National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
Cisco Systems, Inc. IoT Industrial Ethernet and
Connected Grid Switches running IOS 15.2
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-10907-2018
Dated: 11/29/2018
Version: 0.3
National Institute of Standards and Technology National Security Agency
Information Technology Laboratory Information Assurance Directorate
100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road STE 6940
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6940
Cisco IoT running IOS 15.2 Validation Report Version 0.3, 11/29/2018
ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Validation Team
Jerome Myers
Meredith Hennan
The Aerospace Corporation
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
Cody Cummins
Katie Sykes
Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc.
Catonsville, MD
Cisco IoT running IOS 15.2 Validation Report Version 0.3, 11/29/2018
iii
Table of Contents
Contents
1 Executive Summary.................................................................................................... 1
2 Identification............................................................................................................... 1
3 Architectural Information ........................................................................................... 3
3.1 TOE Evaluated Configuration ............................................................................ 3
3.2 TOE Architecture................................................................................................ 3
3.3 Physical Boundaries............................................................................................ 4
4 Security Policy............................................................................................................ 4
4.1 Security audit ...................................................................................................... 5
4.2 Cryptographic support ........................................................................................ 5
4.3 Identification and authentication......................................................................... 6
4.4 Security management.......................................................................................... 7
4.5 Protection of the TSF.......................................................................................... 7
4.6 TOE access.......................................................................................................... 8
4.7 Trusted path/channels ......................................................................................... 8
5 Assumptions & Clarification of Scope ....................................................................... 8
6 Documentation............................................................................................................ 9
7 IT Product Testing ...................................................................................................... 9
7.1 Test Software ...................................................................................................... 9
7.2 Test Environment.............................................................................................. 10
7.3 Developer Testing............................................................................................. 10
7.4 Evaluation Team Independent Testing ............................................................. 10
8 Evaluated Configuration ........................................................................................... 10
9 Results of the Evaluation .......................................................................................... 11
9.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE).......................................................... 11
9.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV)............................................................ 11
9.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD) ............................................... 12
9.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC) ................................... 12
9.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE) ............... 12
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)....................................................... 12
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results........................................................................ 13
10 Validator Comments/Recommendations .................................................................. 13
11 Annexes..................................................................................................................... 13
12 Security Target.......................................................................................................... 14
13 Glossary .................................................................................................................... 14
14 Bibliography ............................................................................................................. 14
Cisco IoT running IOS 15.2 Validation Report Version 0.3, 11/29/2018
1
1 Executive Summary
This report documents the assessment of the National Information Assurance Partnership
(NIAP) validation team of the evaluation of Cisco IoT Industrial Ethernet and Connected
Grid Switches running IOS 15.2 solution provided by Cisco Systems, Inc. It presents the
evaluation results, their justifications, and the conformance results. This Validation Report
is not an endorsement of the Target of Evaluation by any agency of the U.S. government,
and no warranty is either expressed or implied.
The evaluation was performed by the Gossamer Security Solutions (Gossamer) Common
Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL) in Catonsville, MD, United States of America, and was
completed in December 2018. The information in this report is largely derived from the
Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) and associated test reports, all written by Gossamer
Security Solutions. The evaluation determined that the product is both Common Criteria
Part 2 Extended and Part 3 Conformant, and meets the assurance requirements of the
collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices Version 2.0 + Errata 20180314,
Version 2.0, 14 March 2018.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the Cisco IoT Industrial Ethernet and Connected Grid
Switches running IOS 15.2.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) identified in this Validation Report has been evaluated at a
NIAP approved Common Criteria Testing Laboratory using the Common Methodology for
IT Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 4) for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT
Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 4). This Validation Report applies only to the specific
version of the TOE as evaluated. The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the
provisions of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme and the
conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence provided.
The validation team monitored the activities of the evaluation team, provided guidance on
technical issues and evaluation processes, and reviewed the individual work units and
successive versions of the ETR. The validation team found that the evaluation showed that
the product satisfies all of the functional requirements and assurance requirements stated in
the Security Target (ST). Therefore, the validation team concludes that the testing
laboratory’s findings are accurate, the conclusions justified, and the conformance results are
correct. The conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are
consistent with the evidence produced.
The technical information included in this report was obtained from the Cisco IoT Industrial
Ethernet and Connected Grid Switches running IOS 15.2 Common Criteria Security Target,
version 1.0, 11/16/2018 and analysis performed by the Validation Team.
2 Identification
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product
evaluations. Under this program, security evaluations are conducted by commercial testing
Cisco IoT running IOS 15.2 Validation Report Version 0.3, 11/29/2018
2
laboratories called Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs) using the Common
Evaluation Methodology (CEM) in accordance with National Voluntary Laboratory
Assessment Program (NVLAP) accreditation.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality and
consistency across evaluations. Developers of information technology products desiring a
security evaluation contract with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product’s evaluation. Upon
successful completion of the evaluation, the product is added to NIAP’s Validated Products
List.
Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:
 The Target of Evaluation (TOE): the fully qualified identifier of the product as evaluated.
 The Security Target (ST), describing the security features, claims, and assurances of the
product.
 The conformance result of the evaluation.
 The Protection Profile to which the product is conformant.
 The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation.
Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers
Item Identifier
Evaluation Scheme United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
TOE Cisco IoT Industrial Ethernet and Connected Grid Switches running IOS 15.2
Protection Profile (Specific models identified in Section 8)
collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices Version 2.0 + Errata
20180314, Version 2.0, 14 March 2018
ST Cisco IoT Industrial Ethernet and Connected Grid Switches running IOS 15.2
Security Target, version 1.0, 11/16/2018
Evaluation Technical
Report
Evaluation Technical Report for Cisco IoT Industrial Ethernet and Connected
Grid Switches running IOS 15.2, version 1.0, 11/19/2018
CC Version Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
rev 4
Conformance Result CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 conformant
Sponsor Cisco Systems, Inc.
Developer Cisco Systems, Inc.
Common Criteria
Testing Lab (CCTL)
Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc.
Catonsville, MD
CCEVS Validators Jerome Myers, Meredith Hennan
Cisco IoT running IOS 15.2 Validation Report Version 0.3, 11/29/2018
3
3 Architectural Information
Note: The following architectural description is based on the description presented in the
Security Target.
The TOE is the Cisco IoT Industrial Ethernet and Connected Grid Switches running IOS
15.2. The TOE is comprised of both software and hardware. The hardware is comprised of
the IE2000 Series, IE4000 Series, IE5000 Series and 2500 Series CGS models. The software
is comprised of the Universal Cisco Internet Operating System (IOS) software image
Release IOS 15.2.
The Cisco IE2K, IE4K, IE5K and CGS that comprises the TOE has common hardware
characteristics. These characteristics affect only non-TSF relevant functions of the switches
(such as throughput and amount of storage) and therefore support security equivalency of the
switches in terms of hardware.
The Cisco IE2K, IE4K, IE5K and CGS primary features include the following:
 Central processor that supports all system operations;
 Dynamic memory, used by the central processor for all system operation.
 Flash memory (EEPROM), used to store the Cisco IOS image (binary program).
 USB port (v2.0) (note, USB devices are outside the scope of the evaluation).
o Type A for Storage, all Cisco supported USB flash drives.
 Non-volatile read-only memory (ROM) is used to store the bootstrap program and
power-on diagnostic programs.
 Non-volatile random-access memory (NVRAM) is used to store router
configuration parameters that are used to initialize the system at start-up.
 Physical network interfaces (minimally two) (e.g. RJ45 serial and standard
10/100/1000 Ethernet ports). Some models have a fixed number and/or type of
interfaces; some models have slots that accept additional network interfaces.
3.1 TOE Evaluated Configuration
Detail regarding the evaluated configuration is provided in Section 8 below.
3.2 TOE Architecture
The Cisco IE2K, IE4K, IE5K and CGS are switching and routing platforms that provide
connectivity and security services onto a single, secure device. These switches offer
broadband speeds and simplified management to small businesses, and enterprise small
branch and teleworkers.
The Cisco IE2K, IE4K, IE5K and CGS are single-device security and switching solutions
for protecting the network.
The TOE protects itself from tampering and bypass by offering only a limited and controlled
set of functions at each of its physical interfaces to its environment. Communication via those
Cisco IoT running IOS 15.2 Validation Report Version 0.3, 11/29/2018
4
interfaces is either directed at the TOE for the purpose of administration or is directed through
the TOE for communication among network devices. In both cases the TOE implements a
set of policies to control the services available and those services are designed to protect and
ensure the secure operation of the TOE.
3.3 Physical Boundaries
The TOE is a hardware and software solution composed of the switch models IE2000 Series,
IE4000 Series, IE5000 Series and 2500 Series CGS running Cisco IOS 15.2:
The TOE supports the following hardware, software, and firmware components in its
operational environment. Each component is identified as being required or not based on
the claims made in this Security Target.
IT Environment Components
Component Required Usage/Purpose Description for TOE performance
RADIUS AAA
Server
Yes This includes any IT environment RADIUS AAA server that provides
authentication services to TOE administrators.
Management
Workstation
Yes This includes any IT Environment Management workstation that is used
by the TOE administrator to support TOE administration using SSHv2
secured connection. Any SSH client that supports SSHv2 may be used.
Local Console Yes This includes any IT Environment Console that is directly connected to
the TOE via the Serial Console Port and is used by the TOE administrator
to support TOE administration.
Syslog Server Yes This includes any syslog server to which the TOE would transmit syslog
messages over IPsec.
Certification
Authority (CA)
Yes This includes any IT Environment Certification Authority on the TOE
network. This can be used to provide the TOE with a valid certificate
during certificate enrollment.
The TOE has two or more network interfaces and is connected to at least one internal and
one external network. The Cisco IOS configuration determines how packets are handled to
and from the TOE’s network interfaces. If the Cisco IE2K, IE4K, IE5K and CGS is to be
remotely administered, then the management station must be connected to an internal
network, SSHv2 may be used to connect to the switch. A syslog server is also used to store
audit records. If these servers are used, they must be attached to the internal (trusted)
network. The internal (trusted) network is meant to be separated effectively from
unauthorized individuals and user traffic; one that is in a controlled environment where
implementation of security policies can be enforced.
4 Security Policy
This section summaries the security functionality of the TOE:
1. Security audit
2. Cryptographic support
3. Identification and authentication
Cisco IoT running IOS 15.2 Validation Report Version 0.3, 11/29/2018
5
4. Security management
5. Protection of the TSF
6. TOE access
7. Trusted path/channels
4.1 Security audit
The Cisco IE2K, IE4K, IE5K and CGS provide extensive auditing capabilities. The TOE
generates a comprehensive set of audit logs that identify specific TOE operations. For each
event, the TOE records the date and time of each event, the type of event, the subject identity,
and the outcome of the event. Auditable events include:
 failure on invoking cryptographic functionality such as establishment, termination
and failure of cryptographic session establishments and connections;
 modifications to the group of users that are part of the authorized administrator roles;
 all use of the user identification mechanism;
 any use of the authentication mechanism;
 Administrator lockout due to excessive authentication failures;
 any change in the configuration of the TOE;
 changes to time;
 initiation of TOE update;
 indication of completion of TSF self-test;
 maximum sessions being exceeded;
 termination of a remote session;
 attempts to unlock a termination session and
 initiation and termination of a trusted channel.
The TOE is configured to transmit its audit messages to an external syslog server.
Communication with the syslog server is protected using IPsec and the TOE can determine
when communication with the syslog server fails. If that should occur, the TOE can be
configured to block new permit actions.
The audit logs can be viewed on the TOE using the appropriate IOS commands. The records
include the date/time the event occurred, the event/type of event, the user associated with the
event, and additional information of the event and its success and/or failure. The TOE does
not have an interface to modify audit records, though there is an interface available for the
authorized administrator to clear audit data stored locally on the TOE.
4.2 Cryptographic support
The TOE provides cryptography in support of other Cisco IE2K, IE4K, IE5K and CGS
security functionality. This IOS software calls the IOS Common Cryptographic Module
(IC2M) Rel5 (Firmware Version: Rel 5) certificate 2388 and has been validated for
conformance to the requirements of FIPS 140-2 Level 1.
Cisco IoT running IOS 15.2 Validation Report Version 0.3, 11/29/2018
6
The TOE provides cryptography in support of remote administrative management via
SSHv2 and IPsec to secure the transmission of audit records to the remote syslog server. In
addition, IPsec is used to secure the session between the TOE and the authentication
servers. The cryptographic services provided by the TOE are described in the table below.
TOE Provided Cryptography
Cryptographic Method Use within the TOE
AES Used to encrypt IPsec session traffic.
Used to encrypt SSH session traffic.
HMAC Used for keyed hash, integrity services in SSH
session establishment.
DH Used as the Key exchange method for SSH
Internet Key Exchange Used to establish initial IPsec session.
KAS Used to provide key exchange method
Secure Shell Establishment Used to establish initial SSH session.
RSA Signature Services Used in IPsec session establishment.
Used in SSH session establishment.
X.509 certificate signing.
SP 800-90A DRBG Used for random number generation, key
generation and seeds to asymmetric key
generation
Used in IPsec session establishment.
Used in SSH session establishment.
SHS Used to provide IPsec traffic integrity verification
Used to provide SSH traffic integrity verification
4.3 Identification and authentication
The TOE performs two types of authentication: device-level authentication of the remote
device and user authentication for the Authorized Administrator of the TOE. Device-level
authentication allows the TOE to establish a secure channel with a trusted peer. The secure
channel is established only after each device authenticates the other. Device-level
authentication is performed via IKE/IPsec mutual authentication. The IKE phase
authentication for the IPsec communication channel between the TOE and authentication
server and between the TOE and syslog server is considered part of the Identification and
Authentication security functionality of the TOE.
The TOE provides authentication services for administrative users to connect to the TOEs
secure CLI administrator interface. The TOE requires Authorized Administrators to
authenticate prior to being granted access to any of the management functionality. The TOE
can be configured to require a minimum password length of 15 characters as well as
mandatory password complexity rules. The TOE provides administrator authentication
Cisco IoT running IOS 15.2 Validation Report Version 0.3, 11/29/2018
7
against a local user database. Password-based authentication can be performed on the serial
console or SSHv2 secured connection. The TOE supports use of a RADIUS AAA server
(part of the IT Environment) for authentication of administrative users attempting to connect
to the TOE’s CLI.
The TOE also provides an automatic lockout when a user attempts to authenticate and enters
invalid information. When the threshold for a defined number of authentication attempts fail
has exceeded the configured allowable attempts, the user is locked out until an authorized
administrator can enable the user account.
The TOE uses X.509v3 certificates as defined by RFC 5280 to support authentication for
IPsec.
4.4 Security management
The TOE provides secure administrative services for management of general TOE
configuration and the security functionality provided by the TOE. All TOE administration
occurs either through a secure SSHv2 secured connection with the TOE acting as SSH server
or via a local console connection. The TOE provides the ability to securely manage:
 Administration of the TOE locally and remotely;
 Configuration of warning and consent access banners;
 Configuration of session inactivity thresholds;
 Updates of the TOE software;
 Configuration of authentication failures;
 Configuration of the audit functions of the TOE;
 Configuration of the TOE provided services; and
 Configuration of the cryptographic functionality of the TOE.
The TOE supports two separate administrator roles: non-privileged administrator and
privileged administrator. Only the privileged administrator can perform the above security
relevant management functions. The privileged administrator is the Authorized
Administrator of the TOE who has the ability to enable, disable, determine and modify the
behavior of all of the security functions of the TOE.
4.5 Protection of the TSF
The TOE protects against interference and tampering by untrusted subjects by implementing
identification, authentication, and access controls to limit configuration to Authorized
Administrators. The TOE prevents reading of cryptographic keys and passwords.
Additionally, Cisco IOS is not a general-purpose operating system and access to Cisco IOS
memory space is restricted to only Cisco IOS functions.
The TOE internally maintains the date and time. This date and time is used as the timestamp
that is applied to audit records generated by the TOE. Administrators can update the TOE’s
Cisco IoT running IOS 15.2 Validation Report Version 0.3, 11/29/2018
8
clock manually. Finally, the TOE performs testing to verify correct operation of the switch
itself and that of the cryptographic module.
The TOE is able to verify any software updates prior to the software updates being installed
on the TOE to avoid the installation of unauthorized software.
4.6 TOE access
The TOE can terminate inactive sessions after an Authorized Administrator configurable
time-period. Once a session has been terminated the TOE requires the user to re-authenticate
to establish a new session.
The TOE can also display an Authorized Administrator specified banner on the CLI
management interface prior to allowing any administrative access to the TOE.
4.7 Trusted path/channels
The TOE allows trusted channels to be established to itself from remote administrators that
is SSHv2 secured connection, and initiates outbound IPsec tunnels to transmit audit messages
to remote syslog servers. In addition, IPsec is used to secure the session between the TOE
and the authentication servers.
5 Assumptions & Clarification of Scope
Assumptions
The Security Problem Definition, including the assumptions, may be found in the following
documents:
 collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices Version 2.0 + Errata 20180314,
Version 2.0, 14 March 2018
That information has not been reproduced here and the NDcPP20E should be consulted if
there is interest in that material.
The scope of this evaluation was limited to the functionality and assurances covered in the
NDcPP20E as described for this TOE in the Security Target. Other functionality included in
the product was not assessed as part of this evaluation. All other functionality provided by
the devices needs to be assessed separately, and no further conclusions can be drawn about
their effectiveness.
Clarification of scope
All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that
need clarification. This text covers some of the more important limitations and clarifications
of this evaluation. Note that:
 As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated configuration
meets the security claims made with a certain level of assurance (the assurance
Cisco IoT running IOS 15.2 Validation Report Version 0.3, 11/29/2018
9
activities specified in the collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices and
performed by the evaluation team).
 This evaluation covers only the specific device models and software as identified in
this document, and not any earlier or later versions released or in process.
 This evaluation did not specifically search for, nor attempt to exploit, vulnerabilities
that were not “obvious” or vulnerabilities to objectives not claimed in the ST. The
CEM defines an “obvious” vulnerability as one that is easily exploited with a
minimum of understanding of the TOE, technical sophistication and resources.
 The functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the security functional
requirements specified in the NDcPP20E and applicable Technical Decisions. Any
additional security related functional capabilities of the TOE were not covered by this
evaluation. The security claims focus on the TOE as a secure network infrastructure
device and do not focus on other key functions provided by the TOE, such as
controlling the flow of network packets among the attached networks. These
functions can be used without affecting the claimed and evaluated security functions;
they simply have not been evaluated to work correctly themselves.
6 Documentation
The following document was made available with the TOE for evaluation and is the only
documentation that should be trusted for administration or use of the TOE in its evaluated
configuration:
 Cisco IoT Industrial Ethernet and Connected Grid Switches running IOS 15.2
Common Criteria Operational User Guidance and Preparative Procedures, Version
1.0, 11/16/2018
7 IT Product Testing
This section describes the testing efforts of the developer and the Evaluation Team. It is
derived from information contained in the Assurance Activity Report (NDcPP20E) for Cisco
IoT Industrial Ethernet and Connected Grid Switches running IOS 15.2, Version 1.0,
11/19/2018 (AAR).
7.1 Test Software
 Ubuntu 16.04
 FreeRadius 3.0.5
 Strongswan 5.3.5
 OpenSSH 7.2p2
 Windows 10 Enterprise
Cisco IoT running IOS 15.2 Validation Report Version 0.3, 11/29/2018
10
 Wireshark v2.4.2
 Putty v0.68
7.2 Test Environment
7.3 Developer Testing
No evidence of developer testing is required in the assurance activities for this product.
7.4 Evaluation Team Independent Testing
The evaluation team verified the product according to a Common Criteria Certification
document and ran the tests specified in the NDcPP20E including the tests associated with
optional requirements.
8 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is the Cisco IoT Industrial Ethernet and Connected Grid Switches running IOS
15.2. The TOE is comprised of both software and hardware which must be configured in
accordance with the documentation listed in Section 6.
The hardware is comprised of the following IE2000 Series, IE4000 Series, IE5000 Series
and 2500 Series CGS models:
IE2000 Series
 IE-2000-4TS-L, IE-2000-4TS-B, IE-2000-4T-L, IE-2000-4T-B, IE-2000-4TS-G-L, IE-
2000-4TS-G-B, IE-2000-4T-G-L, IE-2000-4T-G-B, IE-2000-4S-TS-G-L, IE-2000-4S-TS-
G-B, IE-2000-8TC-L, IE-2000-8TC-B, IE-2000-8TC-G-L, IE-2000-8TC-G-B, IE-2000-
8TC-G-E, IE-2000-16TC-L, IE-2000-16TC-B, IE-2000-16TC-G-L, IE-2000-16TC-G-E, IE-
2000-16TC-G-X, IE-2000-8TC-G-N, IE-2000-16TC-G-N, IE-2000-16PTC-G-L, IE-2000-
16PTC-G-E, IE-2000-16PTC-G-NX
IE4000 Series
 IE-4000-4TC4G-E, IE-4000-8S4G-E, IE-4000-4T4P4G-E, IE-4000-16T4G-E, IE-4000-
4S8P4G-E, IE-4000-8GT4G-E, IE-4000-8GS4G-E, IE-4000-4GC4GP4G-E, IE-4000-
Cisco IoT running IOS 15.2 Validation Report Version 0.3, 11/29/2018
11
16GT4G-E, IE-4000-8GT8GP4G-E, IE-4000-4GS8GP4G-E, IE-4010-16S12P, IE-4010-
4S24P
IE5000 Series
 IE-5000-12S12P-10G, IE-5000-16S12P
2500 Series CGS
 CGS-2520-24TC, CGS-2520-16S-8PC
The software is comprised of the Universal Cisco Internet Operating System (IOS) software
image Release IOS 15.2.
9 Results of the Evaluation
The results of the assurance requirements are generally described in this section and are
presented in detail in the proprietary ETR. The reader of this document can assume that all
assurance activities and work units received a passing verdict.
A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to the
corresponding evaluator action elements. The evaluation was conducted based upon CC
version 3.1 rev 4 and CEM version 3.1 rev 4. The evaluation determined the IoT Industrial
Ethernet and Connected Grid Switches running IOS 15.2 TOE to be Part 2 extended, and to
meet the SARs contained in the NDcPP20E.
9.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE)
The evaluation team applied each ASE CEM work unit. The ST evaluation ensured the ST
contains a description of the environment in terms of policies and assumptions, a statement
of security requirements claimed to be met by the Cisco IoT Industrial Ethernet and
Connected Grid Switches running IOS 15.2 products that are consistent with the Common
Criteria, and product security function descriptions that support the requirements.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
9.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV)
The evaluation team applied each ADV CEM work unit. The evaluation team assessed the
design documentation and found it adequate to aid in understanding how the TSF provides
the security functions. The design documentation consists of a functional specification
contained in the Security target and Guidance documents. Additionally, the evaluator
performed the assurance activities specified in the NDcPP20E related to the examination of
the information contained in the TSS.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
Cisco IoT running IOS 15.2 Validation Report Version 0.3, 11/29/2018
12
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
9.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD)
The evaluation team applied each AGD CEM work unit. The evaluation team ensured the
adequacy of the user guidance in describing how to use the operational TOE. Additionally,
the evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the administrator guidance in describing how
to securely administer the TOE. All of the guides were assessed during the design and testing
phases of the evaluation to ensure they were complete.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
9.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)
The evaluation team applied each ALC CEM work unit. The evaluation team found that the
TOE was identified.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
9.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE)
The evaluation team applied each ATE CEM work unit. The evaluation team ran the set of
tests specified by the assurance activities in the NDcPP20E and recorded the results in a Test
Report, summarized in the AAR.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)
The evaluation team applied each AVA CEM work unit. The vulnerability analysis is in the
Detailed Test Report (DTR) prepared by the evaluator. The vulnerability analysis includes
a public search for vulnerabilities. The public search for vulnerabilities did not uncover
any residual vulnerability.
On 10/02/2018 the evaluator searched the following sources for vulnerabilities:
 National Vulnerability Database (https://web.nvd.nist.gov/vuln/search)
 Vulnerability Notes Database (http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/)
 Rapid7 Vulnerability Database (https://www.rapid7.com/db/vulnerabilities)
Cisco IoT running IOS 15.2 Validation Report Version 0.3, 11/29/2018
13
 Tipping Point Zero Day Initiative (http://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories)
 Exploit / Vulnerability Search Engine (http://www.exploitsearch.net)
 SecurITeam Exploit Search (http://www.securiteam.com)
 Tenable Network Security (http://nessus.org/plugins/index.php?view=search)
 Offensive Security Exploit Database (https://www.exploit-db.com/)
Each site was searched using the following terms:
1. TCP
2. IPsec
3. SSH
4. Switch
5. Router
6. Cisco
7. IoT
On 11/19/2018 a second public vulnerability search was performed using the same sources
and terms from 10/1/2018 to present to ensure the most recently published vulnerabilities
were included.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results
The evaluation team’s assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims in
the ST are met. Additionally, the evaluation team’s testing also demonstrated the accuracy
of the claims in the ST.
The validation team’s assessment of the evidence provided by the evaluation team is that it
demonstrates that the evaluation team followed the procedures defined in the CEM, and
correctly verified that the product meets the claims in the ST.
10 Validator Comments/Recommendations
All validator comments have been addressed in Section 5, Assumptions and Clarification of
Scope.
11 Annexes
Not applicable
Cisco IoT running IOS 15.2 Validation Report Version 0.3, 11/29/2018
14
12 Security Target
The Security Target is identified as: Cisco IoT Industrial Ethernet and Connected Grid
Switches running IOS 15.2 Common Criteria Security Target, Version 1.0, 11/16/2018.
13 Glossary
The following definitions are used throughout this document:
 Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL). An IT security evaluation facility
accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and
approved by the CCEVS Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based
evaluations.
 Conformance. The ability to demonstrate in an unambiguous way that a given
implementation is correct with respect to the formal model.
 Evaluation. The assessment of an IT product against the Common Criteria using the
Common Criteria Evaluation Methodology to determine whether or not the claims made
are justified; or the assessment of a protection profile against the Common Criteria using
the Common Evaluation Methodology to determine if the Profile is complete, consistent,
technically sound and hence suitable for use as a statement of requirements for one or
more TOEs that may be evaluated.
 Evaluation Evidence. Any tangible resource (information) required from the sponsor or
developer by the evaluator to perform one or more evaluation activities.
 Feature. Part of a product that is either included with the product or can be ordered
separately.
 Target of Evaluation (TOE). A group of IT products configured as an IT system, or an
IT product, and associated documentation that is the subject of a security evaluation
under the CC.
 Validation. The process carried out by the CCEVS Validation Body leading to the issue
of a Common Criteria certificate.
 Validation Body. A governmental organization responsible for carrying out validation
and for overseeing the day-to-day operation of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation
and Validation Scheme.
14 Bibliography
The Validation Team used the following documents to produce this Validation Report:
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation: Part 1:
Introduction and General Model, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012.
[2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security
functional components, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012.
Cisco IoT running IOS 15.2 Validation Report Version 0.3, 11/29/2018
15
[3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security
assurance components, Version 3.1 Revision 4, September 2102.
[4] collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices Version 2.0 + Errata 20180314,
Version 2.0, 14 March 2018.
[5] Cisco IoT Industrial Ethernet and Connected Grid Switches running IOS 15.2
Common Criteria Security Target, Version 1.0, 11/16/2018 (ST).
[6] Assurance Activity Report (NDcPP20E) for Cisco IoT Industrial Ethernet and
Connected Grid Switches running IOS 15.2, Version 1.0, 11/19/2018 (AAR).
[7] Detailed Test Report (NDcPP20E) for Cisco IoT Industrial Ethernet and Connected
Grid Switches running IOS 15.2, Version 1.0, 11/19/2018 (DTR).
[8] Evaluation Technical Report for Cisco IoT Industrial Ethernet and Connected Grid
Switches running IOS 15.2, Version 1.0, 11/19/2018 (ETR)