TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V.
Head Office:
Westervoortsedijk 73
NL-6827 AV Arnhem
P.O. Box 2220
NL-6802 CE Arnhem
The Netherlands
Location Leek:
Eiberkamp 10
NL-9351 VT Leek
P.O. Box 37
NL-9350 AA Leek
The Netherlands
info@nl.tuv.com
www.tuv.com/nl
Tel. +31 (0)88 888 7 888
Fax +31 (0)88 888 7 879
TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. is a
registered company at the
Netherlands Chamber of Commerce
(KVK), under number 27288788.
VAT number: NL815820380B01
IBAN: NL61DEUT0265155096
Version
2021-06
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Certification Report
TRISS Trust Remote InfoCert Signing Server version 1.0.2
Sponsor and developer: InfoCert S.p.A.
Piazza Sallustio 9
00187 Rome
Italy
Evaluation facility: SGS Brightsight B.V.
Brassersplein 2
2612 CT Delft
The Netherlands
Report number: NSCIB-CC-0490158-CR
Report version: 2
Project number: 0490158
Author(s): Kjartan Jæger Kvassnes
Date: 30 June 2022
Number of pages: 12
Number of appendices: 0
Reproduction of this report is authorised only if the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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CONTENTS
Foreword 3
Recognition of the Certificate 4
International recognition 4
European recognition 4
1 Executive Summary 5
2 Certification Results 6
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation 6
2.2 Security Policy 6
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 7
2.3.1 Assumptions 7
2.3.2 Clarification of scope 7
2.4 Architectural Information 7
2.5 Documentation 7
2.6 IT Product Testing 7
2.6.1 Testing approach and depth 8
2.6.2 Independent penetration testing 8
2.6.3 Test configuration 9
2.6.4 Test results 9
2.7 Reused Evaluation Results 9
2.8 Evaluated Configuration 9
2.9 Evaluation Results 9
2.10 Comments/Recommendations 9
3 Security Target 11
4 Definitions 11
5 Bibliography 12
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Foreword
The Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security (NSCIB) provides a third-party
evaluation and certification service for determining the trustworthiness of Information Technology (IT)
security products. Under this NSCIB, TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. has the task of issuing
certificates for IT security products, as well as for protection profiles and sites.
Part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product, protection profile or site
according to the Common Criteria assessment guidelines published by the NSCIB. Evaluations are
performed by an IT Security Evaluation Facility (ITSEF) under the oversight of the NSCIB Certification
Body, which is operated by TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. in cooperation with the Ministry of the
Interior and Kingdom Relations.
An ITSEF in the Netherlands is a commercial facility that has been licensed by TÜV Rheinland
Nederland B.V. to perform Common Criteria evaluations; a significant requirement for such a licence is
accreditation to the requirements of ISO Standard 17025 “General requirements for the accreditation
of calibration and testing laboratories”.
By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. asserts that the product or
site complies with the security requirements specified in the associated (site) security target, or that
the protection profile (PP) complies with the requirements for PP evaluation specified in the Common
Criteria for Information Security Evaluation. A (site) security target is a requirements specification
document that defines the scope of the evaluation activities.
The consumer should review the (site) security target or protection profile, in addition to this
certification report, to gain an understanding of any assumptions made during the evaluation, the IT
product's intended environment, its security requirements, and the level of confidence (i.e., the
evaluation assurance level) that the product or site satisfies the security requirements stated in the
(site) security target.
Reproduction of this report is authorised only if the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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Recognition of the Certificate
The presence of the Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement (CCRA) and the SOG-IS logos on the
certificate indicates that this certificate is issued in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA and
the SOG-IS Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOG-IS MRA) and will be recognised by the participating
nations.
International recognition
The CCRA was signed by the Netherlands in May 2000 and provides mutual recognition of certificates
based on the Common Criteria (CC). Since September 2014 the CCRA has been updated to provide
mutual recognition of certificates based on cPPs (exact use) or STs with evaluation assurance
components up to and including EAL2+ALC_FLR.
For details of the current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, see
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
European recognition
The SOG-IS MRA Version 3, effective since April 2010, provides mutual recognition in Europe of
Common Criteria and ITSEC certificates at a basic evaluation level for all products. A higher
recognition level for evaluation levels beyond EAL4 (respectively E3-basic) is provided for products
related to specific technical domains. This agreement was signed initially by Finland, France,
Germany, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Italy joined the SOG-IS
MRA in December 2010.
For details of the current list of signatory nations, approved certification schemes and the list of
technical domains for which the higher recognition applies, see https://www.sogis.eu.
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1 Executive Summary
This Certification Report states the outcome of the Common Criteria security evaluation of the TRISS
Trust Remote InfoCert Signing Server version 1.0.2. The developer of the TRISS Trust Remote
InfoCert Signing Server version 1.0.2 is InfoCert S.p.A. located in Rome, Italy and they also act as the
sponsor of the evaluation and certification. A Certification Report is intended to assist prospective
consumers when judging the suitability of the IT security properties of the product for their particular
requirements.
The TOE is a combination of software and hardware components defined as Signature Activation
Module (SAM). The SAM implements the Signature Activation Protocol (SAP), and it uses the
Signature Activation Data (SAD) and Authorisation Data to activate the signing key to be used in the
Cryptographic Module. The hardware and firmware are not part of the TOE and is considered to be
part of the TOE environment.
The TOE has been evaluated by SGS Brightsight B.V. located in Delft, The Netherlands. The
evaluation was completed on 30 June 2022 with the approval of the ETR. The certification procedure
has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Netherlands Scheme for Certification in
the Area of IT Security [NSCIB].
The scope of the evaluation is defined by the security target [ST], which identifies assumptions made
during the evaluation, the intended environment for the TRISS Trust Remote InfoCert Signing Server
version 1.0.2, the security requirements, and the level of confidence (evaluation assurance level) at
which the product is intended to satisfy the security requirements. Consumers of the TRISS Trust
Remote InfoCert Signing Server version 1.0.2 are advised to verify that their own environment is
consistent with the security target, and to give due consideration to the comments, observations and
recommendations in this certification report.
The results documented in the evaluation technical report [ETR] 1 for this product provide sufficient
evidence that the TOE meets the EAL4 augmented (EAL4+) assurance requirements for the evaluated
security functionality. This assurance level is augmented with AVA_VAN.5 (Advanced methodical
vulnerability analysis).
The evaluation was conducted using the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 [CEM] for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information
Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 [CC] (Parts I, II and III).
TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V., as the NSCIB Certification Body, declares that the evaluation meets
all the conditions for international recognition of Common Criteria Certificates and that the product will
be listed on the NSCIB Certified Products list. Note that the certification results apply only to the
specific version of the product as evaluated.
1 The Evaluation Technical Report contains information proprietary to the developer and/or the
evaluator, and is not available for public review.
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2 Certification Results
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) for this evaluation is the TRISS Trust Remote InfoCert Signing Server
version 1.0.2 from InfoCert S.p.A. located in Rome, Italy.
The TOE is comprised of the following main components:
Delivery
item type
Identifier Version
Software TRISS Trust Remote InfoCert Signing Server V1.0.2
To ensure secure usage a set of guidance documents is provided, together with the TRISS Trust
Remote InfoCert Signing Server version 1.0.2. For details, see section 2.5 “Documentation” of this
report.
2.2 Security Policy
The TOE has the following security features:
• Operator management:
o Privileged Users can create other Privileged Users.
• System management
o Privileged Users can handle system configuration.
• Signer management covers:
o Privileged Users can create Signers
o Privileged Users set up the indirect authentication scheme that is assigned to all
Signers.
o Privileged Users or Signers can generate signing keys and Signature Verification Data
(SVD) using a Cryptographic Module and assign the signing key identifier and SVD to
a Signer. Signer can generate signing keys only for him/herself.
o Privileged Users or Signers can disable a signing key identifier to be used by a
Signer. Signer can disable the own signing key identifier.
• Signature operations
o Signers can supply a DTBS/R(s) to be signed, Privileged User can’t.
o The link between Signer authentication, DTBS/R(s) and signing key identifier is
handled by the Signature Activation Data (SAD). The SSA securely exchange the
SAD with the TOE by using the Signature Activation Protocol (SAP). The following
actions are performed within the TOE:
▪ The SAD is verified in integrity.
▪ The SAD is verified that it binds together the Signer authentication, the
DTBS/R(s) and the signing key identifier.
▪ The Signer identified in the SAD is authenticated by using indirect
authentication scheme only.
▪ It is verified that the DTBS/R(s) used for signature operations is bound to the
SAD.
▪ It is verified that the signing key identifier is assigned to the Signer.
▪ The TOE uses Authorisation Data to activate the signing key within the
Cryptographic Module.
▪ The TOE uses its Cryptographic Module services to create signatures.
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▪ The TOE generates audit records for all security-related events and relies on
the SSA to store and provide access control for the records.
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
2.3.1 Assumptions
The assumptions defined in the Security Target are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead
to specific Security Objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. For detailed information on the
security objectives that must be fulfilled by the TOE environment, see section 6.2 of the [ST].
2.3.2 Clarification of scope
The evaluation did not reveal any threats to the TOE that are not countered by the evaluated security
functions of the product.
2.4 Architectural Information
Figure 1 - Logical architecture of the TOE.
The TOE consists of a software application deployed within the tamper protected part of the
Cryptographic Module, in a dedicated tamper-protected environment. The local nature of the
communication between the software application and the Cryptographic Module within the same
physically protected environment ensures integrity and confidentiality protection of the exchanged
data, as well as mutual authentication of the communicating IT entities.
Together the TRISS application and the Cryptographic Module are a QSCD (the TOE). In Figure 1, the
TOE perimeter is highlighted in red colour. It includes both the Cryptographic Module and the TRISS
software application running inside its CPU, and the intended operational environment.
2.5 Documentation
The following documentation is provided with the product by the developer to the customer:
Identifier Version
TRISS AGD_PRE, 31-03-2022 V2.1
TRISS AGD_OPE, 31-03-2022 V2.1
2.6 IT Product Testing
Testing (depth, coverage, functional tests, independent testing): The evaluators examined the
developer’s testing activities documentation and verified that the developer has met their testing
responsibilities.
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2.6.1 Testing approach and depth
In this evaluation, a methodical vulnerability is executed to create fair coverage, by asking security
questions inspired by generic weaknesses separately for all security implementations of the TOE. This
analysis led to four potential vulnerabilities, which were further analysed.
Around 60 possible vulnerabilities were identified by using the following classifications:
• (ACCESS) Accessibility, which includes:
o Access Control (proper verification of the privileges of each role)
o Authentication (proper role determination based on authentication data)
o Privilege (Proper privileges management)
• (CHANNEL) Channel (secure communication with other trusted parties)
• (CRYPT) Cryptography (crypto usage to protect the TOE and as service)
• (ENTRYPOINT) Entry Points (unexpected entry points that could lead to exposure of
confidential information)
• (INPUT) Exception Management (Does the TOE react properly on exceptional
inputs/conditions) and Tainted input (corrupted input)
• (LEAK) Information Leak (No confidential information leakage)
• (MALWARE) Malware (no code execution without integrity check possible)
• (MEMORIES) Memories, which includes:
o Memory Access (proper memory management that is robust against logical
anomalies)
o Memory Management (Proper memory allocation/de-allocation )
o Resource Management (Proper data handling)
• (CODE) Coding, which includes:
o Implementation (proper coding rules and implementation of it)
o Compiler (Compiler does not remove security features)
o Unused entities (No unexpected usage of dead code)
o Risky Values (Proper calculation security values)
• (DESIGN) Design and Architecture (Sound architecture of the building blocks)
• (RANDOM) Predictability (proper RNG usage with the required entropy)
• (COMMANDFLOW) Command flow, which includes:
o Synchronization (Secure TOE behaviour when expected commands order is not
followed)
o Path Resolution (proper data flow)
The applicability of each possible vulnerability are assessed, using design argumentation, developer
the evaluator testing or code review. Possible vulnerabilities that require extra attention was
considered potential vulnerabilities.
2.6.2 Independent penetration testing
All Automatic developer tests were selected to be repeated. Three of the five Manual developer Tests
where selected to be repeated.
The total test effort expended by the evaluators was nine days. During that test campaign, 100% of
the total time was spent on logical tests.
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2.6.3 Test configuration
The TOE configuration used for testing was TRISS Trust Remote InfoCert Signing Server version
1.0.2.
2.6.4 Test results
The testing activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected results and observed
results are summarised in the [ETR], with references to the documents containing the full details.
The developer’s tests and the independent functional tests produced the expected results, giving
assurance that the TOE behaves as specified in its [ST] and functional specification.
No exploitable vulnerabilities were found with the independent penetration tests.
2.7 Reused Evaluation Results
Sites involved in the development and production of the hardware platform were reused by
composition.
2.8 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is defined uniquely by its name and version number TRISS Trust Remote InfoCert Signing
Server version 1.0.2. The TOE user must verify that the SHA-256 fingerprint of the delivered TOE
matches the following:
1a7e91b4d70bbe968181cd7a8132cf9931743c1b0d4434883cad9bbe3628181a
2.9 Evaluation Results
The evaluation lab documented their evaluation results in the [ETR], which references an ASE
Intermediate Report and other evaluator documents, and Site Technical Audit Reports for the sites
[STAR_DevCenter] and [STAR_DataCenter] 2.
The verdict of each claimed assurance requirement is “Pass”.
Based on the above evaluation results the evaluation lab concluded the TRISS Trust Remote InfoCert
Signing Server version 1.0.2, to be CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 conformant, and to meet the
requirements of EAL 4 augmented with AVA_VAN.5. This implies that the product satisfies the
security requirements specified in Security Target [ST].
The Security Target claims ’strict’ conformance to the Protection Profile [PP].
2.10 Comments/Recommendations
The user guidance as outlined in section 2.5 “Documentation” contains necessary information about
the usage of the TOE. Certain aspects of the TOE’s security functionality, in particular the
countermeasures against attacks, depend on accurate conformance to the user guidance of both the
software and the hardware part of the TOE. There are no particular obligations or recommendations
for the user apart from following the user guidance. Please note that the documents contain relevant
details concerning the resistance against certain attacks.
In addition, all aspects of assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not
covered by the TOE itself must be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk
management process. For the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, the
customer should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the TOE is required and thus
requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
2 The Site Technical Audit Report contains information necessary to an evaluation lab and
certification body for the reuse of the site audit report in a TOE evaluation.
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The strength of the cryptographic algorithms and protocols was not rated in the course of this
evaluation. This specifically applies to the following proprietary or non-standard algorithms, protocols
and implementations: none.
Not all key sizes specified in the [ST] have sufficient cryptographic strength to satisfy the AVA_VAN.5
“high attack potential”. To be protected against attackers with a "high attack potential", appropriate
cryptographic algorithms with sufficiently large cryptographic key sizes shall be used (references can
be found in national and international documents and standards).
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3 Security Target
The Signature Activation Module Trust Remote InfoCert Signing Server – TRISS Security Target,
Version 2.1, 31 March 2022 [ST] is included here by reference.
4 Definitions
This list of acronyms and definitions contains elements that are not already defined by the CC or CEM:
CA Certification Authority
CM Cryptographic Module
CSR Certificate Signing Request
DTBS Data to be signed
IT Information Technology
IT Information Technology
ITSEF IT Security Evaluation Facility
JIL Joint Interpretation Library
NSCIB Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the area of IT Security
OSP Organizational Security Policies
PP Protection Profile
PU Privileged User(s)
QSCD Qualified Electronic Signature Creation Device or Qualified
Electronic Seal Signature Creation Device
QTSP Qualified Trust Service Provider
RA Registration Authority
SAD Signature Activation Data
SAM Signature Activation Module also referred to as TOE
SAP Signature Activation Protocol
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SCA Signature Creation Application
SCD Signature Creation Device
SIC Signer Interaction Component
SPD Security Problem Definition
SSA Sign Server Application
SVD Signature Verification Data
TOE Target of Evaluation
TRISS Trust Remote InfoCert Signing Server (TOE) also referred to as
(SAM)
TSP Trust Service Provider
TW4S Trustworthy Systems Supporting Server Signing
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5 Bibliography
This section lists all referenced documentation used as source material in the compilation of this
report.
[CC] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Parts I,
II and III, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
[ETR] Evaluation Technical Report “TRISS Trust Remote Infocert Signing
Server"– EAL4+, 22-RPT-230, Version 4.0, 01 April 2022
[ETR HW] Evaluation Technical Report “nShield Solo XC Hardware Security Module
v12.60.15” – EAL4+, Version 3.0, date: 5 July 2021
[NSCIB] Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security, Version
2.5, 28 March 2019
[PP] Trustworthy Systems Supporting Server Signing Part 2: Protection Profile
for QSCD for Server Signing, 419241-2:2019 v0.16, dated 18 May 2020,
registered under the reference ANSSI-CC-PP-2018/02-M01
[ST] Signature Activation Module Trust Remote InfoCert Signing Server –
TRISS Security Target, Version 2.1, 31 March 2022
[STAR_DevCenter] Site Audit report Infocert development site, 22-RPT-002, Version 2.0, 28
March 2022
[STAR_DataCenter] Site Audit report Infocert Data Center, 22-RPT-003, Version 2.0, 28
March 2022
(This is the end of this report.)