Certification Report
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
BSI-DSZ-CC-0242-2004
for
TCOS Tachograph Card Version 1.0
from
T-Systems International GmbH
Service Line SI, T-Telesec
- Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Telefon +49 228 9582-0, Infoline +49 228 9582-111, Telefax +49 228 9582-455
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Telefon (0228) 9582-0 - Telefax (0228) 9582-455 - Infoline (0228) 9582-111
BSI-DSZ-CC-0242-2004
Smart Card with Tachograph Application
TCOS Tachograph Card Version 1.0
from
T-Systems International GmbH
Service Line SI, T-Telesec SOGIS-MRA
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an accredited and licensed/
approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Part 1
Version 0.6, Part 2 Version 1.0 extended by advice of the Certification Body for components
beyond EAL4 and smart card specific guidance for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT
Security Evaluation, Version 2.1 (ISO/IEC 15408:1999) and including final interpretations for
compliance with Common Criteria Version 2.2 and Common Methodology Part 2, Version 2.2.
Evaluation Results:
PP Conformance: Protection Profile PP/9911 and PP BSI-PP-0002-2001
Functionality: Product specific Security Target according to Appendix 10 of
Annex 1B of Regulation (EC) no. 1360/2002, amending Regulation
(EEC) no. 3821/85 on recording equipment in road transport;
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance Package: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant, EAL4 augmented by
ADO_IGS.2, ADV_IMP.2, ALC_DVS.2, ATE_DPT.2, AVA_MSU.3 and
AVA_VLA.4;
Equivalent to ITSEC E3 high as required by Appendix 10 of
Annex 1B of Regulation (EC) no. 1360/2002
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated
configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme
of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation
facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
The notes mentioned on the reverse side are part of this certificate.
Bonn, 18 May 2004
The President of the Federal Office
for Information Security
Dr. Helmbrecht L.S.
The rating of the strength of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms suitable for encryption
and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2)
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty
of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
BSI-DSZ-CC-0242-2004 Certification Report
V
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the
task of issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a
distributor, hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product
according to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised
security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the
BSI or by BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This
report contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the
detailed Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security
functionality of the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and
weaknesses) and instructions for the user.
1
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of
17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0242-2004
VI
Contents
Part A: Certification
Part B: Certification Results
Part C: Excerpts from the Criteria
Part D: Annexes
BSI-DSZ-CC-0242-2004 Certification Report
A-1
A Certification
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down
in the following:
• BSIG2
• BSI Certification Ordinance3
• BSI Schedule of Costs4
• Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal
Ministry of the Interior)
• DIN EN 45011 standard
• BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
• Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.15
• Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM)
- Part 1, Version 0.6
- Part 2, Version 1.0
• BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme
(AIS)
• Advice from the Certification Body on methodology for assurance
components above EAL4
The use of Common Criteria Version 2.1, Common Methodology, part 2,
Version 1.0 and final interpretations as part of AIS 32 results in compliance of
the certification results with Common Criteria Version 2.2 and Common
Methodology Part 2, Version 2.2 as endorsed by the Common Criteria
recognition arrangement committees.
2
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of
17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 7 July 1992,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-
Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 29th October 1992, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1838
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 22nd September 2000 in the
Bundesanzeiger p. 19445
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0242-2004
A-2
2 Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries
a mutual recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are
based on ITSEC or CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1 ITSEC/CC - Certificates
The SOGIS-Agreement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on
ITSEC became effective on 3 March 1998. This agreement was signed by the
national bodies of Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. This
agreement on the mutual recognition of IT security certificates was extended to
include certificates based on the CC for all evaluation levels (EAL 1 – EAL 7).
2.2 CC - Certificates
An arrangement (Common Criteria Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC evaluation assurance levels up to and including
EAL 4 was signed in May 2000. It includes also the recognition of Protection
Profiles based on the CC. The arrangement was signed by the national bodies
of Australia, Canada, Finland France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands,
New Zealand, Norway, Spain, United Kingdom and the United States. Israel
joined the arrangement in November 2000, Sweden in February 2002, Austria
in November 2002, Hungary and Turkey in September 2003, Japan in
November 2003.
BSI-DSZ-CC-0242-2004 Certification Report
A-3
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform
procedure, a uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product TCOS Tachograph Card Version 1.0 has undergone the
certification procedure at BSI.
The evaluation of the product TCOS Tachograph Card Version 1.0 was
conducted by TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH (ITSEF)6
. TÜV
Informationstechnik GmbH is an evaluation facility recognised by BSI.
The sponsor and vendor and distributor is T-Systems International GmbH,
Service Line SI, T-Telesec.
The certification is concluded with
• the comparability check and
• the production of this Certification Report.
This work was completed by the BSI on 18 May 2004.
The confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
• all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as
given in the following report, are observed,
• the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in
the following report.
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product indicated
here. The validity can be extended to new versions and releases of the product,
provided the sponsor applies for re-certification of the modified product, in
accordance with the procedural requirements, and the evaluation does not
reveal any security deficiencies.
For the meaning of the assurance levels and the confirmed strength of
functions, please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at the end of the
Certification Report.
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0242-2004
A-4
4 Publication
The following Certification Results contain pages B-1 to B-26.
The product TCOS Tachograph Card Version 1.0 has been included in the BSI
list of the certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet:
http:// www.bsi.bund.de). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline
0228/9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the vendor7
of
the product. The Certification Report can also be downloaded from the above-
mentioned website.
7
T-Systems International GmbH, Service Line SI, T- Telesec,
Untere Industriestr. 20, 57250 Netphen
BSI-DSZ-CC-0242-2004 Certification Report
B-1
B Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
• the security target of the sponsor for the target of evaluation,
• the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
• complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0242-2004
B-2
Contents of the certification results
1 Executive Summary 3
2 Identification of the TOE 14
3 Security Policy 15
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 15
5 Architectural Information 16
6 Documentation 17
7 IT Product Testing 17
8 Evaluated Configuration 19
9 Results of the Evaluation 19
10 Comments/Recommendations 21
11 Annexes 22
12 Security Target 22
13 Definitions 22
14 Bibliography 25
BSI-DSZ-CC-0242-2004 Certification Report
B-3
1 Executive Summary
Target of Evaluation (TOE) and subject of the Security Target (ST) [6] and [7] is
the smart card product “TCOS Tachograph Card Version 1.0”.
The TOE will be used within the Tachograph System as a security medium
which carries a specific Tachograph Application intended for its use with the
recording equipment.
The basic functions of the Tachograph Card are:
• to store card identification and card holder identification data. These data
are used by the vehicle unit to identify the cardholder, provide
accordingly functions and data access rights, and ensure cardholder
accountability for his activities,
• to store cardholder activities data, events and faults data and control
activities data, related to the cardholder.
A Tachograph Card is therefore intended to be used by a card interface device
of a vehicle unit. It may also be used by any card reader (e.g. of a personal
computer) which shall have full read access right on any user data. During the
end-usage phase of a Tachograph Card life cycle (phase 7 of life-cycle as
described), vehicle units only may write user data to the card. A Tachograph
Card is either of the type Driver Card or Control Card or Workshop Card or
Company Card as outlined in the ST [7], chapter 2.1.
The TOE comprises the following components:
• Integrated Circuit (IC) "Infineon Smart Card Controller SLE66CX322P
m1484 b14" provided by Infineon Technologies AG
• Smartcard Embedded Software provided by T-Systems International
GmbH, Service Line SI, T-Telesec.
The smart card embedded software consists of a native operating system
based on TCOS V3.0 with additional Tachograph Application commands and
the Tachograph Card’s file system. The configuration of the Tachograph Card to
be performed in a secure environment concerns the following points:
• Completion of the operating system and tachograph application code
• Loading of the Tachograph Card’s specific file system for either a
complete Driver Card, Control Card, Workshop Card or Company Card
• Loading of the security keys to protect delivery and for authentication
prior to personalisation
The TOE is developed and constructed in full accordance with the Tachograph
Card Specification [8], Annex 1B main body, Appendix 2, Appendix 10 (Tacho-
graph Card Generic Security Target) and Appendix 11. In particular, this implies
the conformance of the Tachograph Card with the following standards: ISO/IEC
7810 Identification cards – Physical characteristics, ISO/IEC 7816 Identification
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0242-2004
B-4
cards - Integrated circuits with contacts: part 1, part 2, part 3, part 4 and part 8;
ISO/IEC 10373 Identification cards – Test methods.
In order to achieve the required system security, the Tachograph Card and the
corresponding ST [6] and [7] meet all the security requirements and evaluation
conditions defined in the Tachograph Card’s “Generic Security Target” in [8],
Appendix 10 under consideration of the interpretations in [9].
The life-cycle of the TOE conforms to the smart card life cycle described in
Appendix 10 of [8] referring to PP/9911 [13]. The following table outlines the life-
cycle as applied for the TOE:
Phase Description
Phase 1 Smart Card Embedded
Software Development
The Smart Card Embedded Software Developer (T-
Systems International GmbH - T- Telesec, Siegen) is in
charge of the Smart Card Embedded Software (Basic
Software, Application Software) development and the
specification of IC initialisation and pre-personalisation re-
quirements.
Phase 2 IC Development The IC Designer (Infineon Technologies AG
8
) designs the
IC, develops IC Dedicated Software, provides information,
software or tools to the Smart Card Embedded Software
Developer, and receives the Smart Card Embedded
Software (only ROM code) from the developer through
trusted delivery and verification procedures.
The IC Designer constructs the smart card IC database,
necessary for the IC photo mask fabrication.
Phase 3 IC Manufacturing and
Testing
The IC Manufacturer (Infineon Technologies AG
9
)
generates the masks for the IC manufacturing based upon
an output from the smart card IC database.
He is responsible for producing the IC through two main
steps: IC manufacturing and IC testing.
Phase 4 IC Packaging and
Testing
The IC Packaging Manufacturer (Infineon Technologies
AG
10
) is responsible for the IC packaging (production of
modules) and testing.
Phase 5 Smart Card Product
Finishing Process
The Smart Card Product Manufacturer is responsible for
embedding the modules into a plastic card.
Phase
6.1
Smart Card
Initialisation
The initialisation of the TOE (in form of initialisation of the
embedded modules) and its testing is done by (T-Systems
International GmbH – T-Telesec Trust Center, Siegen). In
this phase the TOE becomes either the type Driver Card or
Control Card or Workshop Card or Company Card.
(Note: The initialisation phase is indicated in PP/9911 as
part of phase 5)
8
for evaluated development sites see [18]
9
for evaluated manufacturing site see [18]
10
for evaluated packaging site see [18]
BSI-DSZ-CC-0242-2004 Certification Report
B-5
Phase Description
Delivery of the TOE The TOE is delivered from the initialisation organisation to
the customer which is the personalisation organisation in
form of a complete (initialised) smart card.
Phase
6.2
Smart Card
Personalisation
The Personaliser is responsible for the smart card
personalisation and final tests to be done in a secure
environment. (Note: The personalisation phase is indicated
as phase 6 in PP/9911)
Phase 7 Smart Card
End-usage
The Smart Card Issuer is responsible for the smart card
product delivery to the smart card end-user, and the end of
life process.
Table 1: Life cycle of the TOE
The evaluation of the TOE was conducted as a composition evaluation making
use of the platform evaluation r
esults of the CC evaluation of the underlying
semiconductor "Infineon Smart Card Controller SLE66CX322P m1484b14"
provided by Infineon Technologies AG [18] updated by an actual re-
assessment, which had been successfully carried out by TÜV
Informationstechnik GmbH. The RSA2048 cryptographic library as part of [18]
was not used by the embedded software developer.
The IC was evaluated according to Common Criteria EAL 5 augmented with a
minimum strength level for its security functions of SOF-high for specific
functionality based on the Protection Profile BSI-PP-0002 [12] and as outlined in
[18]. These platform evaluation was performed by TÜV Informationstechnik
GmbH.
The Embedded Software of the “TCOS Tachograph Card Version 1.0” and the
overall composition was evaluated by TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH, too.
The concept for composition as outlined in CC Supporting Document [4, AIS 36]
was used.
The evaluation was completed on 7 May 2004. TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH
is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)11
recognised by BSI. The sponsor, vendor and
distributor of the Tachograph Card Version 1.0 is T-Systems International
GmbH, Service Line SI, T-Telesec.
1.1 Assurance package
The TOE security assurance requirements are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in part 3 of the Common Criteria (see Part C or [1], part 3
for details).
11
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0242-2004
B-6
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of assurance level EAL4+
(Evaluation Assurance Level4 augmented). The following table shows the
augmented assurance components.
Requirement Identifier
EAL4 TOE evaluation: Methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
+: ADO_IGS.2 Delivery and operation - Generation log
+: ADV_IMP.2 Development - Implementation of the TSF
+ ALC_DVS.2 Life cycle support - Sufficiency of security measures
+: ATE_DPT.2 Tests - Testing: low-level design
+ AVA_MSU.3 Vulnerability assessment – Analysis and testing for insecure states
+: AVA_VLA.4 Vulnerability assessment – Highly resistant
Table 2: Assurance components and EAL-augmentation
The level of assurance and the augmentations (ADO_IGS.2, ADV_IMP.2,
ATE_DPT.2 and AVA_VLA.4) are chosen in order to allow the confirmation of
equivalence to ITSEC [10] E3 high as required by Appendix 10 of Annex 1B of
Regulation (EC) no. 1360/2002 [8] and outlined in JIL Security Evaluation and
Certification of Digital Tachographs [9]. ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_MSU.3 are
augmented in addition for PP conformance.
1.2 Functionality
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) and TOE Security Functions
are based on Appendix 10 of Annex 1B of Regulation (EC) no. 1360/2002 [8]
specified in the document JIL Security Evaluation and Certification of Digital
Tachographs [9].
The TOE Security Functional Requirements selected in the Security Target are
Common Criteria Part 2 extended as shown in the following tables.
Security Functional
Requirement
Identifier
Source from PP or
added in ST-IC
FCS Cryptographic support
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation ST-IC [19]
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation ST-IC [19]
FDP User data protection
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control ST-IC [19]
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control ST-IC [19]
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control PP [12]
FDP_ITT.1 Basic internal transfer protection PP [12]
BSI-DSZ-CC-0242-2004 Certification Report
B-7
Security Functional
Requirement
Identifier
Source from PP or
added in ST-IC
FMT Security Management
FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes ST-IC [19]
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation ST-IC [19]
FPT Protection of the TOE Security Functions
FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state PP [12]
FPT_ITT.1 Basic internal TSF data transfer protection PP [12]
FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack PP [12]
FPT_SEP.1 TSF domain separation PP [12]
FRU Resource utilisation
FRU_FLT.2 Limited fault tolerance PP [12]
Table 3: Security Functional Requirements for the IC part of the TOE (see [18] and [19] for BSI-
DSZ-CC-0223-2003) taken from CC Part 2
Security Functional
Requirement
Identifier
Source from PP or
added in ST-IC
FAU Security Audit
FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage PP [12] /ST-IC [19]
12
FCS Cryptographic support
FCS_RND.1 Quality metric for random numbers PP [12] / ST-IC [19]
FMT Security management
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities PP [12]
FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability PP [12]
FPT Protection of the TOE Security Functions
FPT_TST.2 Subset TOE testing ST-IC [19]
Table 4: Security Functional Requirements for the IC part of the TOE (see [18] and [19] for BSI-
DSZ-CC-0223-2003) CC part 2 extended
Security Functional
Requirement
13
Identifier Source from PP or
added in ST
FAU Security audit
FAU_SAA.1 Potential violation analysis [9] and PP [13]
FCO Communication
FCO_NRO.1 Selective Proof of origin ST [7] and [9]
FCS Cryptographic support
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic Key Generation ST [7] and [9]
12
PP/ST-IC: component is described in the PP but operations are performed in the ST.
13
The indicator +n after a component name indicates a specific iteration of the component
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0242-2004
B-8
Security Functional
Requirement
13
Identifier Source from PP or
added in ST
FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic Key Distribution ST [7] and [9]
FCS_CKM.3 Cryptographic Key Access [9] and PP [13]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic Key Destruction [9] and PP [13]
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation (Triple-DES and
RSA)
[9] and PP [13]
FDP User data protection
FDP_ACC.2 Complete access control [9] and PP [13]
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control [9] and PP [13]
FDP_DAU.1 Basic data authentication [9] and PP [13]
FDP_ETC.1 Export of user data without security attributes [9] and PP [13]
FDP_ETC.2 Export of user data with security attributes ST [7] and [9]
FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes [9] and PP [13]
FDP_RIP.1 Subset residual information protection [9] and PP [13]
FDP_SDI.2 Stored data integrity monitoring and action [9] and PP [13]
FIA Identification and authentication
FIA_AFL.1-1 Authentication failure handling [9] and PP [13]
FIA_AFL.1 WS-Card Authentication failure handling (of workshop
card)
ST [7] and [9]
FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition [9] and PP [13]
FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication [9] and PP [13]
FIA_UAU.3 Unforgeable authentication [9] and PP [13]
FIA_UAU.4 Single-use authentication mechanisms [9] and PP [13]
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification [9] and PP [13]
FIA_USB.1 User-subject binding [9] and PP [13]
FMT Security management
FMT_MOF.1 Management of security functions behaviour [9] and PP [13]
FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes [9] and PP [13]
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes [9] and PP [13]
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation [9] and PP [13]
FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF data [9] and PP [13]
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions ST [7]
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles [9] and PP [13]
FPR Privacy
FPR_UNO.1 Unobservability [9] and PP [13]
FPT Protection of the TSF
BSI-DSZ-CC-0242-2004 Certification Report
B-9
Security Functional
Requirement
13
Identifier Source from PP or
added in ST
FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state [9] and PP [13]
FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack [9] and PP [13]
FPT_SEP.1 TSF domain separation [9] and PP [13]
FPT_TDC.1 Inter-TSF basic TSF data consistency [9] and PP [13]
FPT_TST.1 TSF testing [9] and PP [13]
FTP Trusted path/channels
FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel ST [7] and [9]
Table 5: Security Functional Requirements for the Embedded SW part of the TOE
taken from CC Part 2
Note: Only the titles of the Security Functional Requirements are provided. For
more details please refer to the Security Target [7] and [19] and PP [12] and
[13].
These Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functions:
TOE Security Functions
(IC part)
Description
SF1-IC Operating state checking
SF2-IC Phase management with test mode lock-out
SF3-IC Protection against snooping
SF4-IC Data encryption and data disguising
SF5-IC Random number generation
SF6-IC TSF self test
SF7-IC Notification of physical attack
SF8-IC Memory Management Unit (MMU)
SF9-IC Cryptographic support
Table 6: TOE Security Functions for the IC part of the TOE
(see [18] and [19] for BSI-DSZ-CC-0223-2003)
TOE Security Functions
(SW part)
Description
SF1-SW Authentication based on PIN verification and retry
counter
SF2-SW Identification & Authentication based on Challenge-
Response
SF3-SW Data exchange under secure messaging
SF4-SW Data exchange with digital signature
SF5-SW Access Control of stored data objects
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0242-2004
B-10
TOE Security Functions
(SW part)
Description
SF6-SW Accuracy and Audit
SF7-SW Reliability
Table 7: TOE Security Functions of the Embedded SW part of the TOE
Note: Only the titles of the TOE Security Functions are provided. For more
details please refer to the Security Target [7] and [19].
All TOE Security Functions are applicable from TOE delivery to phase 7 of the
smart card life cycle model.
1.3 Strength of Function
The TOE‘s strength of functions is rated ‘high’ (SOF-high) for the following
functions:
- SF1-SW (Authentication based on PIN verification and retry counter)
- SF2-SW (Identification & authentication based on Challenge-Response)
- SF3-SW (Data exchange under secure messaging)
- SF4-SW (Data exchange with digital signature)
For SOF ratings of IC part of the TOE please refer to the certification report [18].
The rating of the strength of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms
suitable for encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2).
1.4 Summary of threats and Organisational Security Policies (OSPs)
addressed by the evaluated IT product
The threats are subdivided into three groups affecting the IC, the general, or the
Tachograph Card specific Embedded Software:
Name Definition
T.Leak-Inherent Inherent Information Leakage
T.Phys-Probing Physical Probing
T.Malfunction Malfunction due to Environmental Stress
T.Phys-Manipulation Physical Manipulation
T.Leak-Forced Forced Information Leakage
T.Abuse-Func Abuse of Functionality
T.RND Deficiency of Random Numbers
Table 8: Threats of IC part of the TOE (see [19] and [12])
Name Definition
Threats on all Phases
T.CLON Cloning of the TOE
BSI-DSZ-CC-0242-2004 Certification Report
B-11
Name Definition
Threats on Phase 1
T.DIS_INFO Disclosure of IC Assets
T.DIS_DEL Disclosure of the Smart Card Embedded Software / Application
Data during Delivery
T.DIS_ES1 Disclosure of the Smart Card Embedded Software / Application
Data within the Development Environment
T.DIS_TEST_ES Disclosure of Smart Card Embedded Software Test Programs /
Information
T.T_DEL Theft of the Smart Card Embedded Software / Application Data
during delivery
T.T_TOOLS Theft or unauthorised use of the Smart Card Embedded Software
Development Tools
T.T_SAMPLE2 Theft or Unauthorised Use of TOE Samples
T_MOD_DEL Modification of the Smart Card Embedded Software / Application
Data during Delivery
T.MOD Modification of the Smart Card Embedded Software / Application
Data within the Development Environment
Threats on Delivery from
Phase 1 to Phases 4 / 5 / 6
T.DIS_DEL1 Disclosure of Application Data during Delivery
T.DIS_DEL2 Disclosure of Delivered Application Data
T.MOD_DEL1 Modification of Application Data during Delivery
T.MOD_DEL2 Modification of Delivered Application Data
Threats on Phases 4 to 7
T.DIS_ES2 Disclosure of the Smart Card Embedded Software / Application
Data
T.T_ES Theft or Unauthorised Use of TOE
T.T_CMD Use of TOE Command-Set
T.MOD_LOAD Program Loading
T.MOD_EXE Program Execution
T.MOD_SHARE Modification of Program Behaviour
T.MOD_SOFT Modification of Smart Card Embedded Software / Application
Data
Table 9: Threats of the TOE-ES parts of the TOE taken from PP/9911 [13]
Name Definition
T.Ident_Data Modification of Identification Data
T.Activity_Data Modification of Activity Data
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0242-2004
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Name Definition
T.Data_exchange Modification of Activity Data during Data Transfer
Table 10: Threats of the TOE-ES (Tachograph Card Specific Threats)
Note: Only the titles of the threats are provided. For more details please refer to
the Security Target [7] and [19] and PP [12] and [13].
1.5 Special configuration requirements
The TOE is delivered at the initialisation process (see above) in form of
complete cards, i.e. after the initialisation process of the TOE has been
successfully finished, final tests have been successfully conducted and the card
production has been fulfilled.
A Tachograph Card may be of the following types: Driver Card, Control Card,
Workshop Card or Company Card as defined in [8] depending on the specific
data structure loaded into the card.
The personalisation of the Tachograph Card requires a preceding
authentication of the external world (personalisation unit). At the end of the
personalisation process, the card is switched to the end-user operational phase.
There are no special security measures for the start-up of the TOE besides the
requirement that the TOE has to be used under the well-defined operating con-
ditions and that the requirements on the personalisation and usage have to be
applied as described in the user documentation [15], [16] and [17].
1.6 Assumptions about the operating environment
The TOE is intended to be used within the Tachograph System as a security
medium which carries a specific Tachograph Application intended for its use
with the recording equipment as specified in [8].
The following general assumptions are made based on the PP/9911 [13] and
PP/9806 [14] referenced in Appendix 10 of Annex 1B of Regulation (EC) no.
1360/2002 [8] (Generic Security Target). As the TOE is delivered at the end of
phase 6.1, the assumptions up to phase 6.1 are covered by this evaluation.
Therefore the following assumptions taken from PP/9911 are relevant after
delivery of the TOE and are to be covered by the operational environment:
Name Definition
Assumptions on the TOE Delivery
Process (for Phases 6 to 7)
A.DLV_PROTECT Protection of the TOE under Delivery and Storage
A.DLV_AUDIT Audit of Delivery and Storage
A.DLV_RESP Responsibility within Delivery
Assumptions on Phases 6
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Name Definition
A.USE_TEST Testing of the TOE
A.USE_PROD Protection of the TOE under Testing and Manufacturing
Assumptions on Phase 7
A.USE_DIAG Secure Communication
Table 11: General assumptions for the TOE
The security target [7] specifically mentions the assumption A.Process-Card
taken from ST-IC [19] and A.Personalisation relevant for phase 6.2.
With A.Personalisation an assumption on secure generation and handling of
personalisation data is made because the establishment of a secure environ-
ment for the personalisation process with adequate personnel, organisational
and technical security measures is in the responsibility of the personalisation
centre itself. This assumptions contains also the three assumptions
A.DLV_PROTECT*, A.DLV_AUDIT* and A.DLV_RESP* during phase 6.2.
The assumption A.Process-Card (Protection during Packaging, Finishing and
Personalisation) applies for the phases 6.2 up to delivery to the end-user to
maintain confidentiality and integrity of the TOE.
1.7 Disclaimers
The Certification Results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the
Certificate and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in
this Certification Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product
by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation
that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT
product by BSI or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
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2 Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
TCOS Tachograph Card Version 1.0
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Date Form of Delivery
1 HW /
SW
Tachograph Smart Card
Consisting of:
1.0 Initialised and
tested smart cards
- Infineon Smart Card
Controller SLE66CX322P
m1484 b14 with production
line indicator: “2” (Dresden)
including IC Dedicated STS
Self Test Software and RMS
Resource Management
System software
See [18]
SW implemented
in ROM of the IC
- Embedded Software,
Version 1.0 (Native
operating system and
Tachograph Application with
Application Data depending
on card type)
TCOSV30
R1
SW implemented
in ROM and
EEPROM of the IC
2 DOC Administrator manual
TCOS Tachograph Card [15]
V1.02 13. April 2004 Document in
paper / electronic
form
3 DOC User Manual
TCOS Tachograph Card [16]
V1.0 22. March 2004 Document in
paper / electronic
form
4 SW Logfiles for personalisation
proceedure [17]
14. April 2004 Delivered together
with [15]
5 Keys Keys for verification of the
TOE and for personalisation
(transport code,
personalisation key)
Customer
specific
in electronic
format
Table 12: Deliverables of the TOE
To ensure that the customer receives this evaluated version, the procedures to
start the personalisation process as described in the administrator manual [15]
[15] have to be followed.
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3 Security Policy
The TOE will be employed within the Tachograph System as a security medium
which carries a specific Tachograph Application intended for its use with the
recording equipment.
The TOE is the composition of the IC, IC Dedicated Software and Smart Card
Embedded Software. The security policy is to provide:
• protection against leakage of information (e.g. to ensure the confidential-
ity of cryptographic keys during cryptographic functions performed by the
TOE), against physical probing, against malfunctions, against physical
manipulations, against access for code and data memory and against
abuse of functionality
• secure storage of user data and TSF data
• access control to user data and TSF data according to the specified rules
• secure communication to the vehicle unit of the Tachograph System
as specified in Appendix 10 of Annex 1B of Regulation (EC) no. 1360/2002 [8].
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The TOE is intended to be used within the Tachograph System as a security
medium which carries a specific Tachograph Application intended for its use
with the recording equipment as specified in [8].
General assumptions are made based on the PP/9911 [13] and PP/9806 [14]
referenced in Appendix 10 of Annex 1B of Regulation (EC) no. 1360/2002 [8]
(Generic Security Target). These general assumptions are structured according
to the phases of the life cycle. Some of these assumptions are related to proce-
dures in phases 1 to 6.1. These phases were part of the TOE evaluation. As
delivery of the TOE is defined at the end of phase 6.1 of the life cycle. (see
table 1), the phases 6.2 and 7 are the usage phases of the TOE. Procedures
related to assumptions on these phases and the additional assumptions
A.Process-Card taken from ST-IC [19] and A.Personalisation relevant for phase
6.2 are outlined in the user documentation.
For further assumptions on the card holder of the workshop card and on the
Certification Authorities (CA) including the Root-CA see chapter 10 of this part
of the report.
There do not exist more Tachograph Card specific assumptions as the definition
of the card type is done before the TOE personalisation in phase 6.2 before
delivery.
The TOE is the TCOS Tachograph Card Version 1.0 providing security
functions as required in Appendix 10 of Annex 1B of Regulation (EC) no.
1360/2002 [8] (Generic Security Target). Threats on the overall Tachograph
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0242-2004
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System which are not related to the Tachograph Smart Cards were not
addressed by this product evaluation.
5 Architectural Information
The TOE is a product. It is composed from an Integrated Circuit (IC) with its
proprietary IC Dedicated Software and a Smart Card Embedded Software (ES),
consisting of a native operating system and application software and data
structures. The four different card types are distinguished as they contain
specific data structures and data.
The embedded software is composed of the following main components:
The kernel is responsible for the communication between the different
components of the ES. It checks memory areas, provides resources and
controls the overall operation.
The administration component provides administrative functions of the ES as
functionality for generation and deletion of files and directories and for reading
and writing of files. It provides the ES with capabilities for finding and selection
of files and for modification of object attributes. Furthermore, it controls access
rules on objects within the file system.
A cryptographic component provides the cryptographic functionality used by the
ES. It controls access to keys and passwords
The IO-component is responsible for the communication with the external world
via the IO-Interface of the card. It handles the protocols T=0 and T=1 and
checks APDUs on syntactical conformance.
The ROM TCOS Tachograph-Type Task contains the Tachograph specific parts
of the ES. It analyses APDUs and calls the required kernel functions.
For information on the IC part of the TOE please refer to [18] and [19].
As all parts of TOE software are running inside the IC, the external interface of
the TOE to its environment can be defined as the external interface of this IC.
The external interface is divided into a physical / electrical interface and a
logical interface.
The physical / electrical interface of the IC are the pads to connect the lines
supply voltage, reset input, clock input, ground and I/O. An external voltage and
timing supply as well as a data interface are necessary for the operation of the
IC. Beyond the physical behaviour, the data interface is defined by the Smart
Card Embedded Software (ES). A user would use the physical interface via the
Chip card contacts. The electrical and physical characteristics fulfilled are given
in the Tachograph Cards Specification [8]. The location and dimensions of the
Chip card contacts comply with the ISO/IEC 7816-2. The electronic signals, the
working of the card as well as the power consumption are in accordance with
ISO/IEC 7816.
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The logical interface consists of two parts: (i) everything below the command
level and (ii) the accessing of the Tachograph Cards by commands via the
command interface. Commands and protocols of the Tachograph Application
for phase 7 are fully described in the Tachograph Cards Specification [8].
Specific commands for the personalisation phase (phase 6.2) are described in
the Administrator Manual [15].
The TOE Summary Specification (chapter 6 of the ST [7]) describes the TOE
Security Functions with relation to the IC and the Embedded Software.
6 Documentation
The user of the TOE is
(i) the developer of a vehicle unit who needs information how the TOE
interacts with the vehicle unit
(ii) the personaliser of the Tachograph Cards who needs information about
security procedures and how the TOE supports the personalisation
process
(iii) the issuer of the Tachograph Cards who needs information how to use
the 4 different card types after personalisation, information on specific
aspects of the issuance of the Tachograph Cards and information to be
passed to the end-user of the Tachograph Cards (card-holder, e.g. the
driver).
For these three types of users the guidance documentation is provided (see
[15], [16] and [17]). Information for the issuer is provided within the administrator
manual and has to be forwarded to the issuer by the personaliser.
7 IT Product Testing
Tests of the TOE were done (i) with real cards using a card reader and a PC
and (ii) in an simulation test environment using an emulator for specific cases.
Source code analysis supported specific test scenarios.
For those tests, where real cards are used, the specified method was used to
identify the Tachograph Card version and the correct card configuration for
every test. The real cards used for testing were either in initialised state (i. e.
ready for personalisation) or in operational state (i. e. personalisation com-
pleted). Using specific commands, the life cycle state of the ES and the type of
the card could be determined.
For identification of the correct versions of the electronic data used for tests in
the emulator test environment, and to determine whether the initial condition of
each test is satisfied, the methods of the evaluated Configuration Management
System were used. The version control mechanism can guarantee that the
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design files and the initial data used for testing are those provided by the
developers for the specific version of the TOE under evaluation.
As specific subsystems are the same in all card types and others are different,
some tests had to be performed on all four card types, others could be re-used.
Tests after modifications of the TOE during the evaluation process were re-
done as necessary depending on the specific change.
Functional tests of the developer:
The developer tests were performed on all four card types. The developer has
performed the functional tests of the TOE in phase 7 and covered all security
functions of the TOE including their sub-functions. The test cases were
implemented based on the functional specification to verify conformance of the
TOE with the expected behaviour. The tests were performed by using
Tachograph smart cards and in specific cases a simulation environment.
Initialisation (phase 6.1) and personalisation tests (phase 6.2) were performed
by using the specified commands for administration. In addition, tests according
to Appendix 9 of the EU Tachograph Card Commission Regulation [8] have
been performed. In this course all tests on ATR, the protocols T=0 and T=1, the
PPS command for switching from T=0 to T=1, the card structure and of the
functionality was performed (see Annex A of this report). The analysis on test
coverage and test depth showed that the TOE was tested on the level of
functional specification, high level design and low level design. All test results
were documented in log-files. All tests were performed correctly.
Independent functional evaluator tests:
The evaluator has selected a subset of functional tests on security functions. All
security functions were covered by these tests. Expected behaviour as well as
error conditions was tested. The evaluator selected a subset of the developer
tests for re-testing. This subset covered all security functions and were
performed on chip cards or using the simulation environment. In addition,
personalisation tests were repeated on all four card types. The subset of tests
and the re-testing of developer tests showed that the TOE operates as
specified.
Penetration testing
Based on the independent vulnerability analysis penetration tests were
performed by the evaluator. These tests covered the life cycle phases,
information on operational use of the security functions, random number
generation, non-existing APDUs, composite TOE aspects and current
consumption of the card. Side channel attacks on DES (SPA, DPA and Timing
attacks) were tested and analysed during the evaluation of BSI-DSZ-CC-0223-
2003. The result of these analysis was re-assessed and is still valid. It showed
that secret keys could not be extracted. Side channel attacks on RSA (SPA,
DPA and Timing attacks) were tested by the developer and supplemented by
the evaluator. It showed that secret keys could not be extracted. Any identified
potential vulnerability was assessed for its exploitability. As a result, the TOE
operated as specified during the independent penetration testing. The identified
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potential vulnerabilities are not exploitable in the intended operational
environment of the TOE.
8 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is delivered at the end of phase 6.1 in form of initialised and tested
complete cards (see table 1). A Tachograph Card may be of the following types:
Driver Card, Control Card, Workshop Card or Company Card depending on the
specific data structures and data loaded into the card. These four different card
types are considered as different configurations of the TOE.
All procedures for personalisation and configuration for the end-user necessary
after delivery are described in the administrator manual [15].
9 Results of the Evaluation
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [11] was provided by the ITSEF TÜV
Informationstechnik GmbH according to the Common Criteria [1], the
Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all interpretations and
guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
As the evaluation of the TOE was conducted as a composition evaluation, the
ETR [11] includes also the evaluation results of the composite evaluation activi-
ties in accordance with CC Supporting Document, ETR-lite for Composition:
Annex A Composite smart card evaluation [4, AIS 36].
The ETR [11] builds up on the ETR-lite for Composition document of the
evaluation of the underlying Infineon Smart Card Controller SLE66CX322P
m1484 b14. These ETR-lite for Composition document was provided by the
ITSEF TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH according to CC Supporting Document,
ETR-lite for Composition ([4, AIS 36]). In the course of this composite
evaluation the ETR for the Infineon Smart Card Controller SLE66CX322P
m1484 b14 as certified in 2003 (see [18]) was updated and the evaluation
results were confirmed.
The evaluation methodology CEM [2] was used for those components identical
with EAL4. For components beyond EAL4 the methodology was defined in co-
ordination with the Certification Body. For smart card specific methodology the
scheme interpretations AIS 25, AIS 26 and AIS 36 (see [4]) were used. For
specific methodology on random number generator evaluation the scheme
interpretations AIS 20 (see [4]) was used.
The assurance refinements outlined in the Security Target were followed in the
course of the evaluation of the TOE.
The verdicts for the CC, Part 3 assurance components (according to EAL4
augmented and the class ASE for the Security Target evaluation) are summa-
rised in the following table.
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Assurance classes and components Verdict
Security Target evaluation CC Class ASE PASS
TOE description ASE_DES.1 PASS
Security environment ASE_ENV.1 PASS
ST introduction ASE_INT.1 PASS
Security objectives ASE_OBJ.1 PASS
PP claims ASE_PPC.1 PASS
IT security requirements ASE_REQ.1 PASS
Explicitly stated IT security requirements ASE_SRE.1 PASS
TOE summary specification ASE_TSS.1 PASS
Configuration management CC Class ACM PASS
Partial CM automation ACM_AUT.1 PASS
Generation support and acceptance procedures ACM_CAP.4 PASS
Problem tracking CM coverage ACM_SCP.2 PASS
Delivery and operation CC Class ADO PASS
Detection of modification ADO_DEL.2 PASS
Generation log ADO_IGS.2 PASS
Development CC Class ADV PASS
Fully defined external interfaces ADV_FSP.2 PASS
Security enforcing high-level design ADV_HLD.2 PASS
Implementation of the TSF ADV_IMP.2 PASS
Descriptive low-level design ADV_LLD.1 PASS
Informal correspondence demonstration ADV_RCR.1 PASS
Informal TOE security policy model ADV_SPM.1 PASS
Guidance documents CC Class AGD PASS
Administrator guidance AGD_ADM.1 PASS
User guidance AGD_USR.1 PASS
Life cycle support CC Class ALC PASS
Sufficiency of security measures ALC_DVS.2 PASS
Developer defined life-cycle model ALC_LCD.1 PASS
Well-defined development tools ALC_TAT.1 PASS
Tests CC Class ATE PASS
Analysis of coverage ATE_COV.2 PASS
Testing: low-level design ATE_DPT.2 PASS
Functional testing ATE_FUN.1 PASS
Independent testing - sample ATE_IND.2 PASS
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Assurance classes and components Verdict
Vulnerability assessment CC Class AVA PASS
Analysis and testing for insecure states AVA_MSU.3 PASS
Strength of TOE security function evaluation AVA_SOF.1 PASS
Highly resistant AVA_VLA.4 PASS
Table 13: Verdicts for the assurance components
The evaluation has shown that:
• the Security Functional Requirements specified for the TOE are Common
Criteria Part 2 extended
• the TOE provides the functionality according to Appendix 10 of Annex 1B
of Regulation (EC) no. 1360/2002 [8] and stated more precisely in the
document JIL Security Evaluation and Certification of Digital
Tachographs [9]
• the assurance of the TOE is Common Criteria Part 3 conformant, EAL4
augmented by ADO_IGS.2, ADV_IMP.2, ALC_DVS.2, ATE_DPT.2,
AVA_MSU.3 and AVA_VLA.4
• the assurance of the TOE is equivalent to ITSEC [10] E3 high as required
by Appendix 10 of Annex 1B of Regulation (EC) no. 1360/2002 [8]
• the TOE fulfils the claimed strength of function SOF-high for the functions
as outlined in chapter 1.3. Therefore the scheme interpretations AIS 20,
and AIS 26 (see [4]) were used. The rating of the strength of functions
does not include the cryptoalgorithms suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2).
• The TOE is conformant to PP/9911 [13] and BSI-PP-0002-2001 [12].
• specific tests required by Appendix 9 of the EU Tachograph Card
Commission Regulation [8] are fulfilled (see Annex A of this report).
The underlying hardware had been successfully reassessed by TÜV
Informationstechnik GmbH.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TCOS Tachograph Card
Version 1.0. The validity can be extended to new versions and releases of the
product, provided the sponsor applies for re-certification of the modified product,
in accordance with the procedural requirements, and the evaluation of the
modified product does not reveal any security deficiencies.
10 Comments/Recommendations
The guidance documentation (refer to chapter 6) contains necessary
information about the secure usage of the TOE. Additionally, for secure usage
of the TOE the fulfilment of the assumptions about the environment in the
Security Target [7] and the Security Target as a whole has to be taken into
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account. Therefore a user/administrator has to follow the guidance in these
documents. (see also chapter 1.6 and chapter 4 of this part of the report).
Resulting from the evaluation the following assumptions are of relevance for the
operation of the TOE:
• The user of a workshop card has to convince himself before using his
PIN authentication code, that no manipulation was performed on tapping
the transmission line between the workshop card and the card accepting
device (vehicle unit).
• The certification authorities (CA) and the Root-CA acting within the
Tachograph PKI-system have to ensure, that omitting a validity check
based on the validity date for a certificate issued by them, does not affect
the security of the Tachograph-PKI.
11 Annexes
Annex A: Functional Tests according to Appendix 9 of Annex I (B) of Council
Regulation (EEC) No. 1360/2002
Annex B: Evaluation results regarding the development and production
environment.
For these annexes please refer to part D of this report.
12 Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [7] of the Target of Evaluation
(TOE) is provided within a separate document. It is a sanitised version (by
editorial changes only) of the complete Security Target [6] used for the
evaluation performed.
13 Definitions
13.1 Acronyms
APDU Application Protocol Data Unit
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik /
Federal Office for Information Security
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation
DES Data Encryption Standard; symmetric block cipher algorithm
DFA Differential Fault Analysis
DOC Document
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DPA Differential Power Analysis
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
EEPROM Electronically Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory
ES Embedded Software
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
IC Integrated Circuit
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
JIL Joint Interpretation Library
MMU Memory Management Unit
OS Operating System
PIN Personal Identification Number
PP Protection Profile
PW Password
RAM Random Access Memory
RNG Random Number Generator
ROM Read Only Memory
RSA Rivest-Shamir-Adleman Algorithm
SF Security Function
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SOF Strength of Function
SPA Simple Power Analysis
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
Triple-DES Symmetric block cipher algorithm based on the DES
TSC TSF Scope of Control
TSF TOE Security Functions
TSP TOE Security Policy
TSS TOE Summary Specification
VU Vehicle Unit
13.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more assurance component(s) from CC
Part 3 to an EAL or assurance package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not
contained in part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the
CC.
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Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics
based on well-established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - An entity within the TSC that contains or receives information and
upon which subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent set of security require-
ments for a category of TOEs that meet specific consumer needs.
Security Function - A part or parts of the TOE that have to be relied upon for
enforcing a closely related subset of the rules from the TSP.
Security Target - A set of security requirements and specifications to be used
as the basis for evaluation of an identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined
semantics.
Strength of Function - A qualification of a TOE security function expressing
the minimum efforts assumed necessary to defeat its expected security
behaviour by directly attacking its underlying security mechanisms.
SOF-basic - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against casual breach of TOE
security by attackers possessing a low attack potential.
SOF-medium - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows
that the function provides adequate protection against straightforward or
intentional breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a moderate attack
potential.
SOF-high - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against deliberately planned or
organised breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a high attack
potential.
Subject - An entity within the TSC that causes operations to be performed.
Target of Evaluation - An IT product or system and its associated
administrator and user guidance documentation that is the subject of an
evaluation.
TOE Security Functions - A set consisting of all hardware, software, and
firmware of the TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the
TSP.
TOE Security Policy - A set of rules that regulate how assets are managed,
protected and distributed within a TOE.
TSF Scope of Control - The set of interactions that can occur with or within a
TOE and are subject to the rules of the TSP.
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14 Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 2.1, August 1999
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
(CEM), Part 1, Version 0.6; Part 2: Evaluation Methodology, Version 1.0,
August 1999
[3] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125, Version 5.1, January
1998)
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS), e.g.
AIS 20: Functionality classes and evaluation methodology for
deterministic random number generators AIS 20, Version 1, 2
December,1999
AIS 25 for: CC-Supporting Document: The application of CC to
Integrated Circuits, Version 2, July 2002
AIS 26 for: CC-Supporting Document: Application of Attack Potential to
Smartcards, Version 2, August 2002
AIS 32: Use of the international approved CC Final Interpretations into
the German Certification Scheme
AIS 35 for: CC-Supporting Document: ST-lite, Version 1.1, July 2002
AIS 36 for: CC-Supporting Documents: ETR-lite for Composition, Version
1.1, July 2002 and
ETR-lite for composition: Annex A Composite smartcard evaluation:
Recommended best practice, Version 1.2, March 2002
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148, BSI 7149), periodically
updated list published also on the BSI Web-site
[6] Security Target, BSI-DSZ-0242-2004, Version 1.00, 7. May 2004, T-
Systems International GmbH, T-Telesec (confidential)
[7] Security Target, BSI-DSZ-0242-2004, Version 1.00, 7. May 2004, T-
Systems International GmbH, T-Telesec (public version, only editoriel
changes from [6])
[8] Annex 1B of Commission Regulation (EC) No.1360/2002 on recording
equipment in road transport: Requirements for Construction, Testing,
Installation and Inspection (in: Official Journal of the European
Communities, L 207 / 1 ff.), 05.08.2002, Commission of the European
Communities
Appendix 2 of Annex I (B) of Council Regulation (EEC) No. 1360/2002 –
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0242-2004
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Tachograph Cards Specification
Appendix 7 of Annex I (B) of Council Regulation (EEC) No. 1360/2002 -
Data downloading protocols
Appendix 9 of Annex I (B) of Council Regulation (EEC) No. 1360/2002 –
Type Approval – List of Minimum Required Tests
Appendix 10 of Annex I (B) of Council Regulation (EEC) No. 1360/2002 -
Generic Security Targets
Appendix 11 of Annex I (B) of Council Regulation (EEC) No. 1360/2002 -
Common Security Mechanisms
[9] Joint Interpretation Library (JIL) - Security Evaluation and Certification of
Digital Tachographs, Version 1.12, June 2003, JIL Working Group (BSI,
CESG, DCSSI, NLNCSA)
[10] Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria (ITSEC), CEC,
Version 1.2, June 1991.
[11] Technischer Evaluierungsbericht (ETR), CC Evaluierung der TCOS
Tachograph Karte, 07. May 2004, Version 2, TÜV Informationstechnik
GmbH (confidential document)
[12] Smart Card IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, July 2001,
registered at the German Certification Body under number BSI-PP-0002-
2001
[13] Smart Card Integrated Circuit With Embedded Software Protection
Profile - version 2.0 - issue June 99. Registered at French certification
body under the number PP/9911.
[14] Smart Card Integrated Circuit Protection Profile - version 2.0 - issue
September 1998. Registered at French certification body under the
number PP/9806.
[15] Administratorhandbuch TCOS Tachograph Card, Version 1.02, T-
Systems International GmbH, T-Telesec, 13. April 2004
[16] Benutzerhandbuch TCOS Tachograph Card, Version 1.0, T-Systems
International GmbH, T-Telesec, 22. March 2004
[17] Logiles zu einem beispielhaften Personalisierungsablauf, T-Systems
International GmbH, T-Telesec, 14. April 2004
[18] Certification Report, BSI-DSZ-CC-0223-2003 for Infineon Smart Card IC
(Security Controller) SLE66CX322P with RSA 2048 / m1484a24,
m1484a27 and m1484b14 from Infineon Technologies AG, 7 October
2003, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
[19] Infineon Technologies AG, Security and Chipcard ICs, SLE66CX322P
with RSA 2048 / m1484a23, Security Target, Version 1.0.5, 06 May 2002
BSI-DSZ-CC-0242-2004 Certification Report
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C Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part 1:
Caveats on evaluation results (chapter 5.4) / Final Interpretation 008
The conformance result indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is
met by a TOE or PP that passes its evaluation. This conformance result is presented
with respect to Part 2 (functional requirements), Part 3 (assurance requirements) and, if
applicable, to a pre-defined set of requirements (e.g., EAL, Protection Profile).
The conformance result consists of one of the following:
Part 2 conformant - A PP or TOE is Part 2 conformant if the functional requirements
are based only upon functional components in Part 2
Part 2 extended - A PP or TOE is Part 2 extended if the functional requirements
include functional components not in Part 2
plus one of the following:
Part 3 conformant - A PP or TOE is Part 3 conformant if the assurance requirements
are based only upon assurance components in Part 3
Part 3 extended - A PP or TOE is Part 3 extended if the assurance requirements
include assurance requirements not in Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance result may include a statement made with respect to sets
of defined requirements, in which case it consists of one of the following:
Package name Conformant - A PP or TOE is conformant to a pre-defined named
functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements (functions or
assurance) include all components in the packages listed as part of the conformance
result.
Package name Augmented - A PP or TOE is an augmentation of a pre-defined
named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements (functions
or assurance) are a proper superset of all components in the packages listed as part of
the conformance result.
Finally, the conformance result may also include a statement made with respect to
Protection Profiles, in which case it includes the following:
PP Conformant - A TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.
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CC Part 3:
Assurance categorisation (chapter 2.5)
„The assurance classes, families, and the abbreviation for each family are shown in
Table 2.1.
Assurance Class Assurance Family Abbreviated Name
Class ACM:
Configuration
management
CM automation ACM_AUT
CM capabilities ACM_CAP
CM scope ACM_SCP
Class ADO: Delivery
and operation
Delivery ADO_DEL
Installation, generation and start-up ADO_IGS
Class ADV:
Development
Functional specification ADV_FSP
High-level design ADV_HLD
Implementation representation ADV_IMP
TSF internals ADV_INT
Low-level design ADV_LLD
Representation correspondence ADV_RCR
Security policy modeling ADV_SPM
Class AGD: Guidance
documents
Administrator guidance AGD_ADM
User guidance AGD_USR
Class ALC: Life cycle
support
Development security ALC_DVS
Flaw remediation ALC_FLR
Life cycle definition ALC_LCD
Tools and techniques ALC_TAT
Class ATE: Tests Coverage ATE_COV
Depth ATE_DPT
Functional tests ATE_FUN
Independent testing ATE_IND
Class AVA:
Vulnerability
assessment
Covert channel analysis AVA_CCA
Misuse AVA_MSU
Strength of TOE security functions AVA_SOF
Vulnerability analysis AVA_VLA
Table 2.1 -Assurance family breakdown and mapping“
BSI-DSZ-CC-0242-2004 Certification Report
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Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 6)
„The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances
the level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of
assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE
at the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the
operational use of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from Part 3 are included in
the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable
assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be
considered for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide
utility.
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 6.1)
Table 6.1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically
ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the
resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.
As outlined in the next section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance
levels are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically
ordered inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The
increase in assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a
hierarchically higher assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e.
increasing rigour, scope, and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components
from other assurance families (i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as
described in chapter 2 of this Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than
one component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every
component are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of
assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation“ allows the addition of assurance
components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the
substitution of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance
component in the same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs
defined in the CC, only EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a
constituent assurance component“ is not recognised by the CC as a valid claim.
Augmentation carries with it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility
and added value of the added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be
extended with explicitly stated assurance requirements.
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0242-2004
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Assurance
Class
Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1 EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6 EAL7
Configuration
management
ACM_AUT 1 1 2 2
ACM_CAP 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ACM_SCP 1 2 3 3 3
Delivery and
operation
ADO_DEL 1 1 2 2 2 3
ADO_IGS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Development ADV_FSP 1 1 1 2 3 3 4
ADV_HLD 1 2 2 3 4 5
ADV_IMP 1 2 3 3
ADV_INT 1 2 3
ADV_LLD 1 1 2 2
ADV_RCR 1 1 1 1 2 2 3
ADV_SPM 1 3 3 3
Guidance
documents
AGD_ADM 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_USR 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
support
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 2 2 3
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 2 2 3
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_CCA 1 2 2
AVA_MSU 1 2 2 3 3
AVA_SOF 1 1 1 1 1 1
AVA_VLA 1 1 2 3 4 4
Table 6.1 - Evaluation assurance level summary“
BSI-DSZ-CC-0242-2004 Certification Report
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Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 6.2.1)
„Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the
threats to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent
assurance is required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with
respect to the protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including
independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance
documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could be successfully
conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner
consistent with its documentation, and that it provides useful protection against
identified threats.“
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 6.2.2)
„Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design
information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the
developer than is consistent with good commercial practice. As such it should not
require a substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require
a low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready
availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when
securing legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.“
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked
(chapter 6.2.3)
„Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound
development practices.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation
of the TOE and its development without substantial re-engineering.“
Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and
reviewed (chapter 6.2.4)
„Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security
engineering based on good commercial development practices which, though rigorous,
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0242-2004
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do not require substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the
highest level at which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing
product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require
a moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity
TOEs and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.“
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested
(chapter 6.2.5)
„Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering
based upon rigorous commercial development practices supported by moderate
application of specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be
designed and developed with the intent of achieving EAL5 assurance. It is likely that
the additional costs attributable to the EAL5 requirements, relative to rigorous
development without the application of specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require
a high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a
rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to
specialist security engineering techniques.“
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and
tested (chapter 6.2.6)
„Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security
engineering techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a
premium TOE for protecting high value assets against significant risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in
high risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional
costs.“
Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 6.2.7)
„Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely
high risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs.
Practical application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security
functionality that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.“
BSI-DSZ-CC-0242-2004 Certification Report
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Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF) (chapter 14.3)
AVA_SOF Strength of TOE security functions
„Objectives
Even if a TOE security function cannot be bypassed, deactivated, or corrupted, it may
still be possible to defeat it because there is a vulnerability in the concept of its
underlying security mechanisms. For those functions a qualification of their security
behaviour can be made using the results of a quantitative or statistical analysis of the
security behaviour of these mechanisms and the effort required to overcome them. The
qualification is made in the form of a strength of TOE security function claim.“
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA) (chapter 14.4)
AVA_VLA Vulnerability analysis
„Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether vulnerabilities identified,
during the evaluation of the construction and anticipated operation of the TOE or by
other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses), could allow users to violate the TSP.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that a user will be able to discover flaws
that will allow unauthorised access to resources (e.g. data), allow the ability to interfere
with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.“
„Application notes
A vulnerability analysis is performed by the developer in order to ascertain the
presence of security vulnerabilities, and should consider at least the contents of all the
TOE deliverables including the ST for the targeted evaluation assurance level. The
developer is required to document the disposition of identified vulnerabilities to allow
the evaluator to make use of that information if it is found useful as a support for the
evaluator's independent vulnerability analysis.“
„Independent vulnerability analysis goes beyond the vulnerabilities identified by the
developer. The main intent of the evaluator analysis is to determine that the TOE is
resistant to penetration attacks performed by an attacker possessing a low (for
AVA_VLA.2), moderate (for AVA_VLA.3) or high (for AVA_VLA.4) attack potential.“
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0242-2004 Certification Report
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D Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Functional Tests according to Appendix 9 of Annex I (B)
of Council Regulation (EEC) No. 1360/2002 D-3
Annex B: Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment D-5
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0242-2004
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0242-2004 Certification Report
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Annex A of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0242-2004:
Functional Tests according to Appendix 9 of Annex I (B) of
Council Regulation (EEC) No. 1360/2002
In addition to the ordinary tasks of the Common Criteria evaluation at level
EAL4+ (equivalent to ITSEC E3 high), functional tests according to Appendix 9
of the EU Tachograph Card Commission Regulation [8] have been performed.
The following list shows the results of these tests:
N
o
Test Description Related
requirements
Result
1 Administrative examination
1.1 Docu-
menta-
tion
Correctness of documentation - Confirmed
4 Protocol tests The evaluators have
assured themselves in
detail of the fact that the
functional tests have
been performed
successfully.
4.1 ATR Check that the ATR is
compliant.
ISO/IEC 7816-3
TCS 304, 307, 308
Confirmed
4.2 T=0 Check that T=0 protocol is
compliant.
ISO/IEC 7816-3
TCS 302, 303, 305
Confirmed
4.3 PTS Check that the PTS command
is compliant by setting T=1
from T=0.
ISO/IEC 7816-3
TCS 309 to 311
Confirmed
4.4 T=1 Check that T=1 protocol is
compliant.
ISO/IEC 7816-3
TCS 303, / 306
Confirmed
5 Card Structure
5.1 Test that the file structure of
the card is compliant by
checking the presence of the
mandatory files in the card
and their Access Conditions.
TCS 312
TCS 400*, 401,
402, 403*, 404,
405*, 406, 407,
408*, 409, 410*,
411, 412, 413*,
414, 415*, 416,
417, 418*, 419
Confirmed
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0242-2004
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N
o
Test Description Related
requirements
Result
6 Functional tests
6.1 Normal
Pro-
cessing
Test at least once each
allowed usage of each
command
(ex: test the UPDATE
BINARY command with CLA
= '00', CLA = '0C' and with
different P1,P2 and Lc
parameters).
Check that the operations
have actually been performed
in the card (ex: by reading the
file the command has been
performed on).
Confirmed
6.2 Error
Messa-
ges
Test at least once each error
message (as specified in
Appendix 2) for each
command.
Test at least once every
generic error (except ‘6400’
integrity errors checked during
security certification).
TCS 313
to
TCS 379
Confirmed
BSI-DSZ-CC-0242-2004 Certification Report
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Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0242-2004
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product, TCOS Tachograph Card Version 1.0 (Target of Evaluation, TOE) has
been evaluated at an accredited and licensed/ approved evaluation facility using the
Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Part 1 Version 0.6, Part 2
Version 1.0, extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL4
and smart card specific guidance, for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT
Security Evaluation, Version 2.1 (ISO/IEC15408: 1999) and including final
interpretations for compliance with Common Criteria Version 2.2 and Common
Methodology Part 2, Version 2.2.
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 18 May 2004, the following results regarding
the development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria assurance
requirements
• ACM – Configuration management (i.e. ACM_AUT.1, ACM_CAP.4, ACM_SCP.2),
• ADO – Delivery and operation (i.e. ADO_DEL.2, ADO_IGS.2) and
• ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.1),
are fulfilled for the development and production sites of the TOE listed below ((a) – (b)):
(a) T-Systems International GmbH, T-Telesec, Untere Industriestr. 20, 57250 Netphen
(embedded software development)
(b) T-Systems International GmbH, T-Telesec Trust Center, 57076 Siegen
(card initialisation site)
For development and productions sites regarding the Infineon Smart Card Controller
SLE66CX322P m1484 b14 refer to the certification report BSI-DSZ-CC-0223-2003.
For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in
accordance with the Security Target BSI-DSZ-0242-2004, Version 1.00, 7. May 2004,
T-Systems International GmbH, T-Telesec [7]. The evaluators verified, that the threats,
policies and security objective for the life cycle phases 1 to 6.1 up to delivery at the end
of phase 6.1 as stated in the TOE Security Target [7] are fulfilled by the procedures of
these sites.