Taiwan eID Applet CC
PACE with CAM, AA and CA
Configuration
Public Security Target
2 | 92
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3 | 92
DOCUMENT MANAGEMENT
Business Unit – Department CI – R&D
Document type FQR
Document Title Taiwan eID Applet CC PACE with CAM, CA and AA Configuration –
Public Security Target
FQR No 110 8499
FQR Issue 1
CONTRIBUTORS
Name Role Author Reviewer Approver
MESTIRI, Sarra Security Manager Yes
YAP Abraham Project Leader
4 | 92
DOCUMENT REVISION
Date Revision Modification Modified by
2018/02/08 1.0 Creation MESTIRI Sarra
5 | 92
TABLE OF CONTENT
1. INTRODUCTION...................................................................................................11
1.1. Security Target Reference .................................................................................... 11
1.2. TOE Reference .................................................................................................... 11
1.3. TOE Identification................................................................................................ 12
1.3.1. TOE Identification ......................................................................................... 12
1.3.2. Platform Identification................................................................................... 12
1.3.3. Configuration of the platform......................................................................... 13
1.4. Reference documents.......................................................................................... 14
1.5. Definitions.......................................................................................................... 17
1.6. Technical Terms Definition................................................................................... 17
2. TARGET OF EVALUATION .....................................................................................22
2.1. TOE Overview ..................................................................................................... 22
2.1.1. TOE Usage and major security features............................................................ 23
2.2. TOE Definition..................................................................................................... 26
2.3. TOE Architecture................................................................................................. 26
2.3.1. Integrated Circuit.......................................................................................... 26
2.3.2. JavaCard Platform ......................................................................................... 26
2.3.3. Application Functionalities ............................................................................. 27
2.3.3.1. Active Authentication (AA) ......................................................................................... 27
2.3.3.2. Basic Access Control (BAC).......................................................................................... 27
2.3.3.3. Terminal Authentication............................................................................................. 28
2.3.3.4. Chip Authentication ................................................................................................... 28
2.3.3.5. Password Authenticated Connection Establishment (PACE) .......................................... 28
2.3.3.6. Extended Access Control (EAC) ................................................................................... 29
2.3.3.7. PACE-CAM................................................................................................................. 30
2.3.3.8. Match On-Card (MOC) Verification.............................................................................. 30
2.3.3.9. PIN ........................................................................................................................... 30
2.3.3.10.SharedPIN ................................................................................................................. 30
2.3.3.11.Watermarking ........................................................................................................... 30
2.3.3.12.Secure Messaging ...................................................................................................... 31
2.3.3.13.OT Cryptographic library ............................................................................................ 31
2.3.3.14.Additional applications............................................................................................... 31
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2.3.4. Mechanism included in the scope of the evaluation.......................................... 31
2.4. Reference ........................................................................................................... 31
3. TOE LIFE CYCLE....................................................................................................33
3.1. TOE Life Cycle Overview....................................................................................... 33
3.2. TOE Life Cycle when the Application code is romed................................................ 34
3.3. Phase 1 “Development”....................................................................................... 34
3.4. Phase 2 “Manufacturing”..................................................................................... 34
3.5. Phase 3 “Personalization of the travel document”.................................................. 35
3.5.1. Loading of application ................................................................................... 35
3.5.2. Applet pre-personalisation (phase 6)............................................................... 35
3.5.3. TOE personalisation (phase 6) ........................................................................ 35
3.6. Phase 4 “Operational Use”................................................................................... 36
3.7. TOE Life Cycle when the Application code is loaded in E2prom................................ 36
4. CONFORMANCE CLAIM........................................................................................38
4.1. Conformance claim.............................................................................................. 38
4.2. Protection Profile claims ...................................................................................... 38
4.1. Life Cycle Conformance........................................................................................ 38
4.2. Protection Profile Additions ................................................................................. 38
4.2.1. SFR dispatch versus PP................................................................................... 39
4.2.2. Overview of the SFR defined in this ST............................................................. 39
4.2.3. Complete overview of the SFR........................................................................ 40
4.2.4. Overview of the additional protocols............................................................... 42
4.2.4.1. Chip Authentication ................................................................................................... 42
4.2.4.2. Active Authentication................................................................................................. 42
4.2.4.3. Prepersonalization phase ........................................................................................... 43
4.2.4.4. Additional functions ...................................................................................... 43
4.2.5. Rationale for the additions............................................................................. 43
4.2.5.1. OE for CA rationale .................................................................................................... 43
4.2.5.2. OE for AA rationale .................................................................................................... 43
4.2.5.3. Assumption for AA rationale....................................................................................... 43
4.2.5.4. Assumption for CA rationale....................................................................................... 43
4.3. Non evaluated features ....................................................................................... 43
5. SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION ..........................................................................45
5.1. Subjects.............................................................................................................. 45
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5.1.1. PP PACE ....................................................................................................... 45
5.1.2. Additional Subjects........................................................................................ 46
5.2. Assets................................................................................................................. 46
5.2.1. User data ..................................................................................................... 46
5.2.2. TSF data....................................................................................................... 48
5.3. Threats............................................................................................................... 49
5.3.1. PP PACE ....................................................................................................... 49
5.3.2. CA ............................................................................................................... 51
5.3.3. AA............................................................................................................... 51
5.3.4. Additional threat........................................................................................... 52
5.4. Organisational Security Policies............................................................................ 52
5.4.1. PP PACE ....................................................................................................... 52
5.4.2. CA ............................................................................................................... 53
5.4.3. AA............................................................................................................... 53
5.5. Assumptions....................................................................................................... 53
5.5.1. PP PACE ....................................................................................................... 53
5.5.2. Assumptions for Chip Authentication .............................................................. 54
5.5.3. Assumptions for Active Authentication............................................................ 54
6. SECURITY OBJECTIVES..........................................................................................55
6.1. Security Objectives for the TOE............................................................................. 55
6.1.1. SO from PP PACE........................................................................................... 55
6.1.2. SO for CA ..................................................................................................... 56
6.1.3. SO for AA ..................................................................................................... 57
6.1.4. SO for additions ............................................................................................ 57
6.2. Security objectives for the Operational Environment.............................................. 57
6.2.1. PP PACE ....................................................................................................... 57
6.2.2. OE for CA ..................................................................................................... 58
6.2.3. OE for AA ..................................................................................................... 59
7. EXTENDED REQUIREMENTS..................................................................................60
7.1. Extended family FAU_SAS - Audit data storage ...................................................... 60
7.1.1. Extended components FAU_SAS.1 .................................................................. 60
7.2. Extended family FCS_RND - Generation of random numbers................................... 60
7.2.1. Extended component FCS_RND.1.................................................................... 60
7.3. Extended family FIA_API – Authentication proof of identity.................................... 60
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7.3.1. Extended component FIA_API.1...................................................................... 60
7.4. Extended family FMT_LIM - Limited capabilities and availability ............................. 60
7.4.1. Extended component FMT_LIM.1 ................................................................... 60
7.4.2. Extended component FMT_LIM.2 ................................................................... 61
7.5. Extended family FPT_EMS - TOE Emanation........................................................... 61
7.5.1. Extended component FPT_EMS.1.................................................................... 61
8. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS ...................................................................................62
8.1. Security Functional Requirements......................................................................... 62
8.1.1. Global SFR.................................................................................................... 62
8.1.2. Product configuration SFR.............................................................................. 63
8.1.3. Active Authentication SFR.............................................................................. 68
8.1.4. Chip Authentication SFR................................................................................. 70
8.1.5. PACE SFR...................................................................................................... 74
8.1.6. PACE CAM SFR.............................................................................................. 79
8.1.7. Additional SFR .............................................................................................. 80
8.2. Security Assurance Requirements......................................................................... 80
8.2.1. Rationale for augmentation............................................................................ 80
8.2.1.1. ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures ................................................................ 80
8.2.1.2. AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis............................................... 81
9. TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION............................................................................82
9.1. TOE Summary Specification.................................................................................. 82
9.2. Link between the SFR and the TSF......................................................................... 84
10. TOE RATIONALES SECURITY OBJECTIVES RATIONALE .............................................91
11. ANNEX B: COMPOSITION WITH THE UNDERLYING JAVACARD OPEN PLATFORM......92
9 | 92
LIST OF FIGURES
Table 1: TOE REFERENCES ............................................................................................................................... 12
Table 2: AID Taiwan eID Applet CC Security Target PACE Configuration ........................................................ 12
Table 3: Platform Identification....................................................................................................................... 13
Table 4: Technical Terms Definition ................................................................................................................ 21
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LIST OF TABLES
Table 1: TOE REFERENCES ............................................................................................................................... 12
Table 2: AID Taiwan eID Applet CC Security Target PACE Configuration ........................................................ 12
Table 3: Platform Identification....................................................................................................................... 13
Table 4: Technical Terms Definition ................................................................................................................ 21
Table 5: 4 Configurations of the Taiwan eID Applet CC application................................................................ 23
Table 6: BAC Configuration.............................................................................................................................. 28
Table 7: PACE Configuration............................................................................................................................ 29
Table 8: TOE Guidance REFERENCES ............................................................................................................... 32
Table 9: Roles Identification on the life cycle.................................................................................................. 34
Table 10: Subjects identification following life cycle steps............................................................................. 34
Table 11: Required inputs for each case ......................................................................................................... 37
Table 12: Conformance Rationale ................................................................................................................... 38
Table 13: Additional subjects........................................................................................................................ 38
Table 14: PPs SFR............................................................................................................................................. 39
Table 15: SFR from the PP ............................................................................................................................... 40
Table 16: Additional SFR.................................................................................................................................. 40
Table 17: Global SFR overview ........................................................................................................................ 40
Table 18: MP SFR overview ............................................................................................................................. 41
Table 19: Additional SFR for the Active Authentication................................................................................. 41
Table 20: CA SFR overview .............................................................................................................................. 41
Table 21: PACE SFR overview .......................................................................................................................... 42
Table 22: SFR for TWN_DG2 overview ............................................................................................................ 42
Table 23: Subjects and phases......................................................................................................................... 45
Table 24: User data stored on the TOE ........................................................................................................... 47
Table 25: Accessibility to the TOE functions and data only for authorised subjects ...................................... 48
Table 26: Genuineness of the TOE .................................................................................................................. 48
Table 27: TOE internal secret cryptographic keys........................................................................................... 48
Table 28: TOE internal non-secret cryptographic material ............................................................................. 49
Table 29: Travel Document communication establishment authorisation data............................................. 49
Table 30: Link between SFR from the PP0068v2 and TSF ............................................................................... 85
Table 31: Link between SFR for AA and TSF.................................................................................................... 86
Table 32: Link between SFR for CA and TSF .................................................................................................... 87
Table 33: Link between Additional SFR for MP and TSF.................................................................................. 88
Table 34: Link between Additional SFR for PACE_CAM and TSF..................................................................... 89
Table 35: Link between Additional SFR and TSF.............................................................................................. 90
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1. INTRODUCTION
This Security Target Lite aims to satisfy the requirements of Common Criteria level EAL5+, augmented
with AVA_VAN.5 and ALC_DVS.2 in defining the security enforcing functions of the Target Of Evaluation
and describing the environment in which it operates.
The basis for this composite evaluation is the composite evaluation of Open Platforms COSMOV8.1-N
- Platform and configurable JavaCard application, Taiwan eID Applet CC.
The Taiwan eID Applet CC can have different configurations, the present ST considers the configuration:
 PACE
 AA
 CAM
 A specific TAIWAN ADF is added, its DG2 is protected by PACE and PIN
The Taiwan eID Applet CC application code is loaded on the E2Prom of the platform at
prepersonalisation or personalisation phase.
The applet works on 2 platforms:
The first is ID-One Cosmo v8.1-N - Standard Platform’, embeds the PIV 2.4 Application in ROM.
The second platform, ‘ID-One Cosmo v8.1-N Large Platform’ embeds the applications PIV 2.4 and IAS
ECC V2 Applications in ROM. A new version of the ID-One Cosmo v8.1-N Large platform (ID-One
Cosmo v8.1-N R2 Large) also embeds the Taiwan eID Applet CC application in ROM.
The 2 platforms have the same interfaces and covered by a unique security target [54].
All additional applications, romed or loaded in E2prom at pre perso or perso phase are out of the scope
of the present evaluation, for example PIV2, IAS ECC V2.
1.1. Security Target Reference
The Security target is identified as follows:
Title: Security Target POLLUX
Name: Taiwan eID Applet CC Security Target PACE CAM CA
AA
Oberthur Technologies registration: FQR 110 8395 Issue 3
Authors: Oberthur Technologies
ST Lite reference: FQR 110 8499 Issue 1
Publication Date for the Public ST-Lite: January 2018
1.2. TOE Reference
Product name:
Taiwan eID Applet CC on ID-One
Cosmo v8.1-N
Taiwan eID Applet CC on ID-One
Cosmo v8.1-N R2
Commercial name of the
TOE 1:
Taiwan eID Applet CC: PACE
configuration with CAM, AA and
Not applicable
12 | 92
CA on ID-One Cosmo v8.1-N -
Standard Platform
Commercial name of the
TOE 2:
Taiwan eID Applet CC: PACE
configuration with CAM, AA and
CA on ID-One Cosmo v8.1-N
Large Platform
Taiwan eID Applet CC: PACE
configuration with CAM, AA and
CA on ID-One Cosmo v8.1-N R2
Large Platform
Memory E2PROM ROM
Application
Reference Code
202842 202842
Communication protocol Contact, Contactless and Dual Contact, Contactless and Dual
ST Cosmo v8.1-N
reference
ERATO Security Target FQR
110 7986
ERATO Security Target FQR
110 7986
Table 1: TOE REFERENCES
1.3. TOE Identification
The aim of the paragraphs is to allow the user to identify uniquely the TOE.
The TOE is composed of application [Taiwan eID Applet CC Security Target PACE] and a COSMO v8-
1n platform on the IC.
1.3.1.TOE Identification
This chapter presents the means to identify the evaluated application and the Platform.
The [Taiwan eID Applet CC Security Target PACE] installation command shall use the executable load
File AID and module AID.
Name Value
Executable Load File (ELF)
AID
A000000077010000071000000000000F
Executable Module AID A000000077010000071000010000000F
Application AID A00000024710FF
Table 2: AID Taiwan eID Applet CC Security Target PACE Configuration
1.3.2.Platform Identification
In order to assure the authenticity of the card, the product identification shall be verified by analysing:.
TOE Name
ID-One Cosmo v8.1-N -
Standard LDS Platform
ID-One Cosmo v8.1-N
Large Platform
ID-One Cosmo v8.1-N R2
Large Platform
Mask /
Hardware
Identificatio
n
083621 084021 084022
Label PVCS
code
COSMO_V81N_LDS_ST
ANDARD_PLATFORM_R
10
COSMO_V81N_LARGE_
PLATFORM_R10
COSMO_V81N_LARGE_
PLATFORM_R2
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IC reference
version
NXP P60D081 NXP P60D145 NXP P60D145
IC ST
identificatio
n
NXP Secure Smart Card
Controller P6021y VB
Security Target Lite
Rev. 1.51
BSI-DSZ-CC-0955-V2-
2016
NXP Secure Smart Card
Controller P6022y VB
Security Target Lite
Rev. 1.52
BSI-DSZ-CC-0973-V2-
2016
NXP Secure Smart Card
Controller P6022y VB
Security Target Lite
Rev. 1.52
BSI-DSZ-CC-0973-V2-
2016
IC EAL
EAL5 with
augmentations:
AVA_VAN.5,
ALC_DVS.2, ASE_TSS.2
EAL5 with
augmentations:
AVA_VAN.5,
ALC_DVS.2, ASE_TSS.2
EAL5 with
augmentations:
AVA_VAN.5,
ALC_DVS.2, ASE_TSS.2
IC
certificate
BSI-DSZ-CC-0955-V2-
2016
BSI-DSZ-CC-0973-V2-
2016
BSI-DSZ-CC-0973-V2-
2016
Date of IC
certification
11 October 2016 11 October 2016 11 October 2016
Reference
of the
Cosmo
Platform
certificate
ANSSI-CC-017/48 ANSSI-CC-2017/49 ANSSI-CC-2017/49-M01
Table 3: Platform Identification
The evaluated platform allows the loading of patch. The patch reference is specified in the platform ST
for ID-One Cosmo v8.1-N and the associated platform certificate. The ID-One Cosmo v8.1-N R2 doesn’t
include any patch.
1.3.3.Configuration of the platform
In the present evaluation, the loading of application (Java Card Applets) on the platform at use phase is
allowed. It can be forbidden if requested by the product issuer.
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1.4. Reference documents
[1] Common Criteria for information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1: Introduction and
general model", September 2012, Version 3.1 revision 4.
[2] Common Criteria for information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2: Security
Functional requirements", September 2012, Version 3.1 revision 4.
[3] Common Criteria for information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3: Security
Assurance requirements", September 2012, Version 3.1 revision 4.
[4] Composite product evaluation for Smart Cards and similar devices”, September 2007,
Version 1.0, CCDB-2007-09-001.
[5] JIL - Certification of "open" smart card products - Version 1.1 - 4 February 2013
[6] Joint Interpretation Library - Composite product evaluation- for Smart Cards and similar
devices – v1.2
[7] GlobalPlatform Card Specification – Version 2.2.1 – January 2011.
[8] GlobalPlatform Card Mapping Guidelines of existing GP v2.1.1 implementations on v2.2.1
– Version 1.0.1 – January 2011.
[9] GlobalPlatform Card Confidential Card Content Management – Card Specification v 2.2 –
Amendment A – Version 1.0.1 – January 2011.
[10] Global Platform Card Technology, Secure Channel Protocol 03, Card - Specification v 2.2
- Amendment D- Version 1.1 - September 2009.
[11] Identification cards - Integrated Circuit(s) Cards with contacts, Part 6: Inter industry data
elements for interchange", ISO / IEC 7816-6 (2004).
[12] FIPS PUB 46-3 “Data Encryption Standard”, October 25, 1999, National Institute of
Standards and Technology
[13] FIPS PUB 81 “DES Modes of Operation”, December, 1980, National Institute of Standards
and Technology
[14] FIPS PUB 140-2 “Security requirements for cryptographic modules”, May 2001, National
Institute of Standards and Technology
[15] FIPS PUB 180-3 “Secure Hash Standard”, October 2008 , National Institute of Standards
and Technology
[16] FIPS PUB 186-3 “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, June 2009, National Institute of
Standards and Technology
[17] FIPS PUB 197, “The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)”, November 26, 2001,
National Institute of Standards and Technology
[18] SP800_90 “Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic
Random Bit Generators (Revised)”, March 2007, National Institute of Standards and
Technology
[19] NIST Special Publication 800-38B, Recommendation for Block, Cipher Modes of
Operation: The CMAC Mode for Authentication, Morris Dworkin, May 2005
[20] CEN/EN14890:2013 Application Interface for smart cards used as Secure Signature
Creation
[21] ANSI X9.31 “Digital Signatures using Reversible Public Key Cryptography for the
Financial Services Industry (rDSA)”, 1998, American National Standards Institute
[22] ISO/IEC 9796-1, Public Key Cryptography using RSA for the financial services industry",
annex A, section A.4 and A.5, and annex C (1995)
[23] ISO/IEC 9797-1, “Information technology — Security techniques — Message
Authentication Codes (MACs) — Part 1: Mechanisms using a block cipher”, 1999,
15 | 92
International Organization for Standardization
[24] ISO/IEC 9796-2:2002 - Information technology - Security techniques - Digital signature
schemes giving message recovery - Part 2: Mechanisms using a hash-function
[25] ISO/IEC 15946-1. Information technology – Security techniques – Cryptographic
techniques based on elliptic curves – Part 1: General, 2002
[26] ISO/IEC 15946-2. Information technology – Security techniques – Cryptographic
techniques based on elliptic curves – Part 2: Digital signatures, 2002
[27] ISO/IEC 15946: Information technology — Security techniques — Cryptographic
techniques based on elliptic curves — Part 3: Key establishment, 2002
[28] PKCS #3: Diffie-Hellman Key-Agreement Standard, An RSA Laboratories Technical Note,
Version 1.4 Revised November 1, 1993
[29] FIPS Publication 180-2 Secure Hash Standard (+ Change Notice to include SHA-224),
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE/National Institute of Standards and Technology,
2002 August 1
[30] AMERICAN NATIONAL STANDARD X9.62-1998: Public Key Cryptography For The
Financial Services Industry (rDSA), 9 septembre 1998
[31] PKCS#1 The public Key Cryptography standards, RSA Data Security Inc. 1993
[32] IEEE Std 1363a-2004, “Standard Specification of Public Key Cryptography – Amendment
1: Additional techniques”, 2004, IEEE Computer Society.
[33] Référentiel Général de Sécurité version 2.0 – Annexe B1 – Mécanismes cryptographiques
– Règles et recommandations concernant le choix et le dimensionnement des
mécanismes cryptographiques, Version 2.03 du 21 février 2014
[34] AIS 31 - Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema, AIS31:
Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren, Version 1, 25.09.2001, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik
[35] European Card for e-Services and national e-ID Applications - IAS ECC v1.0.1
[36] ISO/IEC 7816-4:2013, Identification Cards — Integrated circuit cards— Part 4 :
Organization, security and commands for interchange
[37] ISO/IEC 9797-1:2011, Information technology — Security techniques — Message
Authentication Codes (MACs) — Part 1: Mechanisms using a block cipher
[38] ISO 11568-2:2012, Financial services - Key management (retail) - Part 2 : symmetric
ciphers, their key management and life cycle
[39] Technical Guideline TR-03111- Elliptic Curve Cryptography Version 2.0
[40] Référentiel général de sécurité, version 2.0 du 21 février 2014 - Annexe B1 - Mécanismes
cryptographiques
[41] ISO/IEC 11770-2. Information Technology – Security techniques – Key management –
part 2: Mechanisms using symmetric techniques, 1996
[42] Machine Readable Travel Documents Technical Report, PKI for Machine Readable Travel
Documents Offering ICC Read-Only Access, Version - 1.1, Date - October 01, 2004,
published by authority of the secretary general, International Civil Aviation Organization
[43] ‘ICAO Doc 9303’, Machine Readable Travel Documents, Seventh Edition, 2015 – Security
Mechanisms for MRTDs
[44] Development of a logical data structure – LDS for optional capacity expansion
technologies Machine Readable Travel Documents Technical Report, Development of a
Logical Data Structure – LDS, For Optional Capacity Expansion Technologies, Revision –
1.7, published by authority of the secretary general, International Civil Aviation
16 | 92
Organization, LDS 1.7, 2004-05-18
[45] Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine readable travel documents – Extended
Access control (EAC) – TR03110 – v1.11
[46] Annex to Section III Security Standards for Machine Readable Travel Documents
Excerpts from ICAO Doc 9303, Part 1 - Machine Readable Passports, Fifth Edition – 2003
[47] BAC- Machine readable travel documents with “ICAO Application”, Basic Access control –
BSI-PP-0055 v1.10 25th march 2009
[48] EAC- Machine readable travel documents with “ICAO Application”, Extended Access
control – BSI-PP-0056 v1.10 25th march 2009
[49] EAC With PACE- Machine readable travel documents with “ICAO Application”, Extended
Access Control with PACE (EAC PP) – BSI-PP-0056 V2 – 2012
[50] MRTD with PACE – PP-0068v2
[51] E-passport: adaptation and interpretation of e-passport Protection Profiles,
SGDN/DCSSI/SDR, ref. 10.0.1, February 2007
[52] Embedded Software for Smart Security Devices, Basic and Extended Configurations,
ANSSi-CC-PP-2009/02, 1/12/2009
[53] Technical Report, Supplemental Access Control for Machine Readable Travel Documents
– version v1.01
[54] ERATO Security Target FQR 110 7986, Oberthur Technologies, 2016
[55] ID-One Cosmo V8.1-n, Application Loading Protection Guidance, FQR: 110 8001, Issue 1,
Oberthur Technologies, 2016
[56] ID-One Cosmo V8.1, Applet Security Recommendations, FQR: 110 7999, Issue 3,
Oberthur Technologies, 2016
[57] ID-One Cosmo V8.1, Pre-Perso Guide, FQR: 110 7743, Issue 4, Oberthur Technologies,
2017
[58] ID-One Cosmo V8.1, Reference Guide, FQR 110 7744, Issue 4, Oberthur Technologies,
2017
[59] LDS EAC JAVA Applet SOFTWARE REQUIREMENTS SPECIFICATIONS –Oberthur
Technologies,11-AA 2015
[60] FQR 220 1038 Ed4 – POLLUX Personalization Manual,
[61] FQR 220 1039 Ed2 – POLLUX User Manual
[62] CASTOR Security Target FQR 110 8141 Ed2
17 | 92
1.5. Definitions
DES Data Encryption Standard
DF Dedicated File
DH Diffie Hellman
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
EF Elementary File
EEPROM Electrically Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory
FID File identifier
GP Global Platform
IC Integrated Chip
ICC Integrated Chip card
IFD Interface Device
MAC Message Authentication code
PIN Personal Identification Number
PKI Public Key Infrastructure
ROM Read Only Memory
RSA Rivest Shamir Adleman
RSA CRT Rivest Shamir Adleman – Chinese Remainder Theorem
SCP Secure Channel Procotol
SHA Secure hashing Algorithm
TOE Target of evaluation
1.6. Technical Terms Definition
Term Definition
Active Authentication Security mechanism defined in [6] option by which means the
MRTD’s chip proves and the inspection system verifies the
identity and authenticity of the MRTD’s chip as part of a genuine
MRTD issued by a known State or Organization.
Audit records Write-only-once non-volatile memory area of the MRTDs chip to
store the Initialization Data and Pre-personalization Data.
Authenticity Ability to confirm the MRTD and its data elements on the MRTD’s
chip were created by the issuing State or Organization.
Basic Access Control (BAC) Security mechanism defined in [6] by which means the MRTD’s
chip proves and the inspection system protects their
communication by means of secure messaging with Document
Basic Access Keys (see there).
Basic Inspection System (BIS) An inspection system which implements the terminals part of the
Basic Access Control Mechanism and authenticates itself to the
MRTD’s chip using the Document Basic Access Keys derived
from the printed MRZ data for reading the logical MRTD.
Biographical data (biodata) The personalized details of the MRTD holder of the document
appearing as text in the visual and machine readable zones on
the biographical data page of a passport book or on a travel card
or visa.
Biometric reference data Data stored for biometric authentication of the MRTD holder in
the MRTD’s chip as (i) digital portrait and (ii) optional biometric
reference data.
Counterfeit An unauthorized copy or reproduction of a genuine security
document made by whatever means.
Country Signing CA Certificate
(Ccsca)
Self-signed certificate of the Country Signing CA Public Key
(KPuCSCA) issued by CSCA stored in the inspection system.
Document Basic Access Keys Pair of symmetric (two-key) Triple-DES keys used for secure
messaging with encryption (key KENC) and message
authentication (key KMAC) of data transmitted between the
MRTD’s chip and the inspection system. It is drawn from the
18 | 92
printed MRZ of the passport book to authenticate an entity able
to read the printed MRZ of the passport book.
Document Security Object
(SOD)
A RFC3369 CMS Signed Data Structure, signed by the Document
Signer (DS). Carries the hash values of the LDS Data Groups. It
is stored in the MRTD’s chip. It may carry the Document Signer
Certificate (CDS).
Eavesdropper A threat agent with Enhanced-Basic attack potential reading the
communication between the MRTD’s chip and the inspection
system to gain the data on the MRTD’s chip.
Enrolment The process of collecting biometric samples from a person and
the subsequent preparation and storage of biometric reference
templates representing that person’s identity.
Extended Access Control (EAC) Security mechanism identified in [48] by which means the
MRTD’s chip (i) verifies the authentication of the inspection
systems authorized to read the optional biometric reference data,
(ii) controls the access to the optional biometric reference data
and (iii) protects the confidentiality and integrity of the optional
biometric reference data during their transmission to the
inspection system by secure messaging. The Personalization
Agent may use the same mechanism to authenticate themselves
with Personalization Agent Private Key and to get write and read
access to the logical MRTD and TSF data.
Extended Inspection System
(EIS)
A role of a terminal as part of an inspection system which is in
addition to Basic Inspection System authorized by the issuing
State or Organization to read the optional biometric reference
data and supports the terminals part of the Extended Access
Control Authentication Mechanism.
Forgery Fraudulent alteration of any part of the genuine document, e.g.
changes to the biographical data or the portrait.
Global Interoperability The capability of inspection systems (either manual or
automated) in different States throughout the world to exchange
data, to process data received from systems in other States, and
to utilize that data in inspection operations in their respective
States. Global interoperability is a major objective of the
standardized specifications for placement of both eye-readable
and machine readable data in all MRTDs.
IC Dedicated Support Software That part of the IC Dedicated Software (refer to above) which
provides functions after TOE Delivery. The usage of parts of the
IC Dedicated Software might be restricted to certain phases.
IC Dedicated Test Software That part of the IC Dedicated Software (refer to above) which is
used to test the TOE before TOE Delivery but which does not
provide any functionality thereafter.
IC Identification Data The IC manufacturer writes a unique IC identifier to the chip to
control the IC as MRTD material during the IC manufacturing and
the delivery process to the MRTD manufacturer (i.e MRTD
packaging responsible).
Impostor A person who applies for and obtains a document by assuming a
false name and identity, or a person who alters his or her physical
appearance to represent himself or herself as another person for
the purpose of using that person’s document.
Improperly document person A person who travels, or attempts to travel with: (a) an expired
travel document or an invalid visa; (b) a counterfeit, forged or
altered travel document or visa; (c) someone else’s travel
document or visa; or (d) no travel document or visa, if required.
Initialisation Process of writing Initialisation Data (see below) to the TOE.
Initialization Data Any data defined by the TOE Manufacturer and injected into the
non-volatile memory by the Integrated Circuits manufacturer
(Phase 2). These data are for instance used for traceability and
for IC identification as MRTD’s material (IC identification data).
19 | 92
Inspection The act of a State examining an MRTD presented to it by a
traveler (the MRTD holder) and verifying its authenticity.
Inspection System (IS) A technical system used by the border control officer of the
receiving State (i) examining an MRTD presented by the traveler
and verifying its authenticity and (ii) verifying the traveler as
MRTD holder.
Integrated Circuit (IC) Electronic component(s) designed to perform processing and/or
memory functions. The MRTD’s chip is a integrated circuit.
Integrity Ability to confirm the MRTD and its data elements on the MRTD’s
chip have not been altered from that created by the issuing State
or Organization
Issuing Organization Organization authorized to issue an official travel document (e.g.
the United Nations Organization, issuer of the Laissez-passer).
Issuing State The Country issuing the MRTD.
Logical Data Structure (LDS) The collection of groupings of Data Elements stored in the
optional capacity expansion technology. The capacity expansion
technology used is the MRTD’s chip.
Logical MRTD Data of the MRTD holder stored according to the Logical Data
Structure, as specified by ICAO on the contactless integrated
circuit. It presents contactless readable data including (but not
limited to)
(1) personal data of the MRTD holder,
(2) the digital Machine Readable Zone Data (digital MRZ data,
EF.DG1),
(3) the digitized portraits (EF.DG2),
(4) the biometric reference data of finger(s) (EF.DG3) or iris
image(s) (EF.DG4) or both and
(5) the other data according to LDS (EF.DG5 to EF.DG16).
(6) EF.COM and EF.SOD
Logical travel document Data stored according to the Logical Data Structure as specified
by ICAO in the contactless integrated circuit including (but not
limited to)
(1) data contained in the machine-readable zone (mandatory),
(2) digitized photographic image (mandatory) and
(3) fingerprint image(s) and/or iris image(s) (optional).
Machine Readable Travel
Document (MRTD)
Official document issued by a State or Organization which is used
by the holder for international travel (e.g. passport, visa, official
document of identity) and which contains mandatory visual (eye
readable) data and a separate mandatory data summary,
intended for global use, reflecting essential data elements
capable of being machine read.
Machine Readable Visa (MRV) A visa or, where appropriate, an entry clearance (hereinafter
collectively referred to as visas) conforming to the specifications
contained herein, formulated to improve facilitation and enhance
security for the visa holder. Contains mandatory visual (eye
readable) data and a separate mandatory data summary capable
of being machine read. The MRV is normally a label which is
attached to a visa page in a passport.
Machine Readable Zone (MRZ) Fixed dimensional area located on the front of the MRTD or MRP
Data Page or, in the case of the TD1, the back of the MRTD,
containing mandatory and optional data for machine reading
using OCR methods.
Machine-verifiable biometrics
feature
A unique physical personal identification feature (e.g. an iris
pattern, fingerprint or facial characteristics) stored on a travel
document in a form that can be read and verified by machine.
MRTD application Non-executable data defining the functionality of the operating
system on the IC as the MRTD’s chip. It includes
- the file structure implementing the LDS
20 | 92
- the definition of the User Data, but does not include the User
Data itself (i.e. content of EF.DG1 to EF.DG14, EF.DG 16,
EF.COM and EF.SOD) and
- the TSF Data including the definition the authentication data but
except the authentication data itself.
MRTD Basic Access Control Mutual authentication protocol followed by secure messaging
between the inspection system and the MRTD’s chip based on
MRZ information as key seed and access condition to data stored
on MRTD’s chip according to LDS.
MRTD holder The rightful holder of the MRTD for whom the issuing State or
Organization personalized the MRTD.
MRTD’s Chip A contactless integrated circuit chip complying with ISO/IEC
14443 and programmed according to the Logical Data Structure
as specified by ICAOT.
MRTD’s chip Embedded
Software
Software embedded in a MRTD’s chip and not being developed
by the IC Designer. The MRTD’s chip Embedded Software is
designed in Phase 1 and embedded into the MRTD’s chip in
Phase 2 of the TOE life-cycle.
Optional biometric reference
data
Data stored for biometric authentication of the MRTD holder in
the MRTD’s chip as (i) encoded finger image(s) (EF.DG3) or (ii)
encoded iris image(s) (EF.DG4) or (iii) both. Note that the
European commission decided to use only finger print and not to
use iris images as optional biometric reference data.
Passive authentication (i) verification of the digital signature of the Document Security
Object and (ii) comparing the hash values of the read LDS data
fields with the hash values contained in the Document Security
Object.
Personalization The process by which the portrait, signature and biographical
data are applied to the document. This may also include the
optional biometric data collected during the “Enrolment” (Step 6).
Personalization Agent The agent acting on the behalf of the issuing State or
Organization to personalize the MRTD for the holder by (i)
establishing the identity the holder for the biographic data in the
MRTD, (ii) enrolling the biometric reference data of the MRTD
holder i.e. the portrait, the encoded finger image(s) or (ii) the
encoded iris image(s) and (iii) writing these data on the physical
and logical MRTD for the holder.
Personalization Agent
Authentication Information
TSF data used for authentication proof and verification of the
Personalization Agent.
Personalization Agent Key Symmetric cryptographic authentication key used (i) by the
Personalization Agent to prove their identity and get access to the
logical MRTD and (ii) by the MRTD’s chip to verify the
authentication attempt of a terminal as Personalization Agent
according to the SFR FIA_UAU.4/BAC, FIA_UAU.5/BAC and
FIA_UAU.6/BAC.
Physical travel document Travel document in form of paper, plastic and chip using secure
printing to present data including (but not limited to)
(1) biographical data,
(2) data of the machine-readable zone,
(3) photographic image and
(4) other data.
Pre-Personalisation Process of writing Pre-Personalisation Data to the TOE including
the creation of the MRTD Application (Step 5)
Pre-personalization Data Any data that is injected into the non-volatile memory of the TOE
by the MRTD Manufacturer (i.e IC manufacturer) (Phase 2) for
traceability of non-personalized MRTD’s and/or to secure
shipment within or between life cycle phases 2 and 3. It contains
(but is not limited to) the Active Authentication Key Pair and the
Personalization Agent Key Pair.
21 | 92
Pre-personalized MRTD’s chip MRTD’s chip equipped with an unique identifier and an unique
asymmetric Active Authentication Key Pair of the chip.
Primary Inspection System
(PIS)
An inspection system that contains a terminal for the contactless
communication with the MRTD’s chip and does not implement the
terminals part of the Basic Access Control Mechanism.
Random identifier Random identifier used to establish a communication to the TOE
in Phase 3 and 4 preventing the unique identification of the MRTD
and thus participates in the prevention of traceability.
Receiving State The Country to which the Traveler is applying for entry.
Reference data Data enrolled for a known identity and used by the verifier to
check the verification data provided by an entity to prove this
identity in an authentication attempt.
Secondary image A repeat image of the holder’s portrait reproduced elsewhere in
the document by whatever means.
Secure messaging in encrypted
mode
Secure messaging using encryption and message authentication
code according to ISO/IEC 7816-4
Skimming Imitation of the inspection system to read the logical MRTD or
parts of it via the contactless communication channel of the TOE
without knowledge of the printed MRZ data.
Travel document A passport or other official document of identity issued by a State
or Organization, which may be used by the rightful holder for
international travel.
Traveler Person presenting the MRTD to the inspection system and
claiming the identity of the MRTD holder.
TSF data Data created by and for the TOE, that might affect the operation
of the TOE.
Unpersonalized MRTD The MRTD that contains the MRTD Chip holding only Initialization
Data and Pre-personalization Data as delivered to the
Personalisation Agent from the Manufacturer.
User data Data created by and for the user, that does not affect the
operation of the TSF.
Verification The process of comparing a submitted biometric sample against
the biometric reference template of a single enrollee whose
identity is being claimed, to determine whether it matches the
enrollee’s template.
Verification data Data provided by an entity in an authentication attempt to prove
their identity to the verifier. The verifier checks whether the
verification data match the reference data known for the claimed
identity.
Table 4: Technical Terms Definition
22 | 92
2. TARGET OF EVALUATION
The product Taiwan eID Applet CC is a multi-applicative Javacard product, embeddable in contact
and/or contact-less smart card integrated circuits of different form factors. The product can be configured
to serve different use cases, during the Prepersonalization/personalization phases of the product
[60].
The product supports the storage and retrieval of structured information compliant to the Logical Data
Structure as specified in [44]. It also provides standard authentication protocols, Extended Access
Control [49] PACE [50], Active Authentication,...
It can host two types of applications as mentioned above, namely the IDL and MRTD. Moreover, further
configuration may also be done to each type of application to serve use cases other than those
behaviourally defined in the referenced normative documents.
This product is loaded on the platform, for details see ST [54].
The product uses a sharable interface provided by an application already evaluated. See details in the
ST [62]. This shareable interface allows the user to be authenticated by the PKI PIN.
For the use of shareable interface provided by HiCOS application, HiCOS application shall be present
on the platform. This is done by loading HiCOS application in EEPROM memory.
The Taiwan eID Applet CC product architecture can be viewed as shown in the following figure:
Figure 1: TOE Limits
2.1. TOE Overview
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) addressed by the current Security target is an electronic travel document
representing a contactless / contact smart card1 programmed according to ICAO Technical Report
"Supplemental Access Control" [53]. This smart card / passport provides the following application:
– the travel document containing the related user data including biometric as well as data needed for
authentication including PACE passwords; this application is intended to be used by governmental
organisations, amongst other as a machine readable travel document (MRTD).
APPLETS
In E2PROM
Resident
Application
Virtual Machine API GP
API
CM
BIOS
INTEGRATED CIRCUIT
G
P
P
L
A
T
F
O
R
M
APPLETS
In ROM
23 | 92
The TOE described in this security target is the PACE configuration, conformant to Configuration 1.
The product is composed of the functions: PACE/CA, PACE/CAM and AA ... all are presented in the
chapter TOE architecture. Only some parts are in the scope of the evaluation of the present
configuration.
Applets in ROM are PIV 2.4 and IAS ECC V2.
Different configurations of the TOE are under evaluation. This ST considers only PACE, AA, CA and
CAM.
Configuration PP Conformity
Chip
Extensions
P60D081 P60D145
1 PP 0068 (PACE) X X AA
CA
CAM
2 PP0056v2 (EAC
sur PACE)
X X AA
CAM
PACE-CAM/TA without CA
BAC de-activation
SM (DES + AES) on read
DG3+DG4 After EAC
3 PP 0055 (BAC) X X AA + CA
4 PP0056v1 (EAC
sur BAC)
X X AA
SM (DES + AES) on read
DG3+DG4 after EAC
Table 5: 4 Configurations of the Taiwan eID Applet CC application
All parts of the TOE are detailed in § 2.3.
The TOE life cycle is described in § 3.
The TOE identification is described in § 1.3.1.
The TOE scope encompasses the following features:
Active Authentication
PACE/CAM Authentication
Prepersonalization phase
TWN_DG2 read after a PACE and SharedPIN verification
Nevertheless, the TOE in the Taiwan eID Applet CC application embeds other secure functionalities
they are not in the scope of this evaluation and are in the scope of other evaluations.
Application Note: the SharedPIN is implemented in HICOS product. The verification of the pin
presentation is done in the evaluated HiCOS application. Only the result of the authentication is returned
(true or false).
2.1.1.TOE Usage and major security features
State or organisation issues MRTDs to be used by the holder to prove his/her identity and claiming
associated rights. For instance, it can be used to check identity at customs in an MRTD configuration,
verifying authenticity of electronic visa stored on the card and correspondence with the holder.
In order to pass successfully the control, the holder presents its personal MRTD to the inspection system
to first prove his/her identity. The inspection system is under control of an authorised agent and can be
either a desktop device such as those present in airports or a portable device to be used on the field.
24 | 92
The MRTD in context of this security target contains:
Visual (eye readable) biographical data and portrait of the holder printed in the booklet
A separate data summary (MRZ or keydoc data) for visual and machine reading using OCR
methods in the Machine Readable Zone (MRZ or keydoc area)
And data elements stored on the TOE’s chip for contact-less machine reading.
The authentication of the holder is based on:
The possession of a valid MRTD personalized for a holder with the claimed identity as given on
the biographical data page and
The Biometric matching performed on the Inspection system using the reference data stored
in the MRTD.
When holder has been authenticated the issuing State or Organization can performed extra
authentications in order to gain rights required to grant access to some sensitive information such as
“visa information”…
The issuing State or Organization ensures the authenticity of the data of genuine MRTDs. The receiving
State trusts a genuine MRTD of an issuing State or Organization.
The MRTD can be viewed as the combination:
A physical MRTD in form of paper or plastic with an embedded chip and possibly an antenna.
It presents visual readable data including (but not limited to)
- Personal data of the MRTD holder
- The biographical data on the biographical data page of the passport book
- The printed data in the Machine-Readable Zone (MRZ) or keydoc area that identifies
the device
- The printed portrait
A logical MRTD as data of the MRTD holder stored according to the Logical Data Structure as
specified by ICAO and extended in [44][45][46] on the contactless integrated circuit. It presents
contact or contact-less readable data including (but not limited to)
- Personal data of the MRTD holder
- The digital Machine Readable Zone Data (digital MRZ data or keydoc data, DG1)
- The digitized portraits
- The optional biometric reference data of finger(s) or iris image(s) or both
- The other data according to LDS (up to DG24)
- The Document security object
The issuing State or Organization implements security features of the MRTD to maintain the authenticity
and integrity of the MRTD and its data. The MRTD as the physical device and the MRTD’s chip is
uniquely identified by the document number.
The physical MRTD is protected by physical security measures (e.g. watermark on paper, security
printing), logical (e.g. authentication keys of the MRTD’s chip) and organisational security measures
(e.g. control of materials, personalization procedures). These security measures include the binding of
the MRTD’s chip to the physical support.
The logical MRTD is protected in authenticity and integrity by a digital signature created by the document
signer acting for the issuing State or Organization and the security features of the MRTD’s chip.
The ICAO defines the baseline security methods Passive Authentication and the optional advanced
security methods Basic Access Control to the logical travel document, Active Authentication of the travel
document’s chip, Extended Access Control to and the Data Encryption of sensitive biometrics as
25 | 92
optional security measure in the ICAO Doc 9303, and Password Authenticated Connection
Establishment. The Passive Authentication Mechanism is performed completely and independently of
the TOE by the TOE environment.
The security Target addresses the protection of the logical travel document (i) in integrity by write-only-
once access control and by physical means, and (ii) in confidentiality by the Extended Access Control
Mechanism. This protection profile addresses the Chip Authentication Version 1 as an alternative to the
Active Authentication.
If BAC is supported by the TOE, the travel document has to be evaluated and certified separately. This
is due to the fact that [47] does only consider extended basic attack potential to the Basic Access Control
Mechanism (i.e. AVA_VAN.3).
The Active Authentication authenticates the contactless IC by signing a challenge sent by the IFD
(inspection system) with a private key known only to the IC. For this purpose the contactless IC contains
its own Active Authentication Key pair (KPrAA and KPuAA). A hash representation of Data Group 15
(Public Key (KPuAA) info) is stored in the Document Security Object (SOD) and therefore authenticated
by the issuer’s digital signature. The corresponding Private Key (KPrAA) is stored in the contactless IC’s
secure memory. By authenticating the visual MRZ (through the hashed MRZ in the Document Security
Object (SOD)) in combination with the challenge response, using the eMRTD’s Active Authentication
Key Pair (KPrAA and KPuAA), the inspection system verifies that the Document Security Object (SOD)
has been read from the genuine contactless IC, stored in the genuine eMRTD.
The confidentiality by Password Authenticated Connection Establishment (PACE) is a mandatory
security feature of the TOE. The travel document shall strictly conform to the ‘Common Criteria
Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document using Standard Inspection Procedure with PACE
considers high attack potential.
For the PACE protocol, the following steps shall be performed:
1. The travel document's chip encrypts a nonce with the shared password, derived from the
MRZ resp. CAN data and transmits the encrypted nonce together with the domain parameters
to the terminal.
2. The terminal recovers the nonce using the shared password, by (physically) reading the MRZ
resp. CAN data.
3. The travel document's chip and terminal computer perform a Diffie-Hellmann key agreement
together with the ephemeral domain parameters to create a shared secret. Both parties derive
the session keys KMAC and KENC from the shared secret.
4. Each party generates an authentication token, sends it to the other party and verifies the
received token.
After successful key negotiation the terminal and the travel document's chip provide private
communication (secure messaging).
The protection profile requires the TOE to implement the Extended Access Control. The Extended
Access Control consists of two parts (i) the Chip Authentication Protocol Version 1 and (ii) the Terminal
Authentication Protocol Version 1 (v.1).
The Chip Authentication Protocol v.1 (i) authenticates the travel document’s chip to the inspection
system and (ii) establishes secure messaging which is used by Terminal Authentication v.1 to protect
the confidentiality and integrity of the sensitive biometric reference data during their transmission from
the TOE to the inspection system. Therefore Terminal Authentication v.1 can only be performed if Chip
Authentication v.1 has been successfully executed.
The Terminal Authentication Protocol v.1 consists of (i) the authentication of the inspection system as
entity authorized by the receiving State or Organisation through the issuing State, and (ii) an access
26 | 92
control by the TOE to allow reading the sensitive biometric reference data only to successfully
authenticated authorized inspection systems.
The issuing State or Organisation authorizes the receiving State by means of certification the
authentication public keys of Document Verifiers who create Inspection System Certificates.
2.2. TOE Definition
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the contactless integrated circuit chip of machine readable travel
documents (MRTD’s chip) programmed according to the Logical Data Structure (LDS) and providing
and provides standard authentication protocols, namely Basic Access Control, Extended Access Control
and Active Authentication.
The product can be configured to serve different use cases, during the
Prepersonalization/personalization phases of the product.
The TOE comprises at least:
- Circuitry of the MRTD’s chip (the integrated circuit, IC)
- IC Dedicated Software with the parts IC Dedicated Test Software and IC Dedicated Support
Software
- Cosmo V8-1N Standard or Large
- API
- Taiwan eID Applet CC application
- Associated guidance documentation
The platform provides an operational environment for the application: all cryptographic algorithm
implementations and associated self-tests, random number and key generation, card lifecycle
management, and key storage and protection are provided by the platform. The code for this
functionality is contained in the platform ROM. However, the factory configuration of the module
constrains the module to the set of services provided by the platform’s Card Manager (implementing a
standard set of GlobalPlatform services),
Some applications present on the Cosmo v8.1-N Platform are not usable on this TOE such as the PIV
applet which is not instantiated.
The applet may be used on a contact mode compliant to ISO/IEC 7816-3 specification or on contactless
mode compliant to ISO/IEC 14443 specification.
2.3. TOE Architecture
The TOE is a smartcard, composed of IC, Javacard Platform and the Taiwan eID Applet CC application.
Other applications may reside in the TOE.
2.3.1.Integrated Circuit
The TOE is embedded on NXP chips, more information on the chips is given in the related public
Security Targets lites identified in table 3 of chapter 1.3.2.
2.3.2.JavaCard Platform
The Operating System is based on Java Card Technology and Global Platform technology. His main
responsibilities are:
 providing interface between the Integrated Circuit and the applet
 providing to the applet, basic services to access to memories and all needed cryptographic
operations
 ensuring global management of the card (loading, installation and deletion of applets) and
monitor the security of the card (data integrity and physical attacks counter-measures). For
details see [54].
27 | 92
2.3.3.Application Functionalities
This application stores the personal information related to the cardholder of an MRTD or an IDL. It also
allows governmental organizations to retrieve these pieces of data.
The applet supports the authentication mechanisms described in ICAO and EAC specifications and
ISO/IEC 18013-3 ISO Compliant Driving License specification with a fully configurable access control
management over the EFs (EFs).
The applet may be used on a contact mode (compliant to ISO/IEC 7816-3 specification) and/or
contactless mode (compliant to ISO/IEC 14443 specification).
The compliancy of the applet to LDS, EAC, or IDL, is achieved provided a correct personalization is
performed. The correct authentication mechanisms and access conditions over the EFs must be
assigned.
In summary, the applet supports the following authentication mechanisms stated in the ICAO
specifications (for MRTD) and the ISO Compliant Driving License standard (for IDL):
• Active Authentication (AA)
• Basic Access Control (BAC)
• Password Authenticated Connection Establishment (PACE)
• Extended Access Control (EAC)
• Chip Authentication Mapping (CAM)
• Terminal Authentication (TA)
All authentication mechanisms are listed in the following chapters, all are part of the product but only
some are part of the present evaluation.
2.3.3.1. Active Authentication (AA)
Active Authentication is an authentication mechanism ensuring the chip is genuine. It uses a challenge-
response protocol between the IS and the chip.
Active Authentication is realized with the INTERNAL AUTHENTICATE command.
The key and algorithms supported are the following:
- RSA ISO/IEC 9796-2 with a key length of 1024 bits, 1536 bits or 2048 bits and hashing algorithm
of SHA1 or SHA2.
- ECDSA over prime field curves with hashing algorithm of SHA1 or SHA2 and the key sizes 192
to 512.
- AES-256 using ISO/IEC 9797-1 M2 padding method.
- TDES with double and triple length keys using ISO/IEC 9797-1 M2 padding method.
2.3.3.2. Basic Access Control (BAC)
The protocol for Basic Access Control is specified by ICAO [47] Basic Access Control checks that the
terminal has physical access to the MRTD’s data page. This is enforced by requiring the terminal to
derive an authentication key from the optically read MRZ of the MRTD. The protocol for Basic Access
Control is based on ISO/IEC 11770-2 [41] key establishment mechanism 6. This protocol is also used
to generate session keys that are used to protect the confidentiality (and integrity) of the transmitted
data.
The Basic Access Control (BAC) is a security feature that is supported by the TOE. The inspection
system:
- Reads the printed data in the MRZ (for MRTD),
- Authenticates itself as inspection system by means of keys derived from MRZ data. After
successful 3DES based authentication, the TOE provides read access to data requiring BAC
rights by means of a private communication (secure messaging) with the inspection system.
28 | 92
The purpose of this mechanism is to ensure that the holder gives access to the IS to the logical MRTD
(data stored in the chip); It is achieved by a mutual authentication.
Once the mutual authentication is performed, a secure messaging is available to protect the
communication between the chip and the IS.
This table lists the supported configurations for BAC protocol:
Configuration Key Algo Key Length Hash Algo MAC Algo
BAC 3DES 2Key 16-bytes SHA-1 Retail MAC
Table 6: BAC Configuration
2.3.3.3. Terminal Authentication
The Terminal Authentication Protocol is a two move challenge-response protocol that provides explicit
unilateral authentication of the terminal.
This protocol enables the MRTD chip to verify that the terminal is entitled to access sensitive data. As
the terminal may access sensitive data afterwards, all further communication MUST be protected
appropriately. Terminal Authentication therefore also authenticates an ephemeral public key chosen by
the terminal that was used to set up Secure Messaging with Chip Authentication. The MRTD chip MUST
bind the terminal’s access rights to Secure Messaging established by the authenticated ephemeral
public key of the terminal.
2.3.3.4. Chip Authentication
The Chip Authentication Protocol is an ephemeral-static Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol that
provides secure communication and unilateral authentication of the MRTD chip.
The protocol establishes Secure Messaging between an MRTD chip and a terminal based on a static
key pair stored on the MRTD chip. Chip Authentication is an alternative to the optional ICAO Active
Authentication, i.e. it enables the terminal to verify that the MRTD chip is genuine but has two
advantages over the original protocol:
Challenge Semantics are prevented because the transcripts produced by this protocol are non-
transferable.
Besides authentication of the MRTD chip this protocol also provides strong session keys.
The protocol in version 1 provides implicit authentication of both the MRTD chip itself and the stored
data by performing Secure Messaging using the new session keys.
The protocol in Version 2 provides explicit authentication of the MRTD chip by verifying the
authentication token and implicit authentication of the stored data by performing Secure Messaging
using the new session keys.
2.3.3.5. Password Authenticated Connection Establishment (PACE)
PACE is an access control mechanism that is supplemental to BAC. It is a cryptographically stronger
access control mechanism than BAC since it uses asymmetric cryptography compared to BAC’s
symmetric cryptography.
PACE is realized through 5 commands:
1. MSE SET – AT command
2. GENERAL AUTHENTICATE command – Encrypted Nonce
3. GENERAL AUTHENTICATE command – Map Nonce
4. GENERAL AUTHENTICATE command – Perform Key Agreement
5. GENERAL AUTHENTICATE command – Mutual Authentication
29 | 92
Once the mutual authentication is performed, a secure messaging is available to protect the
communication between the chip and the IS.
This table lists the supported configurations for PACE protocol:
Configuration Mapping
Key
Algo
Key Length
(in bytes)
Secure
Messaging
Auth.
Token
Hash
Algo
PACE–ECDH–GM–3DES Generic
3DES
2Key
16
CBC / Retail
MAC
Retail
MAC
SHA-
1
PACE–ECDH–GM–AES–
128
Generic AES 16 CBC / CMAC CMAC
SHA-
1
PACE–ECDH–GM–AES–
192
Generic AES 24 CBC / CMAC CMAC
SHA-
256
PACE–ECDH–GM–AES–
256
Generic AES 32 CBC / CMAC CMAC
SHA-
256
PACE–ECDH–IM–3DES Integrated
3DES
2Key
16
CBC / Retail
MAC
Retail
MAC
SHA-
1
PACE–ECDH–IM–AES–
128
Integrated AES 16 CBC / CMAC CMAC
SHA-
1
PACE–ECDH–IM–AES–
192
Integrated AES 24 CBC / CMAC CMAC
SHA-
256
PACE–ECDH–IM–AES–
256
Integrated AES 32 CBC / CMAC CMAC
SHA-
256
PACE–ECDH–CAM–
AES–128
Chip
Authentication
AES 16 CBC / CMAC CMAC
SHA-
1
PACE–ECDH–CAM–
AES–192
Chip
Authentication
AES 24 CBC / CMAC CMAC
SHA-
256
PACE–ECDH–CAM–
AES–256
Chip
Authentication
AES 32 CBC / CMAC CMAC
SHA-
256
Table 7: PACE Configuration
2.3.3.6. Extended Access Control (EAC)
EAC is an authentication protocol based on a PKI infrastructure. It further ensures that the IS is
authorized to read and/or update data stored in the applet. This authentication mechanism generates a
strong secure messaging session through the step of Chip Authentication.
This mechanism is realized by the following steps:
1. Chip Authentication (CA)Chip Authentication is achieved by using a MANAGE SECURITY
ENVIRONMENT – SET – Key Agreement Template (MSE SET KAT) command or by using a MANAGE
SECURITY ENVIRONMENT – SET – Authentication Template (MSE SET AT) command followed by
GENERAL AUTHENTICATE command.
The Chip Authentication mechanism enables the authentication of the chip by using an
authenticated DH scheme. It may be realized in two ways:
 Classical DH (DH El Gamal) with key length of 1024, 1536, or 2048 bits
 DH over Elliptic curves over prime fields (ECDH) with the key length supported by the
underlying Javacard platform.
2. Certificate Chain Handling
The certificate chain is processed through a series of MANAGE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT – SET –
Digital Signature Template (MSE SET DST) and PERFORM SECURITY OPERATION – Verify
Certificate (PSO VERIFY) commands.
30 | 92
The chain is done to extract a key from the IS certificate, the key which will be used in the Terminal
Authentication.
3. Terminal Authentication (TA)
Terminal Authentication is achieved by using an EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE command.
The Terminal Authentication mechanism is an authentication of the IS based on a classical
challenge/response scheme. The signature scheme may be:
ECDSA SHA-1, ECDSA SHA-224, ECDSA SHA-256, ECDSA SHA-384, or ECDSA SHA-512 on elliptic
curves over prime field with key length supported by the underlying Javacard platform
RSA SHA-1, SHA-256, or SHA-512 (PKCS#1 v1.5 or PKCS#1 v2.1 - PSS) with a key length of 1024,
1536, and 2048 bits.
2.3.3.7. PACE-CAM
The Chip Authentication Mapping is a new mapping for PACE which extends the Generic Mapping that
integrates Chip Authentication into the PACE protocol. This mapping combines PACE and Chip
Authentication into one protocol PACE-CAM, which allows faster execution than the separate protocols
(i.e. PACE + CA + TA).
PACE-CAM is realized the same way as § 2.3.3.6. The only difference is that the chip computes the
Chip Authentication Data using the chip’s static private key then sends this data to the terminal. The
terminal verifies the authenticity of the chip using the recovered Chip Authentication Data.
2.3.3.8. Match On-Card (MOC) Verification
MOC verification may be used to grant some access rights to EFs.
This feature relies on the services provided by the CHV Server applet MOC verification is supported if
the CHV Configuration is properly configured in the install parameter. Once the MOC verification is
allowed the applet will permit the use of CHV-related commands that handles biometric and Global PIN
credentials.
2.3.3.9. PIN
The product supports the management of card holder credentials such as Cardholder PIN and Global
PIN which can be used to grant access rights to EFs or keys. The Cardholder PIN and Global PIN each
have its PIN Unblocking Key (Cardholder PUK and Global PUK, respectively). These PINs and
corresponding PUKs have to be initialized during personalization if they are used to pdrotect access to
EFs and keys.
2.3.3.10. SharedPIN
The TOE supports also the SharedPIN with Hicos application.
The SharedPIN is implemented in HiCOS application, the TOE uses the shareable interface for PIN
verification and considers only the result of the authentication (the result of the authentication is used to
allow access to sensitive information in a dedicated EF: TWN_DG2 that contains personal information,
user address for example.
2.3.3.11. Watermarking
The watermarking feature may be used to restrict the access to the plain image data of particular EF(s).
Enabling the watermarking will cause the image data to be corrupted during the reading of the file
contents.
The de-watermarking conditions should be configured accordingly and these conditions must be
satisfied in order to grant access to the plain image data, details are in the dedicated security Target.
31 | 92
2.3.3.12. Secure Messaging
The TOE supports the ISO Secure Messaging. It provides a secure channel (i.e. encrypted and
authenticated) between application and terminal. Secure Messaging can be set up by Chip
Authentication, PACE, or Basic Access Control. The provided security level depends on the mechanism
used to set up Secure Messaging.
A session is started when secure messaging is established. The session only ends with the release of
secure messaging, e.g. by sending a command without secure messaging.
2.3.3.13. OT Cryptographic library
A dedicated cryptographic library has been developed and designed by Oberthur Technologies.
This cryptographic library is embedded on the TOE to provide the highest security level and best tuned
performances. It is implemented at the platform level and are already in the scope of the platform
evaluation.
2.3.3.14. Additional applications
Additional java card applications are present in the TOE: PIV 2.4 and IAS ECC V2, … These applications
are outside the scope of the present evaluation.
2.3.4.Mechanism included in the scope of the evaluation
All TOE functionalities are presented in the previous chapter.
The present evaluation includes the listed functionalities:
 AA
 CA
 CAM
 PACE
 TWN_DG2 protection by PACE and SharedPIN
 All crypto functions
 Personalization functions
2.4. Reference
The TOE is identified as follows:
Application Guidance
TOE name
(commercial name)
Taiwan eID Applet CC on ID-One Cosmo v8.1-N
Guidance document for
preparation
Personalization Manual [60]
Guidance document for
operational use
User Manual [61]
Platform Guidance
Guidance document for
Platform Pre-
personalisation
COSMO V8.1-N Pre-Perso Guide[57]
Developer of sensitive
applications*
COSMO V8.1-N Security Recommendations [56]
Guidance for application
developer*
COSMO V8.1-N Reference Guide [58]
32 | 92
Guidance to Issuer of the
platform that aims to load
applications*
COSMO V8.1-N Application Loading Protection Guidance [55]
Table 8: TOE Guidance REFERENCES
33 | 92
3. TOE LIFE CYCLE
3.1. TOE Life Cycle Overview
Figure 2: Smartcard product life-cycle for the TOE
The TOE life-cycle classically described in terms of four life-cycle phases, is additionally subdivided into
7 steps.
The roles involved in the different steps are listed in the following table:
Roles Subjects
IC manufacturer NXP Semiconductors
TOE developer Oberthur Technologies
Manufacturer NXP Semiconductors
Phase 1
a), b)
Phase 2 a)
Phase 3
Phase 4
Testing
Phase 5 b) Testing
Testing
Phase 6
Phase 7
ALC
phase
AGD
phase
USE
phase
AGD PRE
TOE delivery point in case of a)
Software development
IC photomask
fabrication
IC database
construction
IC manufacturing
Card printing
Micromodule
Embedding
Prepersonalization
Personnalisation
Smartcard product
End usage
Application
End usage
Smartcard
End of life
Application
End of life
IC testing
AGD OPE
Code of MRTD
application
loading: ROM or
E2PROM
34 | 92
Oberthur Technologies or another agent
Prepersonalizer Oberthur Technologies or another agent
Personalization Agent Oberthur Technologies or another agent
Table 9: Roles Identification on the life cycle.
3.2. TOE Life Cycle when the Application code is romed
The table below presents the subjects following TOE life cycle steps in accordance with the standard
smart card life cycle, the Protection Profile lifecycle in phases, the TOE delivery point and the coverage
in the case a).
Steps Phase Subject Covered by Sites
Step 1
Development
Oberthur Technologies ALC R&D sites
-Pessac and
Colombes for
platform
and
-Manille for
Taiwan eID
Applet CC
application
development
Step 2 Development NXP Semiconductors IC certification IC certification
Step 3 Manufacturing NXP Semiconductors IC certification IC certification
TOE delivery point
Step 4
Manufacturing MRD Manufacturer
(Prepersonalizer)
AGD_PRE
Step 5
Manufacturing MRD Manufacturer
(Prepersonalizer)
AGD_PRE
Step 6 Personalization Personalization Agent AGD_PRE
Step 7 Operational Use End user AGD_OPE
Table 10: Subjects identification following life cycle steps
Details for each phase/step are presented in the following paragraphs.
3.3. Phase 1 “Development”
(Step1) The TOE is developed in phase 1. The IC developer develops the integrated circuit, the IC
Dedicated Software and the guidance documentation associated with these TOE components.
The TOE includes the Taiwan eID Applet CC application and the Platform.
The LDS is developed at Manille and the platform at Colombes and Pessac.
The sites are audited following MSSR last requirements.
(Step2) The TOE developer uses the guidance documentation for the integrated circuit and the guidance
documentation for relevant parts of the IC Dedicated Software and develops the IC Embedded Software
(operating system), the MRTD application and the guidance documentation associated with these TOE
components.
The manufacturing documentation of the IC including the IC Dedicated Software and the Embedded
Software in the non-volatile non-programmable memories is securely delivered to the IC manufacturer.
The IC Embedded Software in the non-volatile programmable memories, the eMRTD application and
the guidance documentation is securely delivered to the Manufacturer.
3.4. Phase 2 “Manufacturing”
(Step3) In a first step the TOE integrated circuit is produced containing the travel document’s chip
Dedicated Software and the parts of the travel document’s chip Embedded Software in the non-volatile
35 | 92
non-programmable memories (ROM). The IC manufacturer writes the IC Identification Data onto the
chip to control the IC as travel document material during the IC manufacturing and the delivery process
to the Manufacturer. The IC is securely delivered from the IC manufacture to the Manufacturer. If
necessary the IC manufacturer adds the parts of the IC Embedded Software in the non-volatile
programmable memories (for instance EEPROM). The IC manufacturer adds initialization data in
EEPROM and keys (MSK, LSK).
The end of step 3 is the TOE delivery.
(Step4) The Manufacturer combines the IC with hardware for the contact based / contactless interface
in the travel document unless the travel document consists of the card only.
(Step5) The Manufacturer (i) adds the IC Embedded Software (ii) creates the eMRTD application, and
(iii) equips travel document’s chips with pre-personalization Data.
The pre-personalised travel document together with the IC Identifier is securely delivered from the
Manufacturer to the Personalization Agent. The Manufacturer also provides the relevant parts of the
guidance documentation to the Personalization Agent.
3.5. Phase 3 “Personalization of the travel document”
(Step6) The personalization of the travel document includes:
(i) the survey of the travel document holder’s biographical data,
(ii) the enrolment of the travel document holder biometric reference data (i.e. the digitized portraits and
the optional biometric reference data),
(iii) the personalization of the visual readable data onto the physical part of the travel document,
(iv) the writing of the TOE User Data and TSF Data into the logical travel document and
(v) configuration of the TSF if necessary.
The step (iv) is performed by the Personalization Agent and includes but is not limited to the creation
of
(i) the digital MRZ data (EF.DG1),
(ii) the digitized portrait (EF.DG2), and
(iii) the Document security object. The signing of the Document security object by the Document signer
finalizes the personalization of the genuine travel document for the travel document holder.
The personalised travel document (together with appropriate guidance for TOE use if necessary) is
handed over to the travel document holder for operational use.
3.5.1.Loading of application
The platform can host 2 kinds of applications: Evaluated sensitive applications and validated basic
applications. Once the application is evaluated or validated, it is securely delivered to manufacturing
site. This delivery ensures the integrity and confidentiality of the application code and data. Then
applications code and data are securely stored.
The delivery, storage and loading of any application are covered by audited Organisational measures
(ALC).
Applications can be loaded at pre issuance at step 5 or at step 6 or in post issuance.
3.5.2.Applet pre-personalisation (phase 6)
This phase is performed by the Personalisation Agent, which controls the TOE. During this phase, the
javacard applet is prepared as required by P.TOE_Construction.
All along this phase, the TOE is self-protected as it requires the authentication of the Personalisation
Agent prior to any operation.
3.5.3.TOE personalisation (phase 6)
36 | 92
This phase is performed by the Personalisation Agent, which controls the TOE, which is in charge of the
javacard applet personalisation.
All along this phase, the TOE is self-protected as it requires the authentication of the Personalisation
Agent prior to any operation.
This phase may not necessarily take place in a manufacturing site, but may be performed anywhere.
The Personalisation Agent is responsible for ensuring a sufficient level of security during this phase.
The javacard applet is personalized according to guidance document [57].
At the end of phase 6, the TOE is constructed.
3.6. Phase 4 “Operational Use”
(Step7) The TOE is used as a travel document's chip by the traveller and the inspection systems in the
“Operational Use” phase. The user data can be read according to the security policy of the issuing State
or Organisation and can be used according to the security policy of the issuing State but they can never
be modified.
Note that the personalization process and its environment may depend on specific security needs of an
issuing State or Organisation. All production, generation and installation procedures after TOE delivery
up to the “Operational Use” (phase 4) have to be considered in the product evaluation process under
AGD assurance class. Therefore, the Security Target has to outline the split up of P.Manufact,
P.Personalization and the related security objectives into aspects relevant before vs. after TOE delivery.
Some production steps, e.g. Step 4 in Phase 2 may also take place in the Phase 3.
3.7. TOE Life Cycle when the Application code is loaded in E2prom
This chapter presents when the application in loaded in E2prom, case b.
!
Figure 3: Smartcard product life-cycle for the TOE when the application is loaded in
E2prom.
b)
Phase 1
Security IC Embedded Software
Development Oberthur sites
(Colombes and Pessac)
Phase 2
Security IC Development
Phase 3
Security IC Manufacturing
Phase 4
Security IC packaging
Oberthur manufacturing sites
Phase 5 and 6
TOE production and Personalisation
Oberthur manufacturing sites or other
sites
Platform Development and applet
Development
IC manufacturing
Platform Prepersonalisation and
Personalisation
IC Database construction IC, photo
mask fabrication
Card printing
Phase 7
Operational Usage
Use phase
37 | 92
When the Taiwan eID Applet CC application is loaded on the Platform at Phase 5; the entity responsible
of the loading is the manufacturer:
 The Manufacturer (phase 5) loads the Taiwan eID Applet CC application code (ii) creates the
eMRTD application, and (iii) equips travel document’s chips with pre-personalization Data.
 The pre-personalised travel document together with the IC Identifier is securely delivered from
the Manufacturer to the Personalization Agent. The Manufacturer also provides the relevant
parts of the guidance documentation to the Personalization Agent (AGD_PRE).
When the Taiwan eID Applet CC application is loaded on the Platform at Phase 6; the entity responsible
of the loading is the Personalization Agent:
 The Personalization Agent (phase 6) loads the Taiwan eID Applet CC application code (ii)
creates the eMRTD application, and (iii) equips travel document’s chips with pre-
personalization Data.
 The MRTD is also personalized, in this step, as defined in the chapter 3.5.3.
 The personalization phase can also occur in phase 7, by the Issuer.
When the Taiwan eID Applet CC application is loaded on the Platform at Phase 7; the entity responsible
of the loading is the issuer, the Prepersonalization and the personalisation of the MRTD is under the
Issuer responsibility. All required information is securely given (application code and AGD_PRE and
AGD_OPE). The loading follows Platform requirements as defined in the COSMO V8.1-N Application
Loading Protection Guidance [55].
Step Possible operations
Required document
form the platform
Required document
form the application
Step 5
MRD Manufacturer
(Prepersonalizer)
Loading and
Prepersonalization
COSMO V8.1-N
Application Loading
Protection Guidance
[55]
Application code
Personalization
Manual [60]
Step 6
Loading and
Prepersonalization and
personalisation
COSMO V8.1-N
Application Loading
Protection Guidance
[55]
Application code
Personalization
Manual [60]
Step 7
Loading and
Prepersonalization and
personalisation
COSMO V8.1-N
Application Loading
Protection Guidance
[55]
Application code
Personalization
Manual [60]
User Manual [61]
Table 11: Required inputs for each case
38 | 92
4. CONFORMANCE CLAIM
4.1. Conformance claim
This security target claims conformance to the Common Criteria version 3.1, revision 4 ([1][2][3]).
The conformance to the Common Criteria is claimed as follows:
CC Conformance rationale
Part 1 Strict conformance
Part 2
Conformance to the extended1 part:
FAU_SAS.1 “Audit Storage”
FCS_RND.1 “Quality metric for random numbers”
FMT_LIM.1 “Limited capabilities”
FMT_LIM.2 “Limited availability”
FPT_EMS.1 “TOE Emanation”
FIA_API.1 “Authentication Proof of Identity”
Part 3
Strict conformance to Part 3.
The product claims conformance to EAL 5, augmented with:
ALC_DVS.2 “Sufficiency of security measures”
AVA_VAN.5 ”Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis”
Table 12: Conformance Rationale
4.2. Protection Profile claims
This security target claims a strict conformance to the following protection profile:
- BSI-CC-PP-0068-V2-2011: ”Machine Readable Travel Document using Standard Inspection
Procedure with PACE” [50]
4.1. Life Cycle Conformance
The TOE life cycle is presented in § 3.
New users have been defined, that have specific role, as described in the following table.
Additional subjects Description
IC developer Developer of the IC
IC manufacturer
This additional subjet is a refinement of the role Manufacturer It is
Manufacturer of the IC
TOE developer Developer of part of the TOE source code
Prepersonalizer
Agent in charge of the prepersonalization
This additional subjet is a refinement of the role Manufacturer . It is the
agent in charge of the prepersonalization of the TOE.
It corresponds to the MRTD manufacturer
Table 13: Additional subjects
4.2. Protection Profile Additions
The rationale between the SPD, taking into account the additional elements of the SPD, and the
Objectives and Objectives on the operational environment are given in the paragraph Rationales.
For ease the manipulation of security objectives and threats, the names are reduced. For example:
OT.Data_Int is in the PP OT.Data_Integrity. The PP name is under brackets.
1
The rationale for SFR addition is described in the relative PP
39 | 92
4.2.1.SFR dispatch versus PP
The following table present a rationale between the SFR driven from the protection profile versus the
SFR from this security target:
SFR from the PP Dispatch in the ST
FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE
FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE_AES
FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE_3DES
FCS_CKM.1/ECDH_PACE_AES
FCS_CKM.1/ECDH_PACE_3DES
FCS_CKM.4 FCS_CKM.4/Global
FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC
FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC_3DES
FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC_AES
FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC
FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC_AES
FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC_3DES
FCS_RND.1 FCS_RND.1/Global
FIA_AFL.1/PACE FIA_AFL.1/PACE
FIA_UID.1/PACE FIA_UID.1/PACE
FIA_UAU.1/PACE FIA_UAU.1/PACE
FIA_UAU.4/PACE FIA_UAU.4/PACE
FIA_UAU.5/PACE FIA_UAU.5/PACE
FIA_UAU.6/PACE FIA_UAU.6/PACE
FDP_ACC.1/TRM FDP_ACC.1/TRM
FDP_ACF.1/TRM FDP_ACF.1/TRM
FDP_RIP.1 FDP_RIP.1
FDP_UCT.1/TRM FDP_UCT.1/TRM
FDP_UIT.1/TRM FDP_UIT.1/TRM
FTP_ITC.1/PACE FTP_ITC.1/PACE
FAU_SAS.1 FAU_SAS.1/MP
FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMF.1/MP
FMT_SMR.1/PACE
FMT_SMR.1/MP
FMT_SMR.1/PACE
FMT_LIM.1 FMT_LIM.1/Global
FMT_LIM.2 FMT_LIM.2/Global
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA FMT_MTD.1/MP_INI_ENA
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS FMT_MTD.1/MP_INI_DIS
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ
FMT_MTD.1/MP_KEY_READ
FMT_MTD.1/PACE_KEY_READ
FMT_MTD.1/PA FMT_MTD.1/PA
FPT_EMS.1
FPT_EMS.1/Global
FPT_EMS.1/MP
FPT_EMS.1/PACE
FPT_FLS.1 FPT_FLS.1/Global
FPT_TST.1
FPT_TST.1/Global
FPT_TST.1/PACE
FPT_TST.1/CA
FPT_PHP.3 FPT_PHP.3.1/Global
Table 14: PPs SFR
4.2.2.Overview of the SFR defined in this ST
Notation:
For optimisation and ease read, all the SFR presented in chapter Security Functional Requirements
have extensions as presented here:
SFR (/Global) that are global to the product (shared between the various TOE)
SFR (/MP) that are dedicated for the Personalization phases
SFR (/AA) that are dedicated for Active Authentication
SFR (/PACE) that are dedicated for Password Authenticated Connection Establishment
SFR (/PACE_CAM) that are dedicated for Password Authenticated Connection Establishment with
Chip Authentication Mapping
SFR (/TWN_DG2) that are dedicated to DG2 protection
40 | 92
4.2.3.Complete overview of the SFR
From the PP, the following table lists the SFR defined in the ST with the generic notation.
SFR from the PP
FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE ; FCS_CKM.4; FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC ; FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC; FCS_RND.1;
FIA_AFL.1/PACE;
FIA_UID.1/PACE ; FIA_UAU.1/PACE ; FIA_UAU.4/PACE ; FIA_UAU.5/PACE ; FIA_UAU.6/PACE ; FDP_ACC.1/TRM ;
FDP_ACF.1/TRM ; FDP_RIP.1 ; FDP_UCT.1/TRM; FDP_UIT.1/TRM ; FAU_SAS.1 ; FMT_SMF.1 ; FMT_SMR.1/PACE ;
FMT_LIM.1 ; FMT_LIM.2 ; FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA ; FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS ; FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ ; FMT_MTD.1/PA ;
FPT_EMS.1 ; FPT_FLS.1 ; FPT_TST.1 ; FPT_PHP.3
Table 15: SFR from the PP
The following table presents the additional SFRs and express its functionality.
Section Additional SFR
MP
FCS_CKM.1/MP ; FCS_COP.1/MP ; FDP_ACC.2/MP ; FDP_ACF.1/MP ; FDP_ITC.1/MP ;
FDP_UCT.1/MP ; FDP_UIT.1/MP ; FIA_AFL.1/MP ; FIA_UAU.1/MP ; FIA_UID.1/MP ;
FIA_UAU.4/MP ; FIA_UAU.5/MP ; FMT_MTD.1/MP ; FTP_ITC.1/MP ;
FMT_MTD.1/MP_KEY_READ ; FMT_MTD.1/MP_KEY_WRITE
Active Authentication
FCS_COP.1/AA ; FDP_DAU.1/AA ; FDP_ITC.1/AA ; FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_READ ;
FMT_MOF.1/AA ; FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_WRITE
Chip Authentication
FIA_API.1/CA ; FSC_CKM.1/CA ; FCS_COP.1/CA ; FIA_UAU.1/CA ; FIA_UAU.5/CA ;
FIA_UAU.6/CA ; FIA_UID.1/CA ; FPT_TST.1/CA ; FMT_MTD.1/CA_KEY_WRITE ;
FMT_MTD.1/CA_KEY_READ ; FDP_UCT.1/CA ; FDP_UIT.1/CA
PACE_CAM
FIA_UAU.1/PACE_CAM; FIA_UAU.4/PACE_CAM; FIA_UAU.5/PACE_CAM;
FIA_UAU.6/PACE_CAM;
FIA_UID.1/PACE_CAM; FMT_MTD.1/CA_KEY_WRITE
Additional functionality FDP_ACF.1/TWN_DG2, FDP_ACC.1/TWN_DG2
Table 16: Additional SFR
The following table presents Global SFR overview:
Global SFR Additional? ST generic notation
FCS_CKM.4/Global No FCS_CKM.4
FCS_RND.1/Global No FCS_RND.1
FMT_LIM.1/Global No FMT_LIM.1
FMT_LIM.2/Global No FMT_LIM.2
FPT_EMS.1/Global No FPT_EMS.1
FPT_FLS.1/Global No FPT_FLS.1
FPT_TST.1/Global No FPT_TST.1
FPT_PHP.3/Global No FPT_PHP.3
Table 17: Global SFR overview
MP SFR Additional? ST generic notation
FCS_CKM.1/MP Yes FCS_CKM.1/MP
FCS_COP.1/MP_ENC_3DES
FCS_COP.1/MP_ENC_AES
FCS_COP.1/MP_MAC_3DES
FCS_COP.1/MP_MAC_AES
FCS_COP.1/MP_AUTH_3DES
FCS_COP.1/MP_AUTH_AES
FCS_COP.1/MP_SHA
Yes FCS_COP.1/MP
FDP_ACC.2/MP Yes FDP_ACC.2/MP
FDP_ACF.1/MP Yes FDP_ACF.1/MP
41 | 92
FDP_ITC.1/MP Yes FDP_ITC.1/MP
FDP_UCT.1/MP Yes FDP_UCT.1/MP
FDP_UIT.1/MP Yes FDP_UIT.1/MP
FIA_AFL.1/MP Yes FIA_AFL.1/MP
FIA_UAU.1/MP Yes FIA_UAU.1/MP
FIA_UID.1/MP Yes FIA_UID.1/MP
FIA_UAU.4/MP_3DES
FIA_UAU.4/MP_AES
Yes FIA_UAU.4/MP
FIA_UAU.5/MP_3DES
FIA_UAU.5/MP_AES
Yes FIA_UAU.5/MP
FMT_MTD.1/MP Yes FMT_MTD.1/MP
FTP_ITC.1/MP Yes FTP_ITC.1/MP
FMT_MTD.1/MP_INI_ENA No FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA
FMT_MTD.1/MP_INI_DIS No FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS
FMT_MTD.1/MP_KEY_READ Yes FMT_MTD.1/MP_KEY_READ
FMT_MTD.1/MP_KEY_WRITE Yes FMT_MTD.1/MP_KEY_WRITE
FAU_SAS.1/MP No FAU_SAS.1
FMT_SMF.1/MP No FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1/MP No FMT_SMR.1/PACE
FPT_EMS.1/MP No FPT_EMS.1
Table 18: MP SFR overview
The following table presents the dedicated SFRs for Active Authentication (AA)
Active Auth. SFR AdditionalSFR? ST generic notation
FCS_COP.1/AA_DSA
FCS_COP.1/AA_ECDSA
Yes FCS_COP.1/AA
FDP_DAU.1/AA Yes FDP_DAU.1/AA
FDP_ITC.1/AA Yes FDP_ITC.1/AA
FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_READ Yes FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_READ
FPT_EMS.1/AA No FPT_EMS.1
FMT_MOF.1/AA Yes FMT_MOF.1/AA
FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_WRITE Yes FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_WRITE
Table 19: Additional SFR for the Active Authentication
CA SFR overview:
CA SFR Additional? ST generic notation
FIA_API.1/CA Yes FIA_API.1/CA
FCS_CKM.1/CA_DH_SM_3DES
FCS_CKM.1/CA_ECDH_SM_3DES
FCS_CKM.1/CA_DH_SM_AES
FCS_CKM.1/CA_ECDH_SM_AES
Yes FCS_CKM.1/CA
FCS_COP.1/CA_SHA_SM_3DES
FCS_COP.1/CA_SYM_SM_3DES
FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC_SM_3DES
FCS_COP.1/CA_SHA_SM_AES
FCS_COP.1/CA_SYM_SM_AES
FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC_SM_AES
Yes FCS_COP.1/CA
FDP_ITC.1/CA Yes FDP_ITC.1/CA
FIA_UAU.1/CA Yes FIA_UAU.1/CA
FIA_UAU.5/CA_3DES
FIA_UAU.5/CA_AES
Yes FIA_UAU.5/CA
FIA_UAU.6/CA Yes FIA_UAU.6/CA
FIA_UID.1/CA Yes FIA_UID.1/CA
FPT_EMS.1/CA No FPT_EMS.1
FPT_TST.1/CA Yes FPT_TST.1/CA
FMT_MTD.1/CA_KEY_WRITE Yes FMT_MTD.1/CA_KEY_WRITE
FMT_MTD.1/CA_KEY_READ Yes FMT_MTD.1/CA_KEY_READ
FDP_UCT.1/CA Yes FDP_UCT.1/CA
FDP_UIT.1/CA Yes FDP_UIT.1/CA
Table 20: CA SFR overview
42 | 92
PACE SFR overview:
PACE SFR Additional? ST generic notation
FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE_AES
FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE_3DES
FCS_CKM.1/ECDH_PACE_AES
FCS_CKM.1/ECDH_PACE_AES
No FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE
FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC_AES
FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC_3DES
No FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC
FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC_AES
FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC_3DES
No FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC
FDP_ACC.1/TRM No FDP_ACC.1/TRM
FDP_ACF.1/PACE_EAC No FDP_ACF.1/TRM
FDP_RIP.1 No FDP_RIP.1
FDP_UCT.1/TRM No FDP_UCT.1/TRM
FDP_UIT.1/TRM No FDP_UIT.1/TRM
FIA_AFL.1/PACE No FIA_AFL.1/PACE
FIA_UAU.1/PACE No FIA_UAU.1/PACE
FIA_UAU.4/PACE No FIA_UAU.4/PACE
FIA_UAU.5/PACE No FIA_UAU.5/PACE
FIA_UAU.6/PACE No FIA_UAU.6/PACE
FIA_UID.1/PACE No FIA_UID.1/PACE
FMT_MTD.1/PACE_KEY_READ No FMT_MTD.1/ KEY_READ
FMT_SMR.1/PACE No FMT_SMR.1/PACE
FPT_EMS.1/PACE No FPT_EMS.1
FTP_ITC.1/PACE No FTP_ITC.1/PACE
FPT_TST.1/PACE No FPT_TST.1/PACE
FMT_MTD.1/PA No FMT_MTD.1/PA
Table 21: PACE SFR overview
SharedPIN SFR Additional? Dispatch in the ST
FDP_ACC.1/TWN_DG2 No FDP_ACC.1/TWN_DG2
FDP_ACF.1/ TWN_DG2 No FDP_ACF.1/ TWN_DG2
Table 22: SFR for TWN_DG2 overview
4.2.4.Overview of the additional protocols
4.2.4.1. Chip Authentication
The Chip Authentication has been added to this Security Target in order to reinforce the BAC
authentication mechanism by ensuring the verification of the Card by the Terminal. For this addition, the
TOE SPD has been refined and contains the following additions:
- Additional Threats: § 5.3.2
- Additional Objective: § 6.1.2
- Additional OSP: § 5.4.2
- Additional Assumptions: § 5.5.2
4.2.4.2. Active Authentication
The additional functionality of Active Authentication (AA) is based on the ICAO PKI V1.1 and the related
on-card generation of RSA and ECC keys.
It implies the following addition to the standard PP:
- Additional Threats: § 5.3.3
- Additional Objective: § 6.1.3
- Additional OSP: § 5.4.3
- Additional Assumptions: § 5.5.3
43 | 92
4.2.4.3. Prepersonalization phase
The prepersonalization phase has been reinforced in this Security Target, with the following elements.
This functionality is usable in phase 5 and phase 6. Once the product is locked, stated as personalized,
it is no more possible to perform this operation.
4.2.4.4. Additional functions
The additional functionality related to sensitive data, protection of TWN_DG2 and access control to
sensitive biometric reference data according to SM level. The additions imply the following additions in
this security target:
Additional Threats: § 5.3.4
Additional Objective: § 6.1.4
4.2.5.Rationale for the additions
In order to be compliant with the CEM, a rationale is given for the additional Objectives on the
Environment, such as to demonstrate that they neither mitigates a threat or fulfil an OSP.
4.2.5.1. OE for CA rationale
OE.Exam_MRTD_CA, OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD_CA and OE.Auth_Key_MRTD define additional
requirements on the operational environment for the Chip Authentication Protocol which is not in the
original scope of the PP BAC. This OE is only linked to threat and OSP for the Chip Authentication and
has no links with those of the PP.
4.2.5.2. OE for AA rationale
The objectives OE.Exam_MRTD_AA, OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD_AA, OE.Activ_Auth_Verif and
OE.Activ_Auth_Sign define additional requirements on the operational environment for the Active
Authentication Protocol which is not in the original scope of the PP BAC. This OE is only linked to threat
and OSP for the Active Authentication and has no links with those of the PP.
4.2.5.3. Assumption for AA rationale
The A.Insp_Sys_AA is added, this assumption is only linked to Active Authentication
mechanism as the Inspection System has to implement the mechanism and shall verify the
authenticity of the MRTD’s chip during inspection using the signature returned by the TOE during Active
Authentication.
4.2.5.4. Assumption for CA rationale
The A.Insp_Sys_CA,
The assumption A.Insp_Sys_CA serves only the Chip authentication mechanism added in the scope
of the evaluation. The inspection system shall implement the CA mechanism. The IS has to verify the
authenticity of the MRTD during the inspection by establishing a secure messaging.
A.Signature_PKI
This assumption is only linked to the Chip authentication as the issuing and receiving States or
Organizations shall establish a public key infrastructure for passive authentication i.e. digital
signature creation and verification for the logical MRTD.
4.3. Non evaluated features
Some features may be part of the TOE but are not evaluated as they are not relevant for the TSFs:
44 | 92
- BAC
- EAC
45 | 92
5. SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION
5.1. Subjects
SFR
Before
phase 5
Phase 5 Phase 6 Phase 7
PP BAC subjects
Manufacturer x x
Personalization Agent x
Terminal x x x
Inspection System x
MRTD Holder x
Traveler x
Attacker x x x x
Additional subjects
IC Developer x
Software Developer x
Prepersonalizer (refinement of
Manufacturer. It corresponds to the MRTD
manufacturer)
x
Table 23: Subjects and phases
5.1.1.PP PACE
Manufacturer
Generic term for the IC Manufacturer producing integrated circuit and the travel document Manufacturer
completing the IC to the travel document. The Manufacturer is the default user of the TOE during the
manufacturing life cycle phase. The TOE itself does not distinguish between the IC Manufacturer and
travel document Manufacturer using this role Manufacturer.
This entity is commensurate with ‘Manufacturer’ in [47].
Personalisation Agent
An organisation acting on behalf of the travel document Issuer to personalise the travel document for
the travel document holder by some or all of the following activities:
 Establishing the identity of the travel document holder for the biographic data in the travel
document
 Enrolling the biometric reference data of the travel document holder
 Writing a subset of these data on the physical travel document (optical personalisation)
and storing them in the travel document (electronic personalisation) for the travel
document holder as defined in [43]
 Writing the document details data
 Writing the initial TSF data
 Signing the Document Security Object defined in [43] (in the role of DS).
Please note that the role ‘Personalisation Agent’ may be distributed among several institutions according
to the operational policy of the travel document Issuer.
This entity is commensurate with ‘Personalisation agent’ in [47].
Application Note
Personalization Agent is refered as the Personalizer in the Security Target
46 | 92
Terminal
A terminal is any technical system communicating with the TOE through the contactless/contact
interface. The role ‘Terminal’ is the default role for any terminal being recognised by the TOE as not
being PACE authenticated (‘Terminal’ is used by the travel document presenter). This entity is
commensurate with ‘Terminal’ in [47].
Basic Inspection System with PACE (BIS-PACE)
A technical system being used by an inspecting authority and verifying the travel document presenteras
the travel documentholder (for ePassport: by comparing the real biometric data (face) of the travel
document presenter with the stored biometric data (DG2) of the travel document holder).
BIS-PACE implements the terminal’s part of the PACE protocol and authenticates itself to the travel
document using a shared password (PACE password) and supports Passive Authentication.
Document Signer (DS)
An organisation enforcing the policy of the CSCA and signing the Document Security Object stored on
the travel document for passive authentication. A Document Signer is authorised by the national CSCA
issuing the Document Signer Certificate (CDS), see [43]. This role is usually delegated to a
Personalisation Agent.
Country Signing Certification Authority (CSCA)
An organisation enforcing the policy of the travel document Issuer with respect to confirming correctness
of user and TSF data stored in the travel document. The CSCA represents the country specific root of
the PKI for the travel document and creates the Document Signer Certificates within this PKI.
The CSCA also issues the self-signed CSCA Certificate (CCSCA) having to be distributed by strictly
secure diplomatic means, see [43].
Travel document holder (MRTD holder)
A person for whom the travel document Issuer has personalised the travel document. This entity is
commensurate with ‘MRTD Holder’ in [47]. Please note that a travel document holder can also be an
attacker.
Travel document presenter (Traveler)
A person presenting the travel document to a terminal and claiming the identity of the travel document
holder. This external entity is commensurate with ‘Traveller’ in [47]. Please note that a travel document
presenter can also be an attacker (s. below).
Attacker
A threat agent (a person or a process acting on his behalf) trying to undermine the security policy defined
by the current PP, especially to change properties of the assets having to be maintained. The attacker
is assumed to possess an at most high attack potential.
Please note that the attacker might ‘capture’ any subject role recognised by the TOE.
This external entity is commensurate with ‘Attacker’ in [47].
5.1.2.Additional Subjects
IC Developer
Developer of the IC.
TOE Developer
Developer of part of the TOE source code.
Prepersonalizer
Agent in charge of the Prepersonalization. This agent corresponds to the MRTD manufacturer as
described in [47].
5.2. Assets
5.2.1.User data
47 | 92
The assets to be protected by the TOE include the User Data on the travel document’s chip, user data
transferred between the TOE and the terminal, and travel document tracing data from the claimed PACE
PP [50], chap 3.1.
Logical travel document sensitive User Data
Sensitive biometric reference data (EF.DG3, EF.DG4)
Authenticity of the travel document’s chip
The authenticity of the travel document’s chip personalised by the issuing State or Organisation for the
travel document holder is used by the traveller to prove his possession of a genuine travel document.
Due to strict conformance to PACE PP, this ST also includes all assets listed in [50], chap 3.1, namely
the primary assets user data stored on the TOE (object 1), user data transferred between the TOE and
the terminal connected (object 2), travel document tracing data (object 3), and the secondary assets
accessibility to the TOE functions and data only for authorised subjects (object 4) Genuineness of the
TOE (object 5), TOE intrinsic secret cryptographic keys (object 6), TOE intrinsic non secret
cryptographic material (object 7), and travel document communication establishment authorisation data
(object 8).
They are refined here below for the present TOE.
User data stored on the TOE
All data (being not authentication data) stored in the context of the eMRTD application of the travel
document as defined in [43] and being allowed to be read out solely by an authenticated terminal acting
as Basic Inspection System with PACE (in the sense of [43]), i.e. for the current TOE:
User Data Description
CPLC Data
Data uniquely identifying the chip. They are considered as
user data as they enable to track the holder
TWN_DG2 Contains personal data, like the address
Sensitive biometric reference
data (EF.DG3, EF.DG4)
Contain the fingerprint and the iris picture
Chip Authentication Public Key
and attributes in EF.DG14
Contain public data enabling to authenticate the chip thanks to
a chip authentication
Active Authentication Public
Key and attributes in EF.DG15
Contain public data enabling to authenticate the chip thanks to
an active authentication
Table 24: User data stored on the TOE
Property to be maintained by the current security policy: Confidentiality, Integrity and Authenticity.
Though not each data element stored on the TOE represents a secret, the specification [4] anyway
requires securing their confidentiality: only terminals authenticated according to [4] can get access to
the user data stored. They have to be operated according to P.Terminal.
User data transferred between the TOE and the terminal connected
All data (being not authentication data) being transferred in the context of the eMRTD application of the
travel document as defined in [47] between the TOE and an authenticated terminal acting as Basic
Inspection System with PACE (in the sense of [43]).
User data can be received and sent (exchange <--> [receive, send]).
Property to be maintained by the current security policy: Confidentiality, Integrity and Authenticity.
Though not each data element being transferred represents a secret, the specification [4] anyway
requires securing their confidentiality: the secure messaging in encrypt-then-authenticate mode is
required for all messages according to [4].
Travel document tracing data
Technical information about the current and previous locations of the travel document gathered
unnoticeable by the travel document holder recognising the TOE not knowing any PACE password.
TOE tracing data can be provided / gathered.
Property to be maintained by the current security policy: Unavailability
48 | 92
Unavailability represents a prerequisite for anonymity of the travel document holder
5.2.2.TSF data
Accessibility to the TOE functions and data only for authorised subjects
Property of the TOE to restrict access to TSF and TSF-data stored in the TOE to authorised subjects
only.
TSF data Description
Personalisation Agent reference
authentication Data
Private key enabling to authenticate the Personalisation
agent (same as PACE ST)
Password Authenticated
Connection Establishment (PACE)
Key
Master keys used to established a trusted channel
between the Basic Inspection Terminal and the travel
document (same as PACE ST)
Session keys for the secure
channel
Session keys used to protect the communication in
confidentiality and in integrity
Table 25: Accessibility to the TOE functions and data only for authorised subjects
Property to be maintained by the current security policy: Availability.
Genuineness of the TOE
Property of the TOE is to be authentic in order to provide claimed security functionality in a proper way.
The authenticity of the MRTD's chip personalised by the issuing State or Organization for the MRTD
holder is used by the traveller to prove his possession of a genuine MRTD. This asset also covers
"Authenticity of the MRTD's chip" in [47].
TSF data Description
Chip Authentication private Key
Private key the chip uses to perform a chip
authentication
Active Authentication private key
Private key the chip uses to perform an active
authentication
Current Date Current date of the travel document
Table 26: Genuineness of the TOE
Property to be maintained by the current security policy: Availability.
TOE internal secret cryptographic keys
Permanently or temporarily stored secret cryptographic material used by the TOE in order to enforce its
security functionality.
TSF data Description
Personalisation Agent reference
authentication Data
Private key enabling to authenticate the Personalisation agent
Password Authenticated
Connection Establishment
(PACE) Key
Master keys used to established a trusted channel between the
Basic Inspection Terminal and the travel document
Chip Authentication private Key Private key the chip uses to perform a chip authentication
Active Authentication private
key
Private key the chip uses to perform an active authentication
Session keys for the secure
channel
Session keys used to protect the communication in confidentiality
and in integrity
MSK
Manufacturer Secret Key used to perform the authentication of the
personal agent in pre-personalisation phase
Table 27: TOE internal secret cryptographic keys
49 | 92
Property to be maintained by the current security policy: Confidentiality, Integrity.
TOE internal non-secret cryptographic material
Permanently or temporarily stored non-secret cryptographic (public) keys and other non-secret material
(Document Security Object SOD containing digital signature) used by the TOE in order to enforce its
security functionality.
TSF data Description
Life Cycle State Life Cycle state of the TOE
Public Key CVCA Trust point of the travel document stored in persistent memory
CVCA Certificate All the data related to the CVCA key (expiration date, name,..) stored in
persistent memory
Current Date Current date of the travel document
Table 28: TOE internal non-secret cryptographic material
Property to be maintained by the current security policy: Integrity, Authenticity.
Travel Document communication establishment authorisation data
Restricted-revealable authorization information for a human user being used for verification of the
authorisation attempts as authorised user (PACE password). These data are stored in the TOE and are
not to be send to it.
TSF data Description
PACE password
(MRZ or CAN)
Reference information being persistently stored in the TOE and
allowing PACE authentication
Table 29: Travel Document communication establishment authorisation data
Property to be maintained by the current security policy: Confidentiality, Integrity.
5.3. Threats
This section describes the threats to be averted by the TOE independently or in collaboration with its IT
environment. These threats result from the TOE method of use in the operational environment and the
assets stored in or protected by the TOE.
5.3.1.PP PACE
T.Skimming
Adverse action
An attacker imitates an inspection system in order to get access to the user data stored on or transferred
between the TOE and the inspecting authority connected via the contactless/contact interface of the
TOE.
Threat agent
Having high attack potential, cannot read and does not know the correct value of the shared password
(PACE password) in advance.
Asset
Confidentiality of logical travel document data
T.Eavesdropping
Adverse action
An attacker is listening to the communication between the travel document and the PACE authenticated
BIS-PACE in order to gain the user data transferred between the TOE and the terminal connected.
Threat agent
50 | 92
Having high attack potential, cannot read and does not know the correct value of the shared password
(PACE password) in advance.
Asset
Confidentiality of logical travel document data
T.Tracing
Adverse action
An attacker tries to gather TOE tracing data (i.e. to trace the movement of the travel document)
unambiguously identifying it remotely by establishing or listening to a communication via the
contactless/contact interface of the TOE.
Threat agent
Having high attack potential, cannot read and does not know the correct value of the shared password
(PACE password) in advance.
Asset
Privacy of the travel document holder
T.Forgery
Adverse action
An attacker fraudulently alters the User Data or/and TSF-data stored on the travel document or/and
exchanged between the TOE and the terminal connected in order to outsmart the PACE authenticated
BIS-PACE by means of changed travel document holder’s related reference data (like biographic or
biometric data). The attacker does it in such a way that the terminal connected perceives these modified
data as authentic one.
Threat agent
having high attack potential.
Asset
integrity of the travel document.
T.Abuse-Func
Adverse action
An attacker may use functions of the TOE which shall not be used in TOE operational phase in order (i)
to manipulate or to disclose the User Data stored in the TOE, (ii) to manipulate or to disclose the TSF-
data stored in the TOE or (iii) to manipulate (bypass, deactivate or modify) soft-coded security
functionality of the TOE. This threat addresses the misuse of the functions for the initialisation and
personalisation in the operational phase after delivery to the travel document holder.
Threat agent
having high attack potential, being in possession of one or more legitimate travel documents
Asset
integrity and authenticity of the travel document, availability of the functionality of the travel document.
T.Information_Leakage
Adverse action
An attacker may exploit information leaking from the TOE during its usage in order to disclose
confidential User Data or/and TSF-data stored on the travel document or/and exchanged between the
TOE and the terminal connected. The information leakage may be inherent in the normal operation or
caused by the attacker.
Threat agent
having high attack potential.
Asset
confidentiality of User Data and TSF-data of the travel document.
Application note: Leakage may occur through emanations, variations in power consumption, I/O
characteristics, clock frequency, or by changes in processing time requirements. This leakage may be
interpreted as a covert channel transmission, but is more closely related to measurement of operating
parameters which may be derived either from measurements of the contactless interface (emanation)
or direct measurements (by contact to the chip still available even for a contactless chip) and can then
be related to the specific operation being performed. Examples are Differential Electromagnetic Analysis
(DEMA) and Differential Power Analysis (DPA). Moreover the attacker may try actively to enforce
information leakage by fault injection (e.g. Differential Fault Analysis)..
51 | 92
T.Phys-Tamper
Adverse action
An attacker may perform physical probing of the travel document in order (i) to disclose the TSF-data,
or (ii) to disclose/reconstruct the TOE’s Embedded Software. An attacker may physically modify the
travel document in order to alter (I) its security functionality (hardware and software part, as well), (ii)
the User Data or the TSF-data stored on the travel document.
Threat agent
having high attack potential, being in possession of one or more legitimate travel documents.
Asset
integrity and authenticity of the travel document, availability of the functionality of the travel document,
confidentiality of User Data and TSF-data of the travel document.
Application note: Physical tampering may be focused directly on the disclosure or manipulation of the
user data (e.g. authentication key of the travel document) or indirectly by preparation of the TOE to
following attack methods by modification of security features (e.g. to enable information leakage through
power analysis). Physical tampering requires a direct interaction with the travel document’s internals.
Techniques commonly employed in IC failure analysis and IC reverse engineering efforts may be used.
Before that, hardware security mechanisms and layout characteristics need to be identified.
Determination of software design including treatment of the user data and the TSF data may also be a
pre-requisite. The modification may result in the deactivation of a security function, the biometric
reference data for the inspection system) or the TSF data (e.g.
T.Malfunction
Adverse action
An attacker may cause a malfunction the travel document’s hardware and Embedded Software by
applying environmental stress in order to (i) deactivate or modify security features or functionality of the
TOE’ hardware or to (ii) circumvent, deactivate or modify security functions of the TOE’s Embedded
Software. This may be achieved e.g. by operating the travel document outside the normal operating
conditions, exploiting errors in the travel document’s Embedded Software or misusing administrative
functions. To exploit these vulnerabilities an attacker needs information about the functional operation.
Threat agent
having high attack potential, being in possession of one or more legitimate travel documents, having
information about the functional operation.
Asset
integrity and authenticity of the travel document, availability of the functionality of the travel document,
confidentiality of User Data and TSF-data of the travel document.
Application note: A malfunction of the TOE may also be caused using a direct interaction with elements
on the chip surface. This is considered as being a manipulation (refer to the threat T.PhysTamper)
assuming a detailed knowledge about TOE’s internals.
5.3.2.CA
T.Counterfeit
Adverse action:
An attacker with high attack potential produces an unauthorized copy or reproduction of a genuine
MRTD's chip to be used as part of a counterfeit MRTD. This violates the authenticity of the MRTD's chip
used for authentication of a traveller by possession of a MRTD. The attacker may generate a new data
set or extract completely or partially the data from a genuine MRTD's chip and copy them on another
appropriate chip to imitate this genuine MRTD's chip.
Threat agent:
having high attack potential, being in possession of one or more legitimate MRTDs
Asset:
authenticity of logical MRTD data
5.3.3.AA
52 | 92
T.Counterfeit
The definition is in the previous chapter.
5.3.4.Additional threat
T. Read_DG2 “read DG2 stored in the TOE”
Adverse action: An attacker reads fraudulently the DG2 stored in TWN_ADF.
Threat agent: having high attack potential, being in possession of one or more legitimate MRTDs.
Asset: confidentiality of data stored in file DG2 of TWN_ADF.
5.4. Organisational Security Policies
The TOE shall comply with the following Organisational Security Policies (OSP) as security rules,
procedures, practices, or guidelines imposed by an organisation upon its operations.
5.4.1.PP PACE
P.Manufact
The Initialization Data are written by the IC Manufacturer to identify the IC uniquely. The MRTD
Manufacturer writes the Pre-personalization Data which contains at least the Personalization Agent Key.
P.Pre-Operational
1) The travel document Issuer issues the travel document and approves it using the terminals complying
with all applicable laws and regulations.
2) The travel document Issuer guarantees correctness of the user data (amongst other of those,
concerning the travel document holder) and of the TSF-data permanently stored in the TOE.
3) The travel document Issuer uses only such TOE’s technical components (IC) which enable traceability
of the travel documents in their manufacturing and issuing life cycle phases, i.e. before they are in the
operational phase.
4) If the travel document Issuer authorises a Personalisation Agent to personalise the travel document
for travel document holders, the travel document Issuer has to ensure that the Personalisation Agent
acts in accordance with the travel document Issuer’s policy.
P.Card_PKI
1) The travel document Issuer shall establish a public key infrastructure for the passive authentication,
i.e. for digital signature creation and verification for the travel document. For this aim, he runs a Country
Signing Certification Authority (CSCA). The travel document Issuer shall publish the CSCA Certificate
(CCSCA)
2) The CSCA shall securely generate, store and use the CSCA key pair. The CSCA shall keep the
CSCA Private Key secret and issue a self-signed CSCA Certificate (CCSCA) having to be made
available to the travel document Issuer by strictly secure means, see [53]. The CSCA shall create the
Document Signer Certificates for the Document Signer Public Keys (CDS) and make them available to
the travel document Issue.
3) A Document Signer shall:
(i) Generate the Document Signer Key Pair
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(ii) Hand over the Document Signer Public Key to the CSCA for certification
(iii) Keep the Document Signer Private Key secret
(iv) Securely use the Document Signer Private Key for signing the Document Security
Objects of travel documents.
P.Trustworthy_PKI
The CSCA shall ensure that it issues its certificates exclusively to the rightful organisations (DS) and
DSs shall ensure that they sign exclusively correct Document Security Objects to be stored on the travel
document.
P.Terminal
The Basic Inspection Systems with PACE (BIS-PACE) shall operate their terminals as follows:
1) The related terminals shall be used by terminal operators and by travel document holders
2) They shall implement the terminal parts of the PACE protocol [53], of the Passive Authentication [43]
and use them in this order. The PACE terminal shall use randomly and (almost) uniformly selected
nonces, if required by the protocols (for generating ephemeral keys for Diffie-Hellmann)
3) The related terminals need not to use any own credentials
4) They shall also store the Country Signing Public Key and the Document Signer Public Key (in form
of CCSCA and CDS) in order to enable and to perform Passive Authentication (determination of the
authenticity of data groups stored in the travel document, [43])
5) The related terminals and their environment shall ensure confidentiality and integrity of respective
data handled by them (e.g. confidentiality of PACE passwords, integrity of PKI certificates, etc.), where
it is necessary for a secure operation of the TOE
5.4.2.CA
P.Chip_Auth
The terminal implements the Chip Authentication protocol as described in [43].
5.4.3.AA
P.Activ_Auth
The terminal implements the Active Authentication protocol as described in [43].
5.5. Assumptions
The assumptions describe the security aspects of the environment in which the TOE will be used or is
intended to be used.
5.5.1.PP PACE
A.Passive_Auth
The issuing and receiving States or Organisations establish a public key infrastructure for passive
authentication i.e. digital signature creation and verification for the logical travel document. The issuing
State or Organisation runs a Certification Authority (CA) which securely generates, stores and uses the
Country Signing CA Key pair. The CA keeps the Country Signing CA Private Key secret and is
recommended to distribute the Country Signing CA Public Key to ICAO, all receiving States maintaining
its integrity.
The Document Signer
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 Generates the Document Signer Key Pair
 Hands over the Document Signer Public Key to the CA for certification
 Keeps the Document Signer Private Key secret
 Uses securely the Document Signer Private Key for signing the Document Security Objects
of the travel documents.
The CA creates the Document Signer Certificates for the Document Signer Public Keys that are
distributed to the receiving States and Organisations. It is assumed that the Personalisation Agent
ensures that the Document Security Object contains only the hash values of genuine user data
according to [43].
5.5.2.Assumptions for Chip Authentication
A.Insp_Sys_CA
The Inspection System implements the Chip Authentication Mechanism. The Inspection System verifies
the authenticity of the MRTD’s chip during inspection and establishes secure messaging with keys
established by the Chip Authentication Mechanism.
A.Signature_PKI
The issuing and receiving States or Organizations establish a public key infrastructure for passive
authentication i.e. digital signature creation and verification for the logical MRTD. The issuing State or
Organization runs a Certification Authority (CA) which securely generates, stores and uses the Country
Signing CA Key pair. The CA keeps the Country Signing CA Private Key secret and is recommended to
distribute the Country Signing CA Public Key to ICAO, all receiving States maintaining its integrity. The
Document Signer (i) generates the Document Signer Key Pair, (ii) hands over the Document Signer
Public Key to the CA for certification, (iii) keeps the Document Signer Private Key secret and (iv) uses
securely the Document Signer Private Key for signing the Document Security Objects of the MRTDs.
The CA creates the Document Signer Certificates for the Document Signer Public Keys that are
distributed to the receiving States and Organizations.
5.5.3.Assumptions for Active Authentication
A.Insp_Sys_AA
The Inspection System implements the Active Authentication Mechanism. The Inspection System
verifies the authenticity of the MRTD’s chip during inspection using the signature returned by the TOE
during Active Authentication.
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6. SECURITY OBJECTIVES
This chapter describes the security objectives for the TOE and the security objectives for the TOE
environment. The security objectives for the TOE environment are separated into security objectives for
the development and production environment and security objectives for the operational environment.
6.1. Security Objectives for the TOE
This section describes the security objectives for the TOE addressing the aspects of identified threats
to be countered by the TOE and organizational security policies to be met by the TOE.
6.1.1.SO from PP PACE
OT.Data_Int
The TOE must ensure integrity of the User Data and the TSF-data stored on it by protecting these data
against unauthorised modification (physical manipulation and unauthorised modifying).The TOE must
ensure integrity of the User Data and the TSF-data during their exchange between the TOE and the
terminal connected (and represented by PACE authenticated BIS-PACE) after the PACE Authentication.
OT.Data_Auth (OT.Data_Authenticity)
The TOE must ensure authenticity of the User Data and the TSF-data stored on it by enabling verification
of their authenticity at the terminal-side. The TOE must ensure authenticity of the User Data and the
TSF-data during their exchange between the TOE and the terminal connected (and represented by
PACE authenticated BIS-PACE) after the PACE Authentication. It shall happen by enabling such a
verification at the terminal-side (at receiving by the terminal) and by an active verification by the TOE
itself (at receiving by the TOE).
OT.Data_Conf (OT.Data_Confidentiality)
The TOE must ensure confidentiality of the User Data and the TSF-data by granting read access only
to the PACE authenticated BIS-PACE connected. The TOE must ensure confidentiality of the User Data
and the TSF-data during their exchange between the TOE and the terminal connected after the PACE
Authentication.
OT.Tracing
The TOE must prevent gathering TOE tracing data by means of unambiguous identifying the travel
document remotely through establishing or listening to a communication via the contactless/contact
interface of the TOE without knowledge of the correct values of shared passwords (PACE passwords)
in advance.
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
After delivery of the TOE to the MRTD Holder, the TOE must prevent the abuse of test and support
functions that may be maliciously used to:
- (i) Disclose critical User Data
- (ii) Manipulate critical User Data of the IC Embedded Software
- (iii) Manipulate Soft-coded IC Embedded Software
- (iv) Bypass, deactivate, change or explore security features or functions of the TOE.
Details of the relevant attack scenarios depend, for instance, on the capabilities of the Test Features
provided by the IC Dedicated Test Software which are not specified here.
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
The TOE must provide protection against disclosure of confidential TSF data stored and/or processed
in the MRTD's chip:
- By measurement and analysis of the shape and amplitude of signals or the time between events
found by measuring signals on the electromagnetic field, power consumption, clock, or I/O lines
and
- By forcing a malfunction of the TOE and/or
- By a physical manipulation of the TOE.
56 | 92
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
The TOE must provide protection of the confidentiality and integrity of the User Data, the TSF Data, and
the MRTD's chip Embedded Software. This includes protection against attacks with enhanced-basic
attack potential by means of
- Measuring through galvanic contacts which is direct physical probing on the chips surface
except on pads being bonded (using standard tools for measuring voltage and current) or
- Measuring not using galvanic contacts but other types of physical interaction between charges
(using tools used in solid-state physics research and IC failure analysis)
- Manipulation of the hardware and its security features, as well as
- Controlled manipulation of memory contents (User Data, TSF Data)
with a prior
- reverse-engineering to understand the design and its properties and functions.
OT.Prot_Malfunction
The TOE must ensure its correct operation. The TOE must prevent its operation outside the normal
operating conditions where reliability and secure operation has not been proven or tested. This is to
prevent errors. The environmental conditions may include external energy (esp. electromagnetic) fields,
voltage (on any contacts), clock frequency, or temperature.
OT.Identification
The TOE must provide means to store IC Identification and Pre-Personalization Data in its nonvolatile
memory. The IC Identification Data must provide a unique identification of the IC during Phase 2
"Manufacturing" and Phase 3 "Personalization of the MRTD". The storage of the Pre- Personalization
data includes writing of the Personalization Agent Key(s). The storage of the Prepersonalization data
includes writing of the Personalization Agent Key(s).
OT.AC_Pers
The TOE must ensure that the logical MRTD data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16, the Document security object
according to LDS [43] and the TSF data can be written by authorized Personalization Agents only. The
logical MRTD data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 and the TSF data may be written only during and cannot be
changed after its personalization. The Document security object can be updated by authorized
Personalization Agents if data in the data groups EF.DG 3 to EF.DG16 are added.
Application note:
The OT.AC_Pers implies that the data of the LDS groups written during personalisation for travel
document holder (at least EF.DG1 and EF.DG2) can not be changed using write access after
personalisation.
6.1.2.SO for CA
OT.CA_Proof
The TOE must support the General Inspection Systems to verify the identity and authenticity of the
MRTD’s chip as issued by the identified issuing State or Organization by means of the Chip
Authentication. The authenticity proof provided by the MRTD’s chip shall be protected against attacks
with high attack potential.
Application note: The objective implies the MRTD’s to have (i) a unique identity as given by the MRTD’s
Document Number, (ii) a secret to prove its identity by knowledge i.e. a private authentication key as
TSF data. The TOE shall protect this TSF data to prevent their misuse. The terminal shall have the
reference data to verify the authentication attempt of MRTD’s chip i.e. a certificate for the Chip
Authentication Public Key that matches the Chip Authentication Private Key of the MRTD’s chip. This
certificate is provided by (i) the Chip Authentication Public Key (EF.DG14) in the LDS [43] and (ii) the
hash value of the Chip Authentication Public Key in the Document Security Object signed by the
Document Signer.
OT.Data_Int_CA
The TOE must ensure the integrity of the logical MRTD stored on the MRTD's chip against physical
manipulation and unauthorized writing. The TOE must ensure the integrity of the logical MRTD data
during their transmission to the General Inspection System after Chip Authentication.
57 | 92
6.1.3.SO for AA
OT.AA_Proof
The TOE must support the Inspection Systems to verify the identity and authenticity of MRTD’s chip as
issued by the identified issuing State or Organization by means of the Active Authentication as defined
in [43]. The authenticity proof through AA provided by MRTD’s chip shall be protected against attacks
with high attack potential.
OT.Data_Int_AA
The TOE must ensure the integrity of the logical MRTD stored on the MRTD's chip against physical
manipulation and unauthorized writing. The TOE must ensure the integrity of the logical MRTD data
during their transmission to the General Inspection System after Active Authentication.
6.1.4.SO for additions
OT.TWN_DG2 “protection of confidential Holder information”
The TOE must ensure the confidentiality of the sensitive information (EF.DG2 from ADF TWN) by
granting read access only to authorized entity. The confidentiality of the sensitive data shall be protected
against attacks with high attack potential.
During use phase, the TOE must allow the read the DG2 after successful authentication with the
SharedPin and after the establishement of PACE protocol.
6.2. Security objectives for the Operational Environment
6.2.1.PP PACE
OE.Legislative_Compliance
The travel document Issuer must issue the travel document and approve it using the terminals complying
with all applicable laws and regulations
OE.Pass_Auth_Sign (OE.Passive_Auth_Sign)
The travel document Issuer has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure as follows: the CSCA
acting on behalf and according to the policy of the travel document Issuer must (i) generate a
cryptographically secure CSCA Key Pair, (ii) ensure the secrecy of the CSCA Private Key and sign
Document Signer Certificates in a secure operational environment, and (iii) publish the Certificate of the
CSCA Public Key (CCSCA). Hereby authenticity and integrity of these certificates are being maintained.
A Document Signer acting in accordance with the CSCA policy must:
(i) generate a cryptographically secure Document Signing Key Pair
(ii) ensure the secrecy of the Document Signer Private Key
(iii) hand over the Document Signer Public Key to the CSCA for certification
(iv) sign Document Security Objects of genuine travel documents in a secure operational environment
only. The digital signature in the Document Security Object relates to all hash values for each data group
in use according to [6].
The Personalisation Agent has to ensure that the Document Security Object contains only the hash
values of genuine user data according to [6]. The CSCA must issue its certificates exclusively to the
rightful organisations (DS) and DSs must sign exclusively correct DocumentSecurity Objects to be
stored on travel document.
OE.Personalization
The travel document Issuer must ensure that the Personalisation Agents acting on his behalf:
(i) establish the correct identity of the travel document holder and create the biographical data for the
travel document
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(ii) enrol the biometric reference data of the travel document holder
(iii) write a subset of these data on the physical Passport (optical personalisation) and store them in the
travel document (electronic personalisation) for the travel document holder as defined in [6]
(iv) write the document details data
(v) write the initial TSF data
(vi) sign the Document Security Object defined in [6](in the role of a DS).
OE.Terminal
The terminal operators must operate their terminals as follows:
1.) The related terminals (basic inspection systems, cf. above) are used by terminal operators
and by travel document holders as defined in [6]
2.) The related terminals implement the terminal parts of the PACE protocol [4], of the Passive
Authentication [4] (by verification of the signature of the Document Security Object) and use
them in this order. The PACE terminal uses randomly and (almost) uniformly selected nonces,
if required by the protocols (for generating ephemeral keys for Diffie-Hellmann)
3.) The related terminals need not to use any own credentials
4.) The related terminals securely store the Country Signing Public Key and the Document
Signer Public Key (in form of CCSCAand CDS) in order to enable and to perform Passive
Authentication of the travel document (determination of the authenticity of data groups stored in
the travel document, [6])
5.) The related terminals and their environment must ensure confidentiality and integrity of
respective data handled by them (e.g. confidentiality of the PACE passwords, integrity of PKI
certificates, etc.), where it is necessary for a secure operation of the TOE according to the
current PP
OE.MRTD_Holder (OE.Travel_Document_Holder)
The travel document holder may reveal, if necessary, his or her verification values of the PACE
password to an authorized person or device who definitely act according to respective regulations and
are trustworthy.
6.2.2.OE for CA
OE.Auth_Key_MRTD
The issuing State or Organization has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure in order to:
- (i) Generate the MRTD's Chip Authentication Key Pair
- (ii) Sign and store the Chip Authentication Public Key in the Chip Authentication Public Key data
in EF.DG14
- (iii) Support inspection systems of receiving States or organizations to verify the authenticity of
the MRTD's chip used for genuine MRTD by certification of the Chip Authentication Public Key by means
of the Document Security Object.
OE.Exam_MRTD_CA
Aditionally to the OE.Exam_MRTD, the inspection systems perform the Chip Authentication protocol to
verify the Authenticity of the presented MRTD’s chip.
OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD_CA
Aditionally to the OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD, the inspection system prevents eavesdropping to their
communication with the TOE before secure messaging is successfully established based on the Chip
Authentication Protocol.
Application note
The Inspection Systems follow the order (i) running the Basic Access Control Protocol, (ii) reading and
verifying only those parts of the logical MRTD that are necessary to know for the Chip Authentication
Mechanism (i.e. Document Security Object and Chip Authentication Public Key), (iii) running the Chip
Authentication Protocol, and (iv) reading and verifying the less-sensitive data of the logical MRTD after
Chip Authentication. The supposed sequence has the advantage that the less-sensitive data are
protected by secure messaging with cryptographic keys based on the Chip Authentication Protocol
which quality is under control of the TOE. The inspection system will prevent additionally eavesdropping
to their communication with the TOE before secure messaging is successfully established based on the
59 | 92
Chip Authentication Protocol. Note that reading the less sensitive data directly after Basic Access
Control Mechanism is allowed and is not assumed as threat in this PP. But the TOE ensures that reading
of sensitive data is possible after successful Chip Authentication.
6.2.3.OE for AA
OE.Exam_MRTD_AA
Aditionally to the OE.Exam_MRTD, the inspection systems perform the Active Authentication protocol
to verify the Authenticity of the presented MRTD’s chip.
OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD_AA
Aditionally to the OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD, the inspection system prevents eavesdropping to their
communication with the TOE before secure messaging is successfully established based on the Active
Authentication Protocol.
OE.Activ_Auth_Verif
In addition to the verification by passive authentication, the inspection systems may use the verification
by Active Authentication, which offers a stronger guaranty of the authenticity of the MRTD.
OE.Activ_Auth_Sign
The issuing State or Organization has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure in order to (i)
generate the MRTD’s Active Authentication Key Pair, (ii) ensure the secrecy of the MRTD’s Active
Authentication Private Key, sign and store the Active Authentication Public Key in the Active
Authentication Public Key data in EF.DG15 and (iii) support inspection systems of receiving States or
organizations to verify the authenticity of the MRTD’s chip used for genuine MRTD by certification of the
Active Authentication Public Key by means of the Document Security Object.
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7. EXTENDED REQUIREMENTS
7.1. Extended family FAU_SAS - Audit data storage
7.1.1.Extended components FAU_SAS.1
Description: see [47].
FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage
FAU_SAS.1.1 The TSF shall provide [assignment: authorized users] with the capability to store
[assignment: list of audit information] in the audit records.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
Rationale: see [47]
7.2. Extended family FCS_RND - Generation of random numbers
7.2.1.Extended component FCS_RND.1
Description: see [47]
FCS_RND.1 Quality metric for random numbers
FCS_RND.1.1 The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate random numbers that meet
[assignment: a defined quality metric].
Dependencies: No dependencies.
Rationale: See [47]
7.3. Extended family FIA_API – Authentication proof of identity
7.3.1.Extended component FIA_API.1
Description: see [48]
FIA_API.1 Quality metric for random numbers
FIA_API.1.1 The TSF shall provide a [assignment: authentication mechanism] to prove the identity of
the [assignment: authorized user or role].
Dependencies: No dependencies.
Rationale: See [48]
7.4. Extended family FMT_LIM - Limited capabilities and availability
7.4.1.Extended component FMT_LIM.1
Description: see [47]
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities
FMT_LIM.1.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so that in conjunction
with "Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)" the following policy is enforced [assignment: Limited capability
and availability policy].
Dependencies: (FMT_LIM.2)
Rationale: See [47]
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7.4.2.Extended component FMT_LIM.2
Description: See [47]
FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability
FMT_LIM.2.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so that in conjunction
with "Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)" the following policy is enforced [assignment: Limited capability
and availability policy].
Dependencies: (FMT_LIM.1)
Rationale: See [47]
7.5. Extended family FPT_EMS - TOE Emanation
7.5.1.Extended component FPT_EMS.1
Description: see [47]
FPT_EMS.1 TOE Emanation
FPT_EMS.1.1 The TOE shall not emit [assignment: types of emissions] in excess of [assignment:
specified limits] enabling access to [assignment: list of types of TSF data] and [assignment: list of types
of user data].
FPT_EMS.1.2 The TSF shall ensure [assignment: type of users] are unable to use the following interface
[assignment: type of connection] to gain access to [assignment: list of types of TSF data] and
[assignment: list of types of user data].
Dependencies: No dependencies.
Rationale: See [47]
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8. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
8.1. Security Functional Requirements
This chapter presents the Security Functional Requirements to take into account within the TOE
configuration presented in this security target. It is composed of the following elements:
- Global SFR that are applicable to all the passports configuration
- MP SFR for covering the phase Manufacturing and Personalization described in the Passport
Protection Profile.
- Active Authentication SFR that cover the Active Authentication Protocol
- CA SFR that cover the Chip Authentication Protocol
- PACE SFR that cover the Password Authenticated Connection Establishment protocol
- PACE CAM that cover the Password Authenticated Connection Establishment with Chip
Authentication Mapping protocol
8.1.1.Global SFR
This chapter covers the common SFR that are shared between the different parts of the embedded
application on the product.
FCS_CKM.4/Global Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.4.1/Global The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key destruction method zeroisation that meets the following: none.
FCS_RND.1/Global Quality metric for random numbers
FCS_RND.1.1/Global The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate random numbers that meet
1. The requirement to provide an entropy of at least 7.976 bits in each byte, following AIS 31[34] and
2. The requirement of FIPS SP800-90 [18]for random number generation.
FMT_LIM.1/Global Limited capabilities
FMT_LIM.1.1/Global The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so that in
conjunction with "Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)" the following policy is enforced:
Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow:
1. User Data to be manipulated
2. TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated
3. Software to be reconstructed
4. Substantial information about construction of TSF to be gathered which may enable other
attacks
FMT_LIM.2/Global Limited availability
FMT_LIM.2.1/Global The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so that in
conjunction with "Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)" the following policy is enforced:
Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow
1. User Data to be manipulated
2. TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated
3. Software to be reconstructed
4. Substantial information about construction of TSF to be gathered which may enable other
attacks
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FPT_EMS.1/Global TOE Emanation
FPT_EMS.1.1/Global The TOE shall not emit power variations, timing variations during command
execution in excess of non useful information enabling access to
1. EF.COM, EF.SOD and EF.DG1 to EF.DG16
FPT_EMS.1.2/Global The TSF shall ensure any unauthorized users are unable to use the following
interface smart card circuit contacts to gain access to
1. EF.COM, EF.SOD and EF.DG1 to EF.DG16
FPT_FLS.1/Global Failure with preservation of secure state
FPT_FLS.1.1/Global The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of failures occur:
1. Exposure to out-of-range operating conditions where therefore a malfunction could occur
2. Failure detected by TSF according to FPT_TST.1.
FPT_TST.1/Global TSF testing
FPT_TST.1.1/Global The TSF shall run a suite of self tests to demonstrate the correct operation of the
TSF, at the conditions:
At reset
Before any cryptographic operation
When accessing a DG or any EF
Prior to any use of TSF data
Before execution of any command
FPT_TST.1.2/Global The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of
TSF data.
FPT_TST.1.3/Global The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of
stored TSF executable code.
FPT_PHP.3/Global Resistance to physical attack
FPT_PHP.3.1/Global The TSF shall resist physical manipulation and physical probing to the TSF
by responding automatically such that the SFRs are always enforced.
8.1.2.Product configuration SFR
This chapter adds some requirements on Manufacturing and Personalization SFR.
FCS_CKM.1/MP Cryptographic key generation
FCS_CKM.1.1 The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic
key generation algorithm [cryptographic key generation algorithm] and specified cryptographic key
sizes [key length] that meet the following [standard]:
Cryptographic key generation algorithm
Key length
(bits)
Standards
MSK derivation from initial MSK loaded in phase 1 using SHA 256 256 None
64 | 92
FCS_COP.1/MP_ENC_3DES Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/MP_ENC_3DES The TSF shall perform [cryptographic operation] in accordance with
a specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes
[cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following [standard]:
Cryptographic operation Algo
Key length
(bits)
Standard
Secure Messaging – encryption and
decryption
3DES in CBC mode 112 [13][12]
FCS_COP.1/MP_ENC_AES Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/MP_ENC_AES The TSF shall perform [cryptographic operation] in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes
[cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following [standard]:
Cryptographic operation Algo
Key length
(bits)
Standard
Secure Messaging – encryption and
decryption
AES in CBC mode 128, 192 and 256 [17]
FCS_COP.1/MP_MAC_3DES Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/MP_MAC_3DES The TSF shall perform [cryptographic operation] in accordance with
a specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes
[cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following [standard]:
Cryptographic operation Algo
Key length
(bits)
Standard
Secure Messaging – MAC 3DES RMAC 112 [15][13][12]
FCS_COP.1/MP_MAC_AES Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/MP_MAC_AES The TSF shall perform [cryptographic operation] in accordance with
a specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes
[cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following [standard]:
Cryptographic operation Algo
Key length
(bits)
Standard
Secure Messaging MAC AES 128, 192 and 256 [17]
FCS_COP.1/MP_AUTH_3DES Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/MP_AUTH_3DES The TSF shall perform [cryptographic operation] in accordance with
a specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes
[cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following [standard]:
Cryptographic operation Algo
Key length
(bits)
Standard
Card Manufacturer Authentication (MSK) 3DES 112 [12]
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FCS_COP.1/MP_AUTH_AES Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/MP_AUTH_AES The TSF shall perform [cryptographic operation] in accordance with
a specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes
[cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following [standard]:
Cryptographic operation Algo
Key length
(bits)
Standard
Card Manufacturer Authentication (MSK) AES 128, 192 and 256 [17]
FCS_COP.1/MP_SHA Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/MP_SHA The TSF shall perform [cryptographic operation] in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes
[cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following [standard]:
Cryptographic operation Algo
Key length
(bits)
Standard
Hashing SHA256 None [29]
FDP_ACC.2/MP Complete access control
FDP_ACC.2.1/MP The TSF shall enforce the Prepersonalization Access Control on all subjects and
all objects and all operations among subjects and objects covered by the SFP.
FDP_ACC.2.2/MP The TSF shall ensure that all operations between any subject controlled by the TSF
and any object controlled by the TSF are covered by an access control SFP.
FDP_ACF.1/MP Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACF.1.1/MP The TSF shall enforce the Prepersonalization Access Control to objects based on
the following Prepersonalizer Authentication (AS_AUTH_MSK_STATUS).
FDP_ACF.1.2/MP The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among
controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: AS_AUTH_MSK_STATUS=TRUE (EXTERNAL
AUTHENTICATE).
FDP_ACF.1.3/MP The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the following
additional rules: none.
FDP_ACF.1.4/MP The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following
additional rules: none.
Application Note
This SFR enforces access control over all the operation in phase 5.
AS_AUTH_MSK_STATUS is related to authentication status or the prepersonalizer. If the
Authentication is successful, the AS_AUTH_MSK_STATUS is set to true. Otherwise the
AS_AUTH_MSK_STATUS is set to false.
FDP_ITC.1/MP Import of user data without security attributes
FDP_ITC.1.1/MP The TSF shall enforce the Prepersonalization access control when importing user
data, controlled under the SFP, from outside of the TOE.
66 | 92
FDP_ITC.1.2/MP The TSF shall ignore any security attributes associated with the user data when
imported from outside the TOE.
FDP_ITC.1.3/MP The TSF shall enforce the following rules when importing user data controlled under
the SFP from outside the TOE: none.
Application Note
This SFR control import of data in phase 5.
This SFR ensures also the MSK diversification, which is performs once, at first command, without any
security requirements preliminary to this action.
FDP_UCT.1/MP Basic data exchange confidentiality
FDP_UCT.1.1/MP The TSF shall enforce the Prepersonalization access control to receive user data
in a manner protected from unauthorised disclosure.
FDP_UIT.1/MP Data exchange integrity
FDP_UIT.1.1/MP The TSF shall enforce the Prepersonalization Access Control SFP to receive user
data in a manner protected from modification errors
FDP_UIT.1.2/MP [Editorially refined] The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data,
whether modification of some pieces of the application sent by the Prepersonalizer has occurred
FIA_AFL.1/MP Authentication failure handling
FIA_AFL.1.1/MP The TSF shall detect when 3 unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to
authentication of
1. Prepersonalizer
FIA_AFL.1.2/MP When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been met, the
TSF shall forbid any authentication attempt as Personalizer.
FIA_UAU.1/MP Timing of authentication
FIA_UAU.1.1/MP The TSF shall allow GET DATA, SELECT FILE on behalf of the user to be performed
before the user is authenticated.
FIA_UAU.1.2/MP The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any
other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
FIA_UID.1/MP Timing of identification
FIA_UID.1.1/MP The TSF shall allow GET DATA, SELECT FILE on behalf of the user to be performed
before the user is identified.
FIA_UID.1.2/MP The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any other
TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
FIA_UAU.4/MP_3DES Single-use authentication mechanisms
FIA_UAU.4.1/MP_3DES The TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to
1. Authentication Mechanisms based on 3DES
67 | 92
FIA_UAU.4/MP_AES Single-use authentication mechanisms
FIA_UAU.4.1/MP_AES The TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to
1. Authentication Mechanisms based on AES
FIA_UAU.5/MP_3DES Multiple authentication mechanisms
FIA_UAU.5.1/MP_3DES The TSF shall provide
1. Symmetric Authentication Mechanism based on 3DES
to support user authentication.
FIA_UAU.5.2/MP_3DES The TSF shall authenticate any user's claimed identity according to the
1. The TOE accepts the authentication attempt as Personalization Agent by the Symmetric
Authentication Mechanism with the Personalization Agent Key
FIA_UAU.5/MP_AES Multiple authentication mechanisms
FIA_UAU.5.1/MP_AES The TSF shall provide
1. Symmetric Authentication Mechanism based on AES to support user authentication.
FIA_UAU.5.2/MP_AES The TSF shall authenticate any user's claimed identity according to the
1. The TOE accepts the authentication attempt as Personalization Agent by the Symmetric
Authentication Mechanism with Personalization Agent Key
FMT_MTD.1/MP Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/MP The TSF shall restrict the ability to switch the TOE life cycle from phase 5 to phase
6 to the Prepersonalizer.
FTP_ITC.1/MP Inter-TSF trusted channel
FTP_ITC.1.1/MP The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and another trusted IT
product that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured identification
of its end points and protection of the channel data from modification or disclosure.
FTP_ITC.1.2/MP [Editorially Refined] The TSF shall permit the Prepersonalizer to initiate
communication via the trusted channel.
FTP_ITC.1.3/MP The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for:
1. Personalization Agent key storage
2. Life cycle transition from Prepersonalization to Personalization phase
FMT_MTD.1/MP_INI_ENA Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/MP_INI_ENA The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the Initialization Data and
Prepersonalization Data to the Prepersonalizer.
FMT_MTD.1/MP_INI_DIS Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/MP_INI_DIS The TSF shall restrict the ability to disable read access for users to the
Initialization Data to the Personalization Agent.
68 | 92
FMT_MTD.1/MP_KEY_READ Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/MP_KEY_READ The TSF shall restrict the ability to read the [data] to [authorized
identified roles]:
TSF Data Authorized Identified roles
MSK None
Personalization Agent Keys None
FMT_MTD.1/MP_KEY_WRITE Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/MP_KEY_WRITE The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the [data] to [authorized
identified roles]:
TSF Data Authorized Identified roles
MSK IC manufacturer (created by the developer)
Personalization Agent Keys None
FAU_SAS.1/MP Audit storage
FAU_SAS.1.1/MP The TSF shall provide the Manufacturer with the capability to store the IC
Identification Data in the audit records.
FMT_SMF.1/MP Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMF.1.1/MP The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions:
1. Initialization
2. Pre-personalization
3. Personalization
FMT_SMR.1/MP Security roles
FMT_SMR.1.1/MP The TSF shall maintain the roles
1. Manufacturer
2. Personalization Agent
FMT_SMR.1.2/MP The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
FPT_EMS.1/MP TOE Emanation
FPT_EMS.1.1/MP The TOE shall not emit power variations, timing variations during command
execution in excess of non useful information enabling access to
1. Prepersonalizer Key
2. Personalization Agent Key
3. MSK
FPT_EMS.1.2/MP The TSF shall ensure any unauthorized users are unable to use the following
interface smart card circuit contacts to gain access to
1. Prepersonalizer Key
2. Personalization Agent Key
3. MSK
8.1.3.Active Authentication SFR
69 | 92
FCS_COP.1/AA_DSA Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/AA_DSA The TSF shall perform [cryptographic operation] in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes
[cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following [standard]:
Operation Algorithm
Key length
(bits)
Standard
Digital Signature
Creation
RSA signature (CRT) with SHA1,
224, 256, 384, 512
1024, 1536 and 2048. [24]
FCS_COP.1/AA_ECDSA Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/AA_ECDSA The TSF shall perform [cryptographic operation] in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes
[cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following [standard]:
Operation Algo
Key length
(bits)
Standard
Digital Signature
Creation
ECDSA with SHA1, 224, 256, 384,
512
192 to 512 over prime
field curves
[24] [28][29][30]
FDP_DAU.1/AA Basic Data Authentication
FDP_DAU.1.1/AA The TSF shall provide a capability to generate evidence that can be used as a
guarantee of the validity of the TOE itself.
FDP_DAU.1.2/AA The TSF shall provide any users with the ability to verify evidence of the validity of
the indicated information.
Refinement:
Evidence generation and ability of verifying it constitute the Active Authentication protocol.
FDP_ITC.1/AA Import of user data without security attributes
FDP_ITC.1.1/AA The TSF shall enforce the Active Authentication Access Control SFP when
importing user data, controlled under the SFP, from outside of the TOE.
FDP_ITC.1.2/AA The TSF shall ignore any security attributes associated with the user data when
imported from outside the TOE.
FDP_ITC.1.3/AA The TSF shall enforce the following rules when importing user data controlled under
the SFP from outside the TOE: none.
FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_READ Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/AA_KEY_READ The TSF shall restrict the ability to read the AAK to none.
FPT_EMS.1/AA TOE Emanation
FPT_EMS.1.1/AA The TOE shall not emit power variations, timing variations during command execution
in excess of non useful information enabling access to
1. Active Authentication: Private Key (AAK)
70 | 92
FPT_EMS.1.2/AA The TSF shall ensure any unauthorized users are unable to use the following
interface smart card circuit contacts to gain access to
1. Active Authentication: Private Key (AAK)
FMT_MOF.1/AA Management of security functions behaviour
FMT_MOF.1.1/AA The TSF shall restrict the ability to disable and enable the functions TSF Active
Authentication to Personalization Agent.
FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_WRITE Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/AA_KEY_WRITE The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the AAK to Personalization
Agent.
8.1.4.Chip Authentication SFR
FIA_API.1/CA Authentication Proof of Identity
FIA_API.1.1/CA The TSF shall provide a Chip Authentication protocol according [48] to prove the
identity of the TOE.
FCS_CKM.1/CA_DH_SM_3DES Cryptographic key generation
FCS_CKM.1.1/CA_DH_SM_3DES The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [cryptographic key generation algorithm] and
specified cryptographic key sizes [key length] that meet the following [standard]:
Cryptographic key generation algorithm Key length (bits) Standards
Algorithm based on the Key Diffie-Hellman key derivation protocol
compliant to PKCS#3
112 [28]
FCS_CKM.1/CA_DH_SM_AES Cryptographic key generation
FCS_CKM.1.1/CA_DH_SM_AES The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [cryptographic key generation algorithm] and
specified cryptographic key sizes [key length] that meet the following [standard]:
Cryptographic key generation algorithm Key length (bits) Standards
Algorithm based on the Key Diffie-Hellman key derivation protocol
compliant to PKCS#3
128, 192, 256 [28]
FCS_CKM.1/CA_ECDH_SM_3DES Cryptographic key generation
FCS_CKM.1.1/CA_ECDH_SM_3DES The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [cryptographic key generation algorithm] and
specified cryptographic key sizes [key length] that meet the following [standard]:
Cryptographic key generation algorithm Key length (bits) Standards
Algorithm based on ECDH key derivation protocol compliant to ISO
15946
112 [39]
71 | 92
FCS_CKM.1/CA_ECDH_SM_AES Cryptographic key generation
FCS_CKM.1.1/CA_ECDH_SM_AES The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [cryptographic key generation algorithm] and
specified cryptographic key sizes [key length] that meet the following [standard]:
Cryptographic key generation algorithm Key length (bits) Standards
Algorithm based on ECDH key derivation protocol compliant to ISO
15946
128, 192, 256 [39]
FCS_COP.1/CA_SHA_SM_3DES Cryptographic key generation
FCS_COP.1.1/CA_SHA_SM_3DES The TSF shall perform hashing in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes [key length] that meet
the following [standard]:
Cryptographic algorithm
Key length
(bits)
Standards
SHA1 None [29]
FCS_COP.1/CA_SHA_SM_AES Cryptographic key generation
FCS_COP.1.1/CA_SHA_SM_AES The TSF shall perform hashing in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes [key length] that meet
the following [standard]:
Cryptographic algorithm
Key length
(bits)
Standards
SHA1 None [29]
FCS_COP.1/CA_SYM_SM_3DES Cryptographic key generation
FCS_COP.1.1/CA_SYM_SM_3DES The TSF shall perform SM encryption and decryption in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key
sizes [key length] that meet the following [standard]:
Cryptographic algorithm
Key length
(bits)
Standards
3DES CBC mode 112 [48]
FCS_COP.1/CA_SYM_SM_AES Cryptographic key generation
FCS_COP.1.1/CA_SYM_SM_AES The TSF shall perform SM encryption and decryption in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key
sizes [key length] that meet the following [standard]:
Cryptographic algorithm
Key length
(bits)
Standards
AES 128, 192 and 256 [48]
72 | 92
FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC_SM_3DES Cryptographic key generation
FCS_COP.1.1/CA_MAC_SM_3DES The TSF shall perform SM message authentication code in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key
sizes [key length] that meet the following [standard]:
Cryptographic algorithm
Key length
(bits)
Standards
3DES Retail MAC 112 [15]
FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC_SM_AES Cryptographic key generation
FCS_COP.1.1/CA_MAC_SM_AES The TSF shall perform SM message authentication code in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key
sizes [key length] that meet the following [standard]:
Cryptographic algorithm
Key length
(bits)
Standards
AES CMAC 128, 192 and 256 [48]
FDP_ITC.1/CA Import of user data without security attributes
FDP_ITC.1.1/CA The TSF shall enforce the Chip Authentication Access Control SFP when importing
user data, controlled under the SFP, from outside of the TOE.
FDP_ITC.1.2/CA The TSF shall ignore any security attributes associated with the user data when
imported from outside the TOE.
FDP_ITC.1.3/CA The TSF shall enforce the following rules when importing user data controlled under
the SFP from outside the TOE: none.
FIA_UAU.1/CA Timing of authentication
FIA_UAU.1.1/CA The TSF shall allow:
1. To establish the communication channel
2. To read the Initialization Data if it is not disabled by TSF according to FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS
3. To identify themselves by selection of the authentication key
4. To carry out the Chip Authentication Protocol
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated.
FIA_UAU.1.2/CA The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any
other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
FIA_UAU.5/CA_3DES Multiple authentication mechanisms
FIA_UAU.5.1/CA_3DES The TSF shall provide
1. Secure Messaging in MAC-ENC mode
2. Symmetric Authentication Mechanism based on 3DES
to support user authentication.
FIA_UAU.5.2/CA_3DES The TSF shall authenticate any user's claimed identity according to the
1. After run of the Chip Authentication Protocol the TOE accepts only received commands with
correct message authentication code sent by means of secure messaging with key agreed with
the terminal by means of the Chip Authentication Mechanism.
73 | 92
FIA_UAU.5/CA_AES Multiple authentication mechanisms
FIA_UAU.5.1/CA_AES The TSF shall provide
1. Secure Messaging in MAC-ENC mode
2. Symmetric Authentication Mechanism based on AES
to support user authentication.
FIA_UAU.5.2/CA_AES The TSF shall authenticate any user's claimed identity according to the
1. After run of the Chip Authentication Protocol the TOE accepts only received commands with
correct message authentication code sent by means of secure messaging with key agreed with
the terminal by means of the Chip Authentication Mechanism.
FIA_UAU.6/CA Re-authenticating
FIA_UAU.6.1/CA The TSF shall re-authenticate the user under the conditions each command sent
to the TOE after successful run of the CA shall be verified as being sent by the inspection system.
FIA_UID.1/EAC Timing of identification
FIA_UID.1.1/EAC The TSF shall allow
1. To establish the communication channel
2. To read the Initialization Data if it is not disbled by TSF according to FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS
3. To carry out th Chip Authentication Protocol
4. To carry out the Terminal Authentication Protocol
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified.
FIA_UID.1.2/CA The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any other
TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
FPT_EMS.1/CA TOE Emanation
FPT_EMS.1.1/CA The TOE shall not emit power variations, timing variations during command
execution in excess of non useful information enabling access to
1. Chip Authentication: Session Keys, Private Key (CAK)
FPT_EMS.1.2/CA The TSF shall ensure any unauthorized users are unable to use the following
interface smart card circuit contacts to gain access to
1. Active Authentication: Session Keys, Private Key (CAK)
FPT_TST.1/CA TSF testing
FPT_TST.1.1/CA The TSF shall run a suite of self tests to demonstrate the correct operation of the
TSF, at the conditions:
When performing the Chip Authentication
FPT_TST.1.2/CA The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of
TSF data.
FPT_TST.1.3/CA The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of
stored TSF executable code.
74 | 92
FMT_MTD.1/CA_KEY_WRITE Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/CA_KEY_WRITE The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the CAK to Personalization
Agent.
FMT_MTD.1/CA_KEY_READ Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/CA_KEY_READ The TSF shall restrict the ability to read the CAK to none.
FDP_UCT.1/CA Basic data exchange confidentiality
FDP_UCT.1.1/CA [Editorially Refined] The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP to transmit
and receive user data in a manner protected from unauthorised disclosure after Chip Authentication
protocol.
FDP_UIT.1/CA Data exchange integrity
FDP_UIT.1.1/CA [Editorially Refined] The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP to transmit
and receive user data in a manner protected from modification, deletion, insertion and replay errors
after Chip Authentication protocol
FDP_UIT.1.2/CA [Editorially Refined] The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data,
whether modification, deletion, insertion and replay has occurred after Chip Authentication
protocol
8.1.5.PACE SFR
FCS_CKM.1/ECDH_PACE_3DES Cryptographic key generation
FCS_CKM.1.1/ECDH_PACE_3DES The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [cryptographic key generation algorithm] and
specified cryptographic key sizes [key length] that meet the following [standard]:
Cryptographic key generation algorithm Key length (bits) Standards
ECDH key derivation protocol compliant to PKCS#3 3DES 2 keys [43]
FCS_CKM.1/ECDH_PACE_AES Cryptographic key generation
FCS_CKM.1.1/ECDH_PACE_AES The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [cryptographic key generation algorithm] and
specified cryptographic key sizes [key length] that meet the following [standard]:
Cryptographic key generation algorithm Key length (bits) Standards
ECDH key derivation protocol compliant to ISO 15946 128, 192 & 256 [43]
FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE_3DES Cryptographic key generation
FCS_CKM.1.1/DH_PACE_3DES The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [cryptographic key generation algorithm] and
specified cryptographic key sizes [key length] that meet the following [standard]:
Cryptographic key generation algorithm Key length (bits) Standards
DH key derivation protocol compliant to PKCS#3 3DES 2 keys [43]
75 | 92
FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE_AES Cryptographic key generation
FCS_CKM.1.1/DH_PACE_AES The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [cryptographic key generation algorithm] and
specified cryptographic key sizes [key length] that meet the following [standard]:
Cryptographic key generation algorithm Key length (bits) Standards
DH key derivation protocol compliant to ISO 15946 128, 192 & 256 [43]
FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC_AES Cryptographic key generation
FCS_COP.1.1/PACE_ENC_AES The TSF shall perform Secure Messaging – encryption and
decryption in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and
cryptographic key sizes [key length] that meet the following [standard]:
Cryptographic algorithm
Key length
(bits)
Standards
AES in CBC mode 128, 192 and 256 [53]
FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC_3DES Cryptographic key generation
FCS_COP.1.1/PACE_ENC_3DES The TSF shall perform Secure Messaging – encryption and
decryption in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and
cryptographic key sizes [key length] that meet the following [standard]:
Cryptographic algorithm
Key length
(bits)
Standards
3DES in CBC mode 112 [53]
FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC_AES Cryptographic key generation
FCS_COP.1.1/PACE_MAC_AES The TSF shall perform Secure Messaging – Message
Authentication Code in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic
algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes [key length] that meet the following [standard]:
Cryptographic algorithm
Key length
(bits)
Standards
CMAC AES 128, 192 and 256 [53]
FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC_3DES Cryptographic key generation
FCS_COP.1.1/PACE_MAC_3DES The TSF shall perform Secure Messaging – Message
Authentication Code in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic
algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes [key length] that meet the following [standard]:
Cryptographic algorithm
Key length
(bits)
Standards
Retail MAC with 3DES 112 [53]
FDP_ACC.1/TRM Complete access control
FDP_ACC.1.1/TRM The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP on terminals gaining access to
the User Data and data stored in EF.SOD of the logical travel document and active Authentication
private key of the logical MRTD.
76 | 92
FDP_ACF.1/TRM Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACF.1.1/TRM The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP to objects based on the following
1. Subjects:
a. Terminal
b. BIS-PACE
c. Extended Inspection System
2. Objects:
a. Data in EF.DG1, EF.DG2 and EF.DG5 to EF.DG16, EF.SOD and EF.COM of the logical
MRTD
b. Data in EF.DG3 of the logical MRTD
c. Data in EF.DG4 of the logical MRTD
d. All TOE intrinsic secret cryptographic keys stored in the travel document
3. Security attributes:
a. PACE Authentication
b. Terminal Authentication
c. Authorization of the Terminal
FDP_ACF.1.2/TRM The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among
controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: A BIS-PACE is allowed to read data objects
from FDP.ACF.1.1/TRM according to [4] after a successful PACE authentication a required by
FIA_UAU.1/PACE
FDP_ACF.1.3/TRM The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the
following additional rules: none.
FDP_ACF.1.4/TRM The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following
additional rules:
1. Any terminal being not authenticated as PACE authenticated BIS-PACE is not allowed to read,
to write, to modify, to use any User Data stored on the travel document
2. Terminals not using secure messaging are not allowed to read, to write, to modify, to use any
data stored on the travel document
FDP_RIP.1 Subset residual information protection
FDP_RIP.1.1 The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content of a resource is made
unavailable upon the allocation of the ressource to and deallocation of the resource from the
following objects:
1. Session Keys (immediately after closing related communication session)
2. The ephemeral private key ephem-SKPICC- PACE (by having generated a DH shared secret)
FDP_UCT.1/TRM Basic data exchange confidentiality - MRTD
FDP_UCT.1.1/TRM The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP to be able to transmit and receive
user data in a manner protected from unauthorised disclosure.
FDP_UIT.1/TRM Data exchange integrity
FDP_UIT.1.1/TRM The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP to be able to transmit and receive
user data in a manner protected from modification, deletion, insertion and replay errors
FDP_UIT.1.2/TRM The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data, whether modification,
deletion, insertion and replay has occurred
77 | 92
FIA_AFL.1/PACE Authentication failure handling
FIA_AFL.1.1/PACE The TSF shall detect when an administrator configurable positive integer
within range of acceptable values 0 to 255 consecutive unsuccessful authentication attempts occur
related to authentication attempts using the PACE password as shared password
FIA_AFL.1.2/PACE [Editorially Refined] When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication
attempts has been met, the TSF shall wait for an increasing time between receiving of the terminal
challenge and sending of the TSF response during the PACE authentication attempts.
FIA_UAU.1/PACE Timing of authentication
FIA_UAU.1.1/PACE The TSF shall allow
1. To establish the communication channel
2. Carrying out the PACE Protocol according to [4]
3. To read the Initialization Data if it is not disabled by TSF according to FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS
4. To identify themselves by selection of the authentication key
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated.
FIA_UAU.1.2/PACE The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing
any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
FIA_UAU.4/PACE Single-use authentication mechanisms
FIA_UAU.4.1/PACE The TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to
1. PACE Protocol according to [4]
FIA_UAU.5/PACE Multiple authentication mechanisms
FIA_UAU.5.1/PACE The TSF shall provide
1. PACE Protocol according to [4]
2. Passive Authentication according to [6]
3. Secure messaging in MAC-ENC mode according to [4]
to support user authentication.
FIA_UAU.5.2/PACE The TSF shall authenticate any user's claimed identity according to the following
rules:
1. Having successfully run the PACE protocol the TOE accepts only received commands with
correct message authentication code sent by means of secure messaging with the key agreed
with the terminal by means of the PACE protocol
FIA_UAU.6/PACE Re-authenticating
FIA_UAU.6.1/PACE The TSF shall re-authenticate the user under the conditions each command sent
to the TOE after successful run of the PACE protocol shall be verified as being sent by the PACE
terminal
FIA_UID.1/PACE Timing of identification
FIA_UID.1.1/PACE The TSF shall allow
1. To establish the communication channel
2. Carrying out the PACE Protocol according to [4]
3. To read the Initialization Data if it is not disabled by TSF according to FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified.
78 | 92
FIA_UID.1.2/PACE The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any
other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
FMT_MTD.1/PACE_KEY_READ Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/PACE_KEY_READ The TSF shall restrict the ability to read the
1. PACE passwords
to none.
FMT_SMR.1/PACE Security roles
FMT_SMR.1.1/PACE The TSF shall maintain the roles
1. Terminal
2. PACE authenticated BIS-PACE
FMT_SMR.1.2/PACE The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
FPT_EMS.1/PACE TOE Emanation
FPT_EMS.1.1/PACE The TOE shall not emit power variations, timing variations during command
execution in excess of non useful information enabling access to
1. PACE: Session Keys (PACE-KMAC, PACE-KENC), Ephemeral Private Key ephem SKPICC-
PACE
FPT_EMS.1.2/PACE The TSF shall ensure any users are unable to use the following interface smart
card circuit contacts to gain access to
1. PACE: Session Keys (PACE-KMAC, PACE-KENC), Ephemeral Private Key ephem SKPICC-
PACE
FTP_ITC.1/PACE Inter-TSF trusted channel
FTP_ITC.1.1/PACE The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and another trusted
IT product that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured
identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from modification or disclosure.
FTP_ITC.1.2/PACE The TSF shall permit another trusted IT product to initiate communication via the
trusted channel.
FTP_ITC.1.3/PACE The TSF shall enforce communication via the trusted channel for any data
exchange between the TOE and the Terminal
FPT_TST.1/PACE TSF testing
FPT_TST.1.1/PACE The TSF shall run a suite of self tests to demonstrate the correct operation of self
tests at the conditions:
- When performing a PACE authentication
to demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF
FPT_TST.1.2/PACE The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of
TSF data.
FPT_TST.1.3/PACE The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of
stored TSF executable code.
79 | 92
FMT_MTD.1/PA Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/PA The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the Document Security Objects (SOD) to
Personalization Agent.
8.1.6.PACE CAM SFR
FIA_UAU.1/PACE_CAM Timing of authentication
FIA_UAU.1.1/PACE_CAM The TSF shall allow
1. Carrying out the PACE Protocol according to [4]
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated.
FIA_UAU.1.2/PACE_CAM The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before
allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
FIA_UAU.4/PACE_CAM Single-use authentication mechanisms
FIA_UAU.4.1/PACE_CAM The TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to
Aditionally to FIA_UAU.4/PACE
1. PACE CAM Protocol according to [4]
FIA_UAU.5/PACE_CAM Multiple authentication mechanisms
FIA_UAU.5.1/PACE_CAM The TSF shall provide
1. PACE CAM Protocol according to [4]
to support user authentication.
FIA_UAU.5.2/PACE_CAM The TSF shall authenticate any user's claimed identity according to the
following rules:
The same rules from FIA_UAU.5.2/PACE applies, with the PACE_CAM protocol
FIA_UAU.6/PACE_CAM Re-authenticating
FIA_UAU.6.1/PACE_CAM The TSF shall re-authenticate the user under the conditions each
command sent to the TOE aftter successful run of the PACE CAM protocol shall be verified as
being sent by the PACE terminal
FIA_UID.1/PACE_CAM Timing of identification
FIA_UID.1.1/PACE_CAM The TSF shall allow additionally to FIA_UID.1/PACE:
1. Carrying out the PACE CAM Protocol according to [4]
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified.
FIA_UID.1.2/PACE_CAM The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing
any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
FMT_MTD.1/PACE_CAM_KEY_READ Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/PACE_CAM_KEY_READ The TSF shall restrict the ability to read the
1. PACE CAM Private Key
to none.
80 | 92
FMT_MTD.1/PACE_CAM_KEY_WRITE Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/PACE_CAM_KEY_WRITE The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the PACE CAM
private key to Personalization Agent
8.1.7.Additional SFR
FDP_ACC.1/TWN_DG2 “Subset access control
FDP_ACC.1.1/TWN_DG2
The TSF shall enforce the DG2 Access Control SFP on terminals gaining read TWN_DG2.
FDP_ACF.1/TWN_DG2 Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACF.1.1/TWN_DG2 The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP to objects based on the
following
1. Subjects:
user
2. Objects:
a. Data in TWN.DG2 of the logical MRTD
3. Security attributes:
Successful Authentication with SharedPin
FDP_ACF.1.2/TWN_DG2 The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among
controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: after PACE authentication and successful
authentication with sharedPIN.
FDP_ACF.1.3/TWN_DG2 The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the
following additional rules: none.
FDP_ACF.1.4/TWN_DG2 The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the
following additional rules: none
Application Note: the SharedPIN is not owned by the TOE, once the holder is authentified, only the result
of the authentication is send to the TOE (true or false).
The access to the DG2 of ADF TWN, is permitted after a PACE and a true Authentication.
8.2. Security Assurance Requirements
The security assurance requirement level is EAL5+ augmented with ALC_DVS.2, AVA_VAN.5.
8.2.1.Rationale for augmentation
8.2.1.1. ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
The selection of the component ALC_DVS.2 provides a higher assurance of the security of the MRTD's
development and manufacturing especially for the secure handling of the MRTD's material.
Development security is concerned with physical, procedural, personnel and other technical measures
that may be used in the development environment to protect the TOE. This assurance component is a
higher hierarchical component to EAL5 (only ALC_DVS.1). Due to the nature of the TOE, there is a
81 | 92
need for any justification of the sufficiency of these procedures to protect the confidentiality and integrity
of the TOE.
The component ALC_DVS.2 augmented to EAL5 has no dependencies to other security requirements.
8.2.1.2. AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis
Due to the definition of the TOE, it must be shown to be highly resistant to penetration attacks. This
assurance requirement is achieved by the AVA_VAN.5 component.
Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis is based on highly detailed technical information. The
attacker is assumed to be thoroughly familiar with the specific implementation of the TOE. The attacker
is presumed to have a high level of technical sophistication. AVA_VAN.5 has dependencies with
ADV_ARC.1 "Security architecture description", ADV_FSP.4 "Complete functional specification",
ADV_IMP.1 "Implementation representation of the TSF", ADV_TDS.3 "Basic modular design",
AGD_PRE.1 "Preparative procedures" and AGD_OPE.1 "Operational user Guidance" and ATE_DPT.1
"Testing: basic design".
All these dependencies are satisfied by EAL5.
82 | 92
9. TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION
9.1. TOE Summary Specification
Access Control in reading
This function controls access to read functions and enforces the security policy for data retrieval. Prior
to any data retrieval, it authenticates the actor trying to access the data, and checks the access
conditions are fulfilled as well as the life cycle state.
It ensures that at any time, the following keys are never readable:
- PACE keys
- PACE CAM keys
- Active Authentication private key
- Personalization Agent keys
- MSK
- CVCA keys
It controls access to the CPLC data as well:
It ensures the CPLC data can be read during the personalization phase
It ensures it cannot be readable in free mode at the end of the personalization step.
It controls access to TWN_DG2.
Regarding the file structure:
In the operational use:
- The terminal can read user data (except DG3 & DG4), the Document Security Object, EF.CVA,
EF.COM only after PACE authentication and through a valid secure channel.
- When the EAC was successfully performed, the terminal can only read the DG3 & DG4 provided
the access rights are sufficient throught a valid secure channel.
- When the PACE was successfully performed and with successful authentication with PKI PIN.
Terminal can only read the TWN.DG2.
In the personalization phase:
- The Personalization Agent can read all the data stored in the TOE after it is authenticated by
the TOE (using its authentication keys).
It ensures as well that no other part of the memory can be accessed at anytime
Access Control in writing
This function controls access to write functions (in EEPROM) and enforces the security policy for data
writing. Prior to any data update, it authenticates the actor, and checks the access conditions are fulfilled
as well as the life cycle state.
It ensures as well the CPLC data cannot be written anymore once the TOE is personalized.
Regarding the file structure:
In the operational use:
It is not possible to create any files (system or data files). Furthermore, it is not possible to
update any system files. However the application data is still accessed internally by the
application for its own needs.
The root CVCA key files and temporary key files are updated internally by the application
according to the authentication mechanism described in [45].
In the personalization phase
The Personalization Agent can create and write through a valid secure channel all the data files
it needs after it is authenticated by the TOE (using its authentication keys).
Active Authentication
This security functionality ensures the Active Authentication is performed as described in [45]. (if it is
activated by the personnaliser).
83 | 92
Chip Authentication
This security functionality ensures the Chip Authentication is performed as described in [45]. (if it is
activated by the personnaliser). It could be used as an alternative of Active Authentication to reinforce
the Authentication of the Chip. It differs from an EAC not performing the Terminal Authentication.
PACE mechanism
This security functionality ensures the PACE is correctly performed. It can only be performed once the
TOE is personalized with the PACE password. Furthermore, this security functionalities ensures the
correct calculation of the PACE session keys.
PACE_CAM mechanism
This security functionality ensures the PACE_CAM is correctly performed. It can only be performed once
the TOE is personalized with:
- the chip authentication mapping (CAM) keys the Personnalization Agent loaded during the
personalization phase
- the PACE password.
Furthermore, this security functionality ensures the correct calculation of the PACE_CAM session keys.
Personalization
This security functionality ensures the TOE, when delivered to the Personnalization Agent, demands an
authentication prior to any data exchange. This authentication is based on a symmetric Authentication
mechanism based on a Triple DES or AES algorithm. This TSF can use a Secure Messaging described
in the TSF Secure Messaging.
This function allow to configure SM level for biometrical data access and the BAC deactivation
mechanism
Physical protection
This security functionality protects the TOE against physical attacks.
Prepersonalization
This security functionality ensures the TOE, when delivered to the Prepersonalization Agent, demands
an authentication prior to any data exchange. This authentication is based on a symmetric
Authentication mechanism based on a Triple DES or AES algorithm. This function is in charge of pre-
initializing the product. This TSF can use a Secure Messaging described in the TSF Secure Messaging.
Safe state management
This security functionalities ensures that the TOE gets back to a secure state when
- an integrity error is detected by F.SELFTESTS
- a tearing occurs (during a copy of data in EEPROM)
This security functionality ensures that such a case occurs, the TOE is either switched in the state "kill
card" or becomes mute.
Secure Messaging
This security functionality ensures the confidentiality, authenticity & integrity of the communication
between the TOE and the IFD.
After a successful PACE authentication and successful Chip Authentication, a secure channel is
established based on Triple DES algorithm, and after a successful Chip Authentication , a secure
channel is (re)established based on Symmetric algorithms (Triple DES, AES128, 192 or 256)
This security functionality ensures:
- No commands were inserted, modified nor deleted within the data flow
- The data exchanged remain confidential
- The issuer of the incoming commands and the destinatory of the outgoing data is the one that
was authenticated (through PACE or EAC)
If an error occurs in the secure messaging layer, the session keys are destroyed.
This Secure Messaging can be combined with the Active Authentication.
84 | 92
This TSF can provide a GP Secure Messaging (SCP02 or SCP03) for the Prepersonalization or
Personalization.
Self tests
The TOE performs self tests to verify the integrity on the TSF data:
- Before the TSF data usage
- The integrity of keys and sensitive data is ensured
9.2. Link between the SFR and the TSF
The following chapters present the rationales between security objective and security requirements. For
ease reading some requirements are merged.
- FIA_UAU.4/MP represents the 2 SFRS: FIA_UAU.4/MP_3DES and FIA_UAU.4/MP_AES
as the 2 sfrs have the same functionalities, single use authentication mechanisms are used with the
same scope. The only difference is the used algorithms.
- FIA_UAU.5/MP represents the 2 SFRS: FIA_UAU.5/MP_3DES and FIA_UAU.5/MP_AES
as the 2 sfrs have the same functionalities, Multiple use authentication mechanisms are used with the
same scope. The only difference is the used algorithms.
- FCS_COP.1/MP represents the 7 SFRS: FCS_COP.1/MP_AUTH_3DES,
FCS_COP.1/MP_AUTH_AES, FCS_COP.1/MP_ENC_3DES, FCS_COP.1/MP_ENC_AES,
FCS_COP.1/MP_MAC_3DES, FCS_COP.1/MP_MAC_AES and FCS_COP.1/MP_SHA.
All the SFRs provide equivalent service at personalisation phase: cryptographic authentication of the
personalisation. The differences are related to algorithms used for the authentication.
85 | 92
FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC
FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC
FCS_RND.1
FIA_AFL.1/PACE
FIA_UID.1/PACE
FIA_UAU.1/PACE
FIA_UAU.4/PACE
FIA_UAU.5/PACE
FIA_UAU.6/PACE
FDP_ACC.1/TRM
FDP_ACF.1/TRM
FDP_RIP.1
FDP_UCT.1/TRM
FDP_UIT.1/TRM
FTP_ITC.1/PACE
FAU_SAS.1
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1/PACE
FMT_LIM.1
FMT_LIM.2
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ
FMT_MTD.1/PA
FPT_EMS.1
FPT_FLS.1
FPT_TST.1
FPT_PHP.3
Access Control in reading X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Access Control in writing X X X X X
Active Authentication X X X
Chip Authentication X X X
PACE mechanism X X X X X X X X X X
PACE_CAM mechanism X X X
Personalization X X X X
Physical protection X X X X
Prepersonalization X X X X X X X X X
Safe state management X X X X X X X
Secure Messaging X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Self tests X X
Table 30: Link between SFR from the PP0068v2 and TSF
86 | 92
FCS_COP.1/AA
FDP_DAU.1/AA
FDP_ITC.1/AA
FMT_MOF.1/AA
FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_WRITE
FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_READ
Access Control in reading
Access Control in writing X
Active Authentication X X X X X X
Chip Authentication
PACE mechanism
PACE_CAM mechanism
Personalization
Physical protection
Prepersonalization
Safe state management
Secure Messaging
Self tests
Table 31: Link between SFR for AA and TSF
87 | 92
FIA_API.1/CA
FCS_CKM.1/CA
FCS_COP.1/CA_SHA
FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC
FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC
FDP_ITC.1/CA
FIA_UAU.1/CA
FIA_UAU.5/CA
FIA_UAU.6/CA
FIA_UID.1/CA
FMT_MTD.1/CA_KEY_WRITE
FMT_MTD.1/CA_KEY_READ
FDP_UCT.1/CA
FDP_UIT.1/CA
Access Control in reading
Access Control in writing
Active Authentication
Chip Authentication X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
PACE mechanism
PACE_CAM mechanism
Personalization X
Physical protection
Prepersonalization
Safe state management
Secure Messaging
Self tests
Table 32: Link between SFR for CA and TSF
88 | 92
FCS_CKM.1/MP
FCS_COP.1/MP
FDP_ACC.2/MP
FDP_ACF.1/MP
FDP_ITC.1/MP
FDP_UCT.1/MP
FDP_UIT.1/MP
FIA_AFL.1/MP
FIA_UAU.1/MP
FIA_UID.1/MP
FIA_UAU.4/MP
FIA_UAU.5/MP
FMT_MTD.1/MP
FTP_ITC.1/MP
FMT_MTD.1/MP_KEY_READ
FMT_MTD.1/MP_KEY_WRITE
Access Control in reading X X X X X
Access Control in writing X X X X X X X
Active Authentication
Chip Authentication
PACE mechanism
PACE_CAM mechanism
Personalization X X X
Physical protection
Prepersonalization X X X X X
Safe state management
Secure Messaging X X X
Self tests
Table 33: Link between Additional SFR for MP and TSF
89 | 92
FIA_UAU.1/PACE_CAM
FIA_UAU.4/PACE_CAM
FIA_UAU.5/PACE_CAM
FIA_UAU.6/PACE_CAM
FIA_UID.1/PACE_CAM
FMT_MTD.1/PACE_CAM_KEY_READ
FMT_MTD.1/PACE_CAM_KEY_WRITE
Access Control in reading X X X X X X
Access Control in writing X
Active Authentication
EAC mechanism
PACE mechanism
PACE_CAM mechanism X X X X X X X
Personalization
Physical protection
Prepersonalization X
Safe state management
Secure Messaging X X X X
Self tests
Table 34: Link between Additional SFR for PACE_CAM and TSF
90 | 92
FDP_ACC.1.1/TWN_DG2
FDP_ACF.1.2/TWN_DG2
Access Control in reading X X
Access Control in writing
Active Authentication
Chip Authentication
PACE mechanism X X
PACE_CAM mechanism
Personalization
Physical protection
Prepersonalization
Safe state management
Secure Messaging
Self tests
Table 35: Link between Additional SFR and TSF
91 | 92
10. TOE RATIONALES SECURITY OBJECTIVES RATIONALE
Rationales are not provided in this public version.
EXTERNAL
92 | 92
11. ANNEX B: COMPOSITION WITH THE UNDERLYING
JAVACARD OPEN PLATFORM
This annex discusses the composition with the underlying javacard platform [54] according to
[6].This part is removed from the ST lite.