TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V.
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Version
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Certification Report
EP-COS V3.0 Plain, EPCOSV30d
Sponsor and developer: NXP Semiconductors GmbH, Business Unit
Security & Connectivity
Stresemannallee 101
22529 Hamburg
Germany
Evaluation facility: Brightsight
Delftechpark 1
2628 XJ Delft
The Netherlands
Reportnumber: NSCIB-CC-127667-CR2
Report version: 1
Projectnumber: NSCIB-CC-127667
Author(s): Wouter Slegers
Date: 15 March 2017
Number of pages: 12
Number of appendices: 0
Reproduction of this report is authorized provided the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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CONTENTS:
Foreword 4
Recognition of the certificate 5
International recognition 5
European recognition 5
1 Executive Summary 6
2 Certification Results 7
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation 7
2.2 Security Policy 7
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 7
2.4 Architectural Information 7
2.5 Documentation 8
2.6 IT Product Testing 8
2.7 Re-used evaluation results 9
2.8 Evaluated Configuration 10
2.9 Results of the Evaluation 10
2.10 Comments/Recommendations 10
3 Security Target 11
4 Definitions 11
5 Bibliography 12
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Foreword
The Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security (NSCIB) provides a third-party
evaluation and certification service for determining the trustworthiness of Information Technology (IT)
security products. Under this NSCIB, TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. has the task of issuing
certificates for IT security products, as well as for protection profiles and sites.
Part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product, protection profile or site
according to the Common Criteria assessment guidelines published by the NSCIB. Evaluations are
performed by an IT Security Evaluation Facility (ITSEF) under the oversight of the NSCIB Certification
Body, which is operated by TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. in cooperation with the Ministry of the
Interior and Kingdom Relations.
An ITSEF in the Netherlands is a commercial facility that has been licensed by TÜV Rheinland
Nederland B.V. to perform Common Criteria evaluations; a significant requirement for such a license is
accreditation to the requirements of ISO Standard 17025 “General requirements for the accreditation
of calibration and testing laboratories”.
By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. asserts that the product or
site complies with the security requirements specified in the associated (site) security target, or that
the protection profile (PP) complies with the requirements for PP evaluation specified in the Common
Criteria for Information Security Evaluation. A (site) security target is a requirements specification
document that defines the scope of the evaluation activities.
The consumer should review the (site) security target or protection profile, in addition to this
certification report, in order to gain an understanding of any assumptions made during the evaluation,
the intended environment, its security requirements, and the level of confidence (i.e., the evaluation
assurance level) that the product or site satisfies the security requirements stated in the (site) security
target.
Reproduction of this report is authorized provided the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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Recognition of the certificate
Presence of the Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement and SOG-IS logos on the certificate
indicates that this certificate is issued in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA and the SOG-IS
agreement and will be recognised by the participating nations.
International recognition
The CCRA has been signed by the Netherlands in May 2000 and provides mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC. Starting September 2014 the CCRA has been updated to provide mutual
recognition of certificates based on cPPs (exact use) or STs with evaluation assurance levels up to
and including EAL2+ALC_FLR. The current list of signatory nations and approved certification
schemes can be found on: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
European recognition
The European SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) version 3 effective from April
2010 provides mutual recognition of Common Criteria and ITSEC certificates at a basic evaluation
level for all products. A higher recognition level for evaluation levels beyond EAL4 (resp. E3-basic) is
provided for products related to specific technical domains. This agreement was initially signed by
Finland, France, Germany, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Italy
joined the SOGIS-MRA in December 2010. The current list of signatory nations, approved certification
schemes and the list of technical domains for which the higher recognition applies can be found on:
http://www.sogisportal.eu.
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1 Executive Summary
This Certification Report states the outcome of the Common Criteria security evaluation of the EP-
COS V3.0 Plain, EPCOSV30d. The developer of the EP-COS V3.0 Plain is NXP Semiconductors
GmbH, Business Unit Security & Connectivity located in Hamburg, Germany and they also act as the
sponsor of the evaluation and certification. A Certification Report is intended to assist prospective
consumers when judging the suitability of the IT security properties of the product for their particular
requirements.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the contactless integrated circuit chip of machine readable travel
documents (MRTD’s chip) programmed according to the Logical Data Structure (LDS) and providing
the Basic Access Control according to Part 1 of ‘ICAO Doc 9303’.
The TOE has been originally evaluated by Brightsight B.V. located in Delft, The Netherlands and was
certified on 14 February 2017. The re-evaluation also took place by Brightsight B.V. and was
completed on 13 March 2017 with the approval of the ETR. The re-certification procedure has been
conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of
IT Security [NSCIB].
The reason for the re-certification was a minor change to the evidence. The security evaluation re-
used the evaluation results of the recently performed evaluation. The updated TOE identified in this
report was assessed using the developers Impact Analysis Report (IAR). The IAR is intended to
satisfy requirements outlined in the document Assurance Continuity: CCRA Requirements [CCRA-
AC]. In accordance with those requirements, the IAR describes the changes made to the certified
TOE, the evidence updated as a result of the changes and the security impact of the changes. The
assessment indicated that the original evaluation results could be re-used and the Security Target [ST]
and the public version of the Security Target [ST-lite] only needed editorially updating to include
changes of the provided guidance documentation.
The scope of the evaluation is defined by the security target [ST], which identifies assumptions made
during the evaluation, the intended environment for the EP-COS V3.0 Plain, the security requirements,
and the level of confidence (evaluation assurance level) at which the product is intended to satisfy the
security requirements. Consumers of the EP-COS V3.0 Plain are advised to verify that their own
environment is consistent with the security target, and to give due consideration to the comments,
observations and recommendations in this certification report.
The results documented in the evaluation technical report [ETR]
1
for this product provide sufficient
evidence that it meets the EAL4augmented (EAL4(+)) assurance requirements for the evaluated
security functionality. This assurance level is augmented with ALC_DVS.2 (Sufficiency of security
measures) and ATE_DPT.2 (Testing: security enforcing modules).
The evaluation was conducted using the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 4 [CEM], for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information
Technology Security Evaluation, version 3.1 Revision 4 [CC].
TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V., as the NSCIB Certification Body, declares that the EP-COS V3.0
Plain, EPCOSV30d evaluation meets all the conditions for international recognition of Common
Criteria Certificates and that the product will be listed on the NSCIB Certified Products list. It should be
noted that the certification results only apply to the specific version of the product as evaluated.
1
The Evaluation Technical Report contains information proprietary to the developer and/or the
evaluator, and is not releasable for public review.
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2 Certification Results
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) for this evaluation is the EP-COS V3.0 Plain, EPCOSV30d from NXP
Semiconductors GmbH, Business Unit Security & Connectivity located in Hamburg, Germany.
The TOE is comprised of the following main components:
Delivery
item type
Identifier and version
Hardware
P60D081PVB (P6021yVB configuration) with Crypto Library V3.1.2 on
P60D081PVB
Software IC Embedded Software (operating system)
MRTD application BAC
To ensure secure usage a set of guidance documents is provided together with the EP-COS V3.0
Plain. Details can be found in section 2.5 of this report.
For a detailed and precise description of the TOE lifecycle refer to the [ST]/[ST lite], section “TOE life
cycle”.
2.2 Security Policy
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the contactless integrated circuit chip of machine readable travel
documents (MRTD’s chip) programmed according to the Logical Data Structure (LDS) and providing
the Basic Access Control according to Part 1 ‘ICAO Doc 9303’.
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
2.3.1 Assumptions
Detailed information on the assumption and threats can be found in the [ST] sections 3.2 and 3.3
respectively. Detailed information on the security objectives that must be fulfilled by the TOE
environment can be found in section 4.2 of the [ST].
2.3.2 Clarification of scope
The evaluation did not reveal any threats to the TOE that are not countered by the evaluated security
functions of the product.
Note that the ICAO MRTD infrastructure critically depends on the objectives for the environment to be
met. These are not weaknesses of this particular TOE, but aspects of the ICAO MRTD infrastructure
as a whole.
The environment in which the TOE is personalized must perform proper and safe personalization
according to the guidance and referred ICAO guidelines.
The environment in which the TOE is used must ensure that the inspection system protects the
confidentiality and integrity of the data send and read from the TOE.
2.4 Architectural Information
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) EP-COS V3.0 Plain is the contactless integrated circuit chip of
machine readable travel documents (MRTD’s chip) programmed according to the Logical Data
Structure (LDS) and providing the Basic Access Control according to the ICAO documentation.
The TOE is comprised of the following subsystems:
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• the circuitry of the MRTD’s chip P60D081PVB (P6021yVB configuration) with Crypto Library
V3.1.2 on P60D081PVB
• the IC Embedded Software (operating system)
• the MRTD application BAC
Using this, the TOE provides an ISO 7816-4 file structure according to the ICAO 9303 specifications.
2.5 Documentation
The following documentation is provided with the product by the developer to the customer:
Identifier Version
Personalization Guidance (AGD_PRE) EP-
COS_V3.0_Plain
version 0.98, 27 February 2017
Operational User Guidance (AGD_OPE) EP-
COS_V3.0_Plain
version 0.97, 27 February 2017
2.6 IT Product Testing
Testing (depth, coverage, functional tests, independent testing): The evaluators examined the
developer’s testing activities documentation and verified that the developer has met their testing
responsibilities.
2.6.1 Testing approach and depth
The developer has performed extensive testing on functional specification, subsystem and SFR-
enforcing module level. The testing was largely automated using proprietary test suites, mostly on the
actual TOE and in exception cases on an emulator.
The hardware and crypto-library test results are extendable to composite evaluations, as this
underlying platform is operated according to its guidance and the composite evaluation requirements
are met.
For the testing performed by the evaluators, the developer has provided samples. The evaluators
have witnessed the execution of the test suite by the developer, and performed a small number of test
cases designed by the evaluator, addressing edge cases.
2.6.2 Independent Penetration Testing
The penetration tests are devised after performing the Evaluator Vulnerability Analysis. This analysis
has followed the following steps. The reference for attack techniques against which smart card-based
devices such as the TOE must be protected against is the document "Attack methods for smart cards"
[JIL-AM]. Additional guidance for testing was provided by the certification body in the form of a number
of questions regarding the TOE. The vulnerability of the TOE for these attacks has been analysed in a
white box investigation conforming to AVA_VAN.3.
1. Inventory of required resistance
This step uses the JIL attack list [JIL-AM] as a reference for completeness and studies the ST
claims to decide which attacks in the JIL attack list apply for the TOE. Also the BSI attack list for
RSA [RSA-BSI] has been used.
2. Validation of security functionalities
This step identifies the implemented security functionalities and performs tests to verify the
implementation and to validate proper functioning. (ATE)
3. Vulnerability analysis
This step first gives an overview against which attacks the implemented security functionalities are
meant to provide protection. Secondly in this step the design of the implemented security
functionalities is studied. This also includes the security functionalities implemented in the
hardware (cf. [HW-UG-021], [HW-ETRfC]). Thirdly, analysis is performed to determine whether the
design contains vulnerabilities against the respective attacks of Step 1. (AVA)
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4. Analysis of input from other evaluation activities
This step first analyses the input from other CC-evaluation classes expressed as possible
vulnerabilities. Secondly, the evaluators performed analysis of the TOE in its intended
environment to check whether the developer vulnerability analysis provides sufficient assurance or
whether penetration testing is needed to provide sufficient assurance. (AVA)
5. Design assurance evaluation
This step analyses the results from an attack perspective as defined in Step 1. Based on this
design analysis the evaluators determine whether the design provides sufficient assurance or
whether penetration testing is needed to provide sufficient assurance. (AVA)
6. Penetration testing
This step performs the penetration tests identified in Step 4 and Step 5. (AVA)
7. Conclusions on resistance
The evaluators analyse the results of the penetration tests performed in Step 6. Based on this
analysis the evaluators draw conclusions on the resistance of the TOE attackers possessing
Enhanced-Basic attack potential.
No potential vulnerabilities within the attack potential were found not already covered by the
underlying platform.
For extra assurance, several of the potential vulnerabilities beyond the attack potential were tested.
The total test effort was 26 days, and consisted of one EMFI and three laser tests.
2.6.3 Test Configuration
Testing has been performed on the TOE as inlays, SO28, CLCC and DIL packages. The SO28 have
been used for ATE developer tests; the inlays have been used for ATE independent and AVA tests;
the DIL and CLCC packages have been used for AVA tests only. In all cases the samples have been
delivered in locked state. The evaluators have run a script to bring the samples from the locked state
to unlocked state and further on to the operational state. The ATE tests cover all life-cycle states of the
TOE. The AVA tests target the operational state.
2.6.4 Testing Results
The testing activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected results and observed
results are summarised in the [ETR], with references to the documents containing the full details.
The developer’s tests and the independent functional tests produced the expected results, giving
assurance that the TOE behaves as specified in its ST and functional specification.
No exploitable vulnerabilities were found with the independent penetration tests.
2.7 Re-used evaluation results
This security evaluation re-used the evaluation results of the recently performed evaluation which has
been performed as a composite evaluation on the underlying hardware platform [HW-CERT] and
crypto library [CL-CERT]. Sites involved in the development, production and delivery of the hardware
and crypto library platform were re-used by composition. The site where the native operating system
and application were developed, was audited on July 5th, 2016.
On 2 March 2017, NXP the developer of the EP-COS V3.0 Plain submitted an application form and
Impact Analysis Report (IAR) to the NSCIB Certification Body requesting to issue a new certificate for
their updated EP-COS V3.0 Plain product. The IAR is intended to satisfy the requirements outlined in
the document ‘Assurance Continuity: CCRA Requirements’ [CCRA-AC]. In accordance with those
requirements, the IAR describes the changes made to the recently certified TOE, the evidence
updated as a result of the changes and the security impact of the changes.
The changes of the TOE can be categorized as a minor change to the evidence.
The assessment of the IAR by the evaluation lab in the [ETR] indicated that the changes have no
security issues and that the original evaluation results could be re-used. The evaluation lab confirmed
in the [ETR] that the original Vulnerability Analysis is still valid.
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2.8 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is defined uniquely by its name and version number EP-COS V3.0 Plain, EPCOSV30d.
2.9 Results of the Evaluation
The evaluation lab documented their evaluation results in the [ETR]
2
which references the ASE
Intermediate Report and other evaluator documents.
The verdict of each claimed assurance requirement is “Pass”.
Based on the above evaluation results the evaluation lab concluded the EP-COS V3.0 Plain,
EPCOSV30d, to be CC Part 2 extended
3
, CC Part 3 conformant, and to meet the requirements of
EAL 4 augmented with ALC_DVS.2 and ATE_DPT.2. This implies that the product satisfies the
security technical requirements specified in Security Target [ST].
The Security Target claims ’strict’ conformance to the Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine
Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application”, Basic Access Control, Version 1.10, 25th March
2009, registered under the reference BSI-CC-PP-0055-2009.
2.10 Comments/Recommendations
The user guidance as outlined in section 2.5 contains necessary information about the usage of the
TOE. Certain aspects of the TOE’s security functionality, in particular the countermeasures against
attacks, depend on accurate conformance to the user guidance (including the ICAO guidelines)
There are no particular obligations or recommendations for the user apart from following the user
guidance. Please note that the documents contain relevant details with respect to the configuration of
the TOE in its evaluated configuration.
In addition all aspects of assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not
covered by the TOE itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk
management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, he
should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the TOE is required and thus requested from
the sponsor of the certificate.
The strength of the implemented cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this
evaluation.
2
The Evaluation Technical Report contains information proprietary to the developer and/or the
evaluator, and is not releasable for public review.
3
The TOE is a composite TOE with a certified hardware platform. Claiming CC Part 2 extended is
because the underlying platform claims CC Part 2 extended
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3 Security Target
The Security Target EP-COS V3.0 Plain, Rev. 1.7, dated 27 February 2017 [ST] is included here by
reference.
Please note that for the need of publication a public version (Security Target Lite EP-COS V3.0 Plain,
Rev. 1.7, dated 27 February 2017) [ST-lite] has been created and verified according to [ST-SAN].
4 Definitions
This list of Acronyms and the glossary of terms contains elements that are not already defined by the
CC or CEM:
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organisation
IT Information Technology
ITSEF IT Security Evaluation Facility
JIL Joint Interpretation Library
MRTD Machine readable travel document
MRZ Machine readable zone
NSCIB Netherlands scheme for certification in the area of IT security
PP Protection Profile
TOE Target of Evaluation
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5 Bibliography
This section lists all referenced documentation used as source material in the compilation of this
report:
[CC] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Parts I, II and III,
Version 3.1 Revision 4, September 2012.
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1
Revision 4, September 2012.
[CCRA-AC] Assurance Continuity: CCRA Requirements, CCRA Supporting Document, version
2.1, June 2012.
[CL-CERT] Certification report. Crypto Library V3.1.x on P6021y VB, NSCIB-CC-15-66030-CR,
dated 2 June 2016.
[CL-ETRfC] ETR for Composite Evaluation Crypto Library V3.1.x on P6021y VB EAL6+/5+,
version 7.0, dated 25 April 2016.
[CL-ST] Crypto Library V3.1.x on P6021y VB Security Target, Rev. 1.4, 18-03-2016,
Evaluation document, NSCIB-CC-15-66030, Public, Rev 1.4, dated 18 March
2016.
[ETR] Evaluation Technical Report NXP EP-COS V3.0 Plain EAL4+, 17-RPT-051,
version 3.0, dated 2017-03-09, and
Evaluation Report on IAR EPCOS v3.0 and EPCOS v3.0 Plain Re-certification, 17-
RPT-112, version 1.0, dated 2017-03-09.
[HW-CERT] Certification Report for NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P6021y VB including IC
Dedicated Software, BSI-DSZ-CC-0955-2016, 17 March 2016.
[HW-ETRfC] TÜVIT Evaluation Technical Report for Composite Evaluation (ETR COMP), v3,
12-02-2016, BSI-DSZ-CC-0955, P6021y VB, dated 12 February 2016.
[HW-ST] NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P6021y VB, Security Target Lite, Rev. 0.93, 25-
01-2016, Evaluation Document, BSI-DSZ-CC-0955, dated 25 January 2016.
[HW-UG-021] NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P6021y VB Information on Guidance and
Operation, Rev. 1.0, 28-08-2015, Guidance and Operational Manual, docstore
number 323810.
[JIL-AM] JIL, (Mandatory) Attack Methods for Smartcards and Similar Devices (controlled
distribution), Version 2.2, January 2013.
[NSCIB] Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security, Version 2.2,
August 10
th
, 2015.
[ST] Security Target EP-COS V3.0 Plain, Rev. 1.7, dated 27 February 2017.
[ST-lite] Security Target Lite EP-COS V3.0 Plain, Rev. 1.7, dated 27 February 2017.
[ST-SAN] ST sanitising for publication, CC Supporting Document CCDB-2006-04-004, April
2006.
(This is the end of this report).