UNCLASSIFIED
COMMON CRITERIA
CERTIFICATION REPORT
EMC® VNXe1600™ OE v3.1.3
16 May 2016
UNCLASSIFIED
FOREWORD
This certification report is an UNCLASSIFIED publication, issued under the authority of the Chief,
Communications Security Establishment (CSE). Suggestions for amendments should be forwarded through
departmental communications security channels to your Client Services Representative at CSE.
The Information Technology (IT) product identified in this certification report, and its associated certificate, has
been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility – established under the Canadian Common Criteria Scheme –
using the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 4, for
conformance to the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 4.
This certification report, and its associated certificate, applies only to the identified version and release of the
product in its evaluated configuration. The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of
the Canadian CC Scheme, and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the evaluation report are consistent
with the evidence adduced. This report, and its associated certificate, are not an endorsement of the IT product
by the Communications Security Establishment, or any other organization that recognizes or gives effect to this
report, and its associated certificate, and no warranty for the IT product by the Communications Security
Establishment, or any other organization that recognizes or gives effect to this report, and its associated
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
If your department has identified a requirement for this certification report based on business needs and would
like more detailed information, please contact:
ITS Client Services
Telephone: (613) 991-7654
E-mail: itsclientservices@cse-cst.gc.ca
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OVERVIEW
The Canadian Common Criteria Scheme provides a third-party evaluation service for determining the
trustworthiness of Information Technology (IT) security products. Evaluations are performed by a commercial
Common Criteria Evaluation Facility (CCEF) under the oversight of the Certification Body, which is managed by
the Communications Security Establishment.
A CCEF is a commercial facility that has been approved by the Certification Body to perform Common Criteria
evaluations; a significant requirement for such approval is accreditation to the requirements of ISO/IEC
17025:2005, the General Requirements for the Competence of Testing and Calibration Laboratories.
Accreditation is performed under the Program for the Accreditation of Laboratories - Canada (PALCAN),
administered by the Standards Council of Canada.
The CCEF that carried out this evaluation is EWA-Canada.
By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, the CCS Certification Body asserts that the product complies with the
security requirements specified in the associated security target. A security target is a requirements specification
document that defines the scope of the evaluation activities. The consumer of certified IT products should
review the security target, in addition to this certification report, in order to gain an understanding of any
assumptions made during the evaluation, the IT product's intended environment, the evaluated security
functionality, and the testing and analysis conducted by the CCEF.
The certification report, certificate of product evaluation and security target are posted to the Certified Products
list (CPL) for the Canadian CC Scheme, and to the Common Criteria portal (the official website of the
International Common Criteria Project).
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Executive Summary........................................................................................................................................1
1 Identification of Target of Evaluation......................................................................................................2
1.1 Common Criteria Conformance..................................................................................................................2
1.2 TOE description ..........................................................................................................................................2
1.3 TOE architecture.........................................................................................................................................2
2 Security policy .......................................................................................................................................3
3 Assumptions and Clarifications of Scope.................................................................................................4
3.1 Usage and Environmental assumptions .....................................................................................................4
3.2 Clarification of Scope..................................................................................................................................4
4 Evaluated Configuration.........................................................................................................................5
4.1 Documentation...........................................................................................................................................5
5 Evaluation Analysis Activities .................................................................................................................6
5.1 Development..............................................................................................................................................6
5.2 Guidance Documents .................................................................................................................................6
5.3 Life-cycle Support.......................................................................................................................................6
6 Testing Activities....................................................................................................................................7
6.1 Assessment of Developer Tests..................................................................................................................7
6.2 Conduct of Testing......................................................................................................................................7
6.3 Independent Functional Testing.................................................................................................................7
6.4 Independent Penetration Testing ..............................................................................................................8
7 Results of the Evaluation........................................................................................................................9
8 Supporting Content..............................................................................................................................10
8.1 List of Abbreviations................................................................................................................................ 10
8.2 References............................................................................................................................................... 11
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LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1 TOE Architecture ....................................................................................................................................2
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1 TOE Identification.......................................................................................................................................2
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
EMC® VNXe1600™ OE v3.1.3(hereafter referred to as the Target of Evaluation, or TOE), from EMC Corporation,
was the subject of this Common Criteria evaluation. The results of this evaluation demonstrate that TOE meets
the requirements of the conformance claim listed in Table 1 for the evaluated security functionality.
The TOE is a midrange capacity storage system comprised of the VNXe1600 hardware platform and the VNXe
Operating Environment (OE) software. The VNXe1600 hardware houses the disks in the storage array which are
managed by the VNXe storage processors. It provides Storage Area Network (SAN) services by interfacing with
the front-end clients (application hosts such as database servers, web servers, etc.) and the back-end storage
disks.
Application Hosts access the storage arrays via Internet Small Computer System Interface (iSCSI) and/or Fibre
Channel (FC). The TOE presents storage to application hosts in the form of Logical Units (or LUNs) using block
storage protocols. Each LUN is a useable storage system volume that the TOE can expose to individual hosts.
Application hosts can only access LUNs for which permission has been granted by an authorized administrator.
EWA-Canada is the CCEF that conducted the evaluation. This evaluation was completed on 16 May 2016 and
was carried out in accordance with the rules of the Canadian Common Criteria Scheme.
The scope of the evaluation is defined by the security target, which identifies assumptions made during the
evaluation, the intended environment for TOE, and the security functional/assurance requirements. Consumers
are advised to verify that their operating environment is consistent with that specified in the security target, and
to give due consideration to the comments, observations and recommendations in this certification report.
Communications Security Establishment, as the Certification Body, declares that the TOE evaluation meets all
the conditions of the Arrangement on the Recognition of Common Criteria Certificates and that the product will
be listed on the Certified Products list (CPL) and the Common Criteria portal (the official website of the
International Common Criteria Project).
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1 IDENTIFICATION OF TARGET OF EVALUATION
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is identified as follows:
Table 1 TOE Identification
TOE Name and Version EMC® VNXe1600™ OE v3.1.3
Developer EMC Corporation
Conformance Claim EAL 2+ (ALC_FLR.2)
1.1 COMMON CRITERIA CONFORMANCE
The evaluation was conducted using the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1 Revision 4, for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1 Revision 4.
1.2 TOE DESCRIPTION
The TOE is a midrange capacity storage system comprised of the VNXe1600 hardware platform and the VNXe
Operating Environment (OE) software. The VNXe1600 hardware houses the disks in the storage array which are
managed by the VNXe storage processors. It provides Storage Area Network (SAN) services by interfacing with
the front-end clients (application hosts such as database servers, web servers, etc.) and the back-end storage
disks.
Application Hosts access the storage arrays via Internet Small Computer System Interface (iSCSI) and/or Fibre
Channel (FC). The TOE presents storage to application hosts in the form of Logical Units (or LUNs) using block
storage protocols. Each LUN is a useable storage system volume that the TOE can expose to individual hosts.
Application hosts can only access LUNs for which permission has been granted by an authorized administrator.
1.3 TOE ARCHITECTURE
A diagram of the TOE architecture is as follows:
Figure 1 TOE Architecture
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2 SECURITY POLICY
The TOE implements policies pertaining to the following security functional classes:
 Security Audit
 User Data Protection
 Identification and Authentication
 Security Management
 Protection of the TSF
Complete details of the security functional requirements (SFRs) can be found in the Security Target (ST)
referenced in section 8.2.
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3 ASSUMPTIONS AND CLARIFICATIONS OF SCOPE
Consumers of the TOE should consider assumptions about usage and environmental settings as requirements
for the product’s installation and its operating environment. This will ensure the proper and secure operation of
the TOE.
3.1 USAGE AND ENVIRONMENTAL ASSUMPTIONS
The following assumptions are made regarding the use and deployment of the TOE:
 The TOE will be located within controlled access facilities, which will prevent unauthorized physical
access.
 The authorized administrators are not careless, wilfully negligent, or hostile, are appropriately trained
and will follow the instructions provided by the TOE documentation.
3.2 CLARIFICATION OF SCOPE
The following TOE features are supported but not included in this evaluation:
 Common Event Enabler (CEE)
 File-level retention
 Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP)
 Simple Network Transfer Protocol (SNMP)
 Replication
 Network Data Management Protocol (NDMP)
 Common Anti-Virus Agent (CAVA)
 EMC Secure Remote Support (ESRS)
The following TOE interfaces are supported but not included in this evaluation:
 Representational State Transfer (REST) Interface
 Storage Management Initiative Specification (SMI-S) Interface
 vStorage APIs for Storage Awareness (VASA) Interface
 Storage Processor (SP) Ethernet Service Port connection
 VNXe Service Secure Shell (SSH) Interface
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4 EVALUATED CONFIGURATION
The evaluated configuration for the TOE comprises:
The TOE software;
 VNXe Operating Environment (OE) 3.1.3.7141854
 VNXe Unisphere 3.1.3. 7141854
 VNXe Unisphere CLI version 3.0.0.1.16
Installed on a VNXe1600 hardware appliance. With support from the environment of a Microsoft Active
Directory server.
4.1 DOCUMENTATION
The following documents are provided to the consumer to assist in the configuration and installation of the TOE:
a. EMC VNXe 1600 Applied Best Practices Guide, HJ4494, September 2015
b. EMC® VNXe® Series Unisphere Command Line interface User Guide, 302-000-194 REV.03, May 20 15
c. EMC® VNXe 1600TM
OE v3.l.3 UEMCLJ and Unisphere GUI Error Messages, December 14, 2015
d. EMC® VNXe 1600 Hardware information Guide, REV 01, July 2015
e. EMC® VNXe 1600 installation Guide, REV 0 1, July 2015
f. introduction to the EMC VNXe 1600, H14385.2, August 2015
g. EMC® VNXe l600TM OE v3.l.3 Guidance Supplement, Version 0.1, March 28, 2016
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5 EVALUATION ANALYSIS ACTIVITIES
The evaluation analysis activities involved a structured evaluation of the TOE. Documentation and process
dealing with Development, Guidance Documents, and Life-Cycle Support were evaluated.
5.1 DEVELOPMENT
The evaluators analyzed the TOE functional specification and design documentation; they determined that the
design completely and accurately describes the TOE security functionality (TSF) interfaces, the TSF subsystems
and how the TSF implements the security functional requirements (SFRs). The evaluators analyzed the TOE
security architectural description and determined that the initialization process is secure, that the security
functions are protected against tamper and bypass, and that security domains are maintained. The evaluators
also independently verified that the correspondence mappings between the design documents are correct.
5.2 GUIDANCE DOCUMENTS
The evaluators examined the TOE preparative user guidance and operational user guidance and determined that
it sufficiently and unambiguously describes how to securely transform the TOE into its evaluated configuration
and how to use and administer the product. The evaluators examined and tested the preparative and
operational guidance, and determined that they are complete and sufficiently detailed to result in a secure
configuration.
Section 4.1 provides details on the guidance documents.
5.3 LIFE-CYCLE SUPPORT
An analysis of the TOE configuration management system and associated documentation was performed. The
evaluators found that the TOE configuration items were clearly marked.
The evaluators examined the delivery documentation and determined that it described all of the procedures
required to maintain the integrity of the TOE during distribution to the consumer.
The evaluators reviewed the flaw remediation procedures used by developer for the TOE. During a site visit, the
evaluators also examined the evidence generated by adherence to the procedures. The evaluators concluded
that the procedures are adequate to track and correct security flaws, and distribute the flaw information and
corrections to consumers of the TOE.
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6 TESTING ACTIVITIES
Testing consists of the following three steps: assessing developer tests, performing independent functional tests,
and performing penetration tests.
6.1 ASSESSMENT OF DEVELOPER TESTS
The evaluators verified that the developer has met their testing responsibilities by examining their test evidence,
and reviewing their test results, as documented in the ETR.
The evaluators analyzed the developer’s test coverage analysis and found it to be complete and accurate. The
correspondence between the tests identified in the developer’s test documentation and the functional
specification was complete.
6.2 CONDUCT OF TESTING
The TOE was subjected to a comprehensive suite of formally documented, independent functional and
penetration tests. The detailed testing activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected
results and observed results are documented in a separate Test Results document.
6.3 INDEPENDENT FUNCTIONAL TESTING
During this evaluation, the evaluator developed independent functional tests by examining design and guidance
documentation.
All testing was planned and documented to a sufficient level of detail to allow repeatability of the testing
procedures and results. The following testing activities were performed:
a. Repeat of Developer's Tests: The evaluator repeated a subset of the developers tests;
b. Enforcement of Password rules: The evaluator confirmed that the password composition rules are
enforced for all users; and
c. Information Leakage Verification: The evaluator verified that there is no login information is exposed
during access to the TOE.
6.3.1 FUNCTIONAL TEST RESULTS
The developer’s tests and the independent functional tests yielded the expected results, providing assurance
that the TOE behaves as specified in its ST and functional specification.
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6.4 INDEPENDENT PENETRATION TESTING
Subsequent to the independent review of public domain vulnerability databases and all evaluation deliverables,
limited independent evaluator penetration testing was conducted. The penetration tests focused on:
a. Use of automated vulnerability scanning tools to discover potential network, platform and application
layer vulnerabilities such as Heartbleed, Shellshock, FREAK, POODLE, and GHOST; and
b. Network Outage: The evaluator attempted to gain unauthorized access to the TOE by simulating a
network outage.
6.4.1 PENETRATION TEST RESULTS
The independent penetration testing did not uncover any exploitable vulnerabilities in the intended operating
environment.
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7 RESULTS OF THE EVALUATION
This evaluation has provided the basis for the conformance claim documented in Table 1. The overall verdict for
the evaluation is PASS. These results are supported by evidence in the ETR.
The IT product identified in this report has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility established under
the Canadian Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification Scheme using the Common Methodology for IT
Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 4, for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1 Revision 4. These evaluation results apply only to the specific version and release of the product in
its evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete certification report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Canadian Common Criteria
Evaluation and Certification Scheme and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the evaluation report are
consistent with the evidence adduced. This is not an endorsement of the IT product by CSE or by any other
organization that recognizes or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by CSE or by any
other organization that recognizes or gives effect to this certificate, is expressed or implied.
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8 SUPPORTING CONTENT
8.1 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
Term Definition
CAVP Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program
CCEF Common Criteria Evaluation Facility
CCS Canadian Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification Scheme
CM Configuration Management
CMVP Cryptographic Module Validation Program
CSE Communications Security Establishment
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
GC Government of Canada
IT Information Technology
ITS Information Technology Security
ITSET Information Technology Security Evaluation and Testing
PALCAN Program for the Accreditation of Laboratories – Canada
PP Protection Profile
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Function
UEMCLI Unified Element Manager Command Line Interface
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8.2 REFERENCES
Reference
CCS Publication #4, Technical Oversight, Version 1.8, October 2010.
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 4, September 2012.
Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, CEM, Version 3.1 Revision 4,
September 2012.
EMC® VNXe 1600
TM
OE v3.l.3 Security Target, Version 0.7, March 18, 2016
Evaluation Technical Report for EAL 2+ Common Criteria Evaluation of EMC Coporation EMC VNXe1600 OE
v3.1.3, v1.0, 16 May 2016