National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
for the
KLC Advantech Drives Firmware Version:
SCPB13.0/ECPB13.0
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-VID11453-2024
Dated: June 25, 2024
Version: 1.0
National Institute of Standards and Technology Department of Defense
Information Technology Laboratory ATTN: NIAP, SUITE: 6982
100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Fort Meade, MD 20755-6982
®
TM
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Validation Team
Jenn Dotson
Clare Parran
Chris Thorpe
The MITRE Corporation
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
Nil Folquer
Kevin Steiner
Lightship Security, USA
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Table of Contents
1. Executive Summary.................................................................................................... 1
2. Identification............................................................................................................... 2
3. Architectural Information ........................................................................................... 4
3.1. TOE Evaluated Configuration ........................................................................ 4
3.2. TOE Architecture............................................................................................ 5
3.3. Physical Boundary .......................................................................................... 5
3.4. Required Non-TOE Hardware, Software, and Firmware ............................... 5
4. Security Policy............................................................................................................ 6
4.1. Cryptographic Support.................................................................................... 6
4.2. Data Protection................................................................................................ 6
4.3. Security Management ..................................................................................... 6
4.4. Protection of the TSF...................................................................................... 6
5. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope..................................................................... 7
5.1. Assumptions.................................................................................................... 7
5.2. Clarification of Scope ..................................................................................... 7
6. Documentation............................................................................................................ 8
7. IT Product Testing ...................................................................................................... 9
7.1. Developer Testing........................................................................................... 9
7.2. Evaluation Team Independent Testing ........................................................... 9
7.3. Remote Testing............................................................................................... 9
7.4. Evaluated Configuration................................................................................. 9
8. Results of the Evaluation .......................................................................................... 12
8.1. Evaluation of Security Target (ASE)............................................................ 12
8.2. Evaluation of Development Documentation (ADV) .................................... 12
8.3. Evaluation of Guidance Documents (AGD)................................................. 12
8.4. Evaluation of Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)..................................... 13
8.5. Evaluation of Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE) ................. 13
8.6. Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)................................................... 13
8.7. Summary of Evaluation Results.................................................................... 14
9. Validator Comments................................................................................................. 15
10. Annexes..................................................................................................................... 16
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11. Security Target.......................................................................................................... 17
12. Glossary .................................................................................................................... 18
13. Acronym List ............................................................................................................ 19
14. Bibliography ............................................................................................................. 20
List of Tables
Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers............................................................................................ 2
Table 2: TOE Models......................................................................................................... 4
Table 3: Devices in the Testing Environment.................................................................. 10
Table 4: Tools Used for Testing ....................................................................................... 10
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1. Executive Summary
This report documents the assessment of the National Information Assurance Partnership
(NIAP) Validation team of the evaluation of KLC Advantech Drives Firmware Version:
SCPB13.0/ECPB13.0 solution provided by KLC Group LLC. It presents the evaluation
results, their justifications, and the conformance results. This Validation Report (VR) is
not an endorsement of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) by any agency of the U.S.
government, and no warranty is either expressed or implied.
The evaluation was performed by the Lightship Security USA Common Criteria
Laboratory (CCTL) in Baltimore, MD, United States of America, and was completed in
June 2024. The information in this report is largely derived from the Evaluation Technical
Report (ETR) and associated test reports, all written by Lightship Security (LS). The
evaluation determined that the product is both Common Criteria Part 2 Extended and Part
3 Conformant and meets the assurance requirements of the collaborative Protection Profile
for Full Drive Encryption - Encryption Engine Version 2.0 + Errata 20190201.
The TOE is the KLC Advantech Drives Firmware Version: SCPB13.0/ECPB13.0. The
TOE identified in this VR has been evaluated at a NIAP approved CCTL using the
Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 5) for conformance
to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 5). This VR applies
only to the specific version of the TOE as evaluated. The evaluation has been conducted
in accordance with the provisions of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and
Validation Scheme (CCEVS) and the conclusions of the testing laboratory in the ETR are
consistent with the evidence provided.
The Validation team monitored the activities of the Evaluation team, provided guidance
on technical issues and evaluation processes, and reviewed the individual work units and
successive versions of the ETR. The Validation team found that the evaluation showed
that the product satisfies all of the functional requirements and assurance requirements
stated in the Security Target (ST). Therefore, the Validation team concludes that the
testing laboratory’s findings are accurate, the conclusions justified, and the conformance
results are correct. The conclusions of the testing laboratory in the ETR are consistent
with the evidence produced.
The technical information included in this report was obtained from the KLC Advantech
Drives Firmware Version: SCPB13.0/ECPB13.0 Security Target, Version 1.4, June 2024
and analysis performed by the Validation team.
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2. Identification
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST) effort to establish commercial facilities to perform
trusted product evaluations. Under this program, security evaluations are conducted by
commercial testing laboratories called Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs)
using the Common Evaluation Methodology (CEM) in accordance with National
Voluntary Laboratory Assessment Program (NVLAP) accreditation.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality
and consistency across evaluations. Developers of information technology products
desiring a security evaluation contract with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product’s
evaluation. Upon successful completion of the evaluation, the product is added to
NIAP’s Validated Products List.
Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:
• The TOE: the fully qualified identifier of the product as evaluated.
• The ST, describing the security features, claims, and assurances of the product.
• The conformance result of the evaluation.
• The Protection Profile (PP) to which the product is conformant.
• The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation.
Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers
Item Identifier
Evaluation Scheme
United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation
Scheme
Evaluated Product
KLC Advantech Drives Firmware Version:
SCPB13.0/ECPB13.0
Sponsor and Developer
KLC Group LLC
1900 Camden Ave.
San Jose, CA 95124
CCTL
Lightship Security USA
3600 O’Donnell St., Suite 2
Baltimore, MD 21224
CC Version
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
CEM
Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation: Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Revision 5,
April 2017.
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Item Identifier
Protection Profile
collaborative Protection Profile for Full Drive Encryption -
Encryption Engine, Version 2.0 + Errata 20190201, February 1,
2019
ST
KLC Advantech Drives Firmware Version: SCPB13.0/ECPB13.0
Security Target, Version 1.4, June 2024
Evaluation Technical
Report
KLC Advantech Drives Firmware Version: SCPB13.0/ECPB13.0
Evaluation Technical Report, Version 0.3, June 2024
Conformance Result CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 conformant
Evaluation Personnel Lightship USA: Nil Folquer, Kevin Steiner
CCEVS Validators Jenn Dotson, Clare Parran, Chris Thorpe
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3. Architectural Information
Note: The following architectural description is based on the description presented in the
Security Target.
The TOE is a solid state self-encrypting drive that provides encryption and decryption of
stored user data.
3.1. TOE Evaluated Configuration
The TOE evaluated configuration includes the KLC Advantech Drives Firmware
Version: SCPB13.0/ECPB13.0, which consists of the following models and versions:
Table 2: TOE Models
Series CC Listed P/N &
Version
Advantech P/N &
Version
Form
Factor
Controller
FW
Version
840F SQF-2020-1TSCB SQFFS25V8-1TSC 2.5"
SATA
PS3112-S12 SCPB13.0
840F SQF-2020-512SCB SQFFS25V8-512GSC 2.5"
SATA
840F SQF-2020-256SCB SQFFS25V4-256GSC 2.5”
SATA
840F SQF-2020-128SCB SQFFS25V2-128GSC 2.5”
SATA
840F SQF-2020-1TSCM SQFFSM8V4-1TSC M.2
SATA
840F SQF-2020-512SCM SQFFSM8V4-512GSC M.2
SATA
840F SQF-2020-256SCM SQFFSM8V4-256GSC M.2
SATA
840F SQF-2020-128SCM SQFFSM8V2-128GSC M.2
SATA
920F SQF-2040-1TECM SQFFCM8V4-1TEC M.2
NVMe
PS5012-E12 ECPB13.0
920F SQF-2040-512ECM SQFFCM8V4-512GEC M.2
NVMe
920F SQF-2040-256ECM SQFFCM8V4-256GEC M.2
NVMe
PS5012-E12 ECPB13.0
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3.2. TOE Architecture
The TOE provides full drive encryption to safeguard data on lost or stolen devices. The
Encryption Engine (EE) ensures that the drive data is encrypted using NIST approved
algorithms.
3.3. Physical Boundary
The physical boundary of the TOE encompasses the KLC Advantech Drives firmware
running on the SEDs. The TOE hardware is delivered to customers via trusted courier
with the firmware preinstalled.
The TOE models support either NVMe PCIe or SATA III interfaces. All TOE models
incorporate an ARM Cortex-R5 processor (ARMv7-R microarchitecture).
3.4. Required Non-TOE Hardware, Software, and Firmware
The TOE operates with the following components in the environment:
• Authorization Acquisition - KLC CipherDrive v1.2.3 software installed on a 128
MB read-only Shadow MBR partition on the SED. This supplies the Border
Encryption Value (BEV) for locking and unlocking the drives. The AA software
provides the GUI used for performing the security management functions
described within this ST.
• Protected OS - The TOE supports protection of commonly used operating
systems, such as Linux Operating Systems/Linux based Hypervisors and
Windows Operating Systems.
• Computer Hardware - Intel based UEFI booted systems that supports Intel
Secure Key Technology. CC Testing performed using CPUs:
o Intel Core i5-13500 (Raptor Lake)
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4. Security Policy
This section summarizes the security functionality of the TOE:
4.1. Cryptographic Support
The TOE ensures key material used for storage encryption is properly generated and
protected from disclosure. It also implements cryptographic key and key material
destruction during transitioning to a Compliant power saving state, or when all keys and
key material are no longer needed.
The TOE performs cryptographic operations as shown in relevant Cryptographic
Algorithm Validation Program (CAVP) certificates.
4.2. Data Protection
The TOE enables encryption and decryption of user data on a SED to protect it from
unauthorized disclosure.
4.3. Security Management
The TOE enables management of its security functions, including:
i) Changing and erasing the DEK
ii) Updating the TOE firmware
4.4. Protection of the TSF
The TOE ensures the authenticity and integrity of firmware updates through digital
signatures using RSA 2048 with SHA-256. The TOE supports the D3 compliant power
saving state as prompted by the protected OS when a user initiates a request.
The TOE ensures its integrity and operation by performing self-tests.
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5. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
5.1. Assumptions
The Security Problem Definition, including the assumptions, can be found in the
following documents:
• collaborative Protection Profile for Full Drive Encryption - Encryption Engine,
Version 2.0 + Errata 20190201, February 1, 2019
That information has not been reproduced here and CPP_FDE_EE_V2.0E should be
consulted if there is interest in that material.
5.2. Clarification of Scope
The scope of this evaluation was limited to the functionality and assurances covered in
CPP_FDE_EE_V2.0E as described for this TOE in the ST. Other functionality included
in the product was not assessed as part of this evaluation. All other functionality provided
by the devices needs to be assessed separately, and no further conclusions can be drawn
about their effectiveness.
All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions
that need clarifying. This text covers some of the more important limitations and
clarifications of this evaluation. Note that:
• As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated
configuration meets the security claims made in accordance with the assurance
activities specified in the CPP_FDE_EE_V2.0E and performed by the Evaluation
team
• This evaluation covers only the specific software version identified in this
document, and not any earlier or later versions released or in process.
• Apart from the Admin Guide identified in Section 6, additional customer
documentation for the specific models was not included in the scope of the
evaluation and therefore should not be relied upon when configuring or operating
the device as evaluated.
• This evaluation did not specifically search for, nor attempt to exploit,
vulnerabilities that were not “obvious” or vulnerabilities to objectives not claimed
in the ST. The CEM defines an “obvious” vulnerability as one that is easily
exploited with a minimum of understanding of the TOE, technical sophistication
and resources.
• The functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the security functional
requirements specified in the CPP_FDE_EE_V2.0E and applicable Technical
Decisions. Any additional security related functional capabilities of the TOE
were not covered by this evaluation. In particular, functionality defined in
Section 3.4 is not covered by this evaluation.
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6. Documentation
The following guidance documents were available with the TOE for evaluation:
• KLC Advantech Drives Firmware Version: SCPB13.0/ECPB13.0 Common
Criteria Guide, Version 1.1, June 2024
This document is the only documentation that should be trusted to set-up, administer, or
use the product in the evaluated configuration. Additional documentation was not
included in the scope of the evaluation and should not be relied upon when configuring or
operating the device as evaluated.
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7. IT Product Testing
This section describes the testing efforts of the Evaluation team. It is derived from
information contained in KLC Advantech Drives Firmware Version:
SCPB13.0/ECPB13.0 FDE Encryption Engine Test Plan, version 0.3, June 2024, which
is not publicly available. The KLC Advantech Drives Firmware Version:
SCPB13.0/ECPB13.0 Assurance Activity Report, Version 0.3, June 2024 provides an
overview of testing and the prescribed assurance activities.
7.1. Developer Testing
No evidence of developer testing is required in the Assurance Activities for this product.
7.2. Evaluation Team Independent Testing
The Evaluation team conducted independent testing at Lightship Security USA lab in
Baltimore, MD during December 2023. The Evaluation team configured the TOE
according to vendor installation instructions and as identified in the ST.
The Evaluation team confirmed the technical accuracy of the setup and installation guide
during installation of the TOE. The Evaluation team confirmed that the TOE version
delivered for testing was identical to the version identified in the ST.
The Evaluation team used the PP test procedures as a basis for creating each of the
independent tests as required by the Assurance Activities.
Each Assurance Activity was tested as required by the conformant PP and the Evaluation
team verified that each test passed.
7.3. Remote Testing
Remote testing was conducted at the Phison facility located in Jhunan, Miaoli, Taiwan.
Phison representatives conducted the testing. The Evaluation team directed and observed
remote testing for the SQFFSM8V2-128GSC and SQFFCM8V4-256GEC TOE models for
the FCS_CKM.1(c), FCS_CKM.4(b) and FDP_DSK_EXT.1 test activities. This was
performed over a recorded remote session and participation included the Vendor, CCTL,
NIAP and the Validation team on April 24, 2024. Prior approval was granted by NIAP.
Prior to testing, the Evaluation team confirmed the TOE models were running the correct
firmware and were physically and logically separated from other hardware in the test
facility.
7.4. Evaluated Configuration
The TOE testing environment components are identified in the tables below.
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Table 3: Devices in the Testing Environment
TOE model Platform Controller Firmware SFRs
SQFFSM8V2-
128GSC
(onsite)
Windows 11, Intel
i5-13500
PS3112-
S12
SCPB13.0 FCS_VAL_EXT.1
FMT_SMF.1
FPT_TUD_EXT.1
SQFFCM8V4-
256GEC
(onsite)
Windows 11, Intel
i5-13500
PS5012-
E12
ECPB13.0 FCS_VAL_EXT.1
FMT_SMF.1
FPT_TUD_EXT.1
SQFFS25V8-
1TSC (onsite)
Windows 11, Intel
i5-13500
PS3112-
S12
SCPB13.0 FCS_VAL_EXT.1
FMT_SMF.1
FPT_TUD_EXT.1
SQFFSM8V2-
128GSC
(remote)
Ubuntu 16.04 LTS,
Intel i5-8400
PS3112-
S12
SCPB13.0 FCS_CKM.4(b)
FCS_CKM.1(c)
FDP_DSK_EXT.1
SQFFCM8V4-
256GEC
(remote)
Ubuntu 20.04.2
LTS, Intel i5-8400
PS5012-
E12
ECPB13.0 FCS_CKM.4(b)
FCS_CKM.1(c)
FDP_DSK_EXT.1
Table 4: Tools Used for Testing
Tool name Version Description
KLC CipherDrive v1.2.3 This tool provides
GUI access to the
TOE to be able to
perform management
functions
Phison Pattern System
(for SQFFSM8V2-
128GSC)
0.9.01.33 This tool was used to
test the deletion and
generation of key as
well as provide
dumps of the entire
drive to verify
evidence
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Tool name Version Description
Phison Pattern System
(for SQFFCM8V4-
256GEC)
1.10.01.01 This tool was used to
test the deletion and
generation of key as
well as provide
dumps of the entire
drive to verify
evidence
DLMC Tool for Trusted
Update
V1.00 This tool was used
for updating the
firmware on the TOE
for trusted update
tests.
HxD 2.5.0.0 This tool was used to
verify binary file
dumps with key
contents
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8. Results of the Evaluation
The results of the assurance requirements are generally described in this section and are
presented in detail in the proprietary documents: the Detailed Test Report (DTR) and the
Evaluation Technical Report (ETR). The reader of this document can assume that all
activities and work units received a passing verdict.
A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to
the corresponding evaluator action elements. The evaluation was conducted based upon
CC Version 3.1 Revision 5 and CEM Version 3.1 Revision 5. The evaluation determined
the KLC Advantech Drives Firmware Version: SCPB13.0/ECPB13.0 to be Part 2
extended, and to meet the SARs contained in the PP. Additionally, the evaluator
performed the Assurance Activities specified in CPP_FDE_EE_V2.0E.
8.1. Evaluation of Security Target (ASE)
The Evaluation team applied each ASE CEM work unit. The ST evaluation ensured the
ST contains a description of the environment in terms of policies and assumptions, a
statement of security requirements claimed to be met by the KLC Advantech Drives
Firmware Version: SCPB13.0/ECPB13.0 products that are consistent with the Common
Criteria, and product security function descriptions that support the requirements.
The Validation team reviewed the work of the Evaluation team and found that sufficient
evidence and justification was provided by the Evaluation team to confirm that the
evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the
conclusion reached by the Evaluation team was justified.
8.2. Evaluation of Development Documentation (ADV)
The Evaluation team applied each ADV CEM work unit. The Evaluation team assessed
the design documentation and found it adequate to aid in understanding how the TSF
provides the security functions. The design documentation consists of a functional
specification contained in the ST and Guidance documents. Additionally, the evaluator
performed the assurance activities specified in the CPP_FDE_EE_V2.0E related to the
examination of the information contained in the TOE Summary Specification (TSS).
The Validation reviewed the work of the Evaluation team and found that sufficient
evidence and justification was provided by the Evaluation team to confirm that the
evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the
conclusion reached by the Evaluation team was justified.
8.3. Evaluation of Guidance Documents (AGD)
The Evaluation team applied each AGD CEM work unit. The Evaluation team ensured
the adequacy of the user guidance in describing how to use the operational TOE.
Additionally, the Evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the administrator guidance in
describing how to securely administer the TOE. All of the guides were assessed during
the design and testing phases of the evaluation to ensure they were complete.
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The Validation team reviewed the work of the Evaluation team and found that sufficient
evidence and justification was provided by the Evaluation team to confirm that the
evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the
conclusion reached by the Evaluation team was justified.
8.4. Evaluation of Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)
The Evaluation team applied each ALC CEM work unit. The Evaluation team found that
the TOE was appropriately labeled with a unique identifier consistent with the TOE
identification in the evaluation evidence and that the TOE references used are consistent.
The Validation team reviewed the work of the Evaluation team and found that sufficient
evidence and justification was provided by the Evaluation team to confirm that the
evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the
conclusion reached by the Evaluation team was justified.
8.5. Evaluation of Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE)
The Evaluation team applied each ATE CEM work unit. The Evaluation team ran the set
of tests specified by the assurance activities in the CPP_FDE_EE_V2.0E and recorded
the results in a Test Report, summarized in the AAR.
The Validation team reviewed the work of the Evaluation team and found that sufficient
evidence and justification was provided by the Evaluation team to confirm that the
evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the
conclusion reached by the Evaluation team was justified.
8.6. Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)
The evaluation team applied each AVA CEM work unit. The vulnerability analysis is in
the KLC Advantech Drives Firmware Version: SCPB13.0/ECPB13.0
CPP_FDE_EE_v2.0E Vulnerability Assessment, Version 0.2, June 2024, report prepared
by the Evaluation team. The vulnerability analysis includes a public search for
vulnerabilities. The public search for vulnerabilities conducted on June 11, 2024, did not
uncover any residual vulnerability.
The Evaluation team searched:
• NIST National Vulnerabilities Database (can be used to access CVE and US-
CERT databases identified below): https://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/search
• Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures:
https://cve.mitre.org/cve/search_cve_list.html
• US-CERT: http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/html/search
The Evaluation team performed a search using the following keywords:
• Drive encryption
• Disk encryption
• Key destruction
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• Key sanitization
• Self Encrypting Drive
• SED
• OPAL
• KLC Advantech
• SQFFS25V8-1TSC
• SQFFS25V8-512GSC
• SQFFS25V4-256GSC
• SQFFS25V2-128GSC
• SQFFSM8V4-1TSC
• SQFFSM8V4-512GSC
• SQFFSM8V4-256GSC
• SQFFSM8V2-128GSC
• SQFFCM8V4-1TEC
• SQFFCM8V4-512GEC
• SQFFCM8V4-256GEC
• SCPB13.0
• ECPB13.0
• PS3112-S12
• PS5012-E12
• ARMv7 (cpe:2.3:h:arm:arm7:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*)
• ARM Cortex-R (cpe:2.3:h:arm:cortex-r:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*)
• ARM Cortex-R5
The Validation team reviewed the work of the Evaluation team and found that
sufficient evidence and justification was provided by the Evaluation team to confirm
that the evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM,
and that the conclusion reached by the Evaluation team was justified.
8.7. Summary of Evaluation Results
The Evaluation team's assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the
claims in the ST are met. Additionally, the evaluation team's test activities also
demonstrated the accuracy of the claims in the ST.
The Validation team's assessment of the evidence provided by the evaluation team is
that it demonstrates that the Evaluation team followed the procedures defined in the
CEM and performed the Assurance Activities in the CPP_FDE_EE_V2.0E and
correctly verified that the product meets the claims in the ST.
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9. Validator Comments
The Validation team notes that the evaluated configuration is dependent upon the TOE
being configured per the evaluated configuration instructions in the documentation
referenced in Section 6 of this VR. Consumers are encouraged to download the
configuration guide from the NIAP website to ensure the device is configured as
evaluated. Any additional customer documentation provided with the product, or that is
available online, was not included in the scope of the evaluation and should not be relied
upon when configuring or operating the device as evaluated.
The functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the security functional requirements
specified in the ST. Other functionality included in the product was not assessed as part
of this evaluation. Other functionality provided by devices in the operational environment
needs to be assessed separately and no further conclusions can be drawn about their
effectiveness. No versions of the TOE models or Firmware versions, either earlier or
later, were evaluated.
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10. Annexes
Not applicable.
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11. Security Target
KLC Advantech Drives Firmware Version: SCPB13.0/ECPB13.0 Security Target,
Version 1.4, June 2024.
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12. GLOSSARY
• Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL): An IT security evaluation facility
accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and
approved by the CCEVS Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based
evaluations.
• Conformance. The ability to demonstrate in an unambiguous way that a given
implementation is correct with respect to the formal model.
• Evaluation: The assessment of an IT product against the Common Criteria using the
Common Criteria Evaluation Methodology to determine whether or not the claims
made are justified; or the assessment of a protection profile against the Common
Criteria using the Common Evaluation Methodology to determine if the Profile is
complete, consistent, technically sound and hence suitable for use as a statement of
requirements for one or more TOEs that may be evaluated.
• Evaluation Evidence: Any tangible resource (information) required from the sponsor
or developer by the evaluator to perform one or more evaluation activities.
• Feature. Part of a product that is either included with the product or can be ordered
separately.
• Target of Evaluation (TOE): A group of IT products configured as an IT system, or
an IT product, and associated documentation that is the subject of a security evaluation
under the CC.
• Threat: Means through which the ability or intent of a threat agent to adversely affect
the primary functionality of the TOE, facility that contains the TOE, or malicious
operation directed towards the TOE. A potential violation of security.
• Validation: The process carried out by the CCEVS Validation Body leading to the
issue of a Common Criteria certificate.
• Validation Body: A governmental organization responsible for carrying out validation
and for overseeing the day-to-day operation of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation
and Validation Scheme.
• Vulnerabilities: A vulnerability is a hardware, firmware, or software flaw that leaves
an Automated Information System (AIS) open for potential exploitation. A weakness
in automated system security procedures, administrative controls, physical layout,
internal controls, and so forth, which could be exploited by a threat to gain unauthorized
access to information or disrupt critical processing.
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13. Acronym List
CAVP Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program (CAVP)
CCEVS Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
CCIMB Common Criteria Interpretations Management Board
CCTL Common Criteria Testing Laboratories
CEM Common Evaluation Methodology for IT Security Evaluation
LS Lightship Security USA CCTL
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
IT Information Technology
NIAP National Information Assurance Partnership
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
NSA National Security Agency
NVLAP National Voluntary Laboratory Assessment Program
OS Operating System
OSP Organizational Security Policies
PCL Products Compliant List
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
VR Validation Report
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14. Bibliography
1. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1:
Introduction and General Model, CCMB-2017-04-001, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April
2017
2. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2: Security
functional requirements, CCMB-2017-04-002, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
3. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3: Security
assurance requirements, CCMB-2017-04-003, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
4. Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Evaluation
Methodology, CCMB-2017-04-004, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017
5. collaborative Protection Profile for Full Drive Encryption – Encryption Engine,
Version 2.0e + Errata 20190201, February 1, 2019
6. KLC Advantech Drives Firmware Version: SCPB13.0/ECPB13.0 Security Target,
Version 1.4, June 2024
7. KLC Advantech Drives Firmware Version: SCPB13.0/ECPB13.0 Common Criteria
Guide, Version 1.1, June 2024
8. KLC Advantech Drives Firmware Version: SCPB13.0/ECPB13.0 Assurance Activity
Report, Version 0.3, June 2024
9. KLC Advantech Drives Firmware Version: SCPB13.0/ECPB13.0
CPP_FDE_EE_v2.0E Vulnerability Assessment, Version 0.2, June 2024
10. KLC Advantech Drives Firmware Version: SCPB13.0/ECPB13.0 Evaluation
Technical Report, Version 0.3, June 2024
11. KLC Advantech Drives Firmware Version: SCPB13.0/ECPB13.0 FDE Encryption
Engine Test Plan, Version 0.3, June 2024
12. KLC Advantech Drives Firmware Version: SCPB13.0/ECPB13.0 FDE Encryption
Engine Test Plan Evidence, Version 0.3, June 2024