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NETCAD-Enterprise Products
Platform
v1.0
Security Target
Lite
Version No: 2.3
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VERSION HISTORY
Ver-
sion
No
Reason for Change Author
Release
Date
0.1
First Draft Özgür Yılmaz
Barış Kaya
27.01.20
17
1.0
First Publication Özgür Yılmaz
Barış Kaya
07.04.20
17
1.1
First Revision Özgür Yılmaz
Barış Kaya
23.06.2
017
1.2
Second Revision Özgür Yılmaz
Barış Kaya
21.07.2
017
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1.3
Third Revision
Özgür Yılmaz
Barış Kaya
11.08.20
17
1.4
Fourth Revision , FIA_USB removed, Logi-
cal scope is rewritten, difference between
Applications’ aliases are defined
Özgür Yılmaz
Barış Kaya 24.08.20
17
1.5
Fifth Revision SFR’s are updated, TOE use
cases are added
Özgür Yılmaz
Barış Kaya
08.09.20
17
1.6
Sixth revision, format updated and sum-
mary is improved, delivery information is
added
Özgür Yılmaz
Barış Kaya
2.10.201
7
1.7
Seventh revision, minor fixes, new MSA it-
erations added
Özgür Yılmaz
Barış Kaya
12.10.20
17
1.8
FDP_ACC.1, ACF.1, FMT_MSA.1,MSA.3 Up-
dated
Özgür Yılmaz
Barış Kaya
23.10.20
17
1.9
ST Reference, OE&Assumptions and
FDP_ACC requirements are updated
Özgür Yılmaz
Barış Kaya
3.11.201
7
2.0
FMT_MSA.1/3 ,FPT_FLS and FDP_ITC/ETC
are changed. Guest user removed
Özgür Yılmaz
Barış Kaya
8.12.201
7
2.1
Organisational Policies added Özgür Yılmaz
Barış Kaya
15.05.20
18
2.2
Table 1 updated Özgür Yılmaz
Barış Kaya
16.05.20
18
2.3
Use cases of TOE are added Özgür Yılmaz
Barış Kaya
27.07.20
18
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GLOSSARY
NetAdmin: NetAdmin is the administrator user that comes out of the box with TOE. It has no restric-
tions on its actions. It can also create other admins by giving all possible authorizations to a role group.
NetSystem: NetSystem is a system user that comes default. It only has static authorizations and it is
only able to perform automed or timed tasks.
TSF Mediated Data: TSF Mediated Data is the user created data that is used in the TOE. Geographicial
information like city traffic density information can be given as an example to TSF Mediated Data.
Meta data: Meta data is the user created data that customizes the TOE. It is used for defining new
menu items ,pages and actions.
Administrator: Administrator in this document refers both to NetAdmin and users with administrative
authorizations.
Service user: Service users are any kind of users that communicate TOE via SSL to import , export,
query ,create, update, delete TSF Mediated Data over a web service. Service users are also referred as
remote users in this document
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CONTENTS
1. ST INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................... 9
1.1. SECURITY TARGET & TOE REFERENCE...................................................................................... 9
1.2. TOE OVERVIEW..................................................................................................................... 9
1.2.1. TOE Components’ Use Cases ........................................................................................10
1.2.2. Major Security Features of a TOE..................................................................................12
1.2.2. TOE TYPE.....................................................................................................................12
1.2.3. Non TOE Hardware/ Software/ Firmware......................................................................13
1.3. TOE DESCRIPTION ................................................................................................................16
1.3.1. TOE Physical Scope......................................................................................................16
1.3.2. TOE Logical Scope........................................................................................................17
2. CONFORMANCE CLAIMS............................................................................................19
2.1. CC CONFORMANCE CLAIM .....................................................................................................19
2.2. PP CLAIM.............................................................................................................................19
2.3. PACKAGE CLAIM .................................................................................................................. 20
3. SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION...............................................................................20
3.1. THREATS............................................................................................................................. 20
3.2. ORGANIZATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES.................................................................................... 20
3.3. ASSUMPTIONS..................................................................................................................... 20
4. SECURITY OBJECTIVES ..............................................................................................22
4.1. SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE TOE...................................................................................... 22
4.2. SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT .................................................. 22
4.3. SECURITY OBJECTIVES RATIONALE......................................................................................... 24
5. EXTENDED COMPONENTS DEFINITION......................................................................27
6. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS........................................................................................27
6.1. SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS ..................................................................................27
6.1.1. Class FAU: Security Audit .............................................................................................27
6.1.2. Class FCS: Cryptographic support .................................................................................34
6.1.3. Class FDP: Data Protection...........................................................................................35
6.1.4. Class FIA: Identification and Authentication................................................................. 40
6.1.5. Class FMT: Security Management................................................................................ 42
6.1.6. Class FPT: Protectıon of The Tsf................................................................................... 44
6.1.7. Class FRU: Resource Utilisation.....................................................................................45
6.1.8. Class FTA: Toe Access...................................................................................................45
6.1.9. Class FTP: Trusted Paths ............................................................................................. 46
6.2. SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS .................................................................................. 48
6.3. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS RATIONALE ....................................................................................50
6.3.1. Security Functional Requirements Dependency Rationale..............................................50
6.3.2. Security Functional Requirements Rationale .................................................................55
6.3.3. Security Functional Requirements Rationale Tables.......................................................59
6.3.4. Security Assurance Requirements Rationale..................................................................61
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7. TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION .................................................................................62
7.1. TOE SECURITY FUNCTIONS................................................................................................... 62
7.1.1. Log Generatıon and Revıew......................................................................................... 62
7.1.2. Cryptographic Key Management & Operatıons............................................................. 62
7.1.3. User Login and Authentication......................................................................................63
7.1.4. Protection Of User, TSF Mediated and Meta Data ........................................................ 64
7.1.5. User Roles and Security Rules ...................................................................................... 64
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LIST OF TABLES
Table 1. Security Objectives Rationale 24
Table 2. Audit Logs Table 32
Table 3. Security Assurance Requirements 49
Table4. Security Functional Requirements Dependency Rationale 54
Table5. Security Functional Requirements Rationale 59
Table6. SFR Rationale Table for TOE 61
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LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1. Typical Software/Firmware Environment of TOE 15
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1. ST INTRODUCTION
1.1. SECURITY TARGET & TOE REFERENCE
ST Title: NETCAD – Enterprise Products Platform Security Target Lite
ST Reference: v2.3
TOE Identification: NETCAD – Enterprise Products Platform v1.0
CC Conformance: Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 (Revi-
sion 5)
Assurance Level: EAL4+ (ALC_FLR.2)
Keywords: GIS, Geographical Information Systems, MIS, Management Information Systems, GE-
OCODING, GEOSPATIAL
Note: This Security Target Lite has been derived from the full Security Target Version 2.3.
1.2. TOE OVERVIEW
TOE consists of web applications which are installed onto the operating system in a computing plat-
form.
These web applications are assembled in three groups:
● Netigma
Netigma is the web application which end users mainly use. Netigma web application pro-
vides view and modification operations on TSF data. Also dynamic reports and queries are
presented on Netigma. End users also reach map data and spatial data using Netigma. Re-
ports, queries and objects which are related to TSF data can be managed by administrator
users on development pages.
● NetGIS Server
NetGIS Server is the web application consisting of web services which provides map data and
map drawings as partial according to related coordinates. NetGIS Server also has a configura-
tion interface. .
● NetCad Base
NetCad Base consists of three types of web applications. Those are:
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o Parameter Server: Provides management of configuration parameters by administra-
tor users for all applications
o Log Server: Provides log review and filtering by administrator users for all applica-
tions.
o Authentication Server: Manages access control for all applications using single sign-
on mechanism, authorization of users and verification of user-rights for all applica-
tions. User, group, role and authorization management is also done by administrator
users on authentication server.
Web Server(s) which TOE components are hosted on, Database Server(s) which TOE should use to
store data, BIOS and other firmware, the operating system kernel, and other systems software (and
drivers) provided as part of the platform are outside the scope of this document.
1.2.1. TOE COMPONENTS’ USE CASES
Components of TOE have different use cases which are same in core security functionalities and de-
sign with the versions included in TOE but different in naming, meta data and licensing.
Different use cases of web applications in TOE can be listed as below:
● Netigma
NETIGMA Developer: Netigma version that has the licence that is needed to develop
project/product.
NETIGMA Runtime: Netigma version that has the licence that is needed for the server
that Netigma will run on.
BELNET.WEB : Municipal administration application
KEOS.ABS : Address Information System Application
KEOS.TBS : Immovable Information System Application
KBS : Expropriation Information System
KEOS.PARK BAHCELER : Parks and recreation works application
KEOS.FEN ISLERI : Civil works application
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KEOS.YAPI.RUHSATI : MAKS Integrated Building Forms application
KEOS.ISTEK SIKAYET: Request Complaint Tracking Application
KEOS.KPS Servisi : Identity Sharing System Integration Application
KEOS.MAKS Servisi : Population and Citizenship Affairs MAST System Integration Ap-
plication
KRM.TAPUSERVIS : Land Registry System Online Service Integration Web Application
KEOS.SBS : Infrastructure Network Information System Application
KEOS.PYS : Plan Management System Application
KEOS.MEBIS : Cemetery Information System Application
KEOS.EIMAR : E-Reconstruction Application via Internet application
KEOS.KENT REHBERI : Interactive City Guide Application
KEOS.KENT REHBERI 3D : 3D Interactive City Guide Application
KEOS.VERIAKTARIM : Data transfer application
KEOS.MISGIS/TEMEL : Basic MIS GIS Integration Application
KEOS.MISGIS/ILERI : Advanced MIS GIS Integration Application
KEOS.ABIS : Disaster Information System Application
KEOS.AYKOME : Infrastructure and Coordination Center Application
KRM.TAPU : Land Registry System Online Service Integration Web Application
KRM.MOBILTAPU : Land Registry System Online Service Integration Mobile Applica-
tion
KEOS.KENT REHBERI.NE– Nöbetçi Eczane : Pharmacy on duty locator application
KEOS.KENT REHBERI.NW – Kısayol : City Guide and shortcuts application
Coğrafi Plan Arşiv Uygulaması : Geographical plans archiving application
KEOS.EIMAR.ASKI : Municipality zoning tracking and publishing application
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Tadilat Süreç Takip Sistemi : Renovation tracking system
● NetGIS Server
NETGIS Server Standard : Standard NETGIS Server Application
NETGIS Server Enterprise : OGC compliant Web Based Geo Data Server Application
NETGIS Server 360 : Panoramic Imaging Server Application
NETGIS Server Network : Standard NETGIS Server Application Configured for Network
Applications
NETGIS Server WebEdit : NETGIS Server Web Edit Server Application
● NetCad Base
1.2.2. MAJOR SECURITY FEATURES OF A TOE
The following features are the major security functionality of the TOE;
● Audit: TOE will generate audit logs in order to provide accountability for the administrators
and system users. The assigned roles have the capability to review the audit logs.
● Cryptographic Support: TOE should provide mechanisms for encryption and decryption of ses-
sion data and encryption of user passwords
● Identification, Authentication and Authorization: TOE will successfully identify, authenticate
and authorize its users.
● Data Protection: TOE provides confidentiality and integrity of user and TSF data during im-
port/export of data to/from third parties.
● Security Management: TOE will manage the security attributes and user roles.
1.2.2. TOE TYPE
TOE is a software solution which provides GIS and security services to third party IT solutions and/or
users.
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1.2.3. NON TOE HARDWARE/ SOFTWARE/ FIRMWARE
TOE consists of 3 different parts and they are called Netigma, NetGIS Server and NetCad Base. Soft-
ware and hardware requirements for each group are given below:
NETCAD Base Hardware Requirements
Hardware Requirement
Processor 1 GHz +
RAM 512 MB +
Disk space 850 MB (32 bit), 2GB (64 bit)
NETCAD Base Software Requirements:
• Internet Information Service (IIS) 6.0+
• Microsoft .NET Framework 4.6
Netigma Hardware Requirements
Hardware Requirement
Processor 1 GHz +
RAM 512 MB +
Disk space 850 MB (32 bit), 2GB (64 bit)
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Netigma Software Requirements:
• Internet Information Service (IIS) 6.0+
• Microsoft .NET Framework 4.6
• Netcad Base 1.0.24+
• Relational Database:
• Access
• Oracle
• PostGIS
• SQL Server
• DB2
NetGIS Server Software Requirements
• Internet Information Service (IIS)
• Microsoft .NET Framework 4
• Netcad 6.0/ GP10 or higher
• Netcad Base 1.0.24
• Relational Database:
• Access
• Oracle
• PostGIS
• SQL Server
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• DB2
NETGIS Server Minimum Hardware Requirements
Hardware Requirement
CPU 1 GHz
RAM 512 MB
Disk Space 850 MB (32 bit) - 2GB (64 bit)
1.2.3.1.Typical Software/ Firmware Environment of TOE
TOE (Web applications)
Web Server (IIS)
File System and Software Libraries
Operating System
Figure 1. Typical Software/Firmware Environment of TOE
Web applications in TOE scope are web applications which run on web server. All web applications of
TOE can be configured to run on a single server or server farm consists of multiple servers.
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TOE operates using a database to store data. Database also can be hosted on the same server which
TOE applications run or on a separated database server.
1.2.3.2.Hardware Environment of TOE
Servers in the operating environment can be configured to operate on the same local network or dif-
ferent remote networks.
1.3. TOE DESCRIPTION
1.3.1. TOE PHYSICAL SCOPE
TOE scope consists of Netigma, NetGIS Server and Netcad Base. Since TOE is a software that works
with 3rd party database applications database is not included in the TOE Scope. TOE is a group of
web applications running on a webserver. Webserver and other hardware are not included in the
scope.
Delivery and Integration of TOE:
TOE is delivered to customers by a sales representative. Deliverables are listed below:
-Netigma.exe : Netigma installation file
Netcad Base.exe : Netcad Base installation file
Webgis SDK.exe : Netgis SDK installation file
Netgis Server.exe : Netgis Server installation file
Install manual.pdf : Installation manual for TOE
Usage manual.pdf : User guide for TOE
Security Helper.exe : Application used for applying CC configurations
License key files
3rd
party extentions needed by TOE are included in installation files. Other dependencies based on
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Windows version of the system are provided by the OS.
Configuration for the evalutated version of TOE:
These configurations are all done using SecurityHelper.exe :
-Unsecure SSL/TSL channels are closed using OS settings
-Base application addresses are updated as https
-Machinekeys that are use for cryptographic operations are updated
-Exception handling settings are done to enable showing detailed errors to user
-HTTP Header configurations are done
-Anti clickjacking is activated
-Input validation is activated
-Parameter server is configured as below:
-Two-factor authentication with email is activated
-Captcha is enabled
-Cookies are set to require SSL by default
-Password complexity is set as 4
-Number of allowed unsuccessful login attempts before ban is set to 5
1.3.2. TOE LOGICAL SCOPE
Audit:
TOE generates audit logs that consist of various auditable events. Those logs include information
about actions like user login/log out events, meta data changes, rule changes and errors. User IP,
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application name, log description, database table name, old and new values for modified data at-
tributes and date and time of events are recorded. TOE allows authorized administrators to filter,
search and review all the recorded logs stated above.
Cryptographic Support:
TOE uses AES-256 algorithm and cryptographic key sizes 256 bits that meet the following: FIPS 197
(for AES) for encryption and decryption of session data and encryption of user passwords.
Cryptographic keys are generated and destructed using mechanisms provided by IIS, they can be
generated by using manual or automatic triggers that can be configured by Administrator.
Identification, Authentication and Authorization:
TOE provides an identification and authentication layer with a login page as a part of GUI. Since
TOE consists of 3 different applications, each application require different logins altough they can
be used with same credentials.
TOE includes administrator defined role groups and provides authentication before any action. This
security feature acts to protect and prevent access by unauthorized users to
the system.
TOE also provides configurable authentication failure handling by locking users after an administ-
rator defined number of unsuccesful login attemps .
Authorized administrators are granted the ability to set the idle timeout threshold after which
an authorized user would be automatically logged out of his active session.
Data Protection:
TOE provides access control to TOE functions and Information flow control for TSF Data. The access
control function permits a user to access a protected resource only if the role group of the user is
given permission to perform the requested action on the resource by Administrator.
Security Management:
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Although TOE includes static authorizations ,authorized administrator can also create dynamic au-
thorizations.
Administrator can create role groups and bind static and dynamic authorizations to those role
groups.After creating role groups administrator can assign role groups to users to define functions
or resources that they are allowed to perform
Additional functionalities such as modifying access privileges and unlocking password for users are
also accessible by authorized administrator.
2. CONFORMANCE CLAIMS
2.1. CC CONFORMANCE CLAIM
This Security Target claims conformance to
● Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1: Introduction and
General Model; Version 3.1, Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-001, [1]
● Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2: Security Functional
Components; Version 3.1, Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-002, [2]
● Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3: Security Assurance
Components; Version 3.1, Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-003, [3]
referenced hereafter as [CC].
This Security Target claims the following CC conformance:
● part 2 conformant
● part 3 conformant
● evaluation assurance level (EAL) 4+
2.2. PP CLAIM
● This ST does not claim conformance to any protection profile
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2.3. PACKAGE CLAIM
This ST is conforming to assurance package EAL4 augmented with ALC_FLR.2 defined in CC part 3 (CC
Part 3).
3. SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION
This part of the ST defines the security problem that is to be addressed by the TOE. It consists of Assets,
Subjects and External Entities, Organizational Security Policies, Threats and Assumptions.
3.1. THREATS
T. MASQUERADE: An unauthorized user, process or external IT entity may masquerade as an author-
ized entity to gain access to data or TOE resources.
T. NETWORK_ATTACK: An attacker is positioned on a communications channel or elsewhere on the
network infrastructure. Attackers may engage in communications with the application software or al-
ter communications between the application software and other endpoints in order to compromise it.
T. NETWORK_EAVESDROP: An attacker is positioned on a communications channel or elsewhere on
the network infrastructure. Attackers may monitor and gain access to data exchanged between the
application and other endpoints.
3.2. ORGANIZATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES
P.CONF_KEY: Keys that are used to encrypt and export confidential data are under administrator’s
responsibility. Administrator should keep that keys safe and never share with anybody.
P.FULL_LOG_ACTION: It is administrator’s responsibility to take action when the informative mail
about the reached log limit is sent by the TOE.
3.3. ASSUMPTIONS
A. PLATFORM: The TOE relies upon a trustworthy computing platform for its execution. This includes
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isolation of the TOE Application from other applications on the platform.
A. PROPER_USER: The user of the application software is not willfully negligent or hostile, and uses
the software in compliance with the applied enterprise security policy.
A. PROPER_ADMIN: The administrator of the application software is not careless, willfully negligent
or hostile, and administers the software within compliance of the applied enterprise security policy.
A. PROPER_DB_ADMIN: The administrator of the database(s) which application software uses, is not
careless, willfully negligent or hostile, and administers the database within compliance of the applied
enterprise security policy.
A.SECURE_NETWORK: The network connection between TOE parts are secure and uninterrupted.
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4. SECURITY OBJECTIVES
In this section part-wise solutions are given against the security problem defined in Part 3.
4.1. SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE TOE
O. AUTHORIZATION: TOE will successfully identify and authenticate its users before allowing any ac-
tions.
O. AUDIT: TOE will provide the capability to create audit records of security relevant events associated
with users and allow capability to review audit information.
O. MANAGE: TOE will allow administrators to effectively manage the TOE and its security functions
and must ensure that only authorized administrators are able to access such functionality.
O. DATA_PROTECTION: TOE will protect the confidentiality and integrity of TSF data during transmis-
sion to other trusted IT entities.
O. SECURE_COMM: To address both passive (eavesdropping) and active (packet modification) network
attack threats, conformant TOEs will use a trusted channel for sensitive data.
4.2. SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
The following security objectives for the operational environment assist the TOE in correctly providing
its security functionality. These tracks with the assumptions about the environment.
OE. PLATFORM: The TOE relies upon a trustworthy computing platform for its execution. This includes
the underlying operating system and any discrete execution environment provided to the TOE.
OE. PROPER_USER: The user of the application software is not willfully negligent or hostile, and uses
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the software within compliance of the applied enterprise security policy.
OE. PROPER_ADMIN: The administrator of the application software is not careless, willfully negligent
or hostile, and administers the software within compliance of the applied enterprise security policy.
OE. PROPER_DB_ADMIN: The administrator of the database(s) which application software uses, is not
careless, willfully negligent or hostile, and administers the database within compliance of the applied
enterprise security policy.
OE.SECURE_NETWORK: The TOE parts are installed in a secure network and the network connection
between TOE parts are secure and uninterrupted.
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4.3. SECURITY OBJECTIVES RATIONALE
This section describes how the assumptions, threats, and organizational security policies map to the
security objectives.
Threat, Assumption, or OSP Security Objectives Rationale
T. MASQUERADE O. AUTHORIZATION
O. AUDIT
O. MANAGE
The threat T. MASQUERADE is coun-
tered by O. AUTHORIZATION, O. AUDIT
and O. MANAGE where each users of the
TOE will be successfully authenticated
before any actions and TOE will generate
audit logs to review user actions. TOE
will provide security management func-
tionality for user management.
T. NETWORK_ATTACK O. AUDIT
O. DATA_PROTECTION
The threat T. NETWORK_ATTACK will be
countered by access control and infor-
mation flow control based O.
DATA_PROTECTION and also log man-
agement via O. AUDIT.
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T. NETWORK_EAVESDROP O. DATA_PROTECTION
O. SECURE_COMM
The threat T. NETWORK_EAVESDROP
will be countered by O. SECURE_COMM
and O. DATA_PROTECTION where TOE
will communicate via secure channels
and information flow to third parties will
be under security control.
A. PLATFORM OE. PLATFORM The assumption A. PLATFORM is ad-
dressed by OE. PLATFORM. This objec-
tive ensures that the TOE relies upon a
trustworthy computing platform for its
execution.
A. PROPER_USER OE. PROPER_USER The assumption A. PROPER_USER is ad-
dressed by OE. PROPER_USER. This ob-
jective ensures that the user of the ap-
plication is educated about the software
and uses the software in a secure man-
ner.
A. PROPER_ADMIN OE. PROPER_ADMIN
The assumption A. PROPER_ADMIN is
addressed by OE. PROPER_ADMIN. This
objective ensures that the administrator
of the application software administers
the software in a secure manner.
A. PROPER_DB_ADMIN OE. PROPER_ DB_ADMIN The assumption
A.PROPER_DB_ADMIN is addressed by
OE. PROPER_DB_ADMIN. This objective
ensures that database administrator ad-
ministers the database within compli-
ance of the applied enterprise security
policy.
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A.SECURE_NETWORK OE.SECURE_NETWORK The assumption A.SECURE_NETWORK is
addressed by OE. SECURE_NETWORK.
This objective ensures that the network
connection between TOE parts are se-
cure and uninterrupted.
P.CONF_KEY OE. PROPER_ADMIN
The assumption P.CONF_KEY is ad-
dressed by OE. PROPER_ADMIN. This
objective ensures that the administrator
of the application software secures con-
fidential keys in a secure manner.
P.FULL_LOG_ACTION OE. PROPER_ADMIN
The assumption P.FULL_LOG_ACTION is
addressed by OE. PROPER_ADMIN. This
objective ensures that the administrator
of the application software takes action
when the log limit is reached.
Table 1. Security Objectives Rationale
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5. EXTENDED COMPONENTS DEFINITION
There is not any extended components definition within this Security Target.
6. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
6.1. SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS
This part of the ST defines the detailed security requirements that shall be satisfied by the TOE. The
statement of TOE security requirements shall define the functional and assurance security require-
ments that the TOE needs to satisfy in order to meet the security objectives for the TOE. The CC allows
several operations to be performed on functional requirements; refinement, selection, assignment,
and iteration are defined in Section 8.1 of Common Criteria Part1 [17]. The following operations are
used in the ST.
The refinement operation is used to add detail to a requirement, and thus further restricts a require-
ment. Refinements of security requirements are denoted in such a way that added words are in bold
text and removed are crossed out.
The selection operation is used to select one or more options provided by the CC instating a require-
ment. Selections having been made are denoted as underlined text.
The assignment operation is used to assign a specific value to an unspecified parameter, such as the
length of a password. Assignments are denoted by italicized text.
The iteration operation is used when a component is repeated with varying operations. Iteration is
denoted by showing a slash “/”, and the iteration indicator after the component identifier.
6.1.1. CLASS FAU: SECURITY AUDIT
6.1.1.1.FAU_GEN.1 Audit Data Generation
FAU_GEN.1.1 The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable events:
a) Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions;
b) All auditable events for the [minimum] level of audit; and
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c) [
● User login / logout
● Configuration Meta Data Save
● Application & Parameter Registration
● Application Data Modification
● Modification on Authorization Rules
].
FAU_GEN.1.2 The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following information:
a) Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity (if applicable), and the outcome (success
or failure) of the event; and
b) For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the functional components
included in the PP/ST, [user IP, application name, log type, error message (if applicable), stack trace (if
applicable), log description, database table name (if applicable), old and new values for modified data
attributes (if applicable), data input variables (for web forms - if applicable), priority (Debug, info, Error,
Trace, Warn, Fatal)].
SFRs Minimum Audit
FAU_GEN.1 -
FAU_GEN.2 -
FAU_SAR.1 -
FAU_SAR.2 -
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FAU_SAR.3 -
FAU_SEL.1
Minimal: All modifications to the audit con-
figuration that occur while the audit collec-
tion functions are operating.
FAU_STG.1 -
FAU_STG.3 -
FCS_CKM.1/AES
Minimal: Success and failure of the activity.
FCS_CKM.4/AES
Minimal: Success and failure of the activity.
FCS_COP.1
(see application note below)*
FDP_ACC.1 -
FDP_ACF.1
Minimal: Successful requests to perform an
operation on an object covered by the SFP.
FDP_IFC.1 -
FDP_IFF.1
Minimal: Decisions to permit requested in-
formation flows.
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FDP_ITC.2
Minimal: Successful import of user data, in-
cluding any security attributes.
FDP_ETC.2
Minimal: Successful export of information.
FDP_SDI.2
Minimal: Successful attempts to check the
integrity of user data, including an indication
of the results of the check.
FIA_AFL.1
a) Minimal: the reaching of the threshold for
the unsuccessful authentication attempts and
the actions (e.g. disabling of a terminal)
taken and the subsequent, if appropriate, res-
toration to the normal state (e.g. re-enabling
of a terminal).
FIA_ATD.1 -
FIA_SOS.1
Minimal: Rejection by the TSF of any tested
secret;
FIA_UAU.2
Minimal: Unsuccessful use of the authenti-
cation mechanism;
FIA_UAU.5
Minimal: The final decision on authentica-
tion;
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FIA_UID.2
a) Minimal: Unsuccessful use of the user
identification mechanism, including the user
identity provided;
FMT_MOF.1 -
FMT_MSA.1 -
FMT_MSA.3 -
FMT_MTD.1 -
FMT_SMF.1
Minimal: Use of the management functions.
FMT_SMR.1
Minimal: modifications to the group of users
that are part of a role;
FPT_FLS.1 -
FPT_ITT.1 -
FPT_TDC.1
Minimal: Successful use of TSF data con-
sistency mechanisms.
FRU_FLT.1
Minimal: Any failure detected by the TSF.
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FTA_MCS.1
Minimal: Rejection of a new session based
on the limitation of multiple concurrent ses-
sions.
FTA_SSL.3
Minimal: Termination of an interactive ses-
sion by the session locking mechanism.
FTA_SSL.4
Minimal: Termination of an interactive ses-
sion by the user.
FTA_TAH.1 -
FTA_TSE.1
Minimal: Denial of a session establishment
due to the session establishment mechanism.
FTP_TRP.1
Minimal: Failures of the trusted path func-
tions.
Table2: Audit logs table
Application note:
While salted SHA-2 operations take place at one time password events, operations using AES
algorithm are done in every request so logging them would result performance issues. As a result all
SHA-2 operations are logged but operations using AES algorithm are not.
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6.1.1.2.FAU_GEN.2 User Identity Association
FAU_GEN.2.1 For audit events resulting from actions of identified users, the TSF shall be able to asso-
ciate each auditable event with the identity of the user that caused the event.
6.1.1.3.FAU_SAR.1 Audit Review
FAU_SAR.1.1 The TSF shall provide [authorized administrators] with the capability to read [all infor-
mation of audit record] from the audit records.
FAU_SAR.1.2 The TSF shall provide the audit records in a manner suitable for the user to interpret the
information.
6.1.1.4.FAU_SAR.2 Restricted Audit Review
FAU_SAR.2.1 The TSF shall prohibit all users read access to the audit records, except those users that
have been granted explicit read-access.
6.1.1.5.FAU_SAR.3 Selectable audit review
FAU_SAR.3.1 The TSF shall provide the ability to apply [filtering and ordering] of audit data based on
[log type, application name, user ID, database table name, user IP, username ,URL ,Posted Data, Notes,
Current Data or Error, log date, priority].
6.1.1.6.FAU_SEL.1 Selective audit
FAU_SEL.1.1 The TSF shall be able to select the set of events to be audited from the set of all auditable
events based on the following attributes:
a) [user identity]
b) [log type (Security, Datachange etc.), priority (Trace, Debug,Info, Warn, Error, Fatal)]
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6.1.1.7.FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage
FAU_STG.1.1 The TSF shall protect the stored audit records in the audit trail from unauthorized dele-
tion.
FAU_STG.1.2 The TSF shall be able to [prevent] unauthorized modifications to the stored audit rec-
ords in the audit trail.
6.1.1.8.FAU_STG.3 Prevention of audit data loss
FAU_STG.3.1 The TSF shall [ignore audited events andnotify administrator via e-mail] if the audit trail
exceeds [ administrator configurable predefined limit].
6.1.2. CLASS FCS: CRYPTOGRAPHIC SUPPORT
6.1.2.1.FCS_CKM.1 /AES Cryptographic key generation - AES
FCS_CKM.1.1 The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic
key generation algorithm [AES-256] and specified cryptographic key sizes [256 bit] that meet the fol-
lowing: [FIPS 197].
6.1.2.2.FCS_CKM.4 /AES Cryptographic key destruction - AES
FCS_CKM.4.1 The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic
key destruction method [overwrite] that meets the following: [FIPS 197].
6.1.2.3.FCS_COP.1 / AES Cryptographic operation - AES
FCS_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform [encryption and decryption] in accordance with a specified crypto-
graphic algorithm [AES-256] and cryptographic key sizes [256 bits] that meet the following: [FIPS 197
(for AES), NIST Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operations (for CBC mode)].
Application Note: FCS_COP.1 / AES is used to encrypt session variables while writing to user’s cookie,
and decrypt while reading from user’s cookie.
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6.1.2.4.FCS_COP.1 / Salted SHA-2 Cryptographic operation – Salted SHA-2
FCS_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform [one-way encryption] in accordance with a specified cryptographic
algorithm [Salted SHA-2] and cryptographic key sizes [256 bits] that meet the following: [FIPS 180-4].
Application Note: FCS_COP.1 / Salted SHA-2 is used to salt and encrypt user password before it is
stored in database, and before login to compare with the values stored in the database.
6.1.3. CLASS FDP: DATA PROTECTION
6.1.3.1.FDP_ACC.1 Subset Access Control /A
FDP_ACC.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Auth SFP] on [
Subjects:
● User
● Administrator (predefined administrator called “NetAdmin”)
Objects:
● User role groups
● Dynamic authorizations that are manually created by the administrator
● Predefined authorizations that are hard coded privileges
Operations:
● Create
● Delete
● Update
● Assocaiate
● Deassociate
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covered by the SFP].
6.1.3.2.FDP_ACF.1 Security Attribute Based Access Control /A
FDP_ACF.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Auth SFP] to objects based on the following: [
-Dynamic and Static authorizations assigned to role groups and NetAdmin
-The users assigned to a role group
].
FDP_ACF.1.2 The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among con-
trolled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: [
-Administrator can create/delete/update user role groups over application
- Administrator can create/delete/update Dynamic Authorizations over application
- Administrator can associate/deassociate Dynamic Authorizations and Static Authorizations with User
role groups over application.
- Administrator can associate/deassociate User role groups with Users over application.
-User can create/delete/update Dynamic Authorizations if their user role group’s authorizations allow
it over application.
-User can create/delete/update user role groups if their user role group’s authorizations allow it over
application.
-User can associate/deassociate Dynamic Authorizations and Static Authorizations with User role
groups if their user role group’s authorizations allow it over application.
-User can associate/deassociate User role groups with Users if their user role group’s authorizations
allow it over application.
].
FDP_ACF.1.3 The TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects based on the following
additional rules: [none].
FDP_ACF.1.4 The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following ad-
ditional rules: [none].
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6.1.3.3.FDP_ACC.1 Subset Access Control / B
FDP_ACC.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Data Access Control SFP] on [
Subjects:
● User
● NetSystem
● Administrator (predefined administrator called “NetAdmin”)
Objects:
● TSF Mediated Data
● Meta Data
● User Data
Operations:
● Query
● Insert
● Update
● Delete
● Import
● Export
covered by the SFP].
6.1.3.4.FDP_ACF.1 Security Attribute Based Access Control /B
FDP_ACF.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Data Access Control SFP] to objects based on the following:
[
-Static and dynamic authorizations assigned to a user’s role group, NetAdmin and Netsystem
].
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FDP_ACF.1.2 The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among con-
trolled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: [
-NetAdmin can apply query/insert/update/delete/import/export actions over TSF Mediated Data,
Meta Data and User Data over application.
-NetSystem can query/insert/update/delete/import/export actions over TSF Mediated Data and Meta
Data if there is no extra dynamic authorization needed to take action over that data over application.
-User can query/insert/update/delete/import/export actions over TSF Mediated Data and Meta Data
if both their user role group’s authorizations allow it over application and there is no limitation (loca-
tion limitation, ip limitation etc.) defined in the data over application.
].
FDP_ACF.1.3 The TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects based on the following
additional rules: [if there is no dynamic or static authorization related to an action over a certain type
of data, it can be used by any user ].
FDP_ACF.1.4 The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following
additional rules: [none].
6.1.3.5.FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control
FDP_IFC.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Information Flow Control SFP] on [
Subjects:
•Service Users
Subject attributes:
-SessionId
Information:
-TSF Mediated Data
Operations:
-Allow or Deny Query/Create/Update/Delete/Import/Export actions over a web service
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].
6.1.3.6.FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes
FDP_IFF.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [information flow control SFP] based on the following types of
subject and information security attributes: [Session Id].
FDP_IFF.1.2 The TSF shall permit an information flow between a controlled subject and controlled
information via a controlled operation if the following rules hold: [
-TOE shall allow/deny Service Users to apply Query/Create/Update/Delete/Import/Export actions on
TSF Mediated Data over web services based on their Session Ids .
].
FDP_IFF.1.3 The TSF shall enforce the [communication via secure SSL channel between client applica-
tion and the TSF].
FDP_IFF.1.4 The TSF shall explicitly authorize an information flow based on the following rules: [none].
FDP_IFF.1.5 The TSF shall explicitly deny an information flow based on the following rules: [none].
ApplicationNote:
Service users are any kind of clients that communicate TOE via SSL using Session Ids(that is unique to
each user) to import , export, query ,create, update, delete TSF Mediated Data over a web service.
6.1.3.7.FDP_ITC.2 Import of User Data with Security Attributes
FDP_ITC.2.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Auth Access Control SFP ,Data Acces Control SFP and Infor-
mation Flow Control SFP] when importing user data , controlled under the SFPs, from outside of the
TOE.
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FDP_ITC.2.2 The TSF shall use the security attributes associated with the imported user data.
FDP_ITC.2.3 The TSF shall ensure that the protocol used provides for the unambiguous association
between the security attributes and the user data received.
FDP_ITC.2.4 The TSF shall ensure that interpretation of the security attributes of the imported user,
TSF Mediated and meta data is as intended by the source of the user data.
FDP_ITC.2.5 The TSF shall enforce the following rules when importing user data controlled under the
SFP from outside the TOE: [none].
6.1.3.8.FDP_ETC.2 Export of User Data with Security Attributes
FDP_ETC.2.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Auth Access Control SFP, Data Access Control SFP and Infor-
mation Flow Control SFP] when exporting user data controlled under the SFPs, outside of the TOE.
FDP_ETC.2.2 The TSF shall export the user data with the user data's associated security attributes.
FDP_ETC.2.3 The TSF shall ensure that the security attributes, when exported outside the TOE, are
unambiguously associated with the exported user data.
FDP_ETC.2.4 The TSF shall enforce the following rules when user is exported from the TOE: [none].
6.1.3.9.FDP_SDI.2 Stored data integrity monitoring and action
FDP_SDI.2.1 The TSF shall monitor user data stored in containers controlled by the TSF for [integrity
errors] on all objects, based on the following attributes: [hash calculation].
FDP_SDI.2.2 Upon detection of a data integrity error, the TSF shall [show records with integrity error
to the administrator on administrator level accessible integrity error check page].
6.1.4. CLASS FIA: IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION
6.1.4.1.FIA_AFL.1 Authentication Failure Handling
FIA_AFL.1.1 The TSF shall detect when [an administrator configurable positive integer within
greater or equal to [3] ] unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to [user login].
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FIA_AFL.1.2 When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been [met],
the TSF shall [lock the user account until it is unlocked by authorized administrator].
6.1.4.2.FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition
FIA_ATD.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the following list of security attributes belonging to individual us-
ers: [user id, name, e-mail, password, user role].
6.1.4.3.FIA_SOS.1 Verification of Secrets
FIA_SOS.1.1 The TSF shall provide a mechanism to verify that secrets meet [at least 4 of the following
predefined metrics:
● password length should be at least 6 characters
● password length should be at least 12 characters
● password should contain numeric characters
● password should contain both capital and lower case characters
● password should contain non-alphanumeric characters
].
6.1.4.4.FIA_UAU.2 User authentication before any action
FIA_UAU.2.1 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any
other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
6.1.4.5.FIA_UAU.5 Multiple authentication mechanisms
FIA_UAU.5.1 The TSF shall provide [login user interface and login with session id] to support user au-
thentication.
FIA_UAU.5.2 The TSF shall authenticate any user's claimed identity according to the [
User Interface Login: Users login with user name and password.
Login with session id: Users login using their session ids over a terminal interface
].
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6.1.4.6.FIA_UID.2 User identification before any action
FIA_UID.2.1 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any other TSF-
mediated actions on behalf of that user.
6.1.5. CLASS FMT: SECURITY MANAGEMENT
6.1.5.1.FMT_MOF.1 Management of Security Functions Behaviour
FMT_MOF.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to [disable, enable, modify the behavior of] the func-
tions [user password complexity policy, audit log information detail level, modification on user data] to
[administrator].
6.1.5.2.FMT_MSA.1 Management of Security Attributes / A
FMT_MSA.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Auth SFP] to restrict the ability to [modify, delete , [create,
grant ,revoke]] the security attributes [user role,static & dynamic authorizations] to [administrator &
users in authorized role groups].
6.1.5.3.FMT_MSA.1 Management of Security Attributes / B
FMT_MSA.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Data Access Control SFP] to restrict the ability to [modify,
delete , [none]] the security attributes [user id, name, password] to [administrator & users].
6.1.5.4.FMT_MSA.1 Management of Security Attributes / C
FMT_MSA.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [information flow control SFP] to restrict the ability to [modify,
delete ,[create]] the security attributes [Session id] to [service users].
6.1.5.5.FMT_MSA.3 Static Attribute Initialization / B
FMT_MSA.3.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Data access control SFP] to provide [restrictive] default values
for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.
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FMT_MSA.3.2 The TSF shall allow the [administrator] to specify alternative initial values to override
the default values when an object or information is created.
6.1.5.6.FMT_MSA.3 Static Attribute Initialization / A
FMT_MSA.3.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Auth SFP] to provide [restrictive] default values for security
attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.
FMT_MSA.3.2 The TSF shall allow the [administrator] to specify alternative initial values to override
the default values when an object or information is created.
6.1.5.7.FMT_MSA.3 Static Attribute Initialization / C
FMT_MSA.3.1 The TSF shall enforce the [information flow control SFP] to provide [restrictive] default
values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.
FMT_MSA.3.2 The TSF shall allow the [service users] to specify alternative initial values to override the
default values when an object or information is created.
6.1.5.8.FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF Data
FMT_MTD.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to [change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [none]]
the [User , TSF Mediated and Meta data] to [administrator(NetAdmin) and authorized users].
6.1.5.9.FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions: [create,
delete, modify, and read security attributes defined in FIA_ATD.1].
6.1.5.10.FMT_SMR.1 Security Roles
FMT_SMR.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the roles [NetSystem,user, and administrator].
FMT_SMR.1.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
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6.1.6. CLASS FPT: PROTECTION OF THE TSF
6.1.6.1.FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state / Log Fail
FPT_FLS.1.1 The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of failures occur: [
-Database connection cannot be established while trying to perform a logging event
-An error occurred in database while trying to write
].
6.1.6.2.FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state / Meta Fail
FPT_FLS.1.1 The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of failures occur: [
- inconsistency in meta file
- nonexisting component used in meta file].
6.1.6.3.FPT_ITT.1 Basic internal TSF data transfer protection
FPT_ITT.1.1 The TSF shall protect TSF data from [disclosure, modification] when it is transmitted be-
tween separate parts of the TOE.
Application Note: Netigma, NetGIS Server and NetCad Base uses secure SSL communication while
transferring of TSF data between these separate web applications.
6.1.6.4.FPT_TDC.1 Inter-TSF basic TSF data consistency
FPT_TDC.1.1 The TSF shall provide the capability to consistently interpret [user data and other TSF
data] when shared between the TSF and another trusted IT product.
FPT_TDC.1.2 The TSF shall use [validation of TSF data by transferred class level, session management
of authorized web service requester] when interpreting the TSF data from another trusted IT product.
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6.1.7. CLASS FRU: RESOURCE UTILISATION
6.1.7.1.FRU_FLT.1 Degraded fault tolerance / Log fail
FRU_FLT.1.1 The TSF shall ensure the operation of [logs will be written in a file] when the following
failures occur: [-Database connection cannot be established while trying to perform a logging event, -
Any writing error occurred while writing into database].
6.1.7.2.FRU_FLT.1 Degraded fault tolerance / Meta fail
FRU_FLT.1.1 The TSF shall ensure the operation of [-asking for administrator’s comfirmation to solve
meta file problems and reload the meta data] when the following failures occur: [
- inconsistency in meta file
- non-existing component used in meta file].
6.1.8. CLASS FTA: TOE ACCESS
6.1.8.1.FTA_MCS.1 Basic limitation on multiple concurrent sessions
FTA_MCS.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the maximum number of concurrent sessions that belong to the
same user.
FTA_MCS.1.2 The TSF shall enforce, by default, a limit of [administrator defined] sessions per user.
6.1.8.2.FTA_SSL.3 TSF-initiated termination
FTA_SSL.3.1 The TSF shall terminate an interactive session after a [administrator defined interval of
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user inactivity].
6.1.8.3.FTA_SSL.4 User-initiated termination
FTA_SSL.4.1 The TSF shall allow user-initiated termination of the user's own interactive session.
6.1.8.4.FTA_TAH.1 TOE access history
FTA_TAH.1.1 Upon successful session establishment, the TSF shall display the [date, time, method,
location] of the last successful session establishment to the user.
FTA_TAH.1.2 Upon successful session establishment, the TSF shall display the [date, time, method,
location] of the last unsuccessful attempt to session establishment and the number of unsuccessful
attempts since the last successful session establishment.
FTA_TAH.1.3 The TSF shall not erase the access history information from the user interface without
giving the user an opportunity to review the information.
6.1.8.5.FTA_TSE.1 TOE session establishment
FTA_TSE.1.1 The TSF shall be able to deny session establishment based on [user id, location of user, IP
range of user, time range].
6.1.9. CLASS FTP: TRUSTED PATHS
6.1.9.1.FTP_TRP.1 Trusted Path
FTP_TRP.1.1 The TSF shall provide a communication path between itself and [remote] users that is
logically distinct from other communication paths and provides assured identification of its end points
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and protection of the communicated data from [modification, disclosure].
FTP_TRP.1.2 The TSF shall permit [remote users] to initiate communication via the trusted path.
FTP_TRP.1.3 The TSF shall require the use of the trusted path for [initial user authentication]
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6.2. SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS
Assurance Class Assurance Component
ADV: Development
ADV_ARC.1 – Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.4 – Complete Functional Specification
ADV_IMP.1 – Implementation Representation of the TSF
ADV_TDS.3 – Basic Modular Design
AGD: Guidance Docu-
ments
AGD_OPE.1 – Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 – Preparative procedures
ALC: Life-cycle Support
ALC_CMC.4 – Production support, acceptance procedures automation
ALC_CMS.4– Problem tracking CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1 – Delivery procedures
ALC_DVS.1 – Identification of security measures
ALC_LCD.1 – Developer defined life-cycle model
ALC_TAT.1 – Well defined development tools
ALC_FLR.2 – Flaw reporting procedures
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ASE: Security Target
Evaluation
ASE_CCL.1 – Conformance claims
ASE_ECD.1 - Extended components definition
ASE_INT.1 – ST Introduction
ASE_OBJ.2 – Security objectives
ASE_REQ.2 – Derived security requirements
ASE_SPD.1 – Security problem definition
ASE_TSS.1 – TOE summary specification
ATE: Test
ATE_COV.2 – Analysis of coverage
ATE_DPT.1 – Testing: basic design
ATE_FUN.1 – Functional testing
ATE_IND.2 – Independent testing – sample
AVA: Vulnerability As-
sessment
AVA_VAN.3 –Focused vulnerability analysis
Table 3. Security Assurance Requirements
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6.3. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS RATIONALE
6.3.1. SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS DEPENDENCY RATIONALE
SFRs Dependency Dependency Met?
FAU_GEN.1
FPT_STM.1
Time stamps will be provided by
operational environment.
FAU_GEN.2
FAU_GEN.1
FIA_UID.1
YES (FAU_GEN.1 ,FIA_UID.2 (is
hierarchical to FIA_UID.1))
FAU_SAR.1
FAU_GEN.1
YES (FAU_GEN.1)
FAU_SAR.2
FAU_SAR.1
YES (FAU_SAR.1)
FAU_SAR.3
FAU_SAR.1
YES(FAU_SAR.1)
FAU_SEL.1
FAU_GEN.1
FMT_MTD.1
YES (FAU_GEN.1, FMT_MTD.1)
FAU_STG.1
FAU_GEN.1
YES (FAU_GEN.1)
FAU_STG.3
FAU_STG.1
YES (FAU_STG.1)
FCS_CKM.1/ AES
[FCS_CKM.2, or
FCS_COP.1]
FCS_CKM.4
YES (FCS_COP.1/AES
,FCS_CKM.4/AES)
FCS_CKM.4/ AES
[FDP_ITC.1, or
FDP_ITC.2, or
FCS_CKM.1]
YES(FCS_CKM.1/AES)
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FCS_COP.1 / AES
[FDP_ITC.1, or
FDP_ITC.2, or
FCS_CKM.1 ]
FCS_CKM.4
YES(FCS_CKM.1/AES,
FCS_CKM.4/AES)
FCS_COP.1 / Salted SHA-2
[FDP_ITC.1, or
FDP_ITC.2, or
FCS_CKM.1 ]
FCS_CKM.4
Since SHA-2 is a hashing algo-
rithm and a one way function it
doesn’t need any key genera-
tion or destruction. There for
the dependencies are not appli-
cable.
FDP_ACC.1 / A
FDP_ACF.1
YES (FDP_ACF.1/A)
FDP_ACC.1 / B
FDP_ACF.1
YES (FDP_ACF.1/B)
FDP_ACF.1 / A
FDP_ACC.1
FMT_MSA.3
YES (FDP_ACC.1/A)
FDP_ACF.1 / B
FDP_ACC.1
FMT_MSA.3
YES (FDP_ACC.1/B)
FDP_IFC.1
FDP_IFF.1
YES (FDP_IFF.1)
FDP_IFF.1 FDP_IFC.1
FMT_MSA.3
YES (FDP_IFC.1, FMT_MSA.3/C)
FDP_ITC.2 [FDP_ACC.1, or
FDP_IFC.1 ]
[FTP_ITC.1 , or
FTP_TRP.1 ]
YES
(FDP_ACC.1/B,FDP_ACC.1/A,FD
P_IFC.1, FTP_TRP.1, FPT_TDC.1)
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FPT_TDC.1
FDP_ETC.2 [FDP_ACC.1, or
FDP_IFC.1]
YES(FDP_ACC.1/A, FDP_ACC.1/
B, FDP_IFC.1)
FDP_SDI.2 - -
FIA_AFL.1
FIA_UAU.1
YES (FIA_UAU.2 (is hierarchical
to FIA_UAU.1))
FIA_ATD.1
-
-
FIA_SOS.1 -
-
FIA_UAU.2 FIA_UID.1
YES (FIA_UID.2 (is hierarchical to
FIA_UID.1))
FIA_UAU.5 -
-
FIA_UID.2
-
-
FMT_MOF.1 FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1
YES (FMT_SMR.1, FMT_SMF.1)
FMT_MSA.1 / B [FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1 ] YES (FDP_ACC.1/
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FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1
B,FMT_SMR.1,FMT_SMF.1)
FMT_MSA.1 / A [FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1 ]
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1
YES
(FDP_ACC.1/A,FMT_SMR.1,FMT
_SMF.1)
FMT_MSA.1 / C [FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1 ]
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1
YES
(FDP_IFC.1,FMT_SMR.1,FMT_S
MF.1)
FMT_MSA.3 / A FMT_MSA.1
FMT_SMR.1
YES (FMT_MSA.1 /
A,FMT_SMR.1
)
FMT_MSA.3 / B FMT_MSA.1
FMT_SMR.1
YES (FMT_MSA.1 /
B,FMT_SMR.1
)
FMT_MSA.3 / C FMT_MSA.1
FMT_SMR.1
YES (FMT_MSA.1
/C,FMT_SMR.1
)
FMT_MTD.1 FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1
YES (FMT_SMR.1,FMT_SMF.1)
FMT_SMF.1
-
-
FMT_SMR.1
FIA_UID.1
YES (FIA_UID.2 (is hierarchical to
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FIA_UID.1))
FPT_FLS.1 / Log Fail
-
-
FPT_FLS.1 / Meta Fail
FPT_ITT.1
-
-
FPT_TDC.1
-
-
FRU_FLT.1 / Log Fail
FPT_FLS.1
YES (FPT_FLS.1/Log Fail)
FRU_FLT.1 / Meta Fail
FPT_FLS.1
YES (FPT_FLS.1/Meta FAİL)
FTA_MCS.1
FIA_UID.1
YES (FIA_UID.2 (is hierarchical to
FIA_UID.1))
FTA_SSL.3
-
-
FTA_SSL.4
-
-
FTA_TAH.1
-
-
FTA_TSE.1
-
-
FTP_TRP.1
-
-
Table 4. Security Functional Requirements Dependency Rationale
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6.3.2. SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS RATIONALE
Objectives SFRs Rationale
O. AUDIT
FAU_GEN.1,
FAU_SAR.1,
FAU_SAR.2,
FAU_SAR.3,
FAU_GEN.2,
FAU_SEL.1,
FAU_STG.1,
FAU_STG.3
Auditing requirements of TOE are defined by using
FAU_GEN.1 and generated audit records are associated
with users of TOE by FAU_GEN.2. FAU_SAR.1 provides
the users of the TOE with a human-readable interface to
the audit records while
FAU_SAR.2 prohibits normal users to review audit logs,
only administrator is able to see audit logs
FAU_SAR.3 introduces an ability to TOE, with which audit
records can be shown to the user in a selectable format.
FAU_SEL.1 provides administrator configurable selective
audit
FAU_STG.1 provides protection of audit trail storage.
FAU_STG.3 provides notifications for administrator when
the audit storage is near to exceed configurable limits.
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Objectives SFRs Rationale
O. MANAGE
FMT_MOF.1,
FMT_MSA.1 / A,
FMT_MSA.1 /B,
FMT_MSA.1 /C,
FMT_MSA.3 /A,
FMT_MSA.3 /B,
FMT_MSA.3 / C,
FMT_MTD.1,
FMT_SMF.1,
FAU_SAR.1,
FAU_SAR.2,
FAU_SAR.3,
FAU_SEL.1,
FAU_STG.3,
FDP_ACC.1 / A,
FDP_ACC.1 / B,
FDP_ACF.1 /A,
FDP_ACF.1/B,
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MOF.1 restricts the ability to manage security fea-
tures to the authorized identified roles. FMT_MSA.1 iter-
ations applies the specified policy to manage security at-
tributes to authorized users. FMT_MSA.3 iterations limits
to be able to manage default values for attributes ac-
cording to a specified policy. FMT_MTD.1 allows author-
ized users to manage TSF data within the specified rules.
FMT_SMF.1 and FMT_SMR.1 determines the manage-
ment functions and roles.
FAU_SAR.1 provides the users of the TOE with a human-
readable interface to the audit records while
FAU_SAR.2 prohibits normal users to review audit logs,
only administrator is able to see and manage audit logs
FAU_SAR.3 introduces an ability to TOE, with which audit
records can be shown to the user in a selectable format.
FAU_SEL.1 provides managable selective audit
FAU_STG.3 provides protection of audit trail storage.
FDP_ACC.1, FDP_ACF.1 iterations specify access control
policy details, information and rules on the management
functions.
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Objectives SFRs Rationale
O. DATA_PROTECTION
FDP_IFC.1,
FDP_IFF.1,
FDP_ACC.1 / A,
FDP_ACC.1 / B,
FDP_ACF.1 /A,
FDP_ACF.1/B,
FDP_ITC.2,
FDP_ETC.2,
FPT_TDC.1,
FDP_SDI.2,
FPT_FLS.1 / Log Fail,
FPT_FLS.1 /Meta Fail
FPT_ITT.1,
FRU_FLT.1 /Log Fail,
FRU_FLT.1/ Meta
Fail,
FCS_COP.1/ Salted
SHA-2
FDP_ACC.1, FDP_ACF.1 iterations specify access control
policy details, information and rules. On the other hand,
FDP_IFF.1, FDP_IFC.1 are the components that details in-
formation flow control policy rules. FDP_ITC.2 provide a
functionality for imported data with consistency pro-
vided by FPT_TDC.1 verification as FDP_ETC.2 is a func-
tionality that applies some security measures for ex-
ported data.
FDP_SDI.2 provides detection of data integrity errors
FPT_FLS.1 iterations provide preserving secure state
when software errors occur
FPT_ITT.1 protects data from disclosure and modification
during it is transmitted between parts of TOE
FRU_FLT.1 iterations provide operation of all critical TOE
functions when a software error occurs.
FCS_COP.1 / Salted SHA-2provides salting and encryption
of user password before it is stored in database.
O. SEC_COMM FTP_TRP.1
FTP_TRP.1 helps to establish a secure channel from the
user’s browser to GIS application protecting the user
data from disclosure and modification.
O. AUTHORIZATION
FIA_UAU.2,
FIA_UAU.5,
FIA_UID.2,
Before performing any action, FIA_UAU.2 forces TOE us-
ers to authenticate as well as identify provided by
FIA_UID.2. FIA_UAU.5 provides multiple authentication
mechanism for users. FIA_AFL.1 protects the TOE against
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Objectives SFRs Rationale
FIA_AFL.1,
FIA_ATD.1,
FIA_SOS.1,
FCS_CKM.1/AES,
FCS_CKM.4/AES,
FCS_COP.1 / AES,
FTA_MCS.1,
FTA_SSL.3,
FTA_SSL.4,
FTA_TAH.1,
FMT_SMR.1,
FTA_TSE.1
brute-force attacks by introducing a protection mecha-
nism. FIA_ATD.1 provides maintaining of security attrib-
utes such as: user id, name, e-mail, password, user role.
FIA_SOS.1 also contributes to this objective due to the
fact that by this component TSF defines the rules for se-
crets which contribute to the measures taken against un-
authorized access. FCS_CKM.1/AES and FCS_CKM.4/AES
provides cryptographic key management which is used
to encrypt / decrypt user session keys. FCS_COP.1 / AES
provides encryption & decryption of user session varia-
bles.
FTA_MCS.1 limits users of starting multiple concurrent
sessions.
FTA_SSL.3 provides session termination after a defined
period of inactivity.
FTA_SSL.4 allows users to terminate their own session.
FTA_TAH.1 provides users history of successful and un-
successful login attempts.
FTA_TSE.1 provides the capability to deny user sessions
according to selected criteria such as banned user id,
user’s IP range, user’s location etc.
FMT_SMR.1 associates users with role groups that in-
clude static & dynamic authorizations.
Table5. Security Functional Requirements Rationale
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6.3.3. SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS RATIONALE TABLES
SFR s
O. AUTHO-
RIZATION
O. AUDIT
O. MA-
NAGE
O.
DATA_PR
OTECTION
O.
SEC_CO
MM
FAU_GEN.1 ✓
FAU_GEN.2 ✓
FAU_SAR.1 ✓ ✓
FAU_SAR.2 ✓ ✓
FAU_SAR.3 ✓ ✓
FAU_SEL.1 ✓ ✓
FAU_STG.1 ✓
FAU_STG.3 ✓ ✓
FCS_CKM.1/ AES ✓
FCS_CKM.4/ AES ✓
FCS_COP.1 / AES ✓
FCS_COP.1 / Salted SHA-2 ✓
FDP_ACC.1 / A ✓ ✓
FDP_ACC.1 / B ✓ ✓
FDP_ACF.1 / A ✓ ✓
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FDP_ACF.1 / B ✓ ✓
FDP_IFC.1 ✓
FDP_IFF.1 ✓
FDP_ITC.2 ✓
FDP_ETC.2 ✓
FDP_SDI.2 ✓
FIA_AFL.1 ✓
FIA_ATD.1 ✓
FIA_SOS.1 ✓
FIA_UAU.2 ✓
FIA_UAU.5 ✓
FIA_UID.2 ✓
FMT_MOF.1 ✓
FMT_MSA.1 / A ✓
FMT_MSA.1 / B ✓
FMT_MSA.1 / C ✓
FMT_MSA.3 / A ✓
FMT_MSA.3 / B ✓
FMT_MSA.3 / C ✓
FMT_MTD.1 ✓
FMT_SMF.1 ✓
FMT_SMR.1 ✓ ✓
FPT_FLS.1 / Log Fail ✓ ✓
FPT_FLS.1 / Meta Fail ✓ ✓
FPT_ITT.1 ✓
FPT_TDC.1 ✓
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FRU_FLT.1 / Log Fail ✓ ✓
FRU_FLT.1 / Meta Fail ✓ ✓
FTA_MCS.1 ✓
FTA_SSL.3 ✓
FTA_SSL.4 ✓
FTA_TAH.1 ✓
FTA_TSE.1 ✓
FTP_TRP.1 ✓
Table6. SFR Rationale Table for TOE
6.3.4. SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS RATIONALE
EAL4 is the highest level at which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product
line. EAL4 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate to high
level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs and are prepared to incur
additional security-specific engineering costs. In addition, ALC_FLR.2 is chosen to provide additional
quality assurance to the TOE.
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7. TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION
7.1. TOE SECURITY FUNCTIONS
7.1.1. LOG GENERATION AND REVIEW
TOE generates audit logs in order to provide accountability for the administrators and system users.
Administrators have the capability to review the audit logs.
When a log is created after a user’s action, that log is associated with that user.
Audit logs can be reviewed by administrators using “Log Server” application and can be filtered and
ordered according to criteria with logical relations.
TOE also have capability to generate selective audit according to configuration made by adminis-
trators.
TOE protects audit storage considering OE_PROPER_ADMIN operational environment constraint.
TOE prevents unauthorized users to make modification of logs and it protects audit records from
unauthorized deletion.
TOE ignores audit events and notify administrators when audit storage exceeds administrator
configurable limit.
Functional Requirement Satisfied: FAU_GEN.1, FAU_GEN.2, FAU_SAR.1, FAU_SAR.2, FAU_SAR.3,
FAU_GEN.2, FAU_SEL.1, FAU_STG.1, FAU_STG.3
7.1.2. CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY MANAGEMENT & OPERATIONS
TOE provides mechanisms for encryption and decryption of session data and salting and encryption
of user passwords. Cryptographic key generation and destruction mechanisms are also provided
for keys used in session variables encryption & decryption.
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Functional Requirement Satisfied: FCS_CKM.1/AES, FCS_CKM.4/AES, FCS_COP.1 / AES, FCS_COP.1 /
Salted SHA-2
7.1.3. USER LOGIN AND AUTHENTICATION
TOE successfully identifies, authenticates and authorizes its users and it provides user identification
& authentication before any action. Authentication failures are handled by locking user account
until it is unlocked by administrator or the defined time interval expires. There are multiple mech-
anisms provided to authenticate users. Authentication of users are done via login interface, au-
thentication of web services are done using user name, password and application security key
which are provided by requester as parameters for web services. TOE also has the ability to deny
session establishment based on user id, location of user, time range and IP range of user. After
successful authentication TOE presents users successful and unsuccessful access history containing
date, time, method and location of login attempts.
TOE restricts multiple concurrent sessions of the same user according to an administrator defined
limit.
TOE maintains user id, name, e-mail, password, user role attributes belong to individual users.
There is also a mechanism provided to verify user secrets meet the properties explained in 6.1.4.3
.
TOE terminates inactive user session after an administrator defined period and it also allows users
to terminate their own session.
Functional Requirement Satisfied: FIA_UAU.2, FIA_UAU.5, FIA_UID.2, FIA_AFL.1, FIA_ATD.1,
FIA_SOS.1, FTA_MCS.1, FTA_SSL.3, FTA_SSL.4, FTA_TAH.1, FTA_TSE.1
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7.1.4. PROTECTION OF USER, TSF MEDIATED AND META DATA
TOE provides confidentiality and integrity of user and TSF data during import/export of data to/from
third parties and it enforces Auth SFP ,Data Access Control SFP and Information Flow Control SFP for
import and export of user data, meta data and TSF mediated data. For service users TOE enforces
Information Flow Control SFP on all subjects, information, and operations that cause controlled infor-
mation to flow to and from controlled subjects covered by the SFP using SSL secure channel
TOE preserves a secure state when application failures and user failures occur and it ensures the op-
eration of logs will be written in a file when database connection cannot be established while trying to
perform a logging event. Furthermore, TOE ensures the operation of asking for administrator’s com-
firmation to solve meta file problems and reload the meta data while there is inconsistency in meta
file or nonexisting component used in meta file.
Moreover, TOE controls integrity of data stored in containers. Administrators may run integrity
check on existing data via administrator user interface.
Functional Requirement Satisfied: FDP_ACC.1 /B, FDP_ACC.1 / A, FDP_ACF.1 /B , FDP_ACF.1 / A,
FDP_IFC.1, FDP_IFF.1, FDP_ITC.2, FDP_ETC.2, FDP_SDI.2, FPT_FLS.1 / Log fail , FPT_FLS.1 / Meta fail ,
FPT_ITT.1, FPT_TDC.1, FRU_FLT.1 / Log fail , FRU_FLT.1 / Meta fail , FTP_TRP.1
7.1.5. USER ROLES AND SECURITY RULES
This feature contains managing security functions and data for different situations. Security roles,
rules and conditions are identified and management is supplied according to roles, rules and con-
ditions and only authorized people access the TOE.
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The TSF enforces auth and data access control SFP, information flow control SFP to restrict the
ability to modify, delete or unauthorized existing user, change user role, create, modify, delete user
roles, and modify authorization of roles and the security attributes user id, name, password, user
role to administrator user.
Administrator users can specify alternative initial values to override the default values when an
object or information is created.
Only administrator user change_default, query, modify, delete or clear critical TSF data such as
application configuration parameters, user data.
The TSF allows to create, delete, modify, and read security attributes defined in FIA_ATD.1 only to
administrator users.
Functional Requirement Satisfied: FMT_MOF.1 , FMT_MSA.1 /A ,FMT_MSA.1 / B, FMT_MSA.1 /C
,FMT_MSA.3 /A , FMT_MSA.3 / B, FMT_MSA.3 /C , FMT_MTD.1, FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1 ,
FDP_ACC.1 /A , FDP_ACC.1 /B , FDP_ACF.1 /A , FDP_ACF.1 / B