems
LED Light Emitting Diode
MACsec Media Access Control Security
NDcPP CCRA-approved collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices
ND-iTC Network International Technical Community
NGFW Next-Generation Firewall
NTP Network Time Protocol
PIM Pluggable Interface Module
PP Protection Profile
SD-WAN Software-Defined Wide Area Network
SSH Secure Shell
SSHv2 Secure Shell version 2.0
TLS Transport Layer Security
TOE Target of Evaluation
VPN Virtual Private Network
WAN Wide Area Network
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Disclaimer
The material in this guide is of a general nature and should not be regarded as legal advice or relied on for assistance
in any particular circumstance or emergency situation. In any important matter, you should seek appropriate
independent professional advice in relation to your own circumstances.
The Commonwealth accepts no responsibility or liability for any damage, loss or expense incurred as a result of the
reliance on information contained in this guide.
Copyright
© Commonwealth of Australia 2026
With the exception of the Coat of Arms, the Australian Signals Directorate logo and where otherwise stated, all
material presented in this publication is provided under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International licence
(www.creativecommons.org/licenses).
For the avoidance of doubt, this means this licence only applies to material as set out in this document.
The details of the relevant licence conditions are available on the Creative Commons website as is the full legal code
for the CC BY 4.0 licence (www.creativecommons.org/licenses).
Use of the Coat of Arms
The terms under which the Coat of Arms can be used are detailed on the Department of the Prime Minister and
Cabinet website (www.pmc.gov.au/government/commonwealth-coat-arms).
For more information, or to report a cyber security incident, contact us:
cyber.gov.au | 1300 CYBER1 (1300 292 371)