Nessus Network Monitor 5.12.0 Security Target, Version 1.0 04 December 2020
Nessus Network Monitor 5.12.0
Security Target
Version 1.0
04 December 2020
Prepared for:
Tenable, Inc.
7021 Columbia Gateway Dr.
Columbia, MD 21046
Prepared by:
Accredited Testing and Evaluation Labs
6841 Benjamin Franklin Drive
Columbia, MD 21046
Nessus Network Monitor 5.12.0 Security Target, Version 1.0 04 December 2020
Contents
1 Security Target Introduction.................................................................................................................1
1.1 Security Target, TOE and CC Identification.....................................................................................1
1.2 Conformance Claims.......................................................................................................................1
1.3 Conventions....................................................................................................................................4
1.3.1 Terminology ............................................................................................................................4
1.3.2 Acronyms.................................................................................................................................5
2 Product and TOE Description................................................................................................................7
2.1 Introduction....................................................................................................................................7
2.2 Product Overview...........................................................................................................................7
2.3 TOE Overview .................................................................................................................................7
2.4 TOE Architecture ............................................................................................................................8
2.4.1 Physical Boundary ...................................................................................................................8
2.4.2 Logical Boundary.....................................................................................................................9
2.4.2.1 Timely Security Updates ................................................................................................10
2.4.2.2 Cryptographic Support...................................................................................................10
2.4.2.3 User Data Protection......................................................................................................10
2.4.2.4 Identification and Authentication..................................................................................10
2.4.2.5 Security Management....................................................................................................10
2.4.2.6 Privacy............................................................................................................................11
2.4.2.7 Protection of the TSF .....................................................................................................11
2.4.2.8 Trusted Path/Channels ..................................................................................................11
2.5 TOE Documentation .....................................................................................................................11
3 Security Problem Definition................................................................................................................12
4 Security Objectives .............................................................................................................................13
5 IT Security Requirements....................................................................................................................14
5.1 Extended Requirements...............................................................................................................14
5.2 TOE Security Functional Requirements........................................................................................15
5.2.1 Cryptographic Support (FCS).................................................................................................16
5.2.1.1 FCS_CKM.1(1) Cryptographic Asymmetric Key Generation...........................................16
5.2.1.2 FCS_CKM.1(3) Password Conditioning...........................................................................16
5.2.1.3 FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic Key Establishment...............................................................16
5.2.1.4 FCS_CKM_EXT.1 Cryptographic Key Generation Services .............................................16
5.2.1.5 FCS_COP.1(1) Cryptographic Operation – Encryption/Decryption................................17
5.2.1.6 FCS_COP.1(2) Cryptographic Operation – Hashing........................................................17
5.2.1.7 FCS_COP.1(3) Cryptographic Operation – Signing.........................................................17
5.2.1.8 FCS_COP.1(4) Cryptographic Operation – Keyed-Hash Message Authentication.........17
5.2.1.9 FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1/Server HTTPS Protocol.....................................................................18
5.2.1.10 FCS_HTTPS_EXT.2 HTTPS Protocol with Mutual Authentication...................................18
5.2.1.11 FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation Services.........................................................18
5.2.1.12 FCS_RBG_EXT.2 Random Bit Generation from Application...........................................18
5.2.1.13 FCS_STO_EXT.1 Storage of Credentials.........................................................................18
5.2.1.14 FCS_TLS_EXT.1 TLS Protocol (TLS EP)............................................................................19
5.2.1.15 FCS_TLSS_EXT.1 TLS Server Protocol (TLS EP)................................................................19
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5.2.1.16 FCS_TLSS_EXT.2 TLS Server Support for Mutual Authentication (TLS EP).....................19
5.2.2 User Data Protection (FDP)...................................................................................................20
5.2.2.1 FDP_DAR_EXT.1(1) Encryption of Sensitive Application Data (by TOE) ........................20
5.2.2.2 FDP_DAR_EXT.1(2) Encryption of Sensitive Application Data (by OE) ..........................20
5.2.2.3 FDP_DEC_EXT.1 Access to Platform Resources .............................................................20
5.2.2.4 FDP_NET_EXT.1 Network Communications...................................................................20
5.2.3 Identification and Authentication (FIA).................................................................................21
5.2.3.1 FIA_X509_EXT.1 X.509 Certificate Validation................................................................21
5.2.3.2 FIA_X509_EXT.2 X.509 Certificate Authentication ........................................................22
5.2.4 Security Management (FMT).................................................................................................22
5.2.4.1 FMT_CFG_EXT.1 Secure by Default Configuration ........................................................22
5.2.4.2 FMT_MEC_EXT.1 Supported Configuration Mechanism ...............................................22
5.2.4.3 FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions...................................................22
5.2.5 Privacy (FPR)..........................................................................................................................22
5.2.5.1 FPR_ANO_EXT.1 User Consent for Transmission of Personally Identifiable Information
22
5.2.6 Protection of the TSF (FPT)....................................................................................................23
5.2.6.1 FPT_AEX_EXT.1 Anti-Exploitation Capabilities...............................................................23
5.2.6.2 FPT_API_EXT.1 Use of Supported Services and APIs ....................................................23
5.2.6.3 FPT_IDV_EXT.1 Software Identification and Versions ..................................................23
5.2.6.4 FPT_LIB_EXT.1 Use of Third Party Libraries ...................................................................23
5.2.6.5 FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Integrity for Installation and Update...................................................23
5.2.6.6 FPT_TUD_EXT.2 Integrity for Installation and Update...................................................24
5.2.7 Trusted Path/Channels (FTP).................................................................................................24
5.2.7.1 FTP_DIT_EXT.1 Protection of Data in Transit.................................................................24
5.3 TOE Security Assurance Requirements ........................................................................................24
6 TOE Summary Specification................................................................................................................25
6.1 Timely Security Updates...............................................................................................................25
6.2 Cryptographic Support .................................................................................................................25
6.3 User Data Protection....................................................................................................................28
6.4 Identification and Authentication ................................................................................................29
6.5 Security Management ..................................................................................................................30
6.6 Privacy ..........................................................................................................................................31
6.7 Protection of the TSF....................................................................................................................31
6.8 Trusted Path/Channels.................................................................................................................32
7 Protection Profile Claims ....................................................................................................................34
8 Rationale.............................................................................................................................................35
8.1 TOE Summary Specification Rationale .........................................................................................35
Appendix ATOE Usage of Third-Party Components
37
A.1 Platform APIs................................................................................................................................37
A.2 Third-Party Libraries.....................................................................................................................38
Tables
Table 1: Terms and Definitions .....................................................................................................................4
Table 2: Acronyms.........................................................................................................................................5
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Table 3: TOE Security Functional Components...........................................................................................15
Table 4: Assurance Components.................................................................................................................24
Table 5: Cryptographic Functions ...............................................................................................................25
Table 6: Sensitive Data................................................................................................................................28
Table 7: TOE Network Usage ......................................................................................................................29
Table 8: Security Functions vs. Requirements Mapping.............................................................................35
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1 Security Target Introduction
The Security Target (ST) contains the following additional sections:
 Product and TOE Description (Section 2)
 Security Problem Definition (Section 3)
 Security Objectives (Section 4)
 IT Security Requirements (Section 5)

 The TLS Package does contain evaluation activities for how to evaluate its SFR claims as part of
the evaluation of ASE_TSS.1, AGD_OPE.1, AGD_PRE.1, and ATE_IND.1. All Security Functional
Requirements specified by the TLS Package will be evaluated in the manner specified in that
package.
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 TOE Summary Specification (Section 0)

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 Protection Profile Claims (Section 0)
 This ST is conformant to the Protection Profile for Application Software, Version 1.3, 1 March
2019 (App PP) and Functional Package for Transport Layer Security (TLS), Version 1.1, February
12, 2019 (TLS Package) along with all applicable errata and interpretations from the certificate
issuing scheme.
The TOE consists of a software application that runs on a Linux operating system as its platform.
As explained in section 3, Security Problem Definition, the Security Problem Definition of the App PP has
been included by reference into this ST.
As explained in section 4, Security Objectives, the Security Objectives of the App PP has been included by
reference into this ST.
All claimed SFRs are defined in the App PP and TLS Package. All mandatory SFRs are claimed. No optional
or objective SFRs are claimed. Selection-based SFR claims are consistent with the selections made in the
mandatory SFRs that prompt their inclusion.
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 Rationale (Section 0)
 TOE Usage of Third-Party Components (Appendix A)
1.1 Security Target, TOE and CC Identification
ST Title – Nessus Network Monitor 5.12.0 Security Target
ST Version – Version 1.0
ST Date – 04 December 2020
TOE Identification – Nessus Network Monitor (also known as NNM) 5.12.0, supported on RHEL 7 and
Windows Server 2016
TOE Developer – Tenable, Inc.
Evaluation Sponsor – Tenable, Inc.
CC Identification – Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1, Revision
5, April 2017
1.2 Conformance Claims
This ST and the TOE it describes are conformant to the following CC specifications:
 Protection Profile for Application Software, Version 1.3, 01 March 2019 (App PP) with the following
optional and selection-based SFRs:
o FCS_CKM.1(1)
o FCS_CKM.1(3)
o FCS_CKM.2
o FCS_COP.1(1)
o FCS_COP.1(2)
o FCS_COP.1(3)
o FCS_COP.1(4)
o FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1/Server (as specified in NIAP TD0473)
o FCS_HTTPS_EXT.2 (as specified in NIAP TD0473)
o FCS_RBG_EXT.2
o FIA_X509_EXT.1
o FIA_X509_EXT.2
 Functional Package for Transport Layer Security (TLS), Version 1.1, February 12, 2019 (TLS
Package) with the following optional and selection-based SFRs:
o FCS_TLSS_EXT.1
o FCS_TLSS_EXT.2
 The following NIAP Technical Decisions apply to the TOE and have been accounted for in the ST
development and the conduct of the evaluation, or were considered to be non-applicable:
TD0416: Correction to FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Test Activity
o No change to ST; affects only test evaluation activities.
TD0427: Reliable Time Source
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o No change to ST; the ST includes the PP’s assumptions by reference and therefore any changes
to the assumptions are implicitly made.
TD0434: Windows Desktop Applications Test
o No change to ST; affects only evaluation activities.
TD0435: Alternative to SELinux for FPT_AEX_EXT.1.3
o No change to ST; affects only evaluation activities.
TD0437: Supported Configuration Mechanism
o Changes text selection for FMT_MEC_EXT.1.1. This change has been applied to this ST.
TD0442: Updated TLS Ciphersuites for TLS Package
o No change to ST; affects selections in FCS_TLSS_EXT.1 that are not applicable to the TOE.
TD0444: IPsec Selections
o No change to ST; affects selections in FTP_DIT_EXT.1.1 that are not applicable to the TOE.
TD0445: User Modifiable File Definition
o No change to ST; affects the evaluation of FPT_AEX_EXT.1 for the Windows platform version
of the TOE.
TD0465: Configuration Storage for .NET Apps
o No change to ST; the TD modifies evaluation activities only.
TD0469: Modification of test activity for FCS_TLSS_EXT.1.1 test 4.1
o No change to ST; the TD modifies evaluation activities only.
TD0473: Support for Client or Server TOEs in FCS_HTTPS_EXT
o Changes FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1. This change has been applied to the ST.
TD0486: Removal of PP-Module for VPN Clients from allowed-with list
o N/A; the TOE does not have VPN Client functionality so no attempt was made to claim the
VPN Client PP-Module. This TD modifies selections in FDP_DAR_EXT.1.1, but the ST does not
choose any of the modified selections so there is no change to the SFR.
TD0495: FIA_X509_EXT.1.2 Test Clarification
o No change to ST; the TD modifies evaluation activities only.
TD0498: Application Software PP Security Objectives and Requirements Rationale
o No change to ST; the TD modified portions of the App PP that were not reproduced in the ST.
TD0499: Testing with pinned certificates
o N/A; the TOE does not claim FCS_TLSC_EXT.1
TD0510: Obtaining random bytes for iOS/macOS
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o N/A; the TOE does not use iOS or macOS as its platform.
TD0513: CA Certificate loading
o N/A; the TOE does not claim FCS_TLSC_EXT.1
TD0515: Use Android APK manifest in test
o N/A; the TOE does not include an Android platform version.
TD0519: Linux symbolic links and FMT_CFG_EXT.1
o No change to ST; affects only evaluation activities.
TD0521: Updates to Certificate Revocation (FIA_X509_EXT.1)
o Changes FIA_X509_EXT.1.1. This change has been applied to the ST. Note that the TD also
added selections to FIA_X509_EXT.1.1. However, none of these added selections were
applicable to the TOE and were therefore not selected.
TD0540: Expanded AES Modes in FCS_COP
o No change to ST; affects selections in FCS_COP.1(1) that are not applicable to the TOE.
TD0543: FMT_MEC_EXT.1 evaluation activity update
o No change to ST; affects only evaluation activities.
TD0544: Alternative testing methods for FPT_AEX_EXT.1.1
o No change to ST; affects only evaluation activities.
TD0548: Integrity for installation tests in AppSW PP 1.3
o No change to ST; affects only evaluation activities.
TD0554: iOS/iPadOS/Android AppSW Virus Scan
o No change to ST; affects only evaluation activities.
 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security functional
components, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
o Part 2 Extended
 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security assurance
components, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.
o Part 3 Extended
1.3 Conventions
The following conventions have been applied in this document:
 Security Functional Requirements – Part 2 of the CC defines the approved set of operations that may
be applied to functional requirements: iteration, assignment, selection, and refinement.
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o Iteration: allows a component to be used more than once with varying operations. An iterated
SFR is indicated by a number in parentheses placed at the end of the component. For example,
FCS_COP.1(1) through FCS_COP.1(4) indicate that the ST includes four iterations of the
FCS_COP.1 requirement: (1), (2), (3), and (4).
o Assignment: allows the specification of an identified parameter. Assignments are indicated
using italics and are surrounded by brackets (e.g., [assignment item]). Note that an
assignment within a selection would be identified in both italics and underline, with the
brackets themselves underlined since they are explicitly part of the selection text, unlike the
brackets around the selection itself (e.g., [selection item, [assignment item inside selection]]).
o Selection: allows the specification of one or more elements from a list. Selections are
indicated using underlines and are surrounded by brackets (e.g., [selection item]).
o Refinement: allows technical changes to a requirement to make it more restrictive and allows
non-technical changes to grammar and formatting. Refinements are indicated using bold, for
additions, and strike-through, for deletions (e.g., “… all objects …” or “… some big things …”).
Note that minor grammatical changes that do not involve the addition or removal of entire
words (e.g., for consistency of quantity such as changing “meets” to “meet”) do not have
formatting applied.
 Other sections of the ST – Other sections of the ST use bolding to highlight text of special interest,
such as captions.
 The ST does not show operations that have been completed by the PP authors, though it does
preserve brackets to show where such operations have been made.
1.3.1 Terminology
The following terms and abbreviations are used in this ST:
Table 1: Terms and Definitions
Term Definition
Log Correlation Engine An environmental component that is responsible for collecting log data from
a variety of sources and aggregating it into a single collection of results.
Nessus Agent An environmental component that is installed on an endpoint system to
collect details about that system’s configuration and behavior.
Nessus Network Monitor The TOE; an application that collects and analyzes raw network traffic.
Nessus/Nessus Manager An environmental component that conducts remote scans of systems to
collect data about their configuration and behavior and is used to deploy
and collect data from the TOE.
Platform A general-purpose computer on which the TOE is installed.
Tenable.sc (SecurityCenter) An environmental component that functions as a centralized aggregator for
data collected by the TOE and by other environmental components.
1.3.2 Acronyms
Table 2: Acronyms
Term Definition
API Application Programming Interface
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
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ASLR Address Space Layout Randomization
CA Certificate Authority
CAVP Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program
CBC Cipher Block Chaining
CC Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation
CCECG Common Criteria Evaluated Configuration Guidance
CEM Common Evaluation Methodology for Information Technology Security
CN Common Name
CTR Counter (cryptographic mode)
CVE Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures
DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator
EAR Entropy Analysis Report
ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography
ECDHE Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (Ephemeral)
ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard
FQDN Fully Qualified Domain Name
GB Gigabyte
GCM Galois/Counter Mode
GUI Graphical User Interface
HMAC Hashed Message Authentication Code
LCE Log Correlation Engine
NIAP National Information Assurance Partnership
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
NNM Nessus Network Monitor
OCSP Online Certificate Status Protocol
OE Operational Environment
OID Original Issue Document
OS Operating System
PBKDF Password-Based Key Derivation Function
PII Personally Identifiable Information
PKI Public Key Infrastructure
PP Protection Profile
RAM Random Access Memory
RSA Rivest, Shamir and Adleman (algorithm for public-key cryptography)
SAN Subject Alternative Name
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFR Security Functional Requirement
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SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SSL Secure Sockets Layer
ST Security Target
TCP Transmission Control Protocol
TLS Transport Layer Security
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Function
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2 Product and TOE Description
2.1 Introduction
Nessus Network Monitor 5.12.0 (NNM) is a software product that is designed to passively collect traffic
data from environmental networks for analysis.
NNM also connects to an environmental instance of Tenable.sc (SecurityCenter) which serves as a single
point to aggregate and analyze data collected from various Tenable applications, including NNM.
The TOE conforms to the App PP and TLS Package. As such, the security-relevant functionality of the
product is limited to the claimed requirements in those standards. The security-relevant functionality is
described in sections 2.3 and 2.4. The product overview in section 2.2 below is intended to provide the
reader with an overall summary of the entire product so that its intended usage is clear. The subset of the
product functionality that is within the evaluation scope is subsequently described in the sections that
follow it.
2.2 Product Overview
NNM is a vulnerability management product that is designed to provide visibility into network assets. The
product is used to collect information about its environment that is used to diagnose and enhance the
security posture of the environment. It does this by passively scanning network traffic using deep packet
inspection to perform asset discovery and to detect user and application activities that could indicate
compromise or misuse. Information collected by NNM can be fed to the environmental Tenable.sc
product for centralized aggregation, analysis, and reaction.
NNM also supports plugins, which can be downloaded and added to the product to detect specific
vulnerabilities.
2.3 TOE Overview
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) for NNM consists of the mandatory functionality prescribed by the App PP
and TLS Package, as well as some selection-based functionality where needed.
The logical boundary is summarized in section 2.4.2 below. In general, the following NNM capabilities are
considered to be within the scope of the TOE:
 Protection of sensitive data at rest: the TOE uses encryption to protect credentials and other
sensitive data.
 Protection of data in transit: the TOE secures data in transit between itself and its operational
environment using TLS and HTTPS.
 Trusted updates: the TOE provides visibility into its current running version and the vendor
distributes updates to it that are digitally signed so that administrators can securely maintain up-
to-date software.
 Remote administration: the TOE provides a Web GUI to administer its security functions. Note
however that the bulk of the product’s administration functions are outside the scope of the App
PP and TLS Package and are therefore not part of the TOE.
 Cryptographic services: the TOE includes an implementation of OpenSSL with NIST-validated
algorithm services that it uses to secure data at rest and in transit.
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 Secure interaction with operating system: the TOE is designed to interact with underlying host
operating system platforms in such a way that the TOE cannot be used as an attack vector to
compromise an operating system.
The TOE’s data collection capabilities are outside the scope of the TOE, as is any other product behavior
that is not described in the App PP or TLS Package. The content and execution of plugins is similarly
excluded from the TOE, although they are discussed in the context of network communications because
the TSF must use platform network resources to acquire them.
2.4 TOE Architecture
The NNM TOE consists of the NNM application, which is a C application with a PHP/JavaScript web front-
end running on a proprietary web server. The TOE has both Linux and Windows platform versions.
2.4.1 Physical Boundary
The TOE consists of the following component, as shown in Figure 1 below:
 Nessus Network Monitor (NNM) 5.12.0
Figure 1 shows the TOE in a sample deployment with other Tenable applications in its operational
environment.
Figure 1 - TOE Boundary
SecurityCenter
Nessus Manager
Nessus Network
Monitor
Log
Configuration
Engine
Remote Admin
Remote Log
Sources
TCP/8835 (HTTPS)
Network Assets
Nessus Agent
Monitored Client
TOE Component
Environmental Component
TSF Interface
Non-TSF Interface
TCP/443 (HTTPS)
TCP/8834 (HTTPS)
TCP/8834 (HTTPS)
TCP/8835 (HTTPS)
TCP/8836 (HTTPS)
TCP/1243 (HTTPS)
TCP/8834 (HTTPS)
TCP/22 (SSH)
various
various
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TSF-relevant remote interfaces are shown in Figure 1. Note that the TOE consists of exactly one instance
of NNM.
The TOE has the following system requirements for its host platforms:
 2x 2GHz cores
 4 GB RAM
 20 GB disk storage
These system requirements reflect the lightest usage scenarios for the TOE. Additional factors such as
network size and storage retention requirements will affect the system requirements for a particular
deployment. Refer to the relevant TOE documentation (as referenced in section 2.5) for the specific
system requirements that apply to a given deployment.
The following network port must be open for the TOE to function, but the specific port is configurable if
the default port cannot be used:
 TCP/8835 (for communications with remote administrators and with Tenable.sc)
NNM will collect network traffic to determine whether potential unauthorized or malicious activity is
occurring in the network. This functionality is not within the scope of the TOE because it is not “sensitive
data” but it is necessary for the product to function as advertised. In particular, if network configuration
between NNM and a particular network node blocks traffic to that node, it may result in a false negative
if malicious activities are occurring that the TOE cannot detect due to an inability to receive the traffic.
The TOE’s operational environment includes the following:
 Other Tenable components (an instance of Tenable.sc—Nessus Manager, Nessus Agent(s), and
Log Correlation Engine are expected to be present in the TOE’s operational environment because
they also interface with Tenable.sc but the TOE does not interact with these applications directly).
 Platform (hardware and software) on which the TOE is hosted.
o The TOE is capable of running on a general-purpose Windows or Linux operating system
on standard consumer-grade hardware on either a physical or virtual machine. For the
evaluated configuration, the TOE was tested on virtualized instances of Windows Server
2016 and RHEL 7, each running on VMware ESXi 6.5 on a system using an AMD Ryzen
Threadripper 1950X processor with the Zen microarchitecture.
 Full disk encryption is required for the TOE platform to ensure adequate data-at-rest protection.
 Web browser, used to access the GUI interface.
2.4.2 Logical Boundary
This section summarizes the security functions provided by the TOE:
 Timely Security Updates
 Cryptographic Support
 User Data Protection
 Identification and Authentication
 Security Management
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 Privacy
 Protection of the TSF
 Trusted Path/Channels
2.4.2.1 Timely Security Updates
The TOE developer has internal mechanisms for receiving reports of security flaws, tracking product
vulnerabilities, and distributing software updates to customers in a timely manner.
2.4.2.2 Cryptographic Support
The TOE implements cryptography to protect data at rest and in transit.
For data at rest, the TOE stores credential data to log in to the TOE as well as passphrase data used to
protect PKI certificates that the TOE uses to authenticate to environmental components. This stored data
is encrypted using AES or a PBKDF, depending on the data that is being stored.
For data in transit, the TOE implements TLS/HTTPS as a server. The TOE implements a TLS server for its
administrative interface and to communicate with other Tenable products in its operational environment.
The TOE supports mutual authentication as a TLS server for all uses.
The TOE implements all cryptography used for these functions using its own implementations of OpenSSL
with NIST-approved algorithms. The TOE’s DRBG is seeded using entropy from the underlying OS platform.
2.4.2.3 User Data Protection
The TOE uses cryptographic mechanisms to protect sensitive data at rest. The key used by the TOE to
encrypt and decrypt sensitive data is cryptographically protected by the TOE platform.
The TOE relies on the network connectivity and system log capabilities of its host OS platform. The TOE
supports user-initiated, externally-initiated, and application-initiated uses of the network.
2.4.2.4 Identification and Authentication
The TOE supports X.509 certificate validation as part of establishing TLS and HTTPS connections. The TOE
supports various certificate validity checking methods and can also check certificate revocation status
using OCSP. If the validity status of a certificate cannot be determined, the certificate will be accepted. All
other cases where a certificate is found to be invalid will result in rejection without an administrative
override.
2.4.2.5 Security Management
The TOE itself and the configuration settings it uses are stored in locations recommended by the platform
vendor for both Windows and Linux application versions.
The TOE includes a web GUI. This interface enforces username/password authentication using locally-
stored credentials that are created using the TOE. The TOE does not include a default user account to
access its management interface.
The security-relevant management functions supported by the TOE relate to configuration of transmission
of system data (through collection of network traffic).
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2.4.2.6 Privacy
The TOE does not handle personally identifiable information (PII) of any individuals.
2.4.2.7 Protection of the TSF
The TOE enforces various mechanisms to prevent itself from being used as an attack vector to its host OS
platform. Each TOE platform version (Windows and Linux) implements address space layout
randomization (ASLR), does not allocate any memory with both write and execute permissions, does not
write user-modifiable files to directories that contain executable files, is compiled using stack overflow
protection, and is compatible with the security features of its host OS platform.
Each TOE platform version contains libraries and invokes system APIs that are well-known and explicitly
identified.
The TOE has a mechanism to determine its current software version. Software updates to the TOE can be
acquired by leveraging its OS platform. The format of the software update is dependent on the TOE
platform version. All updates are digitally signed to guarantee their authenticity and integrity.
2.4.2.8 Trusted Path/Channels
The TOE encrypts sensitive data in transit between itself and its operational environment using TLS and
HTTPS. It facilitates the transmission of sensitive data from remote users over TLS and HTTPS.
2.5 TOE Documentation
Tenable provides the following product documentation in support of the installation and secure use of
the TOE:
 Nessus Network Monitor 5.12.x User Guide, Last Updated: October 29, 2020
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3 Security Problem Definition
This ST includes by reference the Security Problem Definition, composed of threats and assumptions, from
the App PP, including the inclusion of A.PLATFORM as required by TD0427. The Common Criteria also
provides for organizational security policies to be part of a security problem definition, but no such policies
are defined in the App PP.
As a functional package, the TLS Package does not contain a Security Problem Definition. The TOE’s use of
TLS is intended to mitigate the T.NETWORK_ATTACK and T.NETWORK_EAVESDROP threats defined by the
App PP.
In general, the threat model of the App PP is designed to protect against the following:
 Disclosure of sensitive data at rest or in transit that the user has a reasonable expectation of security
for.
 Excessive or poorly-implemented interfaces with the underlying platform that allow an application to
be used as an intrusion point to a system.
This threat model is applicable to the TOE because aggregated and analyzed vulnerability scan results
could show an attacker what system weaknesses are present in the environment if they were able to
obtain this data. It is also applicable because the TOE is a collection of executable binaries that an attacker
could attempt to use to compromise the underlying OS platform if it was designed in such a manner that
this exploitation was possible.
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4 Security Objectives
Like the Security Problem Definition, this ST includes by reference the security objectives defined in the
App PP. This includes security objectives for the TOE (used to mitigate threats) and for its operational
environment (used to satisfy assumptions).
As a functional package, the TLS Package does not contain a Security Problem Definition. The TOE’s use of
TLS is intended to satisfy the O.PROTECTED_COMMS objective of the App PP by implementing a specific
method by which network communications are protected.
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5 IT Security Requirements
This section defines the Security Functional Requirements (SFRs) and Security Assurance Requirements
(SARs) that serve to represent the security functional claims for the Target of Evaluation (TOE) and to
scope the evaluation effort.
The SFRs have all been drawn from the following Protection Profiles (PP) and Functional Packages:
 Protection Profile for Application Software, Version 1.3, March 1, 2019
 Functional Packages for Transport Layer Security (TLS), Version 1.1, February 12, 2019
As a result, any selection, assignment, or refinement operations already performed by that PP on the
claimed SFRs are not identified here (i.e., they are not formatted in accordance with the conventions
specified in section 1.3 of this ST). Formatting conventions are only applied on SFR text that was chosen
at the ST author’s discretion.
5.1 Extended Requirements
All of the extended requirements in this ST have been drawn from the App PP and TLS Package. These
documents define the following extended SAR and extended SFRs; since they have not been redefined in
this ST, the App PP and TLS Package should be consulted for more information regarding these extensions
to CC Parts 2 and 3.
Defined in App PP:
 ALC_TSU_EXT.1 Timely Security Updates
 FCS_CKM_EXT.1 Cryptographic Key Generation Services
 FCS_CKM.1(3) Password Conditioning
 FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1/Server HTTPS Protocol (as specified in NIAP TD0473)
 FCS_HTTPS_EXT.2 HTTPS Protocol with Mutual Authentication (as specified in NIAP TD0473)
 FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation Services
 FCS_RBG_EXT.2 Random Bit Generation from Application
 FCS_STO_EXT.1 Storage of Credentials
 FDP_DAR_EXT.1 Encryption of Sensitive Application Data
 FDP_DEC_EXT.1 Access to Platform Resources
 FDP_NET_EXT.1 Network Communications
 FIA_X509_EXT.1 X.509 Certificate Validation
 FIA_X509_EXT.2 X.509 Certificate Authentication
 FMT_CFG_EXT.1 Secure by Default Configuration
 FMT_MEC_EXT.1 Supported Configuration Mechanism
 FPR_ANO_EXT.1 User Consent for Transmission of Personally Identifiable Information
 FPT_AEX_EXT.1 Anti-Exploitation Capabilities
 FPT_API_EXT.1 Use of Supported Services and APIs
 FPT_IDV_EXT.1 Software Identification and Versions
 FPT_LIB_EXT.1 Use of Third Party Libraries
 FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Integrity for Installation and Update
 FPT_TUD_EXT.2 Integrity for Installation and Update
 FTP_DIT_EXT.1 Protection of Data in Transit
Defined in TLS Package:
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 FCS_TLS_EXT.1 TLS Protocol
 FCS_TLSS_EXT.1 TLS Server Protocol
 FCS_TLSS_EXT.2 TLS Server Support for Mutual Authentication
5.2 TOE Security Functional Requirements
The following table identifies the SFRs that are satisfied by the TOE.
Table 3: TOE Security Functional Components
Requirement Class Requirement Component
FCS: Cryptographic Support FCS_CKM.1(1) Cryptographic Asymmetric Key Generation
FCS_CKM.1(3) Password Conditioning
FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic Key Establishment
FCS_CKM_EXT.1 Cryptographic Key Generation Services
FCS_COP.1(1) Cryptographic Operation – Encryption/Decryption
FCS_COP.1(2) Cryptographic Operation – Hashing
FCS_COP.1(3) Cryptographic Operation – Signing
FCS_COP.1(4) Cryptographic Operation – Keyed-Hash Message Authentication
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1/Server HTTPS Protocol
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.2 HTTPS Protocol with Mutual Authentication
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation Services
FCS_RBG_EXT.2 Random Bit Generation from Application
FCS_STO_EXT.1 Storage of Credentials
FCS_TLS_EXT.1 TLS Protocol (TLS Package)
FCS_TLSS_EXT.1 TLS Server Protocol (TLS Package)
FCS_TLSS_EXT.2 TLS Server Support for Mutual Authentication (TLS Package)
FDP: User Data Protection FDP_DAR_EXT.1(1) Encryption of Sensitive Application Data (by TOE)
FDP_DAR_EXT.1(2) Encryption of Sensitive Application Data (by OE)
FDP_DEC_EXT.1 Access to Platform Resources
FDP_NET_EXT.1 Network Communications
FIA: Identification and
authentication
FIA_X509_EXT.1 X.509 Certificate Validation
FIA_X509_EXT.2 X.509 Certificate Authentication
FMT: Security Management FMT_CFG_EXT.1 Secure by Default Configuration
FMT_MEC_EXT.1 Supported Configuration Mechanism
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FPR: Privacy FPR_ANO_EXT.1 User Consent for Transmission of Personally Identifiable
Information
FPT: Protection of the TSF FPT_AEX_EXT.1 Anti-Exploitation Capabilities
FPT_API_EXT.1 Use of Supported Services and APIs
FPT_IDV_EXT.1 Software Identification and Versions
FPT_LIB_EXT.1 Use of Third Party Libraries
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Requirement Class Requirement Component
FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Integrity for Installation and Update
FPT_TUD_EXT.2 Integrity for Installation and Update
FTP: Trusted Path/Channels FTP_DIT_EXT.1 Protection of Data in Transit
5.2.1 Cryptographic Support (FCS)
5.2.1.1 FCS_CKM.1(1) Cryptographic Asymmetric Key Generation
FCS_CKM.1.1(1) The application shall [
 implement functionality
] to generate asymmetric cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key generation algorithm [
 [ECC schemes] using [“NIST curves” P-256, P-384 and [no other curves]] that
meet the following: [FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”,
Appendix B.4]
].
5.2.1.2 FCS_CKM.1(3) Password Conditioning
FCS_CKM.1.1(3) A password/passphrase shall perform [Password-based Key Derivation
Functions] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm as specified in
FCS_COP.1(4), with [10000] iterations, and output cryptographic key sizes [128]
that meet the following [NIST SP 800-132].
FCS_CKM.1.2(3) The TSF shall generate salts using a RBG that meets FCS_RBG_EXT.1 and with
entropy corresponding to the security strength selected for PBKDF in
FCS_CKM.1.1(3).
5.2.1.3 FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic Key Establishment
FCS_CKM.2.1 The application shall [implement functionality] to perform cryptographic key
establishment in accordance with a specified cryptographic key establishment
method: [
 [Elliptic curve-based key establishment schemes] that meet the following:
[NIST Special Publication 800-56A, “Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key
Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography”]
].
5.2.1.4 FCS_CKM_EXT.1 Cryptographic Key Generation Services
FCS_CKM_EXT.1.1 The application shall [
 Implement asymmetric key generation
].
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5.2.1.5 FCS_COP.1(1) Cryptographic Operation – Encryption/Decryption
FCS_COP.1.1(1)1
The application shall perform encryption/decryption in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm [
 AES-CBC (as defined in NIST SP 800-38A) mode,
 AES-GCM (as defined in NIST SP 800-38D) mode,
 AES-XTS (as defined in NIST SP 800-38E) mode
] and cryptographic key sizes [128-bit, 256-bit].
5.2.1.6 FCS_COP.1(2) Cryptographic Operation – Hashing
FCS_COP.1.1(2) The application shall perform cryptographic hashing services in accordance with
a specified cryptographic algorithm [
 SHA-256,
 SHA-384
] and message digest sizes [
 256,
 384
] bits that meet the following: FIPS Pub 180-4.
5.2.1.7 FCS_COP.1(3) Cryptographic Operation – Signing
FCS_COP.1.1(3) The application shall perform cryptographic signature services (generation and
verification) in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [
 RSA schemes using cryptographic key sizes of 2048-bit or greater that meet
the following: FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Section 4
].
5.2.1.8 FCS_COP.1(4) Cryptographic Operation – Keyed-Hash Message Authentication
FCS_COP.1.1(4) The application shall perform keyed-hash message authentication in accordance
with a specified cryptographic algorithm
 HMAC-SHA-256
and [
 SHA-384
] with key sizes [256 bits, 384 bits] and message digest sizes 256 and [384] bits
that meet the following: FIPS Pub 198-1 The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication
Code and FIPS Pub 180-4 Secure Hash Standard.
1
This SFR is modified by TD0543 but this ST does not claim any of the selections that were added by the
TD.
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5.2.1.9 FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1/Server HTTPS Protocol2
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1.1/Server The application shall implement the HTTPS protocol that complies with RFC
2818.
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1.2/Server The application shall implement HTTPS using TLS as defined in the TLS
package.
5.2.1.10 FCS_HTTPS_EXT.2 HTTPS Protocol with Mutual Authentication3
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.2.1 The application shall [not establish the connection] if the peer certificate is
deemed invalid.
5.2.1.11 FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation Services
FCS_RBG_EXT.1.1 The application shall [
 implement DRBG functionality
] for its cryptographic operations.
5.2.1.12 FCS_RBG_EXT.2 Random Bit Generation from Application
FCS_RBG_EXT.2.1 The application shall perform all deterministic random bit generation (DRBG)
services in accordance with NIST Special Publication 800-90A using [CTR_DRBG
(AES)].
FCS_RBG_EXT.2.2 The deterministic RBG shall be seeded by an entropy source that accumulates
entropy from a platform-based DRBG and [
 no other noise source
] with a minimum of [
 256 bits
] of entropy at least equal to the greatest security strength (according to NIST SP
800-57) of the keys and hashes that it will generate.
5.2.1.13 FCS_STO_EXT.1 Storage of Credentials
FCS_STO_EXT.1.1 The application shall [
 implement functionality to securely store [Web GUI authentication
credentials, PKI certificate passphrases] according to [FCS_COP.1(1),
FCS_CKM.1(3)]
] to non-volatile memory.
2
As specified in NIAP TD0473.
3
As specified in NIAP TD0473.
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5.2.1.14 FCS_TLS_EXT.1 TLS Protocol (TLS Package)
FCS_TLS_EXT.1.1 The product shall implement [
 TLS as a server
].
5.2.1.15 FCS_TLSS_EXT.1 TLS Server Protocol (TLS Package)
FCS_TLSS_EXT.1.14
The product shall implement TLS 1.2 (RFC 5246) and [no earlier TLS versions] as a
server that supports the cipher suites [
 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289,
 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289,
 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289,
 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289]
and also supports functionality for [
 mutual authentication
].
FCS_TLSS_EXT.1.2 The product shall deny connections from clients requesting SSL 2.0, SSL 3.0, TLS
1.0 and [TLS 1.1].
FCS_TLSS_EXT.1.3 The product shall perform key establishment for TLS using [
 ECDHE parameters using elliptic curves [secp256r1, secp384r1] and no other
curves
].
5.2.1.16 FCS_TLSS_EXT.2 TLS Server Support for Mutual Authentication (TLS Package)
FCS_TLSS_EXT.2.1 The product shall support authentication of TLS clients using X.509v3 certificates.
FCS_TLSS_EXT.2.2 The product shall not establish a trusted channel if the client certificate is invalid.
FCS_TLSS_EXT.2.3 The product shall not establish a trusted channel if the Distinguished Name (DN)
or Subject Alternative Name (SAN) contained in a certificate does not match one
of the expected identifiers for the client.
4
This SFR is modified by TD0442 but this ST does not claim any of the selections that were added by the
TD.
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5.2.2 User Data Protection (FDP)
5.2.2.1 FDP_DAR_EXT.1(1)Encryption of Sensitive Application Data (by TOE)
FDP_DAR_EXT.1.1(1)5
The application shall [
 protect sensitive data in accordance with FCS_STO_EXT.1
] in non-volatile memory.
Application Note: “Sensitive data” includes both the credential data specified in FCS_STO_EXT.1 as
well as system scan, network traffic, and log data that is collected from the
Operational Environment. This data is not credential data, but it is still protected
using the methods specified in FCS_STO_EXT.1. This is because all sensitive data,
regardless of whether or not it is credential data, is stored in an encrypted
database.
5.2.2.2 FDP_DAR_EXT.1(2)Encryption of Sensitive Application Data (by OE)
FDP_DAR_EXT.1.1(2)6
The application shall [
 leverage platform-provided functionality to encrypt sensitive data
] in non-volatile memory.
Application Note: The database encryption referenced in FDP_DAR_EXT.1(1) requires a secret key to
be stored on the platform. This is considered to be sensitive data and is therefore
protected using platform-provided means.
5.2.2.3 FDP_DEC_EXT.1 Access to Platform Resources
FDP_DEC_EXT.1.1 The application shall restrict its access to [
 network connectivity
].
FDP_DEC_EXT.1.2 The application shall restrict its access to [
 system logs
].
5.2.2.4 FDP_NET_EXT.1 Network Communications
FDP_NET_EXT.1.1 The application shall restrict network communication to [
 User-initiated communication for [
5
This SFR is modified by TD0486 but this ST does not claim any of the selections that were added by the
TD.
6
This SFR is modified by TD0486 but this ST does not claim any of the selections that were added by the
TD.
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o access to Web GUI]
 Respond to [
o retrieval of scan results by Tenable.sc,
o retrieval of plugin updates from Tenable.sc]
 [application-initiated network communication for
o collection of network data
]
].
5.2.3 Identification and Authentication (FIA)
5.2.3.1 FIA_X509_EXT.1 X.509 Certificate Validation
FIA_X509_EXT.1.17
The application shall [implement functionality] to validate certificates in
accordance with the following rules:
 RFC 5280 certificate validation and certificate path validation.
 The certificate path must terminate with a trusted CA certificate.
 The application shall validate a certificate path by ensuring the presence of
the basicConstraints extension, that the CA flag is set to TRUE for all CA
certificates, and that any path constraints are met.
 The application shall validate that any CA certificate includes caSigning
purpose in the key usage field.
 The application shall validate the revocation status of the certificate using
[the Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) as specified in RFC 2560].
 The application shall validate the extendedKeyUsage (EKU) field according to
the following rules:
o Certificates used for trusted updates and executable code integrity
verification shall have the Code Signing purpose (id-kp 3 with OID
1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.3) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
o Server certificates presented for TLS shall have the Server Authentication
purpose (id-kp 1 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1) in the extendedKeyUsage
field.
o Client certificates presented for TLS shall have the Client Authentication
purpose (id-kp 2 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2) in the extendedKeyUsage
field.
o S/MIME certificates presented for email encryption and signature shall
have the Email Protection purpose (id-kp 4 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.4) in
the extendedKeyUsage field.
o OCSP certificates presented for OCSP responses shall have the OCSP
Signing purpose (id-kp 9 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.9) in the
extendedKeyUsage field.
7
As specified in NIAP TD0521.
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o Server certificates presented for EST shall have the CMC Registration
Authority (RA) purpose (id-kp-cmcRA with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.28) in the
extendedKeyUsage field.
FIA_X509_EXT.1.2 The application shall treat a certificate as a CA certificate only if the
basicConstraints extension is present and the CA flag is set to TRUE.
5.2.3.2 FIA_X509_EXT.2 X.509 Certificate Authentication
FIA_X509_EXT.2.1 The application shall use X.509v3 certificates as defined by RFC 5280 to support
authentication for [HTTPS, TLS].
FIA_X509_EXT.2.2 When the application cannot establish a connection to determine the validity of
a certificate, the application shall [accept the certificate].
5.2.4 Security Management (FMT)
5.2.4.1 FMT_CFG_EXT.1 Secure by Default Configuration
FMT_CFG_EXT.1.1 The application shall provide only enough functionality to set new credentials
when configured with default credentials or no credentials.
FMT_CFG_EXT.1.2 The application shall be configured by default with file permissions which protect
the application’s binaries and data files from modification by normal unprivileged
users.
5.2.4.2 FMT_MEC_EXT.1 Supported Configuration Mechanism
FMT_MEC_EXT.1.1 The application shall [invoke the mechanisms recommended by the platform
vendor for storing and setting configuration options].8
5.2.4.3 FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions [
 enable/disable the transmission of any information describing the system's
hardware, software, or configuration
].
5.2.5 Privacy (FPR)
5.2.5.1 FPR_ANO_EXT.1 User Consent for Transmission of Personally Identifiable
Information
FPR_ANO_EXT.1.1 The application shall [
 not transmit PII over a network
].
8
Modified from original App PP definition by TD0437
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5.2.6 Protection of the TSF (FPT)
5.2.6.1 FPT_AEX_EXT.1 Anti-Exploitation Capabilities
FPT_AEX_EXT.1.1 The application shall not request to map memory at an explicit address except for
[no exceptions].
FPT_AEX_EXT.1.2 The application shall [
 not allocate any memory region with both write and execute permissions
].
FPT_AEX_EXT.1.3 The application shall be compatible with security features provided by the
platform vendor.
FPT_AEX_EXT.1.4 The application shall not write user-modifiable files to directories that contain
executable files unless explicitly directed by the user to do so.
FPT_AEX_EXT.1.5 The application shall be compiled with stack-based buffer overflow protection
enabled.
5.2.6.2 FPT_API_EXT.1 Use of Supported Services and APIs
FPT_API_EXT.1.1 The application shall use only documented platform APIs.
5.2.6.3 FPT_IDV_EXT.1 Software Identification and Versions
FPT_IDV_EXT.1.1 The application shall be versioned with [[semantic versioning (SemVer)]].
5.2.6.4 FPT_LIB_EXT.1 Use of Third Party Libraries
FPT_LIB_EXT.1.1 The application shall be packaged with only [third-party libraries listed in
Appendix A.2].
Application Note: The TOE uses a large number of third-party libraries so this information has been
provided in an Appendix for readability purposes.
5.2.6.5 FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Integrity for Installation and Update
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.1 The application shall [leverage the platform] to check for updates and patches to
the application software.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.2 The application shall [provide the ability, leverage the platform] to query the
current version of the application software.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.3 The application shall not download, modify, replace, or update its own binary
code.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.4 The application installation package and its updates shall be digitally signed such
that its platform can cryptographically verify them prior to installation.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.5 The application is distributed [as an additional software package to the platform
OS].
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5.2.6.6 FPT_TUD_EXT.2 Integrity for Installation and Update
FPT_TUD_EXT.2.1 The application shall be distributed using the format of the platform-supported
package manager.
FPT_TUD_EXT.2.2 The application shall be packaged such that its removal results in the deletion of
all traces of the application, with the exception of configuration settings, output
files, and audit/log events.
5.2.7 Trusted Path/Channels (FTP)
5.2.7.1 FTP_DIT_EXT.1 Protection of Data in Transit
FTP_DIT_EXT.1.1 The application shall [
 encrypt all transmitted [sensitive data] with [HTTPS in accordance with
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1/Server, TLS as defined in the TLS Package]
] between itself and another trusted IT product.
Application Note: HTTPS server functionality also implements mutual authentication
(FCS_HTTPS_EXT.2).
5.3 TOE Security Assurance Requirements
The security assurance requirements for the TOE are included by reference to the App PP.
Table 4: Assurance Components
Requirement Class Requirement Component
ADV: Development ADV_FSP.1 Basic Functional Specification
AGD: Guidance Documentation AGD_OPE.1 Operational User Guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative Procedures
ALC: Life-cycle Support ALC_CMC.1 Labeling of the TOE
ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
ALC_TSU_EXT.1 Timely Security Updates
ATE: Tests ATE_IND.1 Independent Testing – Conformance
AVA: Vulnerability Assessment AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability Survey
As a functional package, the TLS Package does not define its own SARs. The expectation is that all SARs
required by the App PP will apply to the entire TOE, including the portions addressed by the TLS Package.
Consequently, the evaluation activities specified in the App PP apply to the entire TOE evaluation,
including any changes made to them by subsequent NIAP Technical Decisions as summarized in section
1.2 above.
The TLS Package does contain evaluation activities for how to evaluate its SFR claims as part of the
evaluation of ASE_TSS.1, AGD_OPE.1, AGD_PRE.1, and ATE_IND.1. All Security Functional Requirements
specified by the TLS Package will be evaluated in the manner specified in that package.
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6 TOE Summary Specification
This chapter describes the security functions of the TOE:
 Timely Security Updates
 Cryptographic Support
 User Data Protection
 Identification and Authentication
 Security Management
 Privacy
 Protection of the TSF
 Trusted Path/Channels
6.1 Timely Security Updates
Tenable supports a timely security update process for the TOE In addition to their own internal research,
the product vendor supports disclosure of potential issues using community forums, direct engagement,
and the Tenable support channel. For issues where there is a potential security concern, the support
channel uses HTTPS for secure disclosure.
When an issue is reported, Tenable will determine its applicability to the product. The length of time
needed to make this determination depends on the complexity of the issue and the extent to which it can
be reproduced; well-documented issues such as exposure to a published CVE can be made quickly. If found
to be a security issue, a patch is released within 30 days. Tenable monitors the third-party components
used by the TOE for potential security issues as well. However, an issue with a dependent component may
not be addressed if found not to be applicable to the TOE. For example, security issues are frequently
found within the PHP image library but Tenable does not install this library as part of the NNM distribution.
Security updates to the TOE are delivered as regular update packages in the same manner as a functional
update. This process is described in section 6.7 below.
6.2 Cryptographic Support
The TOE uses cryptography to secure data in transit between itself and its operational environment.
All TOE cryptographic services are implemented by the OpenSSL cryptographic library. The TOE uses
OpenSSL 1.1.1d. The cryptographic algorithms supplied by the TOE are NIST-validated. The following table
identifies the cryptographic algorithms used by the TSF, the associated standards to which they conform,
and the NIST certificates that demonstrate that the claimed conformance has been met.
Table 5: Cryptographic Functions
Functions Standards Certificates
FCS_CKM.1(1) Cryptographic Asymmetric Key Generation
ECC key pair generation (NIST curves P-256,
P-384)
FIPS PUB 186-4 CAVP cert # C1600
FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic Key Establishment
ECDSA based key establishment NIST SP 800-56A CAVP cert # C1601
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Functions Standards Certificates
FCS_COP.1(1) Cryptographic Operation – Encryption/Decryption
AES-CBC, AES-GCM, AES-XTS (128, 256 bits) CBC as defined in NIST SP 800-
38A
GCM as defined in NIST SP 800-
38D
XTS as defined in NIST SP 800-38E
CAVP cert # C1600
FCS_COP.1(2) Cryptographic Operation – Hashing
SHA-256 and SHA-384 (digest sizes 256 and
384 bits)
FIPS PUB 180-4 CAVP cert # C1600
FCS_COP.1(3) Cryptographic Operation – Signing
RSA (2048-bit or greater) FIPS PUB 186-4, Section 4 CAVP cert # C1600
FCS_COP.1(4) Cryptographic Operation – Keyed Hash Message Authentication
HMAC-SHA-256 and SHA-384 FIPS PUB 198-1
FIPS PUB 180-4
CAVP cert # C1600
FCS_RBG_EXT.2 Random Bit Generation from Application
CTR_DRBG
DRBG (256 bits)
NIST SP 800-90A
NIST SP 800-57
CAVP cert # C1600
The TOE generates asymmetric keys in support of trusted communications. The TSF generates ECC keys
using P-256 and P-384. These keys are generated in support of the ECDHE key establishment schemes that
are used for TLS/HTTPS communications. To ensure sufficient key strength, the TOE also implements
DRBG functionality for key generation, using the AES-CTR_DRBG. The proprietary Entropy Analysis Report
(EAR) describes how the TSF extracts random data from software-based sources to ensure that an amount
of entropy that is at least equal to the strength of the generated keys is present (i.e., at least 256 bits
when the largest supported keys are generated) when seeding the DRBG for key generation purposes.
The Windows platform version of the TOE relies on a third-party entropy source provided by the platform
vendor. The Linux platform version of the TOE relies on the OS platform entropy source as well.
Specifically, random numbers are obtained from the following platform APIs, depending on the platform
used:
 Windows: SystemPRNG
 Linux: invocation of /dev/random pseudo-device
In both cases, it is assumed that these platforms provide at least 256 bits of entropy.
The TOE uses TLS 1.2 for server communications. All other TLS versions are rejected by the TOE. The TLS
server implementation supports the following TLS cipher suites in the TOE’s evaluated configuration:
 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA256
 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
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All supported ciphersuites use ephemeral elliptic curves as the method of key establishment. The TSF
presents secp256r1 and secp384r1 as the supported values in the Supported Groups extension and uses
the same NIST curves for key establishment.
As part of certificate validation in the establishment of TLS connectivity, the TOE will validate the reference
identifier of a presented server certificate. For all TOE usage of mutual TLS authentication, the TSF will
perform the same verification of a presented client certificate. This is done through validation of the
Common Name (CN) and Subject Alternative Name (SAN) certificate fields, the latter of which is expected
to contain the FQDN of the external system that is presenting the certificate to the TOE. The reference
identifier is established by configuration. IP addresses are not supported. Wildcards are only supported
for the left-most label immediately preceding the public suffix. Certificate pinning is not supported. All
digital signatures used for the establishment of TLS communications use 2048-bit RSA.
The TOE uses TLS server functionality for communications between the TOE and the environmental
Tenable.sc application and from remote administrators to the Web GUI interface. All uses of the TOE’s
TLS server support mutual authentication. The TOE’s implementation of HTTPS conforms to RFC 2818. In
all cases, the connection will be rejected if certificate validation fails.
The TOE also uses OpenSSL to secure credential data at rest. Specifically, the TOE stores the following
credentials:
 Web GUI authentication credentials: username and hashed password data for locally-defined
users.
 Passphrases for certificate encryption: used to encrypt the TOE's TLS server certificate.
Passphrases for certificate encryption are encrypted by the TOE using AES-XTS and administrative
credentials to the TOE are encrypted using PBKDF2. The TOE uses the DRBG specified in FCS_RBG_EXT.2
to generate salts that contain at least as many entropy bits as the output key length. The TOE’s PBKDF2
implementation performs 10,000 iterations and outputs a 128-bit strength key. Password-based derived
keys are formed using a 128-bit salt that is randomly generated by the TOE’s DRBG. This is input to the
PBKDF function along with the password and specified hashing algorithm, which is SHA-512.
The TOE does not maintain a key hierarchy; the TOE’s usage of PBKDF is to generate a hash.
The Cryptographic Support security function is designed to satisfy the following security functional
requirements:
 FCS_CKM.1(1) – The TOE uses a NIST-validated implementation to generate asymmetric keys in
support of TLS communications.
 FCS_CKM.1(3) – The TOE performs password-based key derivation in support of secure storage of
credentials.
 FCS_CKM.2 – The TOE performs NIST-validated key establishment in support of TLS
communications.
 FCS_CKM_EXT.1 – The TOE implements its own cryptographic functionality.
 FCS_COP.1(1) – The TOE uses a NIST-validated implementation to perform AES encryption and
decryption in support of both TLS communications and secure storage of credentials.
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 FCS_COP.1(2) – The TOE uses a NIST-validated implementation to perform cryptographic hashing
in support of TLS communications.
 FCS_COP.1(3) – The TOE uses a NIST-validated implementation to generate and verify RSA digital
signatures in support of TLS communications.
 FCS_COP.1(4) – The TOE uses a NIST-validated implementation to perform HMAC functions in
support of TLS communications and the pseudo-random function used for password-based key
derivation.
 FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1/Server – The TOE implements HTTPS as a server to secure data in transit.
 FCS_HTTPS_EXT.2 – The TOE implements mutual authentication when acting as an HTTPS server.
 FCS_RBG_EXT.1 – The TOE implements its own random bit generation services.
 FCS_RBG_EXT.2 – The TOE uses a NIST-validated implementation to generate pseudo-random bits
and this implementation is seeded with sufficiently strong entropy collected from the operational
environment.
 FCS_STO_EXT.1 – The TOE uses its own cryptographic functions to secure credential data at rest.
 FCS_TLS_EXT.1 – The TOE implements TLS to secure data in transit.
 FCS_TLSS_EXT.1 – The TOE implements TLS as a server.
 FCS_TLSS_EXT.2 – The TOE’s TLS server implementation supports mutual authentication.
6.3 User Data Protection
The App PP defines ‘sensitive data’ as follows: “Sensitive data may include all user or enterprise data or
may be specific application data such as emails, messaging, documents, calendar items, and contacts.
Sensitive data must minimally include PII, credentials, and keys. Sensitive data shall be identified in the
application’s TSS by the ST author.”
The table below lists the data that is considered to be ‘sensitive data’ for this TOE along with where that
data resides.
Table 6: Sensitive Data
Sensitive Data Exchange Protection at Rest
Protection in
Transit
GUI credentials Admin’s browser to Web Server
over browser connection
FCS_STO_EXT.1
(PBKDF)
HTTPS
Passphrase for PKI certificate
encryption
None FCS_STO_EXT.1
(AES)
N/A
Collected network traffic data NNM to Tenable.sc FCS_STO_EXT.1
(AES)
TLS
Database encryption key (used for
all AES operations listed above)
None FDP_DAR_EXT.1(2) N/A
The database encryption key is generated by the TOE’s DRBG as part of the initial setup process. The key
is stored as a read-only file owned by root or SYSTEM, depending on platform. The administrator has the
ability to optionally set a passphrase to unlock the use of this key; if this option is chosen, they must enter
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the passphrase when the TOE first starts. The database encryption key is protected cryptographically by
the platform’s use of full disk encryption.
The underlying platform functionality that the TOE interacts with includes network connectivity, system
configuration, and system logs. The TOE uses network connectivity for remote management, connections
to environmental components, and passive collection of network traffic data. The TOE accesses system
logs on the local system (/var/log/messages or Windows Event Log) to record data about its own behavior.
The TOE also indirectly accesses system configuration data of remote systems but only if this is
communicated as network traffic; there is no interface designed for the purpose of collecting this
information specifically.
The TOE uses environmental network capabilities in various ways. All communications between the TOE
and the environmental Tenable.sc component are encrypted, as is remote administrative access. The
following table highlights the TOE’s network usage.
Table 7: TOE Network Usage
Component User-Initiated Externally-Initiated TOE-Initiated
NNM Access to Web GUI Retrieval of scan results by
Tenable.sc
Collection of network data
Retreival of plugin updates
from Tenable.sc
The User Data Protection security function is designed to satisfy the following security functional
requirements:
 FDP_DAR_EXT.1(1) – Sensitive data at rest is protected by the TOE’s implementation of AES.
 FDP_DAR_EXT.1(2) – the AES key used by the TOE to protect sensitive data at rest is protected in
turn by the platform’s use of full disk encryption.
 FDP_DEC_EXT.1 – The TOE’s use of platform services is well understood by users prior to
authorizing the TOE activity.
 FDP_NET_EXT.1 – The TOE communicates over the network for well-defined purposes. Depending
on the function, the use of network resources is user-initiated directly through the TSF, remotely
initiated by a user performing an action in the operational environment, or initiated by the TOE
itself.
6.4 Identification and Authentication
The TOE uses X.509 certificates for authentication of the following trusted communications: validation of
administrator TLS client certificate and validation of Tenable.sc TLS client certificate.
The TOE implements the following functional behavior for all uses of X.509 certificates:
 Certificate validation and certificate path validation is performed in accordance with RFC 5280.
 The certificate path is checked to ensure that it terminates with a trusted CA certificate.
 The certificate path is validated by ensuring the presence of the basicConstraints extension, that
the CA flag is set to TRUE for all CA certificates, and that any path constraints are met.
 Any CA certificate is validated by ensuring that the key usage field includes the caSigning purpose.
 Revocation status is checked using OCSP in accordance with RFC 2560.
 The application shall validate the extendedKeyUsage field according to the following rules:
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o Certificates used for trusted updates and executable code integrity verification shall have the
Code Signing purpose (id-kp 3 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.3) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
o Server certificates presented for TLS shall have the Server Authentication purpose (id-kp 1
with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
o Client certificates presented for TLS shall have the Client Authentication purpose (id-kp 2 with
OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
o S/MIME certificates presented for email encryption and signature shall have the Email
Protection purpose (id-kp 4 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.4) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
In the event that the revocation status of a certificate cannot be verified (i.e. the OCSP responder cannot
be reached), the TOE will accept the certificate.
Because the TOE’s use of the certificate validation function is to validate the authenticity of remote
endpoints, the TSF chooses what certificates to use based on what is presented to it as part of establishing
the TLS session. The TOE is only assigned one certificate for its own use, so there is only one certificate
that it will present in cases where a remote entity may need to validate it.
The Identification and Authentication security function is designed to satisfy the following security
functional requirements:
 FIA_X509_EXT.1 – X.509 certificates are validated by the TSF when establishing trusted
communications.
 FIA_X509_EXT.2 – X.509 certificates are used for TLS. When revocation status of a certificate
cannot be determined, the TSF accepts the certificate by default.
6.5 Security Management
The TOE provides a web-based graphical user interface (GUI) that requires user authentication to access.
The TOE has a default administrator credential of admin/admin that must be changed on first use.
Administrator credentials are stored locally and protected by the TSF as per FCS_STO_EXT.1. Following
the initial installation, additional accounts can be created.
During general operations, an administrator will typically interact with the TOE only through the
environmental instance of Tenable.sc. However, Tenable.sc does not include the ability to directly modify
the initial configuration settings of the TOE.
The TOE is installed into the following locations, depending on the platform version:
 Windows: C:\Program Files\Tenable\nnm
 Linux: /opt/nnm
All directories containing TOE software and data are configured by default in such a manner that nothing
is world-writable on Linux and Administrator privileges are required to access them on Windows.
Configuration settings that affect the TOE’s interaction with the host OS platform are stored in /etc for
Linux and the Windows Registry for Windows.
The TOE supports the following security-relevant management functions:
 Configuration of transmission of system’s hardware, software, or configuration information
o Configuration of collection of network traffic data
The Security Management security function is designed to satisfy the following security functional
requirements:
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 FMT_CFG_EXT.1 – The TOE requires credentials to be defined before administrative use. The TOE
is protected from direct modification by untrusted users via its host OS platform.
 FMT_MEC_EXT.1 – Configuration settings for the TOE are stored in appropriate locations for each
supported host OS platform.
 FMT_SMF.1 – Administrators can use the TSF to configure the collection of network data from the
TOE’s operational environment.
6.6 Privacy
The TOE’s primary function is to examine organizational assets for configuration or operational states that
may indicate the presence of a vulnerability or misuse of organizational resources. To this end, the TOE
collects data about network activity and transmits it to the environmental Tenable.sc application for
aggregation, analysis, and reporting. The TOE is not responsible for the collection or transmission of PII.
The TOE accepts administrative credentials as part of the GUI login process but user account information
is not considered to be PII.
The Privacy security function is designed to satisfy the following security functional requirements:
 FPR_ANO_EXT.1 – The TOE prevents the unnoticed/unauthorized transmission of PII across a
network by not having functionality that is intended for such transmissions.
6.7 Protection of the TSF
The TOE implements several mechanisms to protect against exploitation. The TOE implements address
space layout randomization (ASLR) through the use of the /DYNAMICBASE (Windows) and –fPIC (Linux)
compiler flags and rely fully its underlying host platforms to perform memory mapping. The TOE also does
not use both PROT_WRITE and PROT_EXEC on the same memory regions. There is no situation where the
TSF maps memory to an explicit address. The TOE is written in C and C++. The TOE is compiled with stack
overflow protection whether it is intended for use on Linux or Windows. The Linux platform version is
compiled with –fstack-protector-strong and the Windows platform version is compiled with /GS. The TOE
has a web-based front-end, based on PHP and JavaScript. This is interpreted code to which compilation
instructions do not apply.
Both platform versions of the TOE are designed to run on host OS platforms where platform security
features have been enabled (e.g. Windows Defender Export Guard, SELinux enabled and enforcing). The
TOE uses only documented platform APIs. Appendix A.1 lists the APIs used by the TOE. The TOE also makes
use of third-party libraries. Appendix A.2 lists the libraries used by the TOE. The TOE is versioned using
semver (Semantic Versioning) in the format x.y(.z) where x is the major version, y is the minor version,
and the optional z is the patch version; SWID is not used. The TOE is a standalone application that is not
natively bundled as part of a host OS.
The TOE can identify its current running versions through both platform and TSF-mediated methods. The
Linux platform version of the TOE is installed as an RPM and will identify its version in RPM itself. The TOE
will also return its version information if its binary is invoked with the –v flag on the OS platform regardless
of which platform version it is. An administrator can also check the version of the TOE by logging into its
Web GUI, or they can use the environmental instance of Tenable.sc that is connected to the TOE to check
the TOE’s version.
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The TOE can leverage its OS platform to check for software updates and acquire them if they are available.
In this case, candidate updates are obtained by the administrator downloading them directly from
Tenable’s website or through a package manager such as yum. The TOE will not download, modify,
replace, or update its own binary code. The TOE is packaged as an .rpm file for Linux and an .exe file for
Windows. Each are digitally signed by Tenable using 2048-bit RSA. Removing (uninstalling) the product
will remove all executable code from the host system.
The Protection of the TSF security function is designed to satisfy the following security functional
requirements:
 FPT_AEX_EXT.1 – The TOE interacts with its host OS platform in a manner that does not expose
the system to memory-related exploitation.
 FPT_API_EXT.1 – The TOE uses documented platform APIs.
 FPT_IDV_EXT. 1 – The TOE is versioned using semver.
 FPT_LIB_EXT.1 – The set of third-party libraries used by the TOE is well-defined.
 FPT_TUD_EXT.1 – There is a well-defined method for checking what version of the TOE is currently
installed and whether updates to it are available. Updates are signed by the vendor and validated
by the host OS platform prior to installation.
 FPT_TUD_EXT.2 – The TOE can be updated through installation packages.
6.8 Trusted Path/Channels
In the evaluated configuration, the TOE its own cryptographic implementation to encrypt sensitive data
in transit. Listed below are the various external interfaces to the TOE that rely on trusted communications.
Between TOE and operational environment:
 Between administrator and TOE Web GUI
o Communications use mutually authenticated TLS/HTTPS (TOE is server)
o Configurable TCP port, 8835 is default
o Used to secure administrator interactions with the TOE
Between TOE and environmental Tenable components:
 Between Tenable.sc and TOE
o Communications use mutually-authenticated TLS (Tenable.sc is client and TOE is server)
o Configurable TCP port, 8835 is default
o Used by Tenable.sc to collect network traffic data from TOE
Note that remote acquisition of network data from the operational environment is not necessarily
captured in an encrypted format because the TOE captures this data in the native formats used by the
target systems and networks. As such this is not considered to be ‘sensitive data’ requiring data-in-transit
protection.
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The Trusted Path/Channels security function is designed to satisfy the following security functional
requirements:
 FTP_DIT_EXT.1 – The TOE relies on its own mechanisms to secure data in transit between itself
and its operational environment.
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7 Protection Profile Claims
This ST is conformant to the Protection Profile for Application Software, Version 1.3, 1 March 2019 (App
PP) and Functional Package for Transport Layer Security (TLS), Version 1.1, February 12, 2019 (TLS
Package) along with all applicable errata and interpretations from the certificate issuing scheme.
The TOE consists of a software application that runs on a Linux operating system as its platform.
As explained in section 3, Security Problem Definition, the Security Problem Definition of the App PP has
been included by reference into this ST.
As explained in section 4, Security Objectives, the Security Objectives of the App PP has been included by
reference into this ST.
All claimed SFRs are defined in the App PP and TLS Package. All mandatory SFRs are claimed. No optional
or objective SFRs are claimed. Selection-based SFR claims are consistent with the selections made in the
mandatory SFRs that prompt their inclusion.
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8 Rationale
This Security Target includes by reference the App PP Security Problem Definition, Security Objectives,
and Security Assurance Requirements. The Security Target does not add, remove, or modify any of these
items. Security Functional Requirements have been reproduced with the Protection Profile operations
completed. All selections, assignments, and refinements made on the claimed Security Functional
Requirements have been performed in a manner that is consistent with what is permitted by the App PP
and TLS Package. The proper set of selection-based requirements have been claimed based on the
selections made in the mandatory requirements. Consequently, the claims made by this Security Target
are sufficient to address the TOE’s security problem. Rationale for the sufficiency of the TOE Summary
Specification is provided below.
8.1 TOE Summary Specification Rationale
This section in conjunction with Section 0, the
The TLS Package does contain evaluation activities for how to evaluate its SFR claims as part of the
evaluation of ASE_TSS.1, AGD_OPE.1, AGD_PRE.1, and ATE_IND.1. All Security Functional Requirements
specified by the TLS Package will be evaluated in the manner specified in that package.
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TOE Summary Specification, provides evidence that the security functions meet the TOE security
requirements. Each description includes rationale indicating which requirements the corresponding
security functions satisfy. The combined security functions work together to satisfy all of the security
requirements. The security functions described in Section 6 are necessary for the TSF to enforce the
required security functionality. Table 8 demonstrates the relationship between security requirements and
functions.
Table 8: Security Functions vs. Requirements Mapping
Cryptographic
Support
User
Data
Protection
Identification
and
Authentication
Security
Management
Privacy
Protection
of
the
TSF
Trusted
Path/Channels
FCS_CKM.1(1) X
FCS_CKM.1(3) X
FCS_CKM.2 X
FCS_CKM_EXT.1 X
FCS_COP.1(1) X
FCS_COP.1(2) X
FCS_COP.1(3) X
FCS_COP.1(4) X
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1/Server X
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.2 X
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 X
FCS_RBG_EXT.2 X
FCS_STO_EXT.1 X
FCS_TLS_EXT.1 X
FCS_TLSS_EXT.1 X
FCS_TLSS_EXT.2 X
FDP_DAR_EXT.1(1) X
FDP_DAR_EXT.1(2) X
FDP_DEC_EXT.1 X
FDP_NET_EXT.1 X
FIA_X509_EXT.1 X
FIA_X509_EXT.2 X
FMT_CFG_EXT.1 X
FMT_MEC_EXT.1 X
FMT_SMF.1 X
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Cryptographic
Support
User
Data
Protection
Identification
and
Authentication
Security
Management
Privacy
Protection
of
the
TSF
Trusted
Path/Channels
FPR_ANO_EXT.1 X
FPT_AEX_EXT.1 X
FPT_API_EXT.1 X
FPT_IDV_EXT.1 X
FPT_LIB_EXT.1 X
FPT_TUD_EXT.1 X
FPT_TUD_EXT.2 X
FTP_DIT_EXT.1 X
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Appendix A TOE Usage of Third-Party Components
This Appendix lists the platform APIs and third-party libraries that are used by the TOE.
A.1 Platform APIs
Listed below are the platform APIs used by the TOE. Note that these APIs do not necessarily relate to the
TOE functionality claimed in the Security Target; however, since they are bundled with the product itself
they are disclosed since a vulnerability in outside the logical boundary of the product could still present
an exploitable vulnerability.
Windows:
EncodePointer, UnhandledExceptionFilter, SetUnhandledExceptionFilter, IsDebuggerPresent,
RtlVirtualUnwind, RtlLookupFunctionEntry, RtlCaptureContext, DecodePointer, Sleep, DuplicateHandle,
FindNextFileA, SetFilePointer, GetModuleHandleA, GetProcAddress, RaiseException, HeapReAlloc,
MultiByteToWideChar, CreateProcessA, WideCharToMultiByte, GetVersionExA, GetStdHandle,
SetConsoleMode, GetConsoleMode, GetTickCount, ReadConsoleA, GetCurrentProcess, TlsAlloc,
DeleteCriticalSection, EnterCriticalSection, LeaveCriticalSection, TlsSetValue, InitializeCriticalSection,
TlsGetValue, SetCriticalSectionSpinCount, GetSystemTimeAsFileTime, GetFullPathNameA,
GetCurrentDirectoryA, SetCurrentDirectoryA, GetModuleFileNameA, OpenEventA, ResetEvent,
CreateEventA, GetProcessHeap, SetEvent, WaitForSingleObject, HeapFree, HeapAlloc, FormatMessageA,
OpenProcess, GetExitCodeProcess, CloseHandle, GetLastError, GetCurrentProcessId, SetLastError,
GetFullPathNameW, CreateFileA, GetFileSize, CreateMutexW, HeapCompact, TryEnterCriticalSection,
MapViewOfFile, UnmapViewOfFile, SystemTimeToFileTime, QueryPerformanceCounter, UnlockFile,
FlushViewOfFile, LockFile, WaitForSingleObjectEx, OutputDebugStringW, UnlockFileEx, WriteFile,
FormatMessageW, GetVersionExW, HeapDestroy, GetFileAttributesA, HeapCreate, HeapValidate,
GetFileAttributesW, ReadFile, CreateFileW, FlushFileBuffers, GetTempPathW, HeapSize, LockFileEx,
GetDiskFreeSpaceW, CreateFileMappingA, CreateFileMappingW, GetDiskFreeSpaceA, GetSystemInfo,
GetFileAttributesExW, GetCurrentThreadId, OutputDebugStringA, DeleteFileW, GetTempPathA,
LocalFree, GetSystemTime, AreFileApisANSI, DeleteFileA, HeapSetInformation, TerminateProcess,
SetHandleInformation, GetProcessId, CreatePipe, CreateThread, TzSpecificLocalTimeToSystemTime,
GetTimeZoneInformation, QueryPerformanceFrequency, GetCurrentThread, TerminateThread,
CreateSemaphoreA, SetThreadPriority, ReleaseSemaphore, CreateMutexA, ReleaseMutex,
FindFirstFileA, FindClose, SetEndOfFile
Linux:
accept, access, bind, brk, chdir, chmod, clock_gettime, close, connect, dup2, dup, epoll_create, epoll_ctl,
epoll_wait, eventfd, execve, _exit, fchmod, fchown, fcntl, flock, fork, fsync, ftime, ftruncate,
getdtablesize, getegid, geteuid, getgid, gethostname, getpagesize, getpeername, getpid, getrlimit,
getsockname, getsockopt, gettimeofday, getuid, ioctl, iopl, kill, listen, lseek, mkdir, mlock, mmap,
mmap64, mremap, munmap, nanosleep, nice, open, openat, pipe, poll, pread, pwrite, read, readdir,
readlink, recv, recvfrom, recvmsg, rename, rmdir, select, send, sendmsg, sendto, setegid, seteuid,
setgid, setrlimit, setsockopt, setuid, shutdown, sigaction, signal, socket, socketpair, syscall, syslog, time,
timerfd_create, timerfd_settime, umask, uname, unlink, unlinkat, utime, utimes, waitpid, write
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A.2 Third-Party Libraries
Listed below are the third-party libraries used by the TOE. Note that these libraries do not necessarily
relate to the TOE functionality claimed in the Security Target; however, since they are bundled with the
product itself they are disclosed since a vulnerability in outside the logical boundary of the product could
still present an exploitable vulnerability.
chosen, d3, DataTables, dpdk, Flatiron Director, Font Awesome, Handlebars, Hyperscan, jQuery, jQuery
Cookie, jQuery FileUpload, jQuery HotKeys, jQuery iFrame Transport Plugin, jQuery scroll.To, jQuery-
Storage-API, jQuery TableSorter, jQuery tipsy, jQuery UI, jQuery UI Touch Punch, libbzip2, libpcap,
libxml2, libxmlsec, libxslt, locache, mobile-detect.js, moment, OpenSSL, PCRE / libpcre, session.js,
snprintf.c, spin.js, SQLite, sugar, WinPcap, xml2json, zlib