TrustCB B.V.
Registered address:
Van den Berghlaan 48, 2132 AT
Hoofddorp, The Netherlands
nscib@trustcb.com
https://trustcb.com/common-criteria/nscib/
https://nscib.nl
TrustCB B.V. is a registered company at the
Netherlands Chamber of Commerce (KVK),
under number 858360275.
Version
2023-11
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Certification Report
NXP JCOP 7.x on SN300 Secure Element, versions JCOP 7.0
R1.62.0.1, JCOP 7.1 R1.04.0.1 and JCOP 7.2 R1.09.0.1
Sponsor and developer: NXP Semiconductors N.V.
High Tech Campus 60
5656AG Eindhoven
The Netherlands
Evaluation facility: SGS Brightsight B.V.
Brassersplein 2
2612 CT Delft
The Netherlands
Report number: NSCIB-CC-2300065-02-CR
Report version: 1
Project number: NSCIB-2300065-02
Author(s): Jordi Mujal
Date: 21 October 2024
Number of pages: 14
Number of appendices: 0
Reproduction of this report is authorised only if the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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CONTENTS
Foreword 3
Recognition of the Certificate 4
International recognition 4
European recognition 4
1 Executive Summary 5
2 Certification Results 6
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation 6
2.2 Security Policy 6
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 7
2.3.1 Assumptions 7
2.3.2 Clarification of scope 7
2.4 Architectural Information 7
2.5 Documentation 8
2.6 IT Product Testing 9
2.6.1 Testing approach and depth 9
2.6.2 Independent penetration testing 10
2.6.3 Test configuration 10
2.6.4 Test results 10
2.7 Reused Evaluation Results 10
2.8 Evaluated Configuration 11
2.9 Evaluation Results 11
2.10 Comments/Recommendations 11
3 Security Target 12
4 Definitions 12
5 Bibliography 14
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Foreword
The Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security (NSCIB) provides a third-party
evaluation and certification service for determining the trustworthiness of Information Technology (IT)
security products. Under this NSCIB, TrustCB B.V. has the task of issuing certificates for IT security
products, as well as for protection profiles and sites.
Part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product, protection profile or site
according to the Common Criteria assessment guidelines published by the NSCIB. Evaluations are
performed by an IT Security Evaluation Facility (ITSEF) under the oversight of the NSCIB Certification
Body, which is operated by TrustCB B.V. in cooperation with the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom
Relations.
An ITSEF in the Netherlands is a commercial facility that has been licensed by TrustCB B.V. to
perform Common Criteria evaluations; a significant requirement for such a licence is accreditation to
the requirements of ISO Standard 17025 “General requirements for the accreditation of calibration and
testing laboratories”.
By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, TrustCB B.V. asserts that the product or site complies with
the security requirements specified in the associated (site) security target, or that the protection profile
(PP) complies with the requirements for PP evaluation specified in the Common Criteria for
Information Security Evaluation. A (site) security target is a requirements specification document that
defines the scope of the evaluation activities.
The consumer should review the (site) security target or protection profile, in addition to this
certification report, to gain an understanding of any assumptions made during the evaluation, the IT
product's intended environment, its security requirements, and the level of confidence (i.e., the
evaluation assurance level) that the product or site satisfies the security requirements stated in the
(site) security target.
Reproduction of this report is authorised only if the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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Recognition of the Certificate
Presence of the Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement (CCRA) and the SOG-IS logos on the
certificate indicates that this certificate is issued in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA and
the SOG-IS Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOG-IS MRA) and will be recognised by the participating
nations.
International recognition
The CCRA was signed by the Netherlands in May 2000 and provides mutual recognition of certificates
based on the Common Criteria (CC). Since September 2014 the CCRA has been updated to provide
mutual recognition of certificates based on cPPs (exact use) or STs with evaluation assurance
components up to and including EAL2+ALC_FLR.
For details of the current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, see
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
European recognition
The SOG-IS MRA Version 3, effective since April 2010, provides mutual recognition in Europe of
Common Criteria and ITSEC certificates at a basic evaluation level for all products. A higher
recognition level for evaluation levels beyond EAL4 (respectively E3-basic) is provided for products
related to specific technical domains. This agreement was signed initially by Finland, France,
Germany, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Italy joined the SOG-IS
MRA in December 2010.
For details of the current list of signatory nations, approved certification schemes and the list of
technical domains for which the higher recognition applies, see https://www.sogis.eu.
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1 Executive Summary
This Certification Report states the outcome of the Common Criteria security evaluation of the NXP
JCOP 7.x on SN300 Secure Element, versions JCOP 7.0 R1.62.0.1, JCOP 7.1 R1.04.0.1 and JCOP
7.2 R1.09.0.1. The developer of the NXP JCOP 7.x on SN300 Secure Element, versions JCOP 7.0
R1.62.0.1, JCOP 7.1 R1.04.0.1 and JCOP 7.2 R1.09.0.1 is NXP Semiconductors N.V. located in
Eindhoven, The Netherlands and they also act as the sponsor of the evaluation and certification. A
Certification Report is intended to assist prospective consumers when judging the suitability of the IT
security properties of the product for their particular requirements.
The TOE is the eSE Java Card Operating System and the SN300 Secure Element (including
Dedicated Software) on which it is running. The eSE Java Card Operation System includes GP
functionality. It can be used to load, install, instantiate and execute off-card verified Java Card applets.
The eSE, which is externally accessible via SPI or by the System mailbox connected to the Integrated
NFC controller, supports Type A, B and F contactless communications.
The TOE was evaluated initially by SGS Brightsight B.V. located in Delft, The Netherlands and was
certified on 17 October 2023. The re-evaluation of the TOE has also been conducted by SGS
Brightsight B.V. and was completed on 21 October 2024 with the approval of the ETR. The re-
certification procedure has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Netherlands
Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security [NSCIB].
This second issue of the Certification Report is a result of a “recertification with major changes”.
The major changes are:
- One new JCOP variant is added
- Updates on Guidance
- Changes on the used sites during life cycle
The security evaluation reused the evaluation results of previously performed evaluations. A full, up-
to-date vulnerability analysis has been made, as well as renewed testing.
The scope of the evaluation is defined by the security target [ST], which identifies assumptions made
during the evaluation, the intended environment for the NXP JCOP 7.x on SN300 Secure Element,
versions JCOP 7.0 R1.62.0.1, JCOP 7.1 R1.04.0.1 and JCOP 7.2 R1.09.0.1, the security
requirements, and the level of confidence (evaluation assurance level) at which the product is
intended to satisfy the security requirements. Consumers of the NXP JCOP 7.x on SN300 Secure
Element, versions JCOP 7.0 R1.62.0.1, JCOP 7.1 R1.04.0.1 and JCOP 7.2 R1.09.0.1 are advised to
verify that their own environment is consistent with the security target, and to give due consideration to
the comments, observations and recommendations in this certification report.
The results documented in the evaluation technical report [ETR] 1 for this product provide sufficient
evidence that the TOE meets the EAL5 augmented (EAL5+) assurance requirements for the evaluated
security functionality. This assurance level is augmented with ALC_DVS.2 (Sufficiency of security
measures), ALC_FLR.1 (Basic Flaw Remediation), ASE_TSS.2 (TOE summary specification with
architectural design summary) and AVA_VAN.5 (Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis).
The evaluation was conducted using the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 [CEM] for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information
Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 [CC] (Parts I, II and III).
TrustCB B.V., as the NSCIB Certification Body, declares that the evaluation meets all the conditions
for international recognition of Common Criteria Certificates and that the product will be listed on the
NSCIB Certified Products list. Note that the certification results apply only to the specific version of the
product as evaluated.
1 The Evaluation Technical Report contains information proprietary to the developer and/or the
evaluator, and is not available for public review.
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2 Certification Results
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) for this evaluation is the NXP JCOP 7.x on SN300 Secure Element,
versions JCOP 7.0 R1.62.0.1, JCOP 7.1 R1.04.0.1 and JCOP 7.2 R1.09.0.1 from NXP
Semiconductors N.V. located in Eindhoven, The Netherlands.
The TOE is comprised of the following main components:
Delivery
item type
Identifier Version
Hardware SN300_SE B1.1 J9
Software
FactoryOS 1.11.3
BootOS (ROM) 1.11.1
Flash Driver Software (FlashROM) 1.11.2
Software
JCOP 7.x OS including CryptoLib and FlashOS JCOP 7.0 R1.62.0.1
JCOP 7.1 R1.04.0.1
JCOP 7.2 R1.09.0.1
To ensure secure usage a set of guidance documents is provided, together with the NXP JCOP 7.x on
SN300 Secure Element, versions JCOP 7.0 R1.62.0.1, JCOP 7.1 R1.04.0.1 and JCOP 7.2 R1.09.0.1.
For details, see section 2.5 of this report.
For a detailed and precise description of the TOE lifecycle, see the [ST-Lite], Chapter 1.5.
2.2 Security Policy
The TOE has the following features:
• Hardware-supported features
o hardware to perform computations on multiprecision integers, which are suitable for public-key
cryptography
o hardware to calculate the Data Encryption Standard with up to three keys
o hardware to calculate the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) with different key lengths
o hardware to support Cipher Block Chaining (CBC), Cipher Feedback (CFB), and Counter
(CTR) modes of operation for symmetric-key cryptographic block ciphers
o hardware to support Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) of operation for symmetric-key
cryptographic block ciphers
o hardware to serve with True Random Numbers
o hardware to control access to memories and hardware components.
o hardware to calculate Cyclic Redundancy Checks (CRC)
• Cryptographic algorithms and functionality
o AES
o Triple-DES (3DES)
o RSA for encryption/decryption and signature generation and verification
o RSA key generation
o ECDSA signature generation and verification
o ECDH key exchange
o ECC key generation
o ECC point operations and key validation
o Diffie Hellman key exchange on Montgomery Curves over GF(p)
o Key generation for the Diffie Hellman key exchange on Montgomery Curves over GF(p))
o EdDSA signature generation and verification
o EdDSA key generation
o SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512 algorithms
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o HMAC algorithms
o Data Protection Module for a secure storage of the sensitive data.
o Random number generation according to class DRG.3 or DRG.4 of AIS20 and initialized
(seeded) by the hardware random number generator of the TOE.
• Java Card 3.1 functionality
• GlobalPlatform 2.3.1 functionality
• GSMA ’Remote SIM Provisioning Architecture for consumer Devices’ (SGP.22 v2.2)
• NXP proprietary functionality
o Runtime Configuration Interface: Config Applet that can be used for configuration of the TOE.
o OS Update Component: Proprietary functionality that can update SMK, Crypto Lib, Flash
Services Software or SystemOS. This component allows only NXP authorised updates to the
product.
o Restricted Mode: In Restricted Mode only very limited functionality of the TOE is available
such as reading logging information or resetting the Attack Counter.
o Image4 (IM4): Software which ensures the customer authorisation of any product updates
using OS update or Applet Migration features, and provides features to make the update
management easier.
o Error Detection Code (EDC) API
o Applet Migration: Keep User Data, Key Data or PIN Data after updating an applet.
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
2.3.1 Assumptions
The assumptions defined in the Security Target are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead
to specific Security Objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. For detailed information on the
security objectives that must be fulfilled by the TOE environment, see section 5.2 of the [ST].
2.3.2 Clarification of scope
The evaluation did not reveal any threats to the TOE that are not countered by the evaluated security
functions of the product.
The following components of the platform are not part of the TOE:
• HW NFC Controller Subsystem and Power Management Unit
• JCOP 7.x with eUICC extension and any other secondary JCOP (optional)
• CommOS
There is no security claim on the ECDAA signature generation, Galois Message Authentication code
(GMAC) for symmetric-key crypto, SHA-3, Korean SEED, MIFARE and FeliCa APIs provided by JCOP
7.x.
The following functionality is also present without specific security claims:
• 5G features as per SIM Alliance 2.3
• Programmable Timeout for SMB with Limitations.
• CPLC data made available through SystemInfo.
• Proprietary Bytecode Compression applied after BCV. Some standard bytecodes are replaced by
optimized byte codes (one to one) with exactly the same operation.
• Compliance to Secure Element configuration, Common Implementation Configuration, UICC
Configuration, and UICC Configuration
2.4 Architectural Information
The top-level block diagram of the TOE is depicted in the following figure.
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2.5 Documentation
The following documentation is provided with the product by the developer to the customer:
The following documentation is provided with the product by the developer to the customer for the
JCOP 7.0 R1.62.0.1:
Identifier Revision Date
NXP. JCOP 7.0 User Guidance Manual 1.24.6 2024-08-28
NXP. JCOP 7.0 User Guidance Manual Addendum 1.24.1 2024-04-09
NXP. JCOP 7.0 Anomaly Sheet 1.24.1 2024-04-09
NXP. JCOP 7.0 R1.62.0.1 (JCOP 7.0 17.4-1.62) User
Guidance Manual for JCOP eSE
1.20.6 2024-08-28
NXP. JCOP 7.0 User Guidance Manual Addendum for
JCOP eSE
1.24.1 2024-04-09
NXP JCOP 7.0 UGM Addendum System Management 1.24.2 2024-04-29
SN300 family; Single Chip Secured (NFC) controller,
Product data sheet.
Rev3.1
(580031)
21 October
2022
SN300V TOE Identification, Data sheet addendum Rev. 1.3
(701813)
18 February
2022
SN300_SE Programmer's Manual, Application Note Rev. 0.22 20 January
2022
Arm® Cortex®-M33 Processor, Technical Reference
Manual
Revision:
r1p0
-
The following documentation is provided with the product by the developer to the customer for the
JCOP 7.1 R1.04.0.1:
Identifier Revision Date
NXP. JCOP 7.1 User Guidance Manual 3.05.3 2024-08-21
NXP. JCOP 7.1 User Guidance Manual Addendum 3.04.1 2024-04-02
NXP. JCOP 7.1 Anomaly Sheet 3.04.1 2024-04-02
NXP. JCOP 7.1 19.4-1.04 User Guidance Manual for
JCOP eSE
3.06.3 2024-08-21
NXP. JCOP 7.1 User Guidance Manual Addendum for
JCOP eSE
3.05.1 2024-04-02
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Identifier Revision Date
NXP JCOP 7.1 UGM Addendum System Management 3.04.2 2024-04-29
SN300 family; Single Chip Secured (NFC) controller,
Product data sheet.
Rev3.1
(580031)
21 October
2022
SN300V TOE Identification, Data sheet addendum Rev. 1.3
(701813)
18 February
2022
SN300_SE Programmer's Manual, Application Note Rev. 0.22 2022-01-20
Arm® Cortex®-M33 Processor, Technical Reference
Manual
Revision:
r1p0
-
The following documentation is provided with the product by the developer to the customer for the
JCOP 7.2 R1.09.0.1:
Identifier Revision Date
NXP. JCOP 7.2 User Guidance Manual 4.05.2 2024-03-25
NXP. JCOP 7.2 User Guidance Manual Addendum 4.05.0 2024-02-28
NXP. JCOP 7.2 Anomaly Sheet 4.05.0 2024-02-28
NXP. JCOP 7.2 JCOP 7.2 20.4-1.06 User Guidance
Manual for JCOP eSE,
4.05.2 2024-03-25
NXP. JCOP 7.2 User Guidance Manual Addendum for
JCOP eSE
4.05.0 2024-02-28
NXP JCOP 7.2 UGM Addendum System Management 4.05.0 2024-02-28
SN300 family; Single Chip Secured (NFC) controller,
Product data sheet.
Rev3.1
(580031)
21 October
2022
SN300V TOE Identification, Data sheet addendum Rev. 1.3
(701813)
18 February
2022
SN300_SE Programmer's Manual, Application Note Rev. 0.22 2022-01-20
Arm® Cortex®-M33 Processor, Technical Reference
Manual
Revision:
r1p0
-
2.6 IT Product Testing
Testing (depth, coverage, functional tests, independent testing): The evaluators examined the
developer’s testing activities documentation and verified that the developer has met their testing
responsibilities.
2.6.1 Testing approach and depth
During the baseline evaluation, the developer performed extensive testing on functional specification,
subsystem and SFR-enforcing module level. All parameter choices were addressed at least once. All
boundary cases identified were tested explicitly, and additionally the near-boundary conditions were
covered probabilistically. The testing was largely automated using industry standard and proprietary
test suites. Test scripts were used extensively to verify that the functions return the expected values.
The underlying hardware and crypto-library test results are extendable to composite evaluations,
because the underlying platform is operated according to its guidance and the composite evaluation
requirements are met.
During the current re-evaluation, the developer repeated all the tests done during the baseline
evaluation.
During baseline evaluation, for the testing performed by the evaluators, the developer provided
samples and a test environment. The evaluators reproduced a selection of the developer tests, as well
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as a small number of test cases designed by the evaluator. No tests were repeated by the evaluator in
the current re-evaluation.
2.6.2 Independent penetration testing
The independent vulnerability analysis performed was conducted along the following steps:
• When evaluating the evidence in the classes ASE, ADV and AGD the evaluator considered
whether potential vulnerabilities could already be identified due to the TOE type and/or
specified behaviour in such an early stage of the evaluation.
• For ADV_IMP a thorough implementation representation review was performed on the TOE.
During this attack-oriented analysis the protection of the TOE was analysed using the
knowledge gained from all evaluation classes. This resulted in the identification of
(additional) potential vulnerabilities. This analysis used the attack methods in [JIL-AMS]
and [JIL-AAPS].
• All potential vulnerabilities were analysed using the knowledge gained from all evaluation
classes and information from the public domain. A judgment was made on how to assure
that these potential vulnerabilities are not exploitable. The potential vulnerabilities were
addressed by penetration testing, a guidance update or in other ways that are deemed
appropriate.
The total test effort expended by the evaluators during this recertification was 5.5 weeks. During that
test campaign, 55% of the total time was spent on Perturbation attacks, 18% on side-channel testing,
and 27% on logical tests.
2.6.3 Test configuration
The configuration of the sample used for independent evaluator testing and penetration testing was
the same as described in the [ST].
For some tests, testing was performed on an earlier revision of the TOE and/or on a derivative
product. The assurance gained from testing on an earlier revision has been assessed to be valid for
the final TOE version, because the changes introduced did not have an impact on the TSF.
2.6.4 Test results
The testing activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected results and observed
results are summarised in the [ETR], with references to the documents containing the full details.
The developer’s tests and the independent functional tests produced the expected results, giving
assurance that the TOE behaves as specified in its [ST] and functional specification.
No exploitable vulnerabilities were found with the independent penetration tests.
The algorithmic security level of cryptographic functionality has not been rated in this certification
process, but the current consensus on the algorithmic security level in the open domain, i.e., from the
current best cryptanalytic attacks published, has been taken into account.
Not all key sizes specified in the [ST] have sufficient cryptographic strength for satisfying the
AVA_VAN.5 “high attack potential”. The TOE supports a wider range of key sizes (see [ST]), including
those with sufficient algorithmic security level to exceed 100 bits as required for high attack potential
(AVA_VAN.5).
The strength of the implementation of the cryptographic functionality has been assessed in the
evaluation, as part of the AVA_VAN activities.
For composite evaluations, please consult the [ETRfC] for details.
2.7 Reused Evaluation Results
There has been extensive reuse of the ALC aspects for the sites involved in the development and
production of the TOE, by use of multiple site certificates and Site Technical Audit Reports.
No sites have been visited as part of this evaluation.
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2.8 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is defined uniquely by its name and version number NXP JCOP 7.x on SN300 Secure
Element, versions JCOP 7.0 R1.62.0.1, JCOP 7.1 R1.04.0.1 and JCOP 7.2 R1.09.0.1.
2.9 Evaluation Results
The evaluation lab documented their evaluation results in the [ETR], which references an ASE
Intermediate Report and other evaluator documents. To support composite evaluations according to
[COMP] a derived document [ETRfC] was provided and approved. This document provides details of
the TOE evaluation that must be considered when this TOE is used as platform in a composite
evaluation.
The verdict of each claimed assurance requirement is “Pass”.
Based on the above evaluation results the evaluation lab concluded the NXP JCOP 7.x on SN300
Secure Element, versions JCOP 7.0 R1.62.0.1, JCOP 7.1 R1.04.0.1 and JCOP 7.2 R1.09.0.1, to be
CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 conformant, and to meet the requirements of EAL 5 augmented
with ALC_DVS.2, ALC_FLR.1, ASE_TSS.2 and AVA_VAN.5 . This implies that the product satisfies
the security requirements specified in Security Target [ST].
The Security Target claims ‘strict’ conformance to the Protection Profile [PP0084] and ‘demonstrable’
conformance to the Protection Profile [PP0099].
2.10 Comments/Recommendations
The user guidance as outlined in section 2.5 contains necessary information about the usage of the
TOE. Certain aspects of the TOE’s security functionality, in particular the countermeasures against
attacks, depend on accurate conformance to the user guidance of both the software and the hardware
part of the TOE. There are no particular obligations or recommendations for the user apart from
following the user guidance. Please note that the documents contain relevant details concerning the
resistance against certain attacks.
In addition, all aspects of assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not
covered by the TOE itself must be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk
management process. For the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, the
customer should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the TOE is required and thus
requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms and protocols was not rated in the course of this
evaluation. This specifically applies to the following proprietary or non-standard algorithms, protocols
and implementations: ECDAA, GMAC for symmetric-key crypto, SHA-3, SHAKE, Korean SEED,
MIFARE and FeliCa, which are out of scope as there are no security claims relating to these.
Not all key sizes specified in the [ST] have sufficient cryptographic strength to satisfy the AVA_VAN.5
“high attack potential”. To be protected against attackers with a "high attack potential", appropriate
cryptographic algorithms with sufficiently large cryptographic key sizes shall be used (references can
be found in national and international documents and standards).
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3 Security Target
The "NXP JCOP 7.x on SN300 Secure Element", Security Target, Revision 2.5, 29 August 2024. [ST]
is included here by reference.
Please note that, to satisfy the need for publication, a public version [ST-lite] has been created and
verified according to [ST-SAN].
4 Definitions
This list of acronyms and definitions contains elements that are not already defined by the CC or CEM:
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
CBC Cipher Block Chaining (a block cipher mode of operation)
CBC-MAC Cipher Block Chaining Message Authentication Code
CFB Cipher Feedback
CTR Counter
DES Data Encryption Standard
CPLC Card Production Life Cycle
CRT Chinese Remainder Theorem
CSP Cryptographic Service Provider
DES Data Encryption Standard
DRG Deterministic Random Generator
ECB Electronic Code Book (a block cipher mode of operation)
ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography
ECDAA Elliptic Curve Direct Anonymous Attestation
ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
ECDH Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellman
EDC Error Detection Code
EdDSA Elliptic Curve Edwards-curve Digital Signature Algorithm
eUICC embedded Universal Integrated Circuit Card
GCM Galois/Counter Mode
GF Galois Field
GP Global Platform
GCM Galois/Counter Mode
GSMA Groupe Speciale Mobile Association
HMAC Hashed MAC
IM4 Image4
IT Information Technology
ITSEF IT Security Evaluation Facility
JIL Joint Interpretation Library
MAC Message Authentication Code
MNO Mobile Network Operators
NFC Near-Field Communication
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NSCIB Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the area of IT security
PP Protection Profile
RSA Rivest-Shamir-Adleman Algorithm
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SMB Secure Mailbox
TOE Target of Evaluation
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a
registered
trademark.
Any
use
or
application
requires
prior
approval.
5 Bibliography
This section lists all referenced documentation used as source material in the compilation of this
report.
[CC] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Parts I, II and
III, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
[COMP] Joint Interpretation Library, Composite product evaluation for Smart Cards and
similar devices, Version 1.5.1, May 2018
[ETR] Evaluation Technical Report “NXP JCOP7.x on SN300 B1.1 J9 Secure
Element (versions: JCOP 7.0 R1.62.0.1 - JCOP 7.1 R1.04.0.1 - JCOP 7.2
R1.09.0.1)” – EAL5+, 23-RPT-944, version 6.0, 21 October 2024.
[ETRfC] Evaluation Technical Report for Composition “NXP JCOP7.x on SN300 B1.1 J9
Secure Element (versions: JCOP 7.0 R1.62.0.1 - JCOP 7.1 R1.04.0.1 - JCOP
7.2 R1.09.0.1)” – EAL5+, 23-RPT-945, version 7.0, 21 October 2024.
[JIL-AAPS] JIL Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards, Version 3.2, November 2022
[JIL-AMS] Attack Methods for Smartcards and Similar Devices, Version 2.4, January 2020
(sensitive with controlled distribution)
[NSCIB] Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security, Version 2.6,
02 August 2022
[PP_0084] Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation Packages, version
1.0, 13 January 2014, registered under the reference BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014
[PP0099] Java Card Protection Profile - Open Configuration, version 3.1, April 2020,
registered under the reference BSI-CC-PP-0099-2017
[ST] "NXP JCOP 7.x on SN300 Secure Element", Security Target, Revision 2.5, 29
August 2024.
[ST-lite] "NXP JCOP 7.x on SN300 Secure Element", Security Target Lite, Revision 2.5,
29 August 2024.
[ST-SAN] ST sanitising for publication, CC Supporting Document CCDB-2006-04-004,
April 2006
(This is the end of this report.)