Ärendetyp: 6 Diarienummer: 21FMV7578-24
Dokument ID CSEC2021014
Enligt säkerhetsskyddslagen (2018:585)
SEKRETESS
Enligt offentlighets- och
Sekretesslagen (2009:400)
2023-01-19
Försvarets materielverk
Swedish Defence Material Administration
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report - F5 BIG-IP v16.1.3.1 including
AFM
Issue: 1.0, 2023-Jan-19
Authorisation: Jerry Johansson, Lead Certifier , CSEC
Ärendetyp: 6 Diarienummer: 21FMV7578-24
Dokument ID CSEC2021014
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report - F5 BIG-IP v16.1.3.1 including AFM
21FMV7578-24 1.0 2023-01-19
CSEC2021014 2 (23)
Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary 3
2 Identification 5
3 Security Policy 6
3.1 Security Audit 6
3.2 Cryptographic Support 6
3.3 User Data Protection 6
3.4 Identification and Authentication 6
3.5 Security Function Management 7
3.6 Protection of the TSF 7
3.7 TOE Access 7
3.8 Trusted Path / Channels 7
3.9 Firewall 7
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 8
4.1 Assumptions on Usage and Environment 8
4.2 Clarification of Scope 10
5 Architectural Information 12
6 Documentation 15
7 IT Product Testing (verifieras) 16
7.1 Evaluator Testing 16
7.2 Penetration Testing 16
8 Evaluated Configuration 17
9 Results of the Evaluation 18
10 Evaluator Comments and Recommendations 19
11 Glossary 20
12 Bibliography 21
Appendix A Scheme Versions 22
A.1 Quality Management System 22
A.2 Applicable Scheme Notes 22
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report - F5 BIG-IP v16.1.3.1 including AFM
21FMV7578-24 1.0 2023-01-19
CSEC2021014 3 (23)
1 Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is a networking device comprised of hardware and
software. The TOE provides network traffic management functionality, e.g. local traf-
fic management and access policy management. TOE consists of the software version
16.1.3.1 including APM, build 16.1.3.1-0.0.11, installed on one of the following
hardware appliances:
● i4000 model series, including i4600, and i4800,
● i5000 model series, including i5600, i5800, and i5820-DF
● i7000 model series, including i7600, i7800, and i7820-DF
● i10000 model series, including i10600, and i10800
● i11000 DS model series, including i11600-DS, and i11800-DS
● i15000 model series, including i15600, and i15800
● i15000-DF model series, including i15820-DF
● B2250
● C2400
● B4450
● C4480
or installed on an F5 Virtual Clustered Multiprocessing (vCMP) environment run-ning
on any of the following hardware appliances:
● i5000 model series, including i5800, and i5820-DF
● i7000 model series, including i7800, and i7820-DF
● i10000 model series, including i10800
● i11000 DS model series, including i11600-DS, and i11800-DS
● i15000 model series, including i15800
● i15000-DF model series, including i15820-DF
● B2250
● C2400
● B4450
● C4480
TOE is also available for the following hypervisors
● VMWare ESXi 6.5.0
● Hyper-V 10.0 on Windows Server 2019
● KVM on Ubuntu 20.04
The TOE hardware appliances above are delivered via trusted couriers. The TOE
software is downloaded from the F5 website.
The Security Target [ST] claims exact conformance to the PP-Configuration for Net-
work Device and Stateful Traffic Filter Firewalls, v1.4e [CFG], which combines the
collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, v2.2e [NDcPP], and the PP-
Module for Stateful Traffic Filter Firewalls, v1.4e [FWMOD].
A list of the NIT technical decisions considered during the evaluation is available in
the ST.
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report - F5 BIG-IP v16.1.3.1 including AFM
21FMV7578-24 1.0 2023-01-19
CSEC2021014 4 (23)
There are eleven assumptions being made in the ST regarding the secure usage and the
operational environment of the TOE. The TOE relies on these to counter the thirteen
threats and comply with the one organisational security policy (OSP) in the ST.
The assumptions, threats, and the OSP are described in chapter 4 Assumptions and
Clarification of Scope.
The evaluation has been performed by atsec information security AB and was com-
pleted in 2022-12-13. The evaluation was conducted in accordance with the require-
ments of Common Criteria, version 3.1, release 5, and the Common Methodology for
IT Security Evaluation, version 3.1, release 5. The evaluation meets the requirements
of evaluation assurance level EAL 1, augmented by ASE_SPD.1 Security Problem
Definition, and the Evaluation Activities for the Collaborative Protection Profile for
Network Devices [EAPP], and the PP-Module for Stateful Traffic Filter Firewalls
[EAMOD].
atsec information security AB is a licensed evaluation facility for Common Criteria
under the Swedish Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification Scheme. atsec in-
formation security AB is also accredited by the Swedish accreditation body SWEDAC
according to ISO/IEC 17025 for Common Criteria evaluation.
The certifier monitored the activities of the evaluator by reviewing all successive ver-
sions of the evaluation reports. The certifier determined that the evaluation results
confirm the security claims in the Security Target [ST], and have been reached in
agreement with the requirements of the Common Criteria and the Common Methodol-
ogy for evaluation assurance level:
EAL 1 + ASE_SPD.1 and in accordance with the Evaluation Activities for the Collab-
orative Protection Profile for Network Devices [EAPP], and the PP-Module for State-
ful Traffic Filter Firewalls [EAMOD].
The technical information in this report is based on the Security Target and the Final
Evaluation Report (FER) produced by atsec information security AB.
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the
certificate, and on the condition that all the stipulations in the Security Target are
met. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by CSEC or any other
organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the
IT product by CSEC or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate is either expressed or implied.
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report - F5 BIG-IP v16.1.3.1 including AFM
21FMV7578-24 1.0 2023-01-19
CSEC2021014 5 (23)
2 Identification
Certification Identification
Certification ID CSEC2021014
Name and version of the
certified IT product
F5 BIG-IP v16.1.3.1 including AFM
build 16.1.3.1-0.0.11
Security Target Identification F5 BIG-IP® 16.1.3.1 including AFM Security
Target, F5 Inc., 2022-12-20, document
version 6.8 (2022-12-20)
EAL EAL 1 + ASE_SPD.1 (FWCFG v1.4e)
Sponsor F5 Inc.
Developer F5 Inc.
ITSEF atsec information security AB
Common Criteria version 3.1 release 5
CEM version 3.1 release 5
QMS version 2.2
Scheme Notes Release 19.0
Recognition Scope CCRA
Certification date 2023-01-19
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report - F5 BIG-IP v16.1.3.1 including AFM
21FMV7578-24 1.0 2023-01-19
CSEC2021014 6 (23)
3 Security Policy
The TOE provides the following security services:
• Security Audit
• Cryptographic Support
• User Data Protection
• Identification and Authentication
• Security Function Management
• Protection of the TSF
• TOE Access
• Trusted Path / Channels
• Firewall
3.1 Security Audit
BIG-IP implements syslog capabilities to generate audit records for security-relevant
events. In addition, the BIG-IP protects the audit trail from unauthorized modifications
and loss of audit data due to insufficient space.
3.2 Cryptographic Support
In BIG-IP, cryptographic functionality is provided by the OpenSSL cryptographic
module. The BIG-IP provides a secure shell (SSH) to allow administrators to connect
over a dedicated network interface. BIG-IP also implements the TLS protocol to allow
administrators to remotely manage the TOE. BIG-IP implements a TLS client for in-
teractions with other TLS servers. These cryptographic implementations utilize the
cryptographic module which provides random number generation, key generation, key
establishment, key storage, key destruction, hash operations, encryption/decryption
operations, and digital signature operations.
3.3 User Data Protection
BIG-IP implements residual information protection on network packets traversing
through it. In other words, network packets traversing through the BIG-IP do not con-
tain any residual data.
3.4 Identification and Authentication
An internal password-based repository is implemented for authentication of manage-
ment users. BIG-IP enforces a strong password policy and disabling user accounts af-
ter a configured number of failed authentication attempts.
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report - F5 BIG-IP v16.1.3.1 including AFM
21FMV7578-24 1.0 2023-01-19
CSEC2021014 7 (23)
3.5 Security Function Management
A command line interface (available via the traffic management shell "tmsh"), web-
based GUI ("Configuration utility" or “TMUI”), a SOAP-based API ("iControl API"),
and a REST-based API (“iControl REST API”) are offered to administrators for all
relevant configuration of security functionality. The TOE manages configuration ob-
jects in a partition which includes users, server pools, etc. This includes the authenti-
cation of administrators by user name and password, as well as access control based
on pre-defined roles and, optionally, groups of objects ("Profiles"). "Profiles" can be
defined for individual servers and classes of servers that the TOE forwards traffic
from clients to, and for traffic that matches certain characteristics, determining the
kind of treatment applicable to that traffic. Management capabilities offered by the
TOE include the definition of templates for certain configuration options. The man-
agement functionality also implements roles for separation of duties.
3.6 Protection of the TSF
BIG-IP implements many capabilities to protect the integrity and management of its
own security functionality. These capabilities include the protection of sensitive data,
such as passwords and keys, self-tests, product update verification, and reliable time
stamping.
3.7 TOE Access
Prior to interactive user authentication, the BIG-IP can display an administrative-
defined banner. BIG-IP terminates interactive sessions after an administrator-defined
period of inactivity and allows users to terminate their own authenticated session.
3.8 Trusted Path / Channels
The TOE protects remote connections to its management interfaces with TLS and
SSH. The TOE also protects communication channels with audit servers using TLS.
3.9 Firewall
The TOE offers basic firewall functionality, including stateful packet inspection and
network address translation, and logic to mitigate denial-of-service attacks.
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report - F5 BIG-IP v16.1.3.1 including AFM
21FMV7578-24 1.0 2023-01-19
CSEC2021014 8 (23)
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
4.1 Assumptions on Usage and Environment
The Security Target [ST] makes eleven assumptions on the usage and of the opera-
tional environment of the TOE:
A.PHYSICAL_PROTECTION
The Network Device is assumed to be physically protected in its operational environ-
ment and not subject to physical attacks that compromise the security and/or interfere
with the device’s physical interconnections and correct operation. This protection is
assumed to be sufficient to protect the device and the data it contains. As a result, the
cPP will not include any requirements on physical tamper protection or other physical
attack mitigations. The cPP will not expect the product to defend against physical ac-
cess to the device that allows unauthorized entities to extract data, bypass other con-
trols, or otherwise manipulate the device. For vNDs, this assumption applies to the
physical platform on which the VM runs.
A.LIMITED_FUNCTIONALITY
The device is assumed to provide networking functionality as its core function and not
provide functionality/services that could be deemed as general purpose computing.
For example the device should not provide a computing platform for general purpose
applications (unrelated to networking functionality).
In the case of vNDs, the VS is considered part of the TOE with only one vND instance
for each physical hardware platform. The exception being where components of the
distributed TOE run inside more than one virtual machine (VM) on a single VS. There
are no other guest VMs on the physical platform providing non-Network Device func-
tionality.
A.NO_THRU_TRAFFIC_PROTECTION
The standard/generic Network Device does not provide any assurance regarding the
protection of traffic that traverses it. The intent is for the network device to protect da-
ta that originates on or is destined to the device itself, to include administrative data
and audit data. Traffic that is traversing the Network Device, destined for another
network entity, is not covered by the NDcPP. It is assumed that this protection will be
covered by cPPs and PP-Modules for particular types of network devices (e.g., fire-
wall).
A.NO_THRU_TRAFFIC_PROTECTION is still operative for FWPPM , but only for
the interfaces in the TOE that are defined by the NDcPP and not the FWPPM.
A.TRUSTED_ADMINISTRATOR
The Security Administrator(s) for the Network Device are assumed to be trusted and
to act in the best interest of security for the organization. This includes being appro-
priately trained, following policy, and adhering to guidance documentation. Adminis-
trators are trusted to ensure passwords/credentials have sufficient strength and entropy
and to lack malicious intent when administering the device. The Network Device is
not expected to be capable of defending against a malicious Administrator that active-
ly works to bypass or compromise the security of the device.
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report - F5 BIG-IP v16.1.3.1 including AFM
21FMV7578-24 1.0 2023-01-19
CSEC2021014 9 (23)
For TOEs supporting X.509v3 certificate-based authentication, the Security Adminis-
trator(s) are expected to fully validate (e.g. offline verification) any CA certificate
(root CA certificate or intermediate CA certificate) loaded into the TOE’s trust store
(aka 'root store', ' trusted CA Key Store', or similar) as a trust anchor prior to use (e.g.
offline verification).
A.REGULAR_UPDATES
The Network Device firmware and software is assumed to be updated by an Adminis-
trator on a regular basis in response to the release of product updates due to known
vulnerabilities.
A.ADMIN_CREDENTIALS_SECURE
The Administrator’s credentials (private key) used to access the Network Device are
protected by the platform on which they reside.
A.RESIDUAL_INFORMATION
The Administrator must ensure that there is no unauthorized access possible for sensi-
tive residual information (e.g., cryptographic keys, keying material, PINs, passwords,
etc.) on networking equipment when the equipment is discarded or removed from its
operational environment.
A.VS_TRUSTED_ADMINISTRATOR (applies to vNDs only)
The Security Administrators for the VS are assumed to be trusted and to act in the best
interest of security for the organization. This includes not interfering with the correct
operation of the device. The Network Device is not expected to be capable of defend-
ing against a malicious VS Administrator that actively works to bypass or compromise
the security of the device.
A.VS_REGULAR_UPDATES (applies to vNDs only)
The VS software is assumed to be updated by the VS Administrator on a regular basis
in response to the release of product updates due to known vulnerabilities.
A.VS_ISOLATON (applies to vNDs only)
For vNDs, it is assumed that the VS provides, and is configured to provide sufficient
isolation between software running in VMs on the same physical platform. Further-
more, it is assumed that the VS adequately protects itself from software running inside
VMs on the same physical platform.
A.VS_CORRECT_CONFIGURATION (applies to vNDs only)
For vNDs, it is assumed that the VS and VMs are correctly configured to support ND
functionality implemented in VMs.
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report - F5 BIG-IP v16.1.3.1 including AFM
21FMV7578-24 1.0 2023-01-19
CSEC2021014 10 (23)
4.2 Clarification of Scope
The Security Target contains thirteen threats, which have been considered during the
evaluation.
T.UNAUTHORIZED_ADMINISTRATOR_ACCESS
Threat agents may attempt to gain Administrator access to the Network Device by ne-
farious means such as masquerading as an Administrator to the device, masquerading
as the device to an Administrator, replaying an administrative session (in its entirety,
or selected portions), or performing man-in-the-middle attacks, which would provide
access to the administrative session, or sessions between Network Devices. Success-
fully gaining Administrator access allows malicious actions that compromise the secu-
rity functionality of the device and the network on which it resides.
T.WEAK_CRYPTOGRAPHY
Threat agents may exploit weak cryptographic algorithms or perform a cryptographic
exhaust against the key space. Poorly chosen encryption algorithms, modes, and key
sizes will allow attackers to compromise the algorithms, or brute force exhaust the key
space and give them unauthorized access allowing them to read, manipulate and/or
control the traffic with minimal effort.
T.UNTRUSTED_COMMUNICATION_CHANNELS
Threat agents may attempt to target Network Devices that do not use standardized se-
cure tunnelling protocols to protect the critical network traffic. Attackers may take ad-
vantage of poorly designed protocols or poor key management to successfully perform
man-in-the-middle attacks, replay attacks, etc. Successful attacks will result in loss of
confidentiality and integrity of the critical network traffic, and potentially could lead
to a compromise of the Network Device itself.
T.WEAK_AUTHENTICATION_ENDPOINTS
Threat agents may take advantage of secure protocols that use weak methods to au-
thenticate the endpoints – e.g., shared password that is guessable or transported as
plaintext. The consequences are the same as a poorly designed protocol, the attacker
could masquerade as the Administrator or another device, and the attacker could insert
themselves into the network stream and perform a man-in-the-middle attack. The re-
sult is the critical network traffic is exposed and there could be a loss of confidentiali-
ty and integrity, and potentially the Network Device itself could be compromised.
T.UPDATE_COMPROMISE
Threat agents may attempt to provide a compromised update of the software or firm-
ware which undermines the security functionality of the device. Non-validated updates
or updates validated using non-secure or weak cryptography leave the update firm-
ware vulnerable to surreptitious alteration.
T.UNDETECTED_ACTIVITY
Threat agents may attempt to access, change, and/or modify the security functionality
of the Network Device without Administrator awareness. This could result in the at-
tacker finding an avenue (e.g., misconfiguration, flaw in the product) to compromise
the device and the Administrator would have no knowledge that the device has been
compromised.
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report - F5 BIG-IP v16.1.3.1 including AFM
21FMV7578-24 1.0 2023-01-19
CSEC2021014 11 (23)
T.SECURITY_FUNCTIONALITY_COMPROMISE
Threat agents may compromise credentials and device data enabling continued access
to the Network Device and its critical data. The compromise of credentials include re-
placing existing credentials with an attacker’s credentials, modifying existing creden-
tials, or obtaining the Administrator or device credentials for use by the attacker.
T.PASSWORD_CRACKING
Threat agents may be able to take advantage of weak administrative passwords to gain
privileged access to the device. Having privileged access to the device provides the at-
tacker unfettered access to the network traffic, and may allow them to take advantage
of any trust relationships with other Network Devices.
T.SECURITY_FUNCTIONALITY_FAILURE
An external, unauthorized entity could make use of failed or compromised security
functionality and might therefore subsequently use or abuse security functions without
prior authentication to access, change or modify device data, critical network traffic or
security functionality of the device.
T.NETWORK_DISCLOSURE
An attacker may attempt to “map” a subnet to determine the machines that reside on
the network, and obtaining the IP addresses of machines, as well as the services (ports)
those machines are offering. This information could be used to mount attacks to those
machines via the services that are exported.
T.NETWORK_ACCESS
With knowledge of the services that are exported by machines on a subnet, an attacker
may attempt to exploit those services by mounting attacks against those services.
T.NETWORK_MISUSE
An attacker may attempt to use services that are exported by machines in a way that is
unintended by a site’s security policies. For example, an attacker might be able to use
a service to “anonymize” the attacker’s machine as they mount attacks against others.
T. MALICIOUS_TRAFFIC
An attacker may attempt to send malformed packets to a machine in hopes of causing
the network stack or services listening on UDP/TCP ports of the target machine to
crash.
The Security Target contains one Organisational Security Policy (OSP), which has
been considered during the evaluation.
P.ACCESS_BANNER
The TOE shall display an initial banner describing restrictions of use, legal agree-
ments, or any other appropriate information to which users consent by accessing the
TOE.
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report - F5 BIG-IP v16.1.3.1 including AFM
21FMV7578-24 1.0 2023-01-19
CSEC2021014 12 (23)
5 Architectural Information
The TOE is separated into two (2) distinct planes, the control plane and the data plane.
The control plane validates, stores, and passes configuration data to all necessary sys-
tems. It also provides all administrative access to the TOE. The data plane passes user
traffic through the TOE.
The TOE implements and supports the following network protocols: TLS (client and
server), SSH, HTTPS, FTP. The TOE protects remote connections to its management
interfaces with TLS and SSH. The TOE also protects communication channels with
audit servers using TLS (TLSv1.1 and TLSv1.2). The cryptographic functionality im-
plemented in the TOE is provided by OpenSSL.
The TOE is divided into the following subsystems:
• F5 Device (hardware or virtual) for F5 devices or vCMP deployments,
• Hardware for hypervisor deployments,
• Hypervisor for hypervisor deployments,
• Traffic Management Operating System (TMOS),
• Traffic Management Micro-kernel (TMM),
• Advanced Firewall Manager (AFM), and
• Local Traffic Manager (LTM) for Application Delivery Firewall deployments.
BIG-IP running on a hardware appliance:
BIG-IP running on vCMP:
BIG-IP running on a third party hypervisor:
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report - F5 BIG-IP v16.1.3.1 including AFM
21FMV7578-24 1.0 2023-01-19
CSEC2021014 13 (23)
F5’s TMOS is a Linux-based operating system customized for performance and to ex-
ecute on the TOE hardware or in the TOE Virtual Clustered Multiprocessing (vCMP)
environment. The vCMP is an embedded hypervisor that allows multiple instances of
the TOE to execute on the same underlying hardware. The TMM is the data plane of
the product and all data plane traffic passes through the TMM. The LTM controls
network traffic coming into or exiting the local area network (LAN) and provides the
ability to intercept and redirect incoming network traffic. The AFM implements state-
ful traffic filtering on Level 3 and Level 4 network traffic packets using administrator-
defined packet-filtering rules that are based on network packet attributes.
TMOS is a Linux operating system that runs directly on device hardware, in a vCMP
environment, or directly on the supported hypervisor. TMOS is a modified version of
the RedHat Linux kernel. In addition to providing the standard operating system fea-
tures (such as process management, file management, etc), the TMOS provides the
following security features for the TOE:
• Auditing functionality, using the host system's syslog capabilities. (In addition, a
concept called "high-speed logging" (HSL) allows TMM instances to send certain
log traffic directly to external audit servers.)
• Time stamping
• Management functionality, presented to consumers via a dedicated shell providing a
command line interface (traffic management shell, "tmsh") that can be reached by
administrators via SSH (OpenSSH); and via a web GUI (“Configuration Utility” or
“TMUI”), a SOAP protocol interface ("iControl API"), or REST interface (“iControl
REST API”) that can be reached through a network interface via HTTPS. Those
management interfaces are implemented in the background by a central management
control program daemon (mcpd) that provides configuration information to
individual TOE parts and coordinates its persistent storage.
• Authentication functionality is enforced on all administrative interfaces.
Administrative interfaces implement an internal password-based repository for
authentication of administrative users.
• Cryptographic algorithms provided by OpenSSL.
• Individual daemons introduced by BIG-IP packages, such as the modules
implementing the LTM and AFM logic.
At the core of BIG-IP is a concept referred to as Traffic Management Microkernel
(TMM), representing the data plane of the product when compared to traditional net-
work device architectures. It is implemented by a daemon running with root privileg-
es, performing its own memory management, and having direct access to the network
hardware or hypervisor. TMM implements a number of sequential filters both for the
“client-side” and “server-side” network interfaces served by BIG-IP. The filters im-
plemented in TMM include a TCP, TLS, compression, and HTTP filter, amongst oth-
ers. If the hardware or hypervisor provides more than one CPU, TMM runs multi-
threaded (one thread per CPU). In this case, disaggregators in the kernel are responsi-
ble for de-multiplexing and multiplexing network traffic for handling by an individual
TMM thread. In addition to the actual switch hardware, F5 appliance hardware also
contains a High-Speed Bridge (HSB, implemented by means of an FPGA) that per-
forms basic traffic filtering functionality as instructed by TMM.
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report - F5 BIG-IP v16.1.3.1 including AFM
21FMV7578-24 1.0 2023-01-19
CSEC2021014 14 (23)
Additional plug-in filters can be added to this queue by individual product packages.
These plug-ins typically have a filter component in TMM, with additional and more
complex logic in a counter-part implemented in a Linux-based daemon (module). The
plug-in modules relevant to the Application Delivery Firewall Deployments are shown
in Figure 5 and Figure 6.
The plug-in modules relevant to the Standalone Advanced Firewall Manager Deploy-
ments are shown in Figure 7 and Figure 8 in the [ST]. These plug-in modules include:
• Local Traffic Manager (LTM) only for Application Delivery Firewall deployments:
authentication of HTTP (based on Apache) traffic and advanced traffic forwarding di-
rectives
• Advanced Firewall Manager (AFM): network filtering.
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report - F5 BIG-IP v16.1.3.1 including AFM
21FMV7578-24 1.0 2023-01-19
CSEC2021014 15 (23)
6 Documentation
The main guide to installing the TOE into the evaluated configuration is:
[ECG] BIG-IP® Common Criteria Evaluation Configuration
Guide BIG-IP® Release 16.1.3.1
The [ST], section 1.6.3.2 provides a full list of the guidance documents that are part of
the TOE.
The TOE documentation is collected in an ISO file that can be downloaded via https
from the F5 website.
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report - F5 BIG-IP v16.1.3.1 including AFM
21FMV7578-24 1.0 2023-01-19
CSEC2021014 16 (23)
7 IT Product Testing (verifieras)
7.1 Evaluator Testing
Testing ND/FW
The cryptographic testing was performed within the Cryptographic Algorithm Vali-
dation Program (CAVP). The CAVP certificates covers all TOE hardware appliances,
with and without vCMP, and the following third party hypervisor configurations:
• VMWare ESXi 6.5.0 on Intel Xeon E5-2670 processor
• Hyper-V 10.0 on Windows Server 2019 and Intel Xeon E5-2660v3 processor
• KVM on Ubuntu 20.04 and Intel Xeon E5-2690v4 processor
The CAVP certificates are listed in table 4 in the ST.
All other tests were performed on the i4800 model, the i7800 model with vCMP, and
KVM on Ubuntu 20.04 Linux, with the software build 16.1.3.1-0.0.11.
The evaluator testing was successful and did not reveal any errors.
7.2 Penetration Testing
Port scanning was performed to find open ports that should not be open. The i4800
model, the i7800 model with vCMP, and KVM on Ubuntu 20.04 Linux, with the soft-
ware build 16.1.3.1-0.0.11 were tested.
No discrepancies were found during the penetration testing.
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report - F5 BIG-IP v16.1.3.1 including AFM
21FMV7578-24 1.0 2023-01-19
CSEC2021014 17 (23)
8 Evaluated Configuration
The following configuration specifics apply to the evaluated configuration of the
TOE:
• Appliance mode is licensed. Appliance mode disables root access to the TOE operat-
ing system and disables bash shell.
• Certificate validation is performed using CRLs.
• Disabled interfaces:
- All command shells other than tmsh are disabled. For example, bash and other
user-serviceable shells are excluded.
- Management of the TOE via SNMP is disabled.
- Management of the TOE via the appliance's LCD display is disabled. (applicable
to F5 devices and vCMP only)
- Remote (i.e., SSH) access to the Lights Out / Always On Management
capabilities of the system is disabled. (applicable to F5 devices and vCMP only)
- SSH client
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report - F5 BIG-IP v16.1.3.1 including AFM
21FMV7578-24 1.0 2023-01-19
CSEC2021014 18 (23)
9 Results of the Evaluation
The evaluators applied each work unit of the Common Methodology [CEM] within
the scope of the evaluation, and concluded that the TOE meets the security objectives
stated in the Security Target [ST] for an attack potential of Basic.
The evaluators also applied all assurance activities implied by the firewall PP-
configuration [FWCFG].
The certifier reviewed the work of the evaluators and determined that the evaluation
was conducted in accordance with the Common Criteria [CC] and the evaluation ac-
tivities implied by the firewall configuration [FWCFG].
The evaluators' overall verdict is PASS.
The verdicts for the respective assurance classes and components are summarised in
the following table:
Assurance Class/Family Short name Verdict
Development ADV PASS
Functional Specification ADV_FSP.1 PASS
Guidance Documents AGD PASS
Operational User Guidance AGD_OPE.1 PASS
Preparative Procedures AGD_PRE.1 PASS
Life-cycle Support ALC PASS
CM Capabilities ALC_CMC.1 PASS
CM Scope ALC_CMS.1 PASS
Security Target Evaluation ASE PASS
ST Introduction ASE_INT.1 PASS
Conformance Claims ASE_CCL.1 PASS
Security Problem Definition ASE_SPD.1 PASS
Security Objectives ASE_OBJ.1 PASS
Extended Components Definition ASE_ECD.1 PASS
Security Requirements ASE_REQ.1 PASS
TOE Summary Specification ASE_TSS.1 PASS
Tests ATE PASS
Independent Testing ATE_IND.1 PASS
Vulnerability Assessment AVA PASS
Vulnerability Analysis AVA_VAN.1 PASS
Evaluation Activities for NDcPP PASS
Evaluation Activities for the firewall module PASS
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report - F5 BIG-IP v16.1.3.1 including AFM
21FMV7578-24 1.0 2023-01-19
CSEC2021014 19 (23)
10 Evaluator Comments and Recommendations
The evaluators do not have any comments or recommendations concerning the
product nor regarding its usage.
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report - F5 BIG-IP v16.1.3.1 including AFM
21FMV7578-24 1.0 2023-01-19
CSEC2021014 20 (23)
11 Glossary
ADC Application Delivery Controller
AFM Advanced Firewall Manager
APM Access Policy Manager
CA Certificate Authority
CC Common Criteria
CLI Command Line Interface
CRL Certificate Revocation List
GUI Graphical User Interface
HTTP Hypertext Transfer Protocol
HTTPS HTTP Secure
IP Internet Protocol
IPv4 Internet Protocol version 4
IPv6 Internet Protocol version 6
LTM Local Traffic Manager
NDcPP Network Device Collaborative Protection Profile
OS Operating System
PP Protection Profile
SHA Secure HashAlgorithm
SSH Secure Shell
ST Security Target
TCP Transmission Control Protocol
TLS Transport Layer Security
TOE Target of Evaluation
TMM Traffic Management Microkernel
TMOS Traffic Management Operating System
tmsh Traffic management shell
TSF TOE Security Functions
TSFI TSF Interface
UDP User Datagram Protocol
vCMP Virtual Clustered Multi-Processing
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report - F5 BIG-IP v16.1.3.1 including AFM
21FMV7578-24 1.0 2023-01-19
CSEC2021014 21 (23)
12 Bibliography
ST F5 BIG-IP® 16.1.3.1 including AFM Security Target,
F5 Inc., 2022-12-20, document version 6.8.
ECG BIG-IP® Common Criteria Evaluation Configuration Guide BIG-IP®
Release 16.1.3.1, F5 Inc., 2022-11-07, document version 6.13
FWCFG PP-Configuration for Network Device and Stateful Traffic Filter
Firewalls, 2020-06-25, document version 1.4E
NDcPP Collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, ND iTC,
2020-Mar-23, document version 2.2E
EAPP Evaluation Activities for Network Device cPP, ND iTC,
2019-Dec, document version 2.2
MOD PP-Module for Stateful Traffic Filter Firewalls, ND iTC,
2020-06-25, document version 1.4E
EAMOD Evaluation Activities for Stateful Traffic Filter Firewalls
PPModule, ND iTC, Jun 2020, document version 1.4E
CCpart1 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Part 1, version 3.1 revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-001
CCpart2 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Part 2, version 3.1 revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-002
CCpart3 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Part 3, version 3.1 revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-003
CC CCpart1 + CCpart2 + CCpart3
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, version 3.1 revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-004
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report - F5 BIG-IP v16.1.3.1 including AFM
21FMV7578-24 1.0 2023-01-19
CSEC2021014 22 (23)
Appendix A Scheme Versions
During the certification the following versions of the Swedish Common Criteria Eval-
uation and Certification scheme have been used.
A.1 Quality Management System
During the certification project, the following versions of the quality management
system (QMS) have been applicable since the certification application was registered
2021-11-17:
QMS 1.25 valid from 2021-06-17
QMS 2.0 valid from 2021-11-24
QMS 2.1 valid from 2022-01-18
QMS 2.1.1 valid from 2022-03-09
QMS 2.2 valid from 2022-06-27
In order to ensure consistency in the outcome of the certification, the certifier has ex-
amined the changes introduced in each update of the quality management system.
The changes between consecutive versions are outlined in “Ändringslista CSEC QMS
2.2”.
The certifier concluded that, from QMS 1.25 to the current QMS 2.2, there are no
changes with impact on the result of the certification.
A.2 Applicable Scheme Notes
SN-15 Testing
SN-18 Highlighted requirements on the ST
SN-22 Vulnerability assessment
SN-23 Evaluation reports for NIAP PPs and cPPs
SN-25 CAVP-tests in evaluations