

**National Information Assurance Partnership  
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme**



**Validation Report**  
  
**for**  
  
**Nessus Network Monitor 5.12.0**

**Report Number:** CCEVS-VR-VID11068-2020  
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# 1 Executive Summary

This report documents the National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP) assessment of the evaluation of Tenable Nessus Network Monitor 5.12.0 (the Target of Evaluation, or TOE). It presents the evaluation results, their justifications, and the conformance results. This Validation Report (VR) is not an endorsement of the TOE by any agency of the U.S. Government and no warranty of the TOE is either expressed or implied.

The evaluation was performed by Leidos Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL) in Columbia, Maryland, USA, and was completed in December 2020. The information in this report is largely derived from the Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) and associated test report, all written by Leidos. The evaluation determined that the TOE is:

- Common Criteria Part 2 Extended and Part 3 Conformant

and demonstrates exact conformance to:

- *Protection Profile for Application Software*, Version 1.3, 1 March 2019 [5]
- *Functional Package for Transport Layer Security (TLS)*, Version 1.1, 12 February 2019 [6]

as clarified by all applicable Technical Decisions.

The TOE is Tenable Nessus Network Monitor (also known as NNM) 5.12.0, supported on Red Hat Enterprise Linux (RHEL) 7 and Windows Server 2016.

The TOE identified in this VR has been evaluated at a NIAP approved CCTL using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev. 5) for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev. 5). The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme and the conclusions of the testing laboratory in the Evaluation Technical Report are consistent with the evidence provided.

The validation team monitored the activities of the evaluation team, provided guidance on technical issues and evaluation processes, and reviewed the individual work units documented in the Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) and the Assurance Activities Report (AAR). The validation team found that the evaluation showed that the product satisfies all of the functional requirements and assurance requirements stated in the Security Target (ST). The conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence produced. Therefore, the validation team concludes that the testing laboratory's findings are accurate, the conclusions justified, and the conformance results are correct.

The Leidos evaluation team determined that the product meets the Common Criteria requirements of the Protection Profile for Application Software, Version 1.3, 1 March 2019 and the Functional Package for Transport Layer Security (TLS), Version 1.1, 12 February 2019. The technical information included in this report was obtained from the *Tenable Nessus Network Monitor 5.12.0 Security Target*, Version 1.0, 4 December 2020 and analysis performed by the validation team.

## 2 Identification

The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product evaluations. Under this program, commercial testing laboratories called Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs) use the Common Criteria and Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM) to conduct security evaluations, in accordance with National Voluntary Laboratory Assessment Program (NVLAP) accreditation.

The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality and consistency across evaluations. Developers of IT products desiring a security evaluation contract with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product's evaluation. Upon successful completion of the evaluation, the product is added to NIAP's Product Compliant List (PCL).

Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:

- The Target of Evaluation (TOE)—the fully qualified identifier of the product as evaluated
- The Security Target (ST)—the unique identification of the document describing the security features, claims, and assurances of the product
- The conformance result of the evaluation
- The PP/PP-Modules to which the product is conformant
- The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation.

*Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers*

Item	Identifier
<b>Evaluation Scheme</b>	United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
<b>TOE</b>	Tenable Nessus Network Monitor 5.12.0
<b>Protection Profiles</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Protection Profile for Application Software, Version 1.3, 1 March 2019</li> <li>• Functional Package for Transport Layer Security (TLS), Version 1.1, 12 February 2019</li> </ul>
<b>Security Target</b>	Tenable Nessus Network Monitor 5.12.0 Security Target, Version 1.0, 4 December 2020
<b>Evaluation Technical Report</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Evaluation Technical Report for Tenable Nessus Network Monitor 5.12.0, Part 1 (Leidos Non-Proprietary), Version 1.1, 4 December 2020.</li> <li>• Evaluation Technical Report for Tenable Nessus Network Monitor 5.12.0, Part 2 (Leidos Proprietary), Version 1.1, 4 December 2020.</li> </ul>
<b>CC Version</b>	Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1, Release 5, April 2017
<b>Conformance Result</b>	CC Part 2 Extended and CC Part 3 Conformant
<b>Sponsor</b>	Tenable, Inc.
<b>Developer</b>	Tenable, Inc.

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Item	Identifier
<b>Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL)</b>	Leidos Common Criteria Testing Laboratory 6841 Benjamin Franklin Drive Columbia, MD 21046
<b>Validation Personnel</b>	Jerome F. Myers, PhD Marybeth Panock

### 3 TOE Architecture

Note: The following architectural description is based on the description presented in the Security Target.


Tenable Nessus Network Monitor (NNM) is a software product that is designed to passively collect traffic data from environmental networks for analysis.

NNM also connects to an environmental instance of Tenable.sc (SecurityCenter) which serves as a single point to aggregate and analyze data collected from various Tenable applications, including NNM.

The Tenable Nessus Network Monitor TOE consists of the Nessus Network Monitor application, which is a C application with a PHP/JavaScript web front-end running on a proprietary webserver. The TOE has both Linux and Windows platform versions.

The following figure depicts the TOE in a sample deployment with other Tenable applications in its operational environment.

Figure 1 – Example Deployment



The TOE has the following system requirements for its host platform:

- 2 x 2GHz cores
- 4 GB RAM
- 20 GB disk storage.

These system requirements reflect the lightest usage scenarios for the TOE. Additional factors such as network size and storage retention requirements will affect the system requirements for a particular deployment. Refer to the relevant Guidance Section (as referenced in Section 7 Documentation) for the specific system requirements that apply to a given deployment.

The following network port must be open for the TOE to function, but the specific port is configurable if the default port cannot be used:

- TCP/8835 (for communications with remote administrators and with Tenable.sc)

The TOE's operational environment includes the following:

- Other Tenable components (an instance of Tenable.sc—Nessus Manager, Nessus Agent(s), and Log Correlation Engine are expected to be present in the TOE's operational environment because they also interface with Tenable.sc but the TOE does not interact with these applications directly).
- Platform (hardware and software) on which the TOE is hosted.
  - The TOE is capable of running on a general-purpose Windows or Linux operating system on standard consumer-grade hardware on either a physical or virtual machine. For the evaluated configuration, the TOE was tested on virtualized instances of Windows Server 2016 and RHEL 7, each running on VMware ESXi 6.5 on a system using an AMD Ryzen Threadripper 1950X processor with the Zen microarchitecture.
- Full disk encryption is required for the TOE platform to ensure adequate data-at-rest protection.
- Web browser used to access the GUI interface.



## 4 Security Policy

The TOE enforces the following security policies as described in the ST.

Note: Much of the description of the security policy has been derived from the ST and the Final ETR.

### 4.1 Timely Security Updates

The TOE developer has internal mechanisms for receiving reports of security flaws, tracking product vulnerabilities, and distributing software updates to customers in a timely manner.

### 4.2 Cryptographic Support

The TOE implements cryptography to protect data at rest and in transit.

For data at rest, the TOE stores credential data to log in to the TOE as well as passphrase data used to protect PKI certificates that the TOE uses to authenticate to environmental components. This stored data is encrypted using AES or a PBKDF, depending on the data that is being stored.

For data in transit, the TOE implements TLS/HTTPS as a server. The TOE implements a TLS server for its administrative interface and to communicate with other Tenable products in its operational environment. The TOE supports mutual authentication as a TLS server for all uses.

The TOE implements all cryptography used for these functions using its own implementations of OpenSSL with NIST-approved algorithms. The TOE's DRBG is seeded using entropy from the underlying OS platform.

### 4.3 User Data Protection

The TOE uses cryptographic mechanisms to protect sensitive data at rest. The key used by the TOE to encrypt and decrypt sensitive data is cryptographically protected by the TOE platform.

The TOE relies on the network connectivity and system log capabilities of its host OS platform. The TOE supports user-initiated, externally-initiated, and application-initiated uses of the network.

### 4.4 Identification and Authentication

The TOE supports X.509 certificate validation as part of establishing TLS and HTTPS connections. The TOE supports various certificate validity checking methods and can also check certificate revocation status using OCSP. If the validity status of a certificate cannot be determined, the certificate will be accepted. All other cases where a certificate is found to be invalid will result in rejection without an administrative override.

### 4.5 Security Management

The TOE itself and the configuration settings it uses are stored in locations recommended by the platform vendor for both Windows and Linux application versions.

The TOE includes a web GUI. This interface enforces username/password authentication using locally-stored credentials that are created using the TOE. The TOE does not include a default user account to access its management interface.

The security-relevant management functions supported by the TOE relate to configuration of transmission of system data (through collection of network traffic).

#### 4.6 Privacy

The TOE does not handle Personally Identifiable Information (PII) of any individuals.

#### 4.7 Protection of the TSF

The TOE enforces various mechanisms to prevent itself from being used as an attack vector to its host OS platform. Each TOE platform version (Windows and Linux) implements address space layout randomization (ASLR), does not allocate any memory with both write and execute permissions, does not write user-modifiable files to directories that contain executable files, is compiled using stack overflow protection, and is compatible with the security features of its host OS platform.

Each TOE platform version contains libraries and invokes system APIs that are well-known and explicitly identified.

The TOE has a mechanism to determine its current software version. Software updates to the TOE can be acquired by leveraging its OS platform. The format of the software update is dependent on the TOE platform version. All updates are digitally signed to guarantee their authenticity and integrity.

#### 4.8 Trusted Path/Channels

The TOE encrypts sensitive data in transit between itself and its operational environment using TLS and HTTPS. It facilitates the transmission of sensitive data from remote users over TLS and HTTPS.

## 5 Assumptions

The ST references the PP to which it claims conformance for assumptions about the use of the TOE. Those assumptions, drawn from the claimed PP, are as follows:

- The TOE relies upon a trustworthy computing platform with a reliable time clock for its execution. This includes the underlying platform and whatever runtime environment it provides to the TOE.
- The user of the application software is not willfully negligent or hostile and uses the software in compliance with the applied enterprise security policy.
- The administrator of the application software is not careless, willfully negligent or hostile, and administers the software in compliance with the applied enterprise security policy.

## 6 Clarification of Scope

All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that may benefit from need clarification. This text covers some of the more important limitations and clarifications of this evaluation. Note that:

- As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated configuration meets the security claims made, with a certain level of assurance (the evaluation activities specified in *Protection Profile for Application Software*, Version 1.3, 1 March 2019 [5] and in *Functional Package for Transport Layer Security (TLS)*, Version 1.1, 12 February 2019 [6], and performed by the evaluation team).
- Consistent with the expectations of the Protection Profile, this evaluation did not specifically search for, nor seriously attempt to counter, vulnerabilities that were not “obvious” or vulnerabilities to objectives not claimed in the ST. The CEM defines an “obvious” vulnerability as one that is easily exploited with a minimum of understanding of the TOE, technical sophistication and resources.
- The evaluation of security functionality of the product was limited to the functionality specified in the claimed PPs. Any additional security related functional capabilities included in the product were not covered by this evaluation. In particular, the functionality listed in Section 9.2 of this document is not covered.

## 7 Documentation

Tenable offers guidance documents describing the installation process for the TOE as well as guidance for subsequent administration and use of the applicable security features. The guidance documentation examined during the evaluation and delivered with the TOE model is as follows:

- Nessus Network Monitor 5.12.x User Guide, Last Updated: October 29, 2020.

To use the product in the evaluated configuration, the product must be configured as specified in the subsection “Configure NNM for NIAP Compliance” found within the Nessus Network Monitor 5.12.x User Guide.

The documentation listed above is the only documentation that should be trusted to install, administer, or use the TOE in its evaluated configuration. Any additional customer documentation provided with the product, or that which may be available online, was not included in the scope of the evaluation and therefore should not be relied upon to configure or operate the device as evaluated. Consumers are encouraged to download the evaluated administrative guidance documentation from the NIAP website.

## 8 IT Product Testing

This section describes the testing efforts of the developer and the evaluation team. The information is derived from the Evaluation Technical Report for Tenable Nessus Network Monitor, Part 2 (Leidos Proprietary), Version 1.1, 4 December 2020 and the test report Tenable Nessus Network Monitor Common Criteria Test Report and Procedures, Version 1.1, 4 December 2020 [12], which are listed in the bibliography section 14 of this document. A non-proprietary description of the tests performed, and their results is provided in the *Assurance Activities Report for Tenable Nessus Network Monitor 5.12.0*, Version 1.1, 4 December 2020 [11].

### 8.1 Developer Testing

No evidence of developer testing is required in the Assurance Activities for this product.

### 8.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing

The purpose of the testing activity was to confirm the TOE behaves in accordance with the TOE security functional requirements as specified in the ST for a product that claims conformance to *Protection Profile for Application Software* ([5]) and *Functional Package for Transport Layer Security (TLS)* ([6]).

The evaluation team devised a Test Plan based on the Testing Assurance Activities specified in *Protection Profile for Application Software* and *Functional Package for Transport Layer Security (TLS)*. The Test Plan described how each test activity was to be instantiated within the TOE test environment. The evaluation team executed the tests specified in the Test Plan and documented the results in the team test report listed above.

Independent testing took place at Leidos CCTL facilities in Columbia, Maryland. Testing occurred from February 3, 2020 to October 23, 2020; testing was completed in October 2020.

The evaluators received the TOE in the form that customers would receive it, installed and configured the TOE in accordance with the vendor-provided guidance, and exercised the Team Test Plan on equipment configured in the testing laboratory. The Independent Testing activity is documented in the Assurance Activities Report (AAR), which is publicly available, and is not duplicated here. A description of the test configurations and the test tools may be found in Section 2.8 of that report.

Given the complete set of test results from the test procedures exercised by the evaluators, the testing requirements for *Protection Profile for Application Software* and *Functional Package for Transport Layer Security (TLS)* were fulfilled.

### 8.3 Test Configuration

The evaluation team established a test configuration comprising:

- TOE components:
  - Tenable Nessus Network Monitor 5.12.0, running on Red Hat Enterprise Linux (RHEL) 7.7. RHEL itself was running on ESXi 6.5 on AMD Ryzen Threadripper 1950X (Zen)
  - Tenable Nessus Network Monitor 5.12.0, running on Windows Server 2016 Standard. Windows Server itself was running on ESXi 6.5 on AMD Ryzen Threadripper 1950X (Zen)
- Operational and test environment components:
  - Tenable.sc on Linux RHEL 7.7

- Tenable Nessus Agent on Linux RHEL 7.7
- Tenable Nessus Agent on Windows Server 2016 Standard
- Tenable Nessus Manager running on Windows Server 2016 Standard
- Tenable Nessus Manager running on RHEL 7.7
- Tenable Log Correlation Engine on RHEL 7.7
- Linux TLS Test Server.

## 9 TOE Evaluated Configuration

### 9.1 Evaluated Configuration

The TOE consists of the Tenable Nessus Network Monitor 5.12.0 application, which is a C application with a PHP/JavaScript web front-end running on a proprietary web server. The TOE has both Linux and Windows platform versions.

The TOE is evaluated on Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 and Windows Server 2016

The TOE has the following system requirements for its host platform:

- 2 x 2GHz cores
- 4 GB RAM
- 20 GB disk storage.

The TOE requires the following in its operational environment:

- Other Tenable components (an instance of Tenable.sc—Nessus Manager, Nessus Agent(s), and Log Correlation Engine are expected to be present in the TOE's operational environment because they also interface with Tenable.sc but the TOE does not interact with these applications directly).
- Platform (hardware and software) on which the TOE is hosted.
  - In the evaluated configuration, RHEL 7 and Windows Server 2016 are the supported OS platforms.
- Full disk encryption is required for the TOE platform to ensure adequate data-at-rest protection.
- Web browser used to access the GUI interface.

### 9.2 Excluded Functionality

The TOE's data collection capabilities are outside the scope of the TOE, as is any other product behavior that is not described in the App PP or TLS Package. The content and execution of plugins is similarly excluded from the TOE, although they are discussed in the context of network communications because the TSF must use platform network resources to acquire them.



## 10 Results of the Evaluation

The results of the evaluation of the TOE against its target assurance requirements are generally described in this section and are presented in detail in the proprietary Evaluation Technical Report for Tenable Nessus Network Monitor Part 2 ([11]). The reader of this VR can assume that all assurance activities and work units received passing verdicts.

A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to the corresponding evaluator action elements. The evaluation was conducted based upon CC version 3.1, revision 5 ([1], [2], [3]) and CEM version 3.1, revision 5 ([4]), and the specific evaluation activities specified in *Protection Profile for Application Software*, Version 1.3, 1 March 2019 ([5]) and *Functional Package for Transport Layer Security (TLS)*, Version 1.1, 12 February 2019 ([6]). The evaluation determined the TOE satisfies the conformance claims made in the Tenable Nessus Network Monitor Security Target, of Part 2 extended and Part 3 extended. The TOE satisfies the requirements specified in:

- *Protection Profile for Application Software*, Version 1.3, 1 March 2019 ([5])
- *Functional Package for Transport Layer Security (TLS)*, Version 1.1, 12 February 2019 ([6]).

The Validators reviewed all the work of the evaluation team and agreed with their practices and findings.

### 10.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ST) (ASE)

The evaluation team performed each TSS assurance activity and ASE CEM work unit. The ST evaluation ensured the ST contains an ST introduction, TOE overview, TOE description, security problem definition in terms of threats, policies and assumptions, description of security objectives for the operational environment, a statement of security requirements claimed to be met by the product that are consistent with the claimed Protection Profile, and security function descriptions that satisfy the requirements.

### 10.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV)

The evaluation team performed each ADV assurance activity and applied each ADV\_FSP.1 CEM work unit. The evaluation team assessed the evaluation evidence and found it adequate to meet the requirements specified in the claimed Protection Profile for design evidence. The ADV evidence consists of the TSS descriptions provided in the ST and product guidance documentation providing descriptions of the TOE external interfaces.

### 10.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD)

The evaluation team performed each guidance assurance activity and applied each AGD work unit. The evaluation team determined the adequacy of the operational user guidance in describing how to operate the TOE in accordance with the descriptions in the ST. The evaluation team followed the guidance in the TOE preparative procedures to test the installation and configuration procedures to ensure the procedures result in the evaluated configuration. The guidance documentation was assessed during the design and testing phases of the evaluation to ensure it was complete.

### 10.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)

The evaluation team performed each ALC assurance activity and applied each ALC\_CMC.1 and ALC\_CMS.1 CEM work unit, to the extent possible given the evaluation evidence required by the claimed Protection Profiles. The evaluation team ensured the TOE is labeled with a unique identifier consistent with the TOE

identification in the evaluation evidence, and that the ST describes how timely security updates are made to the TOE.

### 10.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE)

The evaluation team performed each test activity and applied each ATE\_FUN.1 CEM work unit. The evaluation team ran the set of tests specified by the claimed PP and recorded the results in the Test Report, summarized in the AAR.

### 10.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (AVA)

The evaluation team performed each AVA assurance activity and applied each AVA\_VAN.1 CEM work unit. The evaluation team performed a vulnerability analysis following the processes described in the claimed PP. This comprised performance of a virus scan on the installation packages for the TOE and a search of public vulnerability databases. The virus scans did not detect any virus or malware in any of the TOE installation packages.

Searches of public vulnerability repositories were performed on 4 December 2020.

The evaluation team searched the following public vulnerability repositories.

- National Vulnerability Database (<http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/search>)
- SecurityFocus Database (<https://www.securityfocus.com/vulnerabilities>)
- US-CERT Vulnerability Notes Database (<https://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/>).

The evaluation team used the following search terms in the searches of these repositories:

- “tenable”
- “nessus network monitor”
- “tls v1.2”
- “openssl 1.1.1d”

The results of these searches did not identify any vulnerabilities that are applicable to the TOE. The conclusion drawn from the vulnerability analysis is that no residual vulnerabilities exist that are exploitable by attackers with Basic Attack Potential as defined by the Certification Body in accordance with the guidance in the CEM.

### 10.7 Summary of Evaluation Results

The evaluation team’s assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims in the ST are met, sufficient to satisfy the assurance activities specified in the claimed Protection Profiles. Additionally, the evaluation team’s testing also demonstrated the accuracy of the claims in the ST.

The validation team’s assessment of the evidence provided by the evaluation team is that it demonstrates that the evaluation team followed the procedures defined in the CEM, and correctly verified that the product meets the claims in the ST.

## 11 Validator Comments/Recommendations

The validators suggest that the consumer pay particular attention to the evaluated configuration of the TOE. As stated in the Clarification of Scope, the evaluated functionality is scoped exclusively to the security functional requirements specified in the Security Target, and the only evaluated functionality was that which was described by the SFRs claimed in the Security Target.

Note that there is not a separate Common Criteria Configuration Guide. The information needed to use the product in the evaluated configuration, it must be configured as specified in the sub-section “Configure NNM for NIAP Compliance” found within the Nessus Network Monitor 5.12.x User Guide.

All other functionality provided, to include software, firmware, or hardware that was not part of the evaluated configuration needs to be assessed separately and no further conclusions can be drawn about their effectiveness. The excluded functionality is specified in section 9.2 of this report.

All other items and scope issues have been sufficiently addressed elsewhere in this document.

## 12 Security Target

The ST for this product's evaluation is *Tenable Nessus Network Monitor 5.12.0 Security Target, Version 1.0, 4 December 2020* [7].

## 13 Abbreviations and Acronyms

This section identifies abbreviations and acronyms used in this document.

API	Application Programming Interface
CC	Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation
CCTL	Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
CEM	Common Evaluation Methodology
ETR	Evaluation Technical Report
IT	Information Technology
OCSP	Online Certificate Status Protocol
PCL	Product Compliant List
PII	Personally Identifiable Information
RHEL	Red Hat Enterprise Linux
SAR	Security Assurance Requirement
SFR	Security Functional Requirement
ST	Security Target
TOE	Target of Evaluation
TSF	TOE Security Functions
TSS	TOE Summary Specification
VR	Validation Report

## 14 Bibliography

The validation team used the following documents to produce this VR:

- [1] Common Criteria Project Sponsoring Organizations. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation: Part 1: Introduction and general model, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
- [2] Common Criteria Project Sponsoring Organizations. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation: Part 2: Security functional components, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
- [3] Common Criteria Project Sponsoring Organizations. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation: Part 3: Security assurance requirements, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
- [4] Common Criteria Project Sponsoring Organizations. Common Evaluation Methodology for Information Technology Security, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
- [5] Protection Profile for Application Software, Version 1.3, 1 March 2019.
- [6] Functional Package for Transport Layer Security (TLS), Version 1.1, 12 February 2019.
- [7] Tenable Nessus Network Monitor 5.12.0 Security Target, Version 1.0, 4 December 2020. [ST]
- [8] Nessus Network Monitor 5.12.x User Guide, Last Updated: October 29, 2020. [User Guide]
- [9] Evaluation Technical Report for Tenable Nessus Network Monitor 5.12.0, Part 1 (Leidos Non-Proprietary), Version 1.1, 4 December 2020. [ETR P1]
- [10] Evaluation Technical Report for Tenable Nessus Network Monitor 5.12.0, Part 2 (Leidos Proprietary), Version 1.1, 4 December 2020. [ETR P2]
- [11] Assurance Activities Report for Tenable Nessus Network Monitor 5.12.0, Version 1.1, 4 December 2020. [AAR]
- [12] Tenable Nessus Network Monitor Common Criteria Test Report and Procedures, Version 1.1, 4 December 2020. [DTR]
- [13] Tenable Nessus Network Monitor Vulnerability Assessment, Version 1.1, 4 December 2020. [AVA]