National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
for
One Identity Manager v8.1
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-VID11003-2020
Dated: 4 February 2020
Version: 1.0
National Institute of Standards and Technology
Information Technology Laboratory
100 Bureau Drive
Gaithersburg, MD 20899
National Security Agency
Information Assurance Directorate
9800 Savage Road STE 6940
Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6940
®
TM
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Acknowledgements
Validation Team
Daniel Faigin
Aerospace Corporation
Michelle Carlson
Jenn Dotson
Clare Olin
Patrick Mallett, PhD
MITRE Corporation
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
Leidos Inc.
Columbia, MD
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Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary ...................................................................................................................1
2 Identification .............................................................................................................................3
3 Architectural Information..........................................................................................................5
4 Security Policy............................................................................................................................6
4.1 Enterprise Security Management......................................................................................6
4.2 Security Audit ....................................................................................................................6
4.3 Identification and Authentication .....................................................................................6
4.4 Security Management .......................................................................................................6
4.5 Protection of the TSF.........................................................................................................6
4.6 Trusted Path/Channels......................................................................................................7
5 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope....................................................................................8
5.1 Assumptions ......................................................................................................................8
5.2 Clarification of Scope.........................................................................................................8
6 Documentation........................................................................................................................10
7 IT Product Testing....................................................................................................................11
7.1 Test Configuration...........................................................................................................11
8 Evaluated Configuration..........................................................................................................14
9 Results of the Evaluation.........................................................................................................16
9.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ST) (ASE)....................................................................16
9.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV) ............................................................................16
9.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD) ...............................................................16
9.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC) ......................................................17
9.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE)................................17
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (AVA).........................................................................17
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results.......................................................................................18
10 Validator Comments/Recommendations................................................................................19
11 Security Target.........................................................................................................................20
12 Bibliography.............................................................................................................................21
List of Tables
Table 1: Document Information .......................................................................................................................3
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1 Executive Summary
This Validation Report (VR) documents the National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP) assessment
of the evaluation of One Identity Manager v8.1 (the Target of Evaluation, or TOE). It presents the
evaluation results, their justifications, and the conformance results. This VR is not an endorsement of the
TOE by any agency of the U.S. Government and no warranty of the TOE is either expressed or implied.
This VR is intended to assist the end-user of this product and any security certification agent for that end-
user in determining the suitability of this Information Technology (IT) product in their environment. End-
users should review the Security Target (ST), which is where specific security claims are made, in
conjunction with this Validation Report (VR), which describes how those security claims were evaluated
and tested and any restrictions on the evaluated configuration. This VR applies only to the specific version
and configuration of the product as evaluated and as documented in the ST. Prospective users should
carefully read the Assumptions and Clarification of Scope in Section 4 and the Validator Comments in
Section 10, where any restrictions on the evaluated configuration are highlighted.
The evaluation of One Identity Manager v8.1 was performed by Leidos Common Criteria Testing
Laboratory (CCTL) in Columbia, Maryland, USA, and was completed in February 2020.
The evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the Common Criteria and Common
Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), version 3.1, release 4 ([1], [2], [3], [4]) and evaluation
activities specified in the following documents:
 Standard Protection Profile for Enterprise Security Management Identity and Credential
Management, Version 2.1, 24 September 2013 [5]
The evaluation was consistent with NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme (CCEVS)
policies and practices as described on their web site (www.niap-ccevs.org).
One Identity Manager v8.1 is an identity and credential management product that provides centralized
definition of identity and credential attributes for organizational users. The TOE is configured to connect
to environmental systems and applications in the organization so that modifications to user identity and
credential data are propagated across the organization to take effect where relevant. The TOE can
perform centralized maintenance of credential data, e.g. by suspending or revoking a user’s credential,
which will then revoke access to systems and services that are synchronized with the TOE. The TOE defines
a centralized password policy and can be used to provide a single point of service for user password
maintenance so that the TOE’s defined password policy is then implicitly enforced across dependent
systems.
The Leidos evaluation team determined that the TOE is conformant to the claimed Protection Profile (PP)
and, when installed, configured and operated as specified in the evaluated guidance documentation,
satisfies all the security functional requirements stated in the ST [6]. The information in this VR is largely
derived from the Assurance Activities Report (AAR) ([7]) and the associated test report produced by the
Leidos evaluation team ([8]).
The validation team reviewed the evaluation outputs produced by the evaluation team, in particular the
AAR and associated test report. The validation team found that the evaluation showed that the TOE
satisfies all the security functional and assurance requirements stated in the ST. The evaluation also
showed that the TOE is conformant to the claimed PP and that the evaluation activities specified in [5]
had been performed appropriately. Therefore, the validation team concludes that the testing laboratory’s
findings are accurate, the conclusions justified, and the conformance results are correct. The conclusions
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of the testing laboratory in the Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) ([9]) are consistent with the evidence
produced.
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2 Identification
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST) effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product evaluations. Under this
program, commercial testing laboratories called Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs) use the
Common Criteria and Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM) to conduct security
evaluations, in accordance with National Voluntary Laboratory Assessment Program (NVLAP)
accreditation.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality and consistency across
evaluations. Developers of IT products desiring a security evaluation contract with a CCTL and pay a fee
for their product’s evaluation. Upon successful completion of the evaluation, the product is added to
NIAP’s Product Compliant List (PCL).
The following table provides information needed to completely identify the product and its evaluation,
including:
 The TOE—the fully qualified identifier of the product as evaluated
 The ST—the unique identification of the document describing the security features, claims, and
assurances of the product
 The conformance result of the evaluation
 The PP to which the product is conformant
The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation.
Table 1: Document Information
Document Type Document Name
Evaluation Scheme
United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
TOE One Identity Manager v8.1
Security Target One Identity Manager v8.1 Security Target, Version 1.2, 3 February 2020
Sponsor & Developer One Identity, LLC
4 Polaris Way
Aliso Viejo, CA 92656
United States
Completion Date February 2020
CC Version Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Release 4, September 2012
CEM Version Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation:
Version 3.1, Release 4, September 2012
PP/Extended Package Standard Protection Profile for Enterprise Security Management Identity and
Credential Management, Version 2.1, 24 October 2013
Conformance Result PP Compliant, CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 conformant
4
CCTL Leidos
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
6841 Benjamin Franklin Drive
Columbia, MD 21046
Evaluation Personnel Anthony Apted
Greg Beaver
Justin Fisher
Furukh Siddique
Kevin Steiner
Validation Personnel Daniel Faigin
Michelle Carlson
Jenn Dotson
Clare Olin
Patrick Mallett
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3 Architectural Information
The One Identity Manager v8.1 TOE provides centralized provisioning and management of user accounts
based on defined ‘identities’. The TOE provides identity and credential management functions by serving
as the authoritative source for various user attributes while also designating various external systems to
be authoritative sources for other attributes. The end result is that user data can be automatically and
accurately propagated to multiple organizational locations so that external systems can subsequently
make use of this data. For example, One Identity Manager may interface with an organization’s HR system
(e.g. Peoplesoft) such that when a new user is created by the HR system, One Identity Manager will
automatically generate external system accounts for that new user (e.g. create a new AD entry for them
based on the default information and/or information supplied by the HR system). One Identity Manager
can also be used to manually create user accounts and as an interface for TOE users to perform self-service
management of their own password credentials, which are then pushed out to the organizational
repositories (external systems) where that password data resides.
The One Identity Manager v8.1 TOE consists of several components: fat client, web UI, web service, job
service (and its connectors) that interface with a centralized Microsoft SQL Server database through a
shared object layer interface. The object layer interface is responsible for all database I/O operations and
interfacing with external systems. The One Identity Manager Service (Job Service) performs data
synchronization and provisioning between the database and any connected target systems and executes
actions at the database and file level. The Job Service retrieves process steps from the JobQueue and
executes them. The Job Service Application is the only method of interfacing with other organizational
systems (e.g. HR system, AD, SAP) and the protected communication is through the use of connectors.
The fat client provides the Designer and Synchronization Editor tools that are used for the initial setup of
One Identity Manager. The fat client also includes the Manager application, but this interacts with the
TOE via the web service. The Web UI and web services component provide interfaces for managing
employee data. The Web UI is the graphical front-end that handles administrative management tasks, and
where a TOE user can use the Password Reset Portal to change their password. The Web service is a REST
API that provides the same functions as the Web UI as well as the interfaces that Manager uses to manage
administrative role assignment and password policies.
From an architectural standpoint, the identity data maintained by One Identity Management resides in a
central database (in the operational environment). All communications between the TOE and the
database use TLS.
The TOE supports a variety of connectors, which are used to communicate with external systems to
synchronize identity and credential data with the TOE’s operational environment. Depending on the
system the TOE is connecting to, TLS, SSH, or HTTPS may be used to secure data in transit. Trusted
communications are implemented by the TOE’s operational environment and rely on the FIPS-validated
algorithm implementations provided by the underlying OS platform.
The tested configuration of the TOE used Windows 10 for the fat client and Windows Server 2016 for all
other TOE components. The environmental database used to store TOE data was SQL Server 2017.
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4 Security Policy
4.1 Enterprise Security Management
The TOE provides the ability to identify and authenticate administrators using Active Directory. The TOE
provides the capability to define and manage enterprise user security attributes and provision
modifications in the target systems. The TOE provides the capability to define and securely transmit
identity and credential data for use with other ESM products. The TOE provides a password restriction
policy mechanism to ensure secure passwords are defined.
4.2 Security Audit
The TOE generates logs for the security relevant events specified in [5]. The TOE writes the logs to the
central Microsoft SQL Server database using a TLS channel.
4.3 Identification and Authentication
The TOE associates roles, entitlements, and other user attributes with enterprise users and relies on the
operational environment for user authentication. The TOE enforces binding of users to subjects by
defining users as ‘employee’ objects inside the TOE. These objects are then mapped to accounts on
external systems such that changes to user data on the TOE is propagated to these external systems
through synchronization. The TOE also enforces binding between administrators and subjects during
initial authentication such that an administrator’s privileges to manage the TSF are assigned when they
log in and any changes to their privileges only take effect on subsequent logins.
4.4 Security Management
The TOE provides the following management functions identified in [5]:
- Management of administrator authentication data
- Definition and management of user identity and credential data
- Configuration of password policy for credential data
- Management of user credential status (e.g. suspended)
- Enrollment of users
- Configuration of transmission of identity and credential data to external entities, including
enabling of trusted communications where necessary
- Configuration and assignment of administrative roles
The TOE also provides the ability for users to perform self-service management of their own password
credential data. The TOE restricts access to the management functions to users with applicable roles and
entitlements. By default, the TOE includes a One Identity Manager administrator role with full privileges
to manage the TSF, but additional administrative roles can be defined and associated with users to grant
a subset of these privileges.
4.5 Protection of the TSF
Credentials/keys used by the TOE are stored in the operational environment. The TOE does not offer any
interfaces to view the credentials/keys.
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4.6 Trusted Path/Channels
The TOE provides trusted communication channels using TLS for communication with authentication
servers, the audit server and for transfer of policy (identity and credential) data. SSH is used for transfer
of policy data between the TOE and UNIX systems. HTTPS is used to protect communication channels
between distributed TOE components.
The TOE provides trusted communication paths using Web UI/Web Service for remote administrators,
which is enforced by IIS.
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5 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
5.1 Assumptions
The ST references the PP to which it claims conformance for assumptions about the use of the TOE. Those
assumptions, drawn from the claimed PP, are as follows:
 The product is assumed to rely on cryptographic primitives (algorithms and protocol
implementations) provided by its operational environment to provide cryptographic services.
 The product is assumed to be capable of establishing connectivity with other enterprise security
management products in its operational environment.
 Third-party entities that exchange attribute data with the product are assumed to be trusted.
 The operational environment is assumed to provide mechanisms that reduce the ability of an
attacker to impersonate a legitimate user during authentication, i.e. the TOE relies on a third-
party authentication mechanism that includes handling for excessive authentication failure
attempts.
 The product is assumed to be able to receive reliable time data from its operational environment.
5.2 Clarification of Scope
All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that need clarifying.
This text covers some of the more important limitations and clarifications of this evaluation. Note that:
 As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated configuration meets the
security claims made, with a certain level of assurance (the evaluation activities specified in [5]
as modified by applicable NIAP Technical Decisions cited in [6] and performed by the evaluation
team).
 This evaluation covers only the specific software version identified in this document, and not
any earlier or later versions released or in process.
 The evaluation of security functionality of the product was limited to the functionality specified
in the Security Target [6].
 The TOE is responsible for maintaining centralized identity and credential data for organizational
users and transmitting this data as needed to its operational environment based on configured
synchronization behavior. Once the data has been transmitted to its operational environment, it
is outside the TOE’s scope of control, so continued security and correct usage of this data is the
responsibility of system administrators.
 The TOE relies on the Windows OS platform’s cryptographic libraries to perform cryptographic
functions. To ensure that sufficiently strong cryptography is used, the OS platform must be
configured into a FIPS-compliant mode of operation.
 The TOE can be configured to use the following components in its operational environment;
however, these components have not been evaluated and their use with the TOE is not covered
by this evaluation:
o LDAP Enterprise User Stores – in the evaluated configuration, the TOE used the
environmental SQL Server database as its user store.
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o Administrator authentication methods – in the evaluated configuration, the TOE used
Active Directory for administrator authentication. Other methods (internal
authentication, LDAP server, OpenID Connect, OAUTH2, 2-factor authentication) were
not tested.
o Connectors – in the evaluated configuration, the TOE did not use the following
connectors:
 SCIMv2
 Database (ADO.NET, OLEDB, ODBC)
 Structured Files (CSV, tab separated, etc.)
 IBM Notes
 SAP R/3 and S/4Hana
 PowerShell
 Oracle E-Business Suite
 This evaluation did not specifically search for, nor attempt to exploit, vulnerabilities that were not
“obvious” or vulnerabilities to objectives not claimed in the ST. The CEM defines an “obvious”
vulnerability as one that is easily exploited with a minimum of understanding of the TOE, technical
sophistication and resources.
 The TOE must be installed, configured and managed as described in the documentation
referenced in section 6 of this Validation Report.
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6 Documentation
One Identity offers guidance documents describing the installation process for the TOE as well as guidance
for subsequent administration and use of the applicable security features. The guidance documentation
examined during the evaluation and delivered with the TOE is as follows:
 One Identity Manager 8.1 Common Criteria Supplemental Admin Guidance, February 2020 [10]
One Identity also includes a large number of additional administrative guides. The evaluators reviewed
these guides and identified the portions of them that were relevant to the evaluation in in the AAR [7].
The supplemental admin guidance [10] cites these other guides as needed when a security-relevant
function summarized in the supplement needs to be described in further detail. The guidance
documentation also includes the following preparatory procedures:
 One Identity Manager 8.1 Common Criteria Supplemental Admin Guidance, February 2020 [10]
 Identity Manager 8.1 Installation Guide, April 2019 [11]
 Identity Manager 8.1 Configuration Guide, March 2019 [12]
To use the product in the evaluated configuration, the product must be configured as specified in these
guides.
Any additional customer documentation provided with the product, or that which may be available
online, was not included in the scope of the evaluation and therefore should not be relied upon to
configure or operate the device as evaluated. Consumers are encouraged to download the evaluated
administrative guidance documentation from the NIAP website.
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7 IT Product Testing
This section describes the testing efforts of the evaluation team. It is derived from information contained
in the following proprietary documents:
 One Identity Manager v8.1 Test Report and Procedures, Version 1.2, February 3, 2020 [8]
A non-proprietary description of the tests performed and their results is provided in the following
document:
 One Identity Manager v8.1 Assurance Activities Report, Version 1.2, February 3, 2020 [7]
The purpose of the testing activity was to confirm the TOE behaves in accordance with the TOE security
functional requirements as specified in the ST for a product that claims conformance to Standard
Protection Profile for Enterprise Security Management Identity and Credential Management, Version 2.1
[5].
The evaluation team devised a Test Plan based on the Testing Assurance Activities specified in [5]. The
Test Plan described how each test activity was to be instantiated within the TOE test environment. The
evaluation team executed the tests specified in the Test Plan and documented the results in the team test
report listed above.
Independent testing took place at Leidos CCTL facilities in Columbia, Maryland.
The evaluators received the TOE in the form that normal customers would receive it, installed and
configured the TOE in accordance with the provided guidance, and exercised the Team Test Plan on
equipment configured in the testing laboratory.
Given the complete set of test results from the test procedures exercised by the evaluators, the testing
requirements for the claimed Protection Profile were satisfied.
7.1 Test Configuration
This section identifies the devices used for testing the TOE and describes the test configuration. The test
configuration is shown below:
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The following components are installed on the TOE appliance or required to be installed on client
machines or in the operational environment and thus were included in the evaluated configuration
during testing:
 The TOE application installed on a Microsoft Windows Server 2016 Standard platform with the
following additional components:
o MS SQL Server 2017 (64-bit)
 Non-TOE Components required for the client and operational environment:
o Active Directory Server
 Microsoft Internet Information Services Version 10.0.14393.0
 Microsoft .NET framework 4.7.2
o Additional computer for Remote Administration through the Web GUI.
 The following browser versions were used during the course of testing.
 Microsoft Edge 42.17134.1098.0
 Internet Explorer 11.1130.17134.0
o Any SSH client (i.e. PuTTY)
o Any RDP client (i.e. Microsoft Terminal Server Client)
13
o Additional computers running Ubuntu, Windows 10 1803 Enterprise and Windows
Server 2012 R2 Active Directory for product functionality testing.
o Microsoft Azure Active Directory
o Microsoft Office 365 Exchange Online
o Microsoft Office 365 SharePoint Online
o Ubuntu Server
 Version: Ubuntu 18.04.3
o Microsoft Exchange 2016 Version 15.1 (Build 1913.5)
o Microsoft SharePoint 2016
o Google G-Suite
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8 Evaluated Configuration
The One Identity Manager v8.1 TOE consists of fat client, web UI, web service, job service, and
connectors. The TOE provides connectors and any required templates for the following types of external
systems:
Connectors and prepared templates:
 Active Directory
 UNIX/Linux
 Exchange 2010, 2013, 2016
 SharePoint 2010, 2013, 2016
 Azure AD
 Exchange Online
 SharePoint Online
 Google G-Suite
 LDAP (including AS/400, RACF, ACF2, Top Secret)
The Operational Environment consists of:
 Database Server
o SQL Server 2017 (64-bit) with the current cumulative update
 Minimum System Requirements - Administrative Workstations (Fat client)
o Windows 10 (32-bit or 64-bit) minimum version 1511
o Microsoft .NET Framework Version 4.7.2 or later
 Minimum system requirements for the Job Service (admin guides refer to as Server Service)
o Windows Server 2016
o Microsoft .NET Framework Version 4.7.2 or later
 Minimum system requirements for the Web Service and Web UI
o Windows Server 2016
o Microsoft .NET Framework Version 4.7.2 or later
 Microsoft Internet Information Services 10 or 8.5 or 8 or 7.5 or 7 with ASP.NET 4.7.2
 web browser:
o Internet Explorer 11 or later
o Firefox (Latest Release)
o Chrome (Latest Release)
o Microsoft Edge (Latest Release)
 SSH Client,
15
 one or more supported external systems (see connectors above),
 Active Directory authentication server.
The TOE relies on the Windows FIPS-compliant cryptographic libraries bcryptprimitives.dll (CMVP2937)
and cng.sys (CMVP2936) for trusted channel and trusted path connections. Random seeding for
deterministic random bit functions used for key generation is obtained through the Windows
bcryptgenrandom function and its underlying OS operations that provide its non-deterministic entropy
data. The TOE uses SSHblackbox that in turn uses the same underlying Windows FIPS-compliant
cryptographic libraries for SSH functionality. SSHBlackbox is provided with the One Identity Manager
TOE but is itself a third-party product.
The evaluation excludes the following Operational Environment software and security functionality that
is supported by One Identity Manager but is not included or tested in the evaluated configuration:
 LDAP Enterprise User Stores, and
User authentication methods: Internal One Identity Manager authentication, LDAP Server, OpenID
Connect, OAUTH2, and 2-factor authentication.
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9 Results of the Evaluation
The results of the evaluation of the TOE against its target assurance requirements are generally described
in this section and are presented in detail in the proprietary ETR [9]. The reader of this VR can assume that
all assurance activities and work units received passing verdicts.
A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to the
corresponding evaluator action elements. The evaluation was conducted based upon CC version 3.1,
revision 4 ([1], [2], [3]) and CEM version 3.1, revision 4 [4], and the specific evaluation activities defined in
the claimed Protection Profile [5].
The evaluation determined the TOE satisfies the conformance claims made in the Security Target [6],
which included the PP conformance claim and claims of CC Part 2 extended and Part 3 conformant.
9.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ST) (ASE)
The evaluation team performed each TSS assurance activity and ASE CEM work unit. The ST evaluation
ensured the ST contains an ST introduction, TOE overview, TOE description, security problem definition in
terms of threats, policies and assumptions, description of security objectives for the operational
environment, a statement of security requirements claimed to be met by the product that are consistent
with the claimed Protection Profile, and security function descriptions that satisfy the requirements.
The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in
accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team
was justified.
9.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV)
The evaluation team performed each ADV assurance activity and applied each ADV_FSP.1 CEM work unit.
The evaluation team assessed the evaluation evidence and found it adequate to meet the requirements
specified in the claimed Protection Profile for design evidence. The ADV evidence consists of the TSS
descriptions provided in the ST and product guidance documentation providing descriptions of the TOE
external interfaces.
The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in
accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team
was justified.
9.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD)
The evaluation team performed each guidance assurance activity and applied each AGD work unit. The
evaluation team determined the adequacy of the operational user guidance in describing how to operate
the TOE in accordance with the descriptions in the ST. The evaluation team followed the guidance in the
TOE preparative procedures to test the installation and configuration procedures to ensure the
procedures result in the evaluated configuration. The guidance documentation was assessed during the
design and testing phases of the evaluation to ensure it was complete.
17
The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in
accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team
was justified.
9.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)
The evaluation team performed each ALC assurance activity and applied each ALC_CMC.1 and ALC_CMS.1
CEM work unit, to the extent possible given the evaluation evidence required by the claimed Protection
Profile. The evaluation team ensured the TOE is labeled with a unique identifier consistent with the TOE
identification in the evaluation evidence.
The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in
accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team
was justified.
9.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE)
The evaluation team performed each testing assurance activity and applied each ATE_IND.1 CEM work
unit. The evaluation team ran the set of tests specified by the claimed PP and recorded the results in the
Test Report, summarized in the AAR.
The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in
accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team
was justified.
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (AVA)
The evaluation team performed each AVA assurance activity and applied each AVA_VAN.1 CEM work unit.
The evaluation team performed a vulnerability analysis following the processes described in the claimed
PPs. This comprised a search of public vulnerability databases.
Searches of public vulnerability repositories were performed during the evaluation and then re-performed
a final time on 17 January 2020 to ensure that no additional public vulnerabilities were disclosed prior to
the completion of the evaluation.
The evaluation team searched the following public vulnerability repositories:
 http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/search
 https://support.oneidentity.com/identity-manager/all/alerts-notifications
 Google
The evaluation team used the following search terms in the searches of these repositories:
 One Identity Manager (TOE name)
 One Identity (alternate branding)
 Quest One Identity Manager (previous name of product)
 Dell One Identity Manager (previous name of product)
18
 “One Identity Manager” vulnerability (Google search term)
 “One Identity Manager” exploit (Google search term)
The results of these searches did not identify any vulnerabilities that are applicable to the TOE. The
conclusion drawn from the vulnerability analysis is that no residual vulnerabilities exist that are
exploitable by attackers with Basic Attack Potential as defined by the Certification Body in accordance
with the guidance in the CEM.
The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in
accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team
was justified.
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results
The evaluation team’s assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims in the ST are
met, sufficient to satisfy the assurance activities specified in the claimed Protection Profile. Additionally,
the evaluation team’s testing also demonstrated the accuracy of the claims in the ST.
The validation team’s assessment of the evidence provided by the evaluation team is that it demonstrates
that the evaluation team followed the procedures defined in the CEM, and correctly verified that the
product meets the claims in the ST.
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10 Validator Comments/Recommendations
The validators suggest that the consumer pay particular attention to the evaluated configuration of the
product. The functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the security functional requirements
specified in the Security Target, and only the functionality implemented by the SFR’s within the Security
Target was evaluated. All other functionality provided by the product, to include software that was not
part of the evaluated configuration, needs to be assessed separately and no further conclusions can be
drawn about their effectiveness.
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11 Security Target
The ST for this product’s evaluation is One Identity Manager v8.1 Security Target, Version 1.2, 3
February 2020 [6].
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12 Bibliography
The validation team used the following documents to produce this VR:
[1] Common Criteria Project Sponsoring Organisations. Common Criteria for Information
Technology Security Evaluation: Part 1: Introduction and general model, Version 3.1, Revision 4,
September 2012.
[2] Common Criteria Project Sponsoring Organisations. Common Criteria for Information
Technology Security Evaluation: Part 2: Security functional components, Version 3.1, Revision 4,
September 2012.
[3] Common Criteria Project Sponsoring Organisations. Common Criteria for Information
Technology Security Evaluation: Part 3: Security assurance requirements, Version 3.1, Revision 4,
September 2012.
[4] Common Criteria Project Sponsoring Organisations. Common Evaluation Methodology for
Information Technology Security, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012.
[5] Standard Protection Profile for Enterprise Security Management Identity and Credential
Management, Version 2.1, 24 October 2013
[6] One Identity Manager v8.1 Security Target, Version 1.2, 3 February 2020
[7] One Identity Manager v8.1 Assurance Activities Report, Version 1.2, February 3, 2020
[8] One Identity Manager v8.1 Test Report and Procedures, Version 1.2, February 3, 2020
[9] Evaluation Technical Report for One Identity Manager v8.1, Version 1.2, February 3, 2020
[10] One Identity Manager 8.1 Common Criteria Supplemental Admin Guidance, February 2020
[11] Identity Manager 8.1 Installation Guide, April 2019
[12] Identity Manager 8.1 Configuration Guide, March 2019